S/PV.916 Security Council

In accordance with the decisions taken earlier by the Security Council, I invite the representatives of Mali, Guinea, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Indonesia, Cameroun, Yugoslavia, India and the United Arab Republic to take seats at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mamadou Aw (Mali), Mr. Toure Ismael (Gttinea), Mr. Mario Cardoso (Congo, Leopoldville), Mr. Su.kardjo Wirjopranoto (Indonesia), Mr. Joseph Owono (Came1'mm), Mr. ¥iso Pavicevic (Yugoslavia), Mr: Krish,na Menon (Indta.) .and Mr. Mahmoud Fa-zuzi (Umted Amb Republic), took places at the Security Council table. President: M. V. ZORINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques). Presents: Les representants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Ceylan, Chine, Equateur, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Italie, Pologne, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, 'l\misie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Ordre dn jour provisoire (SIAgenda/916) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 13 juillet 1960, adressee par le Secretaire general au President du Conseil de securite (S/4381): Mesures urgentes a prendre eu egard aux derniers evenement5 survenus au Congo: Note du Secretaire general (S/4571 et Add.1); Declaration du Gouvernement de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, en date du 6 decembre 1960, concernant la situation au Congo (S/4573). Adoption de l'ordre du jour L'ordre d1t jour est: adopte. Lettre, en date du 13 juillet 1960, adressoo par le Secretaire general an President du CooseU de secnrite (8/4381) Mesures urgentes it prendre eu egard aox derniers evenements survenus au Congo: Note du Secretaire general (8/4571 et Add.I); Declaration du Gouvernement de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, en date du 6 decembre 1960, coneernant la situation au Congo (S/4573) 1. Le PRESIDENT (tradttit du russe): Conformement aux decisions precedentes du Conseil de securite, j'invite les representants du Mali, de la Guinee, de la Republique du Congo (Uopoldville), de l'Indonesie, du Cameroun, de la Yougoslavie, de l'Inde et de la Republique arabe unie a. prendre place a la table du Conseil. Sur !'invitation du President, M. Mamadou Aw (Mali), M. Toure Ismael (Guinee), M. Mario Cardoso (Congo [LeopoldvilleJ), M. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (Indonesie), M. Joseph Owono (Cameroun), M. Miso Pavicevic (Yougoslavie), M. Krishna Menon (Inde) et M. Mahmoud Fawzi (Republique ambe unie) prennent place a la table du Conseil.

The representative of the Soviet Union to the Security Council addressed a request to me this aftemoon to submit urgently to this evenings meeting of the Security Council complete information in regard to a subject which is described in the report, on the current situation in Stanleyville, [S/4590], from my Special Representative in the Congo. 6. No report has been made by me in regard to this matter, as it is still under consideration in Leopoldville. In this respect, I follow a rule consistently maintained in this as in o~er United Nations bodies. Practically daily difficulties and conflicts arise. We do not trouble the General Assembly and Security Council with them, unless we have first tried to find a satisfactory solution without recourse to the authority of those organs. Another approach would submit them to a meaningless burden without adding to the efficiency of the Organization. However, the facts of this matter are as follows. 7. The Special Representative of the Secretary- General received confirmation that, as rumoured, on 5 December an order had been issued to OTRACO, a parastatal transport organization, by the Administrateur en chef de la stirete restricting the transport of military material and vehicles of the United Nations Force in the Congo. As soon as the Special Representative learned about this matter, he began discussions with the local authorities concerned and finally, not having received satisfaction, he today addressed the following letter to the President of the Republic: "I have the honor to invite your attention to the enclosed copy of an order issued to OTRACO by the Administrateur en chef de la stirete restricting the transport of the strategic or military material and vehicles of the United Nations Force in the Congo. "This order represents an interference in the fulfilment by the Force of its essential functions in the Congo, and the immediate effect has been to prevent the shipment of essential material as to which arrangements must be made with OTRACO by today, Friday, 9 December 1960. "I need not point out that the order also represents a flagrant violation of the agreement of 27 July 1960, signed by Mr. Bunche and Mr. Bomboko, guaranteeting la lwerte de mouvement a l'interieur du pays pour la force, and that it is likewise in contradiction of Articles 25 and 49 of the United Nations Charter. 4. Le PRESIDENT (traduit d'lt russe): Le Conseil continue maintenant l'examen de la question qui figure a l'ordre du jour. Avant de donner la parole au premier Ol'ateur qui figure Slir la liste, c'est-a.-dire au representant des Etats-Unis, et avec son assentiment, je donnerai la parole au Secretaire general qui desire faire une communication au Conseil. .5. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAL (tnuil!.it de l'Q.1~­ glais): Le representant de I'Union sovietique au Conseil de securite m'a demande cet apres-midi de fournir d'urgence, a la reunion de ce soir, des renseignements complets an sujet d'une question tra!tee dans le rapport touchant la situation actuelle a. Stanleyville [S/4590] que m'a adresse mon representant special au Congo. 6. Si je n'ai pas soumis de rapport sur cette question, c'est qu'elle est encore en cours d'e..xamen a Leopoldville. J'ai suivi a cet egard une regIe bien etablie du Conseil et d'autres organes des Nations Unies. Presque chaque jour des difficultes et des conflits surgissent. Nous ne dera.!lgerons pas l'Assemblee generale ou le Conseil de securite a leur sujet avant d'avoir essaye de trouver une solution satisfaisante sans recourir a leur autorite. Agir autrement serait accroitre inutilement le volume de travail de ces organismes, sans rien ajouter a l'efficacite de I'Organisatiol1. Quoi qu'il en soit, voici ce dont il s'agit. 7. Le representant special du Secretaire general a re~u confirmation du fait que, conformement acertaines rumeurs, l'administrateur en chef de la stirete avait envoye le 5 decembre a I'OTRACO, organisation de transports para-etatique, un ordre limitant le transport du mate.iet et des vehicules militaires de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo. Des que le representant special a eu connaissat'lce de l'affaire, il a engage des discussions avec les autorites locales interessees et, n'ayant pas rec;u satisfaction, a dresse aujourd'hui la lettre suivante au President de la Republique: "J'ai l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur la copie ci-jointe d'un ordre emis a l'OTRACO par l'administrateur en chef de la stirete, limitant le transport des produits strategiques ell du materiel militaire et des vehicules de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo. "Cet ordre constitue une intervention dans l'exercice des devoirs essentiels de la Force au Congo et son effet immediat a ete d'empecher l'envoi de matenel essentiel pour lequel des dispositions doivent etre prises avec rOTRACO, aujourd'hui meme, vendredi 9 decembre 1960. "Je n'ai pas besoin de souligner que cet ordre represente une violation flagrante de l'Accord du 27 juillet 1960, signe par M. Bunche et M. Bomboko, garantissant la liberte de mouvements arinterieur du pays pour la Force, et qu'il est egalement en contradiction avec les Articles 25 et 49 de la Charte des Nations Unies. 8. I have subsequently been informed that discussions concerning this matter are still going on and that the possibility of rescinding the order does not seem too distant. Irrespective of the order, the United Nations Command is as usual bringing its supplies to the docks and is preparing for shipment which it is presumed will be undertaken as scheduled. Of course, I shall infornl· the Security Council if direct interference with the movement of United Nations supplies should occur.

It has been my hope that the present Security Council discussion of the Congo situation could be made to serve the useful purpose of promoting peace and security in the Congo, and the establishment of conditions there which would advance the welfare of the Congolese people. These are the objectives of the United Nations and they are the objectives of the United States Government as well. 10. However, it is the Soviet Union that has requested these meetings of the Security Council and I sincerely regret that the Soviet representative has made it clear that he does not have constructive purposes in view. Under amask of humanitarian concern, he is again proposing the Soviet pattern for chaos in the Congo leading to Soviet domination. This Council has, during these past few months, overwhelmingly rejected such proposals on previous occasions and so has the General Assembly. 11. The Soviet Union has persistently pursued its efforts to gain control in the Congo. Over and over again they have made proposals in the United Nations designed to weaken the forces for stability in the Congo. They have taken other steps, some open, some clandestine, to the same end. 12. On the basis, presumably, that the best defence is -to attack, Mr. Zorin has cried "plot". He claims that the United States is skilfully manipulating events in some vast plot in the Congo. He accuses the United States Embassy in Leopoldville, in particular, of master-minding gangster activities in the Congo. I 'find this a strange but perhaps understandable allegation from the gentleman who was Soviet Ambassador in Prague in 1948, when the Soviet-directed coup was perpetrated against the democratic Government of Czechoslovakia. 13. But, if we are to believe the Soviet representative, \~hat were the steps involved in this American conspIracy, this great plot in the Congo? A· series of incredible and fantastic events must have taken place. First, the United States must have persuaded the Belgians to grant -independence to the Congo. Then, the Soviet 3 14. Perhaps the USSR believes that this constitutes evidence of United States imperialism in the Congo, but any country able to exercise independent judgement will reject it as absurd. If the Soviet Union really expects the other members of the Council and of the United Nations to believe these fantastic charges about United States plotting, it shows a most flagrant contempt for the intelligence of Members of the United Nations. 15. We well understand the Soviet attacks on the United States. They are about as trustworthy as the Soviet claim, which was made on the day the Security Council first took up this question, when it was stated as gospel truth that the Fifteenth United States Infantry and the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division were about to go to the Congo, or the other charges that are made about the imminence of a military invasion of small countries. 16. Of course, we understand the purposes behind the present efforts to undermine the authority of the chief of state, President Kasa-Vubu, and to force upon the Congolese people other leaders more amenable to Soviet purposes. We understand the purpose behind the proposal to disarm the Congolese National Army. We understand, in the same context, why it is that the Soviet Union continues its vitriolic personal attacks upon the Secretary-General, upon the office of the Secretary-General, upon the United Nations Command and upon United Nations operations there. I think it should be emphasized that the United States has not the slightest intention of giving way to this kind of pressure. We think that the Security Council and the General Assembly have made their positions equally clear. 17. The essential facts in the present situation are straightiorward-and this is without any reference whatever to differences of opinion, which are of course possible, and differences of interpretation, which are sometimes completely sincere. President Kasa-Vubu is without doubt the chief of state of the Republic of the Congo. The United Nations General Assembly has recently accepted his credentials and those of the 4 19. There can be no question, however-and the United States feels strongly about this-that Mr. Lumumba is entitled to humane and equitable treatment. In this connexion, we welcomed the statement at the previous meeting by the representative of the Republic of the Congo, in which he read to us a portion of President Kasa-Vubu's letter dated 7 December 1960 to the Secretary-General [5/4571 and Add.1, annex Ill]. In this letter the President made absolutely clear his acceptance of the obligations imposed by the Charter and his dedication to the task of restoring a reign of justice and respect for human rights in the Republic of the Congo. 20. I believe it to l, rather widely known, though perhaps not officially, that on 4 December the United States Government instructed the American Ambassador at Leopoldville to inform President Kasa-Vubu and Colonel Mobutu that it hoped former Prime Minister Lumuba would be accorded humane treatment, including regular visits by a physician from the International Red Cross, and that he would be given a fair trial. On the same basis, the United States Government also considers that Red Cross representatives should visit other places in the Congo. 21. We now have a disturbing report from the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo regarding the current situation in Stanleyville [S/ 4590]. We believe that effective, vigorous action is requir~d by the United Nations F:orce to prevent brut~hty and widespread loss of life in Oriental prOVlllce. 18. Toutefois, puisque cette question a ete a nouveau soulevee devant le ConseiI de securite, je definirai une fois de plus et de fac;on tres cIaire notre position. Nous acceptons entieremer..t le point de vue du president Kasa-Vubu, selon lequel M. Lumumba a ete h~galement revoque de ses fonctions dans les formes prevues par l'acte constitutionnel fondamental de la Repuhlique du Congo. Le droit des autorites congolaises de mettre M. Lumumba en etat d'arrestation ne saurait etre conteste. II est evident que ces autorites ont estime que les activites de M. Lumumba constituaient une menace pour la securite de l'Etat. Depuis quelque temps deja, un mandat d'arret, signe par le President de la Republique, avait ete decerne contre lui. M. Lumumba a ete apprehende au moment ou il s'enfuyait pour gagner Stanleyville. II Hait clair pour tout le monde que, si M. Lumumba etait parvenu a Stanleyville, il aurait essaye soit d'etablir un regime separatiste, soit d'usurper le pouvoir au Congo, en opposition avec le chef de I'Etat. Le. mouvement de colere qui a pousse l'Union sovietique a demander la convocation de la presente reunion du ConseiI de securite s'explique tres simplement par l'echec du plan de M. Lumumba qu'eIle avait appuye. 19. It n'est pas douteux cependant-- et les Etats- Unis n'admettent aucune contestation a cet egard - que M. Lumumba a droit a un traitement humain et equitable. C'est pourquoi nous avons accueilli avec une vive satisfaction, a la derniere seance, l'intervention du representant de la Republique du Congo, au cours de laquelle it nous a donne lecture d'un extrait d'une lettre du president Kasa-Vubu adressee le 7 decemhre 1960 au Secretaire general [5/4571 et Add.1, annexe 111]. Dans cette Iettre, le president Kasa-Vubu decIarait en termes cIairs qu'iI acceptait les obligations imposees par la Charte et qu'it se consacrerait au retablissement de la justice et du respect des droits de l'homme dans la Republique du Congo. 20. On n'ignore pas, je crois, hien que la nouvelle n'en ait peut-etre pas ete donnee offidellement, que, le 4 decembre dernier, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a charge son ambassadeur a LeopoldviIle de porter a la connaissance du president Kasa-Vubu et du colonel Mobutu qu'i! esperait que l'ancien premier ministre Lumumba beneficierait d'un traitement humain, recevrait regulierement les visites d'un medecin de la Croix- Rouge internationale et serait juge d'une maniere equitable. Dans le meme esprit, le Gouvernement des Etats- Unis estime egalement que des representants de la Croix-Rouge devraient se rendre dans d'autres localites du Congo. 21. Nous sommes maintenant saisis d'un rapport inquietant du representant special du Secretaire general au Congo concernant les evenements qui se deroulent actuellement a Stanleyville rs/4590]. Nous pensons qu'une action efficace et vigoureusede la part de la Force des Nations Unies est indispensable pour empecher de nombreus~s pertes de vies humaines et des sevices clans la 1 Jvince-Orientale. I might add that our information is that minister Songolo and other members of Parliament have been illegally detained by Lumumba supporters in Stanleyville for over a month and that Mr. Songolo was so badly beaten that he has lost the sight of one eye and may lose the sight of the other, as a result of the continued denial of proper medical treatment. Any Red Cross representatives sent to the Congo clearly should visit these Senators and Deputies illegally held in Stanleyville. 23. Wbile we do not believe that it is appropriate for us to seek to interpret Congolese law, we have every e:..:pectation that due process of law will be observed in the handling of Mr. Lumumba's case. In Stanleyville it is unfortun~tely evident that dissident elements have prevented the" application of proper legal procedures, and that arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and gross mistreatment are the common, everyday practice. 24. If the Security Council can deal with the problenl of law and order in the Congo as a matter of general concern and"broad" importance, a useful purpose can be served by these discussions. The objective of the United Nations, which we should endorse and seek to advance, is the establishment of conditions in the Congo which will promote law and order and the general observance of fundamental human rights. In the view of the United States, this purpose could be very significantly advanced. if all Members of the United Nations would give full support and recognition to what has been characterized as one of the only two standing institutions in the Congo: the office of the President, Mr. Kasa-Vubu; and if they would give full support to President Kasa- Vubu's efforts to restore law and order throughout the Congo. That would reinforce the United Nations effort in the Congo and hasten the day when the United Nations can give its primary attention to the positive task of revitalizing the Congolese economy and improving the conditions of life of the Congolese people. 25. That is what urgently needs to be done-not to destroy the United Nations action through assaulting the Secretary-General or the United Nations Command, nor to seek to erode the strength of the Command itself. The Soviet Union has not sought this meeting out of any desire for the United Nations to succeed in the Congo. It has sought the meeting to try once again to destroy the United Nations effort and the office of the Secretary-General with it. In the jargon of the USSR, the President of the Republic of the Congo is a "traitor", the Secretary-General is a "lackey", and so on. The motives behind such charges are reprehensible. These accusations are self-serving 6 27. In spite of the recriminations, charges and countercharges, and the tension that has been created by the Soviet Union in bringing this subject before the Security Council at the present time, we still hope that something good may come of the travail through which the infant State of the Congo is now passing. For our part we shall continue to give full support to efforts through the United Nations~and I emphasize that: through the United Nations, not outside it-to promote stability and progress in that .unhappy land. 28. I ask the representative of the Soviet Union to reflect soberly on the heavy responsibility which must be borne by any who seek to thwart these efforts and to pursue unilateral policies jeopardizing the interests of the Congolese people and the peace of the world. 29. We have heard and we shall hear again before this debate is over, emotional, iuridical and other appeals calculated to sway the opinions of the members of this body and of the United Nations as a whole. I personally believe, with the utmost sincerity, that we must think not of our own prestige, not of any quarrel between ideologies-East or West--not necessarily enn of which interested group or party within the Congo should or should not have the ascendency; but of the Congolese people. We should remember that the more difficult we make it for the Congolese people, the easier we make it for Congolese to kill other Congolese. That is obviously something which the United Nations was not established to do. V\Te should remember our obligations under the Charter. We should work first, last and always for the Congolese people.

Now that we are in the midst of our substantive discussion I would like to restate that when my delegation proposed a change in the provisional agenda, at the 912th meeting, it did so because it felt deeply convinced that the situation in the Republic of the Congo, and in particalar the most recent events in that country, required too much of an effort in international statesmanship, too much dispassionate evaluation, to allow our debate to be guided by such a libel as the statement circulated by the Soviet Government. A document that uses such a provocatory 32. V-le also proposed that the letter of the Secretary- General dated 13 July 1960, rSj4381], should forn1 the basis of our discussion as it did all through the debates we held on the Congo, because we feel that the recent events, which have again beset that country, should not be viewed in an isolated conte.xt but rather projected against the wider background of all the historic developments there, which ~Lre unavoidably interrelated. 33. The Soviet document and the statement of the Soviet representative of yesterday [914th 1I1cef·ing] try, on the contrary, to isolate the occurrences of the last few days with the evident attempt to distort the historical picture to suit the purposes of polemics and those destructive aims which the Soviet Union is obviously pursuing with r<;"oard to the United Nations operation in the Congo. 34. Actually, when we hear of machinations, plots and conspiracies by the NATO countries we cannot avoid going back to the initial stages of the operation ,,,hen, to a request made by Mr. Lumumba for direct help from the United States, that country responded, indicating its willingness to meet the request, provided aid and assistance would be channelled, as much as possible, through the United Nations. ';Yhat the Soviet Union subsequently did is in striking contrast to this attitude of the United States, which was meant to further and sustain the effort of the United Nations. 'Ve all know there was soon increased evidence that the Soviet Union was supplying the Government of Mr. Lumumba, unilaterally with assistance clearly of a military nature. This was the first blow to the United Nations operation, and constituted also the prelude to attempts in the same direction that finally came from Mr. Lumumba; when he voiced his disapproval of the activit-j of the United Nations Force, after having himself requested the United Nations to support him far beyond the limits set by the Security Council resolution of 14 July [Sj4387]. 35. I do not want to dwell in detail on the events which brought about the end of the Lumumba Government except to point out that Mr. Lumumba, when he finally broke with the United Nations, soon found that in times of distress the United Nations was his only protection. 36. The main event which occurred subsequently was the seating, on 22 November, of Mr. Kasa-Vubu's delegation in the General Assembly [resolution 1498 (XV)). Some representatives tried, during our debates, to see in this an effort to take sides in the internal development of the Congo. But if we go back to that debate, and especially to its conclusive phases, we shall see that, in seating Mr. Kasa-Vubu the majority of 37. The seating of Mr. Kasa-Vubu would not have meant either a victory or a defeat, for one party or another, if one could only allow that, round this recognized constitutional authority of the Congo, all the political forces would try to rally, in order to harmonize the various and sometimes differing components of the new State; the sine qua non for the return to nomality and well-being of that country. In fact, a project for a gathering of such elements at a roundtable conference was and, we hope, is still under way. The two factors which might impede such a project are the flight of Mr. Lumumba and the unfortunate events in Oriental province, about which we have heard such perturbing news in the last few hours. 38. vVe certainly cannot help wondering whether the decision of Mr. Lumumba was not meant to sabotage a round-table conference which he did not want or of which he feared to be a part. At any rate, I think that what we can say is that it was not Mr. Kasa-Vubu, duly and amply recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations, who broke the process of political detente, but precisely Mr. Lumumba who, notwithstanding the fact that he was living under due protection at Leopoldville, chose instead to flee to what the Moscow radio has called "friendly territory", and, by so doing, gave new impetus to the difficulties already rampant in the country. This is the unfortunate historical sequence of events, in which great 'Jpportunities for the Congolese people may have be~n missed, in which openings for fruitful co-operation may have been lost. 39. We cannot help feeling that disruptive factors from outside the Congo add to the poignant fundamental difficulties of the internal Congolese situationto its problems of human relations, to the needs of its people-if we only meditate on the words that one of the representatives of the newly· arrived African States, the Foreign Minister of Cameroun, said during a recent debate in the General Assembly r920th plenary meeting] : - "I should like to tell the representative of the Soviet Union that his country has not been able to subjugate the small country of Cameroun ... despite the subversive machinery which his country and its satellites tried to set up there." The Soviet Union certainly cannot maintain that these attempts are in keeping with one of the principles of Pancha Shila, as incorporated in the Declaration of Bandung, as follows: "Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country." 42. \Ve are against any sort of violence or any violation of human rights. The respect of such rights and freedoms is indeed one of the cornerstones of the Charter, and should inspire our actions in all circmustances. \i\Thether the people abused are Congolese, whether they are enemies of Lumumba or his supporters, United Nations personnel or Belgians, we think that the prerequisite of civilization and orderly democracy is the end of violence. And it was just to protect human lives from such upheavals that the operation of the United Nations in the Congo was conceived. 43. In the first instance, in my delegation's Opll1lOn, we must make an effort to use all ways and means to stop violence. An unbiased and highly respected organization, such as the International Red Cross, would help very much in that direction; moreover, through visiting and proteding the political prisoners, their side of the story would come to light. The respect of human dignity and the preservation of human rights are the motives which have prompted my delegation to join in the sponsorship of the draft resolution [5/4578], which has been so ably presented by the representative of Argentina. 44. This being the reason which prompted the four Powers to present the draft resolution, in the light of the arguments set forth so far, it will be easy to understand our opinion on the draft resolution [5/4579] introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union. \i\Te cannot approve of it because, in the first place, in singling out the situation of Mr. Lumumba, it attempts to focus the whole drama of the Congo on him, particularly the political situation in Leopoldville. This is a notion which distorts the picture prevailing ill that country where, anfortunately, disorders take place in more than one place. The situation which developed particularly in Stanleyville, as described in the report which we have just received [5/4590], causes us great concern. 45. In the second place, we can hardly concur with the requests contained in that draft resolution which would impair the rights of the recognized authorities of the Republic of the Congo to take care of their own affairs. 46. The United Nations must see that violence, maltreatment or other infringements of human rights do not take place. We would be ill-advised to take steps beyond such limits and to enter into the internal situation of the Congo. Nor can we impose upon the 49. This particular point brings me to the concluding part of my statement, in which I wish to direct myself to the report of the Secretary-General [913tll. meeting] and to the future tasks which may lie ahead for our Organization. 50. May I, as an introduction to my remarks on this point, draw the attention of the Council to the fundamental purpose which has guided our action since the begil.;ling of the crisis, namely, to respect the sovereign prerogatives and the independence and unity of the young Republic of the Congo. In the light of this principle which we are sure none of the Members of the United Nations would like to see disregarded-since it is one of the cornerstones of our Organization-it has been imperative for United Nations bodies to take a position of strict non-interference in the domestic problems of the Congo. 51. \Vithin the framework of the Charter's princir~es, our action has been rightly circumscribed to assist, in the best possible way. the legally constituted authorities in the Congo. The three resolutions approved by the Security Council in regard to the situation in the Congo, or 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 [S/4387~ S/4405 and S/4426], and the resolution unanimously approved by the General Assembly on 20 September [1474 (ES-IV)], clearly set forth these limits and constitute the basic guide to the action of the United Nations and of its officials. 52. Only in the event that we reached the conclusion that the resolutions already adopted are not fully adequate for new developments, could we consider taking another course of action; but even in that case some clear limitations, deriving from the provisions of the Charter itself, would condition our possibilities. In any case, no action could be undertaken on our part ",:,hich might represent an infringement of the sovereign nghts of the country. Vle can properly assist.. advise and make appeals, but we cannot dictate a course of ~ction in matters essentially within the framework of Internal jurisdiction. 53. May I say that the Italian delegation fundamentally considers that the decisions already adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, I{~galement constituees. Les trois resolutions sur la situation au Congo adoptees par le Conseil de securite les 14 et 22 juillet et le 9 aout 1960 [S/4387, S/4405' et S/4426], ainsi que la resolution adoptee a l'unammite, le 20 septembre par l'Assemblee generale [1474 (ES-IV)], dcfinissent clairement ces limites et constituent la base fondamentale de l'action de rONU et de ses fonctionnaires. 52. C'est seulement si nous arrivions a la conclusion que les resolutions deja adoptees sont insuffisantes ou ne repondent plus completement aux necessites d'une situation nouvelle que nous pourrions envisager la possibilite de prendre d'autres mesures; mais, meme alors, des limites bien deflnies resultant des dispositions de la Charte elle-meme conditiOlmeraient nos possibilites. Quoi qu'il en soit, nous ne pourrions prendre aucune decision constituant une violation des droits souverains du pays. Nous avons toute latitude pour aider, conseiller et adresser des appels, mais il nous est interdit cl'imposer une ligne de conduite dans des questions qui relevent essentiellement cle la juridiction interieure. 53. Qu'il me soit pennis cle declarer que, selon l'intime conviction de la delegation italienne, les decisions deja adoptees par le Conseil de securite et par l'AssembIee 56. As a matter of fact, all the criticism levelled at the United Nations operation starts from the assumption that the Organization can act as a super-Member State, but at the same time those who utter this criticism would certainly not be willing to give up any particle of their sovereignty to make the United Nations a world Government instead of being what it is -and what it should be-a world Organization. 57: In stating that we feel the United Nations operation should continue, we also want to emphasize that our delegation would certainly wish no withdrawals from the United Nations Force to take place. We feel that, in this time of need, the United Nations Force in the Congo should be enhanced and strengthened and we cannot fail to be concerned, for obvious reasons, with the consequences that a weakening of that Force might entail. We feel the United Nations, with the prestige which it commands through the support of the international community, still constitutes the only hope of keeping the cold war away from Congolese shores, and that for this reason the United Nations operation cannot be allowed to crumble. 58. To that end and in order to overcome the difficulties already encountered, we feel it would be necessary first of all to maintain the maximum measure of co-operation between the United Nations Command and the Congolese authorities. The Secretary-General has admitted that difficulties and misunderstandings have arisen from time to time, but we feel confident that it should be possible, given the necessary cooperation on all sides and at all levels, and making allowances for the faults of human nature-whether the individuals are with an international Organization 58. A cet effet et afin de surmonter les difficultes deja rencontrees, il serait necessaire, tout d'abord, de maintenir la plus etroite collaboration possible entre le Commandement des Nations Unies et les autorites congolaises. Le Secretaire general a reconnu que des difficultes et des malentendus s'etaient produits de temps a autre, mais, si resprit de cooperation necessaire se manifeste de toutes parts et cl. tous les niveaux et si 1'0n fait preuve de tolerance a l'egard des defauts de la nature humaine - qu'it s'agisse de membres d'une organisation internationale ou d'autorites locales - it doit (b) The necessity that the United Nations, without going unduly beyond the limits set by the resolutions and by the Charter, continues in its task of restoring law and order in the territory; (c) The need for stressing the observance of human rights as a pre-requisite for the establishment c: :l decent way of life and of order, law and democracy in the Congo. 60. In order to pursue such goals and to help the Congolese people in their toil, it is essential above all that the United Nations and the United Nations Force in the Congo be helped by our deliberations. That is the appeal and the prayer with which I wish to conclude my remarks on behalf of my Government. 61. Mr. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) [translated from Spanish] : In discussing the question before the Security Council, my delegation intends to adopt a strictly impartial approach. It considers that attempts to convert these distressing problems into cold war issues are insulting to the Congolese people. The problems of the Congo must be settled by the Congo itself. Its final destiny, form of government and autonomy are Congolese problems which call for Congolese solutions. We reject the idea that the former rulers of the Congo have any right to try to re-establish a colonial regime overtly or covertly; that regime must be abolished once and for all. Nor do we believe in the theory that newly liberated peoples have not yet achieved maturity and that new fonns of trusteeship should therefore be set up for their benefit. Just as the highest standards of .individual morality require us to treat man as an end and not a means, so the standards of political morality demand that peoples should be regarded as being of intrinsic importance and not as instrument for the attainment of certain ends. 62. My delegation has the deepest sympathy for the Congolese people, whose emergence as an independent nation has been accompanied by internal tension and agonizing strife. For that reason, we hope to study the problems of the Congo with the greatest understanding. We are convinced that the integrity, dignity and independence of the Congolese people transcend the interests of the factions and groups which today divide the nation. It may well be that the majority of the Congolese people are not directly involved in today's struggles, and it would be neither right nor just to prejudice their future in order to achieve the easiest 6:"'. Ma delegation eprouve la plus vive sympathie a l'ebard du peuple congolais qui a accede a l'independance dans un c1imat affligeant de luttes intestines et de dechirements cruels. C'est pourquoi e1Ie pretend etudier les problemes du Congo avec la plus grande comprehension. Elle est convaincue que l'integrite, la dignite et l'independance du peuple congolais l'emportent sur les .interets des factions et des groupes qui divisent aujourd'hui le pays. Il se peut que le peuple congoIais lui-meme soit, dans sa majeure partie, etranger aux luttes actuelles, et il ne serait pas, moralement, juste que son avenir soit compromis par le desir de trouver 66. It would stretch legal ingenuity to regard Article 39 of the Charter as applicable to the case before us, which is a power conflict, a struggle for political leadership, a dispute over the legitimacy of governments, in short, a problem of an internal constitutional nature. And since the Congo is a free and independent sovereign State, this is unquestionably a matter within its domestic jurisdiction, which is safeguarded by Article 2 (7) of the Charter. 67. The action the United Nations has taken in the Congo, which is now being criticized on such varied grounds, was not taken on its own initiative. It was called for by the Congolese Government itself in cables dated 12 and 13 July 1960 [S/4382], cables signed by Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu as the head of state and by Mr. Patrice Lumumba as the Prime Minister. The cables, which were addressed to the Secretary-General, requested military aid, the second specifying that the purpose of the aid requested was not to restore the internal situation in the Congo but to protect its territory. I should like to emphasize the fact that Mr. Lumumba, as Prime Minister, drew a distinction from the very outset between the domestic problems of the Congo, for which he did not ask assistance, and the defence of the country's territorial integrity, for which he did seek assistance. 68. The mandate given by the Security Council followed very much the same lines. The resolution sub- 69. I should like to stress that this mandate makes United Nations action in the Congo contingent upon consultation with the Congolese Government, which is a sound method of ensuring that such action remains outside the limits of the domestic jurisdiction of the State. It does not establish, nor could it establish, any criterion for assessing the legitimacy or otherwise of the Congolese Government. It does not grant authorization of any kind to interpret the constitutional texts or the laws of the Congo to determine in whom the right to exercise power is legally vested. And this circumstance, which in normal conditions would have raised no problems whatsoever, is the source of the present difficulties. 70. It is a fact-and facts are implacable as they are and not as we would like them to be-that the political difficulties of the young Republic of the Congo have grown increasingly complex. The struggle for power has taken on unusually violent forms. The primarily political struggles resulting from ideological conflict between factions have been followed by tribal strife, in which old animosities have been reinforced by new. And the Congolese armed forces, whose function it was to maintain unity, to guarantee order and to ensure peace, have unfortunately been unable to remain detached from the discord and are participating indiscriminately in the conflict. 71. In these circumstances, it is understandable that each of the rival factions and each of the leaders laying claim to the legitimate exercise of power, should have expected the United Nations forces to protect their particular political interests. But I cannot understand the argument that the representatives of he United Nations should have arbitrated between the factions. Quite clearly, they could not do so within the limits of their mandate. We mayor may not believe, according to our personal sympathies or ideological position, that Mr. Lumumba's removal from office was an unlawful act, but this is a matter which must be decided by reference to Congolese laws, and we cannot interpret these laws without trespassing upon the country's domestic jurisdiction. We may have grave doubts concerning the activities of Colonel Mobutu, the Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, who stated in mid-September that "the Army would take over power until 31 December because of the struggle between opposing governments". I must own that we view with a certain repugnance all military action in the political sphere, be it in Africa or in America, and that we are concerned about systematic interference in the internal problems of that State. 72. The events which led to the convening of the Security Council are the result of these internal conflicts. They have been described in the report sub- 73. The report does mention, however, facts which constitute a flagrant violation of human rights. In my delegation's opinion, the acts of physical violence, beatings and indignities to which Mr. Patrice Lumumba and various members of his party have been subjected, and the conditions of their detention constitute a violation of the principles laid down in the Charter, which the Congolese Government pledged itself to uphold upon joining this Organization. 74. We believe that, in the case of violations of human rights, it is not always possible to invoke the argument that matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State are involved. The Charter is a multilateral treaty and forms an indivisible whole. Its observance is binding upon Member States, which, in signing it, have recognized that their domestic jurisdiction is in some measure subordinate to the international jurisdiction of the United Nations. In this respect we believe that the Congo must be called upon to fulfill its essential obligation to safeguard human rights. 75. I should like to refer briefly to certain suggestions which we have heard and which merit our fullest consideration. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the request for the immediate and unconditional release of the Congolese leaders who have been arrested, but it believes that the authority to order arrests is the exclusive prerogative of the State. On the other hand, it would be prepared to support any request aimed at ensuring that these leaders receive a fair trial and are sentenced in accordance with the laws in force, for this is a fundamental human right. 76. The suggestion that the Conciliation Commission should be converted into a commission to study the general conditions in the Congo and to seek permanent solutions warrants careful consideration, but it should perhaps be taken up when these matters are under discussion in the General Assembly. 77. In conclusion, I shall deal briefly with the draft resolutions. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [Sj4579] contains provisions that are contrary to the Charter and are extremely dangerous politically. I shall mention just two of them: the appeal to the Secretary-General to secure the immediate release of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Okito, Mr. Kasongo and other Congolese and to ensure the resumption of government activities in the Congo is completely contrary to the provisions of the Charter; and the request that the Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo should proceed to disarm the Armee nationale congolaise is not only contrary to the Charter but would also constitute aggression. Nor could my delegation, without further information, endorse the 16 75. Je desire rappeler brievement certaines suggestions que nous avons ecoutees avec le plus grand respect. Ma delegation voudrait pouvoir s'associer a la demande de mise en liberte immediate et inconditionnelle des dirigeants congolais detenus; mais elle estime que le pouvoir d'ordonner une arrestation ou de proceder a un emprisonnement est du ressort exclusif de I'Etat. En revanche elle serait disposee a appuyer toute requete visant a garantir l'impartialite du proc(~s et a nnnner l'assurance que le jugement sera rendu en ccnformite des lois en vigueur, parce que cela entre dans le cadre des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine. 76. La suggestion selon laquelle la Commission de conciliation devrait se transformer en une commission chargee d'etudier les conditions generales regnant au Congo et de rechercher des solutions durables a cette question merite un examen approfondi; peut-etre, cependant, cet examen devrait-il intervenir lors de la discussion de ces problemes au sein de l'Assemblee generale. 77. Pour conclure, je dirai quelques mots des projets de resolution. Celui que presente I'Union sovietique [Sj4579] comporte des elements qui, d'une part, sont contraires aux dispositions de la Charte et, d'autre pad, presentent de graves dangers sur le plan politique. Je me bornerai a en signaler deux: l'appel lance au Secretaire general, afin que celui-ci assure la liberation immediate de MM. Lumumba, Okito, Kasongo et autres Congolais, ainsi que le retablissement de l'autorite au Congo, est absolument contraire aux dispositions de la Charte. Quant a la demande tendant a ce que le Commandant de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo procede au ·desarmement de l'armee nationale congolaise, elle est non seulement contraire aux dispositions de la Charte, mais constituerait en outre un cas d'agre!S- 78. I now turn to the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States [Sj4578]. It is my delegation's understanding that the purpose of the third preambular paragraph is to include in the mandate of the United Nations the safeguarding of civil and human rights for all the inhabitants of the Congo. Even though this provision does not appear in an operative paragraph as a statement of principle, which would have been preferable, my delegation believes that its effect is, if not formally to enlarge the Secretary-General's mandate, at least to make it clear that this mandate should be interpreted to include the safeguarding of the civil and human rights of the Congo's inhabitants. This is very desirable, particularly as the final operative paragraph must be interpreted in this sense. 79. My delegation will support any provision which broa<Jens and clarifies the Secretary-General's mandate in regard to the protection of human rights in the Congo. Any violation of these rights, on whatever side it may be committed, calls for our special attention. We condemn the acts of harassment committed by the Congolese authorities against Mr. LUlllumba and his associates no less vigorously than the outrages and appalling threats by Mr. Lumumba's supporters at Stanleyviile, as set forth in the report of the Secretary- General's Special Representative in the Congo [Sj4590]. SO. My delegation would have preferred something more forceful than the expression of the hope that the Government of the Congo will allow the International Red Cross to visit the prisoners. We believe that respect for human rights is mandatory, not optional, for Member States, and that the Congo is indisputably bound to observe the principles of the Charter. We shall nevertheless support the inclusion of this paragraph, since a report from the International Red Cross would help to shed light on the actual condition of the persons detained both at Leopoldville and at Stanleyville. 81. The third operative paragraph will also receive my delegation's support. I have no personal or political reason for defending the Secretary-General, and neither has my delegation. We realize that he is not infallible, that, being human, he is liable to err, as he himself has recognized. But my delegation also has no reason to believe that his actions have been anything but honourable and just, and it will therefore support the recommendation that he should continue his efforts to restore order and safeguard human rights in the Republic of the Congo. 82. To conr'ude, I should like to express my delegation's hope Llat every effort will be made to remove the problem of .the Congo from the dangerous sphere of the cold war. The unusual language, which the Soviet Union has used in its oral and written statements and which is out of keeping with the respect due to the Security Council, cannot be endorsed by those members of the Council who seek constructive action. The deluge of vituperation has lasted more than forty days and forty nights since the start of the 88. In unequivocal terms, the United Nations defined its policy regarding the Congo as follows: " ... to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may 'be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able. in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks:" [Resohttion S/4387.] "[Req1,ests: ...] All States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Republic of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo;" [General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV).] "[Requests] the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security;" [Ibid.] 87. Toutefois, lorsque, sur l'invitation du gouvernement legitime du Congo, qui avait a sa tete M. Patrice Lumu111ba.. I'OND avait decide d'examiner d'urgence la question et de prendre les mesures qui s'imposaient, nous avions toutes les raisons de croire que la situation serait retablie et que 1'0n s'engagerait a nouveau dans la voie de la raison et de l'action constructive en respedant scrupuleusement l'independance et l'integrite territoriale du Congo. Malheureusement, ces espoirs ont ete de'Sus, et nous nous trouvons maintenant devant une situation extremement menac;ante. 88. En termes non equivoques, I'OND a defini sa politique a l'egard du Congo comme suit: " .... prendre, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo, les 111esures necessaires en vue de fournir a ce gouvernement l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin, et ce jnsqu'au moment ott les forces nationales de securite, grace aux efforts du Gouv"mement congolais et avec l'assistance technique des Nations Unies, seront a meme, de l'opinion de ce gouvernement, de remplir entiere- 111ent leurs taches." [Resolution S/4387.] "[Prie: ...] tous les Etats de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait tendre a empecher le retablissement de 1'0rdre public et l'exercice de son autorite par le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo, et aussi de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait saper runite, l'integrite territoriale et l'independance politique de la Republique du Congo." [Resolution 1474 (ES-IV) de l'Assemblee generale.] " [Prie] le Secretaire general de continuer de 111ener une action vigoureuse conformement aux termes des resolutions susmentionnees et d'aider le Gouvernement central du Congo a retablir et maintenir l'ordre public dans tout le territoire de la Republique du Congo et de sauvegarder son unite, son integrite territoriale et son independance politique dans l'interet de la paix et de la securite internationales." [Ibid.] 90. Are we, in this United Nations, merely to adopt paper resolutions and express futile resentments if those resolutions are flouted and looked on with disdain? Are we to continue for ever to talk about helping the Congo, while imperialism helps itself to the Congo? Are we to submit to being one after the other overrun and trodden under by the forces of imperialism and of evil in the world? To say yes to any or all of these questions would be to deny our intelligence and attack the very core of our own existence. 91. Is it not clear beyond objection that the United Nations cannot afford, and must not choose, merely to meddle and muddle through in the Congo; merely to assume the miserable role of a helpless spectator of the return of Belgium and :'mperialism to that country, and to forget that, if thl;'. U"~':i~d is maintained and is not reversed, we could no louger help the Congo, as there would be nothing left of the Congo to help? ·92. Obviously, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his statement [913th meeting] the happenings in the Congo have been and stilI are constantly changing the assumptions on which we first undertook our responsibilities there. 93. For these and other related considerations, the Government of the United Arab Republic has, with the deepest regret, come to the inevitable conclusion that it should not be a party to nor a direct witness of, the shameful and intolerable action of imperialism in the C~mgo, and has been impelled to decide finally on the Withdrawal of the United Arab RepUblic troops which are now participating in the United Nations operation there. 94. In the meantime, for its part, the United Arab Republic is as determined as ever to maintain its struggle and redouble its efforts on behalf of the in- 99. Persuasion should be used and, if necessary, pressure should be brought to bear on all, particularly Belgium, so that foreign interference in the affairs of the Congo may be promptly stopped. 106. On the other hand, we find ourselves in general agreement with the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation. We find that it rises to the occasion, meets the situation boldly and robustly, and recommends the adoption and implementation of measures 106. En revanche, nous approuvons dans son ensemble le projet de resolution soumis par la delegation de I'Union sovietique. Nous estimons qu'il est a la hauteur de la situation, qu'il l'aborde avec hardiesse et energie et qu'il recommande l'application de mesures

With the consent of the Council, I call on the representative of Indonesia. 109. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): I thank the President and the members of the Security Council for allowing me to participate in this debate and to present the views of Indonesia on the steadily deteriorating situation in the Congo. I wish explicitly and formally to convey to this Council the deep concern of President Su-t..-arno over the happenings in the Congo. 110. When I first addressed this Council, on 16 September last [905tlt meeting], I said that the real struggle in the Congo was a struggle of nationalism againts colonialism. When I spoke in the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly, on 19 September [863rd plenary meeting], I emphasized that we were confronted in the Congo with a life and death struggle between nationalism and colonialism. Today, I wish to reaffirm and to re-emphasize that the Congo problem is one of resurgent nationalism versus dying colonialism. 111. In this struggle Indonesia is, of course, on the side of nationalism. Indonesia is on the side of Congolese democracy as against colonial-inspired, colonial-supported terror and tyranny. 112. Like the nine-headed hydra of Greek legend, dying colonialism is rearing its multiple heads in the Congo. We must uproot this hydra. We must burn it out of the heart of Africa. This is the prerequisite for restoring law and order in the Congo. 113. The essential character of the Congolese problem has indeed remained unchanged. But the events of past months have moved fast to create an ever more ominous situation in the Congo. In examining those events I shall be guided by United Nations reports and documents and the views made known to this Council by the Secretary-General in his report of 7 December [913th meeting]. 22 l~a.ra.. 38.] 115. However, all this chariged with the usurpation of power by Colonel .Mobutu. With the advent of the Moblltll regime terror and lawlessness has been unleashed in the Congo, with flagrant disregard for human rights and liberties, the Armee nationale congolaise has erupted into the political scene, has broken up into factions, and has brought the country to the verge of civil war. United Nations military forces and its civilian operations have been directly and aggressively challenged. Clashes have occurred with loss of life on both sides. The latest attempt by the Congolese authorities to obstruct United Nations transportation, including the movement of strategic materials, constitutes, in the words of Brigadier Rikhye "the most serious challenge" yet, to the United Nations operations in the Congo. 116. This entire state of affairs cannot be tolerated. Within the framework of its mandate to maintain law and order. the United Nations cannot continue to condone, by indifference or hesitation, a regime in the Congo which is illegal and unconstitutional, which is anti-democratic and which is the principal fomenter of lawlessness and terror. 117. In making this judgement I am not speaking in a purely moral or theoretical way. The advent of the Mobutu regime is not exclusively a domestic problem of the Congo. Who is actually responsible for Mobutu? How has this regime come into being in the Congo? Who has paid for its maintenance? Where does it get its weapons and supplies? 'iVho are its instrtlcto~s? In seeking answers to these questions one cannot avoid reaching the conclusion that the establishment of the Mobutu regime in the Congo is an international, not a domestic, problem. Again my facts are derived solely from the reports of United Nations officials. 118. It is only because of the return of Belgian military, paramilitary and civilian personnel that the Mobutu regime continues to hold sway in the Congo. The Belgians, encouraged by their friends, have been participating in and directing this illegal, anti-democratic regime. This regime, with its private armies, has been strengthened and sustained through outside technical and financial assistance. It is founded and based on foreign intervention. This is exactly what the United Nations Command in the Congo was suppose to eliminate and to prevent from recurring. This was its task in response to an appeal from the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. 119. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the legal justification for the decision of the Security Council to provide the Central Government of the ReJ;lublic of the Congo with the necessary military aSSIstance, was the threat to peace" and security which ~rose as a result of the intervention of Belgian troops !11 the Congo. But what is the difference between that II1tervention and the intervention going on today? There 121. Our awareness of what is involved in the Congo has prompted us and other Member States to send troops there. 'Ve will continue to make every effort in the direction of removing the causes of tension and even of conflict. Obviously, we will take all necessary measures, when we consider the occasion warrants it to prevent oltr presence in the Congo from lendin; itself in any way to the colonial game. h 122. "Ve have often been told by the Western Powers to beware of communist subversion. Yet it is Belgian intrigue in the Congo, in the heart of Africa, that is seeking to destroy the .national independence and territorial integrity of a country. It is a colonial Power of the west which is instigating and sustaining acts of subversion in the sovereign Republic of the Congo. This is the actual and present reality. 123. It is said that the United Nations cannot be accused of a failure in the Congo. It is not the instigator of past events there. But we cannot agree that this fact completely relieves the United Nations of responsibility vis-a-vis these events. From the very beginning, in this Council as elsewhere, the Indonesian delegation has stressed the necessity of giving the legal Central Government of the Republic of the Congo our complete and undivided support. If the United Nations does not now-at this late hour, perhaps the last chancepromote and support the re-establishment of a stable central Congolese government, if it does not put a final end to foreign intervention and subversion, then the United Nations will have failed. It will be a United Nations failure and a Congolese-nay, a world-loss. 124. There are certain salient views expressed by the Secretary-General in his statement of 7 December to this Council-views that were already implicit in September from the second progress report of his Special Representative in the Congo [Sj4557]-with which we, too, agree fully and wholeheartedly. We agree that the true function of the United Nations, in the present changed situation, is a question that certainly requires the most serious consideration. We agree that the need which existed in July has not disappeared and that the original reasons for the United Nations 125. Cependant, nous ne voyons pas comment ce jugement du Secretaire general et de M. Dayal peut se concilier avec la conclusion que, dans les circonstances presentes, I'ONU devrait faire preuve de plus de retenue encore et restreindre serieusement ses aetivites au Congo. En fait, c'est la le cceur du probleme. Selon nous, si l'ONU restreignait ses activites au point de devenir passive en presence d'un regime antidemocratique et anticonstitutionnel, elle ne serait plus qu'une spectatrice, pour ne pas dire une complice, des evenements. Or, notre conviction est qu'au lieu de demeurer passive, l'Organisation a le devoir d'encourager energiquement et de faciliter le retour atL'I: regles constitutionnelles et democratiques de gouvernement. Si cela se revelait impossible, elle devrait quitter le Congo plutot que paraitre consacrer par sa presence tme situation qui est en contradiction flagrante avec les principes et les buts de la Charte. 126. Nous venons de recevoir, transmis par le Secretaire general, un rapport sur les evenements de Stanleyville et de la Province-Orientale [S/4590]. Sans examiner ce rapport quant au fond, je voudrais souligner qu'il confinne le fait que tolerer une situation illegale entraine inevitablement de nouveaux bouleversements. L'ONU se trouvera placee devant une reaction en chaine d'actes chaotiques, anarchiques et explosifs aussi longtemps qu'elle acceptera le maintien d'un regime anticonstitutionne1 au Congo. 127. C'est la que nous constatons la confusion qui regne au sujet du mandat de I'ONU au Congo. Cette confusion ne peut etre dissipee, a notre avis, que par une interpretation liberale du mandat, confonnement aux obligations que nous impose la Charte et aux espoirs du Conseil; la seule autre solution possible serait, pour I'Organisation, de quitter la scene congolaise. 128. Ma delegation n'a pas la presomption d'indiquer au Conseil de securite comment I'ordre et la legalite devraient etre promptement retablis au Congo, mais i1 est certaines mesures essentielles qui, selon nous, devraient etre prises. En premier lieu, le Conseil devrait manifester son opposition au regime Mobutu, car I'Organisation des Nations Unies, vouee au regne du droit et de la paix, ne saurait reconnaitre un regime illegal de terreur. En second lieu, le Conseil devrait exiger de nouveau le retrait complet du personnel militaire et civil beIge, qui se trouve encore au Congo, hors de la juridiction des Nations Unies, car il ne peut y avoir de paix et de progres au Congo tant que persistent les intrigues et l'intervention etrangeres. En troisieme lieu, le Conseil de securite devrait exiger la liberation de tous les chefs nationaux congolais actuellement detenus; c'est la la condition prealable de la conciliation qui peut conduire au retablissement de l'unite nationale. 129. Le retour a un gouvernement constitutionnel et democratique, la fin de I'intervention et des intrigues colonialistes, la mise en liberte immediate de taus les dirigeants nationaux congolais aetuellement emprisonnes: telles sont les trois mesures etroitement liees entre elles que nous jugeons indispensables pour le succes de la mission des Nations Unies, c'est-a-dire pour le r Il r 126. We have just received from the Secretary- General a report on developments in Stanleyville and in Oriental province [S/4590]. Without entering into the substance of this report, I wish to stress that it confinns the fact that any toleration of an illegal situation inevitably invites more tubnoiI. The United Nations will be confronted with a chain reaction of chaos and anarchy-of explosions-so long as it acquiesces in the continuation of an unconstitutional regime in the Congo. 127. It is in this light that we see the confusion about the mandate of the United Nations in the Congo. Consequently, we believe that this confusion can be resolved only by liberally interpreting the mandate as I have indicated, in confonnity with the obligations of the Charter and the expectations of this Council, or by removing the Organization from the Congo scene. 128. My delegation does not preStlllle to tell the Security Council how the restoration of law and order in the Congo should be brought about speedily. But there ~re certain essential steps which we believe the CouncIl must lay down. First, the Security Council should pronounce its opposition to the Mobutu regime, because this Organization, dedicated to law and peace, . cannot rec?gnize an illegal regime of terror. Secondly, the CouncIl should again demand the complete withdr~wal of. Belgian military and civilian personnel, ~hl~h are III the Congo outside United Nations juris- ~lctIon, becau3e there can be no peace and revitalization 111 th.e Congo ~s long as foreign intrigue and intervention cont111ue. ThIrdly, the Council should call for the lib.eration of all Congolese national leaders now imprIsoned, because this is the prerequisite for conciliation to restore national unity. 129. A return to constitutional and democratic govern- ~ent, <.m end of colonial intervention and intrigue, the l!J:1medmte release of all imprisoned Congolese national lea~ers: these <!-re the three closely interrelated steps wh~ch we consider indispensable for carrying out the pmted Nations mission of promoting law and order 111 the Republic of the Congo. 133. This does not, of course, reter to the energy or consistency of the operation. It refers to very practical circumstances. which I think I can most easily illustrate by saying that, of course, we cannot continue the training of an army which has become a political instrument, nor can we help financially with the budget if expenditure is partly of a character which runs counter to our aims.

\\Tith the consent of the Secm'it" Council, I shall call on the representative of Cameroun, after which we shall probably have to recess. 135. ~1r. ~V/ONO (Cameroun) (translatcd from Fre1lch): Vlhen the report of the Credentials Committee was being considered by the General Assembly, and the United Nations had to decide which of the two Congolese delegations present was entitled to occupy the Congo's seat; Mr. Okala, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroun, clearly defined, at the 918th plenary meeting my delegation's position on the question of the relations between the United Nations and the State of the Congo. My delegation's position will be the same with regard to the subject of the debate now taking place in the Security Council. That position is one of legality, human freedom and international law. It is a simple position, just and unassailable, and it is precisely that simplicity which has stood fast against the many attacks and the large-scale schemings which have brought the Council to the consideration of its present agenda. That can be appreciated merely by examining the basic material of the debate, namely the Soviet delegation's request for a meeting and the statement by the Soviet Government on the situation in the Congo. 138. My delegation will not revert to the doubts which it voiced at the time with regard to the real purposes of that Commission, and will confine itself to the legal facts inseparable from any discussion, by the United Nations, of the situation in the Congo. 139. This therefore, in my delegation's opinion, is one of the motives underlying the rather inopportune summoning of the present meeting of the Security Council; and such, indeed, is the impression derived frol11 the statement by the Soviet Government on the situation in the Congo [5/4573]. I will not dwell on such tactics, the object of which is to distort procedure and abuse the good faith of delegations. 140. The Camerounian delegation will maintain a position in line with that which it recently adopted in other circumstances and will oppose, if possible, any attempt by the Security Council to reopen the Congo debate suspended by a vote in the General Assembly, unless such action meets the requirements of procedure -in other words, is sanctioned by a two-thirds majority. 141. The reasons which impel me to say that we are in the presence of a circuitous manoeuvre derive not merely frOI11 the tenor of the Soviet statement, but also from the purpose of the proposals contained in the Soviet Union's draft resolution [5/4579], the fifth preambular paragraph of which reads: "Resolutely condemning the continuing interference by Belgium and other colonial Powers in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo, which is undermining the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic, is impeding the normal functioning of its State organs and is producing an increased danger to world peace and the security of the peoples". The draft resolution ends by requesting "the command of the troops despatched to the Congo by decision of the Security Council immediately to disarm the terrorist bands of Mobutu". 142. Moreover, in a telegram dated 9 December 1960 addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria [5/4593], we read: "When the vast majority of peoples and their :epresentatives are coming out in favour of this noble Idea, it is inadmissible that United Nations organs should be giving assistance to the imperialistic States and to the colonialists in their intrigues and attacks upon the freedom and independence of the Republic of the Congo." And this is how the document ends: 140. La delegation camerounaise maintiendra une position confonne a celIe qu'elIe a recel11ment adoptee dans d'autres circonstances et eBe s'opposera, si possible, a toute tentative du Conseil de securite de rouvrir le (h~bat sur la situation au Congo suspendu par un vote de I'Assemblee generale, sauf si une telle initiative satisfait les exigences de la procedure, c'est-a-dire obtient la majorite des deux tiers des voix. 141. Les raisons qui me poussent a enoncer cette idee d'une manceuvre detournee ressortent non seulement du fond de la declaration sovietique, mais egalement de l'objet meme des propositions du projet de resolution presente par I'Union soviHique [5/45i9], qui, dans son cinquicme considerant, condamne "energiquement I'intervention peisistante de la Belgique et d'autres puissances coloniales dans les affaires interieures de la Republique du Congo. intervention qui porte atteinte a I'independance et a l'integrite territoriale de la Republique ainsi qu'au fonctionnement nonllal des organes . d'Etat, et qui entraine une aggravation de la menace a la paix universelle et a la securite des peuples". Le projet de resolution tenlline en invitant "le commandement des troupes envoyees au Congo en vertu de la decision du Conseil de securite it desanller il11mediatement les bandes terroristes de Mobutu". 142. Par ailleurs, dans un telegramme, en date du 9 decel11bre 1960. adresse au Secretaire general par le President du Conseil des l11inistres de la Republique populaire de Bulgarie [S/4593], on lit llotal11l11ent: "Quand I'enonne majorite des peuples et leurs representants se declarent pour cette noble idee, il est inadmissible qu'en meme temps les organes des Nations Unies pretent leur concours aux Etats imperialistes, aux colonialistes dans leurs intrigues et atteintes a la liberte et a l'independance de la Republique clu Congo." Et voici la conclusion de ce document: 143. La delegation du Cameroun estime que l'attestation qui a ete donnee non seulement par la declaration sovietique, mais par la manreuvre qui s'annonce de l'intervention des colonies sovietiques, n'est pas en conformite avec une decision de l'Assemblee generale qui a suspendu tout debat sur le Congo. 144. Poursuivant dans cet ordre d'idees, je dois dire que, si l'on fait credit a la procedure adoptee par I'Union sovietique, des documents comme ceux-ci, qui sont peut-etre deja arrives au Conseil et qui seront en tout cas publies demain, seront suivis, le Conseil pent en etre assure, d'autres documents provenant de celles des colonies sovietiques qui ont pris place a cette table pour appuyer son point de vue. 145. Ma delegation pense qu'une procedure pareille, qui tend aremettre en cause une decision de l'AssembIee general~, est de nature a compromettre la bonne marche de ses travaux. Je n'insisterai pas sur une telle manreuvre qui a pour but de tourner la procedure et de tromper la bonne foi des delegations. 146. Aussi, je reviens sur le point important de votre ordre du jour relatif, en principe, aI'arrestation de l'expremier ministre Patrice Lumumba. La declaration du Gouvernement sovietique sur la situation au Congo semble rattacher la convocation du Conseil de securite aux evenements qui se sont deroules ces derniers jours au Congo. C'est ce que je lis au tout premier paragraphe de la declaration, mais nulle part, sur huit pages de discours, it n'est plus question de l'arrestation, mais de.'? motifs d'une dialectique a laquelle ma delegation refuse de s'habituer. Quoi qu'il en soit, la delegation camerounaise pense que son devoir est d'apporter sa contribution aux travaux du Conseil. Nous nous sommes limites pour cela au texte de la declaration sovietique dont les arguments ont ete generalement repris par les delegations qui l'ont appuyee, en tout cas par certaines d'entre elles qui ne peuvent pas penser toutes seules et qui ont accepte comme verite d'evangile toutes les contradictions auxquelles I'Union sovietique les a habituees. 147. Sur l'arrestation de Lumumba, la declaration sovietique se lit ainsi: "Les evenements qui se sont deroules ces jours derniers au Congo montrent que les puissances coloniales de I'OTAN, les Etats-Unis a leur tete, ont ouvertement entrepris d'eliminer le Parlement de la Republique du Congo et le gouvernement legitime du pays, preside par M. Patrice Lumumba, ainsi que 149. My delegation will remain true to itself and to African traditions, and if it is obliged to take a position with regard to the disputes between the world Powers, that position will be in line with our established idealrespect for legality, for basic international laws, for logic and for plain common sense. 150. The Soviet delegation, then, suggests to us that there are no more Congolese in the Congo, and that there will be none until the Congolese Republic agrees, !lnd~r press.ure from certain African countries, to accept . Its ll1structlons from Moscow. My delegation is concerned at such an error, which seems to make the striking interest in Africa displayed by, all sides dependent upon a condition; if proof thereof were needed, the recent vote on the question of the ad,mission of Mauritania to the United Nations, and the bargaining to which it gave rise, would suffice. It should be pointed out here that no one can claim to give to Africa more ~han the Africans give to it themselves. We forged our lI1dependence and it is our deep conviction that nothing -I repeat, nothing--ean now prevent us from restoring to our continent the individuality which it had temporarily lost. That is our duty, and we shall discharge it. But ~e shall also be on the watch against any attempt to ~nng this victory, the victory of Africa against foreIgn coalition, into disrepute. By that 1 mean any attempt to foist upon us anything which is not African, anythll1g which in theory and in fact can tarnish our glorious victory over selfishness, materialism or atheism 155. The statement continues: "They are seeking in effect to hand over the administration of the country to new (United States) as well as old (Belgian) colonialists, who are working hand in glove with one another as well as with the Portuguese, British and French colonial authorities in Africa." 156. My delegation believes and asserts that this charge is pure childishness. Of the ninety-nine countries represented here, I do not think a single one could. subscribe to the view that the man who led the epic and victorious crusade against colonialism could sud- 153. Je dois dire ici que l'Union sovietique semble ignorer a dessein 1'histoire de l'Afrique et des Africains. Il n'est qu'a suivre les interventions de pure forme des distingues representants du bloc communiste, preparees sans doute plus ou moins a l'avallce et qui ne tiennent compte ni de I'historique des faits ni de la realite. Ainsi, lorsque le Gouvernement sovietique traite le president Kasa-Vubu de "traitre au peuple congolais", ma delegation ne saurait accepter une telle entorse a la verite sans lui rappeler que Joseph Kasa-Vubu est le seul pionnier et le seul instrument de l'independance de la Republique du Congo. Faut-il rappeler ici qu'en faisant echo a une remarque d'un representant qui dernierement, a cette tribune, mettait en relief le fait que la plupart des chefs africains sont passes par les prisons des colonialistes, j'abonde dans son sens pour stigmatiser la repression qui avait eu lieu pendant la periode colonialiste; mais omettre le fait que le president Kasa- Vubu a fait lui aussi de la prison, justement parce qu'il etait en faveur de la renaissance de l'Afrique et particulierement de la renaissance de l'Etat congolais, ce n'est pas autre chose qu'un parti pris contre la vex-ite. 154. Le president Kasa-Vubu est un homme dont le passe est connu, dont l'integrite dans la lutte en faveur de l'independance du Congo est passee dans l'histoire de l'Afrique. Le grand peuple congolais est un peuple dont on doit tenir compte et dont nous saluons la brillante conduite dans la lutte qui l'a amene en moins de deux ans au statut d'independance et de souverainete internationale. Traiter Ileo et Kasa-Vubu de traitres, reconnaitre Lumumba qui est un nouveau venu, est une entorse a la verite. Tout cela permet a ma delegation de rappeler ici a la delegation sovietique, pour le compte de son gouvernement, tout ce que le peuple congolais et l'Afrique tout entiere doivent au president Kasa- Vubu. 1-55. La declaration continue en disant: "En fait, il cherchait a rendre le pouvoir dans le pays cl l'administration coloniale des colonialistes anciens (beIges) et nouveaux (americains) qui agissent de concert et conjointement avec les autorites coloniales portugaises, britanniques et franc;aises en Afrique." 156. Ma delegation pense et confirme que ceci est pur enfantillage. Sur 99 pays representes ici, je ne crois pas qu'il soit possible aun seul d'entre nous d'admettre qu'un homme qui a conduit l'epopee victorieuse de la croisade contre le colonialisme puisse subitement en 158. That, broadly speaking, is the normal reaction of any African State worthy of Africa to some of the Soviet arguments. I have not thought it worth mentioning some other expressions, such as "thousands of Belgians" and "a reallocation of influence and of share capital among the major colonial Powers ...". r would like to add, however, that the Russian colonies in Africa are at their wits' end as to how to accommodate the Soviet settlers who are descending on them in ever-increasing numbers. ~ will not recall here that, in the matter of technical assistance to the Congo, the Soviet Embassy at Leopoldville, in its few weeks of existence, provided ample proof of the exact nature of Soviet assistance and of the directions in which it was dispensed. r will also pass over in silence the episode of the Soviet aircraft; nor will I speak of certain crews of those aircraft, and of the sacred mission which was entrusted to them. 159. Nor will I remind the Security Council that certain diplomatic missions which were expelled from Leopoldville are still in an African capital awaiting new developments in the Congo, having been promised that they would soon return to Leopoldville. The General Assembly's decision, recognizing President Kasa-Vubu's right to nominate the representatives of the Congo, has made the return of those missions highly problematical. The interested parties did not delay taking action. President Kasa-Vubu had scarcely returned from United Nations headquarters when the enemies of the international order attempted a desperate measure-the secession of Oriental province. The . ultimate purpose of that measure was to undermine the stability which would have followed President Kasa- Vubu's return, and at the same time to resuscitate the former Prime Minister, Lumumba. The exploit was a total failure. We have been led to believe that the Congo is a prey to chaos and disorganization, and that its army is an undisciplined rabble; but this army, before the surprise escape of Patrice Lumumba, showed its unquestionable efficiency and at the same time proved that there was unity between the troops and their high command, the authority of Colonel Mobutu. I cannot conceal my admiration for this achievement, which has deprived the real enemies of Africa of the last trump card which they had, or thought they had, in their hands. 160. A Congolese citizen has been arrested. He is bound to the Congolese 'State by Congolese law, and will answer for his actions before the courts of the 161. In judging the actions of Congolese citizens, the Congolese State cannot be replaced by the United Nations. \rVhat we have here is an event on the international scene which has become a common occurrence in certain parts of the world. In many countries Governments are overthrown by COltps d'etat, generally of a military nature, without the world Organization being called upon to intervene. I shall give no examples, since I do not wish to involve certain States Members of this Organization by naming them; but the history of upsets of governments is something of which we must all be aware. Our Organization was not called upon to intervene in all these COtf.ps d'eta.t, since it could pass no judgement on the domestic affairs of any Member State. And I should make it clear that, in the present case, no coup d'etat was involved. Lun1Umba was arrested under Congolese national law, after it had been proved that he had acted against his Government and against the Republic of the Congo. This is not a C01tp d'etat, but a nonnal internal security measure. 162. I cannot conclude this statement without defining the Camerounian Government's views with regard to the attacks which the Soviet delegation has made on the Secretary-General. 163. \Ve must remember that the first act of every African State, on achieving its independence, is to apply for admission to the United Nations. This admission establishes the country's political status; it gives, as we former colonial peoples believe, outward form to our international personality and confirms our equality with our former masters-who are now our friends-and even with the atomic Powers. Apart from this very understandable concern, Africa has many reasons for turning to the United Nations for confinnation of its rebirth. 164. We cannot forget that the Organization is directly or indirectly responsible for our promotion to sovereignty. I do not wish here to assess its contribution to the rebirth of Africa as a whole but I must point out that the Republic of Cameroun is directly indebted to it. The nations represented here have followed our efforts during the fifteen years of the Organization's existence. Our faith in this Assembly is well understood by all. For this and for many other reasons,. my delegation prefers that the Organization should remain as it has been hitherto, both in its Charter and in its structure. The Camerounian delegation will take every opportunity to restate the hopes which we, the people of a former Trust Territory, place in the United Nations. Many States represented here as Members did not exist when Cameroun and our sister State of Togo were already on the international scene, first as Mandated Territories under the League of Nations and then as Trust Territories under the United Nations. We have followed the United Nations and you have followed us in the various dealings which 165. Notre foi en cette assemblee est bien comprise de tous et je suis certain qu'un groupe politique comme celui que nous a propose l'Union sovietique, c'est-a--dire une espece de triumvirat, un secretariat general atrois tetes, enleverait a l'Organisation le prestige qui a attire les nations africaines, et l'impartialite qui a guide ses travaux. Nous ne sommes pas prets a accepter les le<;ons donnees ici par certains chefs de delegation pour transformer cette auguste assemblee en meeting de parti. Nous n'acceptons pas non plus les coups de savate sur la table ou les injures, qui constituent une denegation totale des traditions de courtoisie et de bienseance. Les vieilles civilisations du monde ont ete affligees de ce spectacle, mais les nouveaux Etats independants d'Mrique ont ete de<;us. Cette demonstration de mepris envers des normes internationales etablies sur le respect mutue1 et la courtoisie elementaire demontre exactement queUe serait "atmosphere de l'Organisation si le triumvirat propose par la delegation sovietique etait accepte. Nous avons assiste aux demonstrations du plus grand representant de l'un des trois blocs devant constituer le triumvirat. Les Etats africains n'ont pas eu a envier son comportement et nous ne voulons pas nous exposer a faire l'experience de ce1ui des chefs des deux autres blocs. Nous sommeS convaincus que l'espoir que nous avions place dans cette organisation serait desservi par une teUe proposition. A l'heure actuelle, deux blocs sont consideres: l'Est et l'Ouest. Puis vient bien apres un bloc en miniature, celui des ueutralistes qui commence adonner des signes d'une neutralisation evidente. Plus tard, il y aura peutetre le bloc du nord et le bloc du sud et, lorsque le monde sera divise en blocs conformement aux points cardinaux, il y aura des blocs nord-est, nord-ouest, sudest et sud-ouest, nord-nord-est, nord-nord-ouest, sudsud-est et sud-sud-ouest. Il parait qu'il existe d'autres subdivisions des points cardinaux beaucoup plus subtiles que celle que je viens de considerer. Te vous laisse le soin d'entrevoir le aombre de blocs politiques qui se disputeront la conduite du monde et dont il faudra necessairement tenir compte dans la reorganisation des structures du Secretariat. Vous admettrez, Monsieur le President, que le principe du triumvirat tel qu'il a ete propose par le chef de la delegation sovietique sera largement depasse. 165. All will understand our faith in this Assembly; and I am certain that a political group like that proposed by the Soviet Dnion-a sort of triumvirate, a Secretariat with three heads-would deprive the Organization of the prestige which has attracted the African nations, and of the impartiality which has marked its work. We are not prepared to accept the lessons given here by certain heads of delegation who would turn this august Assembly into a party meeting. Nor do we accept pounding on the table with shoes, or insults which are a complete violation of the traditions of courtesy and propriety. The ancient civilizations of the world were grieved by this exhibition, but the newly independent States of Africa were disillusioned. This demonstration of contempt for international standards, based on mutual respect and elementary courtesy, shows exactly what the atmosphere of the Organization would be if the triumvirate proposed by the Soviet delegation were accepted. We have witnessed displays by the highest representative of one of the three blocs which would make up the triumvirate. The African States were not impressed by his behaviour and we do not wish to await an experience from the heads of the other two blocs. ':Ve are convinced that the hope we have placed in this Organization would be injured by such a proposal. At this moment, two blocs are in question-the East and ·the West. Then, on the horizon, there is another miniature bloc-the neutralist bloc, which is beginning to show clear signs of neutralization. Later there may be a northern bloc and a southern bloc and, when the world is divided into blocs according to the points of the compass, there will be north-eastern, north-western, south-eastern and south-westun, north-north-eastern, north-north-western, south-south-eastern and southsouth-western blocs. It seems that there are other subdivisions of the cardinal points, much more subtle than those I have mentioned. I leave it to you to imagine the number of political blocs which will quarrel over .the conduct of world affairs and which will have to be taken into account in the structural reorganization of the Secretariat. You will admit, Mr. President, that the principle of the triumvirate, as proposed by the Head of the Soviet delegation will be left far behind. 166. The delegation of the Republic of Cameroun cannot accept such a proposal, and will oppose any attempt to change the post of Secretary-General. Last September's spectacle, of unhappy memory, was enough for us. That was a display by a single delegation, the Soviet delegation, which was joined by its lackeys and by the representatives of the Soviet colonies in Africa. But it will be quite different when blocs from all the cardinal points begin to pound the' table with their hands or shoes. It will be the end of the Organization and the beginning of world chaos, which is undoubtedly 166. La delegation de la Republique du Cameroun ne peut accepter une telle proposition et s'opposera a toute tentative de modification du poste de Secretaire general. Le spectacle de septembre dernier, dont nous avons garde la triste memoire, nous a suffi. Cette manifestation etait le fait d'une seule delegation, la delegation sovietique a laquelle se sont joints ses laquais et les representants des colonies sovietiques d'Afrique, mais ce sera autre chose lorsque les blocs de tous les points cardinaux se mettront a cogner sur la table, ase dechausser et a jouer de la savate. Ce sera la fin de 168. The Camerounian delegation has wished to put its views about this particular point on record, because we are convinced that in one or two years, or even in one or two months, the Soviet Union will try again, in other parts of Africa, to create the same incidents and the same fictitious personalities as in the Congo. It may also ask the United Nations to countenance this policy by means of resolutions similar to that which is before us. My delegation has desired me to inform the Security Council of its unshakable opposition to such a manoeuvre. For, if Africa were not vigilant, it would first become a continent under United Nations trusteeship, to which we cannot agree; thereafter when the United Nations had been eliminated, our continent would be no more than a Soviet colony, which is something we must oppose. 169. My delegation takes strong issue with all the Soviet attacks on ~he person and office of the Secretary- General. Mr. Hammarskjold deserves the confidence of the whole world for the integrity with which he has approached the Congo problem. The delegation of Cameroun requests you, Mr. President, to assure the Secretary-General of its admiration and complete support. 170. Lastly, my delegation does not believe that this Council was convened because of a sincere desire to help the Congo solve its problems. On the contrary, it was convened in order to bring new confusion into the calm which would have followed President Kasa-Vubu's return to the Congo. As you must know, the basic element is the arrest of Patrice Lumumba. But this arrest is only a consequence of an earlier event-Patrice Lumumba's escape. The Congolese authorities had issued a warrant, in good and due form, for the arrest of the ex-Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Effect could never be given to this warrant because the United Nations troops had taken Citizen Pratice Lumumba under their protection. The Congolese authorities yielded, and the United Nations guard was joined by another guard of Congolese soldiers around Patrice Lumumba's residence. Nothing happened for colU~gues ici presents sont d'accord sur ce point C01l1me ils 1'0nt prouve recemment lors de l'examen du rapport de la Commission de verification des pouvoirs 1. Je ne reviendrai plus sur les arguments invoques a ce sujet, mais j'attirerai cependant l'attention du Conseil sur un aspect precis des consequences d'une eventuelle intervention de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans l'arrestation de Patrice Lumumba, ex-premier ministre du Congo. Ma delegation desapprouve les termes du projet de resolution sovietique demandant la liberation de Patrice Lumumba. Ma delegation est tout aussi opposee a l'appui donne par les colonies sovietiques d'Afrique a une telle idee. 168. La delegation camerounaise a voulu enregistrer sa position sur ce point precis, car nous sommes persuades que dans un an ou dans deux ans, sinon dans un mois ou dans deux mois, I'Union sovietique essaiera encore, dans d'autres parties d'Afrique, de creer les memes incidents et les memes personnalites fictives qu'au Congo. Elle pourra egalement demander it 1'0NU de cautionner cette politique par des resolutions du genre de celle que nous avons devant nous. Ma delegation a voulu porter a la connaissance du Conseil de securite son opposition irreversible a une telle manreuvre. Car, si I'Afrique n'etait pas vigilante, elle deviendrait d'abord un continent sous la tutelle de 1'0NU, ce que nous ne pouvons pas accepter; et, lorsque 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies aurait ete eliminee, notre continent ne serait plus qu'une colonie sovietique, ce it quoi nous devons nous opposer. 169. Ma delegation fletrit vigoureusement toutes les attaques sovietiques contre la personne et le poste du Secretaire general. M. Hammarskjold merite la confiance du monde entier pour l'integrite avec laquelle il a aborde le probleme congolais. La delegation du Cameroun vous prie, Monsieur le President, de transmettre au Secretaire general l'expression de son admiration et de son appui total. 170. En conclusion, ma delegation estime que cette convocation du Conseil ne correspond pas it un desir sincere d'aider le Congo a resoudre ses problemes; elie avait pour but au contraire d'introduire un nouvel element de confusion dans le calme qui devait suivre le retour du president Kasa-Vubu au Congo. Comme vous devez le savoir, l'element de base est l'arrestation de Patrice Lumumba. Or cette arrestation n'est qu'une consequence d'un fait antecedent, celui de l'evasion de Patrice Lumumba. L'ex-premier ministre .Patrice Lumumba faisait 1'0bjet d'un mandat d'arret en bonne et due forme des autorites congolaises. Ce mandat d'arret n'a jamais pu etre execute, les troupes des Nations Unies ayant pris sous leur protection la personne du citoyen Patrice Lumumba. Les autorites congolaises se sont inc1inees devant le fait, et au cordon de la garde des Nations Unies s'etait ajoute un autre 1 Documents officiels de rAssemblee generale, quinzieme session, Seances plenihes, 917eme a 924eme seance. 171. In any case, the Soviet draft resolution is completely unacceptable, both in its demand for the release of Patrice Lumumba and in its request for the disarming of the Armee nationale congolaise. If the United Nations could assume such a responsibility and undertake such an action, nothing explains why the Soviet Union has not accepted United Nations intervention in several of its European colonies. 172. My delegation thinks that the calling of this Security Council is not justified by the facts, for the reasons we have already given. Its unacknowledged purpose was to reopen the debate on the Congo which, on the proposal of the communist bloc, was postponed sine die. My delegation cannot approve of such a manoeuvre. It believes that no resolution on the subject should be adopted, either by the Council or by the General Assembly. However, my delegation has no objection to any draft resolution expressing appreciation of the work so far done by the United Nations in the Congo. 173. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Before adjourning the meeting I shall call on the representative of the United Arab Republic who apparently wishes to make a few remarks in connexion with the preceding statement. 174. Mr. ASHA (United Arab Republic): During his statement the representative of Cameroun made some insinuations about our Embassy in Leopoldville. I shall not take the Council's time to refute his allegations, because I do not regard them as worthy of a reply. I would, however, like to say that he has been badly advised. r would suggest that in the future he should study the facts more carefully before making allegations about my country. 173. Le PRESIDENT (tradztit du msse): Avant de lever la seance, je donnerai encore la parole au representant de la Republique arabe unie qui desire vraisemblablement faire quelques breves remarques a propos de la derniere intervention. 174. M. ASHA (Republique arabe unie) [traduit de l'anglais]: Dans sa declaration, le representant du Cameroun s'est livre a des insinuations au sujet de notre ambassade a Leopoldville. Je ne retiendrai pas l'attention du Conseil pour refuter ses allegations, car je ne les juge pas dignes d'une reponse. Je veux simplement faire remarquer que M. Owono a ete mal informe. Je suggere qu'a l'avenir il etudie les faits plus soigneusement avant de formuler des allegations concernant mon pays. 175. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe) : Je donne la parole au representant du Cameroun. 176. M. OWONO (Cameroun): Pour repondre aux observations que vient de formuler le representant de la Republique arabe unie, je precise que je crois bien n'avoir cite le nom d'aucun pays dans ma declaration. Je me souviens que j'ai tres attentivement evite toute mention et je pense qu'il est de mon devoir de refuter et de rejeter categoriquement l'allusion qu'il vient de faire a ce sujet. La seance est levee le smnedi 10 decenzbre, a0 h 10.

I call on the representative of Cameroun. 176. Mr. OWONO (Cameroun) (translated from French) : In r::'91r to the remarks which the representative of the ~;n~ted Arab Republic has just made, I must say that I do not think I mentioned, in my statement, any country by name. I remember that I very carefuliy avoided any such reference, and I think it my duty categorically to refute and reject his observation on the subject. The meeting rose on Saturday, 10 December, at 12.10 a:m. Orders and inquiries from counlries not lisled above may be sent to: Sales Seclion, Publishing Sevice. United Nations. New York. U.S.A.; or Sales Section. Uniled Nalions. Palais des Nations, Geneva. Switzerland•. Les commandes et demandes de renseignemenls emanant de pays ou il n'existe pas encore de depositaires peuvent etre adressees a la Section des ventes. Service des publications, Organisalion des Nations Unies. New York (Etals·Unis cfAme. rique). ou a la Seclion des venles. Office europeen des Nations Unies. Palais des Nalions, Geneve (Suisse).