S/PV.919 Security Council

In ac- cordance with the previous decisions of the Security Council I shall invite the representatives of Mali, GUinea, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Indo- nesia, Cameroun, Yugoslavia, India, the United Arab RepUblic and Morocco to take places at the Council table. 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Conformement aux decisions deja prises par le Conseil de securite, j'invite les representants du Mali, de la Guinee, du Congo (Leopoldville), de l'Indonesie, du Cameroun, de la Yougoslavie, de l'lnde, de la Republique arabe unie et du Maroc ilprendre place ilIa table du Conseil. Sur l'invitation du President, M. Mamadou Aw (Mali), M. Toure Is,mael (Guinee), M. Mario Cardoso (Congo [LeopoldvilleJ), M. Sharif Padmadisastra (Indonesie), M. Joseph Owono (Cameroun), M. Koca Popovi6 (Yougoslavie), M. B. Rajan (Inde), M. Rafik Asha (Republique arabe unie) et M. Ahmed Osman (Maroc) prennent place ala table du Conseil. II est donne lecture de l'interpn!tation en anglais de la declaration faite par M. Mongi Slim (Tunisie) a la 918eme seance. The interpretation intO English ofthe statementmade by Mr. Mongi Slim (Tunisia) at the 918thmeeting was given. Ordre du jour provisoire (5/ Agenda/ 919) Mesures urgentes ilprendre euegard aux-derniers evenements survenus au Congo: Note du Secretaire general (S/4571 et Add.l); Declaration du Gouvernement de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, en date du 6 decembre 1960, concernant la situation au Congo (S/4573). Adoption de I'ordredu jour 4. I feel that I should not letthat remark pass without giving the clarification which would seem necessary, because I nannot find exactly what the representative of India was referring to when he saidthat, in spite of what I myself had said, his coUntry had a great deal of kinship ....,ith the liberated countries of Africa. That would seem to imply that I had suggested we had nothing in common with it. I feel I must refute such an interpretation, since the Republic of Cameroun has no intention of isolating itself, either from the rest of Africa or from the world; hence I could not have said that VIe had nothing in common with India or with any other country. . 5. What I think I did say in my statement was that no one here could claim to give more to Africa than the Africans could themselves. My delegation feels that that is an important point, because we believe that there are two sides in a debate such as the one we a.re conducting today in the Security Council: on the one hand, those who desire the peace and happiness of Africa; on the other, those who are using Africa for their selfish ends. My delegation is convinced thatthe best way of approaching the problems of Africa is to attempt to understand African affairs as the Africans themselves understand them. That is why I thought it was important to stress that, however much interest foreigners may have in our continent, they could not have more interest inour affairs thanwe do ourselves. 6. To return to the comment of the Indian repre- sentative, I should like to answer his by saying that, even if I had said that we had nothing in common with his country, I should have been only partly in error. After all, India is India; Asia is Asia; and Africa is Africa. As Mr. Menon said, we certainly )lave points in common; in p2.rticular,we are former colonies who were subjected to the same foreign domination. Nevertheless, in the present situation we are in the course of becomingaware ofthe realities of our continent and of the duties which we, as African citizens inhabiting this continent, have towards our fellow men. Whenever we see that the interest which is taken in our continent bears some relation to the disturbances occurring there, we have the right, and indeed the duty, of drawing the world's attention to it. 7. The purpose of my comment was therefore to draw that point to the attention of those who, on flimsy 6. Revenant sur cette observation du repr6sentant de l'lnde, je voudrais lui repondre que meme si j'avais dit que nous n'avions rien de commun avec eux, je n'aurais ete dans l'erreur qU'en partie. Apr~s tout, l'lnde, c'est l'lnde; PAsie, c'est PAsie; et l'Afrique, c'est l'Afrique. Airisi que l'a dit M. Menon, nous avons certes des points en commUn; en parti- culier, nous sommes d'anciennes colonIes qui ant subi , . une meme domination etrang~re. Mais il se trouve quand meme que, dans l'etat actuel des choses, nous sommes en train de prendre conscience des realites de notre continent et des devoirs qu'en tant que citoyens africains, habitants de ce continent, nouS avons vis-a.-vis de nos semblables. Chaque fois que nous nous apercevons que Pinteret que Pon porte b. notr.e continent a quelque chose a. voir avec les desordres qui s'y deroulent, nous avons le droit, nous avons meme le devoir, d'attirer l~-dessus l'at- tention du monde. 7. Ma remarque avait donc pour objet d Iattirer sur ce point l'attention de ceux qui, pour un oui ou pour 8. J'ai souligne, dans d'autres passages de ma declaration, que l'Afrique ne tient plus a etre un continent sous la tutelle des Nations Unies. En tant que ressortissant d'un ancien Etat sous tutelle, je crois ~tre.mieux plac~ que personne pour dire que 8. I stressed in other parts of my statement that Africa no longer wishes to be a continent under United Nations Trusteeship. As a national of a former Trust Territory. I believe I am in a better position than anyone to say that we might evenpreferto be a colony to being under international trusteeship, since this enables everyone to bring to us the cold wa:r, or the hot war, or the latent war or the declared war, or any sort of war. At the moment the face of Africa is changing, and we should certainly like other countries to help us, but without managingour affairs, since that would be an international trusteeship whichwould be of no benefit to our continent. peut~tre nous pr€lf~rerions ~tre une colonie plutOt que sous la tutelle internationale, qui permetachacun d'apporter la guerre froide, ou la guerre chaude, ou la guerre couvante, ou la guerre declaree, ou toute sorte de guerre. Actuellement, l'Afrique est en train de se reformer et nous aimerions certes que d'autres pays nous aident, mal'S sans contr81er nos affaires, car ce serait une tutelle internationale qui n'appor- terait aucun avantage a notre continent. 9. J'ai poursuivi cette idee en disant qu'il se pose aussi des probl~mes dans d'autres continents, comme par exemple en Asie. L'Inde a ses probl~mesparti- culiers. Mais je ne crois pas savoir que des pays africains aient ete appeles, un jour, a statuer sur le 9. I followed up that idea by saying that there were problems facing other continents too, as for example Asia. India has its own particular problem,,; but, so far as I know, no African country has been called upon at any time to settle them. We know that there are serious problems, calling for international attention, dividing India from other Asian states; but no African I3tate has intervened in those matters. Will the whole world go on thinking that Africa will never be able to become African, will never be able to speakfor itself? That is a question which the United Nations should bear in mind. r~glement de ces probl~mes. Nom; savons que d'im- portants probl~mes, qUi meritent l'attention inter- nationale, opposent l'Iude a d'autres Etats asiatiques. Mais aucun Etat afric:ain n'est 'intervenu dans ces affaires-Ia. Le monde entier continue-t-il a penser que l'Afrique ne pourra jamais devenir africaine, ne pourra jamais parler pour elle-m~me? Cette question merite que les Nations Unies en tiennent compte. 10. The Cameronnian delegation is convinced that most of the problems whichface Africatoday, and most of the controversies which are under discussion at the United Nations in that connexion, could be avoided if the majority of the Member states realized that the time has come when the Africans are capable of looking after their own affairs. To give but one example: some years ago we had only one independent state; then a second State emerged and, for a long time, Ethiopia and Liberia remained the only flowers of Africa. Today we have twenty-two independent States. The people of Africa will soon be freed from the colonial yoke. 10. La d~ll§gation du Cameroun est convaincue que la plupart des probl~mes qui se posent aujourd'hui en Afrique bt la plupart des questions qUi sont en discussion a 1'Organisation des Nations Unies it cet egard pourraient ~tre evites si la majorite des Membres de cette organisation comprenaient que le moment est venu ou les Africains sont capables de s'occuper de leurs affaires. Pour ne citer qu'u.'l exemple, il y a quelques annees nous ne comptions qu'un seul Etat independant; puis en vint un deuxi~me et, pendant longtemps, l'Ethiopie et le Libl§ria sont restes .nos seules fleurs d'Afrique. Aujourd'hui, nous comptons 22 Etats independants. La population afri- caine sera bient8t delivree du joug colonialiste. 11. I believe that, from now on, the assistance which the world as a whole can bring us should be restricted to asking us what we want andnot imposing on us what it wants. 12. The aim of the Indian representative's remarks was to demonstrate that the representative of Cameroun was animated by a kind of isolationism or parochialism. I never had any such idea. Iwas simply saying that we too should like people to ask us our opinion on our own affairs and that we do not want them to try to prove to us, for example, that they are more mature than we are, that they have more ex- perience of democracy, and that they know more than we do.· That feeling is shared by all self-respecting African States. I wish to say bothto the foreign nations in Africa and to the Africans who accept paternalism, that the Republic of Cameroun will object to any statement which may be made to that effect and which Would seem to deny to Africa its right to claim 11. Je crois q~'a partir de maintenant l'aide que peut nous apporter le monde entier doit se limiter a nous demander ce que nous voulons et non pas a nous imposer ce qU'il veut. 12. L'intervention du representant de l'Inde avaitpour but de demontrer que le representant du Cameroun etait anime d'une sorte d'espritd'isolationnismeoude regionalisme. Loin de moi cette idee. Je disais sim- plement que, nous aussi, nous voudrions que les gens puissent nous demander notre avis' sur nos affaires et qU'ils ne viennent pas nous prouver, par exemple, que leur degre de maturite est superieur au n8tre, qU'ils ont une plus grande experience en mati~re de democratie, qu'ns connaissent plus de choses que nous. Ce sentiment-la est un sentiment qui anime tout Etat africain qUi se respecte. Je le dirai aux nations etran~res d'Afrique comme aux Africains qui se laissent aller au paternalisme: la Republique du Cameroun s'opposera it toute mention 'qui serait

I call on the representative of Guinea.

Mr. President, I should like through you, to thank the Security Council for giving my delegation an opportunity to state the views of the Republic of Guinea in this debate. My country and its people be- lieve that the present events in the Congo are of great importance and gravity, not only for that country's future, but for the future of Africa. 16. My delegation speaks not as a "pro-Lumumba" delegation, as it has often been described, but simply as an African delegation deeply concerned with all the problems affecting our independence and unity in Africa. 17. Today, we are justified in saying that, in Africa, the United Nations has, for all practical purposes joined Belgium and other nations in the dock. Yet we still have hope, because we have experience ofAfrican affairs and we know that in the end the Congolese people will succeed in taking its destiny into its own hands. 18. Before our emancipation from the colonial yoke, we in Guinea also knew regrettable periods marked by innumerable schisms, feuds and internal disputes, but we knew that all these divisions were provoked and perpetuated by the colonialists. In our history there has also been much tribal warfare. Much has been made of the barbarous customs of the Guineans, and it always gave everyone great satisfaction to be able to say that we were killing one another and that this was due to our more or less stone age mentality. This state of affairs lasted until a few years ago; even under the "loi-cadre", there were massacres in our country, but these massacres were brought about by colonialism. I must also emphasizethat when the Guinean people united in the struggle against colonialism, it understood the full importance and significance of its past. 19. At the time of General de Gaullels now famous referendum, there were only two political movements in Guinea. That was one too many, because the only question at issue could not possibly have divided the Guineans: it was the question of ending foreign domination. In fact, the two political movements which existed before the time of the de Gaulle referendum 14. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je donne la parole au representant de la Guinee. 15. M. TOURE Ismael (Guinee): Par votre inter- mediaire, Monsieur le President, je voudrais re- mercier le Conseil de securite d'avoir bien voulu accorder a ma delegation la faveur de presenter dans ce debat le point de vue de la Republique de Guinee. En effet, mon pays et son peuple eonsiderent que les evenements qUi se deroulent actuellement au Congo sont tres importants et tres graves a la fois pour l'avenir, non seulement de ce pays, mais aussi pour l'avenir de l'Afrique. 16. Ma delegation intervient done ici, nonpas en tant que delegation qui a souvent ete qualifiee de "pro- Lumumba", mais tout simplement en tant que dele- gation africaine, premccupee au plus haut point par tous les problemes qui conditionnent a la fois notre independance et notre unite en Afrique. 17. J e dirai quIaujourd'hui on est en droit de de- clarer qU'en Afrique, les Nations Unies ont pratique- ment rejoint la Belgique et d'autres nations au banc des accuses. Neanmoins, nous gardons encore con- fiance, pUisque nous avons l'experience des choses d'Afrique et que nous savons qU'en fin de compte le peuple congolais saura prendre en main son destin. 18. Nous avons eonnu aussi, en Guinee, avant notre emancipation du joug colonial, de tristes periodes de divisions a l'infini, d'opposition, de querelles de famille, mais nous savions que toutes ces divisions etaient suscitees et entretenues par le colonisateur. Les luttes tribales aussi ont souvent defraye la chronique chez nous. On a souvent fait etat des mceurs plus ou moins barbares des Guineens et lIon etait tres heureux chaque fois que 1'on pouvait dire que nous nous entretuions et que cela relevait d'une mentalite plus ou moins prelogique. Cela a dura jusqu'a ces dernieres annees; sous la loi-cadre encore, il y a eu des massacres ohez nous, mais ces massacres etaient inspires par le colonialisme. Jtl dois preciser egalement que, lorsque le peuple guinaen a retrouve son unite dans la lutte contre le colo- nialisme, il a compris toute la force et a retrouve toute la valeur de son passe. 19. Au moment du referendum desormais c61~bre dugeneraJ. de Gaulle, il nly avait plUs en Guinee que deux mouvements pol1tlques. C'etalt encore un mouvement de trop, puisque le seul probleme qui se posait a nous ne pouvait absolument pas diviser les Guineens: il I'l'agissait de mettre fin ala domination etrangere. En realite, les deux mouvements poli- 20. At this moment, my country has' achieved its unity on African foundations, and it believes that all other parts of the continent will also achieve their unity and will realize that the unity of Africa is the only sure shield against the imperialists and their subversive intrigues. 21. As I have already said, we have not lost hope, in spite of all the criticisms we are justified in making of the operations being conducted in the Congo in the name of the United Nations. My delegation believes that the Congo problem is of special concern to it in view of the fact that, at the onset of the Belgian aggression, my country sent a contingent to the Congo, thus showing that it identified itself with the fate of the Congolese people and considered that the future of the whole continent deperlded on the independence and unity of the Congo. 22. We have often re-stated these basic principles during the many discussions here on the Congo problem, and there is no further need to elaborate them. We must, however, repeat our profound con- viction that in the Congo circumstances have led the United Nations to adopt an ostrich-like policy of refusing to face facts-even if this means com- plicity. 23. In fact, there has been a setback, at least so far as the first stage is concerned, but any setback can be remedied, if we acknOWledge that it is a setback, and do not try to justify it by references to the Charter and by humanitarian speeches on human rights. It is not human rights that are at stake in the Congo, but the rights of a people, its sovereignty, independence, unity and integrity. That is why we set little store by all the subtle arguments about human rights which we have heard so ofte'" Africa has experience of the humanitarian sentiments cherished towards it; they are illustrated by the two bloody examples .before us: Algeria and the Congo. 23. En realite, il s'agit d'un echec, tout au moins en ce qui concerne la premi~re phase, mais tout ~chec est reparable, a condition que 1'on reconnaisse qU'il s'agit bien d'un echec et a condition qU'on n'essaie pas de le justifier par des consid6rations sur la Charte et par des discours humanitaires sur ies droits de l'homme. Au Congo, ce ne sont pas les droits de 1'homme qui sont en cause, ce sont les droits d'un peuple, sa souverainete, son independance, son unite et son integrite. C'est pourquoi nous n'accordons pas grande consideration a. toutes les subtilites qui ont ete souvent developpees sur les droits de 1'homme. AUjourd'hui, l'Afrique a l'exp6rience des sentiments. humanitaires que l'on eprouve a son egard et actuel- lement, deux exemples sanglants sont la pour en temoigner: l'AIg{lrie et le Congo. 24. Nous disons qU'il y a eu echec dans la premi~re phase de 1'action des Nations Unies au Congo, en ce sens quIll existe une difference fondamentale entre le zpandat qui a -ete donne par le Conseil de securite et la situation qui r~gne actuellement au Congo. Le mandat precisait qU'il s'agissait d'aider le Gouver- nement du Congo a faire face a la situation creee par l'agression beIge. Or, aujourd'hui, que constatons- nous? L'unite politique du pays est compl~tement brisee, emiettee. Les BeIges, dont l'autorite est ren- forcee, reviennent triomphants a Leopoldville, au Katanga et dans tontes les autres parties du Congo. On ne parle plus de l'integrite territoriale, bien au contraire; nous f' -ames au courant de t<;>us les plans qui ont deja ete uresses et qui ont pour but de par- 24. When we say that there has been a setback in the first stage ofthe United Nations operation in the Congo, we mean that there is a fundamental difference between the mandate given by the Security Council and the situation now prevailing in the Congo. Accordingto the mandate, the Government of the Congo was to be assisted in dealing with the situation caused by Belgian aggression. Yet what do we see today? The political unity of the country has been completely' broken and shattered. The Belgians' authority has been strengthened, and they are returning in triumph to Leopoldville, Katanga and all other parts ofthe Congo. We hear no more of territorial integrity, far from it; we are aware of all the plans whichhave been made to diVide the cake. There is obvious insecurity, not only 20. Au moment ou je parle, mon pays a donc realise son unite sur une base africaine et il est persuade que toutes les autres parties du continent realiseront egalement leur unite et sauront que 1'unite en Afrique est le seul bouclier que l'onpuisseefficacementoppo- ser aux imperialistes et a leurs menees subver- sives. 21. Comme je vous le disais nous ne perdons pas confiance, malgre tout ce que nous SOInnJ.es au- jourd'hui en droit de reprocher a Paction menee au Congo au nom des Nations Unies. Madelegationpense, en effet, qU'elle est particuli~rement interessee au probleme congolais, en ce sens qU'elle a envoye un contingent au Congo, d~s les premiers jours de l'agres- sion beIge, montrant ainsi que le sort du peuple congolais etait le sien et que l'independance et l'unite du Congo conditionnaient l'avenir de tout le continent. 22. Nous avons souvent repete ces idees forces au cours des nombreux debats qui ont eu lieu ici sur le probl~me congolais et il ne nous semble plus utile de les developper en detail. Neanmoins, nous devons reaffirmer notre conviction profonde que PONU a ete amenee, par la force des choses, a pratiqueI' au Congo ce que nous appelons la politique de l'autruche qui se cache la tete pour ne pas voir la realite, meme si en agissant ainsi elle engage sa complicite. 25. Of course, we know that certain Powers have no.t seen the essential problem in the Congo as being Belgian aggression; nor have they been concerned to protect the Congolese people's indepenci,::nce, unity or territorial integrity. They had other aims. Some hav\:: said openly that all would be well in the Congo if men such as Mr. Patrice Lumumba were put out of action. Some great Powers have said clearlythat the stumbling block in the Congo was Mr. Patrice Lumumba. Why? Undoubtedly because he represents certain forces in Africa. He represents, first of all, the defence of his country's sovereignty and independence and of all its interests. He also represents liberation, not only liberation in name, which may amount to no more than a flag, an anthem and perhaps a chief of state who inspires respectful speeches, but a iiberation which is dEJvoid of political meaning and involves no social progress. Obviouslythese Powers consider such a man dangerous, and all the dark forces have united in efforts to destroy him. 26. We know how a delegation, which I cannot call a delegation of the Republic of the Congo, was hastily seated in this Assembly. It was a presidential delega- . tion. This is the first time in United Nations history that it has been possible for countries to be repre- sented either by a delegation from their Government or by a delegation from the President ofthe Republic, if it were a kingdom, it would be a royal delegation. , It is no longer the country as a whole which is repre- sented here, but one man. 27. We showed at the time that the decision to give preference to this delegation was against the interests of the Congo and could only worsen the situation. The facts have now proved us right. We saidthat the United Nations could not seat a delegation composed of repre- sentatives of secessionist Katanga and of an illegal authority set up in the Congo after an illegitimate seizure of power. We emphasized all this and pointed out that the United Nations had gone into the Congo to help that country's Governmentto deal with aggression and to eliminate all the centrifugal forces which were tearing the Congolese nation apart. 28. But if we seat Colonel Mobutu's naive and irre- sponsible commissioners in the United Nations, to- gether with representatives of Katanga, who them- selves have strongly protested against this illegal step (we do not agree with their reasons, but we must point out that they have protested), we are taking action directly counter to the plan for saving the Congo; yet this action has been taken, because it had the support of Powers which are of some consequence within the United Nations. 30. It is now clear that Mr. Patrice Ltr<'lUmba stands for more than his own modest person. He stands for law and order and the people in the Congo; he stands for independence and sovereignty, for all that is most dear to Africa today, its new-found dignity and its opportunity to play an independent part in the world. 30. On s'apergoit aujourd'hui que Patrice LumlJ,mba represente plus que sa modeste personne. n repre- sente la legalite et le peuple au Congo; il represente 1'indllpendance et la souverainetll, il reprllsente tout ce que l'Afrique a de plUS cher aujourd'hui, c'est-~-dire sa dignite retrouvee et la possibilite, pour elle, de jouer un role autonome dans-Ie monde. 31. This view is obviously not shared by those who believe that, through an institution such as the United Nations, they can come to the assistance of inferior nations with little experience of all these fine humanitarian ideas, which invariably turn against us, and are always motivated by a desire to per- petuate our inferiority. 31. Cel~ evidemment est tr~s loin de ce que pensent certains qUi croient que, gdcl? ~une institution comme 1'ONU, on peut venir au secours des peuples inferieurs qui n'ont pas une grande experience quant~toutes ces notions hautement humanitaires qui se soldent toujours contre nous et qUi ne tendent toujours qU'~nous main- tenir dans l'inferiorite. 32. So all Africa has revolted against an operation undertaken to repress a people whichhad just emerged from slavery, and to reduce it to silence. Naturally, once the stage has been reached when Parliament is prorogued, the Government disorganized, politicians f)et or_e against another and power wielded only by bayonets, nothing we can then say has any meaning, because there is no longer any country. In such cirqumstances, even a colony has a gre"ter chance of keeping ord'ar, because in a colony there .is at least a responsible authority, the colonial Power; but at present we can see no responsible authority in the Congo; in fact there is none. 32. Done, c'est toute l'Afrique qui s'est inElurgee contre l'action qui a ete menee pour abattre un peuple qui venait de sortir de l'esclavage et pour le faire taire. Naturellement, une fois que le Parlement est suspendu, que le gouvernement est disloque, que les hommes politiques sont dresses les uns contre les autres, que la fO:i'ce n'est plus representee que par les balbnnettes, tout ce qU'on peut dire alors n'a aucun sens puisqu'il n'exiiste plus de pays. C'estvrai, ~ ce moment,~l~ m~me une colonie a plus de chances de se maintenir dansl'ordreparceque,aumoins, dans une colonie il y a un responsable: la puissance colo- nisatrice; actuellement au Congo, nous ne voyons aucun responsable et, en fait, 11 n'y a plus de respon- sable. 33. Donc, aujourd'hui, les Nations Unies peuventfaire au Congo ce qU'elles veulent, peuvent dire cle que ban leur semble et peuvent justifier toutes les positions qU'elles adoptent. Fait encore plus grave ~ notre avis, crest en presence des Nations Unies, appelees au Congo par le gouvernement, que le coup d'Etat a ete prepare et a reussi. Les Nations Unies sont restees indifferentes parce que, dit-on, elles n'avaient pas ~ s'ingerer dans les affaires interieures. Dans l'opinion africaine, une telle attitude restera absolu- ment injustifiable. On ne pourra pas comprendre qU'ayant ete appelees sous le signe de l'amitie et de la solidarite, vous assistiez, en disant: "je ne suis pas responsable", ~ l'assassinat de celui qui vous a demande assistance. 33. Today, therefore, the United Nations can do what it will in the Congo; it cansaywhat it likes and justify any position it may wish to take. "Vhat is even more serious in our view, is the fact that, although the Government of the Congo called in the United Nations , the seizure of power was prepared for -and carried out in the presence of the United Nations in the Congo. The United Nations stood passively by, and we are told that it could not properly interfere in domestic affairs. To African opinion, such an attitude seems completely unjustifiable. When you have been called in for the sake of friendship and solidarity we cannot see how it is possible to stand by while the person who asked for your help is murdered and to say you are not responsible. 34. Evidemment, les Nations Unies ne restent pas toujours inactives. Ainsi, nous savons que, mainte- nant, 11 se produitdans la Province-Orientale une situation qui risque de conduire ~ certains desavan- tages pour les BeIges et autres; nous nous sommes depeches de les prendre sous notre protection, mais en m~me temps les journaux annoncent quIa Leopold- ville aucun dirigeant politique ne beneficiera plus de la protection. Vo11~ la contradiction. Dans le premier cas, on ne fait rien et on pourra toujours le justifier. Il n'y a pas de gouvernement responsable, 11 y a un pouvoir qU'on reconnart officieusement, aveclequelon collabore sous la table, mais, de fac.;:onofficielle, 11 ne represente rien et on en profite pour justifier tout. D'un autre cote, d~s l'instant que certains interSts 34. Of course, the United Nations does not always remain passive. We know, for instance, that a situation has been developing in Oriental Province which might prove disadvantageous to the Belgians and others; the United Nations has hesitated to take them under its protection, but at the same time the newspapers announced that no political leader in Leopoldville would be protected any longer. That is the contra- diction. On the one hand, no action is taken and a pretext can always be found to justify this: there is no responsible government; there is an authority which is unofficially recognized and with which there is covert co-operation; officially this authority repre- sents nothing, yet is used to justify everything. On the other hand, as soon as certain interests or forms of 36. However, for the time being, the United Nations Charter is being used to justify a policy based on a double standard. In the case of the national army, in Sume areas, the troops are being hastily disarmed, while elsewhere the same principles are being in- volved in support of the view that it is not for the United Nations to disarm the Armee nationale con- golaise. 37. It is clear that at present Oriental Province is in the greatest danger because of the trend towards secession, and no one can defend secession in the Congo. Yet we have also seen how the Katanga secessionists and Tshombe have been treated; the United Nations itself has made this secession a reality, has allowed Tshombe to establish a seces- sionist regime and has made it legal. The people who oppose thi& regime are described in the Press as rebels; even the United Nations is acting against them. This is proof of the existence of a double standard. 38. If this policy was purely fortuitous and did not reflect a certain logic, we should say no more about it; but we know that this attitude of the United Nations is based on a kind of logic. At all events, the policy followed has not been straightforward and no one can deny this. It also has all the signs of the incoherence, bordering on irrationality, which marks any system condemned by history. By this we mean that any policy condemned by history can no longer follow a straight line that is traceable in events. As has been pointed out in this debate, we are dealing with political vacillations. 39. I should just like to say that we have never lost confidence because we know that the Congolese, even those who now believe that they have the support and protection of certain Powers, will one day understand their mistake and see that they are more likely to reach some kind of understanding with their brothers than with certain fair-weather friends, who have much to .say about the legitimacy of their position, the inviolability of the person of the Chief ofState and his indisputable authority, even if all their words fall on deaf ears. We are being bombarded with talk about the authority and the indisputable legality and constitu- tionality of a Chief of State who was disowned by his country's army when he called on it to lay down its arms after a dispute between himself and his Prime Minister. The army refused to do so. 40. The Chief of State was faced with the secession of Katanga, which is now minting its own currency and has thus repudiated his authority. The effective- ness of this same Chief of State might be said to have 36. En tout cas, pour l'instant, on s'est base sur la Charte pour appliquer la politique de deux poids et deux mesures. Lorsqu'il s'agit de l'armee nationale, dans certains endroits on se dep~che d'enlever les armes aux soldats; dans d'autres, on invoque les memes principes pour dire: il ne nous appartient pas de desarmer 1'armee nationale congolaise. 37. Aujourd'hui, nous savons que la province de l'Est court les plus grands risques parce qU'elle a une tendance ~ la secession; et personne ne pour1'a defendre la secession au Congo. Cependant, nous avons vu aussi comment on a t1'aite les secession- nistes du Katanga, comment on a traite Tshombe; d'ailleu1's ce sont les Nations Unies qui ont fait de cette secession une realite, qui ont permis ~Tshombe d'asseoir son regime secessionniste, qui l'ont lega- lise. Et les populations qui se 1'evoltent contre ce regime sont traitees de rebelles dans la presse; m~me les Nations Unies agissent ~ l'encontre de ces populations. Done, il y a deux poids et deux mesures. 38. Si c'etait gratuit et s'il n'y avait pas une ce1'- taine logique dans cette politique, nous n'enparlerions pas; mais nous savons qu'il y a une logique ~ la base de cette attitude des Nations Unies. En tout cas, la politique suivie n'a pas ete sinc~re et personne ne pourra dire le contraire. Elle presente aussi tous les aspects d'une certaine incoherence frisant le cre- tinisme inherent ~ tout systeme condamne par 1'his- toire. Nous voulons dire que tout syst~me qui est condamne par l'histoire ne peut plus avoir une ligne juste, une ligne qui soit reconnaissable ~ travel's les evenements. Il s'agit, comme on l'a dit au cours de ce m~me debat, d'oscillations politiques. 39. Je voudrais seulement dire que nous n'avons jamais perdu confiance car nous savons que les Con- golais, m~me ceux qui se croient aujourd'hui appuyes et proteges par certaines pUissances, finiront par comprendre leur erreur et par s'apercevoir qu'ils ont plus de chances de s'entendre tant bien que mal avec leurs freres qu'~ ecouter certains amis de la onzt~me heure qui bavardent beaucoup sur leur legitlmite, sur l'inviolabilite de la personne du chef de l'Etat, sur le caractere incontestable de l'autorite du chefdel'Etat, m~me si ces bavardages tombent absolument dans le vip.e. En effet, on nous rebat les oreilles avec 1'incon- testabilite du caractere legal et constitutionnel d'un chef d'Etat et l'autorite d'un chef d'Etat qui a ete dementi par l'armee de son pays, ~ laquelle il a de- mande de deposer les armes, ~ la suite d'une querelle qui l'opposait ~ son premier ministre. L'armee a refuse. 40. Ce chef d'Etat s'est trouve devant la secession du Katanga, lequel pays frappe maintenant sa mon- naie, done s'est insurge contre son autorite. Ce m~me chef d'Etat a ete neutralise en quelque sorte, par le 42. On peut me repondre qU'il demeure quand m~me chef d'Etat. A ce moment-la, qU'on ne me dise plus qU'on ne veut pas interpreter la Loi fondamentale du Congo car on n'a plus le droit de le pretendre. Si on trouve qU'il y a'un chef d'Etat au Congo, il faut aller jusqu'au bout et reconnal'tre qu'il y a un parlement et un gouvernement provisoire et que, selon la m~me loi, ce gouvernement doit traiter des affaires cou- rantes jusqu'a ce qu'un autre gouvernement ait regu l'investiture des chambres. 4~. Il Y a des gens qui sonttres forts dans leur posi- tion de nun-intervention et de non-immixtion, mais ils ne vont pas jusqu'au bout de cetteposition; ils se con- tentent seulement de s'en servir pour degager ce que j'appellerai non des autorites mais des instruments de la politique que, eux, veulent mener dans le pays. C'est pour cela qu'ils sont parvenus a isoler le chef de l'Etat et a le placer dans une position abso- lument contraire aux inter~ts de son pays. 44. Le chef de 1'Etat, aujourd'hui, est au mieux avec les -secessiQnnistes du Katanga. La preuve, c'est qU'il nous a presente une delegation dans laquelle figure un ministre responsable de cette province. Il est au mieux aujourd'hui avec le colonel Mobutu qui amis le pied sur la democratie et la legalite dans son pays et la preuve, c'est qU'il y a deux commissaires institues par le colonel Mobutu qui sont dans la delegation. Evidemment, il a parle en m~me temps, iei, a New York, d'illegalite du Parlement congolais. Le chef de 1'Etat trouve que son parlement est illegal et c'est ce parlement-Ia qui l'a investi comme chef d'Etat. Voila la position dans laquelle on a amene aUjourd'hui le chef de 1'Etat du Congo. 45. Je voudrais dire aussi qU'en face de tout cela, le premier ministre Lumumba a toujours eu une attitude favorable.a la reconciliation. Quelques joilrs avant son arrestation arbitraire, il declarait encore - et ce fut, je crois, sa derniere declarationpublique - qU'il s'appr~tait a recevoir la mission de conciliation annoncee par les Nations Unies et qu'il serait tres . heureux de s'entretenir avec elle, de discuter avec elle de la meilleure methode permettant d'aboutir a une reconciliation llationale. Ce qui prouve que, jusqu'a cette epoque encore, il avait une certaine confiance dans Paction des Nations Unies; mais que 1'on ne nous demande pas de faire une confiance aveugle aux responsables des Nations Unies lorsque ceux-ci sont ouvertement mobilises dans un sens qui est contraire ai'interet du Congo et contraire meme a l'inter~t de l'Afrique, je veux dire dans un sens qui pietine la dignite africaine. Nous pensons que ceux qui ont inspire l'arrestation operee dans des conditions humiliantes de Lumumba, ont humilie non seulement cet homme et le' peuple congolals, mais toute l'Afrique. 45. I should also like to say that Prime Minister Lu- mumba, on the other hand, has alwa~sbeenfavourably disposed towards reconciliation. A few days before his arbitrary arrest, he said-I believe it was his tast public statement-that he was preparing to receive the Conciliation Commission formally established by the United Nations and that he wouldbe very happy to meet it and to discuss the best way of achieving a national reconciliatioJ?,. This proves that he still had some confidence in the United Natio"ns action. But let no one ask us to put blind'faith in United Nations offiCials when they are openly mobilizedinsupportofa position which is against the interests of the Congo and even of Africa, a position which is derogatory to African dignity. We think that those who engineered the humiliating arrest of Mr. Lumumba, have humiliated not only this man and the Congolese people, but Africa as a whole. 47. But what is the present situation with regard to this Conciliation Commission? On 6 December 1960 the Chief of State sent the Secretary-General a letter, from which I shall quote a few passages: "Mr. Lumumba's arrest will now enable the country to concentrate on the task of re- construction ..." In other words, the Congolese Chief of State, having requested the United Nations to accept the men he presented here as his country's delegation, went home and, despite his promises to the Advisory Committee on the Congo that, on his arrival, he would do everything to facilitate the visit of the Conciliation Commission, made a fine start by arrestingthe Prime Minister and putting him in prison. What he said in effect is: "Since this man is now in prison, the Con- ciliation Commission can come and reconstruction can begin". Mr. Kasa-Vubu adds: "It would seem to me inadvisable, however, to speed the arrival of the Conciliation Commission unduly ..." We must not be' in a hurry; there is nothing urgent, nothing serious, says the Congolese Chief of State, in spite of everything that has happened: "A premature arrival would, I fear, prevent it from exercising its good offices to the best effect. The work must be prepared .•." You see: the work must be prepared of a Conciliation Commission whose function is to go to a country to study the situation objectively, by itself, and to take its own decisions. We are told, in effect: "No, before it arrives the work must be prepared". And we shall see how it is to be prepared. The Chief of State tells us in the following sentence: "The work must be pre- pared and the Conciliation Commission's itinerary.,. should include ..." I emphasize the word "include", which means that the Commission is not to go to the country and to tryto see things for itself in accordance with its own plan, but that its itinerary must be worked out in advance, in other words, the people it will meet must be prepared, etc•." ... The Commission's itinerary through the capital cities of the provinces should include meetings with local notables, political leaders and members of the various elected assemblies." Only in this letter is there a reference to elected as- semblies in the Congo; nothing is said of the national assembly at Leopoldville, but in the provinces there are certainly members of elected assemblies, and it is considered important to have discussions with them. It is the same Chief of State, I repeat, who said that the central Parliament was illegal, and that no further attention need be paid to it, but that in the provinces the members of elected assemblies could be seen, as long as the itinerary was prepared in advance and the Commission could not go wherever it wanted. He continues: 47. Mais OU en est la situation aujourd'hui en ce qui concerne cette mission de conciliation? Le chef de l'Etat a adresse, Je 6 decembre 1960, au Secre- taire general, une lettre dont je voudrais citeI' quelques passages: "L'arrestation de M. Lumumba va permettre desormais au pays de consacrer toute son attention a la tache de la reconstruction..." Ce qui veut dire que le chef de l'Etat congolais, apres avoir demande aux Nations Unies de cautionner les hommes qu'il a presentes ici en tant que delegation du pays, retourne chez lui et apres avoir d'ailleurs promis au Comite consultatif pour le Congo que, des son retour, il ferait tout pour que la Commissior de conciliation puisse venir, il fera bien tout et il commence bien: il commence par arreter le Premier Ministre, il le met en prison et il dit en substance: "Cet homme etant maintenant en prison, la Commis- sion de conciliation peut venir et la reconstruction peut commencer." M. Kasa-Vubu ajoute: "Cependant il me parait inopportun de precipiter l'arrivee de la Commission de conciliation•••" Il ne faut pas etre presse; il n'y a rien d'urgent, il n'y a rien de grave, dit le chef de l'Etat congolais devant les evenements que nous connaissons. "Une arrivee precipitee ne permettra pas, je le crains, d'utiliser a bon escient ses bans offices. Il est en effet indispensable que le travail soit prepare..." Vous entendez bien: il faut que soit prepare le travail d'une Commission de conciliation qui doit se rendre dans un pays pour etudier objectivement la situation par elle-meme et prendre des decisions. On nous dit en substance: "Non, avant son arrivee, il faut prepa- reI' le travail." Et nous allons voir,comment se fera cette preparation. Le chef de l'Etat le dit dans la phrase suivante: Il faut "que le travail soit prepare et que l'itineraire de la Commission soit jalonne.,." Je souligne le mot "jalonne". Cela signifie qu'il ne faut pas que la Commission aille dans le pays et essaie de voir directement les choses selon son propre plan, il faut que lIon jalonne son itineraire: entendez par la qU'il faut que lIon prepare les gens qui seront rencontres, etc. Il faut donc "que l'itineraire de la Commission soit jalonne, dans les chefs-lieux de provinces, de rencontres avec les notabilites locales, les chefs politiques et les membres des differentes al;lsemblees elues." Ce n'est que dans cette lettre que l'on se rend compte qu'il y a des assemblees elues au Congo; on ne parlera pas de l'assemblee nationale a Leopoldville, mais dans les provinces, on pourra certainement rencontrer des membres des assem- blees elues et on considere qU'il est important de s'entretenir avec eux. C'est le meme chef de l'Etat, je le souligne encore une fois, qui a dit que le Parle- ment central etait illegal, on n'en parlera donc pas, mais dans les provinces, on pourra voir les membres des assemblees elues, a la condition d'ailleurs que la It is true that there is to be such a meeting at Brazzaville, and we have heard much about it. It is meddling in the two tragedies which have plunged the continent into mourning, the tragedy of the Congo and the tragedy of Algeria. "As a first step," says the Chief of State of the Congo, "1 should be grateful if youwould ensure that no further doubt exists"-and this, 1 think, is the most revealing part of the message-"regarding the following: "-And these are the points that have to be clarified before the Conciliation Commission sets out- "1. The countries participating in the Com- mission;" We knewthat it had already beendecided that the fifteen Asian and African countries which have sent con- tingents to the Congo would be appointed members of the Conciliation Commission. Yet on 6 December, President Kasa-Vubu tells us: "There must be agree- ment on the countries which are to belong to this Commission". Indeed? "2. The nature of the work to be done by the Com- m_ssion during its stay in the Congo;" What is to be the work ofthe Commission? It is called the Conciliation Commission, and its task is to explore every possible means of reconciling the political leaders of the Congo, yet we are still asked what is to be the nature of its work. Will the Commission be prepared to agree to an interpretation under whichthe United Nations could consider Colonel Mobutu, the Chief of State and the commissioners-general as the legal authorities and the rightful Government of the Congo? That is the real question. Thirdly, the Chief of State, who takes every precaution, adds: "3. The elimination of risks facing the Congo as a result of the strange attitudes of representatives from countries with which the Congo has been obliged to suspend its diplomatic relations." The United Nations_must give some kind of guarantee that, if there are representatives of certain countries am0ng the members of the Conciliation Commission, these representatives will not oppose his own views on the situation. These are the essential points. We would add that the General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) requesting that a conciliation commission should be sent to the Congo was adopted on 20 Sep- tember. 48. There is a second message dated 7 December 1960, which contains the following statement: "In your message of 7 December you inform me of the reactions ofthe Advisory Committee onthe United Nations operation in the Congo." The message is again addressed to the Secretary- General and bears two signatures, that of Mr. Joseph "Au prealable" - dit le chef de I'Etat de Congo - "je serais heureux que soient parfaitement mises au point" -' et c'est 18. je crois la partie la plus revelatrice de ce message - "1!. votre intention, les questions suivantes:" - Voil1!. donc ce qui doit ~tre mis au point avant le depart de la Commission de conciliation - "1. Les pays participant 1!. cette commission." Nous savions qU'il etait dej1!. decide que les 15 pays d'Asie et d'Afrique qui ont envoye des contingents au Congo seraient designes et feraient partie de la Commission de conciliation. Le 6 decembre, le pre- sident Kasa-Vubu nous dit: "Il faut que 1'0n s'entende sur les' pays qui vont faire partie de cette commis- sion." Point d'interrogation! "2. Le caract~re du travail qU'accomplira cette commission pendant son sejour au Congo." Quel sera le travail de la Commission? Elle porte le nom de Commission de conciliation et elle est chargee de rechercher par tous les moyens une recon- ciliation des dirigeants politiques du Congo, mais on nous demande encore quel sera le caract~re de son travail. Est-ce que la Commission pourra accepter de donner une certaine interpretation qui permette aux Nations Unies de considerer le colonel Mobutu, le chef de 1'Etat et les commissaires generaux comme la legalite au Congo, comme le gouvernement valable du Congo? Voil~ le point d'interrogation. Et au troi- si~me point, le chef de l'Etat, qui est tr~s precau- tionneux, ajoute: "3. L'elimination des risques resultant pour.le pays d'attitudes deplacees de deH~gues de pays avec lesquels le Congo a dtl suspendre ses relations diplomatiques." Il faut en quelque sorte que les Nations Unies donnent la garantie que s'il y aparmiles membres de la Com- mission de conciliation des representants de certains pays, ces representants ne vont pas g~nerses propres vues quant ~ la situation. Voila les points essentiels et nous ajouterons que la resolution 1474 (ES-IV) de I'Assemblee generale qUi demandait qU'une commis- sion de conciliaEion soit envoyee au Congo a ete adoptee le 20 septembre. . 48. Il Y a undeuxi~memessageendatedu 7 decembre 1960 dont il convient egalement de vous lire le passage suivant: "Votre message du 7 decembre m'apporte les reactions du Camite consultatif pour l'operationdes Nations Unies au Congo." Le message 'est encore adresse au' Secretaire general et il porte deux signatures: celle du President de la 49. I now revert to some points whichhave been raised during this debate and which reveal a wide discrepancy between what we expected of the United Nations action in the Congo and the way in which the responsible officials of the United Nations interpret their mission in that country. In his statement of 7 December to the Security Council, the Secretary-General calmly said: "The United Nations sent troops and civiliantech- nicians to the Congo for clearly defined Charter aims and under clearly defined Cbarterprinciples." Very goodj but he goes on: "The aim was to protect life andpropertywithin the Congo, in danger after the breakdown of the national security system, so as to eliminate the reasons given for the Belgian military intervention andthere- by to reduce what internationally had to be regarded as a serious threat to peace and security." [913th meeting, paras 15 and 16.] I think that the whole misunderstanding can be seen in that passage; the Secretary-General states that the aim was to protect life and property withinthe Congo, in danger after the breakdown of the national security system; in other words, life and property were in danger because the security forces of the Congo could no longer provide security, and the reasons given for the Belgian intervention had to be eliminated. 50. The concern of the United Nations, then, was not to meet Belgia.'l aggression; it was to eliminate the reasons given by the Belgians for attackingthe Congo. If one really set out to eliminate all that led the Belgians to attack the Congo, there would be no Congo left; there would not even be a United Nations trusteeship; it would mean that everything that is national and of value in the Congo would be destroyed; it would mean the ~e-colonizationof the Congo. For the reasons for the Belgian military intervention are well known in Africa; they are obvious. Ifit was those reasons which it was intended to eliminate along with the disturbances which were provoked inthe Congolese National Army, then there was indeed a grave dis- crepancy between that interpretation and what we African countries had in mind. 51. The Secretary-General said that the aim was "thereby to reduce what internationally had to be regarded as a serious threat to peace and security". Obviously, the word "internationally" is used inorder to avoid any reference to domestic law. There is no longer any question whatever of protecting a state which has just proclaimed its independence and been admitted to membership of the United Nations, and which has been attached. There is no longer any question of aggression. In any event,onecanno longer 49. Je reviens sur quelques considerations qui ont ete soulevees au cours de ce debat et qui r~v~lent un fosse profond entre ce que nous attendions de l'action des Nations Unies au Congo et l'interpr~tation que les plus responsables, au nom des Nations Unies, donnent ~ leur mission dans ce pays. Dans son inter- vention du 7 decembre, devant le Conseil de securite, le Secretaire general a dit tranquillement: "L'Organisation des Nations Unies a envoye des troupes et des techniciens civils au Congo pour des objectifs clairement definis par la Charte et confor- mement ~ des principes clairement definis de la Charte." Tr~s bien. Poursuivons: "Vobjectif etait de proteger les vies humaines et les biens au Congo, menaces apr~s l'effondre- ment du syst~me national de securite, de fa90n ~ faire disparaitre les raisons invoquees aI'appui de l'intervention militaire beIge et ~ reduire par la ce qU'il fallait considerer, du point de vue inter- national, comme une grave menace ~ la paix et ~ la securite." [913~me seance, par. 15 et 16.] Je crois que tout le malentendu se trouve dans ce passage; le Secretaire general affirme que l'objectif etait de proteger les vies humaines et les biens au Congo, menaces apr~s l'effondrement dU'o syst~me national de securite; c'est-~-direque les vies et les biens etaient menaces parce que les forces de secu- rite du Congo ne pouvaient plus assurer cette s~curit~ et qU'il fallait faire disparaltre les raisons invoquees ~.l'appui de l'intervention beIge. 50. Donc, la preoccupation des Nations Unies n'etait pas de faire face a l'agression beIge; elle etait de faire disparaitre les raisons qui ont ete invoquees par les BeIges pour attaquer le Congo. Mais si 1'0n veut vraiment faire disparaltre ce qui a amene les BeIges ~ attaquer le Congo, il ne restera plus de Congo; ce ne sera meme plUS la tutelle des Nations Uniesj ce sera la liqUidation de tout ce qU'il y a de national, de valable au Congo; ce sera la recoloni- sation du Congo. Car les raisons de l'intervention militaire beIge sont connues en Afrique, elles sont evidentes. Si c'est ce qU'il fallait faire disparaitre en meme temps que les troubles qui ont ete suscites dans l'armee nationale du Congo, vraiment alors il y avait malentendu grave entre cette interpretation et ce que nous pensions, nous pays d'Afrique. 51. "Le Secretaire general dit qU'il fallait "rectuire par a ce qU'il fallait considerer, du point de vue international, comme une grave menace a la paix et 1l. la securite". Evidemment, puisqu'on ne v~ut pas s'appuyer sur la loi interieure, on dit: "du point de vue internationalll • 11 n'est plus question du tout de proteger un Etat qui vient de proclamer son indepen- dance, d'etre admis comme Membre de l'ONU et qui a ete attaque. Il n'est plus question d'agression. On ne peut plus d'ailleurs parler d'agression, puisque 52. We find in the Secretary-GeneralIs statement some observations on strict neutrality. The United Nations action, he says, cannot be used by any person or faction for political aims. But if the maintenance of independence and integrity is a political aim, the United Nations cannot be used in pursuit of that aim. That is where this so-called neutrality leads us. I read further in the same statement: "It is indeed commOll experience to everyone who has tried to pursue a line of independence and objectivity in human affairs that he comes under criticism from those who believe that they would have had a greater chance to success for their own special aims if it had not been for this attitude." [Ibid., para 19.] In this connexion, I will quote an African proverb: When a dead leaf, tossed by the Wind, sails high into the air, it sometimes imagines that it is flying and that it is in command of the situation. 53. With reference to the resolution, we are told: "ThIs resolution did not specifically state that the United Nations Force was to maintain law and order, but it was clear from the context that this would be its essential function." [Ibid., para. 25.] Here is a country whose constitution is being ignored, and yet the statement is made that, except in the case of the Chief of State, who is undisputed (undisputed by you, since he approves of your plans, but disputed by everyona else), there will be no interference with the law or the Constitution. And then we hear references to maintaining law and order! 54 We have taken particular note of the following passage later in the Secretary-General's statement: "It should be recalled that at this initial stage there was no United Nations concern with the constitutional issues or political institutions of the Congo. The task of the United Nations Force was a police task-that is, to protect lives and property against violence and disorder," [Ibid., para. 26,] -- Whose lives, whose property? We do not know. 55. I will end the quotationhere, since matters appear to be very clear. I will go straight back to Security Council resolution S/4387, which could not be more explicit, especially in its paragraph 2, which reads as follows: "Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts ofthe Congo- lese Government with the technical assistance ofthe United Nations, the national security forces may be lui-m~me qui fera le proces. 52. On trouve dans cette d€lclaration du Secr€ltaire g€lneral des considerations sur la stricte neutralite. Aucune personne, aucune faction, nous dit-il, ne peut se servir de l'intervention de IIOrganisation des Nations Unies pour ses fins politiques. Supposons que le maintien de l'independance et de l'integrite soitune fin politique; on ne peut se servir de l'ONU ~ cette fin. Voil~ oil. conduit cette pretendue neutralit€l. Je lis encore dans le m~me texte: . "n est bien connu que, lorsqulon cherche ~ se comporter de maniere independante et objective dans les affaires humaines, on est en butte aux critiques de ceux qui pensent qU'ils auraient eu plus de chances de realiser leurs desseins parti- culiers sans cette attitude." [Ibid., par. 19.] L~, je citerai au Conseil de securit€l un proverbe africain: n arrive qU'une feuille morte monte tres haut, ballott~e par le vent, et s'imagine qU'elle est en train de planer et qU'elle domine la situation. 53. A propos de la resolution, on nous dit: "Cette resolution ne stipulait pas express€lment que la Force des Nations Unies devait maintenir l'ordre public, mais il ressortait clairement du contexte que ce serait la sa fonction essentielle." [Ibid., par. 25.] Apropos d'un pays dont on veut ignorer la Consti- tution, on dit: en dehors du chef de l'Etat, qui est inconteste - inconteste par nous, puisqu'il approuve nos plans, conteste par le reste - , nous ne voulons plus nous immiscer dans la l€lgalite et la Consti- tution. Et apres on parle de l'ordre public! 54,- Nous soulignons plus loin, dans l'intervention du Secretaire general: "n y a lieu de rappeler quIa ce stade initial, l'Organisation des Nations Unies ne se preoccupait pas des problemes constitutionnels ni des insti- tutions politiques du Congo. La tache de 1a Force des Nations Unies etait une tache de police: il s'agis- sait de proteger les vies humaines et les biens contre la violence et le d€lsordre." [Ibid., par; 26.] Les vies humaines, les biens de qUi? Nous n'en savons rien. 55. J'arr~te cette citation pUisqu'il semble que les cr0ses soient tres claires. Je reviens imm€ldiatement a .L •• resolution S/4387 du Conseil de securit€l, qui est on ne peut plus explicite, notamment a son para- graphe 2 ainsi libelle: "Decide d'autoriser le, Secr~taire ~n~ral a prendre, en consultation avec le C',JQuvernement de la Republique du Congo, les mesures n€lcessaires en vue de fournir a ce gouvernement l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin, et c.e jusqu'au moment oil. les forces nationales de securite, grace aux efforts du Gouvernement congolais et avec l'assis- 56. The report submitted to us following Mr. Lu- mumba's arrest [S/4571 and Add.1], clearly shows that the situation is very serious, inthat Mr. Lumumba was under the protection of the United Nations Force. There was also a cordon of ConJtOlesetroops; Mobutu's soldiers formed part of the guar9 protecting Mr. Lu- mumba. That was a very serious situation. Some troops were there to protect him; others were there with instructions which, we may be sure, were the exact reverse. But we were told that: "as long as he is indoors, all is well; we are not concerned with who goes in or who comes out." 57. In such a situation, anything may happen, and in those circumstances I think that the worst thing is to appeal to friends who would rather disregard your troubles. 58. I should like to read to the Security Council two messages from President Sekou Toure, regarding the events in the Congo. The first telegram from the President of the Republic of Guinea is dated 3 December 1960 and addressed to the Secretary- GeneraL It reads as follows: nDiplomatic missions United Arab RepUblic and Ghana have been subjected to arbitrary measure's expulsion territory Congo stop Government Republic Guinea indignant at these measures which are illegal and contrary international law and spirit United Nations Charter and protests against un- pardonable indifference representatives United Nations Organization Congo stop we urge United Nations reinstate missions thus flouted and prevent recurrence similar illegality (~Q)Sekou Toure.n!f The second telegram dated 5 December 1960 reads as follows: npeople and Government Republic Guinea deeply incensed by the humiliations of which President Lu- mumba is victim at hands of armed bands Mobutu and convey to you their complete misgivings inview attitude representatives United Nations Organization Congo openly upholding illegal and arbitrary actions stop in view of this situation Republic Guinea hence- forth reserves all rights to seek other means within purely African framework to support Congolese people in struggle against all forms colonialism (Signed) sekou Toure." Y , 59. I should now like to read a few passages from the statement of the representative ofArgentinawhich we heard on 8 December, who put forward his views in very moderate and completely acceptable terms. We do not, however, entirely agree with what he said and more especially with the following statement: 56. Dans le rapport qui nous a ete soumis 11 la suite de 1'arrestation de M. Lumumba [S/4571 et Add.1], nous voyons clairement que la situation est tr~s grave, en ce sens que M. Lumumba etait protege par les forces de 1'ONU. Il y avait aussi, dlailleurs, un cordon de troupes congolaises. Les soldats de Mobutu faisaient partie de la garde qui protegeait M. Lumumba. Situation tr~s grave. Des soldats sont l~ pour le proteger; d'autres sont l~avecdes instruc- tions 11 coup stlr diametralement opposees. Et lIon nous dit: "tant qU'il est dans la maison, tout va bien; mais nous ne nous occupons pas de ceux qu: sortent ou entrent." 57. Dans une pareille situation, tout peut arriver, et, dans ces circonstances, je crois que le malheur est de faire appel 11 des amis qUi pref~rent ignorer vos preoccupations. 58. Je voudrais lire aux representants du Conseil de securite deux messages que nous avons regus du president Sekou Toure, a propos des evenements du Congo. Le premier telegramme date du 3 de- cembre 1960 et il est adresse au Secretaire general par le President de la Republique de Guinee. Il est ainsi congu: "Missions diplomatiques Republique arabe unie et Ghana viennent ~tre objet mesures arbitraires expulsion territoire Congo. Gouvernement Repu- blique Guinee indigne a la suite ces mesures ille- gales et contraires droit international et esprit Charte Nations Unies proteste contre indifference coupable representants ONU Congo. Insistons aupr~s ONU pour retablir missions ainsi bafouees et em- pecher retour pareille illegalite. (Signe) Sekou Toure~n Le deuxi~metelegramme, en datedu5decembre1960, se lit comme suit: "Peuple et Gouvernement Republique Guinee pro- fondement indignes par les humiliations clont est victime le president Lumumba du fait des bandes armees Mobutu vous expriment toutes leurs appre- hensions devant l'attitude des representants ONU Congo soutenant ouvertement 11illegalite et l'arbi- traire. Devant cette situation Republique Guinee se reserve desormais tous droits afin rechercher autre voie pour soutenir dans cadre exclusivement afri- cain peuple congolais en lutte contre toutes formes colonialisme. (Signe) Sekou ToureY." 59. Je voudrais maintenant donner lecture de quelques passages de l'intervention du representant de l'Argen- tine que nous avons entendu le 8decembre. En termes tr~s moderes et tout 11 fait acceptables, il a presente un point de vue que nous contestons quelque peu, surtout lorsqu'il dit: 1/ Documents officlels de l'Assemblee generale, guinzlllme session, Annexes, point 85 de l'ordre du jour, document A/4617. ~1 Ibid. In other words, we are told that, as the Chief of State has been seated, he represents legality in the Congo. Once he has been seated with his delegation, we are told that since we .have seated himwithhis delegation, he is now the only person who can nominate the valid Government of the Congo. We really do not understand this reasoning; onthatbasis anythingis possible, if one· simply begins by saying: Ainsi, on nous dit, lorsqu'il s'agit d'asseoir le chef de l'Etat: "C'est lui qui represente la Mgalit~ au Congo." Une fois qU'll est assis avec sa dele~ation, on nous dit: "Puisque vous l'avez fait asseoir avec sa delegation, il est le seul maintenant qui puisse vous designer le gouvernement valable au Congo." Vraiment, nous ne comprenons pas. Avec cela, on peut .tout faire, 11 suffit de savoir bien commencer. "This explicit recognition means that the United Nations cannot accept the credentials of allY person or group of persons other than those appointed by the President as members or representatives ofthe Congolese Government." [Thid.] The Chief of State can thus nominate Mr. X or Mr. Y:, even if they are riot Congolese nationals; once he has nominated them and declaredthattheyarethe ones who are to represent him, that is the endof th~ matter. This Chief of State is more than a king. Thus, we, as the United Nations, give him the right to nominate ministers, and not only to nominate them, but to en- able them to function as a government, in flagrant violation of the law of his country. We also give him the power to designate his country's representatives abroad; in other words, we give himthe right to direct the foreign policy of his country. This also is a viola- tion of Congolese law. Donc le chef de l'Etat peutnommerM.X, M. Y, meme s'ils ne sont pas des nationaux congolais; du moment qU'll les a nommes et qU'll a declare que c'etait eux qui devaient le representer, c'est termine. Il est plus qu'un roi, ce chef d'Etat! Nous lui donnons donc, en tant que Nations Unies, le droit de nommer les ministres, et non seulement de les nommer, ~ais de les faire fonctionner en tant que gouvernement, ce qui est en contradiction flagrante avec la loi de son pays. Nous ·lui domons aussi la possibilite de designer les representants de son pays ~ l'exterieur, c'est-~-dire le droit d'assumer la politique exterieure de son pays, ce qui est encore contraire aux' lois congo- laises. 60. The representative of Argentina continued: 60. Le representant de l'Argentine poursuit: "Mr. Patrice Lumumba, who held the post ofPrime Minister when independence was declared, is not now a member of the Government led by Mr. Kasa- Vubu..." [Ibid., para. 72]. So Mr.. Kasa-Vubu, who is Chief of State, is also head of a government. He is now assuming two roles, and before long he will be the Parliament as well. Then the trick will be completed. Donc, M. Kasa-Vubu, qui est chef d'Etat, dirige un gouvernement. Il assume maintenant deux roles, et bientot il sera aussi le Parl~ment. Ainsi, le tour sera joue. "The United Nations cannot, therefore, regard him as holding executive authority nor can we refer to him by his previous title, which he no longer possesses ..." [Ibid.]. d~sign~, dans le texte de notre resolution, sous son ancien titre qU'il ne poss~de plus." Et ce qui est beaucoup plus significatif, crest la' phrase suivante: Much more SIgnificant is the sentence which follows: "Certainly, Mr. Lumumba is still a deputy, since the Parliament has not been dissolved." [Ibid.] That is a very revealing remark. Mr. Lumumba is.a deputy, since Parliament has not been dissolved. But when Parliament passes a vote annulling a decision, we remain silent, taking the line that its ruling is illegal or non-existent. Parliament has passed two important votes: it has annulled the decree of the Chief of State deposing the Prime Minister and re- Voil~ qui est tr~s revelateur. M. Lumumba est de- pute, car le Parlement n'a pas et13 dissous. Mais, lorsque le Parlement vote et annule une decision, nous gardons le silence, en disant que cette decision est illegale, ou qU'elle n'existe pas. Le Parlement a vote deux choses importantes: il a annule l'ordon- nance du chef de l'Etat qui deposait le Premier "Cette reconnaissance explicite signifie que les Nations Unies ne peu.vent admettre les titres d' au- cune autre personne ou d'aucun groupe de per- sonnes que celles nommees par le President comme membres ou comme representants du Gouvernement congolais." [Ibid.] "M. Patrice Lumumba, qui a exerce les fonctions de premier ministre lors de la proclamation de 1'independance, ne fait pas actuellement partie du gouvernement dirige par M. Kasa-Vubu." [Ibid., par. 72.] "Il ne peut pas, en consequence, ~tre considere par 1'ONU comme etant investi de l'autorite du pouvoir executif, pas plus qU'il ne saurait ~tre "M. Lumumba conserv~, sans aucun doute, le titre de depute, puisque le Parlement n'a pas ete dissous." [Ibid.] 61. The same Parliament, which has not been dis- solved and which is our authorityfor regardingMr. Lu- mumba as a deputy, has protested against the seating of the delegation presented to us here by the Chief of State. But we have been told that these are matters of domestic concern. But if we are logical, we should no longer even call Mr, Lumumba a deputy. Why do we still do so? Because Parliament has not been dis- solved. We must therefore .continue this logical reasoning. I am sure that,givenawillingnessto do so, we shall soon discover who are the enemie& of the Congolese people. Besides, the statement thatParlia- ment has not been dissolved serves the useful purpose of immediately condemning Colonel Mobutu. 62. Those are the few passages we have selected from the statement by the representative ofArgentina, which was very moderate but put forward a number of very dangerous ideas concerning the situation in the Congo. Moderate statements are always highly de- sirable, since they maintainfriendly relations between delegations; ,but in some cases, they offer no solution to the tragedies which overtake peoples and imperil their very lives. The situation in the Congo is par- ticularly serious, since the independence and unity of the country: are at stake. 63. If therefore, during our statement, we may be permitted to make a few suggestions concerning a possible decision by the Security Council, one of the first would be to request that, if the United Nations wishes to remain worthy of its mission, action should be taken to obtain the release of the legal Prime Minister of the Congo, that is, of Mr. Patrice Lu- mumba, and of all those who are in prison despite the fact that they enjoy parliamentary immunity in their country. 64. We would also like action to be taken to bring about, and provide protection for, a meeting of the Congolese Parliament in the near future, We further believe that, if the Conciliation Commission is to do useful work, it should be converted into a commission of inquiry into the situation. 65. Those are a few suggestions which we put for- ward, not with any great optimism, it is true, for we well know that often it is not logic which prevails in debate and that in many cases it must be said, the die is cast before the debate begins. We know that no country in the world is guided entirely by the United Nations in the management of its affairs, but all countries should try to ensure that their contribution to the Organization is in the interests of freedom, . dignity, and human solidarity. 66. To conclude, I would like to read the latest message received by my delegation from President Sekou Toure in Conakry, announcing that the Republic of Guinea, haVing already been obliged to withdraw from the Conciliation Commission-sipce that Com- mission is now completely paralysed as a result of del8;Ys and hesitations, and since it was in any case 61. Ce m~me parlement, qui n'est pas dissous et qui nous autorise a considerer M. Lumumba comme depute, a proteste contre l'installation de la dele- gation qui nous a ete presentee ici par le chef de l'Etat. Mais on nous a dit qU'il s'agissait 11\ d'af- faires interieures. Cependant, si nous sommes 10- giques, nous ne devons meme plus appeler M. Lumumba "depute". Pourquoi l'appelons-nous ainsi? Parce que le Parlement n'a pa,s ete dissous. Il faut donc continueI' ce raisonnement logique. Je suis sar qU'avec une telle bonne volonte nous trou- verons tout de suite qui sont les ennemis du peuple congolais. D'ailleurs, en disant que le Parlement n'a pas ete dissous, on fait une excellente declaration, car elle condamne tout de suite le colonel Mobotu. 62. Voil~ les quelques passages que nous avons rele- ves dans 1'intervention du representant de I'Argentine; elle etait tres moderee mais elle comportait des idees tr~s dangereuses pour la situation au Congo. Les interventions moderees sont toujours tr~s sou- haitables j elles entretiennent I'amitie entre les dele- gations; mais, dans certains cas, elles n'apportent aucune solution aux drames que subissent les peuples et qui mettent en jeu leur vie m~me. Au Congo, c'est meme plus grave, car ce sontl'independanceetl'unite duo pays qui sont en cause. 63. Par consequent, si, aucours de notre declaration, nous pouvons donner encore quelques suggestions en ce qui concerne une decision eventuelle du Conseil de securite, l'une d'elles serait d'abord de demander qU'une action soit menee, si l'ONU veut rester encore ~ la hauteur de sa tache, pour que le premier ministre legal du Congo, qui est Patrice Lumumba, soitlibere, et que soient liberes aussi tous ceux qui sont empri- sonnes en depit du fait qU'ils jouissent de l'immunite parlementaire dans leur pays. 64. Nous voudrions egalement qU'une action soit prise pour favoriser et pour protegeI' la reunion dans le plus bref delai du Parlement congola~s. D'autre part, si l'on veut qae la Commission de conciliation fasse reuvre utile, il faut qU'elle se transforme en meme temps en une commission d'enquete sur la situation. 65. Ce sont l~ des indications que nous donnons d'ailleurs sans trop d'illusions, car nous savons tr~s bien que souvent ce n'est pas la logique qui prevaut dans le debat et que, il faut bien le dire, les jeux sont souvent faits avant que la discussion ne com- mence. Nous savons qU'aucun pays au monde ne compte formellement sur l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour mener sa vie, maistouslespays devraiemt avoir pour objectif de faire en sorte que leur apport ~ l'Organisation soit positif pour la liberte, pour la dignite, et aussi pour la solidarite humaine. 66. Je voudrais maintenant, pour terminer, vous lire le dernier message du president Sekou Toure que ma delegation a reC;;m de Conakry; le President annonce que la Republique de Guinee, apr~s avoir dej~ ete amenee ~ se retirer de la Commission de conciliation - cette commission se trouvant maintenant dans une situation d'enUsement total, d'atermoiements et d'h6sitations;

With the permission of the members of the Council I now call on the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville). 69. Mr. CARDOSO (Congo, Leopoldville) (translated from French): I had not intended to speak a second time in this debate, for, as I stated at the beginning, the real solutions" to our problem will not be found here. Nevertheless, in view of all that has been said about my country, of all the things that have been said which are wrong, I feel obliged to reply. It is not-at least, it was not-my original intention to criticize anybody. I leave everyone free to have his own opinion, while reserving the right to express my own. 68. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Avec la per- mission des membres du Conseil, je donne la parole au representant du Congo (Leopoldville). 69. M. CARDOSO (Congo [Uopoldville)): Je n'avais· pas l'intention d'intervenir une seconde fois dans la discussion car - et je 1'ai precise d~s le debut - ce n'est pas ici que seront trouvees les veritables solu- tions 1l notre probl~me. Neanmoins, etant donne tout ce que 1'on a raconte sur mon pays, etant donne tout c.e que 1'on a dit d'errone, je me trouve dans 1'obli- gation de repondre. Ce n'est pas - en tout cas ce n'etait pas - mon intention primordiale de critiquer qui que ce soit. Je laisse cependant 1l chacun le loisir d'avoir son opinion en me reservant egale~ent la liberte d'exprimer la mienne. 70. The letter, dated 9 December 1960, addressed to 70. La lettre, en date du 9 decembre 1960, adressee the Secretary-General by the representative of the au Secretaire general par le representant de l'Union Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/4592], does not- des Republiques socialistes sovietiques [S/4592] n'a, unfortunately for your delegation, Mr. President- pas, malheureusement pour votre delegation, Monsieur carry the same weight as the report of Mr. Dayal to le President, tout le poids du rapport de M; Dayal au the Secretary-General [S/4590]. You may think that it Secretairegeneral [S/4590]. Vous pouvez considerer is a waste of time to try and justify the violence of the que crest peine perdue que de chercher 1l justifier Lumumba supporters at Stanleyville and to uphold the la violence des partisans de Lumumba ~ 'stanleyville, 17 71. The Secretary-General has explained to the representative of Indonesia what he means by "great restraint" and by "[adjustment] to the peculiar cir- cumstances at present prevailing in the Congo" [916th meeting.] The Secretary-General means by these terms tha:t ONUC cannot continue the training of an army which has become a political instrument nor can the United Nations help financially with the budget if expenditure is partly ef a character "which runs counter to our own aims". This explanation given by the Secretary-General is at once a statement of account and a programme. 72. We know that certain countries which claim to be our friends refuse, with perhaps the best intentions, to pay ONUC's bills, and thus compromise its activi- ties. We understand, therefore, why the United Nations has to adopt a regime of austerity. It is not because the expenditure is partly of a character which runs counter to its aims. 73. The truth must be told; ONUC is beginning to run out of money. Nevertheless, we shouldlike to have more particulars in connexien with the Secretary- General's statement. What, Mr. Secretary-General, is this expenditure which runs counter to your aims? What,.moreover, are those aims? It is not enough just to give us figures. If you will break down this budget for us, we shall be able to understand your policy. If it would be very difficult for youto give us this informa- tion here, in the Security Council, or if that might prolong the discussion or even poison the atmosphere unnecessarily, we should be ready to receive your answer inthe Fifth Committee, where budgetary affairs are dealt with. 74. As regards the trainingofthe army, whichyou now consider to have become a political instrument, we have hoped since the beginning that ONUC would help us to reorganize our army, which was seriouslycom- promised after the events ofJuly. Since the Secretary- General has just stated that he cannot, or even that he will not, help us any longer, you will understand that we shall have to take the necessary measures ourselves to carry out. this reorganization. Can we do anything else? The Secretary-General has made his statement. Do not be surprised, then, if tomorrow you see all the implications of this statement realized in practice. 75. I should like now to review various statements more or less in detail, but before doing so I want to expose the policy of the man you are defending, the man whom you consider a symbol, but who symbolizes nothing but racialism and the ruin of our country. 76. I have here a letter, dated 15 September 1960, sent by Prime Minister Lumumba to the presidents of all the prOVincial governments-all "except Katanga", he says, as if he were already ratifying its secession. As you might well imagine,lhave here only a photostat of this document. I do not want to walk partimlii~res qUi regnent actuellement au Congo" (916~me seance]. Le Secretaire general entend par ces termes que l'ONUC ne peut continuer d'instruire une armee qui est devenue un instrument politique, de meme que 1'ONU ne peut aider financi~rementil l'equilibre dll budget si une partie des depenses sont de telle nature qu'elles "vont en partie il des fins contraires il nos objectifs". Cette precisionduSecre- taire general est ala fois un bilan et un programme. 72. Nous savons que certains pays qui se proclament nos amis refusent, avec des intentions peut-etre tr~s bonnes, de payer la note de l'ONUC et com- promettent ainsi 1'action de cette derni~re. Nous comprenons,. d~s lors, le regime d'austerite que l'ONU doit s'imposer. Ce n'est donc pas parce qU'une partie des depenses sont de telle nature qu'elles vont directement A l'oppose des objectifs. 73. Il faut dire la verite: l'ONUC commence A m~­ quer·d'argent. Toutefois, nous aimerions recevoir plus de renseignements sur la precision donnee par le Secretaire general. Quelles sont donc, Monsieur le Secretaire general, ces depenses qui vont Ades fins contraires A vos objectifs. Quels sont, par ailleurs, ces objectifs? Vous ne pouvez pas vouS contenter de nous donner des chiffres: vous nous ferez la venti- lation de ce budget et ainsi, nous pourrons saisir votre politique. Si cela vous gene beaucoup de nous donner ces renseignements ici, au Conseil de secu- rib~t et si cela risque peut~trede prolonger ou m~me' d'envenimer inutilement les debats, nous sommes . disposes A recevoir votre reponse A la Cinqui~me Commission .qui traite des questions budgetaires. 74. Quant h l'instruction de l'armee, que vous esti- mez maintenant etre devenue un instrument politique, nous avions espere d~s le debut que l'ONUC nous aiderait A reorganiser notre armee, fortement com- promise apr~s les evenements de juillet; puisque le Secretaire general vient maintenant d'affirmer qU'il ne peut plUS, ou meme qU'il ne veut plus nous aider, vous comprendrez donc que nous prenions nous- memes les dispositions necessaires pour faire cettei .r~organisation. Pouvons-nous faire autre chose? Le. mot du Secretaire general a ete lache. Ne soyez done pas etonnes de voir, demain, se realiser toutes les implications que cette declaration comporte. 75. J'aimerais maintenant passer plus ou moins en revue differentes declarations, mais, avant cela, je veuX devoiler ici la' politique de l'homme que vous defendez, de l'homme que vous considerez comme un symbole et qUi n'est que le symbole du racisme et le symbole de la ruine de notre pays. 76. J'ai ici la lettre du 15 septembre 1960, envoyee par le premier ministre Lumumba a tous les presi- dents des gouvernements provinciaux - tous "sauf le Katanga" fait-il remarquer, comme s'il enterinait dejil la secession.Je n'ai ici, vous le pensez bien, q'l'une photocopie de ce document. Je ne veux pas me "Mr. President", he writes, "I have the honour and pleasure to bring to your attention that in order quickly to restore order in the country, the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, meeting in special session on 13 September 1960, decided to invest the Government with full powers." The term "full powers" must be interpreted as mean- ing that the Government is free to act in all matters as it sees fit. That is the arbitrary element to which I wish to draw your attention. " ... for the purpose of suppressing abuses, dis- orders and any action which is contrary to the will of the Government over which I have presided legally since the attainment of independence by the Congo. "Thus it is for the nationalist members of both the central and provincial governments to take advantage of this unique opportunity to bring order into the country and impose respect for the es- tablished authorities. "The most effective and direct methods of suc- ceeding rapidly in our task may be summarized as follows:" I would ask you, Gentlemen, to note the cynicism of what follows: "1. Establish absolute dictatorship and apply it in all its forms; "2. Terrorism must be undertaken to subdue the population; "3. Proceed systematically, using the army, to arrest all members of the opposition. I will be personally responsible for those at Leopoldville, including the Head of state and his close sup- porters." This language suggests certain comparisons. "A few weeks ago, iI:' ").8W of the present situation in Katanga and South Kaz.~j, IE;enttheNational Army to arrest Tshombe and Kalonji and even.to kill them if possible. If these two, and Mr. K. were to be disposed of"-I do not think this is the great K., it is Kalonji-"the problems that face us would be solved without any difficulty. "4. Imprison the ministers, deputies and senators who sometimes abuse their parliamentary immunity. In such cases, I should be glad if you would not spare them but arrest them all without pity and treat them with ten times more severity than ordinary individuals." I have not yet finished, Gentlemen. "5. Revive the system of flogging and give the rebels ten lashes, morning and evening, for amaxi- mum of seven consecutive days "N.B....Double the number in the case of Ministers, senators anddeputies, reducingthe number gradually according to the condition of each individual" "Monsieur le President - ecrit-il - j'ai l'hon- neur et le plaisir.de porter a votre connaissance qU'en vue de retablir rapidement l'ordre dans ce pays, la Chambre des representants et le Senat, reunis en seance extraordinaire, le 13 septembre courant, ont decide d'investir le gouvernement des pleins pouvoirs." En effet, par "pIeins pouvoirs" il faut entendre que le gouvernement est libre d'agir en tout et pour tout comme bon lui semble. Tel est l'arbitraire sJ.l.rlequel je veux attirer votre attention. " ... afin de reprimer les abus, desordres et tous actes contraires a la volonte du gouvernement que je preside legalement depuis l'accession dn Congo aI' independance. "Il appartient donc aux membres nationalistes du gouvernement, tant central que provincial, de profiter de cette occasion unique pour faire regner l'ordre dans le pays et faire respecter l'autorite etablie. "Les moyens les plus efficaces et les plus directs pour reussir rapidement dans notre tache peuvent se resumer comme suit:" Et je vous prie, Messieurs, de noter le cynisme de ce qui suit: "1. Mener a fond la dictature et I' appliquer sous toutes ses formes; "2. Appliquer le terrorisme indispensable pour dominer la population; "3. Proceder systematiquement, et au moyen de· l'armee, a l'arrestation de tous les membres de l'opposition. Je m'en chargerai personnellement pour ceux de Leopoldville, y compris le chef de I'Etat et ses acolytes immediats." Le langage permet certains rapprochements. "Vu la situation actuelle du Katanga et du Sud- Kasai', j'ai envoye, il y a quelques semaines, I'Armee nationale pour arreter Tshombe et Kalonji et meme les tuer s'il y avait possibilite. En perdant ces deux elements, ainsi que M. K." - Jeconsid~re que ce n'est pas le grand K., c'est Kalonji - "les pro- bl~mes qui nous preoccupent seront resolus sans difficulte aucune. "4. Incarcel'er les ministres, deputes et senateurs qui parfois abusent de leur immunite parlementaire. En pareil cas, je vous saurais gre de ne pas les epargner et de les arreter tous sans pitie, en leur r~servant un traitement dix fois plus sev~re que celui des individus ordinaires." Je n'ai pas encore fini, Messieurs. "5. Reinstaurer le regime dufouet et endonner aux rebelles 10 coups, matin et soir, jusqu'a concur- rence de sept jours successifs. "N.B. - Doubler le regime s'il.s'agitde ministres, senateurs ou deputes; ensuite, diminuer progres- sivement ce regime suivant l'etat de chaque 11- dividu." There is really nothing to laugh about, for we have suffered all that. I am sorry, butone should take these things seriously. "7. In view of the seriousness ofthe situationof the country, which is in danger of sinking into anarchy, it would be well to imprison repeated offenders in underground cells or prisons for at least six months, never allOWing them out to breathe fresh air. "N.B. If someo!' them succumb as a result of certain.trocities, which is possible and desirable, the truth should not be diVUlged but it should be announced, for instance, that Mr. X has escaped and cannot be found. "8. Those who do not succumb in prison should not be released for at least a year. In such cases they will be exiled to a country to be determined by me in agreement with certain foreign countries which have already given their agreement in prin- ciple." I hope that these· countries recognize themselves around this table. "Some of the provincial presidents will say that the measures described are severe. In reply Iwould point out to them that certain politicians have attained power by means of dictatorship. Moreover, the measures of execution that! have indicated above constitute only the first stage of the basic regime that we hope will succeed in the Congo. The second stage will be to destroy anyone who criticizes us. "To avoid any ill-treatment of people who share our ideology, who might not be known to you, you should communicate to me from time to time a list giving full particulars of all the people you may have imprisoned, so that I can instruct you as to the appropriate treatment for each individual. "If these instructions, which should be put into effect immediately on receipt of this ietter, 'are scrupulously carried out, I am sure that we shall triumph. "In conclusion, I would point out that this letter should be communicated only to those authorities under your orders in whom you have entire con- fidence. "(Signed): P. Lumumba, Prime Minister That was only a document being read, but the same treatment could have been meted out to you. Il n'y a vraiment pas de quoi rire, car nous avons souffert de tout cela. Je m'excuse beaucoup, mais 11 faudrait prendre ces choses au serieux. "7. Devant la gravite de la situation oil. se trouve le pays, qui risque de sombrer dans l'anarchie, il y a avantage a. enfermer les recidivistes dans leur cellule ou dans une prison souterraine pendant six mois au minimum, sans jamais leur donner 1'oc- casion de respirer l'air pur du dehors. "N.B. - Si certains venaient a. succomber par suite de certaines atrocites, ce qui est possible et souhaitable, il y aurait lieu de ne pas divulguer la nouveile exacte, mais de cacher la realite en fai- sant, par exen'ple, une declaration selon laquelle M. X. s'est evade et qU'il reste introuvable malgre les recherches. "8. Les personnes qui ne succomberaient pas En prison ne seront liberees qU'apres au moins un an, Dans ce cas, elIes seront exilees dans un pays que je determinerai moi-m~me, en accord avec certains pays etrangers qui m'ont deja. marque leur accord de principe." Je souhaite que ces pays se reconnaissent autour de cette table. "Certains presidents provinciaux me diront que les mesures dictees sont severes. Je leur ferai re- marquer immediatement que certains hommes poli- tiques sont arrives au pouvoir gr~ce a. la dictature. Les mesures d'execution que je vous dicte ci-dessus ne constituent d'ailIeurs que la premi~re phase du regime de base que nous souhaitons prosp~re au Congo. La deuxi~me phase consistera a. faire descendre toute personne qUi nous critiquera. "Pour eviter de maltraiter les gens de notre ideologie, au cas oil. Hs ne seraient pas connus de nous, il y aurait lieu de me communiquer au fur et a. mesure la liste et l'identite compll~te de toutes les personnes que vous seriez amenes a. incarcerer, afin de me permettre de vous dieter le traitement approprie pour chaque individu. "En respectant scrupuleusement ces instructions, qui doivent entrer en vigueur d~s reception de la presente, je suis convaincu que nous triompherons. "Pour terminer, j'attire votre attention surle fait que les autorites sous vos ordres ne peuvent rece- voir communication de la presente que lorsqu'elles jouissent de votre confiance parfaite. ' "(Signe) P. Lumumba, premier ministre." Ceci n'est que la lecture d'un document; mais vous auriez pu subir le m~me traitement. 78. Ou 25 October, Mr. Ileo sent a letter to the special Representative of the Secretary-General inthe Congo which showed that the measures just mentioned were already being put into force. In connexion with that letter, we have here Mr. Baisi, who was an eye- witness and was present in the province of Kivu when President Miruho received the letter. The President summoned him and said: "My dear friend, if I had applied to you all the measures advocated by the Prime Minister, you would no longer be alive." It was because Mr. Baisi told me this that I believed it, and I asked myself how a man like Lumumba, whom he had known, with whom we had worked and with whom we had fought to free our country, had come to take such measures. At that moment, I decided that he . had definitely gone wrong. 79. Here then, is the letter about the deputies im- prisoned at Stanleyville. It is the letter sent by Mr. Ileo to the Representative of the United Nations at Leopoldville: "We have the honour to confirm the numerous telephone conversations which Joseph Ileo has had with your assistants about the members of parlia- ment being held at Stanleyville. On Tuesday, 18 Oc- tober 1960, Prime MinisterIleonotifiedyou, through your assistant Mr. Liu, of the arrest at Stanleyville of several members of parliament. They are Messrs. Songolo, Danga, Bailougandi, Othita, Fataki, Fele, Bougandi, Iloko, Azanga and Majounko. An assurance was given to the Prime Minister that the Representative of the United Nations at Stanleyville had been instructed to take up this matter. Mr. Ileo has reverted to the matter on several occasions, stressing particularly the urgent need to take action in order to free the members of parliament. Up to the present time, however, these men are'still being held at Stanleyville, and their lives are in danger. We. enclose the text of a message dated 20 October 1960 .which we have received from them." TheRe people were then already inprison.Asof today, they are still there, and no one knows in what .cir- cumstances. . 80. Here is their message of 20 October, the last that they were able to send to Leopoldville: "The night of 19-20 October was a night of terrible suffering 'for us. As a result of rumours that Colonel Mobutu had arrived at StanleyviHe with his army, the "gendarmes" from this place went to the airport in battle order, and we were to be the first victims. "The reason why we awoke this morning of 20 Oc- tober safe and soundwas that the news of Colonel Mo- butu's arrival at Stanleyville was denied; otherwise you would have heard that some of us had already been gathered to our fathers. We are actually experiencing from day to day the harsh measures of the fir·st stage of the dictatorship mentioned in the confidential letter of Lumumba. 78. Le 25 octobre, M. Ileo a envoye une lettre au representant special du Secretaire general au Congo, qui montre deja. l'application des mesures mention- nees ci-dessus. En ce qui concerne cette lettre, il y a ici M. BaisI'qui est un temoin oculaire et se trouvait present dans la province du Kivu quand le president Miruho a reQu cette lettre; en effet ce dernier l' a appele et lui a dit: "Mon cher ami, si j'avais applique sur vous toutes lea mesures que le Premier Ministre preconise, vous ne seriez plus vivant." C'est parce que M. Baisi m'a dit cela que je Pai cru et je me suis demande comment un homme comme Lumumba que nous avions connu, avec qui nous avions travaille, avec qui nOUB avions lutte pour la liberation de notre pays, etait arrive a. prendre de telles mesures. A ce moment, j'ai considere qutil etait definitivement devia- tionniste. 79. Voila. donc la lettre au sujet des deputes enfer- mes dans la prison de Stanleyville. C'est la lettre envoyee par M. Ileo au representant des Nations Unies a. Leopoldville: "Nous avons l'honneur de vous confirmer les nombreux entl'etiens telephoniques que Joseph neo a eus avec vos collaborateurs au sujet des parle- mentaires detenus a. Stanleyville. En effet, le mardi 18 octobre 1960, le premier ministre Ileo a signale, par le truchement de votre collaborateur M. Liu, liarrestahon a. Stanleyville de plusieurs parlemen- taires. I1 s'agit de MM. Songolo,Danga, Bailougandi, Othita, Fataki, Fele, Bougandi, Iloko, Azanga, Majounko. L'assurance fut donnee au Premier Ministre que des instructions etaient transmises au representant de l'ONU a. Stanleyville, en lui demandant de s'occuper de ce cas. A plusieurs reprises, M. Ileo a rappele cette affaire eninsistant particuli~rement sur l'urgence d'intervenir en vue de la liberation de ces parlementaires. Or, jusqu'a. ce jour, ces parlementaires sont toujours en deten- tion a. StanleYville ou leur vie est en danger. Nous vous communiquons ci-apr~s le texte du message qu'ils nous ont adresse en date du 200ctobre 1960." Ces gens etaient alors d~ja. en prison et jusqu'h, present, ils y sont encore et personne ne connaft dans quelle situation. 80. Voici leur message, le dernier qU'ils ont pu en- voyer h Leopoldville a. la date du 20 octobre: "La nuit du 19 au 20 octobrefutpour nous une nuit de souffrances horribles. Le bruit ayant ete repandu que le colonel Mobutu etait arrive a. Stanleyville avec son armee, les gendarmes d'ici s'en all~rent h l'aerodrome en tenuede guerre et c'est nous qui allions ~tre les premi~res victimes. "Si nous noUB reveillons sains et saufs, en cette matinee du 20 octobre, ,9'est parce que la nouvelle de I'arrivee h Stanleyville du colonel Mobutu a ete dementie, sinon vous auriez appris que quelques-uns d'entre noUB etaient deja. envoyes ad patres. Reelle- ment, nous vivons au jour le jour les mesures se- v~res de la premi~re phase de la dictature dont 11 est question dans la lettre confidentielle de Lumumba. "While writing this letter. to you, it has been confirmed that we are soon to be transferred to an isolated and unknown spot where we shall be executed. This letter would thus be our last. If you do not receive any more letters from us, it will mean that our transfer and execution have already been carried out, "We therefore now bid you adieu and send greetings to our families and friends, and l')specially to our parliamentary colleagues, whom we ask to carry on the work in our place. "We shall soon be executed because we have fought communism.... "Once more, adieu." That was the message sent by Songolo and his friends to President Kasa-Vubu. 81. I should also like to recall for you the arrest of Lumumba, but I think that it would be pointless. Be- sides, it would give you an opportunity to discuss our internal affairs. I shOUld, however, like to refresh your memories concerning the relations between the ex-Prime Minister of the Congo and the United Nations. It will be enough to recall the most recent develop- ments. You will then be able to judge the inol'dinate ambition, the lust for power, the total lack of restraint of this politician, his brutality and intimidation and, as they say in English, his "unpredictability~, 82. The records of the United Nations are full of examples of acts of brutality committed against its staff under the direct orders of the ex-Prime Minister: the incident at Stanleyville in which eight United States technicians were subjected to serious ill- treatment; the incident of 18 August at Ndijili airport at Leopoldville, in which fourteen Canadian members of the United Nations Force were ill-treated and roughly handled; the incident of 17 August at the residence of the former Prime Minister, when two security officers of the United Nations, sent by Mr. Bunche to deliver a note, were roughly handled, ill-treated and threatened with guns. Then comes the attempt, led personally by the ex-Pri~e Minister, of 11 September, to seize the Leopoldville radio studio by force. 83. It would be a waste of time to relate all the re- quests for military intervention addressed by the ex-Prime Minister to the United ·Nations to help carry out his aggressive designs, and the threats he levelled at the Organization if his requests were not satisfied. "... Au moment Oll nou::! vous eCrlvons la pre- sente, il nous est confirme que nous serons bientot transferes dans un coin isole et inconnu Oll nous serons executes. La presente lettre serait donc la derni~re. Si vous ne recevez plus nos lettres, c'est que notre transfert et notre execution sont dej~ realises. "Nous vous disons donc d~s maintenant adieu et compliments It nos familles et connaissances et SUI'tOut A tous nos coll~gues parlementaires It qui nous demandons de continuer l'reuvre a notre place. "Enfin, nous serons bientot executes pour avoir combattu le communisme••• "Encore une fois, adieu." Voici le message qui a ete envoye par Sangolo et ses amis au president Kasa-Vubu. 81. J'aimerais vous rappeler egalement l'arrestation de Lumumba. J'estime que c'est vraiment inutile. D'ailleurs, je vous donnerai ainsi l'occasion de dis- cuter de nos affaires interieures. J'aimerais toute- fois vous rafraichir la memoire en ce qui concerne les relations de I'ex-premier ministre congolais avec 1'0NU;' il suffira It cet egard d'en citeI' les peripeties recentes. On pourra ainsi juger de l'ambition deme- suree, de l'appetit du pouvoir, de l' absence totale de retenue, des methodes de brutalite et d'intimidation ainsi que de ce que l'on appelle en anglais "unpre- dictability" de ce politicien. 82. Les documents des Nations Unies sont pleins d'exemples d'actes de brutalite commis sous les ordres directs de l'ex-premier ministre contre le personnel de I'Organisation: incident de Stanleyville au cours duquel hutt techniciens am~ricainsfurent I'ob- jet de sevices graves; incident du 18 aouUI. l'aeroport de Ndjili a Leopoldville, au cours duquel 14 membres canadiens de la Force des Nations Unies furent mal- traites et malmenes; incident du 17 aout i\ la residence de l'ancien premier ministre, Oll deux officiers de securite des Nations Unies, envoyes par M. Bunche pour remettre un pli, furent malmenes, maltraites et mis en joue. Puis vint la tentative du 11 septembre, dirigee par l'ex-premier ministre personnellement, pour se saisir par la force de la station de radio de Leopoldville. 83. 11 serait oiseux de recapituler les demandes d'intervention militaire adressees par l'ex-premier ministre It l'ONU pour realiser ses desseins agres- sUs, et les menaces proferees contre I'Organisation s'il n'obtenait pas satisfaction. 85. On 9 October, the ex-Prime Minister, in his famous trip round the bars of Leopoldville, and having been out of office since 5 September, made incendiary speeches in an effort to excite the population against the established authorities, and he did this under the protection of contingents from certain countries. 86. His punitive expeditions in South Kasai will also be remembered. In his fourth report of 7 September, the Secretary-General, alluding to the massacre ofthe Baluba by troops sent to Kasai by the ex-Prime Minister, stated that the Security Council-and listen carefully-must "clarify, in appropriate terms, the mandate of the United Nations Force", and that "emphasis should now be put on the protection of the lives of the civilian population in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geno- cide Convention" [S/4482, para. 12.] 87. Need it be recalled that up to that time, despite the massacre of several thousands of Baluba, the United Nations Force had felt that its mandate did not permit it to stop punitive expeditions of that kind because, allegedly, they related to internal affairs? Is it any wonder that these Baluba peoples of South Kasai, after being so sorely tried, massacred, driven from their homes by the tens of thousands-for there are refugees not only at the international level, but also within our own country, at the national level- these people, pursued by troops in the pay of the ex-Prime Minister and by the hostile groups aligned with him, is it any wonder that they have not yet for- gotten the events of early September'? 88. The methods of brutal repression employed by the ex-Prime Minister were certainly not such as would bring back peace, but rather they sowed new seeds of discord. These acts of mass murder border- ing on genocide were, moreover, the last straw that finally impelled President Kasa-Vubu to disassociate himself from the ex-Prime Minister on 5, September. 89. It is perhaps appropriate to recall here that these massacres would not have been possible except for the direct military assistance which the ex-Prime Minister received from a certain great Power. 90. As has just been pointed out, the ex-Prime Minister never had any qualms about disregarding the United Nations, mistreating and humiliating its per- sonnel, and asking for the recall of its contingents except those which were prepared to give him direct aid. He was not satisfied only to threaten the United Nations with accepting direct military assistance from a Member State; he actually carried out his threat. 91. I should like to say a few words about the famous parliamentary majority. On several occasions the 85. Le 9 octobre, Pex-premier ministre, dans sa fameuse tournee des bars de Leopoldville, alors qU'il etait revoque depuis le 5 septembre, faisait des discours incendiaires pour soulever la population contre le pouvoir etabli, et ce sous la protection des contingents de certains pays. 86. On se souvient aussi de ses expeditions repres- sives dans le Sud-Kasal'. Dans son quatrii!lme rapport en date du 7 septembre, le Secretaire general, faisant allusion au massacre des Baluba par les troupes envoyees au Kasal' par l'ex-premier ministre, disait qU'il etait necessaire que le Conseil de securite - ecoutez bien - "eclaircisse, en termes appropries, le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies ... il convient maintenant d'insister sur la protection de la vie de la popUlation civile dans 1'esprit de la Declaration universelle des droits de l'homme et de la Convention pour la prevention et la repression du crime de geno- cide." [8/4482, par. 12.] 87. Faut-il rappeler que, jusqu'a ce moment, malgre le massacre des quelques milliers de Baluba, la Force des Nations Unies estimait que sa mission ne lui per- mettait pas de mettre fin a des e:ll,"peditions repres- sives de ce genre, car il s'agissait pretendument d'affaires internes. Est-il etonnant que ces populations baluba du Sud-Kasal', alors si durement eprouvees, massacrees, chassees de leurs foyers par dizaines de milliers - car ce n'est pas seulement sur le plan international qU'il y a des refugies, il y en a aussi chez nous sur le plan national - poursuivies par les troupes a la solde de l'ex-premier ministre et les groupes hostiles qui lui etaient infeodes, n'aient pas encore oublie les evenements du debut de sep- tembre? 88, Les methodes de repression brutale employ€es par 1'ex-premier ministre n'etaient certes pas de nature il. ramener la paix mais au contraire it semer de nouveaux germes de discorde. Ce sont d'ailleurs ces actes de massacres collectifs, qui frisaient le genocide, qui ont fait deborder le vase et, finalement, ont decide le president Kasa-Vubu it se dissocier de l'ex-premier ministre, le 5 septembre dernier. 89. Il est peut-etre bon de rappeler ici que ces massacres n'ont ete rendus possibles que par l'aide militaire directe re<;me par Pex-premier ministre d'une certaine grande puissance. 90. Comme on vient de le voir, l'ex-premier mi- ni!'ltre ne slest jamais gene pour ignorer l'ONU, pour malmener son personnel, pour I 'humilier, pour demander le rappel des contingents, sauf de ceux qui etaient disposes a lui donner une aide directe. Il ne s'est pas contente non plus de menacer les Nations Unies de recourir il. l'aide militaire directe d'un Etat Membre, il a mis sa menace il. execution. 91. Quant it la fameuse majorite parlementaire, j'aimerais vous en dire quelques mots. A plusieurs 92. Now, as to false statements I will mention only that, after his dismissal by President Kasa-V1.1bu on 5 September, the ex-Prime Minister made two state- ments between 18 and 20 September claiming that an agreement of reconciliation had been reached between himself and President Kasa-Vubu thanks to the inter- vention of a Ghanaian diplomat at Leopoldville. This "agreement of reconciliation" has been formally and categorically denied. 93. There were many consequences of the ex-Prime Minister's acts. It is not surprising that inthe face of his exorbitant demands, moderate Congolese elements, aware of their responsibility to the Congolese people as a whole, should have disassociated themselves from Lumumba. In fact, more than a third of his cabinet had left him or resigned by the time he was dismissed on ,5 September. Later, on 3 October, twenty-nine members of his party, the Mouvement national con- golais, including a number of members ofparliament, published a communiqu€l in which they announced their decision to break with him. [S/4557, para. 20.] 94. Then those who count on the parliamentto restore Lumumba's authority may be labouring under great delusions. It is not at all surprising that President Kasa-Vubu should have wished to put an end to the political career of a person who repeatedly engaged in lying, deception, blackmail, brutality and shame- less manipulation of the parliamentary apparatus. It was in the following terms that on the evening of 5 September President Kasa-Vubu declared on the national radio that the Prime Minister had betrayed his office by provoking discordwithin the Government, depriving citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging the country into a fratricidal civil war. [S/4531, para. 20.] This is the manwho is being repre- sented today as a defender of the law and a champion of the parliamentary system and democracy; the man whom the majority of the African and Asian States would like to see at the head ofthe Congolese Govern- ment. I shall not dwell any longer on this point. I hope that you will be able to draw the appropriate conclu- sions from what I have said. 95. As to the College of Commissioners-General, which you criticize so easily without even inqUiring how it came into being and how it has sought to render its service, I should like to offer you a few words of explanation. Before this College was instituted, all these young men were still engaged in their university studies. When the first political conference took place at Brussels in February 1960, the political leaders who came to the Belgian capital had never met each ~ la disposition de,s representants et n'a-t-il pas, gdce ~ certains a;~puis, falsifie les resultats des votes parlementaires? M. Dayal lui-m~me ne dit-il pas, en fait, dans son premier rapport, que 1'objet et le resultat du vote par lequelle Parlement,' reuni en session des deux chambres le 13 septembre> a confere les pIeins pouvoirs ~ 1'ex-premier ministre alors qU'il etait dej~ revoque, "ont laisse subsister quelque incertitude" [S/4531, par. 26]. 92. Quant aux declarations mensong~res, je men- tionnerai seulement qU'apr~s avoir ete revoque, le 5 septembre, par le president. Kasa-Vubu, l'ex- premier ministre a fait, entre le 18 et le 20 septembre, deux declarations selon lesquelles un accord de recon- ciliation serait intervenu entre lui et le president Kasa-Vubu, gdce i\ llentremise d'un diplomate gha- neen ~ Leopoldville. Cet accord de reconciliation a ete formellement et categoriquement dementi. 93. Les actes de l'ex-premier ministre eurent plu- sieurs consequences. Il n'est pas etonnant que devant ses exactions, les elements congolais moderes, conscients de leurs responsabilite ~ l'egard du peuple congolais tout entier, se soient dissocies de Lumumba. En fait, lorsqu'il a ete revoque le 5 septembre, plus du tiers des membres de son cabinet l'avaient qUitte ou avaient demissionne. En- suite, 29 membres de son parti, le Mouvement na- 1tional congolais, y compris un certain nombre de membres du Parlement appartenant ~ ce m~me parti, ont publie, le 3 octobre, un communique dans lec.uel ils annon9aient qU'ils avaient decide de se desolida- riser de lui [S/4557, par. 20]. 94. Ainsi donc, ceux qui comptent sur le Parlement pour restaurer l'autorite de Lumumba, se font peut- ~tre beaucoup d'illusions. Il n'est pas non plUS sur- prenant que le president Kasa-Vubu ait voulu mettre fin ~ la carri~re politique d'un recidiviste du men- songe, du faux, du chantage, de la brutalite et de la manipulation ehontee de i'appareil parlementaire. C'est en ces termes que le 5 septembre au soir, le president Kasa-Vubu declarait ~ la radio nationale que le Premier Ministre avait failli ~ ses fonctions en provoquant la discorde ~ 1'interieur du gouver- nement, en privant les citoyens de leurs libert€ls fondamentales, et en plongeant le pays dans une guerre civile fratricide [S/4531, par. 20]. Et c'est cet homme que l'on represente aujourd'hui comme un champion de la l€lgalite, du syst~me parlementaire et de la democratie, et que la majorit€l des pays africano- asiatiques voudraient voir ~ la t@te. du Gouvernement congolais. Je ne vais pas m'etendre plus longtemps sur ce point. J'esp~re que vous pourrez en tirer les conclusions voulues. 95. Quant au Coll~gedes commissaires g€ln€lraux, que vous critiquez ~ loisir sans m~me vous demander comment il est ne et comment il a cherche ~ rendre . service, j'aimerais vous donner un petit mot d'expli- cation. Avant la creation de ce coll~ge,tous ces jeunes gens etaient encore ~ 1'universite poursuivant leurs etudes. Lorsqu'a eu lieu ~ Bruxelles, au mois de f€lvrier 1960, la premi~re conference politique, les dirigeants politiques qui arrivaient dans la capitale 96. There was also an economic round-table con- ference at Brussels at which the political leaders gathered together to discuss with the Belgian au- thorities the transfer of all Congolese economic institutions that were still in Belgium. Once again it was the Congolese students who devoted them- selves to bringing the leaders together and organizing a national front, which I myself had the honour of pre- siding over at the time. 97. These efforts at unification were tirelessly pur- sued by the Congolese students, but they never substi- tuted themselves for the political leaders. They did not even stand for election; thus it is that of all the university students only one has been elected so far, and that is Mr. Bomboko, who did decide to stand for election. The others refused to do so in order that responsibility for leading the country might be left strictly to the political leaders .We then had confidence in them, but we no longer have that confidence now, and I shall tell you the reasons why. 98. We saw our country degenerate, slip into social ruin and founder in disorder and insecurity. And above all, we saw demagogy at work. The Congo was once an economic Power but is not one any longer; now it must go begging and this country, with its immense resources, must now knock at the door of the poor countries. That is why we intervened, anxious to save and protect our country's pride and honour. We did not do so willingly. In fact, many of us were not even at Leopoldville at the time. We had wanted to let the political leaders assume their responsibilities to the full, or at least to give them ample opportunity to shoulder the burden. 99. How did Colonel Mobutu come to stage what has been called a "coup d'~tat", but which actually was not a "coup d'~tat" at all? On the one hand, he had received orders from Lumumba to arrestKasa-Vubu, and on the other he had received orders from Lu- mumba's opponents to arrest Lumumba. What could he do, as head of the army? Ina sense he rebelled; he refused to obey anybody at all-Lumumba, Kasa-Vubu or Ileo. That is why he spoke of "neutralization" . How could he have acted otherwise if he was determined to do his duty? 96. Il Y a eu aussi la Conference de la "table ronde" economique, qui reunissait ii. Bruxelles les dirigeants politiques pour discuter avec les autorites beIges du transfert de toutes les institutions economiques congo- laises se trouvant encore en Belgique. Une fois de plus, ce sont les etudiants congolais qui se sont de- voues pour reunir les dirigeants et constituer un front national, que j'ai eu moi-m~me l'honneur de presider ~ ce moment-la. 97. Ces efforts d'unification ont ete poursuivis inlas- sablement par les etudiants congolais. Ceux-ci ne se sont jamais substitues aux dirigeants politiques. Ils ne se sont meme pas presentes aux elections; c'est ainsi que, de tous les universitaires, un seul jusqu'~ present a ete elu, ~ savoir M. Bomboko, parce qu'il s'est, lui, presente aux elections. Les autres ont refuse de se presenter aux elections afin de laisser aux seuls hommes politiques laresponsabilitedediri- ger le pays. C'est qu'~ ce moment-l~ pous leur faisions confiance. Maintenant, nous n'avons plus confiance, et ce pour les raisons que .le vais vous expliquer. 98. Nous avons vu notre pays degenerer, aller ~ la ruine sociale, sombrer dans le desordre, dans l'inse...: gurite. Et par-dessus tout, nous avons vu la dema- gogie ~ l'ceuvre. Le Congo, qui etait une pui:ssance economique, ne l'est plus; maintenant, il est oblige d'aller .mendier et ce pays, avec ses immenses res- sources, doit maintenant frapper ~ la porte des pays pauvres. C'est pourquoi, voulant sauvegarder lafierte de notre pays et sauver son honneur, nous sommes intervenus. Nous ne i'avons pas fait de notre propre gre. D'ailleurs, beaucoup d'entre nous n'etaient pas it Leopoldville ~ ce moment-l~. Nous avions voulu laisser les hommes politiques assumer completement leurs responsabilites ou en tout cas en mesurer la lourde charge. 99. Comment le colonel Mobutu en est-il arrive a ce que l'on a appeH~ "coup d'Etat"? - qui d'ailleurs n'en est pas un. D'une part, il avait rec;m l'ordre de Lumumba d'arreter Kasa-Vubu; d'autre part, il avait re9u l'ordre de ceux qui s'opposaient a Lumumba d'arr~ter celui-ci. Que pouvait-il faire, lui, chef de 1'armee? Il s'est rebelle, en quelque sorte; il a refuse d'obeir a qui que ce soit, a Lumumba comme ~ Kasa-Vubu et comme a Ileo. C'est ainsi qU'il a parle de "neutralisation". Que pouvait-il faire d'autre, s'il avait ~ cceur d'accomplir son devoir? 101. We have never sought to replace the political leaders. Besides, that is not our task. If, on the other hand, the political leaders do not want to carry out the objectives which the people expected ofthem, what is to be done? 102. We have managed now to achieve a certain degree of economic recovery. Our exports at the port of Matadi have reached the same level as in the corresponding month of last year. Peace has returned to Leopoldville. Kasai has beenpacified; I must admit that this pacifica- tion was partly due to the intervention of the United Nations, which was able to establish a kind of no man's land between the Lulua and the Baluba. But it was also due to the Commissioners-General, through whose efforts Mr. Kalonji was able to speak on the national radio to call for a cease-fire on all sides, that is, between all tribes. Are you reproaching us, then, for being peace-loving? 103. I should like to turn now to a few regrettable statements that have been made by a number of African countries. I know the representatives of these coun- tries well. Indeed, I have friendly relations with them. But they come here and insult us publicly, as if we were incapable of trading insult for insult. 104. First there was the statement of the repre- sentative of the United Arab Republic about the nationalization of Belgian property. As far as the property nationalized in Egypt is concerned, it was not Congolese property, and so it does not concern me. But this operation brought you $10 million. The device is an easy one. If you want to earn a little money, come to us and tell us nicely to expel you. Then you will go and nationalize the property of the others and that will yield you a good profit. If you are really 'convinced that the Belgians stole this money from the Congo, we would be grateful if you would return it to us, because it is from us that the Belgians took it. If you do not want to return it to us, give it at least to the United Nations, for $10 million is exactly the amount needed to pay the bill for one month of the United Nations operations in the Congo. 105. As to what this representative said about the withdrawal of troops, we are very sorry to note that all these African countries want to withdraw their troops. As a matter of fact, they have not understood the Congolese, and if that is so, it is because they never wanted to understand them. Besides, these troops could have been of service to the man you support, and if you withdraw them, they can no longer 26 Coll~ge des commissaires generaux comme ayant des fonctions essentiellement provisoires. Il est vrai que M. Lumumba se contredit du jour au lendemain; mais je tenais quand meme il vous rapporter ce qU'il avait dit ~ cet egard. 101. Nous n'avons jamais voulu nous substituer aux hommes politiques. D'ailleurs ce n'est pas notre tache. Mais si, d'autre part, les hommes politiques ne veulent pas realiser les objectifs que lepeuple attendaitd'eux, que faut-il faire? 102. Nous sommes parvenus, maintenant, ~ realiser un certain redressement economique. Les exporta- tions, au port de Matadi, ont atteint le meme volume que le mois correspondant de l'annee derni~re. Le calme est revenu il Leopoldville. Le Kasai'estpacifie; je dois reconnallre que cette pacification a ete obtenue grace aussi ill'intervention des Nations Unies qui ont pu etablir une esp~ce de "no man's land" entre les Lulua et les Baluba. Mais elle est due aussi ill'effort des commissaires generaux qui ont pu amener M. Kalonji ~ la radio nationale pour qU'il lance un appel en vue d'un cessez-le-feu multilateral, c'est-il-dire entre toutes les tribus. Alors, nous reprochez-vous d'etre pacifiques? 103. J'aimerais enfin revenir sur quelques declara- tions regrettables de la part d'un certain nombre de pays africains. Je connais bien les representants de ces pays, j'entretiens meme des relations amicales avec eux. Or, ils viennent ici nous injurier publique- ment, comme si nous etions incapables d'injurier, nous aussi! 104. Tout d'abord, il y a eu la declaration du repre- sentant de la Republique arabe lmie concernant lanatio- nalisation des biens beiges. Pour ce qui est des biens que l'on a nationalises en Egypte, ce n'etaientpas des biens congolais, de sorte que cela ne me concerne pas. Mais cette operation vous a rapporte 10 millions de dollars. Donc, le procede est facile: si vous voulez gagner un peu d'argent, venez chez nous; dites-nous gentiment de vous expulser; puis vous irez nationaliser les biens des autres. Cela vous rapportera. Si veri- tablement vous etes convaincus que les BeIges ont vole cet argent au Congo, nous vous serions reconnais- sants de nous le rendre, pUisque c'est chez nous que les BeIges 1'ont pris. Si vous ne voulez pas nous le rendre, versez-le au moins ~ 1'ONU, puisque 10 mil- lion_s de dollars representent justement ce qu'il faut pour payer la note d'un mois d'operations des Nations Unies au Congo. 105. Pour ce qui est de ce que ce representant a dit au sujet du retrait des troupes, nous sommes bien au regret de constater que tous ces pays africains veulent retirer leufs troupes. C'est que, veritable- ment, ils n'ont pas compris les Congolais; et s'il en est ainsi, c'est qu'ils n'ont jamais voulu les com- prendre. D'ailleurs, ces troupes, elles auraient pu rendre service il 1'homme que vous soutenez. Si vous 107. The representative of India, for his part, doubts that the Congolese have paratroops. You apparently think that we are intellectually under-developed too. We are under-developed, of course, but we are capable of something. We had commando troops even before' independence. It was enough to have them jump with parachutes, and they became paratroops. You can go, moreover, to the Congo and see them. 108. The representative ofMorocco made a statement that was fraught with political implications. He said that his country had troops in the Congo and that these troops could not stand idly by and watch all that was taking place. He also said that Morocco might con- sequently have to take certain measures and get along without the United Nations. Theexactwordsofa state- ment by his Government were: "If the United Nations does not change its attitude with regard to the Congo, we shall be forced to act without it" [917th meeting, para, 231]. What do you mean by this? Do you i~tend to attack us? If you do, say so now, and we shall alert our troops. I very earnestly hope that this is not the case, because there is no reason for killing each other there while looking at each other here. 109. As to the representative of Guinea,Iwonderwhy he shows so much hatred and misunderstanding. Ifyou withdraw your troops, that will be highly regrettable, but since you insist, we shall not insist on the opposite, because if we did, we should not be leaVing you free to do as yoti wish. llO. You speak of Lumumba, and that is your right. We all admire someone, and if you admire Mr. Lumumba, you can ask him to lead you to the victory you think is yours. The Congolese people are not necessarily of the same opinion. For our part, we are looking for a solution. We do not say that we have already found the final solution, but we shall reach that point. You can, moreover, observe that some regions of the Congo are now pacified. Whatever you may think of it, you might have remained and helped us to achieve further pacification, but I realize that pacification is not your objective, and that is why you are with- drawing your troops. There are many more things to be said, but I do not want to speak of them all here. I should prefer that we meet outside an official and public meeting such as this, so thatwe might reconcile our views in qUiet.

I think that we shall be able to hear one more speaker at this time. The representative of Yugoslavia has asked for the floor;. I shall then call on the repre- 107. Le representant de l'Inde, lUi, doute que les Congolais aient des parachutistes. Decidement, vous nous prenez pour des sous-developpes en mati~re intellectuelle egalement? Nous sommes sous-deve- loppes, bien entendu, mais nous sommes capables de quelque chose. Avant l'independance, il existait dej~ des commandos. Il a suffi qU'on les fasse sauter en parachutes et Hs sont devenus des parachutistes. D'ailleurs, vous pouvez aller les voir au Congo. 108. Le representant du Maroc a fait une declaration lourde d'implications politiques. Il a dit que son pays a des troupes au Congo, mais que ces troupes ne peuvent pas assisterpassivement atout ce qui se passe et que le Maroc risquait par consequent de devoir prendre cert:l.ines mesures et Cie se passeI' des Nations Unies. Les termes exacts de la declaration de son gouvernement etaient les suivants: "Si les Nations Unies ne modifient pas leur attitude auCongo, nous serons obliges d'agir sans elles." [917~me seance, par. 231.] Que voulez-vous dire par l~? Avez-vous iJ'intention de nous attaquer? S'il en est ainsi, dites-le maintenant et nous alerterons nos troupes. Je souhaite vivement que ce ne soit pas le cas car il n'y a pas de raisonpour qU'on se tue l~-bas alors qu'on se regarde ici. 109. Quant au representant de la Guinee, je me demande pourquoi il montre tant de haine et d'incom- prehension. Si vous retirez vos troupes, ce sera bien regrettable, mais, puisque vous insistez, nous n'insis- terons pas nous-memes, car s'il en etait ainsi, nous ne vous laisserions pas libres de faire ce que vous voulez. 110. Yous parlez de Lumumba: c'est votre droit. Chacun admire quelqu'un. Si vous admirez M. Lu- mumba, vous pouvez lui demander de vous conduire a la victoire que vous estimez votre. Le peuple congolais n'est pas necessairement du meme avis. En ce qUi nous concerne, nous cherchons une solution. Nous n'avons pas dit que nous avions dej~trouve la solution definitive mais nous allons y arriver. Yous pouvez d'ailleurs constater que plusieurs regions du Congo sont maintenant pacifiees. Quoi que vous en pensiez, vous auriez pu rester e't nous aider ~ pacifier davan- tage, mais je constate que pacifier n'est pas votre objectif et crest pourquoi yous retirez vos troupes. Il y aurait beaucoup ~ raconter mais je n'aime pas parler de tout cela ic1. Je pref~re que nous nous retrouvions en dehors d'une..,seance officiellepublique comme celle-ci afin que, dans le silence, nous puis- sions nous reconcilier. 111. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je crois que nous pourrons encore entendre un orateur cet apr~s­ midi. Le representant de la Yougoslavie a demande la p,arole; nous ecouterons ensuite le representant de 113. My Government has followed and continues to follow these events with the greatest concern. The , Security Council and the United Nations as a whole are faced with two basic problems which must be solved rapidly, without delay. 114. First, the situation in the Congo has deteriorated very seriously and the elements of civil war are be- coming more and more apparent. Outside intervention and interference, which have been the prime cause of the present grave crisis, are increasing. This aggra- vates the already critical internal situation in the Congo, and adds progressivelyto the difficulties facing the Congolese people which has already suffered so much. It not only jeopardizes the very existence and future of the RepUblic of the Congo, but also seriously endangers peace in Africa and, therefore, security throughout the world. 115. Secondly, these events have very seriously im- paired the authority of the United Nations, since its competent organs have been unable to implement the decisions of, the Security Council and the General Assembly. For this reason we think that the Security Council and the United Nations in general have a grave responsibility in regard to the fate of the Republic of the Congo and of peace and security in Africa and in the world as a whole. 116. I have no intention of giving a historical account of the Congolese crisis, on which ample light has already been shed during many meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 117. The general standpoint of the Yugoslav Govern- ment on this question and the basic factors in its assessment of the situation are well known to all. They are, moreover, in line with the attitude of many other States. I would recall in particular, the address delivered at the 878th plenary meeting by Mr. Josip Broz Tito, President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, during the general debate at the Assembly's current session. You will also remember our statements in the Security Council and in the General Assembly"the memorandum which the Yugo- slav Government recently submitted to the Secretary- General~ and the measures which my Government deemed it necessary to take in view of the situation which had developed, as well as the statement on the subject made at the 915th meeting by Mr. Pavicevi6. 118. I should now like to dwell on certain aspects of the situation which seem to have a special bearing on the problems facing us. Discussion of the position in the Congo has already been going on here for several days. Duringthis debate, some representatives endeavoured to describe the present turn of events 113. Mon gouvern6ment a suivi et continue de suivre ces evenements avec la 'plus grande inquietude. Le Conseil de securite et 1'Organisation des Nations Unies dans son ensemble sont enpresence de deux probl~mes fondamentaux qui doivent ~tre resolus rapidement et sans delai. 114. Premi~rement, la situation au Congo a empire d'une mani~re tr~s grave et les elements de guerre civile y deviennent de plus en plus apparents. L'inter- vention et 1'ingerence du dehors, qui sont la cause fondamentale de la crise grave qui est survenue, s'intensifient. Ceci aggrave enccre davantage la situa- tion interne critique au Congo, augmente de plus en plus les difficultes du peuple congolais qui a deja tant souffert et compromet non seulement 1'existence m~me et l'avenir de la RepubliqueduCongo, mais met aussi serieusement en peril la paix en Afrique et, de ce fait, la securite dans le monde. 115. Deuxi~mement, ces evenements ont porte tr~s gravement atteinte a l'autorite de notre organisation du fait que ses organes competents n'ont pas ete en mesure d'appliquer les decisions du Conseil de secu- rite et de l'Assemblee generale. C'est pourquoi nous considerons qU'une grave responsabilite incombe a present au Conseil de securite et aux Nations Unies en general en ce qui concerne le sort de la Republique du Congo et de la paix et de la securite en Afrique et dans le monde. 116. Je n'ai pas l'intention de faire ici l'historique de la crise congolaise, sur laquelle lumi~re a ample- ment ete faite au cours de nombreuses seances du Conseil de securite et de l'Assemblee generale. 117. Le point de vue general du Gouvernement yougo- slave sur cette question ainsi que les elements essen- tiels de son evaluation sont bien connus de tous. Ils coihcident d'ailleurs avec l'attitude de nombreux autres pays. Je voudrais rappeler tout particulHire- ment le discours prononce a la 868~me seance ple- ni~re par' le President de la Republique populaire federative de Yougoslavie, Josip Broz Tito, au cours du debat general de la presente session de l'Assem- blee. Vous ~tes egalement au courant de nos inter- ventions au Conseil de securite et a l'Assemblee generale, du memoire que le Gouvernement yougoslave a recemment adresse au Secretaire generaill et des mesures que mon gouvernement a juge necessaire de prendre en presence de la situation qui s'estproduite, ainsi que de la declaration faite a la 915~me seance par M. Pavi~evi6. 118. Je voudrais m'arreter maintenant sur quelques aspects de la situation qui me semblent presenter un interet particulier en ce qui concerne les probl~mes auxquels nous avons a faire face. Il y a deja quelques jours que dure ici la discussion sur la situation au Congo. Au cours de ces debats, certains se sont ef- 119. Let 'IS look the facts squarely in the face. The brutal foreign intervention in the Congo is directed not only against the Congolese people but also against the independence and future development of the whole of Africa. It endeavours by every means to eliminate all constitutional institutions, and all factors pro- moting free and normal internal development, in the Congo-and has already largely succeeded in doing so. Numerous facts show that what at present charac- terizes the Congo is disorder, a complete absence of legality. Those chiefly responsible for this state of things are the various armed detachments and the private armies organized and financed by the Belgian interventionists and other colonialist circles. The immediate purpose of these doings was, from the outset, to secure the collapse of the freely elected Government; that Government was not to the taste of the colonialist circles, because they hoped to pre- serve their influence in the Congo and had to discover and impose new forms of colonial dependence. 120. A blow has been struck at the basic sources of constitutional power in the Congo, and more par- ticularly at Parliament and the Central Government; the acknowledged leaders of the Congolese people, and the representatives elected by its will and sovereignty, have been brutally eliminated. All this has endangered and already gravely impaired the Congo's proclaimed independence, it~ sovereignty and its. territorial integrity. This situation, which is critical and disastrous for the Congolese people, is a danger to peace and to the authority of the United Nations in Africa and throughout the world. That is why the countries which have oontingents serVing in the United Nations Force in the Congo are rightly asking themselves, one after another, whether they can continue to bear any share of responsibility in the circumstances created by unimpeded foreign inter- vention and by the flagrant contrast between the way in which the United Nations action is being conducted and the Security Council and General Assembly deci- sions upon which that action should be based. 121. What is the meaning of the disquieting words uttered at the 913th meetingbythe Secretary-General, when he said: "Withdraw the United Nations Force and, it is my fear, everything would crumble.nAnd 29 etrang~re brutale au Congo est dirigee non seulement contre le peuple congolais, mais aussi contre l'inde- pendance et l'evolution future de l'Afrique tout enti~re. Elle essaie par tous les moyens d'effectuer - et elle y a deji reussi dans une large mesure - la lIquidation de toutes les institutions constitutionnelies et de tous les facteurs de developpement interne, libre et normal, au Congo. H ressort denombreuxfaitsqu'undesordre, un manque total de legalite, r~gnent auCongo. Ce sont les divers detachements armes ainsi que les armees privees organises et finances par les intervention- nistes beIges et par d'autres milieux colonialistes qui sont les principaux fauteurs de cet etat de choses. Le but immediat de cette action a ete, d~s le debut, la liquidation du gouvernement librement elu qui ne plai- sait pas aux milieux colonialistes, car ils esperaient maintenir leur influence au Congo et il s'agiseait de trouver et d'imposer de nouveUes formes de depen- dance coloniale. 120. On a porte un coup aux sources fondamentales du pouvoir constitutionnel au Congo et plus particu- li~rement au Parlement et au gouvernement central et l'on a procede a l'elimination brutale des chefs reconnus du peuple congolais et des representants elus de sa vOlonte et de sa souvel'ainete. Tout cela a mis en danger et a deja porte profondement atteinte 11 1'independance proclamee, a la souverainete et 11 l'integrite territoriale du Congo. Cette situation cri- tique et desastreuse pour le peuple du Congo est dangereuse pour la paix et pour l'autorite de l'Orga- nisation des Nations UniesenAfriqueetdansle monde. C'est pour cela que les pays dont les contingents font partie de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo se demandent l'un apr~sI'autre, avec raison, s'ils peuvent continuer a porter une part de la responsabilite dans l'etat de choses cree par suite de 1'intervention etran- g~re non entravee et par suite de la contradiction fla- grante entre la mani~redontl'actiondesNationsUnies est menee et les decisions du Conseil de securite et de l'Assemblee generale qui doivent lui servir de base. 121. Quel est le sens des paroles inqui~tes pronon- cees a la 913~me seance par le Secretaire general: "Que }fon retire la Force des Nations Unies et, je le crains, tout s'ecroulera." Ainsi que de' sa question: 122. The conclusion is clear. Foreign interference in the Congo must be stopped as soon as possible and without any qUibbling; that, in fact, is the surest way of re-establishing constitutionalism and legalitythere, and the only way of safeguardingthe interests of peace and security as well as the free existence and develop- ment of the Congolese people itself. 123. The second argument which has been muchused here concerns the illegal arrest of the head of the Republic of the Congo's Central Government, and the extremely brutal treatment meted out to him. Certain representatives have attempted to minimize that act of violence by making it into a so-called question of personality, of human rights, etc. But the issue is clearly quite different. Mr. Patrice Lumumba is the head of the only legal Government; at the same time he is the acknowledged leader of the most important national political movement in the Congo, and he personifies the Congolese people's struggle for national independence. The same applies to the other leaders of Congolese political life and to the mem- bers of Pa~liament, of the Government and of other representative bodies who have been imprisoned. 124. This being so, it would be a dangerous illusion to expect any return to calm, any normalizationof.the situation, or <1ny positive turn of events in the Congo, as long as the country's genUine national leaders and patriots are being persecuted and arrested by usurping authorities, whose only claim to position is the com- plete support given to them by the colonial Powers and the fact that they are the latters' tools. On the contrary, it is abundantly clear that such arbitrary action cannot fail to engender civil war, the reper- cussions of which would not necessarily be confined to the Congo. 125. For this reason Yugoslavia, like many other countries, demands that the leaders of Congolese political life who have been imprisoned should' be immediately released and that they should be enable.d to resume their legal functions-which would in turn ensure that the constitutional organs would also be able to operate normally•. 126. There is ample evidence to show that Mobutu, his private detachments, the so-called College ofCom:.. missioners and other foreign agents of a similar type in the various provinces, prOVide the mainprop for the existing foreign intervention. The second progress report of Mr. Dayal, the Secretary-GeneralIs Special Representative in the Congo, describes with perfect clarity the unconstitutional and illegal nature of the activities of Mobutu and his associates. It has also established the fact that their illegal administrative organs are entirely controlled by citizens ofthe former colonial Power. We all agreed, however, five months ago that, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, those individuals should immediately cease their intervention and withdraw completely from the Congo. 122. La conclusion est claire. Il faut emp~cher le plus tat possible et sans tergiverser 1'ingerence etrang~re au Congo, car c'est la la voie la plus sure d'y retablir l'ordre constitutionnel et legal et le seul moyen d'assurer les inter~ts de la paix et de la secu- rite ainsi que la vie libre et le developpement du peuple congolais lui-m~me. 123. Le deuxi~me argument dont on s'est beaucoup servi ici concerne l'arrestation illegale et le traite- ment extr~mement brutal inflige au president du gouvernement central de la Repubiique du Congo. Cer- tains ont essaye de reduire cet acte de violence a une pretendue question de personnalite, des droits de l'homme, etc. Or, il est evident qU'il s'agit ici de tout autre chose. M. Patrice Lumumbaest le chef du seul gouv~rnement legal; il est en mame temps le' chef reconnu du mouvement politique national le plus important au Congo et il personnifie la lutte de son peuple pour l'independance nationale .11 en estde meme des autres leaders de la vie politique congolaise, des membres du Parlement, du gouvernement et d'autres corps representatifs qui ont ete incarceres. 124. PUisqu'il en est ainsi, ce serait une illusion dangereuse que de croire a la possibilite d'un retour au calme, d'une normalisation et d'uneevolutionposi- tive au Congo tant que les leaders nationaux authen- tiques et les patriotes congolais seront persecutes, arretes par les autorites usurpatrices dont le seul titre est l'appui total que leur donnent les puissances coloniales et le fait qU'ils sont les instruments de celles-ci. Au contraire, il est tout a fait evident qu'un tel arbitraire ne peut manquer d'engendrer un pro- cessus de. guerre civile dont les repercussions ne seront pas necessairement limitees au seul Congo. 125. C'est pour cette raison que la Yougoslavie, de meme que de nombreux autres pays, exige que soient immediatement liberes des leaders de la vie politique congolaise qui ont ete incarceres et que la possibilite leur soit rendue d'exercer leurs fonctions lega~es, ce qui assurerait egalement l'activite normale des or-' ganes constitutionnels. 126. Un nombre suffisant de faits demontrent que Mobutu, ses detachements prives, le soi-disant Coll~ge des commissaires ainsi que d'autres agents sem- blables de 1'etranger dans les differentes provinces constituent le soutienprincipal de 1'futervention etran- g~re. Le deuxi~me rapport d'activite de M. l}ayal, r~presentant special du Secretaire general au Congo, depeint de fac;on parfaitement claire le caract~re inconstitutionnel et illegal des activites de Mobutu et de ses collaborateurs. 11 a egalement etabli le fait que leurs organes illegaux d'administration se trouvent enti~rement sous le controle de citoyens de l'ancienne puissance coloniale. Or, nous sommestous tombes d'accord il y a cinq mois, en conformite avec les principes des Nations Unies, que ceux-ci devaient cesser immediatement leur intervention et se retirer complMement du Congo. 128. Some representatives try to intimidate us by alleging that if we continue to react as we have thus far reacted, we shall risk bringing the "cold war" into the Congo. If that were so-and assuming that the "cold war" remains cold-it would be almost an improvement, compared with the foreign inter- vention which is now taking place. These gentlemen explain and seek to justify everythinginterms of their own interests in their disputation with the opposing camp. They explain their own aims, and the acts of force to which they resort, by the need to resist the aims of that camp. In any event, whether these aims are real or imaginary, there is no escaping the basic fact that the colonialist Powers, whatever pretext they may invoke, are intervening by force in order to re- subjugate the Congolese people. 129. In this connexion others-or perhaps even the same persons-tell us, onthe basis ofcertainsupposed information from Stanleyville, that the" lives of the whites, which are menaced, must at all costs be pro- tected. The menace in question has not, in any case, been confirmed. Quite apart from that, however, we are of course in favour of protecting the white people, wherever they may be; but this should not distract from the real problem, which is that the black people, the indigenous population whose homeland is the Congo and who have no otherplace to go to, must be protected against the intervention of certainforeignei's, whatever the colour oftheir skins-and bythatI mean the foreign Powers. 130. This leads us to the extremely important question - of the properplace and role ofthe United Nations Force in the Congo, of the way inwhich it has carried out the tasks entrusted to it. This is the secondbasic question that arises regarding the actionwhich must be taken to improve the grave situation prevailing in the Congo, to direct events along positive lines and preserve the constructive nature of the United Nations role in international relations. 131. It is unnecessary, I think, for me to repeat that my Government's policy is solely one of maintaining peace and generally strengthening the role of the United Nations in international relations. I am, how- ever, compelled to state that the responsible officials of the United Nations and the Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo, upon whom lies the duty of implementing the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, have not accomplished their task or their basic mission-that ofterminatingforeign intervention and interference, and of helping the legitimate Government of the Congo, and the Congolese people, to overcome the difficulties created by that intervention and to preserve the real independence, 128. Certains essaient de nous intimider en nous avertissant que si nous continuons a reagi.r comme nous Pavons fait jusqu'a present, nous risquons, parait-il, de provoquer l'etablissement de la guerre froide au Congo. Si c'etait vrai - a condition que cette guerre reste froide - ce serait presque un progr~s en comparaison avec l'intervention etrang~re qui est deja en cours. Ces messieurs expliquent et veulent tout justifier par leurs inter~ts dans les dem~les qu'ils ont avec le camp adverse. Hs expliquent leurs propres fins et les actes de force qu'lls entreprennent par la necessite de s'opposer a des visees du camp oppose. Dans tous les cas, que ces visees supposees soient reelles ou imaginaires, cela ne change rien au fait fondamental qui est que les puissances colonia- listes, quel que soit le pretexte invoque, interviennent effectivement par la force afin de subjuguer a 110uveau le peuple congolais. 129. Dans le m~me ordre d'idees, d'autres - ou plutot sont-ce les m~mes - nous disent, a propos de certaines informations qui sont censees etre parvenues de Stanleyville, qu'il faut a tout prix proteger la vie menacee des blancs. Cette menace n'a d'ailleurs pas ete confirmee. Independamment de cela, nous SQmmes bien entendu favorables a la protection des blancs, ou qU'ils soient, mais cela ne doit pas permettre d'eluder le vrai probl~me, lequel consiste a proteger les noirs, la population indig~ne dont le Congo est la patrie et qui n'ont pas, eux, la possibilite d'aller ailleurs, contre l'intervention de certains etrangers, quelle que soit la couleur de leur peau, et je veux parler ici des puissances etrang~res. 130. Ceci nous am~me a la question extr~mement importante de la place que doit occuper etdu role que doit jouer la Force des Nations Unies au Congo, a la mani~re dont elle s'est acquittee des taches qui lui avaient ete confiees. C'estladeuxi~mequestionfonda- mentale du point de vue de Paction qU'il faut entre- prendre afin de modifier la situation grave qui r~gne au Congo, de llacheminer dans une direction positive, ainsi que de sauvegarder le role constructif des Nations Unies dans les relations internationales. 131. Je pense qu'iln'estpas necessairede reaffirmer que mon gouvernement est exclusivement inspire par une politique de maintien de la paix etdn renforcement g€meral du role de 1'ONU dans les rapports inter- nationaux. Je suis cependant oblige de declarer que les fonctionnaires responsables de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et que le Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo charges de l'execution des resolutions du Conseil de securite et de l'As- semblee generale, n'ont pas accompli leur tache et leur mandat fondamental: la liquidation de l'Inter- vention et de l'inp;erence etrang~res, l'assistance au gouvernement legitime et au peuple congolais pour surmonter les difficultes causees par l'intervention 132. As we have several times recently stressed, a paradoxical and absurd situation has arisen. During the existence of the Central Government of the Congo, in answer to whose appeal the United Nations Force had been dispatched to the country, that Government was ignored and hampered in the exercise of its legitimate functions. So long as the Armee nationale congolaise existed as an integral part of the State's constitutional structure, it was subjected, on various pretexts, to a process of disarmament. But today- under cover of a policy ofnon-interference-the forces of foreign in~ervention, its direct military, adminis- trative and other protagonists in the Congo, and the local Congolese agents of this intervention, are per- mitted and placed in a position to carry through an action which is quite clear-cut in its planning and execution. 133. The report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo which I have mentioned, and which has not even been debated in the United Nations, reveals in the clearest possible way, and with supporting documents, the scope offoreign intervention in that cou,ntry; and, for all who wish to understand, the Secretary-General has also spoken of it in his last report. 134. Many representatives here have remarked on and seriously criticized the United Nations' conduct in the Congo. In one way or another, they all stressed the dangers to which I have just drawn your attention. They also expressed their views and made proposals regarding the action now to be taken. 135 To which countries, primarily, do these repre- sentatives belong? To the countrie3 which, in the course of their history, have experienced the diffi- culties and suffering caused by colonial administra- tion; which at the cost ofgreat sacrifice have achieved their national emancipation and independence; and which have been exposed, in one way or another, to attempts at intervention similar to that now taking place in the Congo. These countries, all friends of the people of the Republic of the Congo, are mainly African; and the United Nations and the international community have rightly regarded them as best fitted to help fulfil our Organization's tasks in that country, both by their contribution to the United Nations Force in the Congo and in other ways. 132. Ainsi que nous l'avons deja soulignerecemment a plusieurs reprises, une situation paradoxale et ab- surde est survenue. Tant qU'existait le gouvernement central du Congo, a l'appel duqueUa Force des Nations Unies avait ete envoyee dans le pays, ce gouvernement etait ignore et entrave dansl'exercicedesesfonctions legitimes. Tant qU'existait l'Armee nationale congo- laise en tant que partie integrante de la structure constitutionnelle de 1'Etat, onprocectait a son desarme- ment sous divers pretextes. Aujourd'hui aucontraire, sous le voile d'une politique de non-ingerence, onper- met et on rendpossible enrealite auxforces de l'inter- vention etrang~re, a ses protagonistes directs, mili- taires, administratifs et autres au Congo, et aux agents domestiques congolais de cette intervention, de mener une action clairement con9ue et appliquee. 133. Le rapport deja cite du representant special du Secretaire general au Congo, qui n'a enfait pas m@me ete discute a l'ONU, illustre de la fa90nla plus claire et avec documents a l'appui, l'ampleur de l'inter- vention etran~re dans ce pays et, pour tous ceux qui veulent comprendre, le Secretaire general en a aussi parle dans son dernier rapport. 134. Les representants de nombreux pays ont for- mule ici des observations et des critiques serie'...:.:as au sujet de la mani~re d'agir des Nations Unies au Congo. Us ont tous mis l'accent, d'une mani~re ou d'une autre, sur les dangers sur lesquels je viens d'attirer l'attention. Us ont egalement expose leurs conceptions et formule des propositions en ce qui concerne les actions qU'a l'heure actuelle il faudrait entreprendre. 135. De quels pays s'agit-il en premier lieu? Il s'agit des pays qui ont vecu, aucours de leur histoire, les difficultes et les souffrances causees par l'admi- nistration coloniale, qui ont realise, au prix de nom- breux sacrifices, leur emancipation "nationale et leur independance et qui ont ete, sous une forme ou une autre, exposes a des tentatives d'interventions sem- blables a celle qui est en train de se derouler au Congo. Ce sont des pays amis du peuple de la Repu- blique du Congo, en grande partie des pays africains, que notre organisation et lacommunaute internationale ont justement consideres comme les plus qualifies pour contribuer, au moyen de leur participation ala Force des Nations Unies au Congo ainsi que par d' autres moyens, ala realisation des taches de notre organisation dans ce pays. 137. Although the Yugoslav Government is far from agreeing with the present policy of the United Nations organs in the Congo, it will continue its efforts to find a constructive solution for the Congo problemthrough direct action by the United Nations, designed once and for all to stop, by urgent measures, the deterioration in the situation and to reverse that trend in a positive sense. This canbe done only throughthe rapid elimina- tion of all interventionist forces and of the results of their past actions, and through the restoration of constitutionalism within the country. 138. Some say that in the resolutions so far adopted, the tasks assigned to the United Nations organs and forces were not defined clearly enough to allow them to take vigorous action; we disagree, but the question of th~ United Nations mandate in the Congo must be settled by new instructions, which should be as precise as possible and be in keeping with the spirit and real meaning of the previous resolutions and with the needs of the situation. There is no longer any reason to hesitate, nor have we the time to do so. 139. It is no longer enough to take half-measures or to assume half-responsibilities. Subversion cannot be checked by fine words, noble wishes or the rhetorical repetition of principles; it must be actively prevented. 140. Foreign intervention has also greatly distorted the background and the legal and constitutional aspects of the problem. As I said, it is therefore of fundamental and decisive importance to end foreigrr intervention in the Congo without delay, by the strongest measures, and to remove all traces ofthat intervention, including its agents and instruments. 141. Otherwise, as has already been clearly shown, there can be no return to normality or calm in the Congo, the United Nations tasks in the country cannot be fulfilled and the possibility of extremely serious international complications cannot be ruled out. But my Government also believes-and the two things are closely connected-that it is important to acknowledge openly, and to draw the necessary conclusions from such acknowledgement, that the so-called authorities, like Mobutu's College ofCommissioners, whichdepend entirely on met:'cenaryforces armed and equippedfrom 137. Bien qU'il ne soit nullement d'accord avec la politique pratiquee actuellement par les organes des Nations Unies au Congo, le Gouvernement yougoslave continuera 11 deployer des efforts pour trouver une solution constructive au probl~me du Congo, par l'engagement direct des Nations Unies dans le but d'arr~ter definitivement, par la prise de mesures urgentes, l'evolution negative et de l'acheminer dans un sens positif. Cela ne peut ~tre realise que par l'eli- mination rapide de toutes les forces interventionnistes, ainsi que des consequences des activites auxquelles elles se sont livrees jusqu'a present, et par le reta- blissement de l'ordre constitutionnel dans le pays. 138. 11 yen a qui affirment q'1e les taches assignees aux organes et aux forces de.; Nations Unies n'ont pas ete definies avec suffisamment de clarte - c'est d'ailleurs une opinion que nous ne partageons pas - dans les resolutions adoptees jusqu'~ present pour pouvoir servir de base 11 une action energique; il faut, par cie nouvelles directives aussi precises que pos- sible, resoudre la question du mandat de 1'ONU au Congo, en conformite avec l'esprit et le sens reel des resolutions precedentes et avec les exigences de la situation actuelle. 11 n'y a plus lieu maintenant d'hesiter a ce sujet et nous n'avons plus de temps pour cela. 139. 11 n'est plus suffisant de prendre des demi- mesures ou d'assumer des demi-responsabilites. L'action subversive ne peut ~tre contrecarree par de belles paroles, par de nobles desirs ou par une repe- tition declamatoire des principes, mais uniquement en l'empechant d'une mani~re active. 140. D'autre part, l'intervention etrang~re agrande- ment fausse tous les prealables et les aspects juri- diques et constitutiolmels du probl~me. Ainsi que je viens de le dire, 11 est d'une importancefondamentale et decisive de liquider, sans aucun delai, au moyen des mesures les plus energiques, 1'intervention etran- g~re au Congo et d'asstirer l'elimination de toutes les consequences de cette intervention, c'est-~-dire egalement des agents -et des instruments de celle-cL 141. 11 a dej11 ete clairement demontre que, sans cela, il ne peut y avoir de. normalisation et de retour au calme au Congo; que sans cela, on ne peut accom- plir les taches des Nations Unies dans ce pays ni s'assurer contre la possibilite de complications1nter- nationales extremement graves. En meme temps, et les deux choses sont intimement liees,11 importe, de l'avis de mon gouvernement, de reconnaftre sans reserve, et d'en tirer les consequences necessaires, que les soi-disant autorites telles que l~ Coll~ge des 'commissaires de Mobutu qui s'appuient exclusivement 143. The first step toward such Vigorous and bene- ficial action must, as I have already said, be the im- mediate release of the head of the Central Government, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, and of all the other leaders of Congolese political life who have been illegally ar- rested. 144. In order to ensure that the competent agents of the United Nations in the Congo follow a consistent policy, I think it would be useful to set up, in the Congo' itself, a new advisory body composed mainly, perhaps, of representatives of countries in the African region. This body !!light usefully relieve the directing and executive United Nations organs of some of their responsibilities, and would even be able to help the future legal Government of the Congo in the same way. 145. If we could succeed, by these and other measures, in restoring normal and stable conditions in the Congo, one of the United Nations' first tasks would obviously be to help that country and its people, which has suffered so much, to overcome the great economic and other difficulties which have been vastly increased by the tragic events of the past few months; in short, to help that people 1:0 devote all its strength to raise its material well-being-to strengthen its independence and to develop its social life. 146. The United Nations has played a valuable and indeed paramount part in the development of inter- national relations since the War and especially in the giVing of effect to the colonial peoples' right to se1£- determination and independence. The Organization has often supplied the strongest framework and the most consistent legal sanction for that process. 147. It would be all the more tragic if the United Nations were now to permit its function and activities in the Congo to be decisively compromised, at a time when we are moving so quickly towards the final abolition of colonialism throughout the world. The de- struction of the Congo's independence and sovereignty by foreign intervention, in the presence of the United Nations forces there, would seriously impair the United Nations future role in international relations. 148. All who attach importance to that role would re- gard the Organization's defeat in the Congo as a heavy 143. Le premier pas dans la voie d'une telle action energique et salutaire doit ~tre, comme je l'ai dej~ dit, la liberation immediate du president du gouver- nement central, M. Patrice Lumumba, et de tous les autres leaders de la vie politique du Congo qui ont ete illegalement arretes. 144. Afin d'assurer une politique consequente de la part des agents competents des Nations Unies au Congo, il me semble qU'll serait opportun d'etablir, au Congo m~me, un nouvel organe consultatifcompose peut-etre, en premier lieu, de representants des pays de la region africaine. Cet organe pourrait, d'une fa~on positive, decharger les organes dirigeants et operat'ifs des Nations Unies d'une partie de leurs responsabilites et serait meme en mesure d'aider, de la m~me fa~on, le futur gouvernement legal duCongo. 145. Si nous reussissions par ces mesures, et d'autres, ~ normaliser et ~ stabiliser effectivement les conditions au Congo, il est evident qu'~ ce mo- ment-a, 1'une des tfiches premi~resdes Nations Unies sera d'aider ce pays et son peuple qUi a tant souffert, ~ surmonte'r les grandes difficultes economiques et autres qUi ont ete grandement multipliees par les ev€mements tragiques des derniers mois, bref ~ ce que ce peuple s'engage, de toutes ses forces, sur la voie de l'eU~vementde son bien-~tre materiel,lacon- solidation de son independance et l~ developpement de sa vie sociale. 146. L'ONU a joue un r81e positif d'une importance capitale dans l'evolution des relations internationales de l'apr~s-guerre,et notamment daus leprocessusde la realisation du droit des peuples coloniaux Ala libre disposition et ~ l'independance. Elle a trl:ls souvent fourni le cadre le plUS concret et l'expression juri- dique la plus consequente de ce processus. 147. Il serait d'autant plus tragique si les Nations Unies permettaient aujourd'hui, lorsque nous nous achE;lminons si rapidement vel'S la liquidation finale du colonialisme dans le monde, que soient definitive- ment compromis leur role et leurs activites au Congo. L'effondrement de I' independance et de la souverainete du Congo, sous les coups de l'intervention etrang~re et en presence des forces des Nations Unies dans ce pays, porterait un coup grave au role futurde l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies dans le domaine des rela- tions internationales. 148. Tous ceux qui tiennent 11. voir 1'ONU jouer ce role, considereraient une defaite de l'Organisation 149. Et surtout, que nul ne cel~bre trop t8t sa victoire. Bien morne est ce triomphe et bien fragile est cette victoirej ils ne peuvent durer longtemps. De nouvelles secousses encore plus graves et pro- fondes viendront d'elles-m~mes, et tr~s vitej' celui qui s~me le vent recolte la tempete. Nous croyons neanmoins que la raison et les inter~ts communs prendront le dessus. 149. Above all, let no one celebrate his victory too soon. Bleak indeed would be the triumph, and barren the victory; they could not last long.. Wew shocks, deeper and graver, will inevitably come, and come very soon; he who sows the wind will reap the whirl- wind. We believe, nevertheless, that reason and the common good will ultimately prevail. . 150. Let us not deceive ourselves. New answers and new, rapid and vigorous steps are needed. Any worsening of the crisis in and around the Congo would mean a worsening of the crisis throughout the African continent. That could lead to incalculable international consequences. W,'3 can still prevent it. 150. Ne nous leurrons pas. De nouvelles solutions et de nouvelles mesures rapides et energiques s'im- posent. L'aggravation de la crise au Congo et autour de ce pays equivaudrait il une aggravation de la crise sur le continent africain tout entier. Cela peut en- gendrer des consequences internationales incalcu- lables. Nous pouvons encore l'emp~cher. 151. In the past, the United Nations has often suc- ceeded in overcoming obstacles and in finding the right way to a constructive and peaceful remedying of com- plicated and dangerous situations. 152. That, we are convinced, was no chance success. Despite all other negative trends and all opposition, an inexorable logic is guiding the march of events towards new and more progressive relations between peoples and States. In this process the United Nations has a central part to play. The Yugoslav Government confidently hopes that the United Nations will nqt, in the Congo, betray the hopes which the whole of man- kind, in its ardent longingfor peace,is at this juncture placing in it. 153. Because of all I have saidhere-because, that is, of the seriousness of the Congo situation-I am officially instructed by my Government, which has sent me here for this purpose, t9 ask for an urgent meeting of the General Assembly, apart from any decisions which may be taken in the Security Council.

If the members 0: the Council do not object, I shall give the floor to ,to ,:,epresentative of Guinea,' after that we shall decide the further course of our work. However, the Secretary-General has asked for the floor.

Mr. President, I just wanted to ask you to grant me a few minutes, after the representative of Guinea, for a clarification.

In exercising my right of reply, I should like to say a few words regarding the statement made by the young man who calls himself the representative of the Republic of the Congo and who, so far as I am concerned, merely represents the power illegally exercised by the so-called commissioners-general. I must admit that the young man gave me the impres- 151. Maintes fois dans le passe, l'Organisation des Nations Unies a reussi il surmonter des obstacles et a trouver la juste voie de la solution constructive et pacifique de situations complexes et dangereuses. 152. Cel!!:, nous en sommes convaincus, n'etait pas le fait du hasard. En depit de toutes les tendances negatives et de toutes les resistances, la marche des evenements est guidee par une logique inexorable vel'S de nouvelles relations de caract~re plus progressif entre les peuples et les Etats. L'Organisation des Nations Unies detient une place extremement impor- tante dans -le cadre de cette evolution. Le Gouver- nement yougoslave a le ferme espoir que l'ONU ne trahira pas, dans le cas du Congo non plus, les espe- rances que l'humanite tout enti~re, ardemment desi- reuse de paix, place en elle en ce moment. 153. En raison de tout ce que je viens de dire ici, c'est-lt-dire il cause du caractere grave de la situation au Congo, j'ai rec;u l'instruction formelle de mQn gouvernement - et c'est pour cela qU'il m'a envoye iei - de demander la reunion urgente de I'Assemblee generale, independamment des decisions pouvant ~tre prises au Conseil de securite. 154. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Si les membres du Conseil n'y voient pas d'objection, je donnerai la parole, au representant de, la Guinee, apr~s quoi nous deciderons de la suite de nos travaux. Cependant, je donne tout d'abord la parole au Secre- taire general qui vient de la demander. 155. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAL (traduit de l'an- glais): Je voudrais simplement vous prier, Monsieur le President, de m'accorder quelques minutes, apr~s l'int~rvention du representant de la Guinee, pour apporter une simple precision. 156. M. TOURE Ismael (Guinee): Je voudrais, dans le cadre du droit de reponse, dire deux mots il la suite de l'intervention du jeune homme qui se dit represen- tant de la Republique du Congo et qui, pour moi, n'est que le representant du pouvoir illegal des commis- saires dits generaux. Je voudrai.s ,dire tr~s honnete- ment que ce jeune homme m' a fait l'impression d' aimer sinc~rementson pays, mais d'avoir ete arrache rtses 157. I should also like to add, to reassure him, that we have left the Congo because we felt that present circumstances make it impossible for our contingent to play its proper role. According to its mandate, which was also the mandate of the United Nations, its role was to assist the Government of the Congo in maintaining all its institutions and safeguarding its independence; in other words, to put an end to Belgian aggression and to enable the country to go forward on the basis of its normal institutions and withthe active support of the people. We feel that now there can be no more talk of pacification, for there is no govern- ment, and we know that the worst enemies of the country control the illegal institutions which are operating there. This young man is a part of one of those institutions. I am sure that at heart he loves his country and is sincere, but I would like to tell him, very simply, that the best advisers for the patriotic citizens of a country which has attained independence through the efforts of its peQple, are by no means those who exercised that domination for !'lighty years, who were responsible for the country being strong economically I yet remaining poor itself, and who committed aggression against it on the morrow of its liberation with a view to destroying by some means all that it had just obtained; namely, liberty, sovereignty and the possibility of resuming control of its own interests.

If the Secretary-General does not object, I shall call on the representative of the United Arab Republic.

The repre- sentative of the Congo referred to my country in his last intervention. If I understood him correctly he said that my Government has nationalized Belgian property because our diplomatic mission was ex- pelled from Leopoldville. He added that, if we con- sider that the property valued at $10 million and he mentioned the figure $10 million, was stolen by Belgium from the Congo, we can give this money either to the Congo or to the United Nations to make up the cost for one month. He also said that we have com- mitted a blunder, with some other African States, in deciding to withdraw our troops from the Congo. 160. Well, as far as the nationalization of Belgian property and paying the alleged value of that property of $10 million is concerned, I must tell him that this is a matter which is the sole concern of my country, and not his country, nor anybody else. He would be well advised if he refrained in the future from at- tempting to meddle in our own affairs. 161. With respect to the second point, that is, the withdrawal of our troops, the Foreign Minister of my country, Mr. Fawzi, stated our position very clearly 157. Je voudrais aussi ajouter, pour le rassurer, que nous avons quitte le Congo parce que nous avons estime que le role que devait jouer notre contingent est devenu impossible dans les circonstances ac- tuelles. Ce r61e etait, selon le mandat qui a ete celui des Nations Unies, d'aider le Gouvernement du Congo ~ maintenir toutes ses i .:ititutions et ~ sauvegarder son independance, donc mettre fin ~ l'agression beIge et permettre au pays de demarrer dans le cadre de ses : institutions normales, avec le soutien actif du peuple. Nous considerons qU'aujourd'hui on ne peut plus parler de pacification - il n'y"a pas de gouver- nement; n'est-ce pas? - et nous savons que les piJ:es ennemis de ce pays ont la haute main sur les insti- tutions illegales qui y fonctionnent. Ce jeune homme fait partie d'une de ces institutions. Je suis sOl' qU'au fond de lui-meme il aime son pays, il est sinc~re, mais je voudrais lui dire, bien simplement que, pour un pays qui a accede ~ l'independance grace ~ l'effort de son peuple, ceux qui ont exerce leur domination pendant 80 ans, ceux qui ont fait que ce pays tout en etant une grande puissance economique est reste pauvre lui-m~me et ceux qui ont commis contre lui une agression au lendemain de sa liberation pour pouvoir en quelque sorte annihiler ce qU'il venait d'obtenir, c'est-~-dire la liberte, la souverainete, la possibilite de reprendre en main tous ses inter~t8, ceux-Ht sont loin d'~tre les meilleurs conseillers des hommes et des nationalistes de ce pays. 158. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Si le Secre- taire general n'y voit pas d'objection, je donnerai la parole au representant de la Republique arabe unie. 159. M. ASHA (Republique arabe unie) [traduit de l'anglais]: Le representant du Congo dans saderni~re intervention a parle de mon pays. Si je Pai bien com- pris, il a decl.are que mon gouvernement avait natio- nalise les biens beIges parce que notre mission diplo- matique avait ete expulsee de Leopoldville. Il aajoute que si nous estimions que des biens evalues ~ 10 mil- lions de dollars - il a bien enonce le chiffre de 10 millions de dollars - avaient ete voles par les BeIges au Congo, nous pouvions donner ces fonds soit au Congolui-meme, soit ~ POrganisation des Nations Unies, afin de participer au r~glement de la note d'un mois. Il a egalement declare que nous avions commis une maladresse, oomme d'autres Etats afri- cains, en decidant de retirer nos troupes du Congo. 160. En ce qui concerne la nationalisation des biens beIges et le paiement de leur montant evalue ~ 10 millions de dollars, je dois lui dire que c'est l~ une question qui interesse uniquement mon pays, et non le sien, ni aucun autre. Il serait bon qu'll s'abstienne ~ Pavenir de se meler de nos propres affaires. - 161. Quant au second point, c'est-~-dire le retrait de nos troupes, le Ministre des affaires etrang~res de mon pays, M. Fawzi, a tr~s clairement dlJfini

I thank you, Mr. President, and I also thank the Secretary-General for having been good enough to let me speak before him, but I merely want to reply to what might at best be called a lack of courtesy. I believe that the representative of Guinea is as YOWlg' as I am, or nearly so, and he cannot treat the representative of a country as a mere youngster. Young I am, but one's years are not the measure of one's worth. I am surprised, moreover, that so much eloquence should be displayed and so much breath expended on such flighty ideas.·I was almost going to say that it was through bad counsel from Guinea that Lumumba has fallen, that it is because of these men who advised him and who led him on the path of extremism that he is where he is today. 164. I shall say no more, for I do not wish to engage in politics. I leave that to the representative of Guinea. 165. As to the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic to the effect that the question of na~ionalization is his own country's concern. I say that of course that is your concern. I need not dwell on that, but I hope that you too will leave to the Congolese what is their concern, because it is for them to attend to their own affairs, just as it is not their duty to attend to yours.

I now call upon the Secretary-General.

The Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia referred to the situation in Stanleyville. I am sorry to say that the threat was a very real one. It was overcome. thanks to energetic and wise action, especially by the Ethiopians. I am not sure that it has been overcome for more than a. short while, so the reality is still facing us . 168. It was hinted, I do not think by the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia but by an earlier speaker in the debate, that there might be an element of dis- crimination, the United Nations showing greater concern for the group threatened in the Stanleyville situation than for other ethnic groups. I can assure the members of the Council that the protection which we tried to give to the population in Stanleyville, who happen to be white, was exactly the same as that Which, for example, we tried to give at an earlier stage to the Baluba. I cannot agree that we, any of us, have ever made any racial distinctions in the policy which has been developed. It is true, as the representative of Guinea said, that we had lifted some of the protection in Leopoldville. He will observe that the main change is that we no longer protect President Kasa-Vubu. . 163. M. CARDOSO (Congo [Leopoldville]): Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President, et je remercie aussi le Secretaire general d'avoir bien voulu me laisser parler avant lui, mais c'est pour repondre h. ce que l'on peut qualifier pour le moins d'un manquede poli- tesse. Je crois que le representant de la Guinee est aussi jeune que moi ou ~ peu pr~s, et il ne peut pas tl'aiter le representant d'Wl pays de siAlple jeune homme. Jeune, je le suis, mais "aux llmes bien nees, la valeur n'attend pas le nombre des annees". Et je m'etonne qU'on puisse faire· montre de tant d'elo- quence et user tant de salive au service <;le tant de velleites. J'allais presque dire que c'est ~ cause des mauvais conseils de la Guinee qu' aujourd'hui Lumumba est tombe, c'est ~ cause de ces hommes qui l'ont conseille et qui l'ont emmene sur les pistes de I'extre- misme qU'il est maintenant ce que vous connaissez. 164. Je ne veux pas insister davantage, je ne veux pas faire de la politique, je laisse celle-ci au repre- sentant de la Guinee. 165. Quant i:l. la reponse du representant de la Repu- blique arabe unie selon laquelle la question de la nationalisation interesse sonpays, bien entenduce sont l~ vos intertlts. Je n'ai pas ~ insister davantage la- dessus, mais j'espere aussi que vous laisserez aux Congolais ce qui les interesse, car c'est i:l. eux et non pas ~ vous qU'il appartient de s'occuper de leurs affaires, de mtlme qU'il n'ont pas ~ s'occuper des v5tres. 166. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): La parole est au Secretaire general. 167. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAL (traduit de l'an- glais): Le Ministre des affaires etran~res de Yougo- slavie a parle de la situationh.stanleyville. Je regrette d'avoir i\ le dire, mais la menace etait des plus se- rieuses. Elle a ete surmontee gdce i\ Paction ener- gique et sage menee, enparticulier, par les Ethiopiens. Je ne suis pas sOl' qU'elle soit definitivement ecartee et nous devons regarder la realite en fa~e. 168. Un des precedents orateurs - je ne pense pas que ce soit le Ministre des affaires etrangeres de Yougoslavie - a laisse entendre qU'il y avaitpeut-tltre li\ un element de discrimination, les Nations Unies manlfestant plus d'inquietude pour le groupe menace de Stanleyville que pour d'autres groupes ethniques. Je puis donner aux membres du Conseill'assurance que la protection que nous avons essaye de fournir a la population de Stanleyville - qui se trouve tltre de race blanche - lltait exactement ~a m~me. par exemple, que celle que nous avions tente d'offrir auparavant aux Baluba. Je ne peux laisser dire que Pun quelconque d'entre nous ait pratique la moindre discrimination raciale dans l'application de notre politique. Il est vrai, ainsi que l'a dit le representant de la Guinee, que nous avons supprime certaines mesures de protection h. Leopoldville: en particulier, comme il pourra le constater, nous n'assurOns plus la protection du president Kasa-Vubu. C'est Ih. le prin- cipal changement. 170. As regards co-operation, we had it on a tech- nicallevel with great intensity up to early September. It is after early September that we have found it increasingly difficult to have such co-operation.

Before we proceed to discuss the question of our future work, I shall, if the members of the Council do not object, call upon the representative of Guinea who has asked to be allowed to exercise his right of reply.

The Secretary-General has given us an explanation, for which I am very grateful to him, regarding the recent United Nations decision not to continue to assume responsibility for the protection of Congolese politicians, particularly the Congolese Chief of state, Mr. Kasa-Vubu. If my delegation were to give an opinion, it would < be that that decision by the United Nations is to be regarded as most re- grettable. In view of the division which obtains in that cc~try, we believe that the United Nations could quite properly undertake to provide protection at least temporarily, until a solution is found, for the most important leaders of the Congo, particularlymembers of Parliament and ministers, who are entitled to immunity. 173. If the United Nations to some extent leaves that task to the local authorities at Leopoldville and is not itself prepared to perform it, the rule must be a general one, because we are sure that in the Oriental Province, too, there are provincial authorities who ought to assume responsibility. If the United Nations will not in future prOVide protection for citizens, except for those employed in United Nations operations, I do not see on what basis it can justify protection for a group of citizens who, in every case, are subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. 174. This is completely incomprehensible, especially since no one could complain if the United Nations de- cided to give protection to members of Parliament, ministers, or at least to the ChiefofState. That would not offend anyone, and would not involve anymisinter- pretation of the Charter or of the mission undertaken by the United Nations in the Congo.

I shall now venture to suggest how the Council should continue its work. We have now come to the end of our discussion and our general exchange of views on the matters which were raised in the course of that discussion; to some extent we have also exchanged views on the draft resolutions. It seems to me that 170. Quant A la cooperation, elle s'est manifestee tr~s activement sur le plan technique jusqu'aux pre- miers jours de septembre. C'est apr~s le debut de ce mois que nous avons eprouve de plus en plus de diffi- cultes ill'obtenir. 171. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Avant de passer ill'examen de la suite de nos travaux, je donne la parole au representant de la Guinee qui desire exercer son droit de reponse. Je pense qU'il n'y aura pas d'objection de la part des membres du Conseil. 172. M. TOURE Ismael (Guinee): Le Secre;:aire ge- neral vient de nous donner une precision dont je lui suis tr~s reconnaissant en ce qui coneerne la decision recel1te de 1'ONU de ne plus assurer laprotection des hommes politiques congolais, en particulier du chef de l'Etat congolais, M. Kasa-Vubu. Si ma delegation a un avis il donher, ce serait de considerer comme tr~s regrettable cette decision. Etant donne la division qui r~gne dans ce pays, nous pensons qU'il serait plutot tout il fait du role des Nations Unies d'assurer provisoirement, jusqu'A ce qU'une solution soit trou- vee, la protection des principaux dirigeants du Congo, en particulier des deputes et des ministres, qui sont couverts par l'immunite. 173. Si l'Organisation des Nations Unies laisse ce soin, il Leopoldville, en quelque sorte aux autorites locales et ne veut plus l'·assumer elle-m~me, il faut que la r~gle soit generale. Parce que nous sommes sill'S que, dans la province de l'Est, il y a des autorites provinciales qui ont aussi des respon- sabilites il assumer. Si 1'ONU, en dehors dupersonnel qui agit dans le cadre de 1'intervention des Nations Unies, ne veut plus proteger les citoyens, je ne vois pas sur quelle base peut se justifier laprotection d'un groupe de citoyens qui, dans tous les cas, releve de l'autorite totale. 174. Ceci est tout il fait incomprehensible, d'autant plus que personne n'en voudrait aux Nations Unies de decider qU'elles protegeront les parlementaires, les ministres, it tout le moins le chef de l'Etat. Ceci ne choquerait personne, ne serait nullement une inter- pretation abusive de la Charte et de la mission reQue par 1'Organisation au Congo. 175. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je me per- mets de vous faire quelques propositions concernant la suite de nos travaux. Il apparaft clairement que nous approchons de la fin de nos deliberations et de nos echanges de vues sur les questions qui ont ete evo- quees pendant ces deliberations; dans une certaine mesure, nous avons egalement parle des projets de 176. Si des representants ont d'autres propositions a soumettre, je serais naturellement tout pret ales en- tendre, mais je crois qU'il ne serait gu~re judicieux de faire trainer davantage l'examen de cette question urgente. 176. If there are any other ideas I shall be glad to hear them, but I hardly think it would be right for us to protract further the discussion of this matter, which is of an urgent nature.

I fully agree that this debate should be brought to a conclusion as speedily as possible, because it is necessary to come to some decision with regard to the situation in the Congo. At the same time, I think we realize fully the importance of the subject we are discussing and the importance of reaching a decision which, as far as is possible, would be acceptable to the Council as a whole and would deal satisfactorily and effectively with the situation existing in the Congo. 177. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduit de l'an- glais]: Je suis enti~rementd'accord aveclePresident pour reconnaitre que ce debat doit etre mene a sa conclusion le plus rapidement possible, car il faut arriver a une decision en ce qui concerne la situation au Congo. D'autre part, je crois que nous comprenons tous fort bien l'importance de la question que nous discutons et la necessite de prendre une decision, qui, autant que possible, soit acceptable a1'ensemble du Conseil, tout en reglant de mani~re satisfaisante la situation dans ce pays. 178. As the President and members of this Council are aware, a further draft resolution has been under preparation and has been a subject of consultation among a number of members of this Council and some representatives who have been good enough to attend this meeting in order to give us the benefit of their views. It has not been possible to complete these consultations because of the fact that a weekend has just intervened and because of other circumstances. 178. Comme le President et les membres duConseil le savent deja, un nouveau projet de resolution est en cours de preparation, et a fait 1'objet de consultations entre plusieurs membres du Conseil et quelques repre- sentants qui ont bien voulu assister a cette seance pour nous faire beneficier de leur avis. Les consulta- tions ne sont pas encore terminees en raison du week-end et de certaines autres circonstances. 179. Je regrette vivement de vous demander, en con- sequence, si nous ne pourrions au lieu de prolonger cette seance, nous reunir demain soir, et liquider 179. I very much regret to make this the reason for suggesting that, instead of continuing our meeting tonight, we have a meeting tomorrow night to finish this off completely. By that time, the draft resolution will have received consideration by all of us, and we will then be in a position to express our views fully as .to which draft resolution would appear to meet the needs of the situation. enti~rement la question. Le nouveau projet de reso- lution aura dans l'intervalle, ete examine par tous les membres du Conseil et nous serons en mesure de savoir exactement quel est celui qui convient le mieux, etant donne la situation. 180. For that reason, and for that reason alone, in spite of the fact that it goes against my own wish to conclude this matter soon, I would suggest that we meet tomorrow night, instead of tonight, so that we may finish this matter without difficulty. 180. Pour cette raison, et pour cette raison seule- ment, malgre mon propre desir de voir les debats se terminer aussi vite que possiblfi,je propose que nous nous retrouvions demain soil', au lieu de ce soil'; nous pourrons alors en finir sans difficulte.

I take it that there are two proposals: one that we meet this evening, the other that we meet tomorrow evening. It seems that we shall have to take a vote. 181. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Si je com- prends bien, nous sommes saisis de deuxpropositions, 1tune tendant a sieger ce soil', et l'autre a nous reunir demain soil'. Il semble que nous aurons a voter. 182. Je comprends fort bien la position du repre- sentant de Ceylan, mais de mon cote je crois qU'etant donne toutes les difficultes que nous eprouvons main- tenant, nous pourrions faire un effort et en terminer aujourd'hui avec la discussion de cette question.Dans ces conditions, s'U n'y a pas d'obj~ction, je vais mettre aux voix ces deux' propositions de fagon a ne pas perdre de temps. 182. I quite understand the position of the repre- sentative of Ceylon but, for my own part, 1 think that in view of all the difficulties we now face we should make every effort to-complete our discussion of this item today. Ifthere are no objections, therefore, I shall call for a vote, so that we may decide without wasting any time. 183. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylan) [traduit de 1'an- glais): Monsieur le President, je ne souhaitais pas voir deux projets de resolution mis aux voix sur une ques- tion de ce genre. Vous aviezfaitune autre proposition, a titre de President ou a titre de representant de l'Union sovietique. Je l'ai corisideree comme une simple suggestion.

Mr. President, I did not want to have two draft resolutions put to a vote on a matter of this kind. You made a different suggestion, either as President or as representative of the Soviet Union. I took yours only as a suggestion. 185. You, Mr. President, are fully aware of the fact that a draft resolution has been prepared by me. I have taken a great deal of trouble over it, in con- sultation with a large number of representatives of many countries. But the difficulty is, that the situation in the Congo is such, that we cannot yet find a draft resolution which is generally acceptable to as large a number as we would like to get, in order to win the approval of the Council itself. I think that it is a search that is worth while. Not for the sake of gaining time by half a day or another day shOUld we deprive ourselves of the possibility of finding a draft resolu- tion which might win the acceptance of the whole of this Council, or a large section of it. 186. If that is not to be allowed, I do not want a vote taken, unless the other members wish it. I would rather not put forward the draft resolutiqn; but I shall be depriving myself and I shall be deprivingthe members of the Council of the possibility of consideringa well- thought-out proposal, which might have the cha.nce of winning the support of the Council. 187. It was inspired by that motive that I tried to prepare a draft resolution. I have prepared a draft resolution, as you, Mr.. President, are well aware. That draft resolution has been receivingconsideration at the hands of a very large number of delegates; but it is not ready, in my opinion, to be submitted at this stage, because I have not secured that amount of agreement which would justify me in submitting it to the Council. 188. That is the position. That is the reason why I suggested that we might meet tomorrow andfinish this off. I leave it entirely in your hands, Mr, President.

I wish to speak mainly in order to support the Ceylonese representative's proposal. We have come to a point where we must end our debate by a decision for which a large majority of the Council might vote, and which might at the same time be of value as a contribution to the remedying of the present serious situation in the Congo. 190. I hesitated for a few moments before putting this view of my delegation, because I know that, however serious the Congo situation may be, we have been faced, especially for the last forty-eight hours, by a far more serious situation in another country, in respect of which the First Committee now has an important problem before it. 191. I know that the situation in Algeria, especially as it has developed over the past forty-eight hours, may lead to a Security Council debate, and I have been torn between two possible courses; either to agree with our President's suggestion that we dispose ofthis Congo question tonight, so that we 'can concentrate on taking a useful part in the debate of the First Com- mittee, or to support the proposal of the Ceylonese representative, that our debate should lead to a deci- 191. Je sais que la situation qUi se developpe en Algerie, surtout depuis 48 heures, pourrait peut-etre faire l'objet d'un debat au Conseil de securite et j'hesite entre deux possibilites: soit me declarer d'ac- cord avec la proposition du President d'en finir ce soir avec cette question du Congo, afind'avoir l'esprit libre pour continuer un debat fructueux a la Premi~re Commission, soit me rallier ~ laproposition du repre- sentant de Ceylan, tendant ~permettre a notre debat de 40 185. Vous etes parfaitement au courant, Monsieur le President, des efforts que j'ai deployes pour mettre au point un projet de resolution. Je me suis donne beaucoup de peine et j'ai consulte un bon nombre de representants de divers pays. La situation au Congo est telle que nous n'arrivons pas encore ~ trouver une formule qUi puisse etre acceptee par le plus grand nombre possible de representants pour obtenir ensuite l'approbation du Conseillui-meme. Je crois pourtant qU'il vaut la peine de poursuivre cet effort. Pour gagner une demi-journee ou une journee nous n'avons pas le droit de renonceralapossibilitede trouver une formule acceptable pour l'ensemble du Conseil ou du moins pour la majorite de ses membres. 186. Si tel n'est pas votre avis, je ne demande pas que cette proposition soit mise aux voix, sauf si d'autres delegations le desirent. Je prefererais alors renoncer a ce projet de resolution; mais en agissant ainsi, je me priverais moi-meme et je priverais les autres membres du Conseil de la possibilite d'exa- miner une proposition mQrement reflechie, qui pour- rait avoir des chances de recueillir l'approbation du Conseil. 187. C'est pour ce motif que j'ai tente de rediger un projet de resolution et je l'ai effectivement pre- pare, comme vous le savez. Un grand nombre de representants l'ont examine, mais, a mon avis, il n'est pas encore pret ~ etre mis aux voix, car Je n'ai pas encore obtenu un nombre d'approbations suffisant pour que je puisse en saisir actuellement le Conseil. 188. Voila quelle est la situation. Telle est la raison pour laquelle je suggerais que nous nous reunissions demain pour terminer la discussion. Mais je m'en remets enti~rement ~ vous, Monsieur le President. 189. M. Mongi SLIM (Tunisie): J'interviens surtout pour soutenir la proposition du representant de Ceylan. Nous sommes arrives a un point ou nous devons ter- miner nos debats par une decision qui pourrait re- cueillir le vote d'une large majorite des membres du Conseil et qUi pourrait etre en meme temps utile au r~glement de la grave situation qui r~gne actuellement au Congo. . 190. Avant de donner cet avis de ma delegation, j'ai hesite pendant quelques instants parce que je sais que, quelle que soit lagravite de la situation au Congo, nous sommes, depuis 48 heures surtout, en face d'une situation beaucoup plUS grave, dans un pays au sujet duquel la Premi~re Commission est saisie d'un im- portant probleme.

Pe.rhaps I could help with a suggestion addressed both to the repre- sentatives of Ceylon and Tunisia. We already have before us two proposals which might provoke some discussion. There may perhaps be a procedural dis- cussion and further statements may be made. Perhaps these could be ready by tonight, at the time we finish with the two proposals which would have priority; then we could do all the work tonight, if that meets with the approval of the Council. 193. M. LEWANDOWSKI (Pologne) [traduit de l'an- glais]: Qu'il me soit permis d'adresser aux repre- sentants de Ceylan et de la Tunisie une suggestion utile. Nous sommes deja saisis de deux propositions qui risquent de soulever quelque discussion. Il y aura peut-etre un debat de procedure et d'autres decla- rations. Peut-etre seront-elles pretes ce soir au mo- ment oil. nous en finirons avec les deux propositions qui ont la priorite; dans ce cas, nous pourrions ter- miner notre travail ce soir meme, avec l'approbation du Conseil.

Does anyone else wish to speak? I have listened carefully to all the considerations advanced just now by the representatives of Ceylon, Tunisia and Poland and I have come to the conclusion that the Council itself must decide this matter. I should not like to assume the responsibility of taking a personal deci- sion on the question, since it not only has significance from the procedural point of view, but also has great significance from the stand point of substance. I have in mind particularly the considerations expressed by the representative of Tunisia. I would ask the mem- bers of the Council to express· their views by means of a simple vote on whether we should meet today or tomorrow. 194. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Quelqu'un veut-il encore intervenir? J'ai ecoute avec la plus grande ,attention les considerations exposees par les representants de Ceylan, de la Tunisie et de la Pologne. J'en arrive A. conclure que c'est le Conseil lui-meme qUi doit trancher la question. Je ne voudrais pas assumer la responsabilite d'une decision unila- terale car il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une question de procedure; cela est important egalement quant au fond. Je tiens tout specialement compte des conside- rations exposees par le representant de la Tunisie. VoilA. pourquoi je vais prier les membres du Conseil de bien vouloir voter d'abord sur :e8 propositions tendant A. sieger aujourd'hui, ou demain soir. 195. Je vais mettre aux voix la proposition tendant a nous reunir ce soir A. 21 heures. nest procede au' vote amain levee. 195. I shall put to the vote the proposal that we should meet tonight at 9 p.m.

In the circumstances I think that the only thing to do is to decide to meet at 8.30 p.m. tomorrow, as there is no other time we can do so in view of the plenary meeting of the·General Assembly. It was so decided. 196. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Dans ces conditions, je crois que la seule solution est de deci- der de nous reunir demain, a 20 h 30; il n'y a pas d'autre heure possible etant donne les seances ple- ni~res de l'Assemblee generale. The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m. Par 9 voix contre 2 la proposition est rejetee. La seance ese levee a19 h 15. ISRAEL Blumstein's Bookstores, 35 Allenby Rd. and 4B Nachlat Benjamin St., Tel Aviv. ITALY.ITALlE Libreria Commissionaria Sansoni, Via Gino Capponi 26, Firenze, & Via D. A. Azuni 15/~, Roma. JAPAN.JAPON Maruzen Company, Ltd., 6 Tori·Nichome, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. JORDAN.JORDANIE Joseph I. Bahous & Co., Dar·ul·Kutub, Box 66, Amman. KOREA·COREE Eul·Yoo Publishing Co., Ltd., 5, 2·KA, Chongno, Seoul. LEBANON.L1BAN Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 92·94, rue Bliss, Beyrouth. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Trauseh·Schummer, place du Theatre, Luxembourg. MEXICO·MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, S.A., Ignacio Mariseal 41, Mexico, D.F. MOROCCo-MAROC Centre de diffusion documentaire du B.E.P.I., 3, rue Michaux·Bellaire, Rabat. NETHERLANDS·PAYS.BAS N.V. Martinus Nljhoff, Lange Voarhout 9, 's·Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVELLE.lELANDE United Nations Association of New Zea· land, C.P.O. 1011, Wellington. NORWAY.NORVEGE . Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, Kr. Au· gustsgt. 7A, Oslo. Orclerr ancl inquiries from counlries nol lislecl above may be Le. commancle. el clemancles cle ren.eignement. emanant cle paY$ ou iI n'exisfe pas encore de depositaires peuvent "re aclressee. er la Sec/ion rle. venle., Service cles publicalions, Organisation cle. Nations Unie., New Yorle (Etals·Unis cI'Ame- rique), ou er la Sec/ion cles venle., Office europ"en cle. Nations Unie., Pa/ai. cle. Nation., Geneve (Suisse). Litho in UoN. Price: $U.s. 0.50; 3/6 stg.; Sw. fr. 2.00 (or equivalent in other currencies) 14011-0ctober 1961-1.725 .enl to: Sale. See/ion, Publishing Sevice, Unitecl Nalion., New York, U.S.A.; or Sola. Section, Unitecl Nalions, Palais cle. Nations, Geneva, Swilzer/ancl.