S/PV.9225 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Security Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Silvio Gonzato, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/2022/912, which contains the fourteenth report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); S/2022/919, which contains the text of a letter dated 6 December 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/2022/937, which contains the text of a letter dated 12 December 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Ms. DiCarlo, Mr. Gonzato and Ambassador Fergal Mythen, Permanent Representative of Ireland, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231(2015). The agreement on the Plan and its endorsement by the Council demonstrated a unity of purpose among its participants. Both the Plan and the resolution support our common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security, in a manner that delivers tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. Back in June (see S/PV.9085), I expressed to the Council the hope that diplomacy would prevail. Unfortunately, despite the tireless efforts of participants to the Plan and the United States since April 2021 to resolve remaining differences, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have yet to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan. Six months later, the space for diplomacy appears to be shrinking rapidly. Regrettably, since the Council last met on this issue, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported on the intention of Iran to instal new centrifuges at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant and to produce more uranium enriched up to 60 per cent at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant. While the Agency has not been able to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country, it estimates that Iran has now a total enriched uranium stockpile of more than 18 times the allowable amount under the JCPOA. This includes worrying quantities of uranium enriched to 20 and 60 per cent. The Agency reiterated that Iran’s decision to cease implementation of its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments has seriously affected its safeguards activities. Further, the Agency reported that the decision of Iran to remove all of the Agency’s equipment for surveillance and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA has also had detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Against that backdrop, we once again call upon on Iran to reverse the steps it has taken since July 2019 that are not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. We also call on the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with Iran. It is also important for Iran to address concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B, as outlined in the Secretary- General’s fourteenth report on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912). First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months. However, the Council received eight notifications submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan. Secondly, regarding the ballistic-missile-related provisions, France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States provided information to the Secretary-General and the Security Council concerning two flight tests of space-launch vehicles conducted by Iran in June and November of this year. We also received information about a new ballistic missile unveiled by Iran in September of this year. The information received reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches and other activities are inconsistent with the resolution. Thirdly, we examined information related to paragraph 4 of annex B. This paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in Council document S/2015/546. This document includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other unmanned- aerial-vehicle systems with a range of 300 kilometres or more. In the reporting period, we conducted a visit to the United Kingdom, upon invitation of its authorities. We examined cruise-missile parts seized in international waters south of Iran by the British Royal Navy in early 2022 that were alleged to have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). We observed many similarities between these parts and other parts examined previously that we had assessed to be of Iranian origin. The latter include those parts seen in the debris of cruise missiles used by the Houthis against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2019 and 2022, and those seized by the United States in 2019. We also observed manufacturer markings of August 2020 and June and November 2021 on three of the five jet engines examined. Finally, we identified the manufacturers of several subcomponents, one of which informed us that the two pressure sensors were exported in early 2020. We continue to trace their complete supply chain. In this reporting period, we also received letters from Ukraine, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning alleged transfers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Iran to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B. In their letters, the five countries also asked that an inspection be conducted. The Permanent Representative of Iran denied that his country had supplied UAVs for use in the conflict in Ukraine; the Russian Federation also expressed its serious concerns with regard to the requests of these Member States. The Secretariat is examining the available information, and any findings will be reported to the Council, as appropriate, in due course. Finally, on the assets freeze provisions, we received information from Ukraine, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States alleging that some of the UAVs transferred by Iran to the Russian Federation were manufactured by an entity on the 2231 list and therefore were transferred in a manner inconsistent with the relevant provisions of annex B. The Secretariat is also examining the available information and will report back to the Council, as appropriate, in due course. The Secretary-General remains convinced that lasting peace and security for all Member States depend on dialogue and cooperation. Restoring the JCPOA remains crucial to assuring the international community of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and to allowing Iran to reach its full economic potential. We encourage all parties and the United States to resume their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues, lest the gains achieved by the Plan after years of painstaking efforts be completely lost. In closing, I would like to thank His Excellency Mr. Fergal Mythen and his predecessor for their leadership throughout their tenure as Facilitator for resolution 2231 (2015) as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Gonzato. Mr. Gonzato: It is again an honour to have an opportunity to address the Security Council in this meeting on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). My first expression of gratitude goes to Secretary- General António Guterres and to the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and in particular the report on that subject (S/2022/912) prepared for today’s discussion. I also want to thank Ambassador Mythen in his role as the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) and for the work done to keep members informed of the current state of play. I would like also to underscore the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole impartial and independent international organization mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA. Last June, we described the intense negotiations efforts to restore the JCPOA undertaken by all JCPOA participants, together with the United States, since April 2021 (see S/PV.9085). Following this process and based on all the key positions of the participants in negotiations, the EU High Representative was able in early August to put forward a compromise text that reflected his understanding of the most realistic equilibrium in view of a deal. The text lays down the necessary steps for the United States to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of all its JCPOA commitments. However, since then, new developments have added significant layers of complications that make it increasingly difficult to reach a deal. Nevertheless, the Coordinator remains in close contact with all JCPOA participants and the Unites States on this issue. Since the discussion on the previous report of the United Nations Secretariat on the implementation of the resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/490), the IAEA documented thoroughly the alarming further acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. The Director General’s reports of 10, 22 and 29 November documented the expansion of Iran’s nuclear enrichment operations and capacity. That includes more enrichment of uranium at the level of 60 per cent in two facilities and more cascades of advanced centrifuges going into operation while others are being installed. Let me also recall that Iran’s unilateral decision in June 2022 that all JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment of the Agency be removed from operation has further aggravated existing concerns that, from 23 February 2021 onwards, the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. Iran, which conditioned a deal on the restoration of the JCPOA on the settlement of the outstanding safeguards issues, needs to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. We continue to recognize that Iran has faced and continues to face very serious negative economic consequences following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of previously lifted United States unilateral sanctions, which we deeply regret. Since our most recent discussion in June, the United States has imposed additional nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, including in the area of oil and petrochemicals. The restoration of the JCPOA remains the only way for Iran to reap the full benefits of the JCPOA and reach its full economic potential, since the restoration of the JCPOA will result in a comprehensive sanctions’ lifting that will encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with Iran. I recall in this context that the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA implementation day, and that remains the case. Let me also clarify that EU measures relating to the unacceptable repression of protests in Iran over the past months and Iran’s military support to Russia are outside the scope of the JCPOA. In addition to the advancement of the nuclear programme of Iran, the European Union is indeed extremely worried about Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, including through the deliveries of drones. The EU will continue to respond to that, as necessary, not least as it also affects the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). On 12 December, the Council of the European Union recalled that any transfer of certain combat drones and missiles to and from Iran without prior permission by the Security Council is in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). On that occasion, the EU reaffirmed its support to the ongoing work by the United Nations Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of the resolution. The EU also recalled that resolution 2231 (2015) calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic technology. The process to conclude a deal and bring the JCPOA back on track has been seriously challenged by the various developments over the past few months, as described earlier. However, I shall be straightforward: the High Representative does not see any sustainable alternative. To echo the statement made by the Secretary- General in his report, I reaffirm that diplomacy and restoring the JCPOA’s full implementation is still the best option for preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. That is also instrumental to the security of the whole region and remains in our fundamental common interest. For almost two years, the Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran’s activities on the entirety of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle. I recall that the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which substantially strengthened the legal capacities of the IAEA in terms of verification, is only made applicable under a fully implemented JCPOA. Moreover, while the Agreement is in the shadows, Iran’s programme is proceeding quickly with irreversible proliferation implications, in particular in the field of research and development. The combination of the continued nuclear progress by Iran and the decreasing visibility of its programme raises more concerns than ever. The procurement channel, another benefit of the JCPOA, continues to be fully operational. It remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It gives assurances to member States and the private sector that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. For all those reasons, on 12 December, the Council of the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. It called on all countries to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The EU also underscored that the JCPOA is separate from Iran’s legally binding obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which are essential to the global non-proliferation regime. Drawing on the unambiguous support of the Foreign Ministers of the 27 EU countries, the High Representative is determined to continue working with the international community towards the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. He joins his voice to that of the Secretary-General to encourage all parties to intensify diplomatic efforts to that end.

I thank Mr. Gonzato for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Mythen.

The fourteenth report (see S/2022/937) of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) was approved by Council members on 12 December. I would like to thank all Council members for their constructive engagement in this process and for their spirit of compromise and flexibility. The report provides a factual account of the activities that took place in the 2231 format of the Security Council, covering the period from 24 June to 12 December. It includes relevant communications, summarized in my report, as well as key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel. Council members may refer to the report for details, but I wish to mention three points in particular. First, one meeting of the Council in the 2231 format was held during this reporting period, on 12 December, at which representatives of the Security Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/912) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), prior to its public release. Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo already referred to some of those points in her briefing. The 2231 format also had a discussion on the ongoing diplomatic efforts to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and other issues related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Secondly, a total of 18 notes were circulated within the 2231 format during the reporting period. I sent 12 official communications to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 11 communications from Member States and the Coordinator. Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in September and November, as well as eight updates. The IAEA plays an important role in the verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA’s work provides confidence for the international community that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran is for exclusively peaceful purposes. The reports of the Director General play a significant role in that regard. Thirdly, again I have to report that no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The procurement channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the JCPOA. It remains operational and stands ready to review proposals. I join the Secretary-General in encouraging all participants to the JCPOA, Member States and the private sector to fully support and utilize the channel. I cannot stress enough the importance of the JCPOA and the importance of its full restoration as soon as possible. It is essential that all parties to the agreement uphold it in both letter and spirit, avoid actions that undermine the implementation of commitments, and ensure its full and effective operation. Finally, I would like to say a few words in a more personal capacity. This is both my first and last time briefing the Security Council as its Facilitator on resolution 2231 (2015), taking over from my colleague and predecessor Ambassador Byrne Nason. As the Facilitator, we have done our utmost to support the implementation of the JCPOA, working closely with all Council members to ensure the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which it underpins. Ireland’s short time on the Council has made clear to us that support for the JCPOA remains undiminished. I have been impressed by the dedication of all the parties to making the JCPOA work as intended in order to reach agreement regarding the possible return of the United States and to ensure the fulfilment of all obligations by all the parties. It is a matter of regret, however, that over the past two years that work has not resulted in an agreement. The JCPOA remains the best means for a peaceful resolution of the issues it addresses. We hope that a restored agreement will also help to build confidence among the parties that can lead to strengthened dialogue and cooperation. We encourage all the parties and the United States to redouble their efforts to achieve that end. I acknowledge the work of the Facilitators who preceded us, laying a strong foundation for Ireland’s term. I thank all the Council members my delegation has worked with over the past two years, as well as the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran for its cooperation and the confidence it has placed in us. I would also like to thank the staff of the Secretariat for their invaluable advice and strong support over that period. It has been a great honour to work with everyone on this very important file.

I thank Ambassador Mythen for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassadors Fergal Mythen and Silvio Gonzato for their briefings. Seven and a half years ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015) as part of the diplomacy that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). All the members of the Council recognized the importance of keeping in place certain critical restrictions, including prohibitions on the transfer of certain nuclear and ballistic-missile-related technology from Iran. We are meeting at a time when Iran is taking increasingly provocative steps to enhance its nuclear programme’s capacity. The concerns of the international community are increasing. The United States is fully committed to resolving those concerns through diplomacy. For months we have been engaged in serious negotiations aimed at a mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. However, Iran’s own actions and stances have been responsible for preventing that outcome. In September, a deal was within reach — one to which all the other participants in the negotiations had agreed. Even Iran appeared to be prepared to say yes until the last minute, when it made new demands that were extraneous to the JCPOA and that it knew could not be met. That was not the first time Iran’s leaders had turned their backs on a deal that was on the table and approved by all. But that last instance dashed our collective hopes for a swift, mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. We have made it clear that the door for diplomacy remains open. Unfortunately, Iran’s actions suggest that goal is not its priority. Its conduct since September, notably its repeated and long-standing failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the expansion of its nuclear programme for no legitimate civilian purpose, reinforce our scepticism about Iran’s willingness and ability to reach a deal and explains why there have been no active negotiations since then. Given that context, the full and complete implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) remains a priority. Yet we see a disturbing trend whereby the Council is turning a blind eye to open violations of its provisions. Tolerating those violations undermines the authority of the Council and gravely harms our ability to respond credibly to threats around the world. We are grateful to the United Nations for its analysis of and investigation into significant quantities of arms and ammunition being sent from ports in Iran to the Houthis in Yemen. Many of those, including anti-materiel rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-tank guided missiles, have been determined to be likely of Iranian origin. Those shipments undermine international efforts to support a durable resolution to the conflict in Yemen and are a threat to regional security — issues that we should all be taking seriously. A few months ago, evidence emerged of even more grave violations of resolution 2231 (2015) — violations committed by a permanent member of the Council. Ukraine reported evidence of drones of Iranian origin being used by Russia to attack civilian infrastructure. That report has been supported by ample evidence from multiple public sources. Tehran has acknowledged transferring unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia, including in a public statement on 5 November by Iran’s Foreign Minister. Let me state it clearly: paragraph 4 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) prohibits all countries — even permanent members of the Security Council  — from transferring those types of drones from Iran without advance Security Council approval. Russia’s open violation of resolution 2231 (2015) would be of serious concern under any circumstances. But we are exceptionally alarmed that Russia is using those drones to attack Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. What could be crueller than seeking to turn out the lights, cut off the heat and shut down the water for millions of Ukrainian families? Russia first started using Iranian drones toward the end of last summer. Ukraine duly reported that violation to the United Nations. Other countries, including the United States, have since supplied the United Nations with additional information and analysis regarding that violation. We regret that the United Nations has not moved to carry out a normal investigation of that reported violation. For seven years, the United Nations mandate to report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) has been clear and unquestioned. We are disappointed that the Secretariat, apparently yielding to Russian threats, has not carried out the investigatory mandate the Council has given it. We were also discouraged by the lack of coverage of those violations in the Facilitator’s report (see S/2022/937) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Now, months after that initial reported violation, we learned last week that Russia has resumed using Iranian drones procured in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). On 14 December, Russia launched a swarm of Iranian-made drones against Kyiv. In the light of those new developments, we renew our call to the Secretariat to document and analyse information related to that violation. Given Iran’s increasing integration into Russia’s defence sector, we fear that there will be more violations in future. Russia may even be tempted to further violate resolution 2231 (2015) by importing complete ballistic missiles from Iran. That is not acceptable. There must be some degree of accountability for openly violating Council resolutions.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the representative of the European Union for their briefings. I also thank Ambassador Mythen of Ireland for his role as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The adoption on 14 July 2015 of the Vienna agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015), marked a decisive step in the fight against nuclear proliferation. Significant progress had been achieved in the implementation of that resolution until the United States withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Since then, the benefits of that landmark agreement have been undermined, and the attempts to bring all the parties back on board have unfortunately been unsuccessful. The fourteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/912) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) notes the development that the Islamic Republic of Iran has achieved the capacity to enrich uranium up to 60 per cent. Moreover, it also notes the development of “space-launch vehicles that incorporate technologies interchangeable with those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” (S/2022/912, p.3). All of that is occurring against a backdrop of Iran’s decision to remove the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) monitoring equipment from operation, thereby preventing it from continuing its monitoring activities. If a new modus operandi is not found as soon as possible, it is very likely that the gains in the implementation of the agreement that were made up until 2018 will be completely lost. There is therefore an urgent need to resume negotiations with all parties with a view to returning to the full implementation of the resolution, which is highly important for security in the region and the world. The parties must demonstrate commitment, flexibility and good faith. Indeed, maximalist demands on both sides, insurmountable positions and conditions and parallel initiatives by the parties serve only to undermine the negotiations and the gains made since the adoption of the Agreement and, ultimately, delay a political outcome. It is essential that trust between the parties be restored in order to establish to a climate conducive to negotiations. That requires each side to take a step towards the other. The commitment of all stakeholders is necessary for the full implementation of the Agreement. Demanding more guarantees without offering anything in return is neither constructive nor a sustainable posture. We recall that the lifting of the unilateral coercive measures imposed on Iran lies at the heart of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as one of the foundational elements of the necessary confidence. The parties must agree on the lifting of the sanctions, which have a negative impact on the country’s economy, have humanitarian consequences, contribute to a more tense internal political climate and increase the security risks. They are clearly counterproductive and tend to undermine bilateral and multilateral efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through political dialogue. Similarly, we call for an interim agreement to allow the IAEA to resume its monitoring and control activities in an impartial manner. Any action that frustrates the dialogue is likely to compromise the diplomatic outcome and contribute, in turn, to a fait accompli situation, which would run counter to the objectives of the JCPOA. Here I wish to recall my country’s commitment to the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as its central pillar, and stress that the parties must comply with their commitments under that Treaty. More nuclear weapons will bring about neither more peace nor more security, but will only increase the scale of the potential threat. By entrenching the balance of fear as a rule of the game, it would also encourage the nuclear ambitions of other States. It is crucial that the positive momentum achieved in implementation of the Agreement before May 2018 is restored, as all parties would benefit. I would like to conclude by welcoming the key role played by the European Union and encouraging its efforts in coordinating the work of the Joint Commission towards the reactivation of the JCPOA.

I thank you, Madam, for giving me the floor to address the Council in my national capacity. Ireland welcomes the reports of the Secretary- General (S/2022/912), the Facilitator for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2022/937) and the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2022/919), and has taken note of their findings. I would like to thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo and Ambassador Gonzato for their briefings today. Ireland is strongly committed to preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We welcome the diplomatic efforts under High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Borrell Fontelles to try to reach an agreement. A viable deal was put on the table earlier this year. We are concerned that despite that, new issues continue to be raised that threaten to undermine the process. It is essential that we put the JCPOA back on track. As the Secretary-General warns, the gains earned by restoring the Plan continue to diminish as delays persist. Iran’s actions regarding its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA are deeply worrying. Iran’s programme has never been as advanced as it is now. The stocks of highly enriched uranium, the uranium metalwork and the substantial expansion and use of advanced centrifuges are well beyond any plausible civilian justification. The irreversibility of the knowledge gained, which is directly relevant to a weapons programme, remains a matter of deepest concern. Ireland shares the grave concern expressed by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the Agency has not been able to perform substantial parts of its verification and monitoring activities for almost two years, as well as regarding the removal of Agency surveillance and monitoring equipment earlier this year. As the Director General states, that has a significant impact on the Agency’s ability to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge in the event of a full resumption of the JCPOA. The longer the situation persists, the greater the uncertainty regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme becomes. The role of the IAEA under the JCPOA is essential. It is only through the Agency’s verification and monitoring, including under the JCPOA, that the international community can have confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and in the JCPOA itself. It is essential that Iran cooperate fully with the IAEA in all aspects of its safeguards obligations and commitments, including the renewed application of the Additional Protocol. The United States must equally take all necessary steps to facilitate the full implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). It is important that the Iranian people see tangible benefits from the full implementation of the JCPOA. We are also gravely concerned by Russia’s acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Iran in contravention of resolution 2231 (2015), annex B, paragraph 4. We welcome Ukraine’s invitation to the United Nations Secretariat to inspect recovered UAVs. We believe this to be essential and welcome the assurance that the Secretariat is ready to examine any evidence provided by Ukraine in line with its evidentiary standards and that any findings would be reported to the Security Council as appropriate in due course. The Council has greatly benefited from the information that the Secretariat has been able to provide on the basis of previous invitations. We stand at a real turning point for the JCPOA. The opportunity remains for the restoration of the Agreement, which would bring real benefits for us all, including Iran. However, the drift in talks and activities that directly contravene the letter and spirit of the Agreement risk undermining that opportunity. It is essential that all of us work to restore and rebuild confidence in the Agreement and ensure that it can achieve its goals. The JCPOA came about by tackling the most complex issues through persistent dialogue and diplomacy. We urgently need to do so again.

At the outset, let me thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the most recent report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912). We also thank Ambassador Silvio Gonzato and Ambassador Fergal Mythen for their respective comments. It is indeed disheartening that the optimism of a breakthrough being imminent in the talks to revive Iran’s nuclear deal earlier this year was short-lived, and that progress made through indirect talks between the parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna and through other mediators has stalled once again. We maintain that the JCPOA remains the best opportunity and most practical course to address the Iranian nuclear issue. We believe that the Plan of Action would not only further validate the success of multilateralism, but would ultimately have a positive impact on regional security. That is because the JCPOA presents a balanced compromise that enables Iran to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the country’s development purposes while ensuring the imperatives for non-proliferation. In that regard, it is crucial that the current lull in the negotiations does not lead to a relapse, given that the only course of action is to revive and forge ahead with the JCPOA. We therefore urge all parties to refocus interest on the general good and define the steps needed to restore the JCPOA. Moving forward, it will be useful for all concerned parties to work towards a common understanding on the existing text and the requisites in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In that regard, it is important that the unilateral sanctions imposed against Iran are lifted, as they have a negative impact on the country’s economy and contribute to tensions that increase security risks both within the country and in the region. On the other hand, Iran must also fully assume its commitments under the deal. The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be exercised in conformity with obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as other nuclear-related commitments, including the Additional Protocol, and in compliance and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We believe that the IAEA’s work is essential in restoring trust and confidence in the region and within the international community, in a manner that ensures that Iran’s nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. In view of that, we welcome the continued efforts of the Director General of the IAEA to maintain the Agency’s monitoring and verification activities with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme. Accordingly, we continue to urge for unimpeded access for the IAEA to conduct its verification and monitoring activities in the country. In conclusion, we reiterate our call to the parties to work constructively for a full return to the terms of the JCPOA deal, while bearing in mind that time is of the essence. The current international climate makes the question of non-proliferation much more critical to international peace and security. We therefore continue to support, with keen interest, all diplomatic efforts to resolve outstanding issues. We need those efforts to reactivate the commitments of the parties under the Plan of Action, in the hope that the next six- month report could coincide with a restored Iranian nuclear agreement.

We thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations for their briefings. We also thank Ambassador Mythen for his report (see S/2022/937) in his capacity as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We welcome the representatives of Iran and Germany to today’s meeting. Mexico has supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) since its adoption in 2015, as we believe that it is a successful example of multilateral diplomacy and a key component of the international non-proliferation architecture. The agreement represented a major shift in the Security Council’s approach to addressing Iran’s nuclear programme, moving away from a sanctions regime and opting instead for a collaborative approach. Despite the international community’s optimism and broad support for the JCPOA, it is particularly worrying that there has been a retreat from full compliance in the two years of our term as an elected member of the Council. As the Security Council awaits JCPOA participants’ full return to the agreement, the respective reports of the Secretary-General (S/2022/912) and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have described an increase in the enrichment of uranium-235 of up to 60 per cent, the installation of new and modernized centrifuge cascades beyond the limits agreed to in the JCPOA, as well as research into more advanced activities such as metal production. In addition to those activities, for which there is no clear civilian application, the IAEA does not have the ongoing and permanent access required to monitor and verify the status of Iran’s nuclear programme. Transparency and cooperation are key elements of a properly functioning JCPOA. It is important to restore access for the IAEA without preconditions, and to remove any doubts about possible actions by Iran that have gone beyond the agreements reached in the JCPOA or its declared reversibility. At the same time, we call on the United States to lift its unilateral sanctions against Iran, especially those imposed extraterritorially or on third States. That would be a way to build trust and bring about significant progress. We understand the position of those who consider it a priority to address the broader security dynamics in the region, including with regard to missiles and the transfer of weapons, which are clearly interconnected issues. However, we believe that it would be better to opt for separate agreements that do not make that aspect conditional on a return to the JCPOA. Beyond the opposing views about missile launches and the use of space technologies, the fact is that the launches and the responses to which they give rise take us further and further away from the atmosphere and the trust that are needed at this time. Incidentally, we have taken note of the various letters that have been sent in connection with the transfers mentioned in paragraph 4 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), and we await information from the Secretariat in that regard. As this is the last time we will be making a statement on Iran’s nuclear programme as an elected member of the Security Council, Mexico calls on the United States and Iran to return to full compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, and on all key actors to redouble diplomatic efforts to that end. It is in the interests of the entire international community and critical to ensuring the peaceful development of Iran’s nuclear programme while also promoting stability in the Middle East. Mexico will continue to consistently defend the right of all countries to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, it is clear that that right carries with it the obligation to comply with the commitments and obligations set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including full cooperation with the IAEA.

I thank our briefers for their remarks and for their valuable efforts under their respective mandates. The United Arab Emirates recognizes nuclear non-proliferation as a cornerstone of our collective security. We have long supported international efforts, including by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to guarantee the peaceful nature of national nuclear programmes. We have also advocated for enabling developing countries to have access to and benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In 2020, the United Arab Emirates became the first Arab country to launch and operate a nuclear power plant, in accordance with the highest international standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underline the importance of resuming the full and timely implementation of all nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including by reversing steps taken that are contrary to that agreement. We also call for continued dialogue between the Republic of Iran and the IAEA in order to restore the Agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities and therefore provide the required assurances to the international community on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The United Arab Emirates is concerned about the findings in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/912), which highlights that cruise-missile parts seized by the United Kingdom in January and February had many similarities to those in cruise missiles used by the Houthis in their terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The acquisition of missile and drone technology by non-State actors, particularly terrorist groups, is a grave threat to regional and international peace and security. It also destabilizes the region and prolongs conflicts and the suffering of millions of people. The Council must therefore do more to counter that threat and prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. In conclusion, the United Arab Emirates reaffirms its unwavering support for all genuine diplomatic efforts aimed at advancing nuclear non-proliferation regionally and globally. We also call on countries in our region and beyond to focus on enhancing areas of convergence and cooperation in order to achieve a safe, prosperous and positive outlook for present and future generations.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Mr. Gonzato and Ambassador Mythen for their briefings. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), endorsed by several Security Council resolutions, is a major achievement of multilateral diplomacy. It is a model for resolving disputes through dialogue and negotiation, a key pillar of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and a buttress for peace and stability in the Middle East. The previous United States Administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and launch of a maximum pressure campaign against Iran triggered the Iranian nuclear crisis. Following the current Administration’s decision to return to the agreement, the parties conducted multiple rounds of negotiations, with positive progress. Regrettably, however, since August, the negotiations on a return to compliance have stalled yet again, making the future of the Iranian nuclear issue uncertain. At a time when the global security situation generally is complex and perilous, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is also facing challenges and geopolitical factors are increasingly prominent. China therefore calls on all the parties concerned to demonstrate a greater sense of urgency, live up to their responsibilities, intensify dialogue and engagement and strive to reach an agreement on outstanding issues as soon as possible, with a view to restoring the integrity of the comprehensive agreement and ensuring its effective implementation. I would like to touch upon four points. First, we must stay the charted course towards political settlement. Dialogue and negotiation have always remained the only correct approach to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. The parties concerned should cherish the hard-won gains of the negotiations over the past two years, demonstrate diplomatic wisdom, make political decisions and remove obstacles on the way. China welcomes Iran’s recent flexible position on the outstanding issues and hopes that the United States and the other relevant parties will seize that opportunity and meet Iran halfway to move the negotiations forward. Secondly, we must uphold the basic principles of fairness and justice. As the party that caused the Iranian nuclear crisis, the United States should be aware of its own responsibilities and take the lead in adopting concrete steps. China calls on the United States to uphold its commitment under the agreement, lift all unilateral sanctions, cease attempts to impose long- distance jurisdiction against Iran and third parties and stop the threat of the use of force against Iran. China also would like to emphasize that the relevant parties to the JCPOA should fulfil their non-proliferation responsibilities and avoid any nuclear cooperation that contravenes the principles and purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and leads to the proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear materials. That will serve as a guiding example for negotiations and resuming compliance. Thirdly, we must create an enabling atmosphere for negotiations. Pushing for the adoption of a resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors to put pressure on Iran will only exacerbate differences, undermine mutual trust and cast a shadow over the negotiations. The facts have demonstrated time and again that exerting pressure on Iran is not helpful. All parties should bear in mind long-term interests and the big picture and avoid any action that could escalate the situation and disrupt the negotiation process. We hope that the parties concerned, including the Secretariat, will accurately interpret Council resolutions and documents, prudently handle issues such as Iran’s space launch and so-called transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle systems, and avoid influencing negotiations on resuming compliance. Linking the Iranian nuclear issue with others, such as the domestic situation in Iran, will only lead to an impasse in negotiations and ultimately undo the gains made through diplomatic efforts. Fourthly, we must properly address regional security issues. In April, President Xi Jinping of China proposed a global security initiative advocating the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and the building of a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture. The initiative provides useful inspiration for promoting the resolution of hotspot issues in the Middle East, including the Iranian nuclear issue. China encourages the parties concerned to embrace the vision of common security and build a platform for multilateral dialogue in the Gulf region to de-escalate conflicts, build mutual trust and jointly build security through dialogue. Countries outside the region should play a constructive role in de-escalating the situation, rather than creating animosity or fuelling confrontation. As a permanent member of the Security Council and party to the JCPOA, China has always been committed to upholding the validity of the agreement and the authority of Security Council resolutions and promoting the political and diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Since September, Chinese President Xi Jinping has met with the Heads of State of Iran and the United States, respectively, to work on the Iranian nuclear issue. Our State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, has also remained closely engaged with the relevant parties on the Iranian nuclear issue. China will continue to maintain an objective and impartial position and play a constructive role in bringing the JCPOA back on track, advancing the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East.

I thank the Under-Secretary-General, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations for their briefings. France is extremely concerned. Iran is pursuing its destabilizing activities in breach of its international and regional nuclear and ballistic obligations. First of all, with regard to the nuclear situation, as detailed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is pursuing its escalation at the risk of a full-scale crisis. Several weeks ago, Iran announced that it intends to significantly increase its enriched uranium production capacity and its production of highly enriched uranium at the Fordow site well beyond the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That decision entails serious proliferation risks. It is not justified by any credible civilian purpose. In taking those actions, Iran is making irreversible knowledge gains and further weakening the relevance of the provisions of the JCPOA. Those actions are all the more concerning since Iran has halted the implementation of all JCPOA transparency measures, which undermines the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure the exclusively peaceful purpose of Iran’s programme. Through resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council conferred upon the Agency a mandate, which Iran’s decisions no longer allow it to exercise. The European coordinator proposed to Iran a plan that represents the best possible way for it to return to compliance with the JCPOA. It is regrettable that Iran turned down that opportunity by maintaining demands that it knows are unacceptable and exceed the framework of the JCPOA. Iran’s actions undermine the balance on which the proposed agreement, which was negotiated over many months, is based and close the door on a diplomatic solution. Negotiations on the JCPOA cannot be used as a pretext to enable Iran to shirk its obligations to implement its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To date, Iran has not engaged in substantive cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to address the outstanding issues. What I just said covered the nuclear issue. I would like to mention three other activities by Iran that are just as worrisome. First, Iran continues to develop its arsenal of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We see that in its space launches, which use technologies that further the development of its intercontinental ballistic capability. Secondly, we condemn Iran’s transfers of weapons, missiles and their components and means of production to State and non-State actors in the region. Such transfers contravene the relevant Security Council resolutions and place Iran and its proxies in a position to threaten international peace and security. Thirdly  — and more specifically  — France condemns the transfer of Iranian combat drones to Russia, which is in violation of resolution 2231 (2015), annex B, paragraph 4. Russia is using those drones to systematically target the Ukrainian civilian population and the country’s infrastructure, resulting in the death of many civilians, which constitutes war crimes. Only today, drone strikes against Kyiv have once again caused damage. We warn Iran against any further arms deliveries to Russia, which would constitute a serious escalation  — in particular the transfer of short- range ballistic missiles  — and would have serious consequences that could only lead to Iran’s isolation on the international stage. We hope to soon be informed of when the Secretariat will visit Ukraine to investigate and report back to the Council, in accordance with its mandate and in keeping with past practices in other regions. In conclusion, the solution must involve respect for international law, dialogue and de-escalation. We call on Iran to return to upholding its international obligations and to end its dangerous and ill-fated headlong rush.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo for the information provided and the representative of Ireland for the report (see S/2022/919) on his excellent work as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also welcome the remarks by Ambassador Gonzato on the efforts under way to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA represents a landmark accord, the key to ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme is and remains exclusively for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, with every passing day, it becomes increasingly clear that this is true only on paper. Today it is at risk of being transformed from historic to historical. We are worried about the findings of the recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/912), which indicates further uncontrolled nuclear proliferation activities by the Iranian regime. It also reports a total lack of cooperation from Tehran and continued non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Additional Protocol. We are particularly alarmed about successive reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicating a worrisome acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme that gravely departs from its JCPOA commitments. The key facts alone are disturbing. Iran has expanded its nuclear-enrichment capacity and has increased production of highly enriched uranium. It is the wrong course. It should stop, as there is less and less evidence that the Iranian nuclear programme has any basis for claiming it has civilian or peaceful purposes. The shutdown for almost two years of the monitoring cameras directly affects the implementation of the JCPOA. By turning them off, the regime has blinded the international community, which is no longer duly informed and cannot independently verify ongoing nuclear activities. This unchecked nuclear trajectory is leading Iran towards a dangerous path. It must be reversed, and the IAEA should be able to fully monitor compliance. Ensuring the exclusively peaceful character of the Iranian nuclear programme is a direct investment in regional and global stability and security. We are extremely worried about the findings of the Secretary-General’s report about the inconsistent activities undertaken by Iran that are in clear violation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The report shows  — and we just heard from Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo  — that there are similarities between cruise-missile parts seized by the United Kingdom in international waters and the parts found in the debris of the cruise missiles used by the Houthi terrorists in their terrorist attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Dry denials simply will not do; clear responses are needed. But above all, international law is unquestionably clear: any transfer of arms by Iran to non-State actors — in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon or elsewhere — is in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). It poses a clear and direct threat to regional stability. Unfortunately, Iran’s unlawful activities are not limited to the region. Its unlawful policies are now affecting peace and security in Europe through the use of a larger toolkit, including cyberattacks and, as discovered lately — first denied and later admitted — the illicit transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle systems to Russia for attacking civilians and critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. We recall again that any transfer of combat drones and missiles to or from Iran without the prior permission of the Security Council is in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). We expect to be duly and fully informed by the Secretariat on the matter. The Council cannot become a spectator to non-compliance with its decisions; it cannot be reduced to a notary of impunity. Albania commends the United States and the European Union for their efforts to achieve a successful outcome of the talks in Vienna for the restoration of the JCPOA. Diplomacy needs all actors to engage in good faith in the negotiations. Unreasonable demands and obstructive steps are not conducive to diplomatic solutions to that issue. Now it is up to the Iranian authorities to seize the opportunity, stop their threats and provocations and work in full transparency with those who have put on the table — as we understand it  — a comprehensive, meaningful, forward-looking document that contributes to peace and security. Multilateral diplomacy and solutions have many times shown their unquestionable efficiency and advantage. They are achieved through continued efforts, continued goodwill and genuine commitment. JCPOA restoration can be one such landmark exercise. It remains to be proved.

I too want to thank Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the European Union delegation for their valuable and informative briefings. We welcome the Secretary-General’s fourteenth report (S/2022/912) on this issue. Norway fully supports the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and echoes the Secretary-General’s stated view that it remains the best available option to achieve the shared commitment and objective of non-proliferation. In my statement today, I want to make four points. First, on the worrisome situation of Iran’s accelerated nuclear escalation, as reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA is highly regrettable. It has had a detrimental impact on the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The continued work on enrichment capacity, the stockpiling of enriched uranium, including the production of uranium metal, and irreversible enrichment research and development is concerning. Some of those pursuits have no credible civilian purpose, such as the enrichment and accumulation of highly enriched uranium. My second point is on the worrisome trend of Iran’s continuing to advance its missile capabilities, including activity related to ballistic missiles and launches using ballistic-missile technology. That activity is inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), and it must stop immediately. My third point concerns the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) from Iran to Russia, which would constitute violations by both Russia and Iran of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). Russia has been escalating its attacks on civilians and civilian objects in Ukraine using UAVs. Intentional or indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure are prohibited under international humanitarian law and may constitute war crimes. Norway regrets that the Secretariat has not yet visited Ukraine in order to examine the evidence of UAV transfers. My fourth and final point is that Norway still hopes to see the JCPOA restored. At the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), more than seven years ago, the Angolan representative commented that “[t]he people of the region deserve more” (S/PV.7488, p. 11). That still holds true today. We urge Iran to demonstrate its political will by delivering on its nuclear-related commitments under the agreement, including full cooperation with the IAEA in order to allow for verification of compliance. The JCPOA marked a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation. We need to revive and rebuild confidence in the agreement in order for it to achieve its goals. The full implementation of the JCPOA would serve our common interests and deliver benefits to the Iranian people.

At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Fergal Mythen for his briefing, his report (see S/2022/937) and his work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The work of the Facilitator is a central element in the process of monitoring the implementation of the resolution, alongside the Secretary-General’s reporting mechanism and the activities of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Gonzato for their briefings. Brazil welcomes the reports of the Facilitator, the Secretary-General (S/2022/912) and the Joint Commission (see S/2022/919) and takes note of the findings therein. Brazil reiterates its belief that the Iranian nuclear issue can be resolved only through peaceful and diplomatic means, in accordance with international law. It is our understanding that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) provides a suitable framework for dialogue among the parties concerned. Over the past four years, we have witnessed many actions that put the sustainability of the JCPOA in serious jeopardy. Such actions have also greatly increased the complexity of the task of agreeing on a common path towards restoring the JCPOA. We are concerned about increasingly frequent signs that the window of opportunity for negotiations towards that goal is closing. However, we remain hopeful that dialogue and mutual understanding will prevail and that all parties involved will demonstrate the flexibility and constructive spirit necessary to achieve that goal. Pending the conclusion of ongoing negotiations, we call upon all parties to refrain from any further actions that may jeopardize a possible and necessary agreement on the issue. As stated in the Secretary- General’s report, issues not related to the JCPOA should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the Plan and its accomplishments. Brazil defends the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the internationally recognized authority responsible for monitoring and verifying compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of States under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this regard, we regret that the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities of nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA have been seriously affected. The resumption of such activities is critical for the successful restoration of full compliance with the JCPOA. In parallel, Brazil welcomes the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA to preserve the Agency’s ability to fulfil its mandate in the implementation of comprehensive safeguards in Iran and to clarify outstanding issues. Finally, with regard to the alleged transfers of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to Russia in possible violation of resolution 2231 (2015), Brazil awaits an independent assessment of such allegations.

We wish to thank the Under-Secretary- General, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, the Chargé d’affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Silvio Gonzato, and Mr. Fergal Mythen, the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), the Permanent Representative of Ireland, for their briefings. We wish to note the efforts undertaken by the Irish side to ensure operations of the Council’s 2231 (2015) format. The consensus-based adoption of the biannual report of the Facilitator (see S/2022/937), as it appears, was a worthy conclusion of the two-year term of Ireland in this post. At the same time, we regret the fact that in his statement the Facilitator failed to directly point to the root cause known to all for the current issues plaguing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the deal and the subsequent violations by the United States of its provisions, including the imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran. This major flaw has also been visible in the biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912). It appears as if, based on the latter report, that the actions of the United States and Iran are effectively equal in magnitude. On the whole, one is left with the impression that the Secretary-General and our Western colleagues are now attempting, to the extent that it is possible, to obscure the fact that Washington withdrew unilaterally from the JCPOA in 2018. That generates a distorted picture, as if the deal had begun to unravel on its own or — and this is even more absurd — that the impasse is something for which Tehran is to blame in the first place. Let us recall that we need to talk not about waivers on the restrictions, but a full lifting  — on a consistent and verifiable basis  — of the illegitimate discriminatory measures imposed by the United States against Iran, in breach of resolution 2231 (2015). The report of the Secretary-General may generate the misguided perception that waivers alone would suffice. It is not the first time that we have voiced our concerns about the so-called investigations mentioned in the report carried out by the United Nations Secretariat in the context of implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Both in our letters and during our statements at Security Council meetings, we have repeatedly emphasized the fact that these kinds of actions — as well as encouragement to carry out these acts by certain States, to which we have recently borne witness, including today — constitute an egregious violation of both the provisions of the note by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2016/44 of 16 January 2016, which explicitly sets out the mandate for the Secretariat in relation to the aforementioned resolution, and the United Nations Charter directly, specifically Article 100 thereof. The Russian Federation has already provided a detailed legal analysis about this matter, and the United Nations Secretariat should not bow to pressure from Western countries and violate the United Nations Charter. We wish to note once again that any results of the pseudo-investigation into the 2231 (2015) cell are, from a legal standpoint, null and void, while references to any alleged practice in the conduct of inspections are irrelevant. Recurrence of violations cannot create a precedent. At the same time, it is with satisfaction that we note that the Secretary-General has voiced his assessment of the JCPOA as the optimal tool for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and regional security. We also firmly believe that there is no alternative to the Plan, and we believe that it is of tremendous importance, in principle, to promptly restore compliance in full therewith. The JCPOA had become a reality thanks to the professional, depoliticized and constructive approach of participants in the process. The development of the Plan was not only practical in nature, but it also had an important political effect. Seven years ago, our joint efforts demonstrated to the world that diplomacy works and, in the presence of political will, allows for results to be achieved despite existing divergences and disagreements. However, subsequent events reflected the fact that, unfortunately, not all parties are willing to embrace the spirit of the JCPOA. The actions of the United States have chipped away at the basis of the deal. Given the counterproductive nature of Washington’s steps, all of the subsequent measures undertaken by Tehran were a mere reaction to violations and pressure from the United States. At the same time, we have regrettably seen no intentions from our American colleagues to ease tensions and rejoin the JCPOA. Doubts about the sincerity of assurances about commitment to this goal have been stoked by public statements that American officials allow themselves to make. But, specifically, a restoration of the deal is apparently not on the United States agenda. We wish to separately touch upon another issue, which has nothing to do with the restoration of the JCPOA, but that Western colleagues are attempting to drum up: the alleged deliveries of drones by Iran to Russia for use in Ukraine. These allegations are patently concocted and false. We are well aware of the fact that representatives of Kyiv have still been unable bilaterally to provide Tehran any documentation to corroborate the use by Russian military personnel of drones of Iranian origin. Despite that, the United States and the European Union believe that it is possible on the basis of their fabrications to attempt to baselessly drag the United Nations Secretariat into this issue and impose sanctions against both Iranian and Russian legal and physical persons. It is noteworthy that attacks against the Russian Federation and Iran around drones were trotted out specifically when negotiations under the Vienna format entered the final stage. This starkly demonstrates who in fact is keen to diplomatically resolve the situation, and who is simply politicizing the discussion and continuously undercutting the JCPOA. Russia maintains its continuous focus on cooperation under the Vienna format to expeditiously restore the JCPOA. We also share the view of the Secretary-General that issues unrelated to the Plan should not hinder its preservation and implementation. Of late, we have occasionally heard conjecture that the JCPOA is allegedly obsolete and fails to reflect the existing balance of interests or that it can be replaced with a better deal. This logic is both reckless and dangerous. I urge Council members to consider if talks about the restoration of the JCPOA have been ongoing for nearly two years, then how much time will it take to reach agreement on a hypothetical new deal? And where are the assurances that it is achievable at all? Work on restoring the JCPOA package is already at a mature stage, and it is important not to reverse the gains. We see no insurmountable problems preventing the restoration of the JCPOA. However, we are at a critical and precarious juncture. Attempts to exert pressure on Iran, the unwarranted spiralling of tensions around the JCPOA and far-fetched allegations whose only purpose is to provoke other participants could completely undermine the prospects for reviving the agreement. Should that type of policy prevail, it would be a woeful departure from the high standards of diplomacy that once made it possible to reach agreement on the JCPOA. We urge the parties to demonstrate strategic restraint, adopt a pragmatic stance and focus on reaching a compromise. We are convinced that in that case, a mutually acceptable solution will be reached. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I would like to start by thanking Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo for her briefing and the Secretariat for its important role in supporting the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to thank Ambassador Mythen for his briefing and him and his team for their work as Facilitator during the past two years. And finally, I would like to thank Mr. Gonzato for his briefing on behalf of the Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Our colleagues are aware that in April 2021 negotiations began to return Iran to full JCPOA compliance and the United States to the deal. As we have heard, the JCPOA Coordinator submitted viable deals in March and August that would have achieved that. Iran refused both packages with unacceptable demands that were beyond the scope of the JCPOA. Iran’s continued nuclear escalation is a threat to international peace and security. Today its total enriched-uranium stockpile is at least 18 times larger than the JCPOA limits, and Iran is continuing to produce highly enriched uranium, which is unprecedented for a State without a nuclear- weapon programme. Its nuclear actions have no credible civilian justification. Iran’s nuclear-breakout time has been reduced to a matter of weeks, and the time required for Iran to produce the fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons is decreasing. Iran is testing technology with direct application to intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear payload. Iran’s behaviour in the region and at home betrays its claims to be a responsible international actor. As the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/912) confirms, Iran has continued to provide increasingly complex weapon systems to non-State actors, including the Houthis. It is providing support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine with unmanned aerial vehicles that Russia is using to target civilians and civilian infrastructure, as it did once again today against Kyiv. And Iran is responding to domestic protests in the most brutal fashion. That behaviour makes progress on a nuclear deal much more difficult. Iran and Russia would try to have us believe that the concerns I have expressed today are part of a Western campaign to undermine the Iranian Government. That is simply false. Iran’s actions should be a matter of profound concern for us all. In a year that has seen increased nuclear rhetoric, including from one of the permanent five members of the Council, the Council’s focus on Iran’s nuclear programme has never been more critical. In the months ahead, it will be incumbent on us to ensure that Iran is not able to develop a nuclear weapon.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo and Ambassadors Gonzato and Mythen for their briefings on their respective reports regarding resolution 2231 (2015). I also recognize the participation of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany in this meeting. Global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons constitute the core guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) are critical multilateral achievements and mechanisms in that regard. It is therefore concerning that this briefing is being held once again against a backdrop of a lack of agreement and the failure of the parties to return to the full implementation of the Plan and the resolution. Kenya commends the numerous efforts and diplomatic engagements to ensure dialogue and cooperation among all States involved in the JCPOA. We also echo the Secretary-General’s call to Iran and the United States to have an open dialogue and demonstrate the flexibility needed to reach a compromise on the last remaining issues and ensure that the negotiations are conducted in good faith and without undue delay. We believe that a successful outcome will not only ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, but will also restore confidence in the ability of such plans to contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in line with the relevant international treaties and instruments. A positive outcome would also ensure the full operationalization of the JCPOA, thereby strengthening regional security, rebuilding trust and addressing other issues of mutual concern to the parties. In our view, three aspects need to be achieved as a matter of priority. First, a clear and practical road map must be established for a return to full compliance with the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) and to ensure their implementation. We note the progress indicated during this briefing as well as the emerging challenges to achieving that. Secondly, there must be parameters to ensure that the parties concerned adhere to their commitments, including the lifting of additional sanctions and the cessation of all non-retractable and retaliatory measures and violations, including the installation of centrifuges and the enrichment of uranium, which are in violation of the parameters and procedures laid out in the JCPOA and in the international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties that the parties are signatories to. Thirdly, the equipment and important verification and monitoring work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be safeguarded and the Agency’s work must continue unhampered on the ground. We encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement its Safeguards Agreement and voluntary transparency and implementation measures with the IAEA, as agreed in the Plan. That includes Iran taking ownership of the Plan and strengthening its commitments to its provisions. Kenya reaffirms its appreciation for the critical role the IAEA plays in global nuclear safety and in providing support to Member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the areas of science, technology and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, including tackling climate and environmental challenges. My own country can attest to that. In that regard, we note that the political and diplomatic efforts that went into the establishment of the JCPOA were aimed at ensuring the economic and technological development of Iran in the area of peaceful nuclear activities, among other goals. We therefore advocate for the Security Council’s engagement with the non-proliferation agenda to go hand in hand with promoting efforts to strengthen the peaceful application of nuclear technology in industrial development projects, for tangible benefits to the Iranian people and a holistic political and economic stability in the subregion. We also commend the significant role of the Joint Commission in ensuring that political and technical differences are addressed, including guaranteeing that the principles of integrity, transparency and confidence-building are upheld in matters pertaining to resolution 2231 (2015), including the continuation of trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran and relevant transfers within the framework of the JCPOA. In conclusion, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Mythen and his team for Ireland’s consultative approach and able facilitation of this subsidiary format over the past two years.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of India. Let me begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912). I also express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Fergal Mythen and congratulate Ireland for its leadership as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank Mr. Silvio Gonzato, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations here in New York, for his briefing. India supports the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We encourage the parties concerned to continue dialogue and diplomacy towards an early resolution of differences and to return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. India also values the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement the Agency’s verification and monitoring mandate. We take note of the Agency’s recent reports, which were also considered recently at the meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors. We have maintained that the way forward is to make progress on engagement between the Agency and Iran in order to clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, thereby enabling the Agency to provide an assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. I will conclude by extending my appreciation to the resolution 2231 team of the Secretariat for the cooperation and support it has extended to my delegation during our tenure on the Council. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I thank India for convening today’s meeting. I also thank the briefers for their briefings. Today, as expected, the members of the Security Council once again expressed their support for the restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and called for its full implementation as the only viable course of action. Obviously, the JCPOA can be restored only by addressing the root causes of the current situation, namely, the United States’ withdrawal therefrom on 8 May 2018. Since then, the United States has reimposed all of its harsh and inhumane sanctions against Iran, in flagrant violation of its explicit legal obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). Moreover, it has pursued its so-called maximum pressure policy against the Iranian people, the aim of which was to starve the Iranian people, as stated openly and shamelessly by the former United States Secretary of State. In reality, the United States has weaponized economic sanctions in its long-standing hostile policy against the Iranian people. Furthermore, as a permanent member of the Council, the United States has brazenly forced all other United  Nations Member States to either violate resolution 2231 (2015) or face punishment. That is unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. Despite the change of the United States Administration in 2021, the country’s maximum pressure policy has remained unchanged. Even though it consistently admits to that policy’s failure, the current Administration continues to implement it more extensively and harshly. It should also be noted that France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) continue to fully support and enforce such United States sanctions and policies. They, like the United States, are failing to meet their obligations under the JCPOA. Nevertheless, today the delegation of the United States played the victim and acted as if it was Iran that withdrew from the JCPOA and was responsible for the current status of the JCPOA. It needs to stop fooling the international community and stop the deception. Its baseless allegations against Iran cannot change the fact that only the United States is responsible for the JCPOA’s current status. Iran’s full compliance with all its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, even one year following the United States withdrawal from the agreement, is well documented. It has been verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is reflected in 15 consecutive reports of its Director General. However, we reacted to the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and its significant non-compliance with its commitments under the deal, in addition to its flagrant violation of resolution 2231 (2015) after only one year of strategic patience. At the same time, the acts we took were certain remedial measures based on our rights, as plainly mentioned in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the JCPOA. Our objective was simple: to restore some balance in the reciprocal commitments and benefits under the agreement. That was important, since the JCPOA is based on Iran’s nuclear-related commitments in exchange for the lifting of all United  Nations, United States and European Union sanctions against Iran, as well as the removal of all the hurdles to Iran’s international economic, commercial and financial cooperation. Against that backdrop, today I will address four issues: first, the ongoing political process for the revival of the JCPOA; secondly, technical cooperation between Iran and the IAEA; thirdly, our position on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/912); and fourthly, our response to the accusations against my country made today by certain members of the Council. The Vienna talks commenced with the United States expressing its willingness to return to the JCPOA and reverse its failing maximum pressure policy. Iran had always shown good faith and taken a constructive approach during the talks. The negotiations were going well, and constant efforts were being made. Iran’s negotiating team exercised maximum flexibility in order to reach an agreement acceptable to all. To that end, our team even introduced innovative solutions to the remaining issues in order to break the impasse. However, the United States’ unrealistic and rigid approach has led to the current situation. Contrary to the baseless assertion that Iran has raised issues unrelated to the JCPOA, I can assure the Council that Iran has not brought up any matters outside of the framework of the Vienna talks and the JCPOA. The other parties, especially the United States, decided to withdraw from the negotiation table and send contrasting, ambiguous and paradoxical messages about negotiations. Instead, the United States and the United Kingdom chose to focus on what they have been doing for decades: interfering in Iran’s internal affairs, including by supporting terrorist groups in their villainous attempts to jeopardize the security of the Iranian people. Let me make it clear — pressure, intimidation and confrontation are not solutions and will lead nowhere. If the United States genuinely wants a revival of the JCPOA, it must rely on diplomacy only. For its part, Iran reiterates its commitment to dialogue and diplomacy. We are ready to resume the Vienna talks, work cooperatively to reach an agreeable solution and even arrange a ministerial meeting as soon as possible to declare the restoration of the JCPOA. That is achievable if the United States demonstrates genuine political will, stands ready to work towards a satisfying solution and agrees to fully comply with its obligations. The United States now has the ball in its court. It must show that it is honest, trustworthy and capable of keeping its word. The time for action is now. With regard to our technical cooperation with the IAEA, I must stress that the issue is entirely outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015). However, given that certain members of the Council have made unsubstantiated allegations and accused Iran of non-compliance, I would like to emphasize that all of our nuclear activities are peaceful and consistent with our rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and our Safeguards Agreement. According to the IAEA, Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme has been under the most robust and intrusive nuclear verification, monitoring and transparency measures ever conducted in a country in the IAEA’s history. It has continued to uphold its commitments and has cooperated fully with the Agency in order to maintain its continuity of knowledge regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities. The joint statement by the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on 5 March 2022 is the latest example of such cooperation. Iran’s current remedial measures, including in connection to surveillance equipment beyond its Safeguards Agreement and a robust verification system, would be reversed only if the illegitimate sanctions were lifted and current safeguards-related issues addressed and terminated. The Agency’s impartiality, independence and professionalism should never be jeopardized or influenced by certain parties. We consider the recent resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors a political action. Iran has fulfilled its responsibilities under its Safeguards Agreement. We stand ready to engage with the Agency to resolve the existing outstanding safeguards issues. We hope that the IAEA team’s visit to Tehran will further contribute to addressing such issues. While our full observations on the report of the Secretary-General the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912) are contained in my letter to him dated 15 December 2022 (S/2022/962), I would like to make a few comments. Contrary to the Secretariat’s assertion, the scope of the report must include the resolution in its entirety, not only its annex B. That is not Iran’s interpretation, but the precise language of paragraph 7 of note S/2016/44 by the Council’s President. Furthermore, the report covers issues that have nothing to do with resolution 2231 (2015). Similarly, it has once again failed to address the root cause of the current situation surrounding the JCPOA, namely, the United States withdrawal from the deal. The report is especially silent on the systematic material breach by the United States and France, Germany and the United Kingdom of their explicit legal obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). Moreover, the Secretariat’s engagement in the so- called investigation to purportedly examine the alleged violations of the resolution is clearly beyond the mandate entrusted to it by the Council through resolution 2231 (2015) and presidential note S/2016/44. According to those two documents, the Secretariat has no mandate whatsoever on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), other than providing administrative support to the Security Council’s work. Therefore, such ultra vires activities by the Secretariat are unacceptable and should be avoided, and any possible findings or assessments based on such activities are null and void. I must once again reiterate our consistent position that Iran’s space and missile programmes fall outside the purview and competence of resolution 2231 (2015). In conclusion, I would like to address the unfounded allegations that Iran transferred unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia in alleged violation of resolution 2231 (2015). First, arms-related restrictions under resolution 2231 (2015) were terminated on 18 October 2020. Since then, the transfer of arms to or from Iran is no longer covered by resolution 2231 (2015). Secondly, invoking paragraph 4 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) has no legal merit, as activities under that paragraph require the Council’s prior approval only if the exporting State determines that concerned items, regardless of their inclusion in document S/2015/546, could contribute to the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Iran has stated officially and in unambiguous terms that it has never produced or supplied, or does it intend to produce or supply, items that it determines could contribute to the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Accordingly, Iran has not transferred to Russia any item that is covered by paragraph 4 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Any claim to the contrary is unfounded and thereby rejected. It is also worth noting that we have already engaged in bilateral talks with Ukraine to clarify the existing misunderstandings on the subject. Moreover, a number of UAVs that were transferred by Iran to Russia prior to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and which are not compatible with the technical characteristics set out in paragraph 4 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were not transferred for use in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Therefore, the misinformation campaign and baseless accusations levelled against Iran must end. Those attempts serve no purpose other than to divert attention from the Western States’ transfer of massive amounts of advanced sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine in order to prolong the conflict. Finally, we reject making artificial linkages between regional issues and resolution 2231 (2015). However, in response to certain claims about our regional policy, I must reiterate that Iran’s foreign policy is based on full respect for international law, mutual respect, good-neighbourliness, cooperation and dialogue, as well as maintaining regional peace and security through the active participation of all States in the region. As in the past, we stand ready to engage actively and constructively with those States. Let me reiterate once again that we are willing to restart the Vienna talks as soon as possible and without any conditions in order to finalize the existing text, which will allow all parties to return to full compliance with their obligations under the deal.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Let me first join others in thanking our briefers for their contributions. I would also like to thank Ireland for its work as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) over the past two years. Finally, let me express our appreciation for the key role played by the Secretariat in supporting the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In his fourteenth report, the Secretary-General renewed his support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (S/2022/912). We fully agree that Iran’s nuclear escalation must be stopped and reversed by diplomatic means. We regret that Iran rejected viable compromise proposals in March and again in August and has stalled the Vienna talks. The prospects for a sustainable diplomatic solution have unfortunately been fading in recent months. Instead, Iran has chosen a path that further diminish the prospects for the restoration and full implementation of the JCPOA. Since we last met in this format (see S/PV.9085), we have been observing clear evidence of Iran’s covert support for Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. Iran has transferred hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia. That is a deeply concerning violation of resolution 2231 (2015), and we encourage the Secretariat to accept Ukraine’s repeated invitations to examine the evidence, in line with its mandate. Iranian combat drones have given Russia additional means to target civilian infrastructure and terrorize Ukrainian civilians. Reports that Russia is attempting to obtain even more weapons from Iran, including ballistic missiles, are deeply alarming. The Secretary-General reported that missile parts seized by the United Kingdom in January and February are consistent with cruise missiles previously assessed to be of Iranian origin. That provides important evidence of Iran’s misuse of its missile programme. Iran’s development of its missile capabilities and transfers to State and non-State actors are in violation of resolution 2231 (2015) and destabilize the region. Iraq is on the front line, with Iran also using its missiles and drones against its neighbours. Reports about threats against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are also worrisome. Iran’s aggressive behaviour in the region is not acceptable. Iran also continues to further escalate its nuclear programme, thereby undermining essential aspects of the global non-proliferation system. Iran’s accelerated production of up to 60 per cent enriched uranium, including at the Fordow fortified underground facility, is unprecedented and lacks any plausible civilian justification. Iran’s nuclear programme is more advanced than ever before and is becoming a threat to international peace and security. Iran has suspended its implementation of JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities. If Iran’s nuclear activities were purely benign, why would Iran continue to make it harder, if not impossible, for the International Atomic Enerby Agency (IAEA) to provide assurances of the programme’s alleged peaceful nature? Iran is further eroding trust by failing to address concerns related to the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, concluded under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We reject Iran’s attempts to evade clear safeguards obligations by linking them to JCPOA negotiations. Iran’s refusal of substantive compromise proposals, including sanctions relief, fuels doubts as to its true intentions. That is just another example of the Islamic Republic for Iran acting against the vital interests of its own people. Let me conclude by calling upon the Government of Iran to reverse course. Iran must stop its nuclear escalation. Iran must end its support for the Russian war against Ukraine. Iran must stop destabilizing regional activities, especially its proliferation of missile technology. It must also stop the gross human rights violations and repression of its own population.

The representative of the United States of America has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I extend my apologies for taking the floor. I would like to make a couple of points that need to be made, but I will be very brief. Others have pointed out all the various actions by Iran that have an impact on international peace and security, but let me just make a couple of points. We all know that Iran’s extraneous demands are the reason that there has not been a return to mutual compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That is a fact. It has rejected all compromise proposals. That is also a fact. Let me just simply say that the ball is not in the United States’ court. On the contrary, the ball is in Iran’s court.