S/PV.926 Security Council

My delegation was quite surprised at being summoned ta a meeting of the Security Council ta consider again the question of the intervention of Belgium in the Republic of the Congo. 3. In the first instance, since Liberia has only rl:;- cently become a member of the Security Counci! we were under the impression that the same kind of relationship prevailed in the Council as in the Committees of the General Assembly. If a situation arase or a representative received new instructions on an issue that might be of interest ta afellow representative, the representatives would freely discuss the 5. AU that the Mrican nationalists are demanding is the right of African peoples to govern themselves and to live at peace with the world. 1 am not so sure whether outside interference leaves the African people without suspicion. AU the world knows that Belgium committed a breach of international conduct as an .Administering Authority of a United Nations Trust Territory by permitting an aggression from that area. The representative of Belgiumdidnothesitateto admit this in his statement to the Security Council yesterday [924th meeting]. Besides, the Belgian Governmenthas again given assurances that such incidents would not happen again. 6. Mrican reaction to the statement of the United Kingdom representative [925th meeting] has been received with much concern. As a matter offact. everything appeared very incidental, as though a neighbour had mistakenly killed a cat. How long will Belgium maintain this attitude? How much more support can its allies and friends continue to give? 7. Mrican reaction to the statements of the representatives of France and Turkey [ibid.] is not unusual in regard to problems related to Mrican affairs. It is to be hoped that the approach of dawn is not far away. 8. Other African information is that the attitude of the Soviet Union in injecting itself when another European country is involved is being weU received, but, as 1 have said, the forum of the Security Council is not always the oost means of solving problems or the medium for negotiations in certain areas. 9. In our view, the Belgian Government, by aUowing the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi to be used for military operations by one of the parties in the conflict in the Republic of the Congo, has violated its obligations under the Charter resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted by the General Assembly on 20 September 1960 during its fourth special emergency session and resolution 1579 (XV) adopted by the Assembly during its fifteenth session. Accordingly. we have co-sponsored a draft resolution [S/4625] which we believe clearly and adequately meets the present situation. 10. It has been said by some speakers that there is no evidence that Belgium is in any way responsible for this violation; the facts. however, speakdifferently. It is evident from the correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Belgian Government that 11. Our interventiun deals only with the present item, the use of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi to facilitate the execution of military operations by one of the factions in the internal conflict of the Congo. 1 do not want to take up too much of the Security Counci!'s time and my delegation has inàicated its willingnes& to co-spv:sor a draft resolution which is mild in conte.nt only because of the attitude of Belgium in its reasst'rances to the Secretary-General that such an incident will not recul'. Therefore, this draft resolution is presented to the Security Counci! merely as a hope that it will lead towards a. solution of the complex problems of the Republic of the Congo.

1 should now like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. 13. Before dealing with the substance of the matter, 1 propose to sum up, briefly, my delegation's position on the Congo question. That position was recently defined here in the Security COUDcil at the meeting of 9 December 1960, and in the General Assembly on 16 December 1960, by Ml'. Fawzi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic. In the Security Counci! he stated: "No one here or elsewhere can doubt that, as long as there is any imperialist presence in the Congo, even under a dilferent name, there will continue to be dissension, 'stoogism' and disruption of the very concept of Congolese independ,ence and territorial integrity. No one can doubt either that, once imperialism disappears, stooges will too, the real leaders of the country will once again be effectively at the forefront, and unitY and independence will bath prevai! and rapidly flourish. "Persuasion should be used and, if necessary, pressure should be brought to bear on all, particularly Belgium, so that foreign interference in the affairs of the Congo should be promptly stoppeù. "At the sarne time, Ml'. Lumumba and the other leaders of the country who are at present apprehended should be immediately freed and allowed full scope for exercising their official, as weIl as human, rights and prerogatives. "Furthermore, a much more positive attitude should be adopted by the United Nations, so that the Congo is not left as a vacuumto be filled only by the return of !3elgians and Belgian domination, and the "1 have already referred to the belief of the Government of the United Arab Republic that there can be no independent Congo, and that there will continue to be a serious crisis there and a danger to world peace, as long as law and order have not been established and liberties safeguarded and as long as foreign, particularly Belgian, intervention continues, and that the first step to be taken therefore is obviously the prompt elimination of that foreign intervention."l! What emerges from these quotations ls that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic was stressing fore~e.4- 'ntervention in the Congo, its consequences and the SE rious repercussions it might have on the internationa 1 sit·_Ll.~')n. 14. My Government's position was al ,0 set forth in the resolution which we submitted to +l,e General Assembly in document A/L.331/Rev.l. Y Tl.atresolution, which unfortunately was not adopted by the Assembly, reflected our point of view IUld constituted an effort to find an adequate solution to the Congo problem. 15. The Casablanca Conference, at which the United Arab Republic was represented by its President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, adopted a resolution concerning the Congo, which 1 will now read out: "The Conference at Casablanca ... " "Having considered the situation in the Congo: "1. Declares the intention and determination of the respective Governments represented to withdraw their troops and other military personnel placed under the United Nations operational command in the Congo; "2. Reaffirms their recognition of the elected Parliament and legally constituted Government of the Republic of the Congo which came into being on 30 June 1960; "3. Convinced that the only justüication for the presence of the United Nations troops in the Congo is: "@) To answer the appeals of the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo at whose request the United Nations decided to create its operational command; "(1)) To implement the decisions of the Security Council in respect of the sit11ation in the Congo; "(Q) Ta safeguard the unitY and independence of the Republic of the Congo and preserve its territorial integrity; "(c) Reconvene the Parliament of the Republic of the ëongo; "@ Eliminate from the Congo aH Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel not belonging to the United Nations operational command whether operating as such or in disguise; "(ê) Release to the legitimate Government of the Congo aIl civil and military airports, radio stations and other establishments now unlawfully withheld from that Government; "m Prevent the Belgians from using the United Nations Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi as a base to commit aggression •.. against the Congolese Republic. "5. Decides that, if the purposes and principles which justified the presence of the United Nations operational command in the Republic of the Congo are not realizl::d and respected. then the States here represented reserve the right to take appropriate action." [See S/4626 and Corr.1.] These decisions are clear, need no comment and are, 1 think, self-explanatory. In any case, they reflect the standpoint of my Government and of the other Governments which were present at that Conference. In our opinion, if those decisions were adopted (and we ask that they should he adopted) they would lead to a constructive solution of the Congo question. 16. In this connexion, 1 would refer to the letter sent by the Secretary-General to Mr. Kasa-Vubu on 21 December 1960 [S/4606 and Add.1. sect. 1] regarding certain questions raised during the disGussion in the Security Council and inthe General Assembly. Ofthese questions. one to which we attach particular importance has to do with the convening of Parliament. Mr. Hammarskjold stated that the convening of Parliament and the return to democratic practices constituted a matter of great urgency. 1do not know whether . Mr. Hammarskjold has received any response from Ml'. Kasa-Vubu on that important point. 17. 1 will now turn to two cardinal points mentioned in the draft resolution [S/4625] which we have submitted jointly with the delegations of Ceylon and Liberia. 18. We know that the Secretary-General sent a "note verbale" to the representative of Belgium on 30 December 1960 [S/4606 and Add.1, sect. il], drawing his attention ta the fact that the Congolese authorities had addressed to the Belgian Ambassador at Brazzaville a request that the airfield at Usumbura. situated in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, might be used by Ml'. Mobutu's troops proceeding tothe Bukavu area. 20. We read, in Ml'. Dayal's report of1January 1961 [ibid., sect. IV], that the Secretary-General was immediately informed of the information 1 have just mentioned-and which is contained in the "note verbale"-that is, the request to the Belgian Government that certain cOI!.tingents of the Congolese National Army be authorized to use the airfield at Usumbura, and the subsequent landing of that contingent. The report continues: "The situation was considered especially grave as it clearly involved more than a purely internaI constitutional conflict, in particular because a United Nations Trust Territory had been used by armed soldiers foreign to that Territory, and a military crossing of an international frontier had taken place by means of an armed penetratiol~ into an area in respect of which the Security Counci! had assigned the Secretary-General special responsibilities which were confirmed by the General Assembly." [Ibid., para. 1l.] The report reveals-and this is the most important pOint-that troops of Colonel Mobutu, stated to numbèr 100. including three officers, were airlüted from Luluabourg in a DC-4 aircraft which arrived at Usumbura on the morning of 31 December, and that: " .•. they were loaded ••• into about ten trucks with European drivers. They left Usumbura just after midnight and trave1led on the Ruanda-Urundi side all the way to within a few hundred yards of the Ruzizi Bridge.•. At the bridge they left the trucks, which then headed back toward Usumbura." [Ibid., para. 12.] -- The soldiers crossed the bridge. Thel'e was a clash between that contingent and the local troops of the Congolese Army, which reported the situation on Kivu side "to be under its control, with sixtY prisoners taken". [Ibid.• para. 14.] Thus, most o~ the intruders who crossed the frontier were arrested. llONUC emissaries crossed over ta Shangugu, in Ruanda-Urundi opposite Bukavu, at the request of the Belgian lieutenant in command there for a conference with him. He disclaimed knowledge of the transit but stated that he had captured and disarmed 21. The Secretary-General, in his "note verbale" to the representative of Belgium of 1 January 1961 [ibid., sect. V], stated: nIn view of these facts, the events referred to above indicate the direct or indirect provision of assistance for military purposes to the Armée nationale congolaise by authorities under the Belgian Government in contravention of paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 20 September 1960. The gravity of the event is accentuate:d by the fact that assistance was rendered through the facilities and in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi which is administered by Belgium under an agreement with the: United Nations that includes a solemn obligation to further international peace and security." 22. From an this it can be clearly seen that the Belgian authorities, by their behaviour, contravened the rules of international law, the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations for the territory of Ruanda-Urundi of 13 December 1946, and General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, as well as General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV) of 20 December 1960. The duties of neutrality and impartiality, under the rules of international law, required the Belgian Government to disarm Ml'. Mobutu's bands and to intern them. A glance at any manual on the subject would suffice to show the correctness of this view. Belgium also contravened the Trusteeship Agreement; for this Agreement includes a solemn obligation to further international peace and security and, therefore, not to commit acts which might endanger international peace and security. This behaviour ofthe Belgian authorities, contravening a United Nations resolution-as the Secretary-General said-in a Trust Territory, constitutcs a contravention of the Trusteeship Agreement, particularly owing to the special situation existing in the Congo and to the special responsibility of the United Nations. This behaviour on the part of the Belgian Government contravenes beyond an question resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, particularly its operative paragraph 5 (g) which, as you know, requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and any action which might undermine the unitY, territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Conp, and above an paragraph 6, which calls upon aU states to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials ofwar and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo. This resolution is quite clear, and it in no way authorizes Belgium to facili.tate the transit landing of troops at Usumbura airfield with a view to affo:rding military assistance to the undisciplined bands of Ml'. Mobutu, which have engaged in attacks upon the United Nations and its personnel. .' vened paragraph 6 of the resolution of 20 September J 1960; claiming that any other attitude on their part ' -the disarming and capturing of the troops of the Congolese National Army at Usumbura-would have involved risks to international peace and security much more serious than those created by the fact of returning the contingents in question to Congolese territory. 24. 1 confess that 1 cannot share that view. No serious risks to peace and security could have arisen from adherence to legality, from application of the rules of international law and the United Nations resolutions which none can challenge and from the disarming of a hWldred or so Wldisciplined men. 25. The representative of Belgium tells us that the Belgian authorities returned the contingent to the territory of the Republic of the Congo. They certainly did so, but reconducted them to the pl, 'Je where they wanted to go, and the Belgian authorities in ntlanda- Urundi must have been aware of that. It was clearly military assistance in contravention of the resolution of 20 September 1960. 26. Likewise, we think it is difficult to maintain that the Belgian authorities, had they disarmed these troops and taken them prisoners, would have been contravening the Security Council resolution of 22 July 1960 [S/4405] which requests aU States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority. Moreover, the Belgian Government appears to have recognized its mistake, since the representative of Belgium told us that his Government had instructed the local authorities to oppose any Wlauthorized transit and that it had no intention of authorizing any further transit. We can only take note of that statement. 27. This incident, endangering peace and security in this area of the world, is a grave one, 9.-'1d constitutes another intervention by Belgium in Congolese affairs, of the sort which our Minister for Foreign Affairs has frequently condemned here. 28. Another point mentioned in our resolution is the presence of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel, advisers and teclL1icians. You are all familial' with this matter, which ha.::; been debaied several times. You will recall that, in his report of 2 November 1960, Ml'. Dayal dealt with the subject; and as an exampIe, 1 will repeat once more what he said regarding events in Katanga: "In Katanga, Belgian influence is omnipresent. Virtually aU key civilian and security posts are either held directly by officials of Belgiannationality or controlled by advisers to i'ecently appointed and often inexperienced Congolese officiaIs. Significantly, within the securityforces, there are, according to the latest available data 114 Belgian officers and 117 Belgians of other ranks in the 'gendarmerie' , and 58 Belgian officers in the police." [Si4557, para. 49.] The Secretary-General has pointed out these facts, and the Belgian comments of 30 November 1960 [S/4585] do not incline us to alter our point of view. 29. The logical concïusion which we are obliged ta draw from what 1 have just stated is that Belgium must cease its intervention in the Congo, withdraw its military and paramilitary personnel and adhere to the General Assembly resolution of 20 September 1960, particularly paragraph 1'> which prohibits itfrom giving any assistance for military purposes in the Congo. 30. That is the purpose of the draft resolution which we have submitted jointly with the representatives of Ceylon and Liberia, and which the Liberian representative has just introduced. It is, in our view, a matter of great importance. If the draft resolution is adopted and implemented, it will help towards restoring calm and stability in this part of the world which has recently been so sorely tried. 31. As 1 have said, if the resolutions adopted at the Casablanca Conference were implemented-as we hope they will be-they would form a basis for a constructive solution of the Congolese crisis. 32. 1 should like to conclude by reminding you of what the President of the United Arab Republic stated in his speech of 27 September last to the effect that, in the opinion of the United Arab Republic, matters in the Congo should be restored to what they were. "Rectification of the error", he said, "necessitates that we should re-establish the situation as it was."11

The Se~urity Council has been called into session to deal with a charge by the 80viet Union of direct aggression by Belgium, with the help of the Secretary-General, against the Republic of the Congo. To meet this socalled aggression the Soviet Union proposes that the United Nations should terminate the Trusteeship Agreement with respect to Ruanda-Urundi, disarm the National Army of the Republic of the Congo, release Mr. Lumumba from prison and turn all civilian and military airfields, radio stations and other installations over to dissident and rebel elements in the Congo. 34. The disparity between what actually happenE::u, as described in the documentation made available by the Secretary-General and the Government of Belgium, and the charges levelled and the action demanded by '1J Ibid., Flfteenth Session (Part Il.J'lenary~e.e!lng!i.vol. l, 873rd meeting, para. 128. 36. So far as the incident is concerned, the United States notes from Ambassador Dayal's last report [8/4606 and Add.l, sect. VII] that the United Nations Command has received assurances from the Belgian chief of the Huanda-Urundi security service that there are no more Congolese troops within the Trust Territory and th:lt no more will bl: permitted to enter. Similar assurances have been reaffirmed III the letter from th d representative of Belgium to the Seeret:irynene:.t1 [8/4621]. Moreover, yesterday the Belgian representative here reaffirmed those assurances in the most categorieal mannel'. Thus, if there ever was any justification for these meetings, that has now been obviated. 37. Considering the Soviet Union's own l'ole ofunilateral intervention, contraI)' to the spirit of the United Nations-and 1 am afraid that the Soviet Union is not alone in this-it is no wonder that the Soviet charge deals only with the Bukavu incident and ignores the fundamental problem besetting the Congo. The fundamental problem is outside intervention in support of rebel elements in order to undermine the legitimate authority of the Chief of State. It is ironie that in introclucing this complaint the Soviet Union uses as its basis a resolution calling on ail States not to render military assi&tance to the Congo. Now, in the SecUl'ity Council the Soviet Union vetoed [906th meeting] a resolution containing this provision, while at that vel)' time Ml'. Zorin explicitly said that the Soviet Union intenclecl to do whatever it wantecl to cio. Later, the General Assembly, at its fourth emergency special session, aclopted just such a resolution by an overwhelming majority, but the Soviet Union was not to be found among the supporters of that resolution. 38. The United States remains firmly committed to the ~upport of the United Nations progi'amme in the Congo and, as an essentialelementofthatprogramme, to the proposition that no military personnel, equip- 39. We have heard the statement of the Soviet representative that ostensibly on the basis of this incident Belgium should be removed as AdministeringAuthority in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and that Territory should be given immediate independence. The suggestion that Belgium should be forced to lay down its responsibilities in this way is, of course, a continuation of Soviet irresponsibility. So far as the independence of Ruanda-Urundi is concerned, as the Belgian representative pointed out yesterday, the necessary arrangements to this end are now under way in accordance with resolutions approved overwhelmingly by the General Assembly. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi is now en route to the Territory to supervise elections. The Commission will subsequently attend a round-table conference in the Territory to promote its development toward independence. This Cummission will report to the Trusteeship Council and to the General Assembly, which must be satisfied that the necessary steps tpward the goal of independence have been taken. Thus, the Soviet statement can be seen for what it ls: an effort to sow seeds of uncertainty and distrust and to promote the pattern of chaos from which that area of Africa has already suffered far too much. 40. We must, however, ask ourselves what the Security Council shoulrl do at this point. The (Ibjective of isolating the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi frùm direct involvement in the struggles in the Congo would seem to be met in the representations orthe Secretary-General and the assurances of the Belgian authorities. 42. 1 feel compelled to express one further thought on this question. As 1 have already said, outside Intervention in the internaI affairs of the Congo is the fundamental problem with which the Security Council and the General Assembly have had to deal. We have regrettably been only partlally successful. The Soviet Union bears a major share of responsibility for the present state of affairs. But it is necessary to say, if the record is to be clear, that the Soviet Union is not alone guilty of using the unfortunate Congolese people for its own purposes. Pious statements against outside interference in Congolese affairs have been made in the United Nations by those whose own governmental policy, perhaps for different reasons from those of the Soviet Union, has included the same kind of interference. Membership ln the Security Council itself, whose primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, has not, 1 am afraid, prevented this. The record must not fail to show this facto 43. Ml'. WIJEGOONAWARDENA (Ceylon): The Security Council in its current meetings is seized of a very important development in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi in relation to the situation in the Republic of the Congo. 1refer to the information contained in the Secretary-General's notes [S/4606 and Add.l]. 44. As the Council is aware, the Secretary-General in his "note verbale" of 30 December 1960 to the representative of Belgium [ibid., sect. II] said that he wished to draw the attention of the representative of Belgium to the fact that he had on that date received information from a trustworthy source that the Congolese authorities had addressed to the Belgian Ambassadar at Brazzaville a request that the airfield of Usumbura, situated in the Trust Territory of Ruanda- Urundi, might be used by troops of the Congolese national army proceeding to the Bukavu area. The Secretary-General added: "The Secretary-General feels certain that, in view of the status of the Trust Territory and the provisions of the TrusteeshipAgreement,no suchauthorization will be granted to the Congolese authorlties. Nevertheless, having regard to the seriousness of the problem, he considers it his duty to draw the attention of the representative of Belgium to the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 1474 (ES-IV) "The Belgian Government learned of the request addressed to it ~y the President of the Republic of the Congo at the same time as it was informed that a contingent of the Congolese National Army had landed at Usumbura. "Since the action in question had already been taken, it instructed the Resident-General of Ruanda- Urundi to see that the contingent left immediately for the Congolese national frontier." 46. We have further light thrown on this incident in the Secretary-General's "note verbale" of l. January 1961 [ibLd" sect. V] to the Belgian representativewhen the former says: nIt is evident that persons in the Trust Territory must have len't support to the operation both at the landing and by facilitating the transit of the Congo- Iese troops to their intended destination. The Secretary-General finds it difficult to believe that such support can have been furnished by persons in Ruanda-Urundi without the knowledge of the responsible authorities of Belgium in the Trust Territory." 47. Ta elaborate further, 1 now quote from the report of 1 January 1961 of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo [ibid., sect. IV]. In that report Ambassador Dayal says: "At the airfield they"-that is, Colonel Mobutu's men who had been airlifted from Luluabourgto Usumbura-"were loaded, after 2100 hours. into about ten trucks with European drivers. They left Usumbura just after midnight and travelled on the Ruanda- Urundi side all the way to within a few b'..illdred yards of the Ruzizi Bridge. At the bridge they left the trucks, which then headed back toward Usumbura." [Ibid.• para. 12.] 48. No one sitting at this table, 1 feel certain, can disagree with the request contained in the Secretary- General's "note verbale" of 1 January 1961 to the Belgian representative stating it was imperative that instructions should be given to officiaIs of the Belgian Government in Ruanda-Urundi that any attempt 1Jy Congolese troops to utilize that Territory for transit purposes in support of military action must, in accordance with the dutY of impartiality, require the disarming of such Congolese troops and, il necessary, guarding them in order to ensure that they did not engage in military action. This obligation, which was similar to that imposed upon neutrals under internationallaw, followed, the Secretary-General concluded, from the dutY of non-intervention mentioned in the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Counci!. 49. In this connexion 1 listened with interest to the statement of the representative of France at the last meeting when he cited paragraph 1 of article 9 of the Trusteeship Agreement in support of the granting of 50. The Belgi:m Governm~'nt's action, contrary as it is to the provisions of paragraphs 5 (~) nnd 6 of General Assembly resolution (l-1H (ES-IV» of 20 September 1960, in favour of which Relgium itself voted. contral'y as H is to the obligations assumed under article -1 and paragraph 3 (1)) of article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Terl'itory of Huanda-U rundi, as approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 19-16 and contrary as it is to the spirit of Hw Security Council l'l'solutions of 1-1 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 [S/-138ï, S/H05, S/-l-126l is, in the view of the Ceylon delegation, a serious :md regrettable infringement of Hs international obligations by Belgium, bath in regard to the presl'nt situation in the Hepublic of the Congo and in regard to the position it holds as the Administering Authority in the Trust Tenitory of Ruanda-Urtmdi. 51. The Ceylon delegation listened carefully to the statement made by the representative of Belgium before this C0uncil and studied very carefully his "note verbale" of 11 January 1961 [S/4621] addressed to the Secretary-General, We find the assertion made in that document that "there are no longer any Congolese soldiers in Ruanda-Urwldi at the present time". It states also that the Belgian Government "has instructed the local aulhorities to oppose any unauthorized transit in future. It does not intend to authorize any new transit". Whatever conclusions one may be expected to arrive at from these assertions, the Ceylon delegation st rongly feels that what had happencd must give rise to serious misgivings. It may be argued that it is an incident, that remedial action has been tnken or will be taken, and so on, but the incident, serious as it is, also calls for serious reflection on some important principles which it brings home to us. 52. First, the action of the Belgian authorities in providing transit facilities to the men of Colonel Mobutu to proceed from Usumbura, in Ruanda-Urundi, to Kivu province in the Republic of the Congo was in no way consistent with the obligation of Member States to the United Nations to extend their fullest co-operation to the United Nations effort in the Congo. As Ambassador Dayal's report of 5 January 1961 [S/4606 and Add.l, sect. VII], mnkes c1ear, this action created difficulties for the United Nations effort to maintain law and order in this area. Tension was created which had, in the words of the report, "a provocative effect during a period of fear and excitement". The Secretary-General underlined this in his "note verbale" of 2 January 1961 [ibid., sect. VI] to the representative of Belgium when he said: 53. Secondly, there is the very matte l' of the risk involved. ln the Ceylon delegation's very brief intervention in the Council in the early hours of 13 July of last year [873rd meeting], when the subject of immediate United Nations assistlmce to the Hepublic of the Congo was being debated, it was pointed out that the risk involved was not necessnrily confined to the Republic of the Congo but that there was the potentinl of a dangerous flare-up in the highly charged situation. Prompt United Nations nction averted this immediate risk. So far we hnve been able to contain it, but this insulntion can wear thin any time ifwe are not prudent enough. lt is in this context that the Belgian ~ction looks so regrettable and unfo rtunnte. ." s far as the Ccylon delcgation is concerned, this action constitutes, whatever mny have been Belgium's links in the past, intervention by another State-and a Member of the United Nations, at that-on behalf of one of the parties, with a view to infiuencing the struggle for power that is going on inside the Hepublic of the Congo by making availabl'e transit facilities in a neighbouringTert'itory, which it administers, to the prejudice of the United Nations effort. The consequences of this example are too serious to contemplate. 1 shal! say no more. 54. Thirdly, what is the status of this Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, neighbouring the Hepublic of the Congo, which has been used for this action by the BelgitUl authorities tUld which, as 1 said, they administer? Here we have a Terl'itory that is administered by Belgium under the United Nations Trusteeship System, and here we have an instance of that Trust Territory's being used to cause difficulties to a United Nations effort next door. Could therL' hl' a more regrettable situation? ln effect, the TrustTerritory of Huanda-Urundi was used in this action as a base against the United Nations effort in the Congo. That certainly is a very serious matter lUld one that cannot be permitted to continue. In fact, il is the view of the Ceylon delegation thnt such a dcvelopment would cal! for l'l'consideration of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Huanda-Urtmdi, as approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 1946. We are nntural!y very perturbed by any prospect ofthis Trust Territory's being used for purpOSl'S other thll" those enjoined by the Trusteeship Agreement. 55. In this connexion, 1'should like to quote from the statelllPnt made by the Defence Minister of India wilen he spoke at the Security Council meetingof 10 December 1960. He said: "1 now come ta another circumstancl', which is l'ven more serious. In this connexion. 1am not rely- These words are self-explanatory and need no elaboration. The incident which occurred on 31 December in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, in the view of the Ceylon delegation, has to be looked at in this wider context. 56. In conclusion, there is one thing that 1should like to emphasize. These are matters which cannot be ignored. The Security Council must play its l'ole. To this end, a draft resolution sponsored by Liberia, the United Arab Republic and Ceylan [S/4625] has been submitted to the Council. It is clear, precise and restrained. The Ceylon delegation hopes that it will have the widest possible support and will be adopted. The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m. Alexander Harn. baden. W. E. Saarbach, Keln (1). GHANA University Boakshop, of Ghana, Legon, GREECE-GRECE Kauffmonn Baak.hap, Athène•. GUATEMALA Saciedad Econômico·Financiera, 14·33, Guatemala HAIT! librairie"A la Caravelle", Port-ou·Prince. HONDURAS Libreria Panamericana, HONG KONG The Swindon Book Kowloon. ICELAND·ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfu.ar F., Auslurstraeti INOIA·INDE Orient Long man., dra., New Delhi Oxfard Boak Delhi and Calcutta. P. Varadachary INDONEsIA.INDONESIE Pembangunan, Djakarta. IRAN Guity, 482 Ferdowsi IRAQ·IRAK Mackenzie'. Book.hop, IRELAND.IRLANDE Stotionery Office, ARGENTlNA-ARGENTlNE Editorial Sudomericono, S,A" AI.ino 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRALIA-AUSTRALIE Melbourne University Pre.., 369 Lon•. dale Street, Melbourne C. 1. AUSTRIA·AUTRlCHE Gorald & Co., Graben 31, Wien, 1. B. Wüllerstarff, Marku. Sittikulltralle 10, Sal.burll· BELGIUM·BELGIQUE Allonco et Messagerie. do la Prelle, S.A., U·22, rue du Persil, Bruxelle•. BOLIVIA-BOLiVIE Librerla Seleccione., Ca.illa 972, La Paz. BR,uIL-BREsIL Livraria Agir, Rua México 98·8, Caixa Pa.tal 3291. Ria de Janeiro. BURMA·BIRMANIE Curator, Govt. Book Depot, Rangoon. CAMBODIA·CAMBODGE Entreprise khmère de librairie, Impri· merie & Papeterie Sarl, Phnom·Penh. CANADA The Queen'. Printer/lmprimeur de la Neine, Ottawa, Ontario. CEYLON.CEYLAN Lake Hou.e Boak.hop, Assac. New.papers of Ceylan, P.O. Box 244, Colombo. CHILE·CHILI Editorial dei Pocifico, Ahumado 57, santiaga. Libreria Iven., Ca.illa 205, Santiago. CHINA·CHINE The World Book Co., Lld.• 99 Chung King Raad, ht Section, Taipeh, Toiw"n. The Commercial Preu, Lid., 211 Honan Rd., Shanghai. COLOMBIA.COLOMBIE Libreria Buchhalz, Av. Jiménez de Que· •ada 8·40, Bogoté. COSTA RICA Imprenta y Librerio Treja., Apartado 1313, Scn Jo.é. CUBA La Ca.a Belga, O'Reilly 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLOVAKIA- TCHECOSLOVAQUIE èe.ko.laven.kY Spisavatel, Nérodnf nida 9, Praha 1. DENMARK.OANEMARK Einar Munk.gaard, Lid., Nfrregade 6, Ktlbenhavn, K. DOMINICAN REPUBLlC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana, Mercede. 49, Ciu· dad Trujillo. ECllADOR.EQUATEUR L;breria Cientrfica, Ca.iIIa 362, Guaya· quil. EL SALVADOR.SALVADOR Manuel Nava. y Cia., la. Avenida .ur 37, San Salvadar. ETHIOPIA.ETHIOPIE International Preu Agency. P.O. Sax 120, Addi. Ababa. FINLANO.FINLA'NDE Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 2 Ke.ku.katu, Hel.inki. FRANCE Editions A. Pédone, 13, rue Soufflot, Pari. (V'). ISRAEL Blum.tein'. Bookslore., and 48 Nachlat ITALY.ITALIE Lihreria Commissionaria Gina Capponi Azuni 15/A, Roma. JAPAN-JAPON Maru.en Campany, Nihanba.hi, Tokya. JORDAN·JORDANIE Jo.eph 1. Bahou. Box 66, Amman. KOREA.COREE Eul·Yao Publi.hing Changna. Seoul. LEBANON·L1BAN Khayat'. College 92·94, rue Blin, LUXEMBOURG Libreirie J. Trau.ch·Schummer, Théâtre, Luxembourg. MEXICO·MEXiQUE Editorial Herme., 41, Méxica, D.F. MOROCCO.MAROC Centre de diffu.ian B.E.P.I., 8, rue NETHERLANDS.PAYS.BAS N.V. Martinu. 9, 's-Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVELLE·ZELANDE United Natinn. land, C.P.O. 1011, NORWAy-NORVEGE Jahan Grandt gu.tsgt. 7A, 0.10. GERMANY-ALLf.MAGNE R. Ei.enschmidt, Schwanthaler Str. 59, Frank1urt/Main. Elwert und Meurer, Hauptstralle lOI, Berlin·Scheneberg. Order. and ;nquirÎes Irom counfr;e~ no# Iisted above may •ent ta: Sales Section, Publishing Seviee, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section. United Natians. Palai. des Natiôns, Genova, Switzerlanc/. Litho in V.N. Priee: $U.5. 0.35; 2/6 stg.; (or equivalent in other