S/PV.929 Security Council

Thursday, Jan. 26, 1961 — Session 16, Meeting 929 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 2 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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War and military aggression General statements and positions General debate rhetoric Southern Africa and apartheid Global economic relations

NEW YORK
The President unattributed #224691
As there are at present no names of other members of the Council inscribed on my list to speak 1 shall, with the permission of the 24. My delegation feels that there are a number of contradictions here; a head of government, arrested in his own territory, is transferred to anoth6r State whose head regards himself as outside the general body of the Congo. Contradiction exists when Kasa- Vubu implicitly recognizes that Lumumba represents samething in the Congo. by agreeing-according to the Press-to Lumumba's participation in a round table conference, while at the sarne time approving of his detention. 25. If my delegation intervenes in this debate today it is in order to state clearly what everyone is thinking. We consider that, if there is to be a fruitful discussion, a minimum of frankness is necessary; otherwise everybody will be misled. The Congolese tragedy continues because of a misu'nderstanding. We must clear up that misunderstanding if we want to achieve anything. 26. When President Modibo Keita asserts that the United ~tates could have stopped the tragedy in Algeria, we should remember that that is equally valid for the Congo. 1 shall come back to the problem of our security later, and let no one think that 1 arn digressing from the subject which now concerns us. My purpose wHl be to prave the urgent need for seeking a solution in the Congo, for upon it depends the security of our 0\\-ï1 State. The problems of colonial domination are connected, and a disrupted Congo is a constant threat on our own fronticr. 27. The Congolese tragedy continues because of a misunderstanding and 1 shall explain what 1 mean. A colony, an entire people is fighting for its independence, and ia languishing in prisons, in ignorance, a.lld in misery. This people has been kept ignorant and brutalized b) slavery-for colonization is nothing else but that-but sorne men emerge from that condition, place themselves at the head of the masses, extort concessions, and gain their independellce despite the fury of the colonial Power. Monopolies are whittled away and towering profits jeopardized. 28. What could be the reaction of the colonial Power-in this case Belgium, since we are dealing with the Congo? Belgium has allies, the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. It had to convince them of the necessity to put an end to the existence of a Government set up by the people, aGovernmentwhose members had taken part in the struggle for national 29. May 1 be allowed, through the Security COUDcil, to address my remarks to the representative of the United States. If 1 do so it is because r arn convinced that if the policy of the United States with regard to the Congo and to Mr. Lumumba were to change, then we could hope for some peace and order in that martyred land. Is it natural that the United States Government should accept all the lies the Government of Belgium has spread about the Congolese leaders, or that it should take as advisers those very perSc.,1S who ha.ve been dismissed by Lumumba? What other information on Lumumba could the United States Government expect the Belgians to give it? Lumumba is the Belgians' worst enemy, but he ia at the s arne time a man who is an honour to the Congolese people and to the whole of thinking Africa. Is it natural that the United States, in the name of 1t8 allhlrïce, should accept all this advice and oppose African patriots, thus becoming an accessory to acts which arouse indignation in all right-minded persons-and that against its own principles? The United States was wise enough not to liston to the French colonialists in the case of Mali, for 1 am certain that the French Ministry üf Foreign Affairs must have represented Mr. Khrushchev as a quiet businessman compared with Modibo Keita. Why should that sarne wisdom not prevail in llie case of the Congo? 30. 1 really hope that, since its ambassadors arel now in Africa, the United States Government wi 1 come to see African problems in a clearer 11ght. { am sure that that Government will not be satisfied with the ready-made votes cast by certain African countries whicil are completely discredited by their servile political alignment. As proof, 1 refer to that amazing communication from a country which is an independent Member of the United Nations inviting us all to address our correspondence vi~ the French delegation. 1 do not th!nk that you want that type of majority-a majority made to order, lacking in conviction and ready to change with every change in the alignment of forces, because it is gJ.so lacking in principle. The question of the Congo is urgent. Change your African policy in the light of the new facts, and you wililay the best groundwork for a policy of peace in Africa, many human lives will be spared, and Afric a will he grateful. 31. If we make this appeal today, it is because we feel the tragedy of the Congo in our own flesh, and any humiliation inflicted on Patrice Lumumba is one that we share with the entire Congolese people. 32. The Secretary-General is responsible for carrying out the decisions of the Security COUDcil. Mistakes have been made in the Congo; but to make a mistake is no dishonour, for ooly those who do not act make no mistakes. Dishonour would be involved only if the act were deiiberate, carried out with evil 34. The Secretary-General has the necessary forces to maintain order. He says that he cannot Interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congo; but 1 wonder whether there are still domestic affairs in the Congo. In thi8 case, he knows quite well that the pilots of the airborne operations had had their faces blacked. He has only to have them washed, and under the coating of burnt cork he will find skins as white as snow. 35. We are also seriously dlsturbed by incidents of the type that has occurred at Bukavu in Kivu province. A debate took place on this subject in the Security Council [924th to 927th meetings], which was called at the request of the USSR Jrepresentative. No decision was taken. To us, who were present as observers, Belgian aggression was clear beyond a doubt. And yet the Council was satisfied with abstentions on a very mild resolution merely because the Belgian representative, in refuting the accusations of the Soviet delegation, had said that Soviet policy was to blow up minor incidents, and that the crimes which his Govermnent, in fact, continues to commit in the Congo were iroaginary. But where the peoples of Africa are cOh~erned, Belgium has been unmasked once and for all, and its empty assertions will convince no one. We are ready to admit, in order to please everybody, that it is usual for the Soviet Union to exaggerate the facts; but what we fail to understand is why any and every statement should he condemned ln arlvance because it cornes from the Soviet Union. 36. 1 must admit that 1 was momentarily filled with astonishment when the representative of France rose up as a champion of Belgium. 1 say "momentarily", for 1 realized at once that it was quite natural that this should be so. To understand why, you have only to turn to French history since the last World War. France is the only colonial Power that has not known any peace. Since the end of the Second World War, France has been constantly making war on peoples wishing to be independent and to emeJ.:ge from under French domination-in Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia, and now Algeria. And again, but for the wisdom shown by the leaders of Mali, after preparing for the br'" <>kup of the Federation of Mali, France would have j.Jl'e- 37. In the record of Ule 925th meeting of the Security Council on 13 Ja.llum'y 1961 l read: "Ile [President Kasa-Vubu) was exereising 'the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo' as specifkrùly mentioned, l might point ~~t, in this pm'agraph Ô, whkh reads as follows: IWithout prejudice to the sovcreign rights of the Republic of U1C Congo, c:ùls upon :ùl States to refr:lin from the direct and indirect provision of :u'ms or othcr materials of war ...'" [925th meeting, para. 10.1 And the reprcsentative of France continues: "The Belgtan Government respondcd to a request which had been made by the official Congolese authority in the exerdse of Us full sovereignty. That Government did nothing more th:m make it possible for the Congolese executive power to move a military contingent from one point on Congolese territory to another point on Congolese territory.ft [Ibid., para. 11.) 38. li 1 understand correctly, the French representative considers it natural for the Belgians to give milit[ll'y assistance to the power established in the Congo, provided this power be the authority recognized by the United Nations-and, in the case we [lI'e discussing, President Kasa-Vubu. For shanw! The members of this Council are not children. If in the time of Lumumba, when he was recognized by the Unfted Nations and, on his invitation, the United Nations entered the Con~o-if, at that time, the Soviet Union had acceded to such a request made by Prime Minister Lumumba, would France have regarded Soviet assistance as "natural"? 1 am sure that France would have been the first to l'aise a hue and cry about Soviet intervention, the subversive methods of international communism, the infiltration of Russians into the :\frican continent, and such like nonselll:lC fit only to impress the mentally retarded. We in Mali judge on the basis of the facts. There are only two Russians at present in the whole of our territory, and we are sorry this is SOt In the United States, 1 believe, there are more than 200 Russians in diplomatie missions, but that does not make the United States a communist country. 39. What 1 want to bring out is that it is a method resorted to by colonialists the world oval' to daim that those who have led their country to independence are agents with an anti-Western bias. This device is used to alienate the sympathies of the non-colonial countries which might otherwise have helped the new countries in theil' development. It is an insult to African countries to believe that they are incap9hle of deciding anything for themselves, and that they must necessarily be the pawns of une power bloc or another. 41. fois douteux, 41. It is well known that on several occasions Lumumba was on the point of being freed by his jailers. 1 prefer, in this connexion, to base myself on the informa.tion given in the Press rather than on. United Nations reports, which ure slow in coming and . often untrustworthy, for, when it is a question of Mr. Lumumba, everything is done with full publicity; newspapermen and television men are called in, and the entire apparatus is mobUized in order to intimidate Africans by showing them the eXanlple of Lumumba, who sought independence that would exclude guiiance by the colonial Power. 42. Ml". Lumumba was sold by Mobutu so that Mobutu would be wle to pay his mercenaries who are ready to wandon him on each pay day. All these things tl1ke place, 1 repeat, quite openly, under the very nose of the United Nations Command and to the indignation of 'the entire Press-even the most reactionary newspapers, such as France-8oir. At the present time, it is only we-and by nwe n 1 mean the United Nationswho believe in the power of the so-called Presidents of the Congo and of the Mobutus. whose actual authority scarcely extends beyond the walls of their huts. Chacun Mobutu ponsable tructions Je des n'est votre tion 43. There ls talk wout the inextricwle situation in the Congo. Everyone says he cannot understand what is happening. 1 .wonder if It is not a question of not wanting to understand. For, after all, a representative of the Kasa-Vubu-Mobutu Congo has a seat in the United Nations, arid tt'1ere 15 aIso a College of Commissioners with an official in charge of foreign affairs who gives instructions tothe permanen representative of the Congo at the United Nations. It is no news to anyone here that the representative of the Congo was appointed by Kasa-Vubu, while the College of Commissioners was appointed by Mobutu, who is not a member of the Congolese Government. For the Council's information, 1 would add that 1 have l'ead in a rag put out by the Ministry of Information 45. This buffooncry must stop. Such goings-on discredit this international Organization. The admission tickets to the spectacle are being paid for with the lives of Africans and are an affront to all that is human and noble in the principles of liberty and of individual and national rights. 46. Very little is needed in the Congo today to precipitate a collapse, and the colonialists are getting ready to do that. A foreign legion is being formed in the Congo. In The New York Times of 27 January we read the following: "Colonel Paul Trinquier is reported to have gone to Katanga Province of the Congo to consider an offer to hea!! its armed forces and its police. The offer ••• was said to have been made by the provincial President, Moise Tshombé." 1t was also reported that Trinquier was well-known in Algeria for having pitilessly repressed the subversive activities of the "rebels", and for having taken an active part in the uprising which lead to the end l?f the Fourth Republic. These are fine character references. 47. Has the Secretariat donè anything to protest agaiIlBt these machinations, which are threatening the peace? For, after all, Tshombé is recognized by no one on the international level. In the circumstances, no one could complain about intervention, if the president of the province of Stanleyville, Mr. Gizenga, were to request mllitary assistance tomorrow. We cannot apply a double standard. These acts constitute direct intervention in the affairs of the Congo, which necessarily encourages and justifies other forms of intervention. The colonialists unleashed their great offensive to intimidate the Africans in the United Nations, Wld today we see African troops of the United Nations leaving the Congo. They will be replaced by the colonialists themselves, and that will at least have the advantage of bringing the real antagonists out into the open. Everyone will be able to decide in accordance with where his true sympathies lie, and not on the basis of legality, since the rule of law no longer applies in the Congo. 48. No one any longer doubts that a far-reaching plot was hatched by the colonialists. The whole of Africa is now on the move, and all the owners of the big monopolies are banding together to carry out the nefariouB task of disorganizing and isolating the countries that have just regained their freedom. The colonial Powers are forced to try to make people accept the idea that Africans are incapable of managing their own affairs. But we, the peoples of the former colonies, owe nothing to our old masters. Their armies were made great with the sacrifice of our blood. We helped to Uberate their territory. We gave their leader the time to make his preparations, so that he would be present at the moment of allied victory. As a reward, our fighters were massacred 14 , 1 50. It is not enough for the Secretary-General to exchange correspondence with the Belgian authorities or with Ml'. Kasa-Vubu. We ask the ~ecretary-Gen­ eral to take resolute action in the light of his own experience. Mistakes have been made, but we are willing to recognize that he was not in possession of all the facts concerning the situation in the Congo. Re seems now-at least according to what is said in the United Nations corridors-to accept the idea that Lumumba embodies something. Any action he might take which would restore peace to the Congo, even if it slightly e~.ceeded his mandate, could only, 1 am sure, meet with the approval of nearly all the Members of the United Nations. VVllat purpose can now be served by the Conciliation Commission for the Congo? Who are the parties to be conciliated? The Secretary- General spends a great deal of money for nothing on all these missions, which will probably try to reconcile Tshombé with the Belgians. But they are accomplices already-it is more than a friendly business relationship. The fact that ail these incidents have recurred troubles our conscience and casts a doubt on the Secretary-General's efforts. 1 repeat, 15 53. These gsmes of the great Powers, WI ereby they tocs the bal1 back snd forth and mske the fd’-st possible use of this international forum for propaganda es, are extremely dangerous. They aredangerecause it is always the small nations which tranquil minds that we cari conn 0~ peoples’ interest. 54. Tbe cold war forces us to divert a part of our energies and OUT llmited resources to national defente. Beace in the Congo is ss necessq to us as it is to the Congolese people. I wa~ saying afew moments ago t.b& colonial affaira are inter-dependent and tbat tbe problem of the Congo is inseparably em of our security. f the Congo experi- If in difficulty would dispatch of United Nations troops to its territory. 55. But it is essentiel that we sbould have confidence in this ~nst~~t~on~ An explosive situation exists to the north of our borders becauee f the Algerian war and the DPeamce of Frencb base in our national terriprovocation on tbe part of tbe Frcnch officer d be e~~~b to @et off discreate a danger0 a k being uBed ta u’ted In tbe of inciting tbe n to civil diaobedience. Some 56. T%e United Natio in Mali. eocurlty 58. Let not the Congo become a bone of contention between the East and the West. As far as we are concerned, we no longer know where the West is. We maintain good relations with West Ckrmany, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria and other countries; yet the moment our policies are opposed to those of Belgium or France, we are considered to be anti-Western. Is the West then bounded by France, Belgium, and Portugal-aH colonial Powers? If this is the West, we are anti-Western indeed, because in Africa we are all nationalists a'ld hence anti-colonialists. Let us then be told where the other non-communist countries, with which we maintain good relations, are situated. 59. Men's l!lves, the lives of Africans, and our own security are at stake in the Congo. Heads of independent African States met at Casablanca to seek a solution to the problem because they were impatient with the ineffectivenes Cl of the United Nations when so Uttle is needed to restore order. 60. Let the UnIted States begin an immediate reappraisal of its position and cease to identify itself with the Belgians as fellow members of the West. Africa is still well disposed towards it. Let the United Nations order the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops stationed in the territory of Ruanda- Urundi, which is being used as a base for aggression against the Congolese people. Let the United Nations disarm Mobutu's hordes and set free all the imprisoned members of ParUament and of the legitimate Government of the Congo. This ia a basic prerequisite for the convening of Parliarnent, the sole . arbiter of the Congo's dcstinies. It is wrong and unnatural to use Belgian personnel, whether military or civilian, when Belgium itself caused the chaos. Nothing will ever make me beUeve that countries other than Belgium are unable to provide the necessary personnel. Let all Belgians be expelled from the Congo, so that the Congolese will be able to place at least a minimum degree of confidence in the United Nations personnel. The United Nations should restore to the legitimate Government of the Congo all that is necessary to the smooth functioning (lf its institutions. of which it was illegally deprived. Only by such actions can peace be brought to the Congo and to Africa. This is what the CasablancaConference called for. The conscience of the Africans represented at Casablanca will no longer enable them to sponsor the actions of the United Nations if they continue in the sarne direction. We want to prevent any unilateral act, just as the resolutions adopted in this very hall have recommended. But the present situation cannot continue; human lives are at stake. The colonialists are still active and dream of reconquest. 61. l am instructed to state on behalf of the Government and people of Mali that we shall reassert our people. We are prepared to join in sny truly disinterested co-operation. But we shall continue to denounce auy plots tbat may be directed against the African peoples. 63. Allow me, in conclusion, to read out the statemeut of Preuident Modibo Keita, whicb remaius timely even though it wss made on 18 Jauuary 1961: *La& Friday, the true situation in our sister Republic of tbe Congo came to light: newspaper correspondent&! reported that the soldiers of Thysville assigned to guard Prime Minister Lumumba came very close to setting him free. *The Congolese have thus taken a clearly=defined position; the dismsenuous attemnts to reoresent this patriotic gesture as a minor dispute over wages bave deceived no one, especially not Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu, who only barely escaped from their owu soldiers. In order to restore the situation, tbe traitors were obligea to try, at the people’s expense, to reach a compromise with Prime Minister Lummnba, a84ubu offered a mimsterial post. *Today there csnnot be the sligbtest doubt that tbe Lumumba Government holds more thau half of the territory of the Republic of the Congo. QI view of this turn of events in the Congo, what are tbe colonialists plotting? aLa& week, a delegation led by Mr. Bomboko, which had been sent by the Congolese traitors snd Mroduced by Father Fulbert Youlou, was received by Mr. Foccart. Througb tbe good offices of the Secret~=-General of the French Communiti. Mr. Bomboko was put in touch with Mr. Spaak, the President of tbe six-member European Economie Community, wftb a delegation of the Compagnie gbnbrale du eongo and witIi Mr. "The colonialist and imperialist coalition is wideranging. Preparations are even now being made to launch a counter-offensive to undo the success of the Congolese nationalists. On Friday, 9 January, in the expectation of Lumumba's escape and disappearance and its probable consequences, six aircraft were landed at Brazzaville with equipment and war matériel estimated at about 60 million francs CFA. Thua, the former French Congo is serving as a staging-area. "We have learned that Lumumba and two persons, who had been held with him have been transferred to a safe place in Katanga. Let our warning not be heeded too late! "In any event, public opinion is on the alerte The instigators of this plot against the Congo and the nationalists will protest strongly and make fiat denials, but they will deceive no onA. I pray to Gad that they should have no opportunity to committheir crime. The Government and the people of Mali once again warn the United Nations of the serious consequences of the continued detention of the Congolese nationalists, Lumumba in particular, and ask it, if it wishes to enjoy some prestige, at least, among the independent African States, to make every effort to restore legality to the Congo, meaning t11e normal fwwtioning of the Parliament and the freedom of action of the legal government headed by Lumumba." 64. The Secretary-General spoke here yesterday to inform us of new developments in the Congo. I have not yet studied the French version of his statement, but I think it must contain some positive elements since, for the fil'St time, the Secretary-General is advancing specifie proposals, even if they are not entirely to our liking. I therefore reserve my right to speak again after I have read the French text of his statement.
The President unattributed #224696
As no member of the Council wishes to speak at present, I shall, with the permission of the COUDcil, calI upon the representative of India, who has been invited by the COUDcil to p~:r­ ticipate in the discussion. 66. Ml'. JHA (India): Ml'. President, permit me first of all to thank you and, through you, the members of the Security Council for the courtesf of extending an invitation to my delegation to sit round this table. I can assure you and members of the COUDcil that we asked to participate in these meetings of the Security Council in full realization of the seriousness of the situation and in the hope that we might be able to make a humble contribution to the solution of the problem before us. 68. In its subsequent resolutions of 22 July and 9 August 1960 [8/4405, 8/4426], the 8ecurity Council elaborated the decisions taken on 14 July. Both these resolutions confirmed the earlier decisions calling upon Belgium to vacate its aggression by withdrawing its troops immediately from all parts of the Congo, including the province of Katanga. These also confirmed the l'ole of the United Nations in assisting in the maintenance and restoration of law and order without intervening so as to influence the outcome of any internal conflict. 69. The purpose of the United Nations was thus clear. The United Nations operat~'ns in the Congo were undertaken at the request and with the :ull concurrence of the Congolese Government. Indeed, there was a specific agreement between the United Nations and the then Governrnent of the Congo. One would hav9 thought, therefore, that the United Nations, in effective co-operation with the Congolese Government, would be enabled to carry out its purposes and that the United Nations forces .and other personnel in the Congo would be an effective instrument not only for helping in the mairltenance of law and order and in the preservation of its independence but also in providing sorely needed technical assistallce, all of which would give the young republic an excellent start in its career as an independent 8tate. 70. Six months ago the United Nations undertook responsibilities in the Congo. It was a moment of great expectations. Rere was an opportunity-aunique and unprecedented one-for the United Nations to play a constructive l'ole in the maintenance of peace and in the building up of the newly emergent countries of Mrlca. Success in these undertakings was expected to add enormous prestige and strength to the United Nations and to its purposes and principles. For the Congo, and indeed for the wh01e of Afriea, this was the beginning of a co-opcrative endeavour with the United Nations and a chance ta consolidate the;1' freedom and build up their economy and administration. 71. The progress of this matter in the United Nations since and the tragedy and deterioration in the Congo are a matter of recent history. It is not my purpose here to go through every phase or every detail of the Congo experience during the last six months and to take on the l'ole of a political analyste It is sufficient to say that the United Nations has gone through many crises and vicissitudes through this periode AU this would have been worth-while and wouId indeed have given cause for satisfaction if there had been progress in the realization of the objectives of the 1'esolutions of the Security Council. 72. The situation today, however, unfortunately is 1 Bueh that one has to admit frankly that not only has the United Nations been prevented from pursuing the 73. Let us look more closely into the present state of affairs. There is no effective central Government of the Congo. The Republic of the Congo faces the danger of disintegrating. Parallel groups have been set up controlling different parts of the country. My Government has no interest in any individual or group in the Congo nor do we even know them, but in our opinion the authorities who pose as the lawful Goverllment of the Congo in Leopoldville have no constitutional sanction behind them, nor have they any moral or political strength. The lawful Government of Ml'. Lumumba, which was elected by a Parliament freely elected on the basis of adult franchise and which has still, as far as one can see, the support of the Parliament, was arbitrarily dismissed from office. Ml'. Lumumba and his supporters are under detention and are being subjected to the most cruel and humiliating treatment in violation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 74. The situatiùn with respect to other political leaders and memb€rs of Parliament is similar. There is a systematic violation of such rights and freedoms in the Congo, perpetrated by all kinds of people including those who pass as the lawful Govermnent of the Congo. The powers which under the fundamental law were distributed among the Chief of State, the Prime Minister and his Government and the Parliament have all been assumed by the President of the Republic without any constitutional sanction. Parliament has been suspended indefinitely, contrary to the terms of the "Loi fondamentale" of the Congo. Secessionist tendencies have grown stronger, thanks to foreign intervention and assistance, military and other, and succour to secessionists, particularly in Katanga. There is a complete absence of the rule of law, and personal and tribal vendetta and struggle for power in all their nakedness are the order of the day. 75. Rival authorities in the Congo are in a state of undeclared war against each other. According to the la':.ust reports, even aerial bombillgs of defellceless civilial1 populations have started. Private armies flourish. Arms and ammunition are coming into the Congo in increasing quantities in four-engine planes. Belgian military officers, in spite of repeated prohibition by the Security Council and the General Assembly and contrary to the pledges given by Belgium, are pouring into Leopoldville and Elisabethville. According to our information dozens of Belgian military officers and advisers have come into Leopoldville and Elisabethville in recent weeks. The Congo has became a happy hunting ground for foreign mercenary military personnel who are descenJmg into the Congo in increasing numbers. According to a United Nations spokesman there are over 200 of them in Katanga apart from the 140 Belgian armed personnel. Even the mere enumeration of the reported nationalities of these mercenaries bodes Hl for the problem of the Congo and indeed has an awful 76. In such a situation, t:he United Nations has become increasingly ineffeetive in the Congo. The policy pursued by it has the appearance of having no definite ,ùm. United Nations action apart from technical assistance which, despite adverse conditions appears ta have been useful, has largely consisted in attempts ta thwart misdeeds here and there by various groups including those which owe allegiance ta Colonel Mobutu. These have had little success and the situation has deteriorated progressively. It appears that the régime headed by President Kasa- Vubu has neither the will nor the ubility to deal with the situation satisfactorily or to follow the decisions of the United Nations. Withcat any constitutional basis it often sets itself in direct opposition and hostility ta the United Nations and its representatives. :\s a result of the passive attitude of the United Nations which is partly forced upon it in tIlis chaotic situation and partly results fI'am the inadequacy of its mandate, the impression gains ground that the United Nations presep..ce helps the régime ta consolidate itself. 77. The malady from which the Congo suffers is all too evident. Let us try ta diagll0se the disease itself. The whole "!\Sis of the United Nations action in the Congo was a request by the Ce'ltral Government of the Congo. 'Thp effectiveness of the ";Jni.ted Nations action pr~-supposed the contiuued existence of an effectiVf and lawful government working hand in hand ,~·:.tl~ Ll1e United Nations, co-operating fully with them and deriving the fullest advantage from the r;.assive technical assistance likely ta be available from the United Nations. 78. Secondly, the central purpose of the Security Council resolutions was the withdrawal of the Belgian forces from the Congo. Such a demand finds place in all the three Security Council resolutions with increasing urgency. Membcrs of the Security Council, out of politeness or sorne other reason, refrained from using the word "aggression", but the plain meaning and purpose of the Security Council resolutions was the end of the aggression involved in the presence of foreigll Belgian troops in lm independent State. 79. As 1 have indicated earlier, bath these fundamental assumptions have been bclied. No effective central government of the Congo cxists, and Belgian military intervention in the Congo contintleS with increasing vigour and ruthlessness and disref;ard of world public opinion and the dicta of the United Nations. 80. Bere, Ml'. President, if 1 may digress for a while, with your permission 1 should Iikn to say that even the complete withdrawal of the then BelgiUll troops, which the Secretary-Gcneral has said took place by the end of \ugust, does not appear ta have become a relùity. The continucd presence of BclgiUll military officers, in Bclgian uniform, long after, as brought out in the second progrcss report of the Secrctary-General's Special Hepresentative in the Congo [S/4557], only gocs to show that BelgilUl with- 82. The main reason for inaction in the Security Council has been the failure of the big Powers to agree. It is obvious that unless they are in agreement no decision can be taken by the Security Council. It appears to us, therefore, that the big Powers should agree on a minimum policy for the Congo without loss of any more time. In this connexion, may I take the liberty of quoting the very wise words uttered by President Kennedy of the United States in his inaugural address the other day. He said: "Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead ofbelabouring those problems which divide us." 1 submit that this is the right approach and the process can and ought to start here and 1l0W in the Security Council, in regard to the question of the Congo. 83. Permit me to express the views of my delegation on what should be the basis of agreement for future United Nations action in the Congo. As 1 said earlier, the United Nations has been handicapped right from the beginning because of the non-fulfilment of the two postulates on which the Security Council resolutions were based. It is obvious that if the United Nations is to continue its work in the Congo with any reasonable chance of success, the basic assumptions of the three Security Council resolutions must become a reality; that is to say, there should be a complete withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel and a complete prohibiti011 of the influx of any such personnel in the Congo, in whatever guise. There is no doubt in our minds that so long as Belgian military and paramilitary perSOT"- "}l are in the Congo ard Belgian intrigue prev~.ils there, there will be no f olution of the Congo problem. In conjunction with this I would add that Belgium must cease to misuse the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi as a base and jumping 85. rt is obvious iliat such a government should be a legal and constitutional government having the sanction of Parliament and based on the will of the people. Any government the source of whose power is a "coup d'état" or an unconstitutional fiat of the Chief of State cannot be regarded as an effective and constitutional central Government of the Congo. In practical terms too, as experience in the Congo during the last few months has shown, there can be no such government without conciliation and without 3. constituttonal basis. 86. rt is a matter of common knowledge that bitter~ ness and internal conflict in the Congo have gone on increasing ever since the President of the Republic suppressed Parliament and dismissed the lawfully elected Prime Minister. The seizure of power in Leopoldville by Colonel Mobutu's forces, under the patronage of the President, ia not acceptable to lcrge sections of the people of the Congo, especially to the nationalist elements who stand behind Mr. Lumumba. The detention and cruel treatment of Mr. Lumumba by thB Leopoldville ré~me has only served to rouse the deepest emotions and bitterness and increasing opposition by the Lumumba supporters, and indeed has strengthened Lumumba's position. Today it does not need a political prophet to say that unless there is a return to the path of constitutionalism and conciliation, it will be impossible to prevent a civil war in the Congo. 87. 1 would like to express the deep sense of shock and disgust felt by my Government and by public opinion in my country at the treatment to which Ml'. Lumumba has been subjected. Not only has he been arrested and is being kept in detention without lawful authority, but, even worse, he has been transferred to Katanga, which amounts to pushing him into the lair of his mortal enemies. On these points my delegation agrees with the legal analysis made at the last meeting by the representative of the United Arab Republic. Ml'. Lumumba and his supporters are being manhandled and mistreated and humiliated in a manner which offends all concepts of civilized behaviour and amounts to the worst form of tyranny. 89. It is our view, therefore, that Parliament should be reconvened without delay. It is Parliament which must become the forum for conciliation and for constitutional settlement. It is obvious that there cannot be a meeting of the Parliament unless all members of Parliament at present in detention, especially Ml'. Lumumba and other political leaders, are released. When I say this, I mean all such persons wherever and in whatever custody they may be. Where necessary, after their release, at their request or with their consent, such persons may be taken under United Nations protection. There should be an im~ mediate cessation of all practices which constitute a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 90. It is obvions that without conciliation there can be no peace or stability in the Congo; and there can be no conciliation unless Ml'. Lumumba and his followers, who obvi':lUsly command a large following in the Congo, and other politicalleaders, are free to take part in the processes of conciliation in the Parliament and outside. Indeed, in our view, Parliament would be the best forum for conciliation, and once Parliament is convened, a government having the support of Parliament will not take time to emerge• 91. The sort of round table conference which President Kasa-Vubu has convened, without the participation of Lumumba and other most important political leaders who are still in detention, can in our view not OlÙy not succeed in bringing about conciliation, but will make future conciliation much more difficult. 92. The Parliament has, of course, to be cOllvened by due cOllstitutional process. We believe, however, that the Security Council should urge the immediate convening of the Parliament. The combined effect of any such resolution of the Security Council and of the persuasion exercised by those who are in a position to influence President Kasa-Vubu will, we feel sure, result in the restoratioll of the Parliamellt. It is the view of my GovernnJ.ent-and we believe that it is aIso the view of the Arrican countries-that the Congo should be kept out of the cold war. None of us wishes to see the development in the Congo of a Korean situation. It is imperative that the Congo should be insulated from the supply of arms and military assistance of all kinds to the various factions contending for power. It is therefore necessary that all arms supplies to the Congo, from whatever source, except for that channelled through the United Nations, must stop. Paragraph 6 of resolution 1474 (ES-IV), adopted by the fourth emergency special session of the GenertÙ Assembly on 20 September 1960 without a dissenting voice, clearly calls upon all States to refrain 94. 1 would like to repeat what 1 said earlier, that in order for the Security Council to be effective, there shotùd be a basic agreement among the big Powers. It is our belief that such a basis can and must be found and that it shotùd be possible for agreement to be :r.eached on the essential points that 1 have just enumerated. 95. We heard with great attention the important stateÎnent made yesterday by tlie Secretary-General. We are in general agreement with his analysis and assessment of the situation. We also agree with him th~t the influx of arms, ammunition, military personnel, and so on, into the Congo must stop and that all private armies shotùd be neutralized. We are, however, firmly of the opinion that piecemeal measures will not do in the Congo. 96. The suggestions of the Secretary-General are well worth consideration, but only in conjunction with other measures which 1 have stated before. These are the release of all political leaders and members of Parliament, in particular Mr. Lumumba and his supporters, the immediate reconvening of Parliament, and the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian military and paramilitary personnel, and other suchpersonnel. 97. AlI these measures, as a matter of fact, hang together. For example, if the ANC is neutralized without the Parliament meeting or without Mr. Lumumba and others being released, or without the Belgian withdrawal, the festering sore of discontent, bitterness and the struggle for power will continue, and out of these will spring up again warring groups and factions. It is the focus of the trouble that must be attacked, and that can only be done by the reestablishment of the rule of law and the setting in motion of the processes of conciliation, without which any piecemeal measures will, in effect, be lending support to unconstitutional régimes. 98. We are firmly of the opinion that, without the elimination of tyranny and lawlessness, which at present prevail in the Congo, the measures proposed by the Secretary-General, useful as they may be, will 99. It only needs the casting aside of mutual suspicion by the big Powers, and the realization of the imperativeness of the success of the United Nations effort in the Congo, for the members of the Security Council ta come ta an agreed decision on the lines 1 have already outlined. The alternative to a more decisive policy is the fizzling-out of the United Nations operation for both political and financial reasons and the Congo becoming involved in large-scale civil war with outside intervention. The time for decision is now; later it may be too late. The meeting rose at 12,55 p.m. GERMANY-ALLEMAGNE R. Ei.enschmidt. Schwanthaler Str. 59. Frankfurt/Main. Elwert und M..ur..r. Hauplstra..e 101. B..rlin.Schaneberg. Litho in V.N. Priee: $V.S. 0.50; 3/6 stg.; (or equ1valent in other Orde.. and inquiries 'rom countries nol lis/ed aboy.. may be senl ta: Sa/..s Section. Publishing SeYice. Uniled Nations, New York. U.S.A.; or Sales Sedion. United Nations. Palais d.s NoUons, Genevo, Swifzer/and.
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