S/PV.93 Security Council

The Security Council is called to order. I call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)' (translated from Russian): I wish first of all to express satisfaction at. the fact that the majority of the mem.bers of the Security Council who have spoken have expressed themselves favourably on the proposals which I submitted for the consideration of the Security Council on 27 December 1945.2 All who have.spoken in the course of the discussion, with the exception of the representative ,of the United States, have supported the proposal of the USSR regarding the necessity to proceed without delay to the elaboration of practical measures to implement the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 19463 on·the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed QUATRE·VINGT·TREIZIEME SEANCE Tenue a Lake Success, New-York, le mercredi 15 janvie1' 1947, a14 h. 30. President: M. N. J. O. MAKll~ (Australie). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 16. Suite de la discussion sur lareglementation et la ..edudion generales des armements 1 Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La seance du Conseil de secunt6 est ouverte. Je donne la parole au representant de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je voudrais tout d'abord exprimer ma satisfaction de ce que la plupart des membres du Conseil de securite qui ont pris la parole jusqu'a present approuvent les propositions que j'avais soumises a l'examen du Conseil, le 27 decembre 1946.2 A part le representant des Etats-Unis, tous ceux qui ant pris part aux debats ont appuye la proposition de la delegation de l'URSS de proceder immediatement al'elaboration des mesures . pratiques en'vue de donner efIet a la resolution de l'Assemblee generale en date du 14 decembre 19463 sur la reglementation et la reduction generales des armements et des forces armees. lis ont 1 Voir l'ordre du jour de la quatre-vingt-douzieme seance du Conseil de securite, page 65.' 2 Voir Proces-Verbaux ofliciels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 2, Annexe 3. As regards the time limit within which the committee'is to prepare the relevant proposals for the Security Council, the delegation of the USSR considers that it should not exceed three months. The tasks assigned to us by the resolution of the Gen- ~ral Assembly are as serious as they are urgent. It 18 the moral obligation of the Security Council to -- Le representant du Royaume~Uni,Sir Alexander Cadogan, m'a demande de 1'6clairer sur un certain nombre de points qu'il avait rcleves au cours de l'examen des propositions de l'URSS. Il m'a demande notamment de preciseI' que! serait le programme des travaux de cette commission, et a vouIu savoir si celle~ci serait composee de representants politiques ou de repr6sentants militaires. J'estime done necessaire de faire quelques observations complementaires. Tout d'abord, je voudrais repondrea Sir Alexander Cadogan. 1. M andat de la commission. Ce mandat est tout trace dans la resolution que l'AssembIee generale avait adoptee le 14 d6cembre 1946: la commission doit soumettre au Conseil de securite des propositions en vue de hater la mise ~ pratique de cette resolution. Il appartient done a la com-. mission eUe-meme de d6limiter avec exactitude les questions qu'elle aura a examiner pour pouvoir formuler ses propositions. La creation de cette commission est une mesure que le Conseil de securit6 doit prendre de toute urgence s'il veut commencer a appliquer la resolution de l'Assemblee. 2. Composition de la commission. Chacun des gouvernem~nts est libre de designer soit un civil, soit un militaire, pour siegeI' au sein de cette commission. Les taches que la resolution de l'AssembIee nollS invite a accomplir sont pour l'instant d'ordre politique. Neanmoins, lorsque la commission discutera de mesures pratiques, nollS pOJIrrons avoir besoin d'experts pour l'examen de certaines questions speciales. Chaque membre de la commission pourra par consequent avoir des conseillers militaires qui l'assisteront dans I'etude de ces questions. D'autre part, il existe un Comite d'etat-major, que la commission pourra consulter lorsqu'il s'agira de questions speciales. . Quant aux delais a accorder a la commission pour prepareI' les propositions qu'eUe devra presenter au Conseil de securite, la delegation de l'URSS estime qU'ils ne devraient pas exceder trois mois. Les taches que nous confiela resolution. de l'AssembIee generale sont graves et urgentes. Le Conseil de securite al'obligation morale d'elaborer J'ai deja dit dans ma declaration du 9 janvier que les propositions soumises par le representant des Etats-Unis1au Conseil de securite n'etaient pas conformes a la resolution de I'Assemblee generale du 14 decembre 1946. En dIet, void ce qui ressort de ces propositions: c'est seulement apres avoir acheve I'etude du rapport de la Commission de I'energie atomique que le Conseil de securite pourrait, le cas ech6ant, proceder a )'elaboration des mesures necessaires a appliquer la resolution de l'Assemblee. Mais c'est une erreur que de poser la question sur ce plan; c'est contraire a l'esprit et a la lettre de la resolution de l'AssembIee generale. Toute decision qui s'inspirerait d'une telle attitude' ne ferait que compromettre la reglementation et la reduction des armements et des forces armees, , l'interdiction des armes atomiques, ainsi que de toutes les autres armes de destruction massive et I'emploi exclusif de I'energie nucleaire pour le bien-etre de l'humanite. Lorsque nollS avons discute de cette question, personne, pas meme le representant des Etats- Unis, n'a formule d'objectionala mise en pratique de la resolution de l'AssembIee generale., Et pourtant, on se trouve en desaccord des qu'il est question de mesmes d'ordre pratique en vue d'appliquer cette resolution: tandis que certains Etats proposent de prendre des mesures en vue de hater rapplication de cette resolution, d'autres Etats font des propositions qui risquent de la retarder, compromettant ainsi l'reuvre de la reglementation et de la reduction des artnements et des forces armees,aussi hien que le controle de l'energie atomique. La resolution de l'AssembIee generale en date du 14 decembre 1946 nous confie le soin d'e~ami­ ner d'urgence les deux questions suivantes: a) La reglementation et la reduction generales des armements et des forces armees; b) L'inter~ctiondes armes atomiques et la creation d'un controle international de I'energie atomique. Nons lisons au point 5 de la resolution de l'Assemblee: . "5. L'AssemblBe generale In the course of our discussion of this question, no one, not even the representative of the Umted States, objected to the ~plementationof the General Assembly's resolution. However, as soon as it becomes necessary to adopt concrete measures to ,P.nplement this resolution, opinions begin to differ. Thus" we are faced with a situation in which :some States are striving to llasten the implementation of the resolution, while other States, on the .contrary, tend to delay its application. The latter States are compromising the whole cause of the ;regulation and'reduction of armaments and armed forces and the establishmentof control over atomic energy. , The resolution of the Gen~ral Assembly of 14 Decemb~r 1946 obliges us to' give urgent consideration to two questions: "'(a) The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; (b) The prohibition of atomic weapoBS and the establishment of intemational control over atomic energy. ,Item5 of the GeneralAssembly resolution reads as follows: "5. The General Assembly "Further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way. of inspection and other means to protect complying States againstthe hazards of violations and • evasions. « ReconnaU en outre que la regImentation et la reduction generales des armements et des forces armees exigent; que soient assurees, au moyen d'inspections ou d'autres procedes, des garanties pratiques et efficaces protegeant les Etats respectueux de leurs obligations contre les risques de violation et de subterfuge. When this report is discussed, the Government of the USSR will of course again explain its position on the control of atomic energy and in particular regarding the drawing up of a convention for the prohibition of atomic and all otherweapons of mass destruction. The latter measure is urgent ifwe are to establish control of atomic energy with a view to the prohibition of its use for military purposes. It is argued that the Security Council should take a decision in accordance with the spirit of the United States proposals to avoid postponement of the consideration of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission; these assertions, in fact, have no foUndation whatever and are apparently intended to confuse the situation. As we know, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly Was based on the USSR and United States proposals, to which certain additions were made at the suggestion of other representatives. It would be regrettable ifthe United States and the 1!SSR were unable to agre~ on the implementanon of the resolution of the General Assembly. It would be regrettable if a country, which had expressed its agreement with the resolution of the General Assembly, should adopt a policy which would delay the elaboration of practical, measures to implement this resolution. We should all endeavour to avoid such a situation, and we should try to reach a unanimous decision on the questWn under discussion. I do not consider it necessary to dwell' on the questions which were touthed upon in the state- Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): It occurs to me that we are discussing solely.a question of procedure, thatwe are not discussing the substantive matter of whether a disarmament committee for the purpose of studying in advance, general disarmament and regulation of armaments oughtto be employed by the Security Councilornot. We are apparentlysolely concerned with the question of procedure. The question is: shall we go ahead and consider all these resolutions at the same time today and then come to a vote tonight upon the substantive matt~rs here, or shall we decide to consider, and study further, all these important resolutions. bearing upon the same subject? They are nmp.erous, they all have merit and they ought to' have deliberate consideration. I confess that I need further education. I am a freshinan here, and though I know something of the background of the probleIns confronting us, personally I should be better able to judge the merits of the case if I had further time to study it. Perhaps there are other memhers of this Council who are in a somewhat similar position. You are all aware, of course, that the. office of Secretary of State of the United States may' change hands within a few days. Certainly, as the highest, representative of the E~ecutive in ~plo­ matic and international affairs, it is, in my judgment, very essential that he should understand the nature of the proposals before,this Security Council and the problems they present, and that I . should then be the spokesman for the viewsof my Government. That is why I think our duty, under Articl;'26 of 'the Charter, is to pause here today and to postpone a decision. If we should'agree with the representative of the USSR and adopt the resolution that he offers .here, what. would we be M. AUSTIN (Etats~Unisd'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Il me semble que nous discutons une question de pure procedure, et non pas le fond du probleme, qui est de savoir si ie Conseil de securite doit demander a une commission du desarmement d'etudier a I'avance le desarmement et la reglementation generale des arme~ ments. Nous paraissons nous accuper seulement de la question de procMure. Ce qu'il s'agit de savoir,c'est si nous allons aborder aujaurd'hui 'l'examen de toutes ces resolutions simultanement pour a1?outir ce soir a un vote sur les questions de fond qui nous occupent, ou si nous allons considerer et etudier d'une maniere plus. complete toutes ces importantes resolutions qui ont trait a un meme probleme. Ces resolutions sont nombreuses, toutes meriteIit l'attention, et elles devraient etre murement etudiees. J'avoue que, pour ma part,.j'ai besoin d'en savoir plus long. Jesuis un nauve! arrive panni vous. J'ai que1que connaissance des elements des problemes devant lesquels nous nous trouvons; je serais toutefois mieux en mesure de porter un jugement sur le fond de la question si j'avais plus de temps pour l'etudier. Peut-etre y a-t-il parmi vous d'autres representants qui sont dans le meme cas. ' Vous n'ignorez pas, evidemment, que d'ici quelques jours le Secretariat d'Etat des Etats- Unis pourrait avoir un nouveau titulaire. I1 est absolument indispensable, a mon avis, que le premier representant du Gouvernement en matiere diplomatique et internationale comprenne. la nature des propositions donc le Conseil est saisi et qu'apres s'etre rendu compte des problemes qu'elles soulevent, vous presente, par mon intermediaire, les vues du Gouvernement. C'est pour cette raison que j'~time que nous avons le devoir, conformement a l'Article 26 de la Charte, de ne pas aller aujourd'hui plus ,avant et d'ajourner toute decision. Que ferions-nous, en effet, si nous nous rangions al'avis du represen- The General Assembly did not give us any choice concerning the position on our agenda of the report.ef the Atomic Energy Commission and the study of general disarmament. The General Assembly simply recommended that the "Security Council expedite consideration of that report". There is one Commission already formed that has performed the first phase of its duties and made its first report to us. Is it not curious that we should start off immediately by evading the obligation the General Assembly placed upon us, which was to expedite consideration of that report? That is the only business that the General Assembly asked us to expedite. And what does "expedite" mean? It means to advance, to accelerate the process and progress of, to facilitate, to hasten and quicken the consideration of that report. You know its derivative. I see a very distinguished doctor here, who realizes that this word is derived from, or has something to do with podiatry, and that the use of the word "expedite" is specific, has a specific meaning, is derived from the past participle of the Latin word expedire, that is, to let go of the foot. Here we are with our foot caught, as it were. We have a report of one Coma mission before us, and now we want to tighten our grip on the foot of that report and not let it go forward. However, the General Assembly has said to us: "You are recommended to expedite, 'free the foot,' hasten the progress of the consideration of the report of this disarmament Commission." And then what? The Assembly directs us to proceed according to priority, to consider the other matter of general reduction of 'armaments. That means that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments. I credit Mr. Gromyko with being earnest and devoted to the purpose of making just as fast and effective progress with· disarmament and regulation of armaments and prohibition of atomic bombs·and all other weapons of mass destruction as anybody I know. I have had many private conversations with him and I have heard him speak publicly, and I know how devoted he is to that cause. In my positionhere as representative of the United States, I make no criticism whatever of him on account of this resolution. He thinks it will L'AssembIee generale ne nous laisse pas le choix quant a. la place que doivent occuper sur notre ordre du jour le rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique et l'etude du desarmement general. Voici en effet ce qu'elle nous dit: "Le Conseil de securite examinera sans delai ces rapports." Il existe deja une commission qui a termine la premiere partie de sa tache et nous a adresse son premier rapport. Ne serait-il pas curieux que nous commencions par nous ecarter des instructions de l'Assemblee generale qui nous prescrivent d'examiner ce rapport sans deIai? C'e;;t la seule question que l'AssembIee generale nous a demande d'examinersans delai. Quefaut-il entendre par la? Le mot anglais expedite, applique a I'etude de ce rapport, signifie fail'e progressel', hater le cours et la bonne marche, faciliter, activeI', acceIerer. Vous en connaissez I'etymologie. J'aper~ois :lans la salle un eminent docteur qui sait qu'il s'agit d'un terme emprunte a la podologie. Ce mot a une acception et un sens bien definis; il est tire du participe passe du verbe latin expedire, qui signifie litteralement lacher le pied. Nous sommes en ce moment, pour ainsi dire, pris par le pied. Nous avons devant nous le rapport d'une commission, et nous voulons arr~ter ce rapport au depart et I'emp~cher de suivreson chemin, alors que l'AssembIee generale nous a dit: Nous vous recommandons de "lacher le pied", de hater I'examen du rapport de la Commission du desarmement et de poursuivre rapidement l'etude de ce rapport. De plus, l'AssembIee generale nous prescrit, dans l'ordre d'urgence, de proceder a. J'examen de l'autre question: la reduction generale des armements. Ceci signifie que le Conseil de securite doit mettre rapidement a I'etude I'elaboration, seIon leur ordre l'urgence, des mesures pratiques qui sont indispensables pour realiser la reglementation et la reduction generales des armements. J'accorde que M. Gromyko pade serieusement et qu'il se consacre autant que quiconque a la tache qui consisteaproceder d'une maniere rapide et efficace au desarmement et a la reglementation des armements, a l'interdiction des bombes atomiques et de tous les autres engins de destruction massive. M'etant souvent entretenu avec lui en particulier et I'ayant entendu pader en public,je sais combien il est devoue a cette cause. En ma qualite de representant des Etats-Unis au Conseil, . je-ne lui adresse pas la moindre critique person- On the basis of conversations, I firmly believe that there is a good chance of our arriving at agreement among ourselves by 4 February 1947 with respect to the implementation by the Security Council of our study of general reduction of armaments and disarmament. At the same time I believe we shall have reached much closer agreement than we now have with respect to the report .of the Atomic Energy CoI,IUnission. C~rtainly we do not want to take a step backward by returning the whole ofits report to the Atomic Energy Commission. We do not wantto do that, because it has considered the report item by item and arrived at a decision by a vote of ten members out of twelve, two members having abstained from voting. We do not want to reverse our, rocedure and send this whole business back Without having w()rked outsome of these items carefully and patiently, in a friendly spirit. We would then be in a position to say: these are matters that we can agree upon; th~se are matters that we C0tIld perhaps agree upon if we' ch..nged just thisCor t4at, The Security Council 1S the body charged with creating the plan upon which these agreements shall be drafted. Therefore, this principle of unanimity is involved in what we do and in the determination of the policy in pursuance of which these agreements shall be written. We want so to conduct ourselves that we shall not be clashing, but comingtogether and reaching agreement. We cannot reach agreement iri a moment. It would have been extraordinary if, today, in the few moments that we had together, we could have agreed upon these very substantial matters. Therefore, I think it is a reasonable suggestion, harming no one here today, since we place no conditions upon anybody, to propose merely that the whole matter, the entire agenda, unconditionally, be taken up on 4 February 1947. Such is the motion which I make on behalf of the United States.

I should like to draw the attention of the Council to rule 33. As will be remembered by the members of the Council, the representative of the United States has submitted a proposal to the effect that items which deal with matters we are now discussing shall be postponed until 4 February. Rule 33 (the beginning and sub-paragraph (e) ) states: "The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting tending . . to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or ..." Then it proceeds to mention other rules. That being so, it would mean that the question which must now take precedence is whether further discussion of these items shall'"be postponed to the day suggested by the representative of the United States. While I should be reluctant to rule out any discussion.on the general question, I think it preferable that we decide this point first. Then, after this has been determined, we will know exactly whether it is desired that we proceed further with the discussion today, or whether it should be deferred until the date that has been suggested. . Does' any representative wish to m?ke observations in regard to ~he proposal for the postponement of discussion until 4 Fepruary? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'twglais): Je voudrais attirer l'attention des membres du Conseil sur l'artic1e 33 du reglement. Les membres du Consei1 se souviendront que le representant des Etats-Unis leur a presente une proposition visant' a remettre au 4 fevrier la discussion des points de l'ordre du jour relatifs aux questions qui font l'objetdu debat. \ L'artic1e 33 (debut et alinea e) pose la regIe suivante: "Ont priorite, dans l'ordre ou. elles figurent ci-dessous, sur toutes les propbsitionsprincipales et projets de resolution visant la question en discussion, les propositions te)1dant . . . a remettre la discussion d'une question a un jour determine ..." L'artic1e enonce, ensuite d'autres regles. n semble done, d'apres cette regIe: qu'il faille maintenant donner la priorite a la question de savoir si la discussion detaillee de ceS problemes doit etre remise a la date proposee par le representant des Etats-Unis. J'aurais nature11ement scrupule a decider qu'on ne discutera pas du probleme d'ordre general; je pense toutefois qu'il est preferable que nollS reglions d'abord le premier point. Dne fois la decision prise en cette matiere, nous saurons exactement si le Consei1 desire poursuivre la discussion aujourd'hui ou la remettre ala date proposee. Certains representants desirent-ils faire des observations au sujet de la proposition tendant a remettre au 4 fevrier l'examen .de cespoints ne l'ordre du jour? ~anD.ot support the proposal to postpone until 4 February, consideration of the items enumerated by the United States representative. In the first place, there are no substantial grounds for postponing consideration of these questions, particularly the question which we have already begun to discuss; in the second place, I cannot support this proposal of the United States representative, because, for its part, the proposal put forward by the Government of the USSR provides first for the speediest possible elaboration of practical measures with a view to implementing the resolution of the General Assembly, and secondly the adoption of a decision on the establishment of means to formulate and apply these practical measures. The proposal of the USSR, which has been:mpported by the majority of the members of the Security Council, provides for the establishment of a committee. This committee should prepare proposals for the Secmity Council within one, two or, in. any case, not more than three months. This is a longer period than that between the present date and 4: February. I have not proposed that the Security Council should prepare proposals as regards the suhstance of other questions raised by the General Assembly. .Besides the general proposal on the necessity for expediting consideration of practical measures to implement the resolution of the General Assembly, th~ Government of the USSR has proposed the establishment of a ..:ommittee which would prepare proposals regardbg these practical measures. In accordance with the USSR proposal, the committee is allotted a period of one, two or even three months, that is to say, a longer period than that provided in the United States proposal, which specifies a period up to 4 February. I would ask: why should we postpone consideration of this question until 4 February, and then resume the discussion? What is the sense of postponing the disc~ssion and the decision on this question? I do not see the sense of it. I cannot agree, therefore, with the proposal of .the United States representative. Mr. LANGE (Poland) : I just wanted to ask you one question on procedure, namely, whether acceptance of the resolution for postponement which is now before us would mean that those representatives who ro:e on your speaker's list, like myself, and who were to speak in the general discussion today, would have to postpone expression of their views until after 4-February.

The representative of the United States wishes to make some comment on . this same point. La proposition de l'URSS, approuvee par la plupart des membres du Conseil qui ont pris part aux debats, prevoit la creation d'une commission a cet efIet. Cette commission, dans un delai d'un, de deux ou tout au plus de trois mois, doit soumettre des propositions au Conseil de securite. C'est plus que le laps de temps qui nous separe du 4 fevrier. Je n'ai pas demande que le ConseiI formule des propositions quant au fond d'autres problemes souleves par l'Assemblee generale. Dans ses propositions, le Gouvernement de l'URSS a non seulement insiste sur la necessite d'examiner d'urgence les mesures pratiques que le Conseil de securite devrait prendre pour dOllller dIet a la resolution de l'Assemblee; mais encore il a propose de Creel' une commission chargee de prepareI' ces mesures. Conformement ala proposition de l'URSS, cette commission disposerait d'un delai d'un, de deux ou meme de trois mois, c'est-a-dire d'un laps de temps plus important que celui que nous accorde la delegation des Etats- Unis en proposant d'ajoumer les debats au 4 fevrier. A quoi bon ajoumer l'examen de la question &ou 4 fevrier, s'il faut le reprendre ensuite? Pourquoi retarder la discussion et les decisions a prendre a ce sujet? Je n'en vois pas la necessite. Aussi ne puis-je approuver la proposition du representant des Etats-Unis. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de ['anglais) : Je voulais simplement poser une question de procedure: je voulais savoir si, an cas ou la motion d'ajournement dont nous sommes saisis serait adoptee, les orateurs inscrits, dont je suis, qui devaient prendre la parole au cours de la discussion generale d'aujourd'hui, devront attendre une date posterieure au 4 fevrier pourexprimer les vueo:; de leur delegation. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le representant des Etats-Unis a une observation a presenter sur le meme point. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): If that is the procedure, I will do that.

The representative of Poland will remember that I indicated reluctance to interfere with a representative's speech on the question that is before the Chair,'but I felt that this resolution called upon members of the Council to give immediate priority to its consideration before continuation of the general discussion. I recognize, of course, that even ill discussing the question of deferring these items to another date, certain matters associated with the general discussion inevitably come under review. That is inescapable, but I thinkit might possiblybe preferable if the representative of the United States was to withdraw this resolution for the time being. It may be taken up at some later hour today to enable those members who wish to speak in the general discussion to do so. But I wish to consult the members of the Council as to whether the representative of the United States should now have sanction to withdraw his resolution with a view to placing it before the Council possibly at a later hour today. Is there any objection to the representative of the United States temporarily withdrawing his resolution regardi."g L1.e deferment of this question to a later date? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): If the representative of the United States provisionally withdraws his resolution, does that mean that we are not able to discuss it until he suggests it again, or does it mean simply that the substance of the matter is open for discussion as well as the proposal which he has made? . The PRESIDENT: Of course, if the representative of the United States Withdraws his resolution for postponement, then we proceed to the general discussion. But there is no rule that I know of that would deny to any member in the course of the general discussion, to indicate whether he feels this M. JOHNSON" (Etats-Unis d'Am6rique) (traduit de 1'"ang1ais): J'y consens si telle est la procedure. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Pour repondre au representant de la Pologne, je lui rappellerai que j'ai declare que j'avais scrupulea emp8cher un representant de prendre la parole sur la question dont est saisi le President, et que llt~anmoins, a mon avis, les membres du Conseil devaient donnerala resolution priorite immediate et prendre une decision acet egard avant de reprendre la discussion generale. Je reconnais naturellement que, meme quand on discute la question de savoir si ces divers points de l'ordre du jour seront remis aune date ulterieure, ill~t inevitable que 1'0n aborde certaines questions ayant trait au probleme general. Il ne peut en 8tre autrement. Je crois neallmoins qu'il serait preferable que le representant des Etats-Unis retirat sa resolution pour le moment. Nous pourrions en reprendre l'etude ulterieurement, au cours de cette seance m8me, afin de permettre aux membres qui le desirent de ptendre la parole au cours de la discussion generale. Toutefois, il y a la un point sur lequel je sollicite l'avis du Conseil: est-il necessaire que la representant des Etats-Unis soit .autorise, maintenant, a retirer sa resolution pour pouvoir la presenter eventue11ement au Conseil, a 1,1n moment ulterieur de la seance? Quelqu'un s'oppose-t-ilace que le representant des Etats-Unis retire momentanement sa resolution, relative a l'ajournement de ia discussionde ce probleme? Sir Alexander CADOaAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Si le representant des Etats- Unis retire provisoirement sa resolution, est-ce a dire que nous n'avons pas la possibilite de la discuter avant qu'illa propose de nouveau, ou devonsnous en conclure simplement que nous pourrons discuter le fond du probleme, ainsi que de la proposition qu'il a faite? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Il va de soi que si le representant des Etats-Unis retire sa motion d'ajournement, nous passerons a la discussion generale. Mais il n'existe, a ma connaissance, aucune regIe qui rduse a un membre du Conseil. le droit de declarer, au cours de la discussion Mr. JOHNSON. (United States of America): The only object I had in suggesting the temporary withdrawal of this motion was that our resolution should not act as a bar to the statements which membe.."'S of the Council wished to make. I have no thought or wish in regard to the procedure except that our resolution shCluld be voted upon and that it should'not bar any member of the Council from saying what he would otherwise say on the general subject today.

As the representative of the United States has said, the actual proposal of such a. resolution would deny to representatives who wish to speak on the general resolution an opportunity to express their views in a more substantial way. Therefore I feel that the explanation as made by the representative of the United States gives quite a clear view regarding the effect of the resolution that he proposed. If there is no objection, the. motion for deferment of the discussion on this matter until a later time is adopted. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I intend to make a few ~emarks in the general discussi~n of the subject which is before us. I speak pere as one of the non-permanent members of the decurity Council, and, as I have had the opportunity to point out on several occasions, our delegation considers that all the non-permanent members of this Council, as well as the permanent on~s, do not merely represent their own nations, but they have a special duty to represent the interests of the United Nations as a whole. We have been elected to this seat by the General Assembly, and we interpret this election to mean that we have received a mandate to act in the interest of international peace ~d security. In the case of Poland, it is parJcularly easy to .carry out this mandate,because we are the country which has suffered more from the war th~ any other country in the world. We have suffered in terms of destruction and devastation; we have suffered b terms of loss of human life. Out of a population of 35,000,000 in pr'e-war Poland, 6,000,000 have lost their lives, that is, almost one of every five citizens. In these circumstances, it is not difficult for us to stand by our mandate to act in the interest of international p~ace and security: - " M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tr<tduit de l'ang1ais): Si j'ai propose de retirer momentanem.ent cette resolution, c'est pour qu'elle n'empccha.t pas les membres du Conseil de prononcer les declarations qu'ils veulent faire. Peu m'importe la procedure a suivre, pourvu que notre resolu~on soit mise aux voix et qu'elle ne constitue pas un obstacle de procedure qui empeche un membre du Conseil de dire ce qu'il a adire aujourd'hui en ce qui concerne le probleme general. Le PRESIDENT ('traduit de l'anglais): Comme l'a dit le representant des Etats-Upis, le fait de proposer une telle resolution priverait les representants qui desirent prendre la parole apropos de la resolution generale de l'occasion cl'exprimer effectivement leurs vues. C'est pourquoi j'estime que l'explication donnee par le representant des Etats-Unis nous permet d'apprecier clairement les effets de la resolution qu'il a proposee. S'il n'y a pas d'opposition, la motion tendant aajourner le debat sur cette question est adoptee. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire seulement faire que1ques remarques en ce qui concerne la discussion generale du probleme dont nous sommes saisis. Je parle id en ma qualite de membre non permanent du Conseil de securite. Comme fai eu l'occasion de le souligner a plusieurs reprises, la delegation de la Pologne estime que tous les membres non permanents du Conseil, de meme que les membres permanents, font plus que representer id leurs pays respectifs; illeur incombe en outre particulierement de representer les interets des Nations Unies en general. Nous avons ete elus au Conseil par l'Assemblee generale et, pour nous, cette election signifie que nous avons re~u le mandat d'agir dans l'interet de la paix et de la securite internationales. Il est particulierement facile pour la Pologne de s'acquitter de ce mandat, parce qu'ell~ a souf· fert de la guerre plus que tout autre pays au monde. Nous avons subi des destructions et des· devastations j nous avons subi des pertes' de vies humaines. Sur une population qui s'elevait avant la guerre a 35.000.000 d'habitants, 6.000.000 de personnes sont mortes, soit pres du cinquieme de la population totale. Dans ces conditions, il ne nousest pas difficile d'etre fideles a notre mandat, qui est d'agir dans l'interet de la paix et de la securite internationalcs. Theremay be-and I auite und~""Standthemc?nsiderations of high power politics which, to different nations and Powers, may make it desirable to delay or postpone the implementation of disarmament until this or that peace conference has taken place, or until this or that has happened.. To all such considerations, we shall have a very undiplom'ttic answer, an answer which is not 11 est possible qu'en raison de certaines considerations de haute politique de puissance, que je comprends parf~tement, diverses Puissances soient desireuses de retarder ou de differer la mise en reuvre du desarmement jusqu'a ce que tel1e ou telle conference de paix, ou tel ou tel evenement aient eu lieu. A toutes les considerations de ce genre, nous opposerons une reponsefort peu diplomatique, une reponse que n'admetpas le langage habitue! de la diplomatie mais que, j'en suis certain, la masse de l'humanite comprendra. Ncms repondrons tout simplement: "Au diable la politique de puissance". II entrepeut-etre en ligne de compte bien des considerations techniques qui, prises isoIement, ont toute leur valeur, toute leur imp9rtance et que peuvent invoquer ceux qui sont partisans d'atten,dre qu'on ait fait ceci ou cela, " co~chedin 'the usual language of diplomacy, but w?ich I trust the .common people of the world will understand. We will just say: "To hell with power politics." There may be many technical consid~ations which are quite valid and important, if considered separately, which may also l:?ake it appear desirable to postpone implementatmn of the disarmament resolution until this has been done, and that has been done, and something Thus, we shall pursue in thts Council, ~ well as in the General Assembly, a policy of rapid disarmament. We shall demand disarmament not in ten years, not in five years, not even in three years~ but right now. We believe that this is possible, and we believe in the goodwill of the Members of the United Nations to carry out such a policy in good faith. We have before us a number of proposals relating to the question of implementing the disarmamentresolution of the General Assembly. We shall judge these proposals in the light of the general policy which I have just outlined. These proposals, taken as a whole, refer to two phases of the disarmament problem. One phase is the general reduction and regulation of armaments, and the other is the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of ml:l.5S destruction. There was some talk about priority of one or the other of these parts of the disarmament programme. Our. position is very simply this. We think that we have to do both, and immediately. We have to do both, to take immediate steps to prepare for general re-duction and regulation of armaments and for the abolition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. I do not think that there is any internal contradiction in this attitude. - Actually, I think most members of this Council have already expressed the same view: that we . can simultaneously initiate action for general reduction and regulation of armaments and for abolition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. For this reason, we favour the proposals which call for the immediate creation of a committee to prepare and submit proposals for the general reduction and regulation of armaments to the Security Council. We favour the creation of such a committee, with the clear understanding that it would in no way infringe upon the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. I think that the difference in t.he tasks assigned respectively to the Atomic Energy Commission and to a disarmament committee is quite clear, so that there should be no fear that the activities of these two bodies will be duplicated. On the one hand, ourobjective is thereduction and regulation of existing armaments, the basic arms still being left in operation only in a smaller amount and under international su~()ervision and control. On the other hand, our objective is to abolish entirely the use of certain arms, namely, atomic weapons and pronon~ons en faveur des resolutions tendant a la creationimmediate d'une commission chargee de preparer des propositions relatives a la regIe,- mentation et a la reduction g-enerales des arme,- ments et de les soumettre au'Conseil de securite. Nous nous pronon~ons en faveur de la creation de cette commission, etant bien entendu qU'elle n'empietera en a~cune maniere sur les attributions de la Commission de l'energie atomique. J'estime qu'il existe une difference tres nette entre les tllches confiees respectivement ala Commission de l'energie atomique etaune commission du desarmement, et qu'il n'y a done pas lieu de craindrele chevauchementde leurs travaux. Celleci a pour but de reglementer et de reduire les armements existants, .en ne permettant de posse~ der les armes les plus importantes qu'en quantite reduite et sous la surveillance et le controle internationaux; celle-Ia s'attache a supprimer totalement l'emploi de certaines armes, les armes ato- Thus, to adopt the proposal of a committee for the reduction and regulation of armaments does not in any way postpone consideration of the problem of international control of atomic energy. We believe, however, that it is highly important that a committee for the implementation of the resolution on the general reduction and regulation of armaments be formed without undue delay, because if we accept the proposal made by one of the delegations, namely, that we give first priority to the establishment of international control over atomic energy, and only afterwards consider further measures of disarmament, we may run into a very substantial delay, a delay which in the opinion of our delegation is quite unnecessary. We may spend quite some time discussing the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, and if I am not quite sure how to interpret exactly the draft resolution.presented to us by the delegation of the United States, but the resolution speaks of the establishment of international control over atomic energy-if we actually wait until that control is established, it may take us one or two years, and we shall not get anywhere on the disarmament problem. That is why we think that we can immediately proceed to the creation of a committee on the implementation of reduction and regulation of armaments, and then, practically even before that committee has had time to start to. work, also take up the report oftheAtomic Energy Commission before this Council. There are three resolutions before us. One is presented by the representative of the USSR/ one by the representative of France,2 and one by the representative of Australia.3 All three contain the same proposal to form a committee of the nature I have just indicated. I hope that the representatives who have presented these resolutions, which 1 SeeOfJicial Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement- No. 2, Annex 3. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux ofJiciels du ConseU de st/curitt/, Deuxieme Annee, Supptement No'2, Annexe 8. "Ibid., Annexe 7. The representative of Australia has presented a few points which essentially, as far as I can see, are merely different wordings of the same ideas, and I wonder whether it would not be possible for him to agree. I would make an appeal to all other members of this Council to do the same: to take the French text as the basis of our discussion and· then to add such amendments as certain of the delegations may feel compelled to make. I think this would simplify our discussion and bring us farther along the way towards a solution of the problem before us. . I spoke of some possible amendments or revisions of the French text. I myself have a few to suggest, andl may just as well mention them right now. One is a minor verbal one. The English text of the proposal 'Submitte~ by the representative of France speakS of a committee to consider the prepared proposal. I should prefer to cpeak of a commission. I think in English there is a slight difference between these two things. We usually give to the term commission more importance and also more permanence than to a mere committee. I do not attach very much importance to it, but I think it might be an improvemen~to speak of a commission wherever the term committee is mentioned. There is also an observation I want to make concemingthe fourth and last paragraph of the French resolution. The last paragraph involves the Military Staff Committee at two points. Firstly, it askS that the Military Staff Committee send or present to us, within a certain time limit, recommendations w1p.ch the Security Council has requested. Th,at is all right, but then there ispoint (b), which.also asks the Military Staff Committee to submit to~he fran~aise, et j'espere qu'il. estimera possible d'accepter le texte de cette resolution. Cela dit, le representant de l'Australie a fait quelques suggestions qui, a mon avis, consistent au fond a exprimer les memes idees sous des formes differentes; je me demande donc s)il ne pourrait pas simplement approuver le texte fran- ~ais. Je me permets egalement d'insister aupres de tous les autres membres du Conseil pour qu'ils adoptent ce texte comme base de discussion, quitte ay ajouter ensuite les amendements que certaines des delegations croiront devoir presenter. Cela simplifierait le debat et .nous rapprocherait de la solution ~u probleme qui nous est soumis. ]'ai parM de reviser ou d'amender eventuellement le texte fran~ais. Pour ma part, j'ai quelques modifications a suggerer, et je puis bien vous en parlermaintenant. L'une a trait a une question de mots sans grande importance. La version anglaise du texte soumis par le representant de la France pade d'un ~ommittee charge d'etudier les projets prepares. Je prefererais ici le mot commission. Je crois qu'il exjs-te en anglais une legere difference de sens entre IC"'s deux mots correspondants. Dne commission a generalement plus d'importance et un caractere plus durable qu'un simple committee. Je n'attache pas .une grande importance a cette modification, mais je pense qu'il serait prefe~a~le de remplacer partout committee par commzsswn. Je desire egalement presenter une observation en ce qui conceme le quatrieme et demier paragraphe de la resolution fran~aise. ' Ce paragraphe fait intervenir deux fois le Comite d'etat-major. n prevoit d'abord q'le le Comite d'etat-major sera invite a nous envoyer ou a noris presenter dans un certain delai les recommandations demandees par le Conseil de securite. Jusque la, tout va. bien. n y a cependant un deuxieme point, le point b), d'apres lequel le The last but one sub-paragraph of paragraph 7 of the General Assembly resolution is a recommendation to Members of the United Nations to effect the pr,ogressive and permanent withdrawal 'Of their armed forces stationed in ex.-enemy terri..; tories, the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed, and :so on. . The following sub-paragraph is a recommendation that a corresponding reduction of national armed forces and the general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces be carried out. I have some doubts whether we really need, for this purpose, a special recommendation of the Military Staff Committee, though I understand that we may want to consult the Military Staff Committee on this subjeot. . Item (a) of the last paragraph of the French resolution is the recommendation to withdraw armed forces from other countries. It is addressed to all Members of the United Nations which have armed fbrces in other countries, and· ! wonder whether there is any need here to bring in the Military Staff Committee. Item (b) is just a general recommendation of reduction of armaments, which refers to all nations, all fifty-five of ,the United Nations. The Military Staff Committee, however, is composed of members of only four nations, and I think that this question directly concerns the Security Council, or any commission or committee the Security Council appoints, because the Security Council represents all th~ United Nations. Therefore I wonder whetheritem (b) of the fourth paragraph in the French resolution could not be dropped or modified in some wl\lY· These are the special observations I had to make on the text proposed by the representative of France. Once'more I should like to make a very strong appeal to an my colleagues to handle the disarmam~nt.qu:estion with the utmost promptness·and WIthout undue delay, and I should also remind t~em that this is the request and the recommendatIon of the General Assembly, a recommendation which, at our last meeting, we solemnly adopted and ~ccepted as being our own objective. . I understand perfectly that some of the delegatiOns may need time to study the details of some provisi0!ffi; As long as I have been participating in the meetings of the SecurityCouncil, I have always pleaded that time be given to any representative who considered that he required it in order to -study a questionfurther. I should like to point out, ~owever, thatimmediate adoption of the proposal 'that a commission or committee be.created to pre- L'alinea suivant recommande de realiset une reduction correspondante des forces armees nationales, ainsi qu'une reduction generale progressive et equilibree des forces armees nationales. Or, si je suis pret a reconnaitre que nous aurons eventuellement a rechercher les avis-duComite d'etatmajor en la matiere, je me demahde vraimenl' si nous aurons besoin, pour atteindre l~s buts que jt: viens de citer, d'une recommandation speciale emanant du Comite d'etat-major. Le point a) du dernier paragraphe de la resolution fran~aise recommande que chaque Etat procede au retrait des forces armee's qui se trouvent sur d'autres territoires que le sien. C'est la une recouullandation adi'essee atous les Membres des Nations Unies dont les forces armees sont stationners dans d'autres pays, et je me demande s'il est vraimerit besoin de faire intervenir ici le Comite d'etat-major. Le point b) recommande simplement, d'une maniere generale, la reduction des armements et vise toutes les nations, les cinquantecinq Nations Unies. Or, le Comite d'etat-major etant compose de representants de quatre nations seulement, il me semble que c'est la une question qui concerne directement le Conseil de securite ou tout comite ou commission nommes par lui, etant donne qu'il represente toutes les Nations Unies. C'est pourquoi il me semble qu'on pourrait peutetre supprimer, ou moilifier d'une mamere ou de l'autre, l'alinea b) du quatrieme paragraphe de la resolution fran~aise. -Telles sont les observations particulieres que j'avais a formuler sur le texte propose par le representant de la France. . Une fois encore, j'adjure tous mes collegues de s'occuper de cette question du desarmement sans retard injustifie et avec toute la celerite possible. Je leur rappelle aussi que tel est ~e desir exprime par l'Assemblee generale clans sa Tecommandation. Cette recoJllrilandation, nous l'avons solennellement adoptee a natre derniere seance et nous avons fait notre le but qu'elle proposait. Je comprends tres bien qu'il faille du temps a certainesdeIegations pour etudier les details de certaines dispositions; et depuis queje participe aux seances du Conseil de securite, j'ai toujours preconise qu'on accorde a .tout repres.entant qui l'estime necessaire le temps d'etudier plus a fond une question. donnee. J'ajouteiais cependant qu'aucune delegation ne devrait voir d'inconvenient a l'adoption immediate de la proposition Baron SILVERCRUYS (Belgium) (translated from French) : On 9 January the Security Council adopted the resolution of the CkneI'al Assembly dated 14 December on the principles governing the regulation and reduction of armaments. I therefore need not emphasize how essential it is to reach a conclusion in this matter as soon as possible, particularly as, at the Assembly, the Belgian delegation was amongst those which upheld this point of view. What we have to settle now is a question of method. Whathas been said in this connexion has strengthened my conviction that it is possible and desirable to consider the various aspects of the problem of armaments simultaneously, with due regard to their respective urgency. The GeneralAssembly's resolution recommends that prompt consideration be given to formulat· ing the practical measures which are essential to provide for the regulation and reduction of armaments. While, according to the tenns of this resolution, we are bound to consider these measures according to their priority, it is none.the less necessary to adopt an efficient procedure. Itwould, in my opin. ion, be anything but efficient to proceed from one point to another in succession, each question being considered separately and regardless of its connexion with the other factors which go to make up the problem as a whole. Thus, we cannot attempt to elucidate fully the question of atomic energy without taking account at the same time of the guiding principles and the general measures calculated to ensure the regulation and reduction of armaments. Conversely, it would be fruitless to try to decide on such general measures unless at the same time the sitt.ation brought about by the discovery· of the atomic weapon were taken into consideration, since it has an obvious bearing on the problem as a whole. The General As8embly's resolution, moreover, especially stresses the importance of the contribution ofthe Atomic Energy Commission, whichwas urged to fulfil its terms of reference without delay. In deference to this appeal, this Commission has submitted its first report. I am therefore inclined to think that there is no better way for us to comply with the Assembly's instructions than to arrange for simultaneous consideration of all the measures likely to ensure The representative of the United States hao;;, however, explained why he considers it advisable to give members of the Council time to carry out a considered study of the resolutions pending before them, and if necessary to conf~r with a view to reaching a common conclusion on the procedure to be adopted. The Belgian delegation will not oppose postponement of th~ discussion of the problem before us to a later date in the sense indicated by the representative of .the United States. Mr. LoPEZ (Colombia) : It is entirely agreeabl~ to the Colombian delegation to have the postponement suggested by the United States delegation favourably voted upon by the Security Council. The reasons given here by Mr. Austin are perfectly clear to everyone, and we feel that at one time or another every delC1gation will need to have a little more time in which to consider the various phases of the very complex disarmament problem. I should be more inclined to agree to the postponement, recalling that only a few days ago, when we intimated that we had not had time enough to examine the agreement on Trieste, we were so readily granted an extension oftime by the Security Council to look more carefully into the matter. However, I do wish to say that the Colombian delegation does not really find it necessary to postpone the consideration of the various proposals at present before the Security Council. We believe that it may be advisable to take a little more time to make decisions, which in our opinion is an entirely different matter from a delay in the consideration of the various proposals. We believe we can immediately begin with that. M. LOPEz (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): La delegation colombienne est tout a fait d'accord pour que le Conseil accepte l'ajournement suggere par la delegation des Etats-Unis. Nous ap~ precions tous les raisons invoquees par M. Austin et nous estimons que, totou tard, l'une ou l'autre d~ delegations aura besoin d'un peu plus de temps pour examiner les diverses phao;;es du desarmement, qui constitue un probleme tres complexe. . Je suis encore plus porte a accepter 1'ajournement quand je me rappelle que nous avons laisse entendre, il y a seulement quelques jours, que nous n'avions pas eu assez de temps pour etudier 1'accord de Trieste. Le Conseil de securite a bien voulu alors, promptement, nous donner un nou- .veau delai pour examiner l'affaire de plus pres. Je tiens cependant a dire que la delegation colombienne estime qu'il n'est vraiment pas necessaire de retarder l'etude des diverses propositions' dont le Conseil de securite est actuellement saisi. Sans doute nous avons peut-etre encore besoin d'un peu de temps avant de decider: cela ne veut pas dire qu'il faille retarder l'examen des differentes propositions. A notre avis, nous pouvonsproc~derimmediatement a cet examen. En outre, la delegation colombienne s'associe aux delegations qui veulent que nous abordions sans delaila question du desarmement. C'est pourquoi nous avons suivi avec beaucoup d'attention les suggestions constructives faites par les delegations australienne et fran~aiseet tendant a ce que le Conseil passe it 1'examen des questions inscrites anotre ordre du jour. Nous nous permettrons de soumettre une proposition un peu differente do~t le texte va etre distribue aux membres du Conseil; elle a pour but de donner aux textes proposes un peu plus de souplesse et au C~nseil de securite un peu plus de temps pour etudier les derrueres propositions. Comme je 1'ai'deja dit, nous proposons qu'elles soient examinees concurremment et non Furthermore, the Colombian deiegation would like to join with those delegations which want the disarmament question acted upon without delay. For these reasons, we have followed very carefully the constructive suggestions made by the Australian and French delegations, designed to hasten consideration by the Council of the items on our agenda. We would like to be free to submit an al~ernative proposal, which ~. presently be distnbuted to the members ofthe Council, and which might give those suggestions a little more flexi- .bility, and allow a little more time to the Security Council to consider the various proposals. But, as T. have said before, we propose thatthey be con- SIdered concurrently, not successively, but so far I believe .1at what we have just heard from the Belgian representative, and to a certain extent from the Polish repres~tative, expresses much better than I could the views I might advance to support this proposal, which, as the members of the Council will presently see, is actually self-explanatory. . The resolution starts with references to the various resolutions which form the basis of our discussion and which were accepted by the Assembly in December 1946, and then it goes on to say: "The Security Council recognizes that in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the recommendations of the General Assembly, the various phases of disarmament can best be discussed concurrently, with a view to reaching unanimous decisions thereon. The Council will therefore proceed with the consideration of items 2, 3 and 4 .:>n th,~ agenda of its ninetysecond meeting, butit will wait until it has completed, within the nextthree months, theformulation ofthe plan ofgeneral disarmament which it has been called upon to submit to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly, in Drder to determine how it shall proceed to act upon the various component proposals for such a plan, provided, however, that the first report of the Atomir. Enerry Commission shall first be disposed of. "The Security Council recognizes the neces- 'sity of giving the most expeditious effect to the wishes and recommendat\onS of the General Assembly on disarmament, and therefore resolves: "(a) To establish a disarmament commission, composed of one representative of each' of ,the members of the SecurityCounciI, which will prepare and submit to the Security Council within a period of three months a plan for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and a system of international, inspection and control of annaments a'!ld armed forces, excluding the atomic bomb, but including ?ll other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction. "The disarmament commission shall leave entirely to the Atomic Energy Commission to submit to the Security Council the recommendations concerning the regulation, inspection and control of atOInic weapons; but it shall advise the Security Council on the information which it should require Member States to furnish in order to give effect tathe resolutions of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946. ' "(c) To call upon the Military Staff Committee to make to the Security Council, within a period of three months, its proposals regarding the armed forces, assistance and facilities which all Members of the United Nations shall undertake to make available to the Security Council as their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter and paragraph 7 0'£ the resolution of 14 December 1946." In our opinion, rather than pursue the course that has been suggested here of postponing consideration of the whole problem or giving priority to one phase of it, it is more advisable to go ahead with consideration of the various phases of the problem as they nave been brought before the Council by means of the various proposals, and to give enough time to the Security Council and, more especially, to the representatives of the great Powers, to ascertain day by day, as we discuss the details of the various proposals, the area of agreement and disagreement. We believe that if we do not feel pressed by a definite date, but give the discussion ample time, ninety days' time, there is no risk of our finding that we do not have the time necessary for a proper examination of the various phases of this plan, or for the adjustment of any :lifferences which may arise. ctreprendre I'etude de ces differentes phases a mesure qu'elles sont evoquees devant le Conseil dans les differentes propositions. n vautmieux egalement donner au Conseil de securite, et tout particulierement aUX representants des grandes Puissances, a mesure que nous discuterons dans le detailles differentes propositions, le temps de determiner, le cas echeant, Its terrains d'entente et de desaGcord. A man avis, si nous n'avons pas l'impression qu'il faut en finir a une date determint~e et si nous diSposons, pour nos debats, d'un deIai assez long, mettons qua.tre-vingt-dix jours, nous ne courrorls pas le risque de tonstater que c nous manquons du temps necessaire pour examiner COInrrle il convient les differentes phases du plan en question, ou pour concilier toutes divergences d'opinions qui pourraient se manifester. Jecrois meme que, non seulement nous gagnerons·le temps que nous aurions perdu a discuter la question de priorite, mais qu'egalement nous gagnerons le temps que nous aurions autrement gaspille a discuter tous les aspects pOSsibles du desarmeinent du fait qu~ nous connaissons mal et incompletement Je plan general des. differentes propositions. Je pense, en procedant de la sorte, que nous avons toute chance.de gagner du·temps et que nous· serions tous certainement tres satisfaits si, d'ici quatre-vingt-dix-joUI'S1 nous arrivions a trouver une solution heureuse a l'ensemble du probleme tcl qu'il est enonce dans les propositions dont nous avons parle. Je doute beaucoup que nous puissions obtenir autant de resultats en si peu de temps. Si nous y parvenons les choses n'en iront que mieux. Y a-t-il quelqu'un qui pense qu'on ne pourra statuer, dansles quatre-vingt-diX jours, sur les propositions relatives a l'energie atomique? Supposons, par exemple, que nous am- I I even believe that we shall not only save time which otherwise would be lost discussing the question ofpriority, butweshallsave tL..-ne which otherwise would be lost discussing every possible phase of disarmament, because of our imperfect and incomplete knowledge of the general plan of the various proposaJs. ! believe that we stand to gain time by this method and that we would all be . very happy if, within ninety days, we could come to a satisfa.ctory conclusion on the whole problem as it is now envisaged by these proposals. I doubt yery much whether we can accomplish s'o much ID such a short time, but if we do, of course it will be all to the good. If, for instance, the atomic energy proposals can be disposed of within ninety ~ays,.is there any disagreement? There is no question m my mind. The Security Council·will find .no difficuty in revising the time limits of these proposals and making them shorter, in order to have the satisfaction of announcing to the v~ry anxious Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I do not intend to taxyour patience atthis late hour by a long speech, especially since most things have already been said and the matter is amply clarified. However, since I have been given the floor, I should like to say one thing. We are happy to say that there is general agreement that the resolution of the General Assembly is to be implemented and measures are to be formulated by the Security Council for such an implementation. There is no difference of opinion about that point. The only difference to be resolved with regard to the proposals before us is that phrase which appeared in the resolution of the General Assembly: ". . . consideration to formulating the practical measures according to their priority". This phrase "according to their priority" has perhaps been understood differently byvarious members. The dele- . gation of the USSR considered that the regulation of armaments would have priority, and the delegation of the United States considered that priority should be given to the atomic energy regulation and control, with a view to prohibition of that atomic energy for use as a weapon of war. I understand this phrase "according to their priority" differently. I consider that the reduction of armaments is an end to be attained by certain means; the means to that end are all enumerated in the resolution of the General Assembly. In that respect, these means cannot be separated and treated independently and separately, nor can the regulation of armaments be treated as an isolated problem. If we consider the regulation of armaments, what do we understand by this term? I understand by regulation of armaments fixing the amount of arms andthe degree of armamentto be adopted by each nation according to the needs of that nation for its public order and its defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, as an emergency measure, until such time as the Security Council shall be prepared to take action. There is a third factor to be considered forthe regulation of armaments, and that factor is very important in the application of Article 43 of the Charter, which means that each Member State in the United Nations should conclude an agreement, a convention with the Security Council, for a certain amount of force to be held at the disposal of the Security Council for purposes of collective security. This amount of force should be known before the regulation ofarmaments, before M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je n'ai pas l'intention, a. cette heure tardive, d'abuser de votre patience en pronon~ant un long discours; j'ajoute que les representants qui m'ont precede ont deja. presque tout dit et que le probleme qui nous occupe est maintenant bitn elucide. Cependant, puisque j'ai la parole, je voudrais tout de meme faire une remarque. Je suis heureux de constater que nous reconnaissons tous qu'il faut mettre en reuvre la resolution de 1'AssembIee generale et que le Conseil de securite doit elaborer des mesures pour assurer cette mise en reuvre. 11 n'y a pas d'avis contraire sur ce point. La seule difficulte a. aplanir dans les propositions dont nous sommes saisis, est suscitee par un membre de phrase contenu dans la resolution de 1'Assemblee generale: cc••• mettre a. 1'6tude 1'elaboration, seIon leur ordre d'urgence ..." Ce membre de phrase a re~u diffi:rentes interpretations. La delegation de l'URSS considere que la reglementation des armeJ;llents devrait avoir priorite absolue; de son cote, la delegation des Etats-Unis estime qu'il faut donner priorite a. la reglementation et au controle de l'energie atomique en vue d'en interdire l'emploi comme arme de guerre. Pour moi, l'expression "selon leur ordre d'urgence" signifie autre chose. J'estime que la reduction des armements est un butqu'on atteindra par certains moyens. Ces moyens, la resolution de l'Assemb16e generale les enumere tous.-On 1),e saurait done, de ce fait, les considerer chacun isolement et independamment des autres; on ne peut pas davantage traiter a. part le probleme .de la reglementation des armements. Prenons la reglementation des armements: comment faut-il comprendre cette expression? Pour moi, reglementer les armements signifie determinet la quantite d'armes et I'impartance des armements attribues a. chaque nation suivant ses besoins pour maintenir l'ordre public et pourvoir a. sa defense en cas de danger, conformement a l'Article 51 de la Charte, en attendant que le Conseil de securite sait pret a. prendre les mesures , . necessarres. Il est un troisieme facteur qui entre en ligne de comp~e dans la reglementation des armem~nts. Ce facteur est tres important: il s'agit de l'application de l'Article 43 de la Charte, qui prevoit que chaque Etat Membre des Nations Unies doit conclure avec le COllseil de securite un accord, une convention, mettant a. la disposition du Conseil des forces armees en vue de la securite collective..Il est necessaire de connaitre l'importance de ces forces avant de reglementer les arme~ents, , , .",1Ill The French delegation and the Australian dele" gation tried to compromise on this point and pre" sented proposals designed to consolidate the items contained in the resolution of the General Assembly by presenting one resolution to the Security Council, comprising all of them. I am sure that the representative of the USSR did not intend to ignore the other problems involved when he presented his resolution for the regulation, control and inspection of armaments; . his intention was to give priority to the latter, and later, in another discussion in, the Security Council, to consider the other items one by one. The same thing holds true of the proposal presented by the delegation ;)f the United States to consider the matter of atomic energy first. Both representatives say: after this is decided, we will go on to the other problems, according to their priority and importance, to be arranged separately and successively. But, as I said, I cannot imagine that any of these problems can be considered separately. There are five items in the resolution of the General Assembly, five topics which are to be considered. The first is the armaments regulation. I call it regulation; I do not use the word disarmament, which is used in these speeches and in some of the proposals before us. I consider the word disarmament to be wrong; it is not correct. We never mean to disarm the States, to abolish armament. States need to have arms; certain arms must be kept by them in order to maintain domestic public order, to defend themselves in time of emergency and to supply the Security Council with an arm of collective security, which is the same. Then, it is to regulate armament, even limitation is not correct, because there is no limit. The limits have to be determined. And even reduction is not correct, because it is not always true that we are to reduce armaments; sometimes we ought to increase them. If some State enters into an agreement, makes a convention with the Security Council to supply a certain amount of arms in time of necessity for public order and ,the collective peace and security of the world, and that State does not now possess that amount of arms, it must increase its armament. COUTS d'un nouveau debat au Conseil de securite. Il en va de meme de la proposition presentee par la delegation des Etats-Unis qui~ eUe, voudrait qu'on examinftt en premier lieu la question de l'energie atomique. Toutes ces resolutions disent ensuite: une fois que nollS aurons pris une decision sur ce point, nous passerons aux suivants, selon leur ordre d'urgence et leur importance, et nous les reglerons successivement, les uns apres les autres. CependaL,t, je I'ai deja dit, je ne con~ois pas que l'un quelconque de ces points puisse etre separe des autres. La resolution de l'Assemb16e generale contient cinq points, cinq questions qui doivent etre etudiees. La premiere a trait a la reglementation des armements. Je dis bien reglementation; j'evite le mot desarmement que l'on - trouve dans les discours prononces ici et dans certaines des propositions dont nous sommes saisis. J'estime'qu'on a tort d'empIoyer le terme desarmemento Ce n'est pas le mot juste. Nous n'avons jamais eu l'intention de desarmer les nations et d'abolir les armements. I1 faut que les Etats possedent des armes, certaines armes qu'lls conservent pour maintenir l'ordre public chez eux; its doivent de plus se defendre en cas de danger et, ce qui revient au meme, fourmr au Conseil une arme . de securite collective. Ainsi, il s'agit bien de regIementer les armements; le mot limitation serait impropre puisqu'il n'est pas'question de limite. Les limites seront fixees. Meme le terme reduction ne convient pas: il ne sera pas toujoun'- exact qu'il faille reduire les armements; il nous faudra parfois les accroltre. Si certains Etats concluent un accord, signent t'· .. convention avec le Conseil de securite, d'apres lesquels il fournissent en cas de necessite une certaine quantite d'armes pour proteger la securite publique, la paix collective et la securite du inonde, et si ces Etats ne possMent pas a l'heure actuelle la qU::lntite d'armes qU'ils se sont engagesafournir, illeurfaudra augmenter leurs armements. The second is the control and inspection of armaments. The proposal of the USSR. combines these two items carefully. The third topic is the atomic energy prohibition, the fourth is the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter, and ' the fifth topic concerns the information to be furnished by the States of the United Nations with regard to their armed forces-those in existence now, abroad and on their own territories-with a view to achieving the withdrawal of troops from ex-enemy territories or from friendly territories. These measures are absolutely necessary for the regulation of armaments. The proposals by the French and Australian delegations would meet one point. Some difference exists in the Australian proposal which provides for a decision with regard to atomic energy, refers the matter to the Atomic Energy Commission, requesting it to continue its studies, without taking any decision or expressing any opinion concerning the report"which it·has already submitted. The French delegation puts that in a different way, saying that the Security Council should expedite the study of the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission, and express an opinion on it. Thus, the Atomic Energy Commission cannot continue the study of the matter unless it knows the opinion of the Security Council on. the report, already submitted. For that matter, there is difficulty in conciliating all opinions on this point. I think that the Security Council should now take two decisions: the first i3 to make its resolution comprise or contain all five points, and the second is to refer the matter to a drafting committee which would prepare a resolution on this basis. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : In view of the. hoUr, I shall be very brief and shall not attempt to cover the whole ground. I shall confine myseH practically to one point. I am more convinced than ever of the necessity for some delay in this matter. The delay will give us some time for re:l.lection and, I hope, for consultation. The very· number and complexity of the resolutions which have been put forward in the course of our discussion show that what we are considering is not at all an easy matter and is, in fact, very complex. ! am quite aware of the necessity' for speed, but not break-neck 'speed, although I know thatif one advises against breakneck speed, one exposes oneseH to the easy taunt Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Etant donne l'heure, je serai tres bref et n'essaierai pas d'examiner tous les aspects de la question. Je m'en tiendrai pratiquement a un seul point. Je suis plus convaincu que jamais qu'il nous faut un delai pour etudier cette question. Ce delai nous donnera le temps de refMchir et jel'espere, de nous concerter, Le nombre et la complexite memes des resolutions qui ont ete presentees au cours de nos discussions montrent que la question que nous examinons est loin d'etre simple. Elle est, en fait, tres compliquee. Je me rends parfaitement compte qu'il faut faire vite, mais non pas proceder avec une hate brouillonne, tout en sachant parfaitementque qui- At our last discussion of this subject, I put one or two questions to the representative of the USSR, who was good enough to give me the answers today. I am very grateful to him and I shall, of course, transmit them to my Government to assist it in formulating its opinion. One of my questions was: what would be the composition of the committee; was it to be military, or mixed, or civilian, or political, or what was it to be? He replied that, of course, it was open to any government to choose its representatives. That,·of course, is perfectly true and correct. But my question was not put out of idle curiosity. I believed it clearly to be very important. The representative of Poland, Dr. Lange, urged this afternoon, I think, that we· should-or, at least, he asked why we should not-immediately appoint a committee. Before we do that, we must know what sort of committee we have in mind. I put that question originally to the representative of the USSR because-and perhaps I ought to have said it at the tirne-I was thinking of events in the past. This Security Council need not be bound by precedent, but there is no reason why it should not pay attention to and learn s.ome lessons from what happened in the past. On a previous occasion, when the task of reduction and limitation of armaments was undertaken at Geneva, the first step was, I think, to appoint a military advisory commission which was practically unable to do anything at all. Mter some time, a new device was tried. It consisted of appointing what was called a Temporary Mixed Commission which, I think, was mixed civilian and military. That lasted for' some considerable time. It. did some work, but, at the same time, it also proved rather unsatisfactory. It was not until the Council finally appointed a political preparatory commission that the work really made progress. It was that preparatory commission which ultimately supmitted to the Conference a draft disarmament convention. A great deal of time and labour was lost in the process of arriving at the decision to appoint this preparatory commission. Therefore, I think it is most important that·we reflect and conSult with each other on exactly what we do mean by appointing a committee, what sort of committee it is to be and how it is to work. I do not think we s~ould be wasting time. I think we require more tune for reflection on all the difficult points that have been raised. We shall not be idle in the interval. We ought to exchange views.with one another and try to reach agreement. I am allin favour of speed, but I am still more in favour of doing the work effectively. That'is what we really Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I do not want to prolong this discussion any longer than is necessary. In making my motion to defer further discussion of the items on today's agenda to 4 February, and in withdrawing that motion, I thought that when the members {)f the Council had completed their substantive statements, my resolution could perhaps win the approval of the Council. The United States delegation regrets exceedingly that it is placed in the position of appearing to oppose the will of the majority of the members of the Council. I say that because from the expressions used by some of the speakers, it would seem that that thought is prevalent in some minds. Nothing is further from our intention than to try to thwart the general purposes of the resolution under discussion. I could agree with the majority of the statements made by the members of this Council tc;>day. The difference is not one of substance; it does not bear upon the real purpose of the United States. It is a question of procedure, and of procedure only. Furthermore, even on that question of procedure the United States is not closing the door; we are not taking a definitive stand today nor asking the Council to accept our stand or take a definitive stand today on how this is to be done. We are merely requesting that these very complicated and important questions, implemented by various resolutiol1& of considerable complexity, be deferred for consideration until 4 February. We have suggested that day in order that the Council may. know exactly when the discussion will be resumed. I fail to see how that will really retard the objectives we are pursuing. I think Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that particular point very well. Sometimes, in order to make real haste,it is perhaps necessary to proceed slowly. Quite frankly~ the United States delegation is not prepared at this moment to discuss the substance of these resolutions, nor to participate in a committee which would study them and attempt to combine them. I therefore earnestly request my colleagues at this table to recall what Mr. Austin has said and :what I have tried to reiterate, namely that the United States is merely asking for a deferment of the discussion of all the items on today's agenda without any prejudice whatsoever as to the position which we may take, or which the. Council may take, or to the order of procedure when we meet again on 4 February. We would like to use the intervening time, free from the obligations of any committees or discussions M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne veux pas prolonger cette discussion outre mcsure. J'ai presente une motion tendant aremettre au 4 f6vrier la suite de la discussion des questions inscrites a notre ordre du jour actuel. J'ai ensuite retire cette motion, pensant qu'une fois terminees les declarations que les membres desirent faire sur la question de fond, ma resolution pourrait peut-etre obtecir l'approbation du Conseil. La delegation des Etats-Unis regrette infiniment d'etre mise dans une situation Oll elle semble etre opposee al'opinion de la majorite des membres du Conseil. En effet, si j'en j~ge par les paroles de plusieurs orateurs, il semble que cette idee existe dans certains esprits. Nous ne songeons pas une seconde a empecher la realisation des fins recherchees dans la resolution que nous discutons maintenant. Je suis en realite d'accord avec la plupart des orateurs qui ont pris aujourd'hui la parole au Conseil. Pour les Etats-Unis, la divergence de vues ne porte pas sur une question de fond, ni sur les veritabies buts que nous visons. Il s'agit d'une question de procedure, sans plus. En outre, meme dans cette question de procedure, la delegation des Etats-Unis laisse la porte ouverte a la conciliation. Nous ne prenons pas aujourd'hui une position definitive; nous ne demandons pas au Conseil d'adopter notre point de' vue ni, de prendre aujourd'hui une decision definitive sur la fa~on dont cette question sera reglee. Nous demandons seulement que la, discussion des problemes tres compliques et tres importants qui nous occupent aujourd'hui et qui ont donne lieu adifferentes resolutions tres complexes soit remise au 4 fevrier. Nous avons suggere cette date pour que le Conseil sache que la discussion sera reprise aun moment bien precis. Je ne vois pas comment ma proposition pourrait reellement retarder la realisation des fins que nous poursuivons. Sir Alexander Cadogati l'a tres bien dit: il faut parfois, pour aller vraiment vite, procMer avec lenteur. Je vous le dis sincerement, la delegation des Etats-Unis n'est pas prete al'heure actuelleadiscuter la substance m@me de ces resolutions ni a faire partie d'une commission chargee d'etudier c~s resolutions et de tenter de les reunir en une seule. Je prie donc instamment mes. collegues id . presents de se rappeler ce que M. Austin a dit et que j'ai moi-meme essaye de redire apres lui, a savoir que la deIeg~tion des Etats-Unis demande simplement l'ajoumeme:nt de la discussion des differents points actuellement inscrits al'ordre du jour, sans prejudice de la position que nous pourrons prendre ouque le Conseil pourra prendre, ni c;lu mode de procedure que noris adopterons lors .de notre prochaine seartccciu 4 fevrier. Dans l'in- I would therefore ask whether this is the appropriate moment to reintroduce the motion Mr. Austin made before his departure: that the Council defer discussion of the items on the agenda &~ the ninety-second meeting, I believe, until 4 February. This is purely a matter of procedure. Our delegation is not yet prepared to discuss the substance of these questions on any level. The PRESIDENT: The resolution submitted by the representative of the United States is that the Security Council resolve that further consideration of items 3, 4 and 5 (I say 5 because today there was an extra item in the agenda, namely, the admission of Mr. Austin) 'on the agenda of the ninety-second meeting, be deferred until 4 February 1947. . I should like to ask the Council whether it feels that this might be the moment to decide whether the discussion on this matter might possibly be considered at another meeting, namely, on Friday. I have two speakers already listed and I have no doubt that other members will wish to speak. Would it meet the convenience of the Council if we ~ould take up at exactly the point where we now are on Friday morning? We could then meet to discuss this matter. Would that meet the convenience and the wish of the members? I shall recognize the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Will the remarks of the representative of the USSR be made in connexion with the. suggestion I have just made? If he intends to make a statement on the general problem, I shall be obliged to give the floor to another member of the Council. Is he going to speak of postponement or of the general problem? Does the representative of the USSR wish to speak? Does he wish to oppose the suggestion that discussion of this matter be postponed until Friday morning? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): No. I have already said that I did not wish to speak on that subject.

In that case, is any member opposed to postponement of the discussion to Friday morning? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Before we decide on that matter, I should like to say a few words to clarify--

Of course, but we shall take up our discussion Friday morning, and you shall then be able to make all the observations that you consider----- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Le representant des Etats-Unis a propose que le Consei1 de securite decide de remettre au 4 f6vrier 1947 l'examen des points 3, 4 et 5 de l'ordre du jour de la quatre-vingt-douzieme seance (je parle du point 5 parce qu'aujourd'hui nous avons inscrit un nouveau point a notre ordre du jour, a savoir l'admission de M. Austin). Je demande au Consei1 s'll n'estime pas opportun de remettre aune autre seance, qui pourrait avoir lieu vendredi par exemple~la suite de notre discussion sur ce point. Deux orateurs sont deja inscrits et je suis certain que d'autres representants d6sireront aussi formuler leur avis sur cette proposition. Les membres du Conseil voient-ils un inconvenient a reprendre la discussion vendredi au point ou nous en sommes aujourd'hui? Dans l'affirmative, nous pourrions nous reunir a cette date. Les membres du Conseil sont-ils d'accord? Je vais donner la parole au representant de l'URSS. Les remarques du representant de l'URSS auront-eUes trait a la proposition que je viens de faire? S'll a l'intention de faire une declaration sur le probleme general, je me vois dans l'obligation de donner la parole a un autre membre du Conseil. Va-t-il parler d'ajournement ou du probleme general? Le representant de l'URSS desire-t-illa parole? Estime-t-il qu'il doit s'opposer a ce que la discussion de cette question soit remise eventuellement avendredi matin? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'ang1ais): Non, j'ai deja dit que ce n'etait pas sur ce point que je voulais parler. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): En ce cas, quelqu'un s'oppose-t-il ace que ce debat sait remis avendredi matin? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Avant toute decision a ce sujet, je voudrais dire quelques mots pour mettre au point . . . . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Bien sOr, mais nous reprendrons la discussion vendredi matin au point ou nous l'avons laissee et vous serez ameme de faire alors toutes les remarques que vous estimerez ...

Now? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) : Yes. The PRESIDENT: In that case, does the representative of France agree to permit the representative of the USSR to speak before him? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I should like to say a few words after the representative of France has spoken. Mr. PARODl (France) (translated from french): I do not wish to speak this evening. The PRESIDENT: I recognize the representative of the USSR. . Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In conhexion with your proposal, Mr. President, I shall confine myself to a few brief remarks, in order to clear up certain points in the speeches of members of the Security Council who spoke before. The representative of Syria considers that the purpose of the USSR proposal was to give priority to one of two fundamental questions raised in the resolution of the General Assembly. He specified that our proposal meant that questions relating to the general regulation and reduction of armaments should be considered in' the first place, in order of priority; and that the consideration of questions relating to the control of atomic energy should take second place. The opinion expressed by the representative of Syria is the result of a misunderstanding, for I have never said anything about this. On the contrary, I have objected and do object to establishing any such priority and to hindering the consideration of one or the other of these two fundamental questions. Indeed, such a system of priority would mean postponement and delay in considering one or the other of these two questions. I think that there has been some misunderstanding. I must say that as a result of the speeches made by some of its members in the Se~urity Council and to the Press, a kind of a myth has been created, apparently with the object of confusing the real situatiofl. It is totally false that the USSR proposal is meant to delay consideration of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. I repeat that this is a myth, based apparently on the assumption that there are still naive p'eopl~ capable of believing such a fabrication. I do not consider it necessary to say any more on this subject: because I have made my position absolutely clear, at any rate to those who wish to see it as it is in reality, and have no desire merely to complicate the sit"ation. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais) : Oui. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Dans ces conditions, le representant de la France acceptet-il que M. Gromyko pade avant lui? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes Rovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais dire quelques mots lorsque le representant de la France aura parle. M. PARODl (France): Je ne desire pas pader ce soir. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je donne la parole au representant de l'URSS. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je profitcrai de votre proposition, Monsieur le President, pour faire que1ques observations tres breves, destinees a eclairer les representants qui ont pris la parole avant moi. Le representant de la Syrie estime que la proposition de l'URSS a pour but d'accorder la priorite al'une des deux questions essentielles traitees dans la resolution de l'Assemblee generale. Il a precise son opinion en declarant que notre proposition consiste a accorder la priorite a la reglementation et a la reduction generales des armements et an'examiner qu'en second lieu les questions relatives au controle de l'energie atomique. L'opinion exprimee par le representant de la Syrie est le resultat d'un malentendu, car je n'ai jamais rien dit de tel. Bien au contraire, j'ai toujours proteste contre les tentatives d'instituer un ordre de priorite et d'entraver I'examen de l'une de ces deux questions essentielles. C'est en eflet ce qui arriverait si un ordre de priorite etait adopte. Je crois qu'il s'est produit id un malentendu. Je dois dire qu'a la suite des declarations que certains membres ont faites au Conseil de securite et· a la presse, un mythe s'est cree, qui permet a certains d'aggraver la confusion qui regne dans les esprits. Il est faux de dire que la proposition de l'DRSS equivaut a ajourner l'examen du rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique. Je le repete, c'est faux, c'est un mythe dont on veut se serVir pour impressionner les naifs. Je me bornerai a l'observation que je viens de faire, car j'estime que ma proposition est tout a fait claire. Elle doit, en tout cas, etre c1aire aux yeux de taus ceux qui veulent la voir telle qu'elle est en realite et qui ne cherchent pas a embrouiller la situation. As regards the nature of the tasks confronting the committee, my answer is unequivocal and clear: they are of a political nature. As for the proposal for the establishment of a drafting subcommittee, I think that we could manage without it. It seems to me that the proposals submitted by the various delegations are clear. If they are not sufficiently clear, we are in the position to clarify them here at the mee~ings of the Security Council. I refrain for the time being from expressing a final opinion on this matter, but I had better point out that drafting committees and sub-committees sometimes delay matters instead of expediting them. This causes me some anxiety. I have already expressed my opinion on the United States proposal, and I do not think I need repeat it.

Does the representative of Syria wish to make any explanation? Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): Just a few words. My use of this expression does not stem from misunderstanding. My reason for using that expression was that we are discussing item 2 of the agend':l, the resolution of the General Assembly, which contains five topics. I found that the proposal of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics included only two of these, but no mention was made of the other three topics. Therefore I naturally understood that he had given priority to these two, leaving the others for subsequent discussions, and I stated that clearly. I did not say that he had stated that priority be J'ai deja dit a Sir Alexander Cadogan que pour l'instant les taches de cette commission sont avant tout d'ordre politique. J'ai soumis mon texte a Sir Alexander. Chaque Gouvernement est libre de nommer les representants qu'il voudra a cette commission: ce seront des representants civils, ou bien un Gouvernement peut trouver bon d'y envoyer un representant a epaulettes. I1 se peut qu'un Gouvernement estime que tel ou tel representant militaire saura mieux traiter d~ problemes politiques que la commission aura a resoudre. Je le repete, cela ne depend que des Gouvernements interesses. Les negociations relatives a la conclusion des traites de paix avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, qui se poursuivent actuellement a Londres, sont menees par des representants civils, les adjoints des Ministres des Maires etrangeres. Les Etats-Unis ont designe un representant militaire, le general Clark, pour prendre part aces negociations. Alors que tous les autres Etats ont envoye des representants civils, le representant des Etats-Unis est un militaire. Les Etats-Unis estiment que le general Clark est qualifie pour mener ces negociations. C'est leur droit. C'est au Gouvernement des Etats- Unis de designer les personnes qui..- devront le representer ala commission. En ce qui concerne les taches qui incombent a cette commission, ma reponse est claire et nette: ces taches sont d'ordre politique. Quant au comite de redaction qu'on a propose de creer, je crois que nous pourrions nous en passer. n me semble que les propositions qui nous ont ete soumise~ par les differentes delegations sont assez claires. Si elles ne l'etaient pas, nous pourrions en discuter ici, au Conseil de securite. Sans vouloir exprimer une -opinion definitive, je crois pouvoir dire que les comites et les souscomites de redaction retardent souvent les travaux au lieu de les accelerer. Aussi cette proposition m'inquiete-t-elle un peu. Quant a la proposition des Etats-Unis, j'ai deja donne mon opinion a ce sujet et je juge inutile de me repeter. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Le representant de la Syrie desire-t-il apporter quelques explications? M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Dui, je voudrais dire quelques mots seulement. L'expression que j'ai employee ne provient pas d'un malentendu. Voici pourquoi j'ai parle de priorite: nous discutons le point 2 de l'ordre du jour qui a trait a la resolution de I'AssembIee, laquelle comprend cinq questions. Or, je constate que, dans sa proposition, le representant de l'URSS ne fait etat que de deux de ces questions, qu'il soumet a l'examen du Conseil, et passe les trois autres sous silence. J'en ai deduit naturellement qu'il donnait priorite a ces deux questions et remettait a phis tard l'examen des trois autres: The USSR representative has, now explained that such was not his interttion. Certainly his explanation is accepted1 and I thank him for it. The PRESIDENT: I think now we might agree to defer further disc, ·ssion until Friday morning at eleven o'clock. The Council stands adjourned until 11 a.m., Friday morning. La seance est levee a19 h. 20.