S/PV.932 Security Council

In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings 1 shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Mali, fudia, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Belgium, Guinea, Ghana, Congo (Leopoldville), Morocco, Poland and Libya to take seats at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Abdoulaye Maiga (Mali), Mr. C. S. Jha (/ndia), Mr. Mi~o Pavi~evi6 (Yugoslavia), Mr. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (/ndonesia), Mr. Walter Loridan (Belgium), Mr. Diallo Telli (Guinea), Mr. K. K. S. Dadzie (Ghana), Mr. Evariste Loliki (Congo, Leopoldville), Mr. El Me'ldi Ben Aboud (Morocco), Mr. Bohdan Lewandowski (Poland), and Mr. Mohieddine Fekini (Libya), took places at the Council table.

Before presenting my country' s views on the documents on the agenda, which deal with various aspects of the tragic problems which face the Congo, 1 should like to make some brief remarks on the circumstances in which this debate is being held. 3. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, you invited eleven delegations, including my own, to participate, without vote, in the discussion. It is not for me to inquire into the real nature of the special interest which certain delegations take in the Congo situation. But 1 noticed two things: the first is that, with one exception, all these delegations are particularly interested in the release and return to power of Mr. Lumumba. The second is that participation by these delegations in the discussion means that representatives of the seven States which attended the Conference held in January 1961 at Casablanca are now seated at this table. 4. 1 have no doubt that all members of the Council will have noticed this massive attendance by the authors of the ambitious "Charter of Casablanca" and that some members have encouraged it. This is obviously a planned attempt to distract the Council's attention in its discussion of a problem which affects us closely. Yet the way in which their speeches agree and the ceaseless repetition of identical arguments by delegations whîch claim to represent Africa may lead to a misunderstanding on the part of a less wellinformed audience, especially amongthe public and the Press. 5. Accordingly, for the sake of objectivity, and to prevent African opinion from being misrepresented, 1 should like to recall certain facts. 6. The meetin~described by my Moroccan colleague [930th meeting] as the "Conference of the Heads of African States" was attended by the Heads of the six African States represented here; by representatives of the Prime Minister of Ceylon; by Mr. Ferhat Abbas, representing the Provisional Government of. Algeria; and by a delegation sent by Mr. Gizenga. This last-mentioned delegation included three Congolese and three Belgian advisers. 1 do not 7. The fact that the "Conference of the Heads of African States" included less than a quarter of the African States Members of the United Nations was due amongst other things to refusals, abstentions and defections occasioned by the obvious political trend of the meeting. 8. Of the six African Casablanca States, five voted against the seating of the delegation led by President Kasa-Vubu at the füteenth session of the General Assembly in November lS60. Only one other African State, Togo, endeavoured to oppose that decision. On the other hand, ten of the füty-three votes in favour were those of African States. Seven others abstained, more from a desire to promote conciliation than from hostility to President Kasa-Vubu and the Leopoldville authorities. Two of the six Casablanca States had accredited diplomatie missions to the Hepublic of the Congo, but it became necessary to demand their recall because of their repeated and Intolerable interference in the domestic affa.irs of the Congo. Further Interference by the United Arab Republic led to the complaint from my country which is on the Council's agenda [S/4689}. 9. 1 shall conclude these preliminary remarks by disputing the fact that the proposals made at the Casablanca Conference, and the views put here by the States which attended it, are in any way representative of world opinion or African opinion. 10. When MI'. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, saw fit to sayat the 930th meeting, after hearing five delegations, including four spokesmen of the Africa represented at Casablanca: "We see that there is a considerable area of agreement on many of the main aspects of the present position in the Congo", he was going a Uttle too fast and underestimating the powers of judgement of members of the Security Council. 11. 1 do not doubt the good faith of some of these African States. If the Congo tragedy has beendeliberately rendered more complicated, this was done in order to exploit the credulity and anti-colonialist fanaticism of African opinion, which is generous and disinterested. But, in this Casablanca symphony, we beUeve neither in the sincerity of the composer nor in the disinterestedness of the conductor. 12. The ooly point where the Casablanca declaration Is not open to criticism under the United Nations Charter is when it announces the intention of the Governments concerned to dissociate themselves from United Nations action in the Congo by withdrawing their troops. 13. The second sub-paragraph of the declaration contains a rather unexpected recognition ofthe Congolese Parliament by African Heads of State, most of whom have not so far seen fit tocomplete their own democratic institutions by setting up elected Parliaments. Paragraphs 3 and 4 explicitly or implicitly 14. At the Casablanca Conference there were more actors in the wings than on stage, and more decisions were taken in the corridors than were set forth in the declaration. 15. My country asked the Security Council should meet to consider with it whether the threats have been carried out and whether direct intervention in the Congo by the United Arab Republic is already a facto 16. 1 shall try to be brief, since 1 have only to prove what everyone already knows. 17. In The New York Times on 5 February 1961 the Congo situation was summed up with a map. Two arrows point towards stanleyville. The text says: "Lumumba: 7,000 troops" and, "Lumumba allies get aid from Nasser's U.A.R.". We also hear that on 4 February, 1,500 rebel soldiers attackedthe Nigerian contingent in Kivu, and that Malayan reinforcements had to be callèd in. No doubttheUnited Nations forces will have collected a further batch of sub-machineguns made in Czechoslovakia, to be added to the arms and arnmunition from the sarne source captured by the Armée nationale congolaise in Equatorprovince, on the boundary of Oriental province. 18. Were these arms brought into the Congo by the United Arab Republic? Did they reach their destination by land or air? Probably both. Let us see what the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has to say. In his letter of 14January to the President of the Republic of the Congo [S/4630, sect. il], he acknowledges that a United Arab Republic Ilyushin 14 aircraft landed at Lisala without obtaining the necessary clearance. The letter refers to "thefailure of the United Arab Republic authorities to comply with ONUC orders and instructions"; those authorities had been sent "a request that the proper procedure be adhered to in the future". 19. As for overland transport, Mr. Dayal indicated that ONUC had neither the power nor the means to ensure the control of points of entry into the territory of the Republic, either on the eastern and northern frontiers or on other frontiers. 20. Two facts, then, are established: the soldiers out of whom Mr. Gizenga is trying to make an army, with the help of foreign technicians, are equipped with arms which come neither from the former "Force publique" ...:...now the Armée nationale congolaise-nor from the United NatJ.onsj aircraft of the United Arab Republic land clandestinely in the Congo and the contingent from the United Arab Republic, which behaves as if it were in a conquered country, opposes any check on the cargo and any contact with the crew. It was only on 21 January, at Gemena, that 1 was able to inspect the Ilyushin, registration 22. But the United Arab Republic could not foresee everything. It will certainly be sorry to hear that three of the Congolese soldiers who were present when the Ilyushin was unloaded and who helped to transport the cargo to Aketi joined the regular army commanded by General Mobutu, and are now at "Leopoldville. Anyone who still has doubts' about the nature of this operation can easily hear them testüy there that seven tons of arms and five transmitterreceivers were unloaded and forwarded to stanleyville. 23. It could have been argued that this material was intended for the contingent of the United Arab Republie. But then why did the aircraft land clandestinely, and why was it isolated by an armed guard of Egyptian soldiers? And, in particular, why the touching story of the "New Year güts" which is solemnly related to us in document Si4630? seven tons of military material sent off clandestinely on 31 December, presumably to give the lucky recipients of this kind attention a surprise! 24. Although this is proof, we shall of course hear a hypocritical and indignant denial by the representative of the United Arab Republic. The Council and public opinion should then consider carefully what that denial is worth and how far the United Arab Republic could be trusted yesterday or can be trusted today or indeed tomorrow, to respect decisions of the Security Counci!. 25. l am weighing my words carefully when l say that we are dealing with a deliberate Violation of Security Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions, an intolerable intervention in my country's domestic affairs and a hostile act violating the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo.. 26. The CounciI wU1 determine whether this is, as we maintain, a threat to international peace and security, and will decide what steps should properly be taken. l may add that the Congo's confidence in the United Nations would be shaken ü the Council were simply to reaffirm its previous resolutions and to maintain that military action by the interventionist States represented at Casablanca was on the .same footing as the technical aj.d which the lawfu1 authorities of the Congo are entitled to seek and obtain. 29. The great majority of the peoples of Asia and Africa are peace-loving. We share their hostility to colonialism, but we denounce the way in which it is exploited by means of lies and hatred. Our very solidarity with the African-Asian community forces us to denounce to our friends the aggress!ve expansionism of the United Arab Republic, the provocative interference of Ghana and the sterile fanaticism of Guinea. 30. My first appeal is to the countries which, in' response to the request of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-General, sent military contingents to the Congo. 1 ask them to remain faithful to the real aims of ~he United Nations in the Congo, as set forth on 1 February by the Secretary-General: "to provide protection to the qountry against outside military interference and to assist in maintaining law and order". [928th meeting; para. 66.] 31. Those aims would be seriously jeopardized and the danger of the Congo being rent by civil war increased if all or part of the arms brought by these contingents were left behind in the country. 1 have no doubt that the Secretary-General is watching this important aspect of the Congo crisis with all the necessary vigilance. '32. Secondly, 1 appeal to the people of the Sudan, our friends and neighbours, and to the Head of the Sudanese State, Ml'. Aboud. We know that a delegation from Stanleyville, led by Antoine Awassi, has asked the Sudan to facilitate deliveries of arms to Gizenga and Kashamura. Antoine Awassi is the propagandist who, in the programmes broadcast from Cairo in Swahili, exhorts his compatriots to revoit against the central authorities. We also know that the policy of the Sudan is based on non-interference and on unreserved support for the United Nations action, and we are convinced that these requests have been rejected, even if other pressures have been brought to bear. Here again, our fears are prompted by President Nasser' s strange gifts, against which the blood shed by our soldiers teaches us to be on our guard. President Nasser' s policy of expansion includes the distribution of his portrait to the astonished peoples of Oriental province and systematic conversion to Islam of the Azande peoples, both north and south of the Sudanese frontier. We very much hope that this militant proselytism has nothing to do with a recent gift from President Nasser to the Sudanese army, which appears to have included jet aircraft and twenty military trucks. We trust that the gifts from President Nasser will stay at a safe distance from the frontiers of the Congo. 34. The States represented at the Conference of Brazzaville and President Bourguiba are no less sincere than we are in their hostility to colonialism and in their rejection of the colonialist pasto 35. 1 cannot confine my statement to its main subject, which is the growingthreat of openoutside intervention in the Congo and make no reference to the other aspects of the tragic problems facing my country. 1 wish to do so with the same consciousness of the gravity of the situation as that shown by the representative of India. 36. At the 929th meeting of the Council, Ml'. Jha dealt soberly and no doubt objectively with conditions in the Congo. 1 refuse to believe that bis delegation' f!- attitude of support for Ml'. Lumumba has been influenced .by his country' s serious population problems, even supposing that the ex-Prime Minister was willing to consider a large-scale immigration policy and to give India assurances in this connexion. ,37. We prefer to b~lieve that, if the representative of India has reached the same conclusions as the communists and the fanatics of Casablanca, it is because the premises of bis argument are mi.staken. Two of his remarks are no more than assumptions which are not borne out by the facts. Ml'. Jha sai-d that Ml'. Lumumba is "perhaps the only truly national figure in the Congo". He also said that Parliament "must become the forum for conciliation ... J 38. The Head of State, the Congolese people and the ministers who followed him also believed that Lumumba would be worthy of his high office. This opinion, which 1 shared, is no longer acceptable to anyone who knowsthefacts.lnparticular, Ml'. Lumumba did not hesitate to corrupt members of Parliament, who did little to resist his propositions. The integrity of the man who is supposed to be "the only truly national figure in the Congo", his love of democracy and his independence of monopolies are alilegends, which an objective observer has no option but to reject if he has studied the facts onthe spot. 39. But Ml'. Lumumba wf 1 e judged by the courts and by the Congolese peopl' , . .:>t by the United Nations. 1 have made this brief digression into Congolese internai politics only to show how rash it is to base 40. 1 am sure that it will be no surprise to Mr. Jha that 1 decline to join him in a debate on the efficiency of the Leopoldville authorities. 1 am only referring to ms remark in order to remind him that there are few men in the Congo ready to shoulder the responsibilities which power brings and that the majority of them are still going through their apprenticeship. Nevertheless, it is only on these few men that the Congo can pin its hopes today. There is no question of the United Nations taking their place, and the few prisons that exist in my country do not harbour the treasures of political wisdom that certain persons suspect them of doing. It is true that what the Congo needs above aIl is an efficient Government. But 1 should like to end this brief digression by stating, as President Bourguiba has already observed, that the Government which the Congo needs today is one that will be able to maintain order, stability and security. It is therefore all the more important not to weaken the authority of those who are endeavouring to govern, and to grant them the assistance which it is essential that they receive, on the basis of the actual situation in the Congo rather than as the haphazard result of transitory majorities or calculations in the United Nations. 41. In accordance with Iknow not what strange process of thinking, the right of the Head of State who asked for United Nations assistance to decide which institutions are to benefit from that assistance is being challenged. What is worse, while United Nations assistance is being given to us grudgingly, we are being prevented from seeking aid elsewhere. There are some who seem to want the Central Government to have a still greater legal status; but its legality has already been demonstrated here by the representative of the Argentine [914th meeting], and it has also been implicity acknowledged by the Generai Assembly. Among the opponents of President Kasa- Vubu, there 11.re many who have reasons of their own for putting up with the anarchy in the Congo. But 1 ask of the others what becomes of their legal scruples if a parliamentary masquerade will suffice to silence them? Everyone knows that anyparliamentary activity worthy of the name is neither physicallynor politically possible at this juncture. As for the scene staged by Mr. Lumumba on 6 September in the Chamber and on 8 September in the Senate, any Head of Government with few scruples would be able to stage them again. The presence of armed soldiers with their pockets full of money and the .exclusion of the Press, are even more efficacious than eloquence as a means of securing a maj0 rity. As to the size of that majority, it is more a question of figures than of numbers. The sort of legality invoked by the Soviet Union and the Casablanca group would be based on constraint and corruption. It might be worth while to remind those who have forgotten it that, in accordance with the "Loi fondamentale" li the dismissal of a Government 43. l shall not dwell at length on the spectacle of violence. murder, extortion and abuses with which we are conîronted in the Congo. l wish to emphasize that if at times regrettable abuses have occurred in places where the writ of lawful authority runs. they have never been encouraged or covered up by that authority. In facto the tranquillity which prevails throughout the provinces of Leopoldville. Equator. Kasai and elsewhere. is in striking contrast with the o:rganized anarchy and violence in the regions subject to the illegal government of Stanleyville. where such methods are being applied. 44. The Congolese delegation has already denounced the Intolerable abuses practised by Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Kashamura in Oriental province and Kivu. Ever since these agitators took the place ofthe legal authoriUes in those provinces. economic life has been paralysed and all forms of organized authority have disappeared; the list of crimes. assaults and arbitrary acts grows longer every day. l note with considerable surprise that the various delegations which are particularly interested in the problem of the Congo have made no mention of these before the Council. 45. The Congolese delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Council to a specifie aspect of this situation. It is true that European civilians and a few Belgian soldiers are daily threatened and ill-treated and are the objects of intolerable abuses by irresponsible people who have been aroused by the hatred instilled by those who claim to be in authority. But it is no less true that my fellow-countrymenpoliticians. workers and farmers-are subjected to the same violence and undergo the same risks in the two provinces. By simply refusing to purchase membership cards in a political party people immediately expose themselves to ill-treatment and the gravest risks. 46. Those who have to suffer the most from the prevailing anarchy are my fellow-countrymen. It is among them that the most numerous victims of this organized terror are to be found. Like the Europeans. they are not sufficiently protected by the United Nations forces. They do not even have the uncertain benefit of consular protection and do not come under the watchful eye of the representatives of the International Red Cross. 47. Only the strengthening of the lawful authority. namely that of the Central Government. can put an end to the anarchy whichprevails in Oriental province. in Kivu ang in northern Katanga and which threatens to spread to other parts of the Congo. 48. l have noticed that the murder of the customary Chief Fosi. the tortures inflicted on the Prime Minister of Kivu. Mr. Mihuro. on Mr. Gilbert Pongo and on a number of Gizenga's other victims, and the mutilations and arbitrary arrests practised in Kivu and Equator. carry little weight with certain delegations when compared with the blows which Mr. Lumumba is said to have received in the ccurse of his transfer to Elisabethville. 50. We hope that we shall soon be able to establish conditions which will ensure respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Congo and that every one without exception will be able to enjoy the protection it affords. If a man who has been guilty of murder, treason, corruption and incitement to murder is set free today, it can only postpone indefinitely the end of the reign of violence and terror over which he has presided up to .now. 51. The representative of the United Arab Republic reminded us of the provisions of the "Loi fondamentale" whereby a member of Parliament may be arrested only in consequence of an authorizedprosecution. The Security Council is aware that a proper warrant was issued for the arrest of Ml'. Lumumba and that the authorization of the House is not required in cases of flagrante delicto. These are principles which are contained in all the democratic constitutions of the world.. 52. My delegation believes that the way in which advantage is being taken of the errors committed at the time of Ml'. Lumumba's transfer is part of a policy intended to distract the Council's attention from the real threat facing the Congo. This same policy is responsible for denouncing as a colonialist threat the arrival in the Congo of technicians who have been requested and who are impatiently awaited. 53. Another diversionary manoeuvre is to denounce the arrival of foreign technicians in the Congo as evincing a desire for foreign domination, or even as collusion between the authorities of the Republic and Belgium, the former colonial Power. 54. My country has not been able to obtain from the United Nations aIl the technicians itneeds. Thedeparture in July 1960 of a large number of the senior foreign officials who were to have facilitated the transition to independence did serious damage to the country. It is both the incontestable right and the dutY of the Congolese authorities to fill the existing gaps in the technical cadres in the Congo. 55. Attempts have been made to place assistance from abroad to the agitators in Oriental and Kivu provinces on the same footing as the assistance which the lawful authorities of Leopoldville or of provinces which have remained within' the law are entitled to request and obtain. 1 must say that such attempts are facilitated when the Secretary-General uses the word "factions" in his reports to describe the Armée nationale congolaise, commanded by General Mobutu under the authority of the Head of State, or the "gendarmerie" of Katanga, as weIl as the marauding bands organized by Gizenga and Kashamura, which are sometimes recruited from among soldiers of the Armée nationale congolaise attracted by the prospect 56. If one day the Republic of the Congo has to make a direct appeal for foreign technicians, the Secretary- General will be partly responsible because promises have not been kept and the instructors have left and have not been replaced. We are still askingthe United Nations to complete the trainingofthe Armée nationale congolaise. We do so without any illusions. We have no intention of allowing ourselves to be crippledwhere the exercise of our responsibilities is concerned. If the Secretary-General does not obtain in the United Nations the majority and the assistance he requires in order to be able to furnish the military aid wbich the Republic has a right to request and to obtain, we shall have no option but to seekdirectlythe assistance which we must have if we are to strengthen the authority of the Central Government. 57. In his important statement of 1 February [928th meeting], the Secretary-General very appositely recalled the aims of the United Nations in the Congo: to provide protection to the country against outside military interference and to assist in maintaining of law and order. 58. At the present time interference can only take the form of uninvited military intervention, such as that of Belgium in July 1960 and that of the United Arab Republic about which we are now complaining. Unfortunately, although the protection of the United Nations was effective in 1960, it appears to be muoh less so today, and Ml'. Dayal has confirmed that it has very little chance of becoming effective. 60. Nevertheless, while it is true that the Secretary- General and his Special Representative subscribe to such straightforward principles, respect for which is the only possible safeguard for the sovereignty of a nation that is still weak, they deviate from them Ùl a perilous way both in their analysis of the situation and in the remedies that they suggest. 61. It is more convenient than accurate to state, for the purposes of the analysis, thatthe" Force publique" has broken up into factions, and to refer to the "factions of the Armée nationale congolaise". The armedgroups of Kasai have nothing whatever to do with the former "Force publique" or the Armée nationale congolaise. The rebel bands of Oriental and Kivu provinces are made up in part of former soldiers who do not recognize the usurpers of civil authority any' more than they obey their officers. This, way of presenting thÙlgs leads the Secretary-General to place the thousands of men'commanded by General Mobutu, under the author,tty accorded to the Head of State by the "Loi fondamentale", on the same footing as one of these factions. The real Armée nationale congolaise thus becomes one of the "factions": it would be the gravest threat to public order, and should be relieved of its responsibilities. Yet it was this same army "the instrument of the Government both for the protection of the integrity of the country and for the maintenance of law and order" which the Secretary-General had instructed General Kettani to reorganize by supplying it withthenecessaryofficers. What new development has taken place between the tiIne when General Kettanî, with the approval of the Secretary-General, was training our paratroops and the time when, the Moroccaninstructorshavingdisappeared, the only step contemplated is to disarm these troops? In essence, three things have happened: the dismissal of the Prime Minister, the replacement of General Lundula by General Mobutu, and the brief period of hostility on the part of the Leopoldville troops towards the personnel of the United Nations following the Intolerable provocation by Ghanaian diplomacy. The "Loi fondamentale/' has not changed, and the Head of State commands the armed forces of the State by virtue of its article 26. 62: The Armée nationale congolaise does exist-the army which obeys the orders of the Head of State. The other armed groups must either be integrated in the Armée nationale congolaise or else be rendered harmless by means of a police operation. 63. Similarly, a legal authority exists in the Congo in whom sovereign powers are vested, namely the Head of State, who appoints and dismisses Ministers. 64. These notions, which form an internal part of the respect due to our sovereignty, have become strangely blurred in Ml'. Dayal's reports and even 12 65. Mr. Zorin knows full well that everything which .is proposed here takes very little account of respect for Congolese sovereignty. He gets round this difficulty in the embarrassed statement which he made on 2 February: "The actions of official Heads of states are . ordinarily, of course, the domestic concern of each state, and as sucharenotmattersfor appraisal by the Security Counci!. But circumstances in the Congo are of a special and more complex nature." [930th meeting, para. 74.] 66. The United Nations Charter was rightly drawn up on the basis of the equality of states and the respect for sovereignty. This is the only safeguard which enables small and medium-sized nations to secure themselves against dangers threatening them from outside. Amongthose dangers, that ofcolonialism belongs to the pasto We are on our guard against any threats from neo-colonialism. Facts however confirm what we already knew, namely that there are forms of imperialism other than colonial domination. The interventionists most to be feared may be the very ones who cry "aggression" and offer themselves as champions. The intervention of the United Nations in the Congo has finally removed the menace of colonialism. We firmly believe that it will enable us to prevent the cold war fromentering our country. But we must go further and make any form of outside interference impossible. . 67. In this matter we place firm reliance on the 1 support of all the small peace-loving nations. We' would draw their attention particularly to the threat implicit in interventionist manoeuvres at the service of a policy of expansion. l do not know just how far the three circles are supposed to go-those three circles within which the United Arab Republic could expand-which President.Nasser refers to in his writings: the Arab circle, the Moslem circle and the African circle. But l do not think this question cm fail to be of interest to many African and Asian States. 68. What l have had to say can he summed up in one principle: there are no valid solutions to the problems of the Congo exceptthosewhichfullyrespect our national sovereignty. If the solutions that are proposed entail measures which touch upon the domestic affairs of the Congo, they cannot be adopted unless they have formed the subject of prior negotiation with the legal authority represented by the Head of State and have ultimately been accepted by him. To impose anything on us would be tantamount to disregarding and infringing our sovereign rights. 69. For the present the Republic of the Congo will persevere along the path which it has set for itself -the reinforcement of the authority of the Central Government within the framework of legality, the reconciliation of divergent tendencies and the reconstruction ofthe country's economythroughthe restoration of order and a return to work. 13 72. Nothing hlls been snid here of the efforts at medintion undertllken by the Conoilit\tion Commission for the Congo. lt had been suggested thl1.t the preparntory round table conferenoe WIlS bound to end in fallure, that three of the provinces were not representod by spokesmqn fOl' tho de flloto authorlties und thut the partislUls of Lumumbll wore not Illlowod to be present. That ls untruo. Ml'. KlIsongo, who iB President of the NlItional t\ssembly llnd an avowed supporter of Ml'. Lumumbn, is taldng purt in the discussions, us is Ml'. Sondwe. Invitations wero sent to Ml'. Glzengu tUld Ml'. KashlUnura, I\S well us to Ml'. Tshombé. The Centrul Governmont is sparing no pains to carry thl'ough sucoessfully the indispensable work of conciliation and of restoring national \mUy. 73. lt is by Ule Cong'Olese, and by Ule Congoiese alone, Uwt order ClUl be restored in the Congo tUld independenoe nssurod. 'l'he Congolese lU'e in urgent need of effeotive nid from the United Nations, llnd are far from lUldel'-estimating the nid l'rom whioh they have benefited so far. They mllst therefore persevere along the path they hnve tnkell, while oorrecting the mistnkes thllt hnve been mnde. 74. But my oOlmtry could never nocept nnythingwhich would he tantamount to plnoing it undel' trusteeship or to its being colonized by uuyone-even by the United Nntions itself. 75. Ml'. BERARD (France) (trlUlslated from French): Less thuu tllree weeks after its lust meeting, tlle 8eourity COUlICil has been oonvened onoe more to deal with the question of the Congo, three aspeots of whioh have been submitted to it. 76. The first oonoerns the request of the President of tlle Republio of the Congo (Leopoldville) tUld the President of the College of Commissioners-Genernl [8/4639], denouncing: "the violation of its [Ule Republio of the Cong'O' s] nationlll sovereignty and ... tlle flagrant interferenoe in its domestio affairs by the United Arab Republic". 77. The seoond dooument [S/4641] refers to the "inhuman and brutlll treatment" to which Ml'. Patrioe LunlUmba, Ml'. Joseph Okito tUld Ml'. Maurioe Mpolo are said to have been subjected. 78. The third dooument refers to what the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Sooilllist Republies, in his letter of 29 January 1961 [8/4644], feels justüied in oalling "the new 1l0ts of BelghUl aggression" in the Congo. 79. As regards the violations of Congolese sovereignty, 1 reoall operative paragraph20fresolution8/4405, adopted on 22 July 1960: "Reguests all 8tates to refrain from any aotion which DÙght tend ta impede the restoration of law and arder and the exeroise by the Government of the Congo of ils authority and ... whioh might undermine the territorial integrity and the politioal independenoe of the Republio of the Congo". 14 81. 'l'hese provisions, although clenr and wlequivocal, have been violated, according to the Congolese Head of State, by a Member of the United Nations. In pllrticular, Ml'. Kasa-Vubu denounces the llUlding, on 31 December 1960 at Lislùa in Oriental province, of lUI Ilyushin ah'craft bearing Egyptian identification marks. B2. In his letter to the President of the Republio of the Congo dated 14 Junullry 1961, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General writes: " ... it is correct that a United Arab Hepublic Ilyushin 14 ah'- craft did llUld at Lisllla on 31 December 1960 [S/4630, sect. II]. And Ml'. Dayal adds thut an inquiry was made: "into the circumstlUlCes which led to the fallure of the United Arab Republic authorities to comply with ONUC orders and instructions in regard to contingent aircraft on flights into the territory of the Hepublic of the Congo" [ibid.]. 83. It would be interesting to know the results of the inquiry ordered by Ml'. Dayal, particularly as regards the nature of the Congo. Other reports, emanating from diplomatie circles in Leopoldville lUld from press correspondents, speak of the supplying of arms, ammunition and military equipment to the de facto authorities in StlUlleyviUe and Bukavu. One day, they report traHic in arms via Juba to Faradjej on another day, air-drops in the northern part of Oriental province. It is of course always hard to prove things of this sort; but even if Irrefutable proof is lacking, there is a sufficient degree of agreement in the information we have received to provide us with strong evidence as to the type of arms trafiic orglUllzed for the benefit of the foUowers of Messrs. Gizenga, MlUlzilcala, Lundula, Kashamura lUld their associlltes. Be that as it may, one fact remaills: the Special Representative of the Secretary- General has established the "fallure of the United Al'ab Republic authorities to comply with ONUC orders and instructions". The complaint of the Congolese Head of State is therefore weU fowlded. 84. We must accordingly insist thnt the decision tnken by the Council be respected, and likewise the Assembly's request to aU Member States to "refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materhùs of war and militllry personnel and other assishUlce for military pUl'poses in the Congo during the temporlll'y period of military assistance through the United Nations ... ". 85. We are asked to give attention to another aspect of the Congolese problem, namely the fate of Ml'. 87. What is really being raised is the general problem of respect for human rights in the Congo. Ml'. Lumumba ought to enjoy the acknowledged fundamental rights of every individual, irrespective of his race, political opinions or religion. What earns him the safeguards which should apply to all prisoners is the simple fact that he is a human being-not bis former title of Prime Minister, a title of which he is now divested. During the 914thmeetingon 8December, our colleague from Argentina, Ml'. Amadeo, showed beyond any doubt that Ml'. Lumumba no longer has any right to the title of Prime Minister or to the powers or privileges pertaining thereto. Comingfrom such a highly regarded legal authority, this opinion can be considered decisive, despite repeated assertions to the contrary. 88: As 1 stated at the 918th meeting on 12 December, my delegation regrets and condemns any violence that may have been inflicted upon Ml'. Lumumba. We are, therefore, all the more entitled to express our astonishment at the silence of the same representatives regarding other acts of violence, clearly proved and far more serious, which have been and are being committed against the inhabitants of the provinces at present under the authority of Ml'. Lumumba'sfollowers and to which the President of the Republic of the Congo has again called our attention in his letter dated 28 J anuary [S/4643, sect. 1]. In the Kivu and Oriental provinces it is not merely a question of blows, but of severe brutality and even murder. The Secretary-General himself, in his message of 23 January to Ml'. Gizenga, referred to the "very large number of violations of the most basic human rights of bath Congolese and non-Congolese elements of the population" [S/4637 and Add.1, Sec. V]. His Special Representative, in a letter of 19 January addressed to Ml'. Gizenga, Ml'. Manzikala and Ml'. Lundula, was obliged to remind them that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" [ibid., sect. IV]. Everyone knows that acts of extortion and violence have been committed in Kivu and in Oriental province, to such an extent that certain Governments, including my own, have been obliged to advise their nationals in these regions to return home. We know that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has had a note of protestdelivered to the provincial authorities in Kivu concerning the ill-treatment inflicted on two German doctors of the Red Cross between 15 and 21 January at Loubero, 300 miles to the north of Bukavu. The United Nations spokesman has also stated that 272 United States missionaries, with their families, have now left Oriental province and taken refuge in Uganda. 1should like to add that news received this very morning from these two provinces revp,,'s that acts of terrorism are unfortunately continUl.::: there. If anyone still 89. One of the countries which requested that the Security Council convene to consider the treatment meted out to Mr. Lumumba also denounced what it called the "inadequate action of the United Nations in the Congo". l cannot agree with such a radical judgement. It must be pointed out, however, that some of the brutality inflicted upon the inhabitants of Kivu and Oriental province has been committed before the eyes of soldiers of the United Nations Command, and it may weIl be asked whether these United Nations troops can remain passive in the face of such violations of the most fundamental rights of the human person. Though the Secretary-General is just as concerned as we are at the seriousness of the situation in these two Congolese provinces, he has told us that he does not consider himself empowered to use force to prevent the acts of violence which are being perpetrated there. He explained to us, on 13 December 1960 [920th meeting], that the resolutions establishing his terms of reference were based on Article 40 of the Charter, and not on Articles 41 and 42 which provide for measures of coercion. We pay tribute to his scruples. We entirely agree that, wherever the circumstances permit lt persuasion is preferable to force, and that whenever possible, ONUC must use peaceful means in order to accomplish its humanitarian mission. But, as Ml'. Dayal writes in his second progress report: "the United Nations assumed the obligation to maintain law and order as part of its general mandate in the Congo to render assistance to the Congolese authorities in the discharge of this basic responsibility" [Si4557, para. 56]. Is persuasion alone sufficient to maintain law and order? Are not the United Nations contingents in dutY bound to resort to coercion, if there is no other way to prevent degrading violations of the law of nations? 90. There would be no objection to having the fate of the persons now under detention or menace investigated by the International Red Cross Committee, provided that the Congolese Government agreed to this, and authorizing that Committee to examine the prisoners as weIl as the places and conditions oi their confinement. This would serve to satisfy those who are indignant at the fate of Ml'. Lumumba and his colleagues. 91. There would be no reason, however, why the Red Cross should confine itself to_ examining one category of cases without also covering aIl those that might be brought to its attention. At a time when, in Kivu and Oriental province, so many foreigners and Congolese are being threatened, molesteq., or subjected to violence or to the pernicious system of ransom, an investigation by the Red Cross should aIso cover those persons who have been arrested and brutally treated by th.e authorities exercising de facto power in those provinces. The case of the eight 93. In our opinion, such demands constitute a clear Interference in the domestic affairs of the Congolese State. The legitimacy and the political responsibility of Ml.'. Kasa-Vubu were formally recognized by the United Nations at the flfteenth session of the General Assembly. It is not for a group of countries to endeavour, under the pretext of helping political leaders, to have the Security Council endorse a partisan view. 94. The President of the Republic of the Congo declared, in the third paragraph of the memorandum which he sent on 7 January to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, that: "At no time did .the Republic of the Con~ intend to entrust to the United Nations the exercise of responsibJ.lities which are essentially part of its national prerogatives. In particular, the legal authorities of the Congo claim exclusive competence with regard to the establishment of political institutions and their adaptation to the needs of the Congolese people." [S/4630, sect. 1.] And Mr. Dayal answered: " ... not only do l agree with the statement in paragraph 3 that at no time did the Republic of the Congo intend to entrust the United Nations with the exercise of responsibilities .which fall essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, but l would add that an}' request to that effect by the Government of the Congo would have to be rejected by the United Nations as inconsistent with the Charter which governs its activities". (Ibid., sect. ILJ 95. My delegation hopes that the recognized :iuthorities which legitimately exercise power in the Congo will be enabled to muster, as soon as possible and in full freedom, the personnel they will need in order to govern the country in a normal manner. We believe that foreign States, as well as the United Nations, must lend them support in their task of restoring the peace and unitY of the State. But we could not approve proposals which, by involving infringement of the rights and privileges of an independent state's lawful authorities, or of its sovereignty, would be contrary to the Charter. 96. l shall devote only a few words to the Soviet request of 29 January [S/4644]. This request is not a new one. For six months the Soviet Union has been bent upon getting Belgium condemned for alleged aggressive acts, and for six months the Securfty Council has no less persistently refused to follow the Soviet Union in that course or to endorse accusations which ft has, each time, rejected. The Soviet delegation continues to repeat that the "Security Council was considering the question of acts of aggression 18 97. Those who cry "aggression" are in reality striving to undermine the authority of the rightful President, Mr. Kasa-Vubu, which has been officially recognized by the United Nations, and to restore Mr. Lumumba to power. Neither with regard to Mr. Lumumba's status nor with regard to alleged Belgian aggression will my delegation be convinced by the incessant repetition of untruths. 98. The French delegation has repeatedly asked, since July 1960, that the rights of aU the communities in the Congo should be safeguarded and that tranquillity, order and legality should be restored in the country. It notes with regret that in this respect the situation has continued to deteriorate, despite the presence of the United Nations Force. Chaos reigns today !n regions where six months ago there was peace, and Congolese nationals, as weIl as foreign residents, are being obliged to leave provinces where the de facto authorities, with the support of foreign Powers, have placed themselves in a state of open rebellion against the legitimate Government. 99. The mutiny of the Armée nationale congolaise and the disorganization of the administration and the Government are the root causes of the iUs which have beset the Congo for more than six months. No cure will be found for these ills until the day when a stabie Government, broadlybased and respected in the six provinces, is established and when the national Congolese forces are able ta play their proper part as guardians of order and legality. 100. The United Nations must lend effective assistance to the legitimate authorities of the Congo in this urgent task. In so doing, they must act in complete agreement with those authorities, particu:- larly President Kasa-Vubu, within a framework of respect for the national sovereignty of the Congolese State. 101. Ml'. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish): The action of the United Nations in the Congo is being severely criticized. The Secretary- General is being blamed for what he has done, for what he has not done and for whathe might have done. So many sins of commission, omission and even intention have been laid at his door that he has told us, with a certain asperity, though moderated by his good Swedish upbringing, that they are trying to make him a scapegoat. Unless l am mistaken, a scapegoat used to be shut up in the temple to have the sins of an the people laid on it, and it was then allowed to escape burdened with others' faults. l can understand that this metamorphosis does not please the Secretary-General. 102. The fair thing to do before blaming him would be to examine what were the powers given to him, 103. The resolution contains two elements: it confers a mandate, but imposes a condition for exercising that power. The power was granted by the Council to the Secretary-General for the purpose of giving military and, in addition, technical assistance ta the Government of the Congo in arder ta help it maintain its sovereignty and national independence. The condition is that he must take such steps "in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo" until such time as the latter considers that the Congolese armed forces are ready and able to carry out their tasks. 104. This is the only mandate which the Secretary- General has been given, and in no way does it allude ta any power to take steps for the maintenance of law and order or to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo. The General Assembly' s resolution of 20 September 1960 [1474 (ES-IV)] has neither the form nor the legal force of a mandate. It does not have the form of a mandate since it merely requests the Secretariat l1to continue ... to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration andmaintenance of law and arder". l repeat: ta continue to assist. It does not have the legal force of a mandate because, under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter, the General Assembly has powers to recommend but not to decide. This point of view was maintained by my delegation at the General Assembly meeting on 19 December 1960. Y 105. Moreover, the circumstances in which the mandate was given have changed. At that time there was a Congolese Government which was unified in the face of an external danger. The factions emerged later. The dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba may appear illegal to many in the light of Congolese laws. The action of the then Colonel Mobutu-today l have heard him called General, but this is something which l did not know and for which l apologize-in dissolving the Congolese Parliament is an obvious "coup d'état" and an unfortunate militaryinterference in political affairs. This we have already maintained at one of the meetings of this Counci!. The Secretary- General's mandate did not, however, entitle himta take action in this field. 106. The subsequent disintegration of authorityplaced the Secretariat in the difficult situation of being unable to distinguish the legitimacy of the rulers except by the seats in which they were sitting, as Ml.'. Dayal' s report points· out. This new way of measuring political power was certainly something which neither the Secretary-General nor his Special Representative could have learnt from books on political or constitutional law. 108. The following facts emerge from the official documents and, in particular, from the Secretary- General's statement of 1 February 1961 [928th meeting]: 109. First: Bilateral foreign military aid is still arriving in the Congo in contravention of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Unfortunately the Secretary-General has not specüied from where this aid to the Congo is coming. 110. Secondly: there is no national Congolese army, for the armed forces have broken up into what the Secretary-General has discreetly called "private armies", which we understand to embrace both those which, in perhaps rather less discreet language, the Soviet Union calls "the terrorist bands of Mobutu" and which Mr. Mobutu calls "the armed bands of Gizenga". 111. Thirdly: The t:!'ansfer of Mr. Lumumba to Katanga seems to be not only a violation of fundamental human rights but also an action which has brought the Congo t. the verge of civil war; and 112. Fourthly: The authority of the Central Government is becoming daily more doubtful. We do not feel that it is for the United Nations to endow the Congo with a new political structure-that is a task for the Congolese people themselves-but we do believe that the United Nations must createthenecessary conditions for the Congolese people to choose their own form of national unitYthrough a democratic and representative popular Government which will enable them to enjoy their political and economic freedom without interference from foreign Powers. 113. This brings us to one final point: the apparent conflict between domestic jurisdiction and international action. As a basis for the international community in its present state ofdevelopment, myGovernment advocates the principle of non-intervention -whether bilateral or multilateral-in the private affaj~s of States. One essential factor in intervention is, however, the lack of consent on the part of the State against which that action is taken. 114. In considering the situation in the Congo, it is obvious that the United Nations Force is there at the express request of its legitimate Government. The subsequent disintegration of the central power has left only a tiny island of constitutionality in an ocean of lawlessness, but we do not believe that there is today a Government with unified authority recognized throughout the territory of the Congo. Similarly, the United Nations, being unable to fulfil the condition laid down in the resolutionbywhichitwasgiven a mandate, has a right to remain in the Congo until conditions of political normality have been established and until there are armed forces capable of carrying out their tasks. Rence the legality of the action in the Congo seems beyond question, and the powers underlying it must be strengthened inorder to give it constructive possibilities. 116. Someone has said that the sman States-like the oné 1 represent-are to the United Nations what the chorus was ta Greek tragedy. This muortunately is true. Nevertheless the l'ole of the chorus in Greek tragedy was not a passive one but ~U1 admonitory one: it warned the powerful about the inevitability of fate. There is no need for a gift of prophecy to be able to guess what fate is likely to bring in the coming years. \Ve do not believe so llluch in the inevitable danger of a war of mass destruction as in the proliferation of litUe civil wars with international backing. The case of the Congo involves this danger, and it could spark a chain reacUon. \Ve must open up new opportunities in the face of new dangers. Unlike the believers in natural law, we do believe in law as something eternal but as a flexible creation of life for the regulation of changing social relationships. And we consider that the United Nations is one of the sources for the development of a new type of international law. 117. The help achieve such aims is one of the functions of the sman States. As, however, those States have no final power of decision, my delegation proposes no solution; it merely expresses hopes. And the main hope is that, in this problem, ways and means of bringing peace to the Congo will be found. This is something which we do not believe can be accomplished while there are still foreign ambitions for economic domination, while clandestine military assistance is being given, while the army is in the service of factions and while hatred is being fostered through venomous propaganda. The permanent members must come to some agreement along these lines; otherwise a storm will break over Africa that will endanger international peace and security.

Three delegations have asked to be allowed to speak briefly in exercise of the right of r.eply. Unless 1 hear any objection 1 shan caU first upon the representaUve of Guinea. 119. Ml'. ACHKAR (Guinea) (translatedfrom French): 1 apologize for having to take the floor, in the absence of Ml'. DiaUo Telli, at the present stage of the debate. 1 hope to speak only fol' a few moments. 120. The young man who spoke a short time ago- 1 refer to my neighbour on the left, who claims to represent the Congo-has attributed to the RelJublic of Guinea a sterile fanaticism. It is customary, when such a gratuitous remark is made about a Member 8tate, for the latter' s representative to make the most suitable reply, But 1 do not think it necessary to rep1y at length to that speech, written by some Belgian or French adviser or, as the French representative would say, by "their associates". That adviser, like those now in the Congo advising the Mobutus and the 121. Nevertheless, my neighbour on the left, although he has lost his way for the time being, is a brotller against whom we canhot beur ill will, und we should simply like to teU ~im once again to remain fi Congolese and an African, dedicated to his country' s cause mld to friendship Witll aU honest countries. We can understand the extent of his confusion because we know that, aIter aU the efforts of the usurpers and puppets, including those whom it is now sought to introduce into our debates, he realizes that nothing can be done, now or in tlle future, without tlle man whom yesterday he worshipped but today he betrays with the blessing of his masters. No, we cannot bear ill will against our brother. We are simply sorry for him, and for tllose who are responsible for his having temporarily lost his way. 122. As for the fmlaticism of Guinea, it is unshakable where the struggle against colonialism is concerned. That is the type of fanaticism to which we boldly lay claim; it cannot be cOlûused with a sterile fanaticism which, in the present case, is the fanaticism of the colonial Powers and their puppets that have not yet abandoned their desire to keep Africn under theil' more or less direct, more or less brutal and more or less shameful domination.

1 caU next on the representative of India. 124. Ml'. JHA (India): Ml'. President, may 1 make a very brief intervention to exercise my right of reply. 1 would have much preferred to do so and also to make some further supplementary observations later, and 1 hope to be permitted to answer some of the substantive points in the statement of the representative of the Congo at a later time. M. de de la d'œuvre ploitation 125. But 1 cannot let go by one remark made by Ml'. Loliki. He mentioned, as a matter of fact he made insinuations, about some promise by Ml'. Lumumba to the Prime Minister of India to help, as he put it, solve India' s demographic problem. This was an astonishing statement. 1 should like to say here categorically that the Government of India has at no time sought nor has it entered into any agreement with Ml'. Lumumba or anyone else either in the Congo or elsewhere for the solution of the so-called demographic problem presented by the increasing population of India. '1'0 seek emigration of its nationaIs is not the policy of the Government of India nor is there any public opinIon in my country in favour of emigration to other countries. While the Government ofIndia is conscious, like many other countries, of the problem presented by increasing population and is taking the necessary measures with a view to limitation of population growth, it belÏeves that aU the available manpower of India is needed for the stupendous task of economic reconstruction and the utilization of the natural resources of India on which we are engaged. 126. 1 hope that the representative of the Cong'O has heard about the economic five-year plans and the parler

1 apologize for taking the floor once again, but 1 shall be very brief. 128. 1 have listened, not without astonishment 1 must confess, to the fantastic allegations and insults proffered by the Congolese representative, who is certainly not lacking in imagination. He accuses us of flagrant interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo and violation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Those are merely assertions, unsupported by proof, which 1 cannot take seriously. Since, however, mention has been made of an aireraft of the United Arab Republic which was in the Congo, 1 wish to say a few words on that point. 129. The authorities of the United Arab Republic, through its delegation to the United Nations, had previously requested from the Secretariat authorization to send by air to Lisala a repair crew to repair another aireraft which had had an accident at the' Lisala airfield, and permission for this team of technicians to salvage the Undamaged parts of the aircraft in accordance with the advice of an international technical expert. 130. The French representative read out a part of Mr. Dayal's report on this matter, but 1 feel obliged for the sake of accuracy, to supplement what he read. This is the part which he did not read: " ...ONUC Headquarters immediately made inquiries. It was learned that the delegation of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations had asked the Secretary-General for permission to be given for the despatch to Lisala of a repair crew to attend to an Ilyushin 14 aircraft wrecked earlier at Lisala airfield on the occasion of a United Nations flight, and for the purpose of transporting New Year gifts to the United Arab Republic contingent. This permission was given in principle." [S/4630, sect. II.] The rest was read out by the representative of France. 131. The French representative also omitted to tell us about the re al and proved interventions which have taken place, and are taking place every day, in the Congo. 1 shall return to that subject on another occasion. 132. It would also have been better if Mr. Kasa- Vubu's representative had told us about other interventions by foreign forces which bomb his country' s territory from the air. It was not our aircraft, but others, which bombed the Congo. However, 1 bear no ill will against the Congolese representative, who is merely repeating colonialist slogans against us. But 134. Ml'. LOLIKl (Congo, Leopoldville) (translated from French): l have asked to speak' but not in order to reply in terms as ridiculous and insulting as those which the Guinean representative has just used about me. According to him, l do not even deserve the title of representative of my country; but aIl l know is that the Guinean representative has no monopoly of intelligence, and that he never left his country in order to answer questions which were put to me in universityexaminations. 135. It is however absolutely pointless and ridiculous, particularly in as distinguished an assembly as this r to dwell on such aspects of the matter. The Guinean representative must know that his country bears considerable responsibility for the situation in which the Congo finds itself today. l am happy for him to calI me "brother", and we shall remain brothers even though we are at odds politically. At least, l know that if he finds me dead he will bury me. However, if he wishes to help my country, l ask mm to forget the financial assistance which his country gave us in our struggle against colonialism, and to forget himself in the help which he gives. In that way h,is aid will be disinterested. 136. Not everybody has the ability to speak weIl. Perhaps the Guinean representative believes that l am incapable of writing a speech. That is his right. But the fact remains that the speech is my own. Furthermore, the Guinean representative maintains that l am a sort of lost sheep, that in the past l was a supporter of Ml'. Lumumba-which l admit-and that l was his adviser during the round table talks at Brussels. But if the Guinean representative at that time believed that l was competent to give political advice to Ml'. Lumwnba, l do not see how he can say today that l am incompetent and that l can only repeat ,what the colonialists tell me. 137. l come now to what the representative of the United Arab Republic has just said about the aireraft which bomb the Congo etc. What was the purpose of my coming here? It was to demonstrate his eountry1s Interference in the domestie affairs of the Congo. l am very glad to note that my speech did provoke sorne reaetion in certain quarters; but, unfortunately for him and fortunately for me, the reaetion was merely in respect of small details, and the main thesis seems to be admitted by those at whom my remarks were directed.

There are no more speakers on my list. Moreover, the Council is, l think, aware that there are other Member States, in addition to those already invited to join in the debate, who wish to be heard by the Council on this subject, but whose representatives have net yet received theil' instructions. 139. l also understand from certain members of the Council that they wish for rather more time to eonsider their position before taking part in this discussion. 141. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): Before l comment on the proposaI you have just made, Ml'. President, l should like to ask you for some clarification. 142. You said that you thought the members of the Council might use the next few days for consultations among themselves and with their Governments and that, in the circumstances, you intended to adjourn the meeting. 143. l should like to know whether, taking into account the process of consultation to which you have referred, you have any particular date in mind for reconvening the Council in order that it might continue this discussion. We consider it important to have an answer to this question because others, l think, share our view that the question we are discussing requires an urgent solution. In the circumstances, l should like to ask you approximately when you intend to caU the next meeting of the Counci!.

l am sure that the representative of the Soviet Union will understand that it is a little difficult for me to give an exact answer to the question he has put, because the length of the adjournment should, l think, depend upon the progress made in the consultations to which l have referred. As the speeches made at this table have shown, the issues concerned are complicated and l think that aIl the members of the Council do require some time for reflection and for consultation with their own Governments. l certainly do not have it in mind to have a long delay. l am not now making a suggestion, but l think we might meet eitber next Friday or next Monday. according to the preferences of the members as revealed in the consultations which are going to be undertaken. But l suggest we should wait and see until we have more knowledge of how these consultations are going. 145. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): l thank you, Ml'. President, for the explanation you have given. l can understand your difflculties in determining the date for reconvening the Council, but l must express the view of the Soviet delegation that the taking of a decision on the important question under discussion cannot be protracted or delayed for any length of time. 146. Whatever may be one' s views on the conditions now prevailing in the Congo, it is clear to aIl that a prolongation of the present conditions would be fraught with very serious consequences bath for the Congolese people themselves and for AIrica as a whole. 148. We therefore feel that every effort must be made to finish these consultations as quickly as possible and pass to a consideration of steps which would serve to strengthen peace in the Congo. 149. This is especially important in the present circumstances when Ml'. Patrice Lunmmba, the Prime Minister of the Congolese Government, and his closest associates are in an extremely dangerous position, for they are in fact in the hands of the Belgian colonialists. This is causing the whole world deep concern, which has been reflected here by the representatives of many Member States. Naturally, not aIl representatives attach equal importance to the freeing of Ml'. LunlUmba, but the discussion which has taken place in the Councn seems to indicate that the overwhelming majority of the speakers consider a positive solution of this question to be a matter of exceptional importance. 150. Furthermore, every day that Lumumbaremains in prison in the hands of the Belgian Administration and its agents in Katanga makes the situation more complicated and intensifies the direct threat to the life of this outstanding Congolese national leader. That is why, of the two dates you mentioned, Ml'. President, the Soviet delegation would prefer the nearest; in other words, the meeting should be held no later than Friday of this week. 151. l understand that you are going to consult the members of the Councn, but l should like to ask you to take into account our view that the Councn should be convened no later than Friday of this week.

l should like to thank the representative of the Soviet Union for explaining his view so clearly. l am sure that aIl members of the Council are concerned that we should carry out our examination of the important issues comprised in the present situation in the Congo without any unnecessary delay and, in the circumstances, l am willing to assure the representative of the Soviet Union that l will give full weight to the views which he has expressed about the date for the next meeting in the consultations which l shaH be having in the next day or two. 153. If the representative of the Soviet Union is prepared to accept that, would it be agreeable to the Councn that we should decide to meet, as l suggest, after consultations, either next Friday, 10 February, or next Monday, 13 February, bearing in mind what has been said at this table? It was so decided. 154. Before we adjourn, the representative of Belgium has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. 155. Ml'. LORIDAN (Belgium) (translated from French): l thank you, Ml'. President, for giving me

1 beg your pardon, Mr. President, but 1 should like to make one short observation in connexion with what the Belgian representative has just said. 157. 1 would have understood if he had said that Mr. Lumumba was not under the control of the Belgian authorities. That he might know. But why does he say that Lumumba is in the hands of the Congolese authorities exclusively? 1 donotunderstand how the Belgian representative can say this so confidently.

The Soviet representative is surprised by my statement, but 1 must say that 1 am amazed at his surprise. AH the time he is accusing Belgium of directing aH the affairs of Katanga and he is making the sarne accusation against the Belgian citizens who', according to him, exercise the real authority there. 159. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that the Belgian Government should wish to make it clear. not only that has it not been involved-such a charge would be ridiculous-but that no Belgian citizen has been involved in the question of the treatment and the fate reserved for Mr. Patrice Lumumba. The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m. ARGENTINA-ARGENTINE Editoriol Sudomericono, S.A., Alsino 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRALlA·AUSTRALlE Melbourne University Press, 369 Lons· dole Street, Melbourne C. 1. AUSTRIA.AUTR1CHE Gerold & Co., Groben 31, Wien, 1. B. Wüllerstorff, Morkus Sittikusstrosse 10, Salzburg. BELGIUM-BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S.A., 14-22, rue du Persil, Bruxelles. BOLlVIA-BOLiVIE Libreria Selecciones, Casilla 972, La Paz. BRAZIL-BRESIL Livrarie Agir, Rua México 98·8, Caixo Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. BURMA.BIRMANIE Curatar, Govt. Book Depot, Rangoon. CAMBODIA·CAMBODGE Entreprise khmère de librairie, Impri. merie & Papeterie Sarl, Phnom·Penh. CANADA The Queen's Printer/lmprimeur de la Reine, Ottawa, Ontario. CEYLON.CEYLAN Lake House Bookshop, Assoc. Newspapers of Ceylon, P.O. Box 244, Colambo. CHILE·CHILI Editorial dei Pacifico, Ahumada 57, Santiago. Libreria Ivens, Casilla 205, Santiago. CHINA·CHINE The World Book Co., L1d., 99 Chung King Road, ht Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. The Commercial Press, L1d., 211 Honan Rd., Shanghai. COLOMBIA.COLOMBIE Libreria Buchholz, Av. Jiménez de Quesada 8·40, Bogot6. COSTA RICA Imprenta y Libreria Trejos, Apartado 1313, San José. CUBA La Ca,,, Belga, O'Reilly 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLOVAKIA· TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ëeskoslavensky Spisovatel, N6rodni T;ida 9, Praha 1. DENMARK.DANEMARK Ejnar Munk.gaard, L1d., Nqlrregade 6, K,benhavn, K. DOMINICAN RgoUBLlC· REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Oominicana, Mercedes 49, Ciu· dad Trujilla. ECUADOR.EQUATEUR Libreria Cient/lica, Ca.illa 362, Guayaquil. EL SALVADOR.SALVADOR Manuel Nava. y Cia., 1a. Avenida .ur 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA.ETHIOPIE Internatianal Press Agency, P.O. Box 120, Addi. Ababa. FINLAND.FINLANDE Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 2 Ke.ku.katu, Hel.inki. FRANCe Edition. A. Pédane, 13, rue Soulllot, Pari. (V'). GERMANY.ALLEMAGNE R. Ei.en.chmidt, Schwanthaler Str. 59, Frankfurt/Main. Elwert und Meurer, Hauptstrasse 101, Berlin-Schoneberg. Alexander Horn, baden. W. E. Saarbach, Këln (1). GHANA University Book.hop, of Ghana, Logon, GREECE-GRECE Kauffmann Book.hop, Athène•. GUATEMALA Sociedod Econ6mico·Financiero, 14·33, Guatemala HAITI librairie /1Ala Carovelle HONDURAS Libreria Panamericana, HONG KONG • HONG·KONG Th" Swindon Book Kowloon. ICELAND.ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar F., Austurstraeti 18, INDIA·INDE Orient Longmans, Calcutta, dras, New Delhi and Oxford Book & Delhi and Calcutta. P. Varadachary & Co., INDONESIA·INDONESIE Pembangunan, L1d., Djakarta. IRAN Guity, 482 Ferdowsi IRAQ·IRAK Mackenzie's Bookshop, IRELAND·IRLANDE Stationery Office, Dublin. ISRAEL Blumstein's Book.tore., and 48 Nachlat Benjamin ITALY·ITALIE Libreria Commissionaria Gino Capponi 26, Azuni 15/A, Roma. JAPAN·JAPON Maruzen Company, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. JORDAN·JORDANIE Jo.eph 1. Bahous Box 66, Amman. KOREA.COREE Eul-Yoo Publishing Chongno, Seoul. LEBANON·L1BAN Khayat's College 92.94, rue Bliss, Beyrauth. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Trau.ch-Schummer, Théâtre, Luxembaurg. MEXICO·MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, S.A., 41, México, D.F. MOROCCO.MAROC Centre de diffusion B.E.P.I., 8, rue Michaux·Beliaire, NETHERLANDS·PAYS·BAS N.V. Martinu. Nijhaff, 9, 's-Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVELLE·ZELANDE United Nation. Association land, C.P.O. 1011, NORWAY.NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum gust.gt. 7A, 0.10. Litho in U.N • Priee: $V.S. 0.50; 3/6 stg.; Sw. (or equiva1ent in other currencies) Orders and inquiries from countries not Ii.ted above may be sent ta: Sales Sedion, Publishing Sevice, United Nation., New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations, Palais