S/PV.935 Security Council

Further requests for participation in the discussion of the item on the agenda have been received from the Central African Republic [S/4710] and from Upper Volta [S/4709]. If there ls no objection, l also invite the renresentatives of the Central African Repùblic and of Upper Volta to t9.ke the places reserved for them in front of the Councl1 table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Michel Gal1in-Douathe (Central Mrican Republic) and' Mr. Frédéric Guirma (Upper Volta) took the places reserved for them in front of the Council table. The interpretations were given in English and French of the statement made at the 934th meeting by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 2. The PRESIDENT: A request for participation in the discussion of the question on our agenda has been received from the permanent representative of Iraq [S/4711]. If tnere is no objection, l now invite the representative of Iraq to take the place reserved for him in front of the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Adnan M. Pachachi (Iraq) took the place reserved for him in front of the Council table. 3. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before entering on the subject matter under consideration, l wish to express our deep regret at the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Okito and Mr. Mpolo. What has happened is a revolting crime against principles for which this Organization stands and must stand. 4. It is vain to argue with those for whom truth is a function of party convenience and justice a function of party interest. But for others it may he essential that some facts are recalled and clearly and simply put on record. The points which may be useful to cover are those which should determine the judgement regarding the relations of the United Nations to the fate of Mr. Lumumba and, in consequence, tl,1e responsibility of -the Organization and of its various organs. 5. Together with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, Mr. Lumumba asked for United Nations military assistance. When 6. In view of the deperate necessity to get the United Nations Force inw Katanga in o;rder to achieve the withdrawal of Belgian troops from all over the Congo, 1 managed a break-through for the Force to Katanga, which made it possible to ree:::h this result. As this move had not been discussed with Mr. Lumumba personally, he accused me bitterly of by-passing the legitimate Government. However, the move had been discussed with the delegation of that Government ln New York consisting of. among others, Mr. Gizenga, the Vice-Prime Minister. Mr. Mpolo and Mr. Kanza. Again, the matter was brought before the Security Council, and again my stand was upheld by the Council. No member even introduc.ed a resolution which would have involved disapproval of the action. 7. In early September, President Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Lumumba each declared the mandate of the other null and void, and both positions were disapproved in a session of Parliament. Somewhat later, Colonel Mobutu. basing himself on units of the Armée nationale congolaise in the Lropoldville area, declared' that he had, as he said, "neutralized" both the Chief of state and, Mr. Lumumba. In the light of the principles applied by the United Nations as regard domestic cOlûlicts, the instruction to the Command and the Special Representative was that they should stand. aside from the conflict that had developed and avoid any actions which colÙd make them a party to the conflict or involve support to any one side in it. These instructions were challenged on the basis that Mr. Lumumba remained the Head of Government and should be treated as such by the United Nations. The mat~r came up both before the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the General Assembly adopted on 20 September 1960, without any dissenting vote, a resolution [1474 (ES-IV)] which must be inter- .preted as upholding the line takenby me in the instructions to the United Nations Commando Thus, whatever is said about "the failure of the United Nations to uphold legality in the Congo", it is somethingfor which the responsibility ls shared by all Members of this Organïzation. 8. While staying in his official residence, Mr. Lumumba requested United Nations protection. He got such protection at ·the place of his residence. in keeping with the principles upheldbythe Organization. While he was under protection, attempts to arrest Mr. Lumumba were stopped by the United Nations. At a later stage of this period, on 7 November, Mr. Lumumba issued a· statement in which he called the United Nations Organization the "guardian of democracy" . With reference to passages in the Secretary-General's report that dealt with a variety of political questions in the Congo, Mr. Lumumba also declared that "the Government which 1 represent and the Congolese Parliament Mly endorse these statements of the United Nations Secretary-General because they are in keeping with the truth and the , reality which we have lived through during these past weeks". And he concluded his statement by re- 9. Mr. Lumumba escaped from his residence in a way unknown to the United Nations and travelled east, without any possibility for the United Nations to know where he was and thus without possibility for the Organization to give him protection. He was arrested out in the country without any possibility for the United Nations to stop this action, as it was not in control of the situation. This may be the point to remind the members of the simple fact that a force of, at its maximum, 20,000 men spreadovera country not far from five times the size of France, is not in a position to check what is going on everywhere in the country or in a position to protect individuals of whom the whereabouts are unknown. ' l,O. When brought for imprisonment to Thysville, Mr. Lumumba was in the custody of the Armée nationale congolaise. The United Nations had neither the power nor the right to liberate Mr. Lumumba from his captors by force-I saythe United Nations, because to my knowledge not even this Council or the General Assembly would have such a right. Much less did it exist for the United Nations representatives in the Congo under theil' mandate. The action of the 01'- ganization had therefore to concentrate on efforts to give Ml'. Lumumba all possible legal and humanitarian protection. l, together with the United Nations repre- .sentatives in the Congo, exercised all the pressure l possibly could for that purpose. We received assurances from the President. The prisoners were visited by Red Cross personnel. No steps were taken, however, by the authorities in Leopoldville with regard to the observance of due process of law for Ml'. Lumumba, which l had requested and which obviously applied to all stages of his arre~t and detention. 11. Ml'. Lumumba was brought to Katanga. His departure was entirely outside the control of the United Nations organs. His arrival in Elisabethville was witnessed from some distance by a fewUnitedNations soldiers, far outmanned by the Katanga forces and without any possibility of interference. Immediately, in "démarches" to Ml'. Kasa-Vubu and Ml'. Tshombé, l exercised all the influence possible for the return of Ml'. Lumumba to Leopoldville and for application of normal legal rules in protection of his interests. Members will recall that this, .as so many of the previous steps to which l referred, was regarded by various Congolese authorities as interference in Congolese internaI affairs. 12. l did not make any special efforts for our own representatives to see Ml'. LumumbawhileatKatanga, as at that stage the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo and its members had solicited a promise from Mr. Kasa-Vubu to see him and were 13. That is where we stood when on the morning of 10 Februarythe authorities in Elisabethville announced that Mr. Lumumba had, as they said, escaped from his place of detention. As it appears from the report, steps were immediately taken in order to find out all the facts, and in various ways itwas impressed on the authorities that the Organization attached the greatest importance to the protection of the life of Mr. Lumumba; as reported by the Katanga authorities, the escape took place from a house far from any United Nations detachment and whose location was unknown to the United Nations. When no response had been received, on 11 February further steps were taken in order to establish objectively the facts and, ofcourse, also thereby to get guidance as to whether the United Nations could lntervene and give protection: the instruction was that if Mr. Lumumba were to seek protection from any United Nations unit, he would immediately be granted asylum. As is well known, in spite of repeated "démarches", no response has been received from the authorities and Generallyassu, who was sent especiaIly for the purpose to Elisabethville, has not been received by Mr. Tshombé. 14. These are the main steps on the road, and it does not seem to me to be asking too much if those who now taIk about the responsibility ofthe United Nations, and more especially of its Secretary-General-in language which only emotion could excuse but which may be inspired by cold calculation-are requested to state clee.rly when and how representatives of the Organization did not use ail the means put at their disposai, in accordancewiththe mandate as established by the Members of the United Nations andthe Security Council. 1 know that it will be said, as it was said a week ago by the representative ofthe SovietUnion, that 1 maintain that we in the Secretariat have made no mistakes and that all responsibility rests withothers. Members are ail aware of the fact that 1 did not say so then, and that 1 do not say so now. But if those who have el3tablished the mandate and those who have decided on the means by which the mandate should be iulfilled attack the representatives ofthe Organization because they have not exceeded the mandate, thus established, or acted against it, and becausethey 'have not used means which have never been put at their disposai, then it seems to me to be fair to point out that ft is not the Secretary-General who has determined the mandate, nor is ft the Secretariat which has decided on what means they should use to fulfil ft. There is no escape from the responsibility which flows from this-in statements to whichwe have listened to the effect that this or that Member gives the mandate another interpretation, often even forgetting the Charter, and claims that we have had or have rights that are not ours. A single voice does not change the decision of a major organ and no single Member is above the Charter. 16. The facts as recalled, and as easilyverifiedfrom the records of the United Nations. obviously do not provide a basis for the attacks of the Soviet Union in the statement of the Governm~nt[S/4704] released to the Press yesterday, in the draft resolution [S/4706] and in the speech of Ml'. Zorin this morning. And why should they? ln fact, what we are witnessingis in part a follow-through of an attempt which the General Assembly witnessed during the general depate-a vain attempt to break through the present United Nations ,set-up so as to open the road to such a change of the structure of the Organlzation and its Secretariat as would give the Soviet Union the kind of influence it wants beyond that which follows from the rules of the Charter. 17. On 3 October of last year, Chairman Khrushchev said in the General Assembly: " ... 1 should like to repeat: we do not, and cannot, place confidence in Ml'. Hammarskjold. Ifhehimself cannot muster the courage to resign in. let us say, a chivalrous way. we shall draw the inevitable conclusions from the situation. Il !J 18. What we have heard today is nothingbuta repetitian of the same thesis with one added argument, the assassination of Ml'. Lumumba-supported by the preposterous allegation that this crime can be laid at the doorstep of the Secretary-General. 19. In reply to what Ml'. Khrushchev said, 1 stated: "I said the other day that 1 would not wish to continue to serve as Secretary-General one day longer than such continued service was considered to be in the oost interests of the Organization. The statement this niorning seems to indicate that the Soviet Union finds it impossible to work with the present Secretary-General. This may seem to provide a strong reason why 1 should resign. However. the Soviet Union has also made it clear that if the present Secretary-General were to resign now, it would not wish to elect a new incumbent but insist 20. What l thus said in replyto ChairmanKhrushchev l can' restate today. And so as to leave no ambiguity, l want to point out that in line with what l stated during the Suez crisis, l would consider the withdrawal of the confidence of one of the permanent memberEl of the Security Council as a reason why the Secretary- General should resign, were it not for the fact that in this case the Soviet Union, while refusing its confidence to the Secretary-General, has at the same time taken a stand which makes it absolutely clear that, were the present Secretary··General to re,sign, no new Secretary-General could be appointed, and the world would haveto bow to the wish of the Soviet Union to have this Organization, on its executive side, run by a triumvirate whlch could not function and which most definitely would not provide the instrument for all the uncommitted countries ofwhich they are in need. And this would happen at a time of great tension and unprecedented demands on the Organization. Tpus, while taking a stand which would without any hesitation cause me to resignunder normal circumstanc~s,the SoYiet Union has at the sarne time created a situation in which l could' not do so, unless it were to be the wish of the uncommitted nations that l do so in their own interest and in the interest of the United Nations. In the language of the Soviet Union, l have the "chivalry" to respect the view of the vast majority of Members which are uncommitted and-although l use the word with hesitation-Icanassure the Soviet Union that l have the "courage" to take the full consequences of this attitude, even if it means being forced to continue in my post without the support needed and with means desperately weak in the face of enormous demands. 21. l hope that my language is clear enough. It is aIl l have to say about the matter and it is all l need to say about it. The dt::cision is thus in the hands of aIl those for whom the Soviet Union pretends to speak. Whatever the Members of this Organizaticn may decide on the subject will, naturally, be my law. 22. l said in the intervention in the General Assembly to which l have referred thatI deplored that the attitude of the Soviet Union had tended to personalize an issue which, in fact, concerns an institution. In doing so again, the Soviet Union has again forced me to speak about my own attitude. 1 regret that l have had to do so, as the issue remains one concerningthe institution and not the man. And l ":'egret it IJven more in a situation in which much 1'Y\ore is at stake than this or that organization of t,.'2 .Jnited Nations or this or that organ of the United :'""tions. In<;leed, the United Nations has never been and will never be more than an instrument for Member Governments in their effort 23. For seven or eight months, throug):l. efforts far beyond the imagination of those who founded this Organization, it has tried to counter tendencies to int.roduce the big-Power conflict into Africa and put the young African countries under the shadow of the cold war. It has done 50 with great risks and against heavy odds. It has done so at the cost of very great personal sacrifices for a great number of people. In the beginning the effort was successful, and l do not now hesitate to say that on more than one occasion the drift into a war with foreign-Power intervention of the Korean or Spanish type was avoidedonly thanks to the work done by the Organization, basing itself on African solidarity. We effectivelycounteredefforts from all sides to make the Congo a happy huntingground for national interests. To be a roadblock to such efforts is to make yourself the target of attacks from all those who find their plans thwarted. In the case of some, the opposition to the United Nations Une was for a while under the surface, but it was not long before it broke out in the open. In other cases, the disappointment at meetingthis unexpected obstacle broke out at once in violent and vocal attacks on the Organization. From both sides the main accusation was a lack of objectivity. The historian will undoubtedly find in this balance of accusations the very evidenee of that objectivity wewere accused oflacking, but also of the fact that very many Member nations have not yet accepted the limits put on their national ambitions by the very existence ot the United Nations and by the membership of that Organization. 24. Now. under basically identical, although superficially more dramatic, circumstances, we have again reached the point where a local armed conflict is threatening in forms which are only too likely to lead to a wideI:!::..ag of the confiict into the international arena. l have no n,ew solutions to offer you. Still, l firmly believe that, as in July and August of last year, the only way in which the continent of Africa and its countries can counter a tragic development into an international confliet, perhaps on a worlrl-wide scale, is by rallying around common aims within the framework of the United Nations. African solidarity within the United Nations was the reply to the threats last summerj l am firmly convinced that it still is the only reply. 25. However, it is not enough to state in general terms suah a line of poliey as the solution to the problem. We are all in dutYbound to he concrete both as to the aims and as to the means to achieve those aims. Again, on this point, l have little new to offer, but l should all the same like to sum up briefly what 27. 8econdly, instructions have already been given to the Force to protect the civilian population against attacks from armed units, whatever the authority 'under which they are acting. Again, it may be said that this is on the outer margin of the mandate of the United Nations, but already in 8eptember 1 said that 1 feIt that it must be considered as a. natural part of the duties of the Organization, and 1 did not meet with any objections. 28. Thirdly, instructions have alreadybeengiventhat, in case a clash between armed Units is threatening, the United Nations should use aIl means, short of force, to forestall such clashes through negotiations, through the establishmentof neutralized zones, through cease-fire arrangements and through similar measures. Negotiations to those enis can be conducted on the basis of the military force at the disposaI of "the United Nations. The chance of success is greater the bigger i8 the force. If this method ofpreventing civilwar risks by peaceful means is to be successful, it is indeed desirable that the United Nations Force shoule!. be strengthened. The weakening of the Force through withdrawal may make the efforts useless. 1 have also already stated that, were clashes between armedunits to develop, the United Nations could not permlt itself to become a third party to such a conflict. But the use of force in support of cease-fire arrangements should not therefore be excluded. 29. Fonrthly, on 1 February 1 proposed [928th meeting] that the United Nations reactivate its basic attitude on the Armée nationale congolaise and take appropriate steps for its reorganization for its normal purposes in the service of the national Government, thus withdrawing aIl its various .factions from their present engagement in the political strüe. 30. Füthly and lastly, already on 8 October of last year, as is clear from documents circulated to the 8ecurity Council, 1 addressed myself to the G-{)vernment of Belgium and to Mr. Tshombé, pointing out the necessity to eliminate the Belgian political element in the Congo [8/4557, part B, sects. 1 and 5]. 1 do not remembell that 1 got anyactive support from any Member country or from any organ of the United Nations for that stand at that time. 1 was attacked violently by Belgium and by various leaders in the Congo. 1 still hold the sameview,forwhich 1 have been trying to get respect aIl through these months, alas without effect. It is still, in my opinion, as essential a need as it was in the early autumn. May 1 now hope that it may gain the moral support of this Council? 32. 1 could, however, go further. Money is as important as men. Arms are essentialfor any military operation. It can be put in question whe:ther the United Nations has the right to inspect trains and aircraft coming to the Congo so as to see to it that no arms are imported. The legal advice 1 have sought and obtained indicates that we may have no such right to search. Is it under such circumstances surprising that so far we have not been able to counter arms imports, when Member countries outside the Congo have not shown hesitation to export arms to the Congo? 33. But further, movements of funds and capit21 are definitely outside the control of the United Nations. To the e}>.'tent that such movements are not for the purposes of economic development or for humanitarian purposes they are certainly not desirable inthe present situation, What authority, if any, is the Council prepared to give its representatives in this field? 34. There is also the constitutional question. Already in the faU 1 pointed out the essential importance of getting Parliament together as a basis for the 1'eorganization of the political life of the nation. This attitude had a wide support, but what can the 01'- ganization do in this respect as obviously it has not so far claimed a right itself to convene Parliament? 1 am certain that the Conciliation Commissionwith its nine African members has used its best endeavours in the direction indicated. If they have not succeeded by means of persuasion, is the Council prepared to override the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, and, in the interest of peace and security, to order the reconvening of Parliament? 35. The five points onwhich, as previously mentioned, 1 have already taken action, are all of them such that no new legal mandate is required while, definitely, there is a need for moral and politieal support. The three last mentioned points are oî a different nature. They are points on which it is for this Cou.Hcil and only for this Council ta decide what itfeels entitled ta do and what it wants ta do. The Secretary-Gene.ral cannot act short of a clear decision by the Counci!. In this case, at least, there is no question about where the responsibility lies. As regards arms imports, as regards the transfer of funds, as regards enforced' constitutional measures, it is for the Security Council ta determine the ends and to decide on the means, in full awareness of its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, but also of its dutY ta respect the sovereignty of a Member nation. It cannat shirk its responsibilities by expecting from the Secretariat action on which it is not prepared to take decisions itself. 36. Were the Security Council to reaffirm and redefine. perhaps even to widen, the mandate for the

At this stage of the debate l wish to express the shock and sorrow fl;':;J in my country in the face of the latest tragic happenings in the Congo. The fact that political instability, division and conflict in that countryshould have reached the stage at which political leaders have met violent death is profoundly regrettable. There can be no doubi that whatever their various ideas about their own political affairs. the majority of the Congolese people must recognize that the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Patrice Lumumba will hamp'9r and defer for some time the reconciliation of the Congolese people among themselves, which forms the centre of our hopes for the Congo. 38. In that reconciliation the United Nations itself has placed its faith. By the resolutions which we have adopted our Organization is committed to preserve the independence and territorial integrity ofthe Congo and to help to eliminate such obstacles which may impede the Congolese people in their efforts to reach freely and in mutual understanding a common solution to their temporary internai problems. 39. The gr'avity of the present situation which has sharpened the conflicting ideas about the Congo demands that aU the Members of the United Nations should raUy round our Organization and not abandon its aims and ideals. 40. My own Government has based aIl its foreign policy on the United Nations. Our every hope and aspiration for a lasting peace and for an international understanding is centred on this Organization. We are confident that the greatest majorityof the Member States. a majority composed of smaU and medium count~ies. see no better guarantee for their futUre existence than the continuation of this Organization under the principles and purposes embodied in the Charter. 41. According to the provisions of the Charter. the office of the Secretary-General is one of the important organs of the United Nations. My Government will co-operate with aIl other Member States in upholding th.:: prestige, the impartiality and the effectivencs~;of that office. 42. Like aIl the other organs of the United Nations which have had to deal with the tragic and highly complex situation in the Congo. the office of the Secretary-GeneraI has also met adverse circumstances. These difficult clrcumstances arise from the very nature of the problems laid before us. My 43. May 1 now say a few words on the attitude of my delegation as a member of the Security Council regarding the general aspects of the Congolese question. My country does not bave extensive economic. cultural or political relations with the Congolese Republic or with the general area in which it is situated; geographicaUy we are placed at a considerable distance and in a different area. The internal conflicts which have unfortunately existed recently in that country give rise to no partisan echoes in our public opinion. whose only reaction to these conflicts is one of sorrow that such discord should exist in that distant land. In spite of all this. the people and the Government of Turkey are far from being disinterested in the unfortunate situation which has been prevailing in the Republic ofthe Congo. Like aU the Members of the United Nations who value above aU individual freedom. national independence and international peace and understanding. we feel that our Organization itself bas a stake in these happenings, and. naturaUy, we have a share in that stake. 44. Our interest is concentrated mainly on the following points. In the first place. the Republic of the Congo is a newly independent ëountry. We are anxious to see full sovereignty. independence and territorial integ:rity firmly established in that African land. as those are attributes which we value highly for ourselves and for all the nations of the world. We would like to see the Congo governed by an administration deriving its strength from the free aUegiance of the Congolese people and serving the interestsofthe Congolese nation'alone. In the second place. the Congo question unfortunately has assumed the character of one aspect of the cold war. and we do not like the cold war in any of its aspects. The sooner this particular aspect is eliminated. the happier we shall be. In the third placeJ the internaI political divergencies in the Congo and the ensuing polemics. not excluding allegiance or opposition to various Congolese personalities. have unfortunately shown a tendency to spread to other parts of Africa. It is regrettable that the debates in the United Nations have not only reflected, but at times alsD accentuated this unhappy tendency towards rift among the African countries in this question. As we realize the importance of unitY and harmony in that great continent, especiallyduring this auspicious period of its existence when its bright destiny is being sbaped, we would be happy if this serious cause of disharmony could be eliminated by a satisfactory solution. 45. Lastly, as 1 have already stated. my Government bases its fol'elgn poli'}y on the United Nations. AlI our hopes and aspirations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace as well as the achievement of widel' international understanding are focused on this 01'- ganization. We therefore feel that since the United Nations is comprltted to pursue in the Congo the aims

The strangest aspect of aIl recent debates on the situatioll in the Congo both here - in the Security Council and in the General Assembly is the attack made by the Soviet Union on the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Soviet Union denounces the Secretary-General, in language which can only be characterized as indecent, as "a participant in and organizer of the violence committed against the leading statesmen of the Republic of the Congo" [S/4706]. My delegation regards this new accusation of the Soviet Union against Mr. Dag Hammarskjold as fantastic, irresponsible and dangerous, that is, dangerous to the United Nations and dangerous for the peace of the world. 48. In the whole world today 1 know of no man who is more anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist than Mr. Hammarskjold. As the representativeofacountry which has suffered from colonialism and which has been engaged for many years in a long struggle against colonialism, 1 am convinced that Mr. Hammarskjold's sympathies are with the under-developed countries and newly independent countries of the world. 49. In the Congo Mr. Hammarskjold hàs done his best to prevent politics from becomingmere brutality. He has not always succeed3d. The responsibility for the failure, however, is not hïs. He has had a limited mandate with even more limited means. 50. The main purpose of the United Nations operation in the Congo is to help the Governmentof the Republic of the Congo in maintaining law and order in that country. What does this phrase lTlaw and order" mean in this context? It means protectionoflife andproperty. It does not mean the maintenance ofa particular constitutional law or a particular constitutional régime. We must remember that we are in the Congo to help the Congo, not to dominate or t9 control it. Our Charter requires that the United Nations must always respect the sovereignty of the Congo. 51. One of the dangers whichthis youngOrganization, the United Nations, faces is to be suddently burdened with a task beyond its strength. Any overburdening may break the back of thïs 'yOUi1g institution in which we rest aIl· dur hopes. True friends of the United Nations must see to it that this Organization makes a contribution to the solution of international problems as they arise, and by making such contributions gathers fresh and greater strength for the future. ln other words, true friends ofthe United Nations must nurture it. 52. My own delegation cannot sha:oe the Soviet approach to the problem of the Congo, first of aIl, be- Cause the Soviet approach would, in our judgement, deal the United Nations a big blow from which it might never recover and, secondly, because the Soviet approach would expose the Republic of the Congo to even greater dangers. 54. Belgian activities in the Congo maybecriticized, but if the Government of Belgium is to be accused of sharing the responsibility for this brutality, 1 say that the Security Council should at least require proper evidence. That we have nc>t had. 55. This whole lurid story-the arrest of Lumumba, his escape, his transfer and, finally, his deathseems to me to be very un-Belgian. Hence, with the lack of evidence so far, my delegation would not support or approve any condemnation of Belgium with regard to the death of Lumumba and his two associates. 56. Ml'. BERARD (France) (translated fromFrench): During the last fevi months 1 have several times had occasion to s!ly in the Council that my Government strongly deprecated the ill treatment apparently suffered by Ml'. Lumumba, Ml'. Okito, Ml'. Mpolo and other Congolese political figures. 57. From the very beginning of the Congo crisis, my Govermnent has constantly urged that aIl possible measures should be taken to ensure full respect for the rights of the human person with reference to all the inhabitants of the Congo. 1 need hardly say that it was with great distress that my delegation learned of the disappearance of Ml'. Lumumba and his companions. 58. This moraing the representative of the Soviet Ul.ùon inf'lrmed us of a statement from his Government, and submitted a draft resolution bath of which are couched in particuh:.rly outrageous terms. This is not the first time that a Soviet representative has employed in the United Nations language so out of keeping with the custom of this Organization and even with ordinary international practice. But the violence of today' s accusations seems to exceed aIl bounds and we can only condemn it formally. In particular, my delegation does not think it right or proper that the integrity of the hfghest official of this Organization should be called into question in such an illconsidered manner, or that such ridicuIous and insuIting charges should be levelled against him as that of having played a "shameful role" in the Congo question, of being "the sorrylackey ofthe colonialists" and of having become "the participant in andorganizer of" criminal acts. 59. The Soviet delegation is not only attacking a policy; it is attacking in this case a man and his dignity. Such vilification is unworthy of this Council. Moreover, such an attitude is certainly not the .best way to contribute to a solution of the tragic problem of the Congo. 60. Ml'. SCHWEITZER (Chile) (translatedfromSpanish): 1 shall be brief. 1 wish to denounce most vehementIy, on behalf of my Government, the political 61. Obviously, one of the primary conditions for securing peace in the Congo and for solving its difficult problems is confidenoe; the United Nations must have confidence in its own forces, in the consistency of its poUcy and in its ability to demonstrate that it can carry out its delicate tasks. 62. If the deplorable and reprehensible events which have culminated in the assassination of Lumumba and others are used in an attempt to produce a structural crisis within the United Nations, not only would that be an admission of the Organization's failure, itwould also be to defraud not Just the Congolese people but aIl peoples who look upon the United Nations as the most reliable guarantee of their security and aspirations. Great harm would be done to the cause of peace and the world community would be left disturbed and mistrustful. 63. A serious crisis would overtake this Organization if the Secretary-General were to be forced to resign or if we were to grudge or deny him the confidence and support he needs in order to act. Furthermore. ~he crisis which certain delegations are trying to precipitate would be based on a serious injustice. In condemning the Secretary-General personally we should find ourselves in the ridiculous position of oondemning the Security Council itself and the Generàl Assembly, for Ml'. Hammarskjold has done nothing more than carry out their decisions and apply their policy. 64. If we review the action taken by the Secretary- General, we can see that he has acted with deUberation, energy and calm, and has interpreted our decisions faithfully, without a trace of surreptitious interests or any motive that is alien to his noble task. 65. Because of the circumstances, the mandate assigned to the Secretary-General by the Security Counci! was precise and limited and, in ourview, he has carried it out with integrity. and unbounded self-sacrifice and-devotion. 66. We understand the different reactions to what he has done, although we feel that there are no grounds for the violent criticism levelled by those who claim that the United Nations is not respecting the sovereignty of the Government or the authorities of the Congo. In this connexion the statement which we have Just heard from Ml'. Hammarskjold seems quite clear and irrefutable. 67. Now that we have once again to express our opinion of the Secretary-General, we have no hesitation in assuring him once more of our respect and support. 68. During the debate at the last session of the General Assembly, we had occasion to express our very strong opposition to the idea of replacing the 69. Now, when such dreadful and persistent attacks are being made on the Secretary-General and the action of hie Special Representative and the United Nations Force in the Congo, it must be apparent to aU that the Organization itself is the real victim of those furious and unwarranted attacks, and when we hear such unjust and ridiculous accusations as that of complicity in the crime of murdering several prominent political leaders of the Congo, we cannot but recall the Biblical injunction: ftJudge not, that ye be not judged. ft 70. Which delegationwas itthatpreventedthe Security Council. in December 1960 [920th meetingJ. from adopting a draft resolution which would have enabled the International Red Cross to help the political prisoners and the Organ1zation to enforce respect for human rights? But it is not our intention to make recriminations. We express our confidence in the Secretary-General and reaffirm our absolute and unconditional support for the noble purposes of the United Nations. We trust. hoping against hope, that the Organization will come out of this ordeal by fire with increased strength for the benefit of humanity in general and of the weak countries in particular. which find in it thetr best and most effective armour against injustice and adversity. 71. Both the Government and the people of Chile have followed with particular sympathy and deep concern the process of independence in the Republic of the Congo. Because of our own history. we are able to understand what tremendous efforts a new-born nation must make to achieve political stability and economic development. Every birth is painful. whether it is the birth of a child or of a people. but at the present historie juncture, the peoples that win their independence have the organized assistance of the international community. the help ofour Organization. the United Nations. Such assistance must be disinterested. that is to say. it has to ensure that the new nations do not come under foreign influence or pressure. 72. In our opinion, the United Nations efforts to help promote stability in the Congo must aim mainly at three things; the restoration of peace among -th~ warring factions and the elimination of violence; the reorganization of its military and police forces; the strengthenlng of its Government through efforts 00- wards conciliation. As can be seen. our views coincide with those expressed by the United States representative whomwe respect andwill be happy to support. 73. We are concerned and distressed by the tragedy in the Congo. We trust that ;7'e different factions now at odds will calm down an,': 'ind a way to becoming integral and harmonious parts of the whole; this is the only way to secure the necessary unity and to

I wish now to speak on behalf of the delegation of the UNITED KINGDOM. 76. 1 do not propose today to put forward the views of my delegation about the substance of the problem which confronts us in this debate. That I will do at a later stage. I w1sh to intervene only in order to comment upon the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union in the course of which he launched a savage personal attack upon the integrity and competence of our Secretary-General. We have just heard the amply sufficient and convincing reply which Ml'. Hammarskjold has made to these accusations. I suppose that very few of us can ever have heard a speech at this table of such hypocrisy as that of the representative of the Soviet Union. 77. When we adjourned our meeting on 13 February f933rd meeting] at the suggestionofthe representative of the United Arab Republic, we did so in order to allow time for further consideration of the situation in the Congo. We all recognized at that time that, foUowing the death of Ml'. Lumumba, the situation had become even more difficult and dangerous. Unfortunately, the illterval since 13 February has been employed-and deliberately employed-by the Soviet Government to transform the serious situation which confronted us last Monday into one of even wider and gl'av'er implications for international peace. The Soviet Government has itself made a statement which can only be interpreted as a major attempt to sabotage the United Nations itself, as weIl as to increase the probability of strife and disorder in the unfortunate country whose affairs we are supposed to be discussing. In fact, so far as the Congo is concerned, I can only describe the Soviet statement, now embodied in a Soviet draft resolution, as a recipe for a merciless civil war-a recipe, I may add, drawn up by experts. 78. The representative of the Soviet Union rose to impassioned heights of oratory in his contribution today to the myth of new colonialist plots in the Congo. But more than oratory will be needed to convince the Council to accept this version of events in ~he Congo. 79. Up to now, very little is known with certainty about the responsibility for the death ofMl'. Lumumba and his two coUeagues. While further investigations are in progress, it is quite unwarranted, as the representative of Chin.a explained, for the representative of the Soviet Union to make the accusations which he threw about with such abandon this morning. In so doing, moreover, he stl'ove to create the impression that the Soviet Union has a monopoly of conoern for the freedom and well-being of the peoples of Afrioa. Every other member of this Counci! is well aware that this is not true. I can speak only in the name of the United Kingdom Government, but it is surely oommon knowledge that all the Powers to whioh Ml'. Zorin habitually refers as "colonialists" have made, and are making, a positive contribution 80. 1 do not need to explain in detail or to emphasize my Government's continued supportfor the Secretary- General in the execution of his extremely difficult task. My Government profoundly regrets the irresponsible attacks made both upOn him personally, upon his office and, in effect, upon the Organization itself. For our part, we believe that any constructive solution for the affairs of the Congo must be built upon the efforts of the United Nations, directed so conscientiously by Mr. Hammarskjold, if it is ta assist that unhappy country forward on the path towards true independence and prosperity.

The representative of Belgium has asked for the floor in the exercise of the right of reply. 1 now invite him to the table for that purpose. 82. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) (translated from French): 1 thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity of replying, in particular to the attacks which have been levelled by the Soviet Union against my country. 83. The Belgian Government condemns political assassination in all its forms. It deplores the circ~stances in which the former Prime Minister of the Congo, Mr. Lumumba, met his death. It deplores the outbreak of violence which has culminated so many times already, and which has culminated yet again in the case of Mr. Lumumba and his fellow prisoners, in acts which are morally unjustifiable. 84. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium . stated yesterday in the House of Representatives: "It is not for the Belgian Government or anyof .its members ta pass judgement on the attitude or behaviour of Mr. LumUI'lba in his capacity as Head of the Government of a foreign country. However, the Government wishes it to be known that, in its eyes, nothing can justify the use of violence ta settle a political problem. It never constitutes a valid argument and it cannot lead to sound and positive results." 85. The assassination of Mr. Lumumba has provided an opportunity for hurling accusations as slanderous as they are gra,tuitous against Belgium and thE; Belgians who are apparently considered responsible for this inhuman act. A campaign to incite hatred and violence against my country has been launc.bed. This incttement has led ta acts of incendiarism which are almost without precedent in history. 86. The Belgian Embassy in Cairo was not only pillaged and sacked but destroyed and burnt to the ground,. without any action being taken to protect it by the forces responsible for the maintenance of law and order of the United Arab Republic. The Belgian ambassador and diplomatic staff were able ta take 87. In Belgrade, the Embassy of Belgium was sacked and pillaged. The whole of the first floor of the chancellery and the chancellery itselfwere destroyed. ûther 'diplomatie missions were subjected to similar acts of violence. 88. And yet, far from bearing any responsibility for the fatal consequences suffered by Mr. Lumumba and his fellow prisoners, the Belgian Government interceded on purely humanitariangrounds withthe Katanga authorities to ask that the prisoners be treated decently. As earlyas 24 January-and l ask you to note' the date-the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared, in his statement to the Senate, that he had not hesitated to urge that considerate treatment be given to a prisoner who "is now only a man unable to defend himse1f" . 89. In a statement to the House of Representatives on 14 February, the Minister for .African Affairs stated that he had sent a first telegramto the Consul- General of Belgiurn as soon as he had heard, through the Press agencies, of the transfer of Mr. Lumumba to Katanga. That telegram contained instructions to the effect that the Katanga authorit1es were to be informed that, in o1,1r view, it was essential to avoid any ill-treatment or act of violence directed against the prisoners. A few days later another message was sent to the Consul-General of Belgium at Elisabethville, which l shall take the liberty of reading out to the Counci1: "1 wish to emphasize, in the most urgent terms, that humane treatment be given to Lumumba, whose life must on no account be endangered. It is desirable that he be examined by a United Nations doctor." 90. Here indeedyou have a document that reveals the complicity of the Belgian Government in the murder of Mr. Lumumba. The Belgian Government insisted that none of its nationals should have anything to do with the treatment meted out to Mr. Lumumba. In his speech to the Senate on 24 January the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, referring to the transfer of Mr. Lumumba to Katanga, said"I solemnlyreaffirm that we have in 'no way been inv~lved in this affair, either directly or indirectly." 91. Meanwhile, instructions had been sent to the Consul-General at Elisabethvilleto informthe Katanga authorities of the wish of .the Belgian Government that none of its nationals should have anyassociation with Mr. Lumumba's guard. 92. The Mlnister for Foreign Affairs stated, on 26 January, that he had questioned his representative at Elisabethville to find oU'~ whether any Belgians had partlcipated in the transfer. The Consul-General replied categorically that none had done so, and that Mr. Lumumba's guard was the exclusive responsibility of the Katanga authorities. 95. On the other hand. while the Belgian ,qovernment deplores the circumstances in which Mr. Lumumba and his companions died. and however regrettable and unjustifiable their fate appears. it cannot pass over in silence the crimlnal treatment inflicted bythe authorities of the Ori~ntal and Kivu provinces, not only on foreigners but also on Congolese citizens themselves. 1 recall t..'le arbitrary arrest of several members of the provincial Government of Kivu province who were put to death after protracted torture; President Miruho, who was kept in a barrel full of water after his eyes had been gouged out. died in those conditions. The Belgian Government did not charge the Soviet Union. Communist China. the United Arab Republic or certain other countries whlch are nevertheless supplying military aid to the rebel authorlties of those provinces with the responsiblllty for his death. Just because the Soviet Union or other countries are. furnishing military aid to the régime of Ml'. Glzenga. we do not hold them responsible for this torture and these deaths. 96. Is it inconceivable to those countries that technical assistance can be given to the Government of Katanga by Belgium without our country being on that account associated with the murders commlttedthere: whether they oe the result of the action of the authorities or attributable to an accidental cause? 97. The true nature of the charges levelled against my country is illustrated by the curious attitude adopted by the accusers towards violations of human rights in the regions controlled by Mr. Glzenga and Mr. Kashamura. Those who. in thefaceofall evidence to the contrary, do not hesitate to accuse Belgium of complicity and even participation in the murder ofthe former Congolese Prime Minister do not have a single word to say about the many blatant acts of brutality commltted in the' north-eastern part of the Congo. This is a remarkable illustration of their objectivity and real devotion to the cause of human rights and of the value ta be attached to their accusations. 98. The Belgian Government considers that international peace and security.would be seriouslyjeopardized if the present situation in the Republic of the Congo were ta continue. In two provinces. rebel bands have risen up in open revolt against the President of the Republic. the only legal head of the armY. Not only are they thus endangering the unity and integrity of the territory, but they are perpetuating the reign of insecurity for the people of the Congo and· the foreigners who are residing there. Pillaglng, illtreatment, arbitrary arrests, brutality and atrocities. even murder. are the order of the day, while the United Nations forces are unable to stop themor even to take effective counter-action. 100. fu any event, the non-Congolese population. as weIl as the Congolese population of Oriental and Kivu' provinces have suffered innumerable brutalities. The Belgian Government has a voluminQus record of the abject treatment meted out to !ts nationals every day. The actual facts have, moreover. been set forth in documents drawn up by the United Nations. 1 shall mention ooly a few typical cases that have occurred in Oriental and Kivu provinces wbich will enable the members of the Council ta realizewhatanatmosphere of tyranny and terrorism prevails in those regions. 101. On 2 January 1961. at about 4.30 p.m., the General Director of a large mining firm was attacked in bis office at Bukavu. He was kicked. beaten with rifle-butts and stripped of some of bis clothing and of all bis personal belongings. The blows fractured his nose and caused a serious haemorrhage. He had a slight heart attack• .tIe was examined inthe morning of 3 January by Doctor Coene at the Bukavu hospital, but the military authorities refused to let him go iI}.to hospital and he was kept in prison until 8 0'clock in the evening. fu view of the serious nature of the injuries he receiveà, the consequences of the treatment he ~derwent are likely to he serious. 102. On 19 January 1961. at stanleyville, a farewell party given by a group of Belgians for a company director leaving for Belgium was the scene of the arrest of tbirty-four persons who were taken to Kétélé camp. They were beaten and then forced to run the gauntlet between two Unes of soldiers. receiving further blows from rifle-butts and clubs. On the following day. 2Q..-January, a United Nations detachment which ha,lf'come to hold a parley on the subject of the prisoners. was met by soldiers carrying machine-guns and withdrew without accomplishing its mission. Twelve prisoners were released after a ransom equivalent to $10.000 been demanded and paid. AlI the released prisoners had been maltreated and two of them were in a serious condition. 103. The day after those incidents the. Stanleyville newspaper Huhuru published the text of a telegram sent to King Baudouin by the District Commissioner, threatening that thousands of Belgians would be killed . if Mr. Lumumba disappeared. These threats increased the nervousness of the Europeans even further and induced Cl great nùmber of people to place themselves under United Nations protection and to ask to be evacuated. This serious maltreatment causedthe death of the victims in several cases. Mr. Emmanuel De Vinc~. a settIer at Rutshuru. died in hospital at . Kisenyi where he waS taken after being struek on the head with a machete as he was getting out of his lorry. Unidentified bodies of Belgians VIere brought to Goma. Other cases of murder 'Y~.re reported. 104. One of the most iniquitous regulations has recently been introduced by the authorities who have usurped power in Oriental province. AlI male Belgl.an nationals over twenty-one are compelled ta pay a so-called special tax of 30,000 francs, or $600. per 105. 1 have been instructed to lay particular stress once again on the fate of a platoon of eight Belgian soldiers. including a sergeant and a corporal. which crossed the Congolese frontier by mistake in a lorry which hecame separated in the night from a motorized column in the Territory of Ruanda and got lost. It was captured without resistance. The circumstancesofthe case are clear and undisputed. likewise theil' political status. If those men are prisoners of war, they should he protected by the Geneva Conventions. But they are not prisoners of war sinceno stateofwar exists. They are men who lost their way and who should be returned without delay. That is why the BelglanGovernment is making every effort to secure their release. It is pressing the case literally every day. It seems to it incredible that there have been no results from the Ulùted Nations side. Not only have these men not been released. but it is not even known for certain whether they are being properly treated. It was through other sources. and ln particular through the Consul-General of a friendly power. that Belgiumwas first able to obtain news of them. 1 ask whether it is tolerable that. in a town where there is a United Nations garrison. eight men who are innocent beyond any shadow of doubt should remain iii prison contrary to all rules of international law. without receiving any moral or material reassurance from our 01'- ganization. What is to hecome of the Organization's prestige if it cannot even enforce respectforthe most elenlentary rules of law in a place where it is present in force? The Belgian Government formally requests the Secretary-General to ensure that these abuses be stopped and that the forces at his disposaI intervene without delay to enforce respect for the Ideal of our Organization, international law and morality. 106. If the United Nations in the Congo were to remain inactive in the face of these machinations. our Organization, which is expressly charged with ensurlng respect for fundamental freedoms, would he admitting its impotence to the world at large. The Belgian Government considers that. for the sake of Us good name. it is incumbent upon our Organization to take a stand against these odious measures and ta ensure that foreigners wishing to leave the Territory. for instance, or who are compelled to do SOt are able to leave without let or hindrance. 107. The powerlessness of the United Nations in the Congo in the face of this situation may lead to very serious consequences not only for the Congo. but for the United Nations and for peace. If, on acco~mt of 'such maltreatment and in view of the absence of any protection, these foreigners were compelled ta leave the territary, economic chaos would he added ta political instabUity and· United Nations actionwouldthen become completely impossible. The process has already begun: the closing-down of business. the loss of wages, poverty and hunger threaten whole populations. 1 will spare the Counci! by not enumerating the large com- 108. The state of insecurity and terrorism is such that the Belgian Government has had to urge its nationals to leave Oriental and Kivu provinces since the United Nations was not able to ensure theil' protection. despite the numerous representations 1was instructed by my Goyernment to make to the Secretary- General. for instanoe on 24, 25, and 30 January and 11 February last. 109. The Belgian Government is not askingfor intervention in the domestic political affairs of the Congo; all it asks is that foreigners who are law-abiding and useful to the country should be protected. 1 would stress that these foreigners stay corepletely aloof from politics and do not interfere with life in the Congo. That truth is so self-evident that the Stanleyville and Bukavu authorities, who do not wish to lose their economic collaboration. refuse to grant them passports. 110. This terrorism and anarchywillnodoubtrejoioe the hearts of those who seek only to extend their imperialism by taking advantage of the misery of the Congolese people. Therein lies the problem which the United Nations and all those who wish to help the Republio of the Congo to oonsolidate its independenoe have the strict and urgent dutY to solve at any priee and by any means. 111. Do not come and accuse these foreigners of political manœuvres or try to justify inaction by quoting the desire to avoid interference in domestic affairs. 1 have already explained why. Feal' of intervention in domestic affairs cannot be a justification for the inaction of the United Nations which. like its contingents. has the fundamental dutY of ensuring the rudimentary conditions of civilized life in the Congo and of enforcing respect for the vital rights of foreigners. Belgium, for its part, has the strict right and obligation to demand that its nationals, like all foreigners in fact. should enjoy the active protection of the United Nations forces in the Congo. 112. In conclusion, 1 should like to ask that none of my remarks be construed as supporting in any way the scandalous attacks made by the representative of the Soviet Union this morning on the actions of the Secretary-General of our Organization and on Ml'. Hammarskjold personally. 113. The PRESIDENTi Although the hour is late. the representative of Morocco has asked to be heard for a few moments and. unless there is an objeotion. 1 propose to ask him to the table for that purpose. 114. Ml'. BEN ABOUD (Morocco) (translated f:::'Om French): 1 wish to make a very brief statement on behalf of the representatives of the States which took part in the Casablanca Conference and also of the Yugoslav delegation which has asked me to speak for it. My statement refers to the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and bis two companions. 115. Amid the colonialist intrigues. which the supporters of African liberty have constantly denounced. our respective delegations always feared that crimes 115. oesse nos 116. Today the worst has happened and their attitude has been justified. This premeditated crime unmasks the criminals. Responsibility in the matter is now clearly determined. We have nottheslightestintention of making or of listening to funeral orations. It is even· possible that those who support the exploitation of man by man may be heard in the international forum shedding their crocodile tears. Our own dutY, in the interest of African solidarity, is to continue struggling for the solution of the great African problem of today: the problem of unity and equality. 117. The crime, instead of simplifying the problem, as those who committed it may think, has on the . contrary had the effect of radically changing the situation. True African. nationalism is henceforth pledged to combat neo-colonialism and its puppets. And it Is destined to win the battle. 118. The new circumstances compel us te review the situation and we therefore reserve the right te speak again after the necessary discussion on the premeditated plan of the colonialists and their henchmen. 119. We merely wish to take advantage oÎ this op~ portunity in order ta express to the people of the Congo, to Mr. Lumumba's comrades-in-arms and his famUy our most sincere èondolences and our deepest sympathy. 120. AUve, Patrice Lumumba personified the ideal of his people; now that he is dead, he offers the finest example of sacrifice: his unshakable tenacity and his devotion to his. mission which we ahall all defend will .guide aIl of us. 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