S/PV.947 Security Council

On behalf ofthe Security COUDcil and myself, personally, 1 wish to express our thanks to the retiring President, Ml'. Stevenson, the representative of the United states of America. Under his able guidance we discussed a very important item in the month of March. His patience and tolerance were manifest in the manner in which he conducted the proceedings during a fairly sharp debate. Ml'. Stevenson, with his high statesmanship and libéral traditions will no doubt contribute in large measure to the work of this Counci! and the United Nations as a whole. 1 regret that, owing to unavoidable circumstances, he is not here today. 2. Succeeding such an experienced personality, 1 am only too well aware of my own limitations. With the co-operation of the learned and experienced representatives round this table, and with the assistance of the hard-working mem'bers of the Secretariat, 1 hope 1 shaU be a,ble to maintain the lofty traditions of this high office. 3. Ml'. PLIMPTON (United States of America): Ml'. Stevenson regrets very much that he cann6t be here this morning. He will regret it even more when he hears the very kind things that the President of the Security Council has been good enough to say about him. 1 am his agent and attorney in fact, and, on his behalf, 1 express to you and to aU of his colleagues here his very deep appreciation of the courtesy, cooperation and unfailing kindness which the members of the Security Counci! showed to him throughout the month in which he was President ofthe Council. 1 suspect that he will be looking forward with pleasure, if The Palestine question Letter dated 1 Apri11961 from the permanent representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan addressed to the President of the Secarity Council (S/4n7) 4. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): 1 thank the President and the members of the Seourity Council for allowing me to take a seat at this table in order to present the com- plaint of my Government against Israel. 5. My country has in the past appeared before this Counoil, never as an accused but always as a. com- plainant. Several times we have come here to submit our complaints against aggression by Israel and to seek the Council' s just and firm pronouncements. Several times we have placed before you, for your considera- tion, violations' by Israel, and several times this Council has heard us and heeded our appeals. 6. Today my delegation comes again to put before you a new violation of the General Armistice Agree- ment by Israel. 7. 1 shall try to keep my statement within the scope of this complaint and shall not at any length revert to the past record of violations by Israel, no matter how tragic and sinful that record may be. Unless 1 am led by the course of the debate to expose the horrors of the past and am compelled to take up the chall.enge, 1 shall confine myself to the merits ofthe present case. 8. Similarly, 1 trust that aIl the members round this table will appreciate the significance of our case within its owndimensions. We are submitting a specific complaint for which we seek a specific decision. 9. On 7 March 1961, the Sub-Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission met in Jerusalem to consider a report submitted by Major Boschi of the United Nations observation team to the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The report stated that on 20 April 1961 an Israel military parade would take place in Jerusalem, the Holy City, on the ocoasion of what Israel calls "Independence Day", and that armoured vehicles and tanks and artil- lery of all kinds would take part. The report added that the troops and equipment would begin to assemble in the city of Jerusalem during the week preceding 20 April 1961. 10. The representative of Jordan who attended the meeting of the Sub-Committee stated that he reserved the right of his. Government to' take any action he feIt neoessary within the terms of the General Armistioe Agreement. 14. Owing to this, the GovernmentofJordanrequested an immediate investigation and an emergency meeting to discuss this complaint. 15. Upon Jordan' s request, the investigation was started on the morning of 18 March and was completed by 12.30 p.m. on the same day. On the basis of this investigation the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission caUed for an emergency meeting of the Commission. However, the representative of Israel asked the Chairman why he had agreed to caU an emergency meeting. The Chairman replied that itwas because the complaint referred to the application of military provisions of the Armistice Agreement, and because there was divergence of opinion between the parties in evaluating the seriousness of the situation. The Chairman also stated that the Commission was the proper place to discuss the matter. 16. At its meeting on 20 March, the Jo:J;'dan:-Israel Mixed Armistice· Commission, in the presence of the representative of Israel, adopted thefoUowingdecision which was circulated to the members of the Security Counci! in document S/4776, dated 31 March 1961: liThe Mixed Armistice Commission, "Having discussed Jordan complaint No. G. 104 and the investigation report concerning this com- plaint made by the United Nations Military Ob- servers, finds: "1. That on the morning of 17 March 1961 heavy military armament in excess of that aUowed for in the General Armistice Agreement between the Hashemit.e Kingdom of Jordan and Israel, such as a Centurion tank, 105 and 155 artillery gun~,Sherman tanks, were on the Israel side of the Demarcation Line in Jerusalem (Holy City); "2. This act by Israel is a breach of the General Armistice Agreement; 18. As to the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement which define the forces allowed for each party to maintain on each side of the armistice line, àrticle VII, paragraph l, reads as follows: "1. The Military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shaH be limited to defensive forces only în the areas' extending ten kilo~netres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this im- practical ••• "y 19. In explaining the "defensive forces", annex il to the Armistice Agreement gives exactdefinitions of the type and calibre of the weapons and equipment and the size of forces which are to be allowed for each party. Under this category a very limited number of very 11ght weapons and equipment is permissible. Sectionil of the sarne annex defines such light weapons allowed for each party in the Jerusalem sector as weIl as in other sectors. In section l, paragraph 2 (!!> of the same annex definitions are given to what is excluded from the term "defensive forces". This category prohibits, among other equipment: "Armour, such as tanks of aIl types, armoured cars, Bren gun carriers, half-tracks, armoured vehicles or load carriers, or any other armoured vehicles." 20. Having presented the facts of the case, Iwish now to stress the following points. 21. First, any heavy armament of any kind, for any purpose and under any conditions, is not allowed to enter the sector of Jerusalem, in accordance with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. Therefore, no matter how the authorities ofIsrael may try to explain the purpose of their act in bringing heavy armament to the city of Jerusalem, their al- legations cannot change the fact that they are vio- lating the terms of the General Armistice Agreement. 22. Secondly, theviews and arguments of Israel con- cerning the contemplated parade have been put before the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Chief of Stàff and have been rejected. 23. Thirdly, the Mixed Armistice Commission, which is the appropriate body' authorized by the Security 24. It clearly appears that any attempt at finding means to aUow the entryofIsrael heavy armament into Jerusalem under the pretext of taking precautionary measures for ensuringthe so-caUedpeacefulpurposes of the parade or for removing any doubts or appre- hensions is anattemptwhich, basicaUyandprincipaUy, is rejected because this action is a violation of the terms of the Armistice Agreement and is a direct contradiction of the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 25. The Security Council, therefore, in assuming its responsibilities towards international peace and se- curity and in preserving the authority, dignity and prestige of the United Nations, should undoubtediy respect the dictates of the General Armil3tice Agree- ment signed by Jordan and Israel under U~ùtedNations chairmanship for the impiementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 (S/1080], and should certainly honour the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission, Any deviationfrom this course of action will be viewed by my Government as being inspired by other considerations. 26, AUow me to add that it would be tao serious and tao dangerous ta underestimate the present situation on the Armistice Demarcation Line on the assumption that there is temporary quiet. The fire has not turned to ashes, Let us notexpose the gunpowderto the flame, Let the United Nations, and partivularly this principal organ charged with the cardinal task of maintaining peace and security, avert the pl)ssibility of war by preventing its causes. 27. After aU, why should Israel choose Jerusalem as the site for its military parade? Why sMuId it choose the Holy City, the divided city, the cityon the Armistice Demarcation Line, the city which, even under the resolutions of the United Nations and the partition scheme of 1947 [General Assembly resolution 181 A and B (II)] does not faU withintheusurped Arab terri- tory of Palestine whichwasgivenbytheUnited Nations to the Israelis to establish aState against aU principles of right and justice? Is this not a political asweU as an ethical defiance on the part of Israel? J erusalem and the road on which the Israel tanks and armament are driven from the coastal plain of Palestine to Jerusalem do not belong under any law, resolution or privilege to Israel. 28. Jerusaler,ll, the city of peace andpiety, sacrej to Christianity, Islam and Judaism, the place of burial of J'esus Chri:i3t and of the ascension of the prophet Mohamm~d, thatcity is partly converted by the Israel authorities into a field for displaying Israel heavy armament and war equipment. Whatanutterdisregard for the holiness of the city when tanks and military vehicles roar on the Israel side as an echo to the bells 29. FoUowing the condemnation ofIsrael bythe Mixed Armistice Commission, the authorities of Israel de- clared their determination to proceed with theirplans to hold the military parade in Jerusalem on 20 April in spite and in defiance of the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 30. The Jewish Chronicle of Londonwrote the foUow- ing on 24 March 1961, under the heading "United Nations condemns Israel": "An Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Israel is taking note of this resolution-but the military parade will he held in Jerusalem on April 20 ... " 31. The Israel broadcasting station in Jerusalem made the following announcement in English on 28 March 1961: "The main military parade on Independence Day (April 20) will be held in Jerusalem and will feature over 300 pieces of ordnance, including Centurion tanks, modern self-propelled guns, recoilless guns, and a unit of SS-10 anti-tank guided missiles. The defence forces weekly Bamahane, which reported this on March 28, also disclosed for the first time details of a new 105 mm. self-propelled howitzer- it is niounted on the chassis of anAmerican medium tank. It is used as a standard artilleryweapon in the armoured divisions of the U.S. Army and in several British divisions. It has a seven-man crew and can travel at a speed of 42 kilometres an hourD Other pieces of ordnance which will be shown in the In- dependence Day parade will include Sherman tanks, AMX light tanks and artillery prime mover units. The foot column of the parade will number 4,000 soldiers representing the three major arms of the services and the military colleges." 32. The Israel newspaper, TheJerusalem Post, wrote the foUowin.g on 29 March 1961: "As one enters the War Room of the Jerusalem Military District, one is faced with tpe entire layout of the parade, worked out on huge maps down to the last detail ••• The huge 50-ton British-made Centu- rions will be part of the motorized column •••which will also include 18 Shermans, 26 AMX' s, auxiliary engineering tanks,. motorized infantry, heavy and light artillery-including the French S.S10 guided anti-tank missiles and the American 106 mm. jeep- mounted recoilless guns •.•" 33. 1 can hardly memorize the verses of the Holy Bible. But among the golden verses which 1 recaU is that which reads: "For by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." 35. My Government, therefore, appears before tbis Council today ta request the adoption of a decision which will endorse and affirm the decision ofthe Mixed Armistice Commission of 20 March1961. Wehopethat such a decision will be taken unanimously. 36. Ml'. LOURIE (Israel): The Security Council has for the past thirteen years on numerous occasions had on its agenda matters arising from Israel' s relations with the neighbouring Arab countries. 1 dq not ",ish to enter into the glancing reference made at the beginning of .the statement by the representative of Jordan re- garding responsibility for episodes which have come before this Council, save to say that the Council will remember that it was the initial assault of the Arab countries on the new-born State ofIsraelin 1948 which b:cought about the basic problem in our relations. The fact is that at the basis of the continuing düficulties which have unhappily existed over the years has been the refusaI of the Arab countries, contrary ta their obligations under the Charter, to the resolutionsofthe United Nations, and the General Armistice Agree- ments, ta make peace with Israel. 37. It has nevertheless presumably been a source of gratüication to the Council that for more than two yeare past the Council has been meloifully relieved of having to concern itself with an Arab-Israel issue. 38. It is the more regrettable that at a time when the world Organization is confronted in other areas with grave issues, the Security Council should be required to devote time and attention ta a minor matter of a technical character, which in no sense involves a threat to international peace and security and which should never have been brought before this body. 39. The alleged justüication for seekingthe interven- tion of the Security Council in this matter is the claim contained in the lastparagraphofJordan' s explanatory memorandum [S/4777] thatwe are confrontedherewith a threat to international peace and security. That term-"threat to international peace and se~urity'~ -is a very serious and far-reaching one and not lightly ta be invoked. 40. Now in the case before us, what is the actual nature of that threat ta international peace about which the Government of Jordan is apparentlysodeeplycon- cerned? On a day and at a time communicated many weeks in advance ta the Jordan authorities and ta the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, mili- tary equipment without ammunition is to pass informaI parade through the streets of Jerusalem on a route stipulated l'l''' made known ahead of time. This parade will move 1-J "lder the watchful eyez of United Nations observers .:>.-.d no doubt. of numerous foreign cor- respondents and visitors. AlI this equipment, having passed briefly in review, is ta be removed in a matter of hours. Is it seriously suggested that this is a threat 42. The artificiality of this complaint is borne out by a brief examination of the background. For this is neither the first occasion nor has Israel been alone in bringing into the Jerusalem area for ceremonial pur- poses equipment outside the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. Such instances go back some years and in the course of that time both Israel and Jordan have, in connexion with some special celebra- tion, conducted military parades on either side of the line in J erusalem. 43. Ever since Israel achieved her independence in the spring of 1948, her people have celebrated tha~ anniversary date with a military parade in one cf her main cities. There is, of course, nothingunique in this practice, which is a cherished tradition inmanycoun- tries all over the world. InIsrael' s case, the people of Israel regard their army, which is a citizen army i.n the fullest sense of theword, notonlywith pride but fiS the guardian of their security and freedom. It is on this one day in the year that the people of Israel, in a mood of celebration and thankfulness, have the opportunity of viewing and identifying themselve~.withthis defense army. 44. The last occasion when an Independence Day parade was held in Jerusalem was in 1958 in celebra- tion of Israel' s tenth anniversary. In the intervening period since that parade Jordan, too, heLl :J.numberof parades of its own in its sector of the city. This fact, together with our 1958 experience, obviously has a direct relevance to today' s situation. InformaI notice of the planned parade was given to the Jordanilms on 1 March 1961 and again on 6 March, that is to say, neady two months in advance of the actual date. On 7 March, at a meeting of aSub-Committeeofthe Israel- Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, the Israel representative officially notified the representative of Jordan of the plans for the parade. The latter took note of the statement and reserved Jordan' s position in the matter. It was not until 17 March, after a brief re- hearsal of the arrangements, thatJordanprotestedthe whole plan and brought its complaint before the Mixed Armistice Commission. 45. It is necessary at this point, for purposes of comparison, to go back to what happened in 1958. In brief, once it had been clearly established that what was planned was purely ceremonial in vharacter, a way " •.• the stated purpose of Israel, in bringing pro- hibited equipment into the Jerusalem area, is to have such equipment in a military parade, in which the troops, tanks and guns, are without ammunition. There is no reason to doubt that this represents the intention of the Israel authorities." He went on to declare that in the prevailing situation the main preoccupation of the Truce Supervision 01'- ganization must be to co-operate with the parties with a view to preventing incidents and to secure as soon as possible, after what he described as a "formaI breach", the re-establishment of compliance by both sides with the General Armistice Agreement. 47. Among the measures agreed upon on the recom- mendation of tl).e United Nations Chief of Staff at that time for minimizing the risk of incidents was the posting of United Nations observers in Jerusalem to note the course and character of this parade. The armoured vehicles brought to Jerusalem, as l have already indicated, were brought without ammunition. The attitude then taken by the Chairman was in fact a very practical and sensible one, whichplaced.thewhole matter in proper perspective. The parade took place without incident and the equipment brought for the oc- casion was withdrawn forthwith. 48. In this connexion there is one point on which l do not propose to dwell at a meetingofthe Security Coun- cil, which is a political rather than a legal body. But l would suggest that it is open to serious doubt whether the ceremonial parading of military equipmentwithout ammunition, and thus incapable of military use, con- stitutes even a "formaI breach" of annex II to the General Armistice Agreement. 49. Each of the arrangements made in 1958 is ac- ceptable to us today. Nor do weexcludethe possibility of additional assurances to Jordan of the peaceful character of the occassion, if such are really required. 50. In the meantime, the Government of Jordanitself has since 1958 proceeded at different times to arrange ceremonial parades of its own within the Jordanian sector of ,Jerusalem, in which connexion they too brought into the Jerusalem area military.equipment and airerait in excess of that allowed for under annex II to the General Armistice Agreement. This has happened not once but on no less than four occasions since the beginning of 1960. 51. Thus on 21 January1960, armoured vehicleswere brought into the Jerusalem areabythe Jordan Govern- ment to celebrate the festival of that date. On 29 January 1960, armour and jet aircraft were brought into the J erusalem area in honour of the visit to the 52. There is a well-knownprincipleoflawthathe who seeks equity must come into court with clean hands. In the light of what I have just stated, the Jordanian action, in seeking ta press a complaint under annex II ta the General Armistice Agreement against our doing the very thing which they have repeatedly done, is an exercise which I would suggest deserves no encourage- ment. I should add that by contrast with sorne of these Jordanian ceremonies we, for our part, have decided, in view of the proximity of the border, ta eliminate from oùr parade the traditional air display. 53. The facts on this occasion, as I have already sug- gested, are indeed no different from those in 1958. By a practical and common sense approach on that oc- casion the matterwas in the end satisfactorilydisposed of. 54. The finding of the Mixed Armistice Commission naturally has a strong persuasive influence on the Security.Council. But I would suggest to the Council that the precedent to be followed and upheld is that of 1958, when the Chairman found a way of resolving the problem without turning it into a major issue. At the very least the matter should be sent back for further consideration with a view to finding a proper solution, taking into account all the circumstances. 55. If the Council really wishes to concern itselfwith the functioning of the Israel-Jordan ArmistIce Agree- ment, there are more far-reaching issues than that now raised. I do not, however, propose to enter at this stage into any detailed analysis of the Armistice Agree- ment as a whole, though I reserve our right to do so should the further course of the discussion require it. There are fundamental clausesofthe Agreementwhich have been flouted and defied by Jordai1 from the very time the Agreement was signed until today, and on which the United Nations has been unable to secure compliance. 56. Non-compliance with basic clauses ofthe Armis- tice Agreement drains the whole Agreement of its real substance. Thus, article I of the Agreement, for ex- ample, emphasizes that the armistice was "an in- dispensable step toward the liquidation of armed con- flict and the restoration of peace." It is saie to say that at the time of the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement it was never for a moment envisaged that the relations between Israel and Jordan should be governed for a prolonged and, indeed, indefinite period now extending to more than twelve years bythe terms of that Agreement. Unfortunately, every effort on Israel' spart to secure Implementation of article l and to attain a peace settlement has met with obstinate refusaI on the part of the Government of Jordan. Had there been compliance, many problems big and small, including matters such as that now before the Council, would have found their solution within the framework 58. l draw the particulaI' attention of the members of the Council to the fact that as far back as 1950 the Security Counoil expressed its hope in its resolution of 17 November 1950'J./ that the Special Committee charged under the Armistice Agreement with the implementation of article VIII "will proceed expedi- tiously to carry out the functions" assigned to it. The refusaI of Jordan to comply with this article has been a source of oonstant friction and tension and would indeed be a far more worthy subject than the present for the attention of the Council. 59. There is a further clause in the ArmisticeAgree- ment which is of direct relevance to the matter at present under discussion, to which l wish very briefly to draw the attention of the Council. Under article XII, paragraph 3 of the Armistice Agreement, the parties to the Agreement may by mutual consent re- vise its provisions. The article goes on to say that: " •.• In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either ofthe parties may caU upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two parties for the purpose of reviewing, revisingor sus- pending any of the provisions ofthis Agreement other than articles l and III" (those being the articles that deal with the termination of aU armed hostilities, and the attainment of peace). "Participation in such conference shaU be obUgatory upon the parties." 60. The necessity for such a clause is obvious. Life does not stand still. Circumstances change and with changing circumstances there may be need for re- vision. On 23 Novembel' 1933, the Government of Israel, in pursuance of this article, did in fact caU upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference for the purpose of reviewingthe ArmiBtice Agreement.v Despite the unequivocalobli- gation imposed upon the Government of Jordan bythis article, the latter informed the Secretal'y-General of theil' refusaI to participate in such a conference. 61. On the one hand the Jordanians refuse implemen- tation of the essential clauses orthe Armistice Agree- ment. On the other they come to the Council on matters of no real significance. If the Jordanians, indisregard of their obligations, are not prepared ta sit down and ~Ilbid•• Fifth Year,SupplementforSeptemberthroughDecember 1950, document S/1907. fi Ibid.. Eightb Year, Supplement for October, November andDecem- ~ document 5/3140. 62. Within the last years there has happily been, as already stated, a relaxation of tension and hostile activity on our borders. If we have not co:ne to the Council, as we could have come to press and press again for Jordanian compliance with its duties under the agreement, it is because we prefer notto precipi- tate debateswhich are unlikely to improve the situation. But this restraint cannot be a one-wayoperstion. As to the present Jordanian complaint, it surely must be clear to the Council that the matter should be dealt with, as it was on a previous occasion, by the parties on the spot. To inflate the trivial and denigrate the important is not only pOOl' logic; it can be very bad politics. 63. Ml'. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (translated from French): In my brief statement this morning l shall merely make certain comments on the question which is before us today. 64. l have listened with attention to the statement by the representative of Jordan, who has given us a bril- liant explanation of the oomplaint which he has sub- mitted to the Council against Israel and which was today placed on our agenda. 65. This complaint is very simple and clear. It is limited in its scope, for it is based on a decision adopted dn 20 March 1961 by the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armi,stice Commission. The facts of the case can be summarized in a few words: on 17 March 1961, the Israel authorities organized a military parade in Jerusalem with heavy military armaments. in con- travention of the provisions of the Armistice Agree- ment to which reference has already beeu made. The Jordanian Government, acting in conformity with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and more particularly article XI. brought the case before the Mixed Armistice Commission established to supervise the execution of the Armistice Agreement. The Mixed Armistice Commissionhad an investigation carriedout by United Nations military observers and, onthe basis of the conclusions reached by them, adopted on 20 March 1961, the decision whose text is reproduced in document 8/4776. 66. One can read in this decision that on the morning of 17 March, heavy military armament in excess of that allowed for in the General Armistice Agreement ap- peared on the Israel side of the Demarcation Line in Jerusalem, Holy City. That was the precise finding of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 67. l should like to open a parenthesis at this juncture and put on record that even in the Holy City the Armistice Agreement is not observed by Israel. As you know, the Holy City has a special status which should have' induced Israel to adopt a different attitude. This status does not entitle Israel to any rights in the Holy City, which must retain its special character in the interests of its history and traditions. 68. The Commission went on to find that the act by Israel was a breach of the General Armistice Agree- 69. Despite this decision, which cannot be criticized for lack of clarity, the Israel authorities have made known their intention to hold a military parade on 20 April 1961. 70. Faced withthis aet ofprovocation andwith Israel' s contempt for the Mixed Armistice Commission' s de- cision dated 20 March 1961 in which Israel had been requested to refrain in the future "from bringing to Jerusalem any equipment in excess of thatallowedfor under the terms ofthe GeneralArmisticeAgreement" , Jordan had no option but to turnto the ~ecurity Council of which the Mixed Armistice Commission is a sub- sidiary organ. 71. Jordan's sole request at the ~resent time is that the Security Council should endorse the decision adopted on 20 March 1961 by the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. This request is fully justified since the Mixed Armistice Commission' s dBcisionwas taken under the terms ofthe GeneralArmistice Agree- ment, article VII of which provides that: "1•. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shaH be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines." 72. Furthermore, under annex n to the Agreement, the term "defensive forces" excludes ~rmour,suchas tanks of aU types, armoured vehicles or load-carriers or any other armoured vehicles. 73. In the Security Council wishes to see peace and security prevail in that part of the world, it cannot withhold its condemnation of flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement; for violations of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement may always have danger- ous repercussions liable to imperil international peace and security. 74. Israel' s letter [S/4778] and the statement by the Israel representative at this meeting of the Security Council have not, in our view, introduced any new factor and should only serve to convincethe Council of the need to give' serious consideration to Jordan' s complaint. This letter which tries to justify Israel's action is in fact, in our view, tantamount to refusaI by Israel to comply with the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion',13 decision which 1 have just quoted. 75. Both in its letter and in the statement made here Israel refers to similar cases which are said to have Occurred in the past but which were not condemned by the mixed Armistice Commission. May 1 point out in this connexion that today we are dealing with concrete facts which have been the subject of a.n investigation and condemnation by the Mixed Armistice Commission and that, consequently, past occurrences do not enter into our debate today. 77, 1 should like to point out in this connexion that these aHegations by Israel were never investigated and that the Mixed Armistice Commission did nottake any decision in the matter; the result is that we have no information on the validity of these claims which, in any case, are not the subjectofthe complaint under consideration today. 78. Lastly, Israel claims to have no intention other than to undertake a peaceful celebration of a national Israel holiday and states that it has conveyed as- surances regarding this purely ceremonial character. We are ofthe opinionthatthis constitutes an attempt by Israel to justifyandexplainaviolationofthe Armistice Agreement, This Agreement-as can be seen from its terms-provides for no exception which Israel could invoke as an excuse for sending its troops and heavy military equipment. If aH Partieswere to seek excuses for violating the Armistice Agreement, thefinal result would be the law of the jungle inthat part of the world. 79. As always; the Israel representative has tried in his statement to obscure the facts relating to the case under consideration by embarking on a discussion of other aspects of the Palestine problem. 1 shaH not follow in bis footsteps, because the issue before us today is weH defined, precise and clear. 80. There can be no question of the Security Council abetting such a flagrarit violation of the Armistice Agreement and remaining inactive. Israel' s policy towards these agreements is, in anycase. weHknown. In some instances it claims that they are no longer in force and in others it constantly violates them. This is again true of the case withwhichwe are faced right now. 81. 1 think that in the matter with which we are now concerned the Security ClJuncil should simplyendorse the decision adopted by the MixedArmistice Commis- sion, which is a subsidiary organ of this Council.-AH the decisions of this Commission which are not ob- served can and. 1 feel. must be brought before the Security Council. 82. This violation of the Armistice Agreement. which Israel would like to minimize" should not be taken lightly. It is necessary to look at this question seriously. bearing in mind Israel's past behaviour in the matter of respect for the Armistice Agreements. There" is no need to recall the numerous occasions on which the Council had to condemn Israel for flagrant and repeated violations of the Armistice Agreements. violations which often hadthe character of premedi- tated acts of armed aggression. The iast violation, which was condemned on 20 March 1961, is also of great importance because, despite the condemnation, Israel wishes to repeat the military parade and again send its troops to Jerusalem. intotheHolyCity, heed- less of the Armistice Commission' s decision.

We have listened to the statements by the representatives ofJordan, Israel and the United Arab Repu1?lic. 85. The question submitted to the Council by thé Jordanian Government should, in our view, be considered primarily from the standpoint ofthe strengthening of peace and the elimination of allfactors likely to aggravate the situation and lead to a breach of the peace. 86. Today's statements, andthe information available to the COUIlcil members in the documents which have been circulated to them, paint a sufficiently clear picture of the true facts of the case. The facts show that there has been a violationoftheArmistice Agreement. Strictly speaking, this has not beendenied by the Israel representative; nor could he deny it, since these facts had been established by the Mixed Armistice Commission, as shown by its definite decision, the text of which has likewise been circulated to members of the Council. This decision contains the perfectlyclear statement that the act consisting in the dispatch of heavy armament to this area, the City of Jerusalem, is a breach of the General Armistice Agreement by Israel. 87. Nor was this aIl, since the :\\{ixed Armistice Commission censured Israel and calledupon the Israel authorities to take the strongest measures to prevent the recurrence of such a breach of the General Armistice Agreement and to refrain inthe future from bringing to Jerusalem'any equipment in excess ofthat allowed for under the terms of the General Armistice Agreement. 88. The Mixed Armistice Commission having found that a breach of the General Armistice Agreementdid take place, and having called upon one Government to refrain in the Ïl1ture from viotating this Agreement, what kind of answer ought to have been made by the Government specified in the Mixed Armistice Commission' s decision? To this question therewould seem to me to be out one possible reply. The Government concerned should have. declared that it undertook to comply with the Armistice Agreement and would not violate it in the future. But what does the Israel Government in fact do? 89. We have heard the statement made here by the Israel representative, and have read the letter circulated by the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel ta the United Nations. Neither the statement made today, nor the letter in question, contains such a declaration by the Israel Government. Moreover, we have a statement-whtch gives rise to particular concern-to the effect thatbreachesoftheGeneralArmistice Agreement did indeed take place and that the Israel Government intends to go on violating this Agreement despite the fàct that the Mixed Armistice Commission has already adopted a decision on this question and has warnedthe Israel Government against 91. Would this be in the interests of peace? 1 think there can be no two answers to that question. Of course it would not be in the lhterests of peace. It is therefore perfeotly clear to the Soviet delegation that the SecuriiY Council cannot shut its eyes to a breach of the Armistice Agreement signed by the two Parties. It cannot shut its eyes to the violation of a definite decision already made by the Mixed Armistice Commission, nor can it embark upon the course of sanctioning violations of an agreement which is crucialfor the maintenance of peace in this area. 92. Any other approach on our part would onlycreate possibilities for causing a conflagration liable to lead to very serious consequences in the area and throughout the world•. 93. These are the preliminary considerations which impel the Soviet delegation, as early as this stage in our discussion, to supporttheJordanianGovernment's request-which is elementary from the standpoint of the need to maintain peace-for a thorough discussion of the complaint" and for steps designed to warn the Israel Government against attempts to violate the General ArmisticeAgreement and the MixedArmistice Commission' s decisions. 94. 1 should like to make one supplementary comment. The Israel representative has spoken of the motives underlying his Government's actions. 1 shaH not examine these motives at this stage, and 1 think that the Jordanian representative was right when, from the very outset, he limited the subject before us to the concrete issue of the violationof the ArmistioeAgreement, since any extension of the subject-matter ofour discussion would lead us too far afieldand, moreover, would hardly be conducive to the consolidationofpeace in this area. It 8eems to me, therefore, that at this stage we should not go beyond a discussion of the specifie issue raised by the Jordanian representative. At the same time, with reference to the motives which might furnish grounds for such acts by the Israel authorities, 1 should like to draw attention to a paragraph of the Armistice Agreement towhich, Ithink, no reference was made by the speakerswho tookthe floor before me. Article l, paragraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement reads: "No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea, or air-of either Party shaH be undertaken, planned or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; •••". 95. If we are te <ew the parade with the participation of heavy armament from the standpoint of this para- 96. Why, indeed, should heavy armament be brought in and shown to the people in the parade? The object can be none other than that ofthreateningor influencing the population. But this, precisely, is a direct breach of the Armistice Agreement. Not onlyhastherebeen a formaI violation of the annex to the Agreement dealing with the nature of the weapons which must not be introduced into the area-that is, annex il-but there has also been a breach of the Agreement as regards its political spirit, since the inclusion of heavy armament in the parade cannot be explained otherwise than as an attempt to influence the people precisely in the way prohibited under article 1. 97. In any event, this does not indicate a desire to avoid aggravating the situation. Rather does it suggest a desire to increase tension, especially given the existence of a definite decision ofthe MixedArmistice Commission containing a warning against such acts. 98. If, after this decision by the Mixed Armistice Commission, certain quarters still entertainthe desire to go on behaving inthe sarne spirit, the Council cannot disregard such a desire, but must frustrate it.

1 have no further requests for the fIoor from any representatives. Under the circumstances, 1 might suggest that the Council adjourn until another day. If the Council agrees, we shall adjourn until 3 p.m. on Monday, 10 April. It was so decided. GR~ECE.GRECE Kauflmann Bookshap, Athènes. GUATEMALA Sociedad Econômico·Financiero, 14·33, Guatemala City. HAITI librairie liA la Caravelle", Port·au-Prince. HONDURAS Libreria Panamericana, HONG KONG • HONG.KONG The Swindon Book Co., Kowloon. ICELAND.ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar F., Austurstraeti 18, Reyèjavik. INDIA·INDE Orient Longmans, Calcu dras, New Delhi and Hyderabad. Oxford Book & Stationery Del"i and Calculla. P. Varadachary & Ca., INDONESIA.INDONESIE Pembangunan, lId., Gunung Djakarta. IRAN 13uity, ~82 Ferdowsi Avenue, IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie's Bookshap, IRELAND.IRLANDE Statianery Office, Dublin. ISRAEL Blumstein's Bookstores, and ~8 Nachlat Benjamin ITALY.ITALIE Libreria Commissionaria Gino Capponi 26., Firenze, Azuni 15/A, Roma. JAPAN.JAPON Maruzen Company, lId., Nihonbashi, Tokyo. JORDAN·JORDANIE Joseph 1. Bahous & Ca., Box 66, Amman. KOREA.COREE Eul·Yoo Publishing Ca., Changno. Seau!. LE8ANON.lIBAN Khayat's College Book 92-9~, rue Bliss, Beyrouth. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Trausch·Schummer, Théâtre, Luxembourg. MEXICO·MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, S.A., 41, México, D.F. MOROCCO·MAROC Centre de diflusian B.E.P.I•• 8, rue Michaux.Bellaire, NETHERLANDS·PAYS.BAS N.V. Martinus Nijhofl, 9. 's.Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVELLE·ZELANDE United Nations Association land, C.P.O. 1011. Wellingta"n. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanuln gushgt. 7A, Oslo. Orde.. and inquirie. 'rom countrie. not listed above may be Les pays odressée. Organisation rique), Unie., Litho in U.N. Priee: $U.S. 0.35: 2/6 stg.: Sw. (or equivalent in other currencies) .ent ta: Sale. Section, Publi.hing Sevice, United Nation•• New York, U.S.A.; or Sale. Section, United Nation., Palais de. Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.