S/PV.957 Security Council

Before the meeting starts, 1 feel compelled in aIl justice to pay a sincere tribute to the representative of China for the skilful, intelligent, wise and impartial way in which he has guided the work of the Security Council during the last month. 1 thinklamexpressing the view of the majority ofthe members ofthe Counci! in paying this tribute to the great intellectual andmoralqualities of Dr. Tsiang, who has conducted our debates with exemplary authority and clignity. 2. There is only one thing that 1 personally regret about Dr. Tsiang's Presidency. 1regretvery sincerely that his term of office didnot last for another two days. Since we cannot halt the march of time 1 am in the invidious position of having to take his place as President .of this meeting. 3. 1 know that 1 lack his experience and wisdom, but 1 shall try to make up for this deficiency by displaying independence, impartiality and respect. 1 was going to add "patience", but 1 realize that 1 should rather ask the members of the Counci! to ex~rcise this virtue in bearing with me whenever necessary.

On behalf of Mr. Tsiang, 1 wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the words you 5. 1 wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President-again on behalf ofMr. Tsiang, and also on behalf of my delegation-on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council. We feel sure that the Council wiU have a month of fruitful work under your able leadership. Statement by the President

Before we begin to consider the provisional agenda, 1 should like to thank the representative of China for his kind words. 7. 1 should also like to apologize to the members of the Council for the fact that 1 was obliged to convene the meeting on a Sunday and at an awkward hourD 1 must explain that 1 took into consideration the urgent nature of the United Kingdomrepresentative's request for an immediate meeting. Despite the fact that the power to convene met.:tings lies with the President, 1 foIlowed the traditions of the Council and asked that the necessary consultations shouldhe held. Most members of the Council were willing toholda meeting last night, but having, as President, a greater knowledge of the differing points of view, 1 took it upon myself, without further consultations, to postpone the meeting until today, which seemed to he the most suitable compromise between the different views. Similarly, 1 chose midday as being midway between the extremes preferred by different members, and 1 thank you for your co-operation. AdGption o{the agenda

The provisional agenda for this meeting appears in document S/Agenda/957/Rev.1. Has anyone any comments on this point?

Mr. President, 1 should like first of aIl to congratulate you on beéoming President of the Security Council and to express the hope that your guidance will have a heneficial effect on the Council's work. 10. Regarding the agenda, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to state that the way the question is formulated in the document submitted by the United Kingdom delegation [S/4845] gives rise at once to serious doubts, since it does not accord with the existing reports on the state of affairs in the Kuwait area. As, however. the situation in that area has obviously become acute, and as we also have Iraq's request [S/4847] for its complaint about an armed threat by the United Kingdom to he included in the agenda. we shaH not object to the Council discussing the situation in Kuwait in order to establish the real reasons for the tension there. In addition, we feel called upon to point out that the documents to be regarded as the formaI grounds for including this whole question in the agenda are the proposaIs by two Mem-

1 thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his kind wishes for the suecess of my term of office as President. 12. 1 take it that he is not opposing the adori;ion of the agenda. If no other member of the Couneil wishes to make any comments on this item 1 shall take it that the provisional agenda has been adoptedby the Council. Complaint by Kuwait in respect of the situation lJrising from the t!l'eat by Iraq ta the territorial independence of Kuwait, which is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter. national peace and security (5/4845, 5/4844) Complaint by the Govemment of the Republic of Iraq in re· spect of the situation arising out of the armed threat by the United Kingdom ta the independence IJnd security of Iraq, which is Iikely ta endanger the maintenance of inter. national peace and security (5/4847)

The representative of Iraq has addressed a letter to the President [S/4846], asking if he may take part in the debate on this matter. If there is no objection, 1propose ta invite the representative of Iraq ta take a seat at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Adnan M. Pachachi (Iraq). took a place at the Council table.

Ml'. President, you have convened this meeting in accordanee with rule 3 of our provisional roles of proqedure to examine the situation which has been brought ta this Council's attention by Kuwait. 15. The letter from the State Secretary of Kuwait reads as follows: "1 am instructed by His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait and in accordance withparagraph 2 ofArticle 35 of the United Nations Charter, 1 have the honour to request you, in your capaeity as President of the 8ecurity CQIlncil, to calI animmediate meeting ofthe Council to consider urgently the following question: 'Complaint by Kuwait in respect of the situation arising from threats by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'." [8/4844] 16. In a letter dated 1 July 1961 [S/4845] 1 referred to this letter from the State Secretary of Kuwait and informed you, on the instructions of my Government, that it supported this request from the Ruler of Kuwait and requested that an immediate meeting ofthe Council should be called aqcordingly. 17. In order to complete the picture of the most recent events relating to the situation in Kuwait, 1 should now like to read to the Council the text of a statement which was issued early yesterday morning in London by Hel' Majesty's Government: "The Secretary-General of the United Nations is being informed. "Her Majesty's Government earnestly hopes that the necessity to makeuseofthisforcewill not arise. It is intended that it should be withdrawn as saon as the Ruler co~siders that the threat to the independence of Kuwait is over." The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, when speaking later yesterday in England, reiterated this statement ofthe policy ofHerMajesty's Government. 18. In order that the Council may be fully apprised of the developments which have led to the present situation in regard to Kuwait, l must now give a short account of the latter stages of the development of relations between the State of Kuwa.it and the outside world. 19. Fortunately, 1 can spare the Council many ét~î;ails. The point 1s that for some time past the State of Kuwait has possessed entire l'esponsibility for the conduct of its own international relations and, with the full support of Her Majesty's Government, Kuwaithas in the past joined a number of international organizations as an independent sovereign State. This development rendered obsolete and inappropriate the terms of the Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement of 23 January 1899. Her Majesty's Government and the Euler of Kuwait therefore agreed that the necessary formaI step should he taken to cancel this agreement. 20. Accordingly, on 19 June last, notes were exchanged by the Ruler of Kuwait and the British Political Representative in the Persian Gulf, the effect of which was formally to establish and recognize a state of affairs which had in fact obtain~d for some time previously. This step was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of Kuwait. It was also a step fully in accordance with the long established policy of the United Kingdom. It was in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the aims which have often found expression at this Council and in the General Assembly. 21. We had thought that, in the words of my Prime Minister, this represented an advance which all countries, and particularly all Arab countries, wouId have welcomed. Tinis was indeed the reaction ofpractically all countries and it was evident that the prospect of a new member shortly to be added to the family of nations was very widely approved. 22. It was, therefore, with surprise and shock that the news was received that Iraq had reacted not with approval, but with a threat. It is-and 1 regret to have to say this-because of the hositility which Iraq has shown to the neighbouring country of Kuwait that the present situation has arisen and that the Council, at the request of the Ruler of Kuwait, has now met to consider his complaint. 24. These remarks were followed by a press and radio campaign from Baghdad, the object ofwhichwas to undermine the independence and integrity of the State of Kuwait and to publicize claims that Kuwait was part of Iraq. 25. That was serious enough. Butthere was something more. Reports were beginning to circulate early last week that Iraq was preparing to launch an attack against Kuwait in support of the claims m2.de by General Kassim. These reports were based on the existence of considerable Iraqi military forces in the Basrah area. To convey to you, MI'. President, the extremely preca:rious situation in which the Ruler of Kuwait and his country feIt themselves placed, I should like for a moment to remind the Council of the physical situation which is particularly relevant in present circumstances. 26. Kuwait, as you know, i8 a small country. Basra, in Iraq, is only about 30 miles from the Kuwaiti border and Kuwait town itself only another 60 miles or so further on. The country is flat and open desert and Iraqi military forces, which greatly outnumber the military forces of Kuwait, could invade Kuwait in a few hours after an order had been given to attack. There have also been indications during the past few days that reinforcements, particularly tanks, have been moved down southwards from Baghdad. This, of course, not only increased the already existing Iraqi potential to attack, but indicated its possible imminence. 27. I hope that 1 have said enough to suggest the considerations that must have weighed with the Ruler; in particular, he must have been conscious that if outside support for his small army were delayed until the attack had been launched, the reinforcements would have arrived too late and Kuwait would have been totally ovel'l'Un. 28. 1 may add that the existence of a threat to Kuwait from the attitude and military dispositions of its neighbour was also recognized by, among others, the Government of the United Arab Republic. It can, therefore, be well understood why the Ruler of Kuwait should have issued his formaI request for assistance by Hel' Majesty's Government when he did and also appealed to King Saud of Saui:Ii Arabia. This formaI request to Hel' Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was made under paragraph (g) of the exchange of notes of 19 June lasttowhich I have already The Council will see that the obligation imposed on Her Majesty's Government by this provision is inescapable, and once a request for aid is addressed to it by the Ruler under thi8 paragraph Hel' Majesty's Government has no alternative but to respond positively. 29. As evidence of the seriousness with which the Ruler regarded the threat confrontillg his country and people from Iraq, may I now quote from the translation of a statement which was issued in the early hours of yesterday morning by the Kuwaiti State secretariat. It was addressed to the people of Kuwait. After referring to the statement made by General Kassim and the military preparations being made by Iraq, to which I have just referred, and also to the messages sent by the Ruler to the Heads of Arab States drawing their attention to the situation and asking for support, this statement continued as follows: "After your Government received confirmation that Kassim had begun to mass bis forces on thl:l frontiers in preparation for invasion ofyourbelovedhomeland, your beloved Amir telegraphed his brother, H.M. King Saud, informing him of the Iraqi concentrations on Kuwaiti borders and of an expected invasionfrom Iraq. Following this telegram H.M. King Saud 01'- dered the despatch of Saudi forces to aid us in these difficult circumstances. At the same time trusting in God and in response to your true wish for the defence of the homeland and in view of situation brought about by Kassim, which left us no alternative, His Highness has requested military assistance from the Government of the UnitedKingdom in accordance with the agreement concluded between your Government and British Government contained in the exchange of letters of 19 June 1961. Your Government announces that the United Kingdom has immediately responded and sent forces to assist our gallant army and support them in defending our precious homeland, and that as soon as the crisis is ovel' these forces will be withdrawn immediately. "We ask Almighty God to help and support us and guide our steps to success. May He grant our prayer." 30. MI'. President, I have described to the Council the events which have led up to the present situation and I have given an account of the threat with which the Ruler was faced and of the steps he has taken to deal with it. 31. I should sayat once that Hel' Majesty's Government shares the anxiety of the Ruler for the continued independence of his country and were as impressed as he. was at the threat which was developing to that independence. As soon as they became awarè, therefore, of the gravity of the situation, Hel' Majesty's Government informed a number of friendly governments in the Middle East and elsewhere of theil' deep concern at this situation, and expressed to them the 33. In supporting the request to you, Mr. President, for an early meeting of the Security Council, my Government has thought it desirable to take this opportunity to report to the Council as early as possible on the steps which they have feIt constrained to take. My delegation also informed the Secretary- General yesterday at the earliest possible moment about these steps. 34. 1 have nothing to add at present to the facts of the situation as 1 have tried briefly to describe them. 35. Bef':lre 1 conclude my statement, 1 should, however, like to emphasize t'NO points. First, 1 should like to repeat, as was stated in the official statement of 1 July issued in London, thatHerMajesty's Government earnestly hopes that the necessity to make use of this British force will not arise, and that it is intended that the force should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of his country is over" 36. Secondly, following on the point which 1 have just made, Her Majesty's Government continues to hope that counsels of moderation will prevail. 37. My Government has noted and welcomed the statesmanlike efforts of a number of Governments to this end. Under the Charter the responsibility of aIl Member States is to work as best they may for the peace and stability of the area. In this connexion, 1 should like to assure the representative of Iraq that our action is in no way hostile to Iraq. Our forces present no threat to Iraq: they have no aggressive intentions. Our forces could only be employed in a combat role if Kuwait were tobe attackedfrom across the border. My Government sincerely wishes to remain on friendly terms with Iraq and its people, and we hope that the existing ties which we have with that country will be maintained and indeed strengthened. 38. Mr. President, finally, 1 regret that this Council has had to meet in circumstances which 1 am afraid must have been very inconvenient to many members. 1 am sure, however, that having heard the report, which 1 have just made, the Councilwill recognize that the issues were such that no delay could be permitted in bringing them to the notice of the Couneil, and will accept the reasons why my delegation accordinglyfelt bound to support the request made by the Ruler of Kuwait for an early meeting to he held.

My delegation does not propose at this meeting of the Council to deal with the substance of the question on the agenda item we have just adopted. "1 am instructed by His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait and in accordance with paragr9.9h 2 of Article 35 of the United Nations Charter, 1 have the honour to request you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to' caU a meeting of the Council to consider urgently the following question: 'Complaint by Kuwait in respect of the situation arising from threats by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'." [S/4844] 41. We deeply regret this situation and this dispute between two Arab countries. The United Arab Republic would like to see this problem resolved in accordance with Arab principles and traditions. My Government cannot conceive of a dispute on Arab soil between two Arab peoples. To ourwayofthinking, allArab territory belongs to .the Arab nation, in accordance with the logic of history. We cannot picture Arab soldiers turning their weapons against one another when the Arab nation is engaged in a struggle against the forces of imperialism. 42. In these circumstances, in which the common destiny of the Arab nation and of future generations is at stake, this nation needs all its energy and the devotion of aIl its sons. 43. It is on the basis of these considerations that the United Arab Republic deplores these events, which can have regrettable consequences for the whole Arab nation. According to rep'orts, ullits of the Iraqi army have been ordered to concentrate on the Kuwaitborder and the possibility of Iraqi military intervention is being studied at Baghdad. We are confident that the noble Iraqi people will not accept any principles other than those of the struggle of the Arab p.30ple which duty to the Arab nation demands.• 44. We feel certain that in considering this problem Arabs will place the interests and future of the Arab nation above aU else, for these interests must come before aU personal considerations and ambitions. 45. It has been with regret and dissatisfaction that the United Arab Republic has followed the military movements and the operations of the British fleet. We consider, furthermore, that no Arab has the right to jeoparclize the securlty of the Arab nation byexposing it to possible imperialist intervention, unless such action is necessitated by the legitimate and just requirements of the Arab people's struggle; we consider that the actions which have given rise to the present crisis have no connexion with the requirements of the Arab national struggle. 46. We express our hope that Iraq will not commit any act which may endanger the security and peace of the area. 48. Ml'. PACHACHI (Iraq): 1 do not want to inconvenience the members ofthe Security Council. Ithought that in view ofthe lateness ofthe hour it would perhaps be more convenient to hear me this afternoon. If, however, the Council wishes me to make my statement now 1 am quite prepared to do so. 1 am in the hands of the President.

1 would ask members of the Council what their position is in this respect. Personally, 1 would he inclined to hear the representative of Iraq at this time. 50. Since 1 hear no objection, 1now call on the representative of Iraq to make his statement. 51. Ml'. PACHACHI (Iraq): 1 am very grateful to the Prp,sident and other members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to speakonthe items of the agenda as adopted by the Council. 52. Before we go into the form and substance of the question, 1 believe that we are entitled to question the motives of the United KingdomGovernmentinbringing its complaint before the 8ecurity Council. The Government of Iraq has repeatedly statedthatitwould employ only peaceful means to settle the difficulty, and has denied the reports of troop concentrations in southern Iraq. In fact, these unfounded reports and rumours have nQt been substantiated, not even by the United Kingdom circles that rule the town of Kuwait itself. In the absence of any troop concentrations, and in view of the repeated assurances given by the Government of Iraq, we must come to the inescapable conclusion that this complaint by the United Kingdom has been lodged in order to cover up and justify the blatant act of aggression committed by the United Kingdom by landing its forces in Kuwait. 53. It is for that reason that my Government has instructed me to request that the Security Council considers the situation arising out of the landing of United Kingdom troops in the Arab country of Kuwait, an integral part of Iraq-a situation which is J.ikely to endanger internationalpeace and security and to violate and threaten the independence, security and territorial integrity of Iraq. 54. 1 shall have a good deal to sayat subsequent meetings of the Security Council about the grave dangers to peace, the national independence of Iraq and the freedom of the Iraqi people resulting from the United Kingdom military occupation of part of our homeland, Kuwait. Let me sayat once that the Sheikh of Kuwait has been brought into the picture in order to give this whole sordid operation some pretence of legality and legitimacy, however spurious and unfoundeditmaybe. But this clumsy and singularly unconvincing attempt to hid~ behind the mantle of the Sheikh can hardly convince anyone. This brings me to the question of the form of the agenda which the Council has adopted. 56. But may l sayat once that there does exist a dispute: between us and the Government of the United Kingdom. It is withinthat context thatwe are participating in the discussions of the Security Council on the item of the agenda. The Sheikh of Kuwait is involved only to the extent that he allows himselfto be a tool of United Kingdom policy, and itwouldbe futile for members of the Council to indulge in the fantasy that this is a dispute hetween Iraq and Kuwait, with the United Kingdom as an innocent and sympathetic bystander. 57. Can there be any doubt ofthe aggressive intentions of the United Kingdom when it has landed its troops in Kuwait and continues ta strengthen themby reinforcements from Bahrein, Aden and other places? 58. The intrusion of troops of a great Power with a long and disastrous colonial history in the area can only result in endangering international peace and security. That this should have been done in spite of the fact that Iraq has not moved onesinglesoldier and has repeatedly declared that it intends te preserve and defend its legitimate rights in KUW8.it by peaceful means demonstrates very clearlythatthe United Kingdom is not interested in protecting Kuwait, as it alleges, but has far more serious designs and intentions in respect of the security and independence of Iraq. 59. If Iraqi troops wanted to invade Kuwait-and the representative of the United Kingdom said they could have done so-why did we have to wait so long, until British reinforcements conveniently arrived in Kuwait? If that was what we wanted, why did we not invade Kuwait immediately after we made our announcement? The fact that nothing has been done, the fact that no troop concentrations have been inevidence, makes ft quite clear thatIraqhas beenpursuing peaceful means, and peaceful means only. 60. This is a preliminary statement in reply ta some of the points raised by the representative ofthe United Kingdom. but l reserve the right ta intervene at a later date,with your permission, Mr. President, to make a more complete and detailed statement onthe complaint we have lodged today against the British landings in 62. Before ending this preliminary statement. l should like to place before the Council certain basic facts about Kuwait which will give Members a proper background for future discussions of the Council on this question. Kuwait is not more than a small coastal town on the Gulf. There is not and has never been a country or a national entity called Kuwait. never in history. It is only a town surrounded bybarren desert which is inhabited by nomads who roam the deserts stretching from the Euphrates in south central Iraq to Nejd in the heart of the Arabian peninsula. It has a population of 206.473. according to the 1957 census. of whom more than three-quarters reside in the town of Kuwait. Of these, the sheikhs consideredonly 30,000 as citizens of Kuwait. So here we have a situation whereby a small town with none of the historical and legal prerequisites of statehood is composed. according to its de facto ruler. of 85 per cent foreigners and only 15 per cent citizens. and we are now called upon to elevate that town to the dignity of national statehood. 63. Politically. as well as culturally and economically, Kuwait always looked to Basra. When the present family of the Sheikh migrated to Kuwait from Nejd during the eighteenth century. their first actwas to send their chief to Basra where he paiq homage to the Ottoman governor of the province. which included the coastal area inwhich the town ofKuwait is situated. 64. During the nineteenth century. Great Britain. anxious to secure its imperial communications with India. became interested in the Gulf. This interestwas heightened toward the end ofthe centurybecause of the increasing Anglo-German rivalry in the area as evidenced by the famous Berlin-Baghdad Railway to which Great Britain was strongly opposed. Moreover. the knowledge that oil in large quantities existedin the area whetted the appetite of British financial circles ~heikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, the grandfather of the present Sheikh. murdered his two eIder brothers in cold blood and usurped the Sheikhdom. His older brother waSt at the time of his death. the Qaimaqam or district commissioner ofKuwaitunder the administrative authority of the Ottoman Governor of Basra. Mubarak's fear of the consequences of this crime dr.ove him into the arms of the British who were waiting eaagerly for an opportunity to extend their influence to Kuwait. In 1899 they concluded a secret Protectorate Treaty with him for which they paid a bribe in the sum of 15.000 rupees or. roughly, 1:1.000. This treaty had two things in common with aU the other treaties concluded by the British with other shèikhs of this area-namely, that there was no time limit to the treaty and they aU containedan undertaking by the sheikhs not to alienate any part of the territory under their administration without the permission of the British Government. The astonishing thing about this treaty with SheikhMubarakis that itwas concluded with a local administrative officer ofa sovereign State with which Great Britain had normal diplomatie relations. There was a British Ambassador in the Ottoman capital .of Constantinople while the British agent was concluding the treaty with an administrative officer of that sovereign State. 66. With the permission of the representative of the United States. 1 should like to give his country as an example of what this treaty in reality was. Imagine for a moment that the Governor of one of the states of the United States concludes an international treaty w~th a foreign Power in defiance of the authority of the Federal Government inWashington. Whatwouldyou think about that? This is exactly what happened in 1899. The Sheikh of Kuwait. however. before andafter that treaty. continued to profess aUegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and remained until the First World War under the administrative authority of the Governor of Basra. The secret treaty of 1899, therefore, has no legal validity whatsoever. and in fact cannot be considered binding on any side. 67. I have gone into this episode at somelength because that secret and illegaldocumenthas beenused by the Britishandthe Sheikhto supporttheir contention of the separateness of Kuwait. The fact is. however. that even as late as 1913. over fourteen years after the 1899 agreement. the British recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait when they concluded a treaty with the Ottoman Empire whereby Kuwait was recognized as a part of the Province of Basra and its sheikhs were recognized as under the authority of the Ottoman Governor of the province. Althoughthe treaty was not ratüied because of the outbreakof the war the following year. it constitutes a cIear-eut recognition by the British, ina duly contracted international instrument, of the fact that Kuwait was part of Basra. 68. As a result of World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, the three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra were unüied and became the State ofIraq. The British, however. triedto exclude 70. The illegal and forced separation OOtween Kuwait and Iraq continued. The Governments under the old régime either were incapable or were unwilling to claim resolutely the legitimate rights of the country. This is not the case now; the Government of the Iraqi Republic, as the Prime Minister, General Kassim, said, will never surrender or compromise on an inch of its national territory. The BritishGovernment must realize that in this age the anachronism of feudal sheikhdoms is no longer accepted or tolerated; so they have come up with a new formula. They hurled at us the word "independence", hoping that we would be blinded by its dazzle and not see the sordid manoeuvre that lies beneath. This is no independence, but continued licence for the Sheikh and his British protectors to continue to squander and pillage the riches of the country. 71. The tenacious, insistence of the United Kingdom Government on maintaining its influence and domination over Kuwait can be explained by one word-oil. Here are sorne figures of which Sir PatrickDean is no doubt aware. The estimated andprovedreserves ofthe oil of Kuwait are 60,000 million barrels, twice the reserves of a great country like the United States. Besides the enormous profits which the British companies derive, the Sheikh has invested more than $1,000 million in British Treasury Bonds. This is the crux of the matter. This is the cause of the trouble. And it can be seen by anyone who would not delude himself by this imaginary independence given to Kuwait. 72. The question at issue goes beyond the immediate crisis created by the British military occupation of Kuwait. Is it conceivable in this age ofrevoluHon, this age of reviving expectations, this age of freedom, that the world can tolerate the existence of such a state of affairs whereby an unholy alliance offeudal sheikhdom and a colonial Power is trying to rob an Arab nation, year after year, of its rightful wealth? 73. Before concluding, 1 should like to convey to the Council the deep emotion and the great attachment which aU the Iraqi people, irrespective of their background, of the language which they speak, of the religions which they profess, have always feIt for the mutilated part of our homeland, Kuwait-and 1 hope to revert to this matter in some detail when we discuss the dangers involved in the latest British militaryadventure which, incidentally, reminds one of the Suez Canal adventure at the end of 1956. 1 shan come to that again and 1 hope that the Council will be in a position to order the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the British forces from Kuwait. 74. Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom): 1 shall be extremely brief. 1 shall wish, at a later stage, to reply in detail and conclusively to the statement just made by the representative of Iraq. For the present 1 limit myself to noting with some satisfactionhis firm statement about the peaceful intentions of the Government The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.