S/PV.958 Security Council

l wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the request addressed to the Secretary-General [S/4851], which has already been circulated to the members of the Council. Before submitting this matter to the consideration of the Council, l should like to state that the representative of Iraq has informed me that he would like to be allowed to speak on the subject. 2. l am in the position of being unable to decide whether this is really a procedural question which concerns only the members of the Counoil, in which case the representative of Iraq would not be allowed to speak, or whether it is, generally speaking, a substantive question, in which case he could take part in the discussion.

l should like to know whether any other member of the Council wishes to speak. If not. l shaH put this question to the vote. since one opposing view has been expressed. 6.Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey): This is just for information. We heard thestatement, and when you asked if there were any othElr statements. no member of the CouncU·showed any intention of taking part in the discussion of this item: Would that perhaps indicate that there would not he the necessity to vote?

l thank the representative of Turkey for his remarks and should like to explain the situation as l understand it. 8. l first submitted to the consideration of the members of the Council the document appearing under the symbol S/4851 and explained that the representative of Iraq wished to speak on this aspect of the discussion. namely the acceptance or rejection of the request contained in the document. Since obviously the floor could not he given to the representative of Iraq after a decision had been taken on the item on which he wished to speak. l asked whether or not he could be given the floor. The representative of the United Kingdom has expressed his opposition. l therefore considered that a vote should he taken on this point: whether or not the representative of Iraq is to be given the opportunity to take part in the discussion of the request addressed to the Secretary-General. 9. l again ask the members of the Council if any of them wish to speak on the subject ofthe request made by the representative of Iraq.

It seems to me that as regards the discussion of this item. which has been submitted both by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Government of Iraq. the representative of Iraq is justified in asking us for permission to speak on a question which affects Iraq's interests and on which he wishes to put forward certain views. 11. The representative of the United Kingdom has opposed this request in the light of the general rules and past practice of the Council. In my opinion, however. the Council is master of its own procedure, and ~l

l should like to ask any members of the Council, who wish to speak on the subject of the request of the representative of Iraq, to make his statement before a decision is taken on the request in document si4851, to give their views on the matter. ~,j :1 A '1 )j J r,l ;~a~s w~o s~~~~rp~:~~e~h~\~~ ~:Ut~~i~:O~~::l:~ j invite the representative of Iraq to speak on the èl subject of the request addressed to the Secretary- <l General [S/4851]. ,!'j A vote was taken by show of hands. j In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: None. .1IlL1 "!j .\ >'I Abstaining: Ceylan, Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Liberia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. ~ fiJl1 I The result of the vote was 1 infavour, none against. with 10 abstentions.

The members of the Council will now consider the request addressed to the Secretary-General [S/4851].

Mr. President, you have invited the Council to consider document si4851, which contains a request that the representative of Kuwait be allowed to take part in the debate on the Kuwait question in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make the following comment in this connexion. :1 J Hl '1 0,4l ') Il 16. The Soviet delegation considers that in the present situation, namely, the fact that Kuwait is çompletely occupied by United Kingdom troops, the Kuwait delegation could hardly act as the representative of a sovereign State, since the real power in that country is exercised by the occupying forces of the United Kingdom. The Soviet delegation is of the opinion that for the representative of Kuwait to take part in the debate in such circumstances would not contribute to an objective consideration of the Kuwait question by the Security Council. It therefore believes that the proper course would be to refrain from inviting that delegation, and hence it cannot support the proposaI to invite the representative of Kuwait to take a place at the Council table. J :'j di

As no other member of the Council wis.hes to speak, l should like to explain that it is my understanding that the representative of the Soviet Union has not expressed opposition but has simply stated that he would not support the proposaI. l would ask the repre-

1 thank the representative of the Soviet Union andwould ask him to regard my request merely as a desire to interpret his thoughts correctly. As there is no objection to the request appearing in document S/4851, 1 consider that the request for the representative of Kuwait to take a place at the Council table has been granted.

Is it your interpretation, Mr. President, that an the members of the Council are voting in favour of inviting the representative of Kuwait except for the representative of the Soviet Union, who has expressed his opiDÏon in this matter? If so, we shan, of course, regard this as being on the record unless there are any objections.

The representative of the Soviet Union made a statement which he and an of us here considered to be sufficiently clear. At my request, he then repeated his qpinion, which has been recorded. 1 therefore consider that aIl the members of the Council, with the exception of the representative of the Soviet Union, agree that the representative of Kuwait should be invited to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Abelel Aziz Hussein (Kuwait), took a plaoe at the Counoil table.

The Council will now take up the item on its agenda. 1 caU on the representative of Iraq.

1 had been instructed by my Government to spea~ on the request contained in document S/4851 before a vote was taken on it by the Security Council. This is a matter of vital concern to my country, and 1 must express my profound regret that my delegation has not been given the opportunity of stating its views on a matter which so greatly affects its interests. 24. The United Kingdom representative contended that the past practice of the security Council was not to allo\\' States which are not members of the Council to participate in discussions of proceàural matters. 1 have two comments to make on that contention. 25. First, there is nothing in the provisional rules of procedure which prevents non-members of the Council from taking part in discussions of proœdùral questions. Rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, under which the Council was good enough to invite me here, does not restrict nonmembers' right to speak to substantive questions. 1 would read out the relevant part of that rule: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any 26. My second comment is the following. In your preliminary remarks, Mr. President, you said that the question of approving the request contained in document S/4851 was a procedural question. If that is the case, it is our understanding that the request has been granted under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, which reads as follows: "The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence." Since you, Mr. President, ruled at the beginning of the meeting that this matter is procedural, there is no other rule in the Council's provisional rules of procedure under which this gentleman may sit at the Council table. 27. If we are to go outside of the provisional rules of procedure, however, then the matter is no longer procedural but, indeed, substantive. But as 1 said, since the President ruled that this is a proceduraI question, it is our understanding that these gentlemen are here under rule 39 and therefore intheir capacity as private persons and nothing else. Because if we are to invoke Article 32 of the Charter, the matter can no longer be considered as procedural, and in any case Article 32 of the Charter cannot be invoked in this case, for two reasons. The first and foremost reason, in our view, is that the request does not emanate from aState with the full attributes of sovereignty, and our understanding of Article 32 is that only States which are recognized as enjoying aU the ,.ttributes and prerequisites of national sovereignty are allowed to sit in the Council under this Article. Secondly, Article 32 speaks of Members of the United Nations or any State which is not a member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute. According to document S/4844, under which these gentlemen have come and which emanates from them, there is no mention of a dispute. They speak about a situation. In fact, the wording is "complaint regarding a situation arising from the threat," etc. 28. Mr. President, you know very well, of course, as do all the members of the Council, that there is a distinct difference in the Charter and indeed in the procedure and past practice of the Security COUDcil between disputes and situations. Even if we were to grant for the sake of argument that these gentlemen represented a sovereign State not a member of the United Nations, they would still not be allowed to invoke Article 32 of the Charter, because there is no 30. With these preliminary remarks, I should like to put on record that we do not consider the gentleman sittin&, across from me, except in his capacity as a private person, as representing any State in the international community of nations. 31. Now I come to the substance of the questions before us on the agenda. At the last meeting of the Council I referred to the historical background of our dispute with the United Kingdom. I showed how the close and historie ties, supported by indisputable facts of law, made Kuwait an integral and inseparable part of the Iraqi homeland. I also gave an account of the way in which the British Government extended its influence in the Gulf area during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and how Kuwait was broughtunder British colonial dominatioh by the illegal and secret agreement of 1889. I also endeavoured to show that the so-called independence agreement, which has been used by the British Government to justify the landing of °troops in Kuwait, is in reality a poorly disguised extension of the 1899 agreement. 32. Today I wish to discuss the most serious aspect of the problem, namely, the landing of British troops. Let me place before the Council the following facts. 33. The British Government has always known about Iraq's legitimate rights and aspirations in Kuwait. Sine::· the end of the First World War the question of Kuwait has been the subject of continuing discussions and, at times, even formaI negotiations between Iraq and the United Kingdom. 34. In the town of Kuwait itself there has always been a very strong movement for the unification of Kuwait with the mother country. In 1938, forexample, matters came to a head when the majority of the members of the Legislative Coun·oil in Kuwait voted in favour of reuniting with Iraq. I should like to quote from a book by an eminent American writer and a member of the Foreign Service of the United States, Mr. Richard H. Sanger. In his book entitled The Arabian Peninsula he writes: "During June 1938 the Sheikh of Kuwait set up a Legislative and a Consultative Council•••On being established, the Legislative Council almost immediately split up into factions, one faction favouring the unification of the Sheikdom to Iraq and another favouring autonomy under the Sheikh. The so-called 'young Kuwaiti' group, which leaned toward Iraq, gained control of the council. When affairs reached an impasse in December 1938, the council was dissolved and new elections were held. "The newly elected council turned out to be very little different from the old one-with pro-Iraq elements representing the majority-"It drew up a draft of a proposed constitution, which would have 35. With this baokground, and the recurrent discussions and negotiations between Iraq and the United Kingdom, the British Government could not have been surprised by the announcement of the Prime Minister of Iraq on 25 June 1961 that Iraq intends to recover its legitimate rights in Kuwait. 36. When the Government of Iraq declared its intention to attain Iraq's legitimate national rights in Kuwait, it assured the outside world that it would use peaceful means to attain these aims. These assurances were repeated time and again, publicly as well as privately, particularly to the British Ambassador in Baghdad. Yet the British Government persisted in fabricating false rumours about alleged Iraqi troop concentrations. 37. The Government of Iraq repeatedly denied that there were any such troop concentrations and the British Government has not provided any substantial proof or evidence to the contrary. However, this did not deter the British from intensifying their campaign of falsehood and, encouraged no doubt by the credulity of some who should have known better, the British Government ordered the Sheikh of Kuwait to ask for assistance. 38. Despite the increasingly provocative nature of the British military build-up in Kuwait, the Iraqi Government to this day has not reinforced the small garrison at Basrah, which is now threatened by the British forces posed for offensive action barely thirty miles away. 39. Five days have passed since the British troops began to land in Kuwait and they have been steadily increasing in number and strength. They are now estimated at 20,000. Tanks, bombers and armoured vehicles of all kinds in great quantities continue to pour into Kuwait. The following is a description of part of the force as given by the British commander: "Navy: Commando carrier, H.M.S. Bulwark; amphibious headquarters ship, H.MS. Meon; frigate, H.M.S. Loch Alvie; tank landing craft, H.M.S. Striker; 42nd and 45th Royal Marine Commandos. "Army: Headquarters 24th Infantry Brigade; 2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards; 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; one squadron, llth Hussarsarmoured cars; one squadron,3rdDragoonGuardstanks. "Air Force: Eight Canberra jet bombers; twelve Hawker Hunter jet fighters; short-range Beverly transport aircraft." 41. At the last meeting of the Council, 1 pointed eut that if we had wanted to use force, we could have do:ne so from the very beginning. The fact that we did not use force at a time when such use could have been effective shows conclusively, 1 believe, that the Government pf Iraq has never contemplated the use of its armed forces for the attainment of its legitimate objectives in Kuwait. 42. In the face of these facts and the repeated assurances of the Iraqi Government that only peaceful means will be used, one is entitled to ask why does the British Government persist in its attitude. and why does it continue to fan the fire of the artificial crisis which it itself created. 43. The answer is that the alleged defence of Kuwait i~ not, and has never been, the real reason for the British landing. Preparation to send armed forces to the Gulf area were made before the present crisis erupted. It is known, for example, that the tank landing ship whiéh was used in Kuwait sailed from Aden on 22 June 1961; that is, three days before the Iraqi Prime Minister announced the intention of the Iraqi Government to press for its legitimate rights in Kuwait. 44. This and other British military movements, some of which date back to the middle of June, lead us to believe that even before the announcement of Kuwait's new status, and before Iraq made its views known, the British Government had decided to make a show of force in the Gulf to be dfrected against Iraq. It seems to us that the British Governmént hopes to achieve a number of objectives from this show of force, the most immediate objective being to force Iraq torenounce its legitimate rights in Kuwait. If that should prove to be .....1 unattainable objective, as the British Government must have suspected, then it hoped, by forcing the issue of Kuwait's independence. to create dissension among the Arab States. thus poisoning the atmosphere of harmony and goodwill which has permeated Arab relations in the past few months. Nothing disturbs the colonialists more than a firm and lasting friendship and co-operation among the Arab States. But the long-term objective is, of course, to consolidate British influence and power in the Gulf. 45. The trusted clients of the United Kingdom in the Gulf are to be maintained and protected at aIl costs. even if that means the use of armed force against neighbouring sovereign States. AIl this is being done to facilitate the exploitation of the vast oil riches of the Gulf, not for the benefit of its inhabitants and the Arab nation as a whole, but for the benefit of the economic and financial interests of the United Kingdom. This is "gunboat diplomacy" at its worst, but its fate will be no different from that of similar diplomacies .. in the pasto 46. At a time when the world liberation movement is rapidly approaching its objective in the final and total 49. Iraq, which has had long and close connexions with the peoples of the Gulf, represents, in the area, the most progressive element in the Arab movement for national liberation and economic and social advancement. The British landing in Kuwait is an attempt to strike at this movement and to retard the march of the Arab people towards liberty, social justice and economic welfare. A British victory in the Gulf, which is what the British Government hopes to achieve from its massive military intervention, would weaken this movement, and it is for this reason that it is necessary to view this latest British act of aggression within the broader context of the efforts of colonialism to resist the world-wide movement for liberation. Today it is Iraq; tomorrow it may be another Arab country. This is a lesson that the Arabs can ignore only at the peril of their national survival as a free people. 50. In conclusion, let me summarize the situation now facing the Council. A great Power invoking a provision in a colonial and illegal treaty has sent to the area a large and well equipped force, which is being continually reinforced and strengthened, threatening the independence and security of a Member of the United Nations, and causing a dangerous state of tension in the entire Middle East. 51. On the other hand, Iraq, which has historic and legitimate rights in Kuwait, has announced repeatedly that it will use only peaceful means to attain its aims. Contrary to the falsehoods S!pread by the British propaganda machine, no Iraqi concentrations have taken place or were ever contemplated. These rumours were used by the British Government to justify its act of aggression. 52. The first duty of the Council, therefore, is to remove the source of tension and the potential threat to the security of a Member State, "by urging the immediate withdrawal of the British forces from Kuwait. British can no longer maintain the fiction of an armed threat to Kuwait, and 1 believe the world 53. This is an appeal of a small State which has always stood squarely and unequivocally behind the aspiration of every people struggling for freedom and human dignity. We are proud of our record in this respect in the United Nations, and we shall continue to do what we feel is our duty towards peoples still suffering under the colonial yoke, and we feel certain that we shaH not be left alone in this hour of mortal peril to our liberty and national independence.

l thank the representative of Iraq and, before giving the floor to the next speaker, who is the representative of the Soviet Union, ï should like to state that so far 1 have not given a ruling but have submitted my doubts to the consideration of the Council. 55. MI'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Once again the Security Council must consider a situation which represents a threat to international peace and security. On this occasion we are concerned with a new hotbed of tension which has developed in the Middle East. What is happening in this area? 56. As we know, about three weeks ago the United Kingdom declared one of its colonies, the Kuwaitprotectorate, an independent State. Almost immediately, however, considerable contingents of United Kingdom troops, equipped with tanks, jet aircraft and other modern means of waging war were sent to Kuwait. In addition to this, units of the United Kingdom fleet are concentrating in the Kuwait area. What is more, this concentration of United Kingdom armed forces in the Kuwait area is not only not coming to an end, but is increasing more and more. According to the latest information, there are already many thousands of United Kingdom soldiers and officers in Kuwait, apart from the fact that the garrisons of the United Kingdom military bases near Kuwait have been put in a state of war readiness. Ships of the United Kingdom navy continue to arrive in the Persian Gulf, bringing more and more contingents of troops. The Press tells us that aIl these troops are to be there for a long time. 57. The United Kingdom justified its dispatch of troops to Kuwait and the concentration of its fleet in the area-as we learnt from the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom at the previous meeting of the Security Council-on the grounds that it is making ready to resist aggression on the part of Iraq. 58. However, this argument carries no weight at all, since there are no Iraqi troops on the territory of Kuwait. Furthermore, we have already had the opportunity to hear an official statement by the Iraqi Government and its representative here, who spoke at the last meeting and has reaffirmed his position at this meeting, to the effect that the Iraqi Government did not and does not in the future intend to undertake 59. As regards the substance of the Iraqi Government's statements concerning its rights to Kuwait, its point of view would seem to have been already weIl known to the United Kingdom, so that these statements could not have caused the United Kingdom Government the least surprise. 60. It is interesting to note in this connexion that certain Powers which for a long time have doggedly refused to recognize aets of aggression where they have actually happened, for example, Belgian aggression against the Congo, are now trying with much haste and determination to discover such acts on the border between Kuwait and Iraq. 61. If, with the help of sorne of its allies the United Kingdom is now trying to blow up a hysterical crisis over the statements which have just been made once again by Iraq concerning the Sheikhdom of Kuwait, there are obviously some motives behind this other than concern for peace and security in the Middle East. What these motives are can easily be guessed if we recall that similar tactics-trying to lead public opinion astray and crying "stop thief" when there is no thief-have already been used many times by the colonial Powers. 62. The United Kingdom itself, as everyone knows, together with its allies, sent troops into Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, claiming without any justification that it was acting as defender of the peace in the Near East, whereas in actual fact it was merely creating further tension in that region and preparing aggression against countries whose régimes were not to the liking of the coionialists, and above aU against Iraq. Somewhat earlier the United Kingdom, this time together with France and Israel, made a direct attack on the United Arab Republic and again claimed to be doing this for the sake of the well-being of the people of the United Arab Republic and peace in the Near East. Belgium, of course, sent troops to the Republic of the Congo almost the day after it had declared that African State independent and also justified its aggressive actions on pseudo-humanitarian grounds. Finally, the Portuguese authorities have flooded Angola with troops and are exterminating the population of that country. They have ignored the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and they are trying to justify their actions, after the pattern of their more experienced allies, as an attempt to keep peace in Africa in the face of subversive activities. 63. Thus in the case of Kuwait we are clearly cohfronted with one more instance of a colonial Power trying to keep another nation under its control and using all possible means for that purpose. The sending of United Kingdom troops to Kuwait and the concentration of its fleet in the area are acts of provocation by a colonial Power whicli create a threat to peace not only in the region itself but throughout the world. That is why those troops must be immediately withdrawn from Kuwait. 65. The paramount consideration in our opinion is the incontrovertible fact that it is not Iraqi troops but United Kingdom troops that are in Kuwait. Hence, the Security Council's most immediate task in this situation is to condemn the actions of the colonial Power and to take measures which will lead to the immediate withdrawal of United Kingdom troops fromKuwait, for this is the. prime requirement if tension in the region is to be dispelled and a dangerous turn of events averted. It is our profound conviction that this must be the concern of all States which are interested in strengthening peace and in combating the policy of the colonial Powers directed against the freedom of peoples. Only after this has been done, will it be possible to discuss further steps for solving the various matters in dispute in this region-not, of course, by force, but by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

l call on the representative of Kuwait.

As the chief representative of Kuwait, and on behalf of my colleagues in the Kuwait delegation, l wish very warmly to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for giving us the opportunity of presenting our case before the Council today. We are very gratified by the friendly consideration which the Council has shown us. We made our application to come here under Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter. 68. World public opinion, and particularly opinion in the Arab world, has been shocked by the Iraqi Prime Minister's claims against the independence ofKuwait. These claims were reported by international news agencies on 25 June 1961, A direct threat has been made to the independence, freedom and sovereignty of the State of Kuwait by General Kassim's allegation that Kuwait during the days of the Ottoman Turkish caliphate was a district governed by the Turkish provisional governor of Basrah. This claim has no historical truth. It is a distortion of history that reveals General Kassim's illegitimate ambitions of territorial expansion. The Government of Kuwait has no wish to indulge in any prolonged and fruitless 69. If we look at the present we shaH see how Kuwait has progressively and systematically established aIl the requisite institutions by which a modern State is defined. Before the declaration of the independent State of Kuwait on 19 June 1961, Kuwait had alre.ady established a viable system of effectively administered government. It had its own currency and its own postage stamps, its own laws and its own courts of justice. In fact, aided by its economic resources, the Government had become an efficiently organized welfare State-a welfare State which is today the pride of the Middle East. 70. The independence of Kuwait has been recognized both de jure and de facto by most of the nations of the world. Iraq is one of the nations of the world which has traditionally dealt with Kuwait as such. It was the same during the days of the Hashemite Monarchy as it was under the Iraqi Republic of Kassim. This recognition of the independÊmce of Kuwait by Iraq ls reflected in the official correspondence between the two countries. Kassim himself has referred to Kuwait and Iraq as independent countries between whom a bond of Arab brotherhood exists. The following is the text of a letter addressed by General Kassim to the Ruler of Kuwait. "His Highness, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al- Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait: 1 have received your letter dated 12 August 1958, and 1 thankYour Highness for the brotherly feelings which have been expressed by you towards Iraq. "1 wish to inform Your Highness with great pleasure that instructions have been directed to the concerned Iraqi offices to free the transportation between our two countries!l-I repeat, "between our two countries". This letter was dated 7 September 1958 and signed by General A. Kassim, Prime Minister of the Iraqi Republic. ' 71. In addition to this, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry directed a message to His Highness, the Ruler of Kuwait, dated 29 December 1958, requesting his approval for the exchange of consular representation between Kuwait and Iraq with the aim of establishing formaI relations between the two countries. It is an axiom of international diplomacy that consular, trade or political representations exist only between sovereign countries. In no way could such representation exist between two parts of one single sovereign country. 72. In his message, the Iraqi Foreign Minister plainly calls Kuwait "an Arab State" and "a dear neighbour". This message reads as follows after the normal greetings: "It gives me a great honour to tnform you that the Iraqi Republic is always keen about maintaining and fostering close and co-operative relations with the sister Arab countries, and feels it is her duty to co-operate with her dear neighbour Kuwaittoestab- 73. The agreement of 19 June 1961 between the Government of the United Kingdom and that of Kuwait did not in fact give birth to the independence of Kuwaitj it merely recognized the status quo as it had become, as a. result of the long-range strategy and wise diplomacy of His Highness, the Ruler of Kuwait. Previous to the formaI announcement of her independence, Kuwait had already taken long strides in the field of international diplomacy, proving that she was a sovereign State. Even before the abrogation of the Treaty of 1899 with Great Britain, Kuwait had achieved a11 of the traditional aspects by which a sovereign State is recognized and defined. 74. The Government of Iraq has not only witnessed but even aided Kuwait in its development as an independent State. Iraqi delegates themselves have backed Kuwait's applications for membership inmany international .organizations. Beginning with 24 July 1959, Kuwait has successively been admitted to the following international organizations: the International Telecommunications Union, the universal Postal Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organisation.' Certainly membership in these organizations constitutes international recognition of the independence of Kuwait. 75. To return to relations between Kuwait and Iraq, only this year Iraq itself called upon Kuwait to send a trade delegation to Baghdad to investigate commercial matters of mutual interest. Kuwait replied positively to the request of Iraq and sent a delegation. At the end of the conference, a statement was issued by the two Governments dated 5 June 1961. l shall quote a translation of a few lines from the last paragraph of this statement: "Both parties are pleased that the discussions between them have been successful in furthering friendly and sincere relations between the two sister nations and in promoting commercial and economical ties which ensure the Arab understanding which will emerge from the sovereignty of the two sister nations. ft 76. Kuwait is an Arab State which has firm faith in peace and has trust in the United Nations and the conscience of the world. Although Kuwait is relatively small, yet it has utilized its potentialities for the prosperity of its people and the welfare of humanity. The Kuwaiti people feel secure in their deep faith in humanity and through the help which has been rendered to them by a11 friendly and peace-loving countries. 77. Kuwait expected that Iraq-its neighbour and Arab sister-would be the first to congratulate her on this happy event of its formaI independence, and that it would co-operate for the prosperity of both countries. Instead, Iraq began moving its troops to the borders of Kuwait, threatening to invade at any moment. The frequent Iraqi demands for the annexation of Kuwait, the war marches, and the provocative threats from Radio Baghdad, gave the impression 79. General Kassim must know that Kuwait will adhere firmly to its independence. We value it much too highly to bargain with him and we have no i.ntention of abandoning our struggle to remain free and independent. Kuwait will take all necessary steps to safeguard its sovereignty. 80. Kuwait can rely on friendly nations and on ber allies to help ber repel any aggression. The United Kingdom immediately responded to Kuwait's request for help when it became clear that its independence was in danger. The British forces will evacuate Kuwait immediately when the aggressive and hostile attitude of General Kassim ceases. This fact has been affirmed by the clear statements of Kuwaiti and British authorities. 81. Let it be clearly understood that Kuwait is fully conscious that there should not be one foreign soldier on its soil. Yet these foreign troops can be removed only when sufficient guarantees have been given that our land will not he violated in any way and that the freedom of our people will not be disgraced. un 82. Kuwait has faith in justice, freedom and peace and is anxious to live in a friendly and peaceful atmosphere with its neighbours, especially with its close Arab neighbour Iraq, and with aIl peace-loving countriel3. Kuwait wishes sincerely to contribute aIl efforts possible for the well-being of humanity and it believes the United Nations has the will and the means to protect smaIl nations and to preserve their freedom and dignity. en et proche pays Unies petites dignité. 83. We put our case before you-the case of a free nation whose independence is threatened bya stronger neighbour. We have faith in your determination to preserve the freedom of aIl small nations and to ensure the liberty of aIl the peoples of the world. nation voisin volonté petites les 84. Ml'. PLIMPTON (United States of America): The Security Council is meeting todaybecause the Government of Kuwait has reported that its independence is threatened by Iraq and that this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. We are confident that discussion within the Security Council can have a moderating effect on the situation which now exists in the area. If the Security Council, through its consideration of this matter, can contribute to an alleviation of tension and help to deter developments which might further threaten the territorial independence of Kuwait, thé Council will have made a positive contribution. For this reason, the United States supported the convening of an early meeting of the Council. de d'hui savoir et le Nous de tion cette éviter vantage son ont délai 86. Regarding the current situation in Kuwait. we should like to make two observations. First. there have been a number of recent public statements by high-ranking Iraqi leaders regarding their intentions with respect to Kuwait. The nature of some of these statements is at variance with past expressions of Iraqi friendship for Kuwait and with Iraq's often avowed desire to maintain tranquillity in the Near East. 87. In the second place. there have been reports. referred to already by the representative of the United Arab Republic-not to mention the representative of the United Kingdom-that Iraqi troop dispositions have been made near the border of Kuwait. In the circumstances. the Ruler of Kuwait has feIt it necessary 'to take precautionary defensive measures by inviting military forces of friendly States to assist him in strengthening Kuwait's defensive capabilities. The Ruler has asked for such help from the Royal Government of Saudi Arabia. and we understand that Saudi Arabian assistance has been provided. He has also requested the military assistance of the Government of the United Kingdom. pursuant to the agreement concluded by the Governments of Kuwait and the United Kingdom on 19 June 1961; and British forces have also been provided. 88. The United States believes that Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom have acted appropriately and that these actions will tend to ensure the preservation of peace in the area. 89. In this connexion we welcome the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom at the meeting of the Security Council on 2 July as follows: "Rer M:ajesty's Government earnestly hopes that the uecessity to make use of this force will not arise. It is intended that it should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of Kuwait is over." [957th meeting. para. 17.] 90. My Government has been infornled by the Government of Iraq that Iraq does not intend to resort to force in Kuwait and welcomes the similar assurances provided to the Security Council by the representatjve of Iraq. We trust that the Government of Iraq will fully resp~'ct its obligations under Arti.. cIe 2. paragraph 4 of the Charter which reads as follows: "AIl Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

It is with great regret that 1 tu}:'n once again to the agenda item which we are discussing toclay. This is a dispute between two sister countries: Iraq and Kuwait. 93. We have followed with deep anxiety the cour.se of the latest events in this crisis between two sister count.:ies. Kuwait has submitted a complaint against Iraq to our Couneil. Kuwait is complaining of the situation arising from threats by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 94. In considering this problem, the United Arab Republic is basing itself upon principles which have always guided its policy in the problems with which it was faced. In adopting a position between two Arab countries, we apply the principles of Arab nationalism and of the struggle of the Arab people. For these reasons, the United Arab Republic cannot support the idea of annexation. On the other hand, we are always ready to support the idea of total or partial unity• The United Arab Republic, which is the result of the total union of Egypt and Syria, cannot on this account, fail to support any movement towards unity. This unity can only be the manifestation of the freely expressed will of the Arab people. h 95. The United Arab Republic supports the independence of Kuwait, on the basis of self-determination and of the right of peoples to decide their own fate. 96. In his statement to the Council on 2 July 1961, the representative of Iraq said: "The Government of Iraq has repeatedly stated that it would employ only peacfaful means to settle the difficulty, and has denied the reports of troop concentrations in southern Iraq." [957th meeting, para. 52.] 97. Today the representative of Iraq has reiterated the substance of this statement. My delegation takes note of this statement and is confid~nt that the actions of the Government of Iraq will be in conformity with it. 98. As 1 have already said, in our view aIl Arab territory belongs to the Arab nation, in accordance with historical logic. We cannot imagine that Arab soldiers could take up arms against each other when the Arab nation is in the throes of a struggle against imperialism. 99. For the solution of this problem, we must allow the interests of the future of the Arab nation to prevail, for those interests must override any personal considerations or ambitions. 100. We are sure that the noble people of Iraq will apply only the principles of the struggle of Arab nationalism~ which were, moreover, the principles on which the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958 was based. 102. The United Arab Republic has noted with regret the concentrations of the British fleet and the landing of British troops in Kuwait. In our opinion, the landing of foreign forces belonging to a great Power, in a part of the Arab world, cannot but have serious repercussions and increase the tension; far from helping to solve the problem, it can only aggravate it. It is for that reason that the United Arab Republic is asking for the withdrawal of these forces. 103. My delegation will not go into details ofthe dispute OOtween Kuwait and Iraq, for, as 1 have already stated, we consider that it should be settled within the framework of the Arab League. 104. In conclusion, the position of my delegation may be summarized as follows: my delegation supports the independ&uce of Kuwait on the basis of selfdetermination and the right of peoples to independence; it requests the withdrawal of the British forces in Kuwait and expresses its confidence that a peacefuI solution will he found to this problem. In addition, my delegation is certain that Iraq, as its representative has just· stated, will not commit any act which might threaten the security and peace of the region.

As there are no further speakers on the list, 1 should like to consult the members of the Council about the possibility of holding another meeting tomorrow at 3 p.m.

Mr. President, 1 have no objection at aU to your suggestion that we should meet tomorrow afternoon, but I would like to inquire whether it would be better not to meet tamorrow afternoon but tomorrow morning.

I should like to inform the representative of the United Kingdom that the reason I suggested an afternoon meeting is that the Trusteeship Council is meeting in the morning and the Secretariat might possibly be overburdened.

I will not press my suggestion any further.

As there are no further observations, the meeting is adjourned until 3 p.m. tomorrow. The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.