S/PV.961 Security Council

The provisional agenda appears in document S/Agenda/ 961. If there is no objection, l shall declare the provisional agenda adopted. j ~1 A

l merely wanted ta say that l do not intend to oppose the inclusion in the agenda of the question raised by the Tunisian Government, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint of the Government of Tunisia against France, together with the commuiùcation attached ta it, present what has occurred in a manner which is not in any way consistent with the facts. ~ Telegram dated 20 July 1961 addressed ta the President of the Security Council by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia (5/4861). Letter d~ted 20 July 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia addressed ta the President of the Security Council (SI 4862) 3. The PRESiDENT (translated from Spanish): Iwish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the letter in document S/4868, in which the repre- sentative of Tunisia requests permission ta take part in the discussion of this question. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, l pro- pose to invite the representative of Tunisia ta take part in the discussion of the item, if there is no objection. At the invitation of the President; Mr. Mongi Slim (runisia). took a place at the Council' table.

The Council will now proceed to consider the agenda. The 6. In this first statement, which constitutes the introductory part of our complaint, l shall confine myself to presenting the facts in their dramatic simplicity and to putting forward the essential factors which form the basis of our complaint and justify it. 7. l have no desire to enter into a controversy regarding the reliability or the unreliability of the Tunisian version of the facts. Were l a member of the 8ecurity Council, l could immediately requestand my Government would be prepared to complythat an international inquiry should be carried out on the spot in order to verify the Tunisian argument and the French argument. But in order to uphold the dignity of this debate, l shall content myself with setting out, simply and dispassionately, "he facts, the events and the elements involved. 8. My delegation of course reserves the right to speak again in the course of the debatewheneverit considers this necessary in order to correct a distortion of the truth or to give the Council any explanatiorrs which might be helpful in clarifying the discussion. 9. The facts are simple. On 19 July 1961, at the conclusion of a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Terrenoire, the Minister of Information of the French Government, made the following statementto the Press: "1 simply confirm that paratroop units intended to supplement those at presentavailable at the base have been or will be sent there." No authorization in this respect was sought from the Tunisian Government, and that Government was not even officially informed of the action. Yet this operation announced by the French Minister of Information was going to take place on Tunisian soil and across Tunisian air space. 10. In this connexion l take the liberty to stress that the latest French-Tunisian agreement, constitutedby the exchange of letters dated 17 June 1958 [8/4869] regarding the evacuation of the French troops from Tunisia, unequivocally states that the FrenchGovernment "does not intend to maintain any armed forces on Tunisian territory other than those which may be stationed there by virtue of agreements negotiated between the two 8tates". l stress the words "...by virtue of agreements negotiated between the two States". 11. In regard to 19 July 1961, however, no agreement was negotiated between the two States concerning the French paratroops whose imminent arrivaI was announced to the Press by the French Minister of Information. 12. In view of this repudiation of the formaI undertaking given by the French Government on 17 June 1958 and repeated here in this Council chamber by 13. It seems, however, that the aggressiveh.. entions had already become irrevocable. Frenchmilitaryaircraft from outside the country began to fly over the Bizerta area; they ignored the warning shots which were fired. Thus, throughout the afternoon of 19 July 1961, troops were dropped by parachute ontheBizerta base, this action being accompanied or preceded by the machine-gunning of Tunisianpositions, whichwere mainly held by civilians. At the same time, three French warships-the Colbert (a cruiser), the Bouvet and the Chevalier-Paul-were seen cruising off the port of Bizerta a little beyond the limit of Tunisian territorial waters, namely, about six miles off shore. These vessels vainly tried to force an entry into the channel leading to Bizerta. 14. Besides this, four French reconnaissance aircraft flew over the artiUery barracks at Bizerta. In consequence of these attacks, whichconstitutepremeditated and concerted aggression, the Tunisian 8ecretary of state for Foreign Affairs, at 6.20 p.m., summoned the French Chargé d'affaires and requested him to transmit a strong protest from the Tunisian Government against the aggression to which its territory had just been subjected by the parachuting of troops and the machine-gunning of Tunisian positions at Bizerta. He warned him of the consequences of such acts and said that the Tunisian Government placed the full responsibility for them on the -French Government. 15. This warning was nevertheless of no avail, for in the early hours of 20 July, that is to say, yesterday, serious incidents occurred at Menzel-Bourguiba, a few kilometres south of the Bizerta roadstead, resulting in füty deadand wounded. Those incidents took place very early in the morning, and Bizerta became the theatre of veritable operations of modern warfare in whichthe aircraft-earrier Arromanches and several fighter aircraft took part, carrying out blind and systematic attacks with bombs and rockets onthe Tunisian demonstrators. Some Red Crescent vehicles were seriously damaged, and the railway linebetween TuniS and Bizerta was cut by French troops. This was announced to the Tunisian Government in the Bizerta area by the French Consul at Bizerta itself. 16. Thus, on the morning of 20 July therewere about fifty dead and wounded on the Tunisian side besides the dead and wounded whom we have not yet been able to retrieve. Further, a unit of 130 Tunisian soldiers stationed in their barracks was mercilessly strafed from the base. The Tunisian Governmenthas as yet received no news of this unit. 17. As a result of these flagrant acts of aggression against Tunisia consisting mainly of the bombing and strafing of Tunisian positions, the sending of aircraft from outside the country and the parachutingoftroops 18. Late in the night of 20-21 July, thatis, last nigIit, the French Consul informedthe Government ofBizerta that the Tunisian garrison would have to withdraw from the town-although it was a civilian area-since the town was to be occupied by French troops. That ultimatum was of course rejected by the Tunisian Government. French troops from the naval and air base then laid siege to the town of Bizerta. Water e....~ elèctricity have been cut off throughout the tcwn of Bizerta sinèe this morning. Road communications between Bizerta and Tunis, the capital, sixty kilo- Metres away, are barely feasible. 19. Armoured paratroop units have attacked peaceful demonstrators at Menzel-Bourguiba, leaving thirtyfive dead and Many wounded among the civilian population, according to thefigures sofar rec·eived. French aircraft have been continuously bombing the town of Bizerta. It isnotyetknownhowmanydead and wounded there are among the Tunisians. 20. In the course of these criminal acts of aggression -1 apologize for the term, but it suitsthe case-committed against the civilian popuhüion, two journalists, Ml'. Davies of the National Broadcasting Corporation and Ml'. Jean Daniel of the French newspaper L'Express, were wowlded. --- 21. According to a dispatch which my delegation received from Tunis about two hours ago, the French forces this morning used napalm against the Tunisian . positions at Sidi-Ahmed, situated about twenty kilo- Metres from Bizerta. Also today-at 11.30 p.m. GMT -French aireraft machine-gunned two barracks where Tunisian soldiers are stationed. 22. French aireraft this morning also bombed the road from Tunis to Bizerta, half"way between the two towns. This bombing was carried out outside the zone of operations. 23. Another attack was carried out by French paratroops, using armoured vehicles, against Menzel- Djemil, situated twenty-five kilometres fromBizerta, and against Mateur, a large townforty-five kilometres from Bizerta. street fighting is going on in these two towns. At Bizerta, street fighting broke out, and now, at abOut 1 p.m. New York time, is still continuing. 24. Clashes began today in the south. Our forces, which are advancing towards the points assigned to them, are confronted with commandos trained in desert warfare. 27. Those are the facts. They point indisputab!y to an armed, premèditated aggression, which has beencontinuing since le July at 5 p.rn. up to now. l have stated these facts simply and dispassionately despite their tragic results for a people which has always asplred to peace and whoee Government, ever since it regained its independence, has worked unceasingly, with complete and absolute devotion, for the restoration of international peace and co-operation on a genuine basis of law and justice and ip. conformity with the principles of the Charter. 28. We 9.re among those who, throughout the wOlld, believe that nothing, absolutely nothing, can justify an act of aggression. The existence of the Charter, the ve'i:y existenc·e of our Organization, means the complete and absolute negation of any possible excuse for an act of aggression. 29. Yet attempts have been made and will be made again ta find such an excuse in the stand taken by the Tunisian Government on .;; July 1961fortheevacuation of all French troops still on Tunisian territory, bath at the Bizerta base and along the Libyan frontier to mark 233, about twenty-five kilometres to the south of Fort-Saint, which is itself at 220 mark. 30. Ta make this statement clear, we would like ta recall briefly the problem whi.ch has E.\xisted since 17 June 1958 as a result of another instance of aggression, that of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, of which the Council is fully aware and which is still pending before it. 31. On 8 February 1958, the bombing of the village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef by French aireraft compelled the Tunisian Government ta realize the consequences of the presence of French t:roops in Tunisia. That same evening, the President of the Republic solemnly stated the principle of the withdrawal of Frenchtroops from Tunisia, saying: "The evacuation of Tunisia has become a necessity. We intend this evacuation ta be total, including Bizerta". 32. The members of the Council will recall what followed the Sakiet affair: the good offices mission led by two senior United Kingdom and United States officiaIs made it possible, among other things, ta refute the doubtful argument maintained at that time by the French Government to the effect that "Bizerta was essential to the defence of the free world". In March 1958 the FrenchGovernment statedthat Bizerta would in no case be abandoned, not even to a friend or an ally, but that "France alone must remain at Bizerta". 33. Just after the revolution of 13 May 1958, General de Gaulle came back to power, and he wisely proceeded to study the situation created by the Sakiet- Sidi-Youssef incident. Secondly, the French Government proposes to open negoti.ations with Tunisia as soon as possible and at the latestupon completionof thl?withdrawal schedule. 1 shall repeat that sentence because it is very important for the conduct of our debate. According to the specifie statement of that agreement of 17 June 1958 the French Government proposed-and we accepted that proposal-to enter into negotiations with Tunisia as soon as possible and at the latest upon completion of the withdrawal schedule. It will he recalledthat the schedule was to coyer a period of four months, starting from 17 June 1958. That point was clearly made here before the Council on 18 June 1958 on behalf of the French delegation by Mr. de Vaucelles, then representative of France. Thirdly, the agreement stipulated that the negotiations were to establish by joint agreement a pro'- visional arrangement for Bizerta, until circumstances allowed of the conclusion of a final agreement. 35. Many days and months passed by, however, since that date of 17 June, and in any case more than the four months constituting the period agreed upon. Then, on 17 February 1959, in the middle of a crisis caused by the discovery of an espionage network under coyer of French technical assistance in Tunisia, President Bourgùiba made a formaI offer: a bilateral agreement on Bizerta representing a concession to France in return for specifie and rapid action for restoring peace in Algeria. 36. No response was made to that offer, and four . months later it was withdrawn. On 17 June 1959, President Bourguiba, drawing the obvious conclusion from the French Government's attitude, once again stated the principle of the total evacuation of Bizerta. 37. Today is not the first time that we have called for the evacuation of Bizerta. Up to the end of 1959, the Tunisian Government missed no opportunity of rais7.ng the question of Bizerta through the normal diplomatie channels, both atTunis and in Paris. 38. The journey undertaken at that time by the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, brought the problem to the fore once again. The Government of the United States agreed to the withdrawal of United States forces from Morocco. 39. On 20 December 1959 and on 4 January 1960, the Tunisian Government took up with France the question of the recognition by F rance of the principle of the evacuation of Bizerta, the task of arranging the procedure and schedule for the withdrawal to be left to experts. 41. It will be recalled, however, that in the meantime the barricades went up in Algiers and confronted the French Government with serious difficulties. The Tunisian Government, not wishing to add to these, decided to postpone its contemplated action regarding Bizerta, and, in the succeeding months, there were several conciliatory gestures. A few barracks at the Bizerta base which were no longer of any use to the French Army and a few military hutments in the town of Bizerta itself were returned to us. There was also talk that the conversion of theMenzel-Bourguiba shipyard might be started. The French Government none the less still refused to negotiate with us concerning the base or its evacuation. 42. That was the situationlastJune: occupation, without right or title, of a portion of our national territory by French armed units, and this against the clearly expressed will of our Government that the situation should be ended. Up to the end of June, however, that will was expressed solely through the normal diplomatie channels. 43. You will therefore understand my Government's astonishment when it realized, at the end of last June, that the military authorities at the base not only appeared to he unaware of our wishes but were making the situation worse by undertaking constructior: work which would increase the base' s potential. In the face of this attitude which clearly showed what the French intentions were, President Bourguiba, always anxious to foster to the utmost the possibilities of a peaceful settlement, addressed a special message to the President of the French Republic on 6 July last, urging him to salvage the chances of co-operation between our two countries by adopting an attitude more in conformity with sound principles of co-operation. 44. The Tunisian people were greatly disturbed. In his personal letter to President de Gaulle, President Bourguiba made known his irrevocable decision to see the end of this abnormal situation. At the request of my delegation, that document will be circulated as a United Nations document [8/4871]. 45. On 14 July, in the course ofagreat popular demonstration, President Bourguiba once again appealed for understanding and moderation and, in response ta the nation' s wishes, announced that an extraordinary session of the National Assembly would be held on 17 July. Ten days had elapsed, and the French Head of State had not seen fit to reply to the personal letter from the Tunisian Head of 8tate. The only French reaction was a request from the French Ambassador in which it was stated that there could be no talks in an atmospheI - of disturbances and street demonstrations. 46. Here you will allow me to express myastonishment at the argument that was used; the French Government took it upon itself to judge a whole people and their actions within their own territory, and to consula~e is still operating in complete freedom in the midst of the popular demonstrations, and no hostile outcry has been addressed to France or to the consulate or to any French civilian living at Bizerta. 48. Where, then, were the disturbances? Where was the valid pretext which could be invoked to prevent the opening of negotiations? As far as 1 know, there have up to now been popular demonstrations only on Tunisian soil and not, 1 repeat, on French soil. 49. In this éonnexion 1 should like to ask, ü negotiations are refused when they are requested through the diplomatic channel, and ü they are still refused when requested somewhat more insistently, when will any negotiations be accepted? 50. We thus come back, after the review ofthis train of events, to the aggression, or at least its preparation. On 12 July, some French newspapers, including Figaro, reported a proposaI to send a contingent of French paratroops from BOne to Bizerta. Because of our anxiety, the French Chargé d'affaires in Tunisia stated on 15 July that this news was a pure invention. 51. An evil deed is always prepared away from the limelight. Two days later it was announcedfrom Paris that the garrison of Bizerta was being reinforced. The preparations had been made, and the French Government informed us "very diplomatically" that France would defend itself against any attack ... on our soil. On 19 July at mid-day, it was announced that paratroops were embarking for Bizerta. At 12:30 p.m., the Tunisian Government, faced with this threat of a landing, gave formaI notice that it was prohibiting flights over Tunisian territory by any Frenchmilitary aircraft, and at about 5.30 p.m. Tunisian troops fired the first warning shots at a French aircraft flying over Bizerta. The reaction, as we know, was swüt: in the minutes that followed, French aireraft began bombing and machine-gunning everything Tunisian in the Bizerta area. 52. 1 might recall in passing that international law requires, for any flight over a territory, the consent of the country concerned. The United Nations itself, even when carrying out a manüest resolution of the 8ecurity Council, neverfails to request such authorization when it has to fly over my country in connexion with the affairs of the Congo or of any other country. 54. SO far as we are concerned, nathing more is involved than the reoccupation of the furthest point of that frontier, that is to say, a point fifteen kilometres south of the Rhadamès parallel in Libya, which was designated by the treaties for topographical purposes as mark 233. 55. It is thus clear from the facts and events which 1have just related that, since 19July 1961, the French have been committing armed, premeditated and continu~:'1g aggression against Tunisia, which is an independent sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. This aggression has been committed by French military forces coming from outside-from Algeria or from French warships off the Tunisian coast. It is being carried out by paratroops, supported by bombing and machine-gunning of the Bizerta area, by aircraft coming from Algeria or by aircraftcarriers and warships off the coast of Bizerta, followed by attacks by armoured units from the barracks at the base. There were not-at least during the first two days-any attacks carried outbytheFrenchforces stationed at Bizerta and from the land bases for the purpose ofdefence against any attackontheir positions. 56. Tunisia is lawfully defending itself against this aggression by aIl the means atitsdisposal. We do not, to be sure, have any tanks to face the French armoured units; we have no fighter aircraft to oppose the French fighter aircraft. We simply have our unshakable faith and the general determination of our people to regain possession of the whole of its territory and to extend its legitimate sovereignty over the whole of its soil and its territory. 57. In order to counter this unspeakable aggression, my Government was compelled to take certain political and military measures. It was decided to break off diplomatic relations with France, and this took effect on 20 July at 11 a.m. GMT. Consequently the members of our Embassy in Paris have returned to TUnis. However, we have so far continued to maintain our consular relations. 58. Also, to its great regret, the Tunisian Government, which has done so much for the United Nations operation in the Congo, was obliged this afternoon to li Convention relating to the frontier between the Regency of Tunis and the 'vilayet" of Tripoli; signed at Tripoli on 19 May 1910. y United Nations, TreatY Series, vol. 300, 1958, 1:4340. 59. Making use of our right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, we are fighting because we are forced ta do sa, whatever the sacrliice, sa that there may be banished forever from our territory the da..'lger of aggression supported by foreign forces stationed on our soil. 60. Putting its trust in the United Nations, the ultimate recourse of the small as well as the great countries of this world, my Government has brought this further complaint before the Security Council by reason of an act of armed, premeditated and continuing aggressionwhichhas beencommittedby F~ance against Tunisia and constitutes a serious threat ta internaI peace and security. 61. What we expect of the Council is simple and is in conformity with the Charter and with the primal'y responsibility vested in the Council under the Charter: first, to bring an .Immediate halt to the aggresslon; secondly, li necessary, to assist Tunisia in repelling it; thirdly, ta assist Tunisia, a Member of the United Nations, to remove from its territory this permanent danger of aggression constituted by the presence of French troops on its soil who are there against its will; in other words, to give to Tunisia all the assistance permitted under the Charter for bringing about the final evacuation of French troops from Tunisian soil. 62. Is that asking tao much of the Council?I honestly do not think so. We believe, on the contrary, that aH the members of the Council, who have frequently affirmed their devotion te peace and their respect for the sovereignty of nations, large and small, and the integrity of their territory, will give us, through the Council,. the legitimate support which, in conformity with the principles of the Charter, they promised us when we acceded to that instrument. 63. Ml'. BERARD (France) (translated fromFrench): No Power is more pained than France by the regrettable and serious events which the Council is considering today and for which France is inno way responsible. France' s feelings towards the Tunisian people are those of friendship and fraternity. Any incident likely to estrange our two peoples, even temporarily, is particularly distressing to us. 64. The Tunisian Government, reversing the position and the l'oIes, is presuming to submit to the Council a complaint against the French Government for the clear "military aggression committed by French forces on Tunisian territory". The truth is that it is much more my Government which could have denounced the unquestionable, deliberate and premeditated acts of aggression ordered by the Tunisian Government against French troops at Bizerta. The account l am about ta give you will, l think, leave the Council in no doubt about which Government is responsible for this tragic situation. 65. Before speaking about the Immediate responsibilities, l should like to say a few words about the 1 1 1 66. The French Governmento for its part, has never failed to abide scrupulously by the provisions of that text. As early as 11 October 1958, when the evacuation of the troops not stationed in Bizerta had been completed, it took the initiative of proposing to the Tunisian Government that talks should be opened on the subject of the base. It repeated that offer on several occasions during' later contacts. Talks have taken place àt various times, but negotiations were never really entered into. , 67. Finally, in a note dated 28 January 1960, the Tunisian Government saw fit to request the French' Government to evacuate Bizerta without further ado. In reply to L'lat note, the French Government told the Tunisian Government on 5 February 1960 that it continued to abide by the provisions jointly agreed upon on 17 June 1958 and it pointed out that it was always willing to continue the talks. Moreover, on 29 March 1960 the French Government, in a spirit of conciliation, decided to evacuate the barracks situated in the town of Bizerta, which were returned to the Tunisian authorities in accordance with a timetable ending on 31 October 1960. In the same spirit, in November 1960, the French Government proposed to transfer to the Tunisian Government certain base installations situated outside the city. In accordance with the time-table that was arranged, those installations were returned to the Tunisian authorities between 15 January and 15 June 1961. J 68. At the same time, the French Government informed the Tunisian Government that it had decided to reduce the number of its land forces stationed at Bizerta. Finally, in November 1960, the French Government proposed that the industrial installations of the Sidi-Abdallah arsenal should be converted and made available to the Tunisian economy. These proposaIs were accepted by the Tunisian Governmentand a Mixed Commission met in February 1961 to examine the technical and financial problems entailed in the conversion of the arsenal. At the request of the Tunisian Government, four Frenchexperts, placed at its disposaI, undertook a study on the spot and submitted a report to it on 9 JUne. The Tunisian author-' ities have not yet published their conclusions. 69. In connexion with this same arsenal, the Secretary of State of the Tunisian Govèrnment told the French Chargé d'affaires on 30 May 1961 that the future of Bizerta should be viewed in a broader perspective and in a spirit of genuine co-operation be- 70. Furthermore. on several occasions during the last few months and particularly in February 1961, during the meeting at Rambouillet between the President of the French Republic and the President of the Tunisian Republic-a meeting characterized by a friendly atmosphere which bothcountrieswarmly welcomed-the Tunisian Government affirmed its desire not to create difficulties at Bizerta which might embarrass the French Government at a time when it was about to open talks with the F l'ont de libération nationale to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Algerian question. 71. Thus everybody was feeling pleased about the very cordial relations that had been restored between the two countries and that were subsequently confirmed by their common decision to re-establ1shnormal diplomatic relations, when the Tunisian Government, in an unexpected move which surprised world opinion as wèll as French opinion, decided to concoct the situation which was inevitably to develop into the present crisis. 72. It is not for me to say what reasons might have prompted that move. 1 shall merely point out that the pretext invoked was really a fl1msy one. The command of the Bizerta base had undertaken some quite minor construction work on an area-a matter offrom two to three metres-at the end of the runway which extends the landing strip of Sidi Ahmed airport and is within itsconfines. The construction was designed to make it safer for aireraft to land in the event of a failure of their brakes. The Ttmisian Government sought to oppose the operation by force and used .it as an argument to demand the opening of talks to make arrangements for the evacuation of the base. 73. At the sarne time it announced its intention of unleashing what it called a "n~w battle of Bizerta" and adopted a series of measures aimed at preparing gradually Tunisian opinion to support and carry on that battle: organization of meetings of the Nêo- Destour throughout Tunisia, adoption of motions, press and radio campaigns, public demonstrations, diggillg of a trench around the base, etc. 74. Those are the circumstances in which, while a cleverly worked-up campaign of agitationwas spreading at Bizerta and throughout the country, President Bourguiba sent a personal letter to General de Gaulle on 7 July demanding the evacuation of the base. At the same time there was a veritable mobilization of pll.ramilitary groups and scores of volunteers were sent to Bizerta to strengthen the National Guard and the Tunisian Army. 75. The Tunisian demand, backed as itwas bythreats, obviously became unacceptable. Consequently, on 76. Far from adopting an attitude which would make it possible for negotiations to be opened, the Tunisian Government simply intensified its aggressive preparations in the days which followed. On 14 July, President Bourguiba announced publicly and officially that he had decided to.launchthe Ilsecond battle of Bizertaft • He said that he would make a statement to the National Assembly on 17 July if he had not received a positive reply from the French Government by that time. 77. On the morning of 16 July the French Chargé d'affaires told the Tunisian Government that, should the situation revert to normal, there would no longer be any reason for General de Gaulle to maintain the reservations which had led him to postpone his reply. 78. Unfortunately the Tunisian Government took no account of that statement. In fact, on 17 July President Bourguiba announced to his National Assembly that he was resuming the battle of Bizerta "at the point where it had been left on 17 June 1958, with the means and methods brought to bear immediately following the incident of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssefll • He specified that those measures would be applied as from Wednesday, 19 July. 79. On 18 July, the French Government took another step. Its Chargé d'affaires emphatically reminded the Tunisian Government that a solution of the Bizerta problem could not be sought under duress. He repeated that France still hoped that negotiations would be opened but he also stated that, as a result of the threats and the concentrations of Tunisian forces, steps would be taken to ensure the inviolability of the base and freedom of communication between its component installations. He made the Tunisian Government responsible in advance for any incidents towhich those moves might give rise. He stressed once again that the communications addressed to the Tunisian Government in no way closed the door to talks and that it was simply a matter of re-establishing an atmosphere calm enough to allow of the opening of talks. With the permission of the Council, l shall read out the text of that important document. It reads as follows: "In his statement to the National Assembly in Tunis on 17 July, the President of the Tunisian Republic said that steps would be taken beginning on 19 July to resume the battle at the point at which it had been left on 17 June 1958 employing the means and methods that were used following the Sakiet-8idi-Youssef incident. "In communications delivered by the French Chargé d'affaires on 13 and 15 July the French Government has already indicated that a solution to the Bizerta problem cannot be sought in an atmosphere of passion or under thteat of public demonstrations. If, however, the situation should return to normal, without threat or ultimatum, a reply would be given to the message which President "It wishes to warn the Tunisian Government most sertously against the possible consequences of such an attempt. Moreover, any such attempt can only result in delaying any talks on the subject of the Bizerta base, such as were contemplated in the exchange of letters of 17 June 1958 and ~hich the French Government still hopes will be ~nitiated. "In response to the increasing threats and pressure being exerted on the Bizerta base, the French Government is constrained to take all the necessary steps to ensure the inviolability of the installations and freedom of communication between them. "The French Government has further noted that, in his aforementioned speech, the President of the Tunisian Republic announced that elements of the Tunisian Army would cross the Sahara border in the direction of Garet El Hamel. Here again it is forced to draw the attention of the TunisianGovernment to the grave danger of any such incursion beyond the Timisian frontier, which the French forces stationed in the area would be bound to oppose. "The French Government is very anxious to avoid any incident. It is compelled to make the Tunisian authorities responsible in advance for any act of violence. It hopes that the Tunisian Government will assess the dangers of the situation and avoid any action likely to exacerbate it. "The French Government is also compelled to state that the action announced by the TunisianGovernment may seriously prejudice French-Tunisian co-operation in aIl fields despite the fact that in his statement the President of the Tunisian Republic made a point of saying that he wished to maintain such co-operation as also the friendly relations between th~ two countries. "The French Government cannot conceive how the maintenance of that co-operation, which it also desires, can be reconciled with the threats of force which are now being made and with which this note is concerned." 80. The circumstances in which the situation deteriorated so sharply in the course of 19 July make the Tunisian Government directly and exclusively responsible. Beginning at one o'clock in the morning on 19 July, the Tunisian authorities set in motion a whole series of clearly aggressive and war-like operations. They set up fourteen roadblocks on the roads which ensure communication between the various parts of the strategic base. These roadblocks were guarded by civilians under officers of the Tunisian Army and the National. Guard. They used force to stop aIl traffic. 81. Confronted with that situation, the French Government, towards noon, announced its decision to ! 1 i \ j \ 1 1 83. At that junctur~ the French forces returned tqe fire. This it was not until several hours after the Tunisian Government took the initiative in opening fire on the French forces that the latter, in exercise of their legitimat~ right of self-defence, resigned themselves to returning fire. 84. At 7.50 p.m. the Tunisian forces began to block the passage through the channel, thus cutting off the base' s communications in the direction of the sea. At 4 a.m. on 20 July Tunisian guns opened fire on the airfield. Towards 5 a.m. a series of attacks were launched against the arsenal, forcing the French forces to return fire. Fresh attacks against the French installations then compelled the French command to take appropriate defence measures. Thus throughout the day of 19 July and the night of 19-20 July the Tunisian authorities engaged in deliberate acts of aggression against the installations of the French forces. The latter, after waiting for a long time, were constrained to return fire when they found themselves-I repeat-in a situation clearly calling for legitimate self-defence. 85. The French Government solemnly warned the Tunisian Government against the action it has deliberately taken and for which it is whollyand solely responsible. It appealed to the Tunisian Government to put an end to attacks whose continuation might have incalculable consequences. 86. On 20 July it announced that it was prepared to issue the necessary instructions for talks with the Tunisian authorities concerning the conditions for an immediate cease-fire. Nobody should be deceived by the Tunisian tactic of placing before the Security Council incidents which it has itselfprovoked. Neither such manœuvres nor any strong appeals to world opinion will resolve French-Tunisian problemsj they will be settled only by negotiation and respect for signed agreements.

The United States views the tragic events which have taken place in Tunisia in the last few days with deep concern. Death and injuries have been suffered which cannot help but cause the deepest bereavement among the people of Tunisia and of France, and among the people of the United States, who have always had the most cordial feelings for both. We express ourcondolences to the families and peoples involved. 89. The use of military force can onlyfurtherarouse passions and greatly complicate a problem which, in accordance with the Charter and the good will which has traditionally prevailedbetween France andTunisia. should be solved by peaceful means. The UnitedStates believes that the people of Tunisia and the people of France share with the Council a common interest in resolving their differences peacefully and in accordance with true regard for each other's sovereignty and well-being. 90. We have the greatest confidence that, under the far-sighted leadership of President Bourguiba and President de Gaulle, means will be found to attain a peaceful solution. 91. We believe that what the Council can most effectively do now, in pursuance of its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, is to urge the restoration of conditions which will allow statesmanship to be asserted promptly and peacefully. The United States therefore appeals both to France and to Tunisia to put into effect an immediate cease-fire and a retum of aIl forces to· their previous positions. 92. We believe that all concerned should refrain from any action which would cause a further deterioration of the situation and make a peaceful solution more difficult. We realize that great patience will be required. 93. We appeal to both Governments to exercise the utmost moderation, forbearance and statesmanship. The lives of many individuals and perhaps the destinies of more than one nation lie at stake. We frankly fail to see how the continuation of hostilities can serve the interests of either country. On the contrary, unless their speedy termination is achieved, irreparable damage may be done. Although diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed, we believe that with good will an immediate cease-fire can be put into effect, and ways and means can be found to arrange for prompt negotiations on outstanding issues in the spirit of the Charter. 94. In the meantime, the United States submits that nothing should be dOl:. 'vhich might hinder the possibilities of achieving a peaceful settlement. It is accordingly important to ensure that whatever takes 96. My Government is profoundly shocked at the actions of the French forces in Tunisia, and my delegation, in strongly condemning this slaughter, can only bow respectfully to the innocent victims of French military aggression. 97. Once again, we have proof that colonialist ambitians are alone responsible for disturbing world peace and security. If there had been no foreign troops in Tunisia, there would have been neither dead nor wounded. Although the presence of these troops has been tolerated provisionally in a part of Tunisia, this provisional situation ought to have ceased a long time ago. 98. We aIl know under what conditions a French military base was maintained at Bizerta and, more particularly, that in an exchange of letters between the representatives of Tunisia and France on 17 June 1958, France undertook not to "maintain anyarmed forces on Tunisian territory other than those which may be stationed there by virtue of 'agreements negotiated between the two States" and proposed to open negotiations with Tunisia as soon as possible and at the latest upon completion of the withdrawal schedule. "The purpose of these negotiations" -as stated in the document-"wiU be to establish by joint agreement between the two Governments a provisional arrangement for the maintenance of the strategic base of Bizerta until circumstances allow of the conclusion of a final agreement on this matter". 99. Since then three years have passed, three years in which Tunisia has tried unceasingly and by peaceful means to liquidate this Bizerta base. France has never made any serious effort to settle this matter:. Today, 1 regret to state, the means employed by the French authorities are cruel. We deplore this situation and vehemently ccndemn thè action taken by the French authorities against a peace-loving people. 100. My delegation urges the liquidation of French military bases in Tunisia because they alone are the cause of aIl the present troubles. We call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops, and we ask that a Member of our Organization he finally allowed to enjoy its full independence and security. 101, 1 shaH not today enter into details or examine the origin and causes of the troubles and massacres. The only important problem-and it must be tackled urgently li peace is to be preserved in this region and perhaps in the world-is the liquidation of the foreign military bases and the Immediate withdrawal of the French troops. 102. My delegation hopes that the Security Counci! will be able to find appropriate means for halting this 104. These tragic happenings have momentarily turned against each other twopeoples which, according to many natural considerations, should bebound by mutua] respect and friendship on the basis of equal sovereignty. In the sad circumstances with which the Security Council is now confronted, my Government urges an immediate cessation of armed action inorder to prevent any further loss of life and so that the status quo ante may be promptly restored. 105. The international atmosphere at the present time is unfortunately perturbed by ~ number of international disputes or potential disputes; in such an atmospher!'l we should be particularly happy to see a prompt and peaceful settlement of the differences which have arisen between Tunisia and France, before those differences are allowed to crysiallize into yet another grave and protracted issue. 106. We are encouraged in this hope by the deep sense of responsibility towards the international community which we know to be shared by aIl concerned. My countrymen have a great sympathy and admiration for the people of Tunisia, as well as for the progressive and enlightened Government which has been leading that country ever since its independence. Tunisia has a brilliant record in the United Nations, where its delegation has played a prominent l'ole-second to none in the service of justice, peace and the pacific settlement of disputes. 107. On the other band, we have just heard the repl'esentative of France himself express the hope for a peaceful settlement of the present dispute. We hope that an immediate cessation of armed action, followed by a prompt and peaceful settlement, will be forthcoming in the interests of both parties as weIl as of the international community. lOS. MI'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The peace-loving countries and peoples have learnt with great alarm and deep indignation of the new acts of aggression committed during the past two days by the French colonialists against the peoples of the African continent-this time in Tunisia, in the area of Bizerta. Again the blood of the Tunisian is flowing, just as it did a short while ago after Tunisia had won its national independence as a result of decades of heroic struggle. There have been many casualties; many bave been killed or wounded, evenamongthecountry's defenceless civilian population, and there have been great material losses. Such are the grievous consequences of these new crimes by the colonialists. 110. To judge from the most recent news, the military action begun by France in the Bizerta region is developing into a large-scale offensive by uhits of the French regular Army against Tunisia. On20July 1961, according to press reports, the Command of the French armed forces demanded that the Tunisian army abandon the town of Bizerta, which is an inalienable part of Tunisia-and this was confirmed today in the Counci!. It is also known that French military units took action designed to effect the outright seizure of the town. The normal life of Bizerta has been disrupted by the actions of the French Air ForGe, which has strafed the town, and its electricity and water supply have been put out of commission. French tanks have been sent into action against the Tunisian population in Bizerta and in several adjacent regions. 111. More and more contingents of the French Marines are being landed on Tunisian territory. Parachute units are being sent to Tunisia by air from the French military bases in Algeria; and the most recent communication which was just distributed under the symbol si4873, was signed by the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, states the following (1 am using the English version since l do not have a Russian translation): "Have honour draw your attention to the very dangerous worsening of situation at Bizerta owing to aggression by French armed forces. Waves of bombers and of aircraft carrying parachutists are arriving at Bizerta from Algeria in a ceaseless procession. Fierce and murderous street fighting is now taking place in the town far from the French military installations. The French air force is machine-gunning the civilian population and destroying buildings and industrial plants. 'vVe dl'aw attention to odious and inhuman nature of activities of French armed forces and denounce it." 112. The ilik, as it were, had scarcely dried on the records of the previous meeting of the SecurityCouncil, which was considering the question of the threat to peace in the Middle East inthe Kuwait region caused by the armed forces of the United Kingdom, when th~ Council was again today called into session to deal with serious breaches of the peace committed by the French armed forces at the northern end of the African continent. And if we turn back a few more pages in the United Nations annals, for the past year alone, we are faced with a long chain of such violations of international peace and security by th~ colonialist Powers. 113. We have Algeria, where a predatory war has now been raging for some seven years; the Congo, Cuba, Angola, South West Africa and Kuwait; andnow, Tunisia. And this is far from a complete list of those situations endangering international peace with which the United Nations has recently been forced, in some 115. We must emphasize particularly the fact that one of the most dangerous means \vhereby the colonialists try ta retain their power is the maintenance of their armed forces, and especially of their mili'tary bases, on the territory of their former colonies. The history of the French military base at Bizerta, as it was outlined ta us here by the Tunisian representative and as a number of other speakers have aIsa pointed out, presents in our view a typical attempt among many other such, on the part of the colonialists to strengthen their influence by force of arms. Allow me to cite sorne facts in this connexion. 116. As we know, Tunisia was long a French colony. French colonialist domination over Tunisia was secured by the so-ealled Treaty of Bardo of 12 May 1881. This treaty for a long time deprived Tunisia of any independence in its internaI and external affairs and turned it, as it were, into a regular base for occupation by French military forces. The treaty was abrogated with the signature of the Frotocol on the Independence of Tunisia of 20 March 1956. However, II. considerable number of Frenchtroops-and, above aIl, the military base at Bizerta-continued ta remain on Tunisian soiL Relying on that base, France retained the ability to exert strong influence on the internaI and external policies of the new State. It was therefore not by chance, as Ml'. Bourguiba, the President of the Republic of Tunisia, very correctly said on 2 July 1956, that colonialism was implanted in Tunisia through the seizure of Bizerta. 117. Let us also remember that in February 1958,11 in connexion with aggressive action by France against Tunisia which took the form ofthe bombing of the town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, the Tunisian Government complained to the Security Council. Almost immediately thereafter, however, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United states offered their mediation for the settlement of the Franco-Tunisian conflict; Tunisia and France announced their acceptance of that offer, and as a result the Security Council did not then study the substance of the Tunisian complaint. 119. More than three years have passed since that tîme. What has happened in those three years in connexion with the military base at Bizerta? In order to give a better picture of the situation and to supplement what the Tunisian representative has already said here, l should like to refer to a document which \','as published as Security Council document 8/4862. In this document we read the following: "8ince that date, the Tunisian Government has approached the French Government with a view to obtaining the evacuation of the base at Bizerta and of a portion of the south-east territory of Tunisia, as defined by an international agreement of 1910) which was also occupied by French troops. This claim has been referred to in the course of many Franco-Tunisian talks since the end of 1958, and was stated publicly by President Habib Bourguiba in his speeches of 17 June 1959) 25 January 1960 and 17 July 1961." 120. There were so many attempts made by the Tunisian Government, in the spirit of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, to arrive at a peaceful settlement of its dispute with the FrenchGovernment. But, as the document l have quoted shows, these attempts met solely with procrastination or evasive rql1ies on the part of the French Government. 121. By acting in this way for three long years the French Government has given proof of its scorn for the legitimate claims of Tunisia and has thus shown, the document says, "that it refuses to take account of the rights of Tunisia, a sovereign and independent country". 122. These, then, were years in which the Tunisian Government, as we can now see and as is completely clear to all, attempted, with seemingly endless patience, to convince the French Government of the need to apply this extremely simple principle. What was the Tunisian Government asking of the French Government during all these years? That it should respect the soverei~ty, independence and territorial integrity of the country. This is the very same aspiration that is easily found in the Charter of our 11 Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1958, document 5/4013. 124. First, it has been established beyond dispute that Bizerta is an inalienable part of Tunisia, over which Tunisia exercises absolute and unconditional sovereignty. 1 would recall once again that even the French Government has formally recognized this facto 125. Secondly, for three years the Tunisian Government, displaying truly remarkable patience and selfrestraint, has pressed for the withdrawal of aU French forces from the territory under Tunisian sovereignty. 126. Thirdly, during these three years the French Government has systematically misled the Tunisian Government, and with it wo:rld opinion and the United Nations, by giv~ng the impression that it was ready to conduct negotiations for the withdrawal of French forces from Bizerta but by in fact, under various pretexts, eva~ing any settlement of the question. 127. Today, in the statement of the French representative, we heard everything imaginable-from reaffirmations of burning love, and deyotion to the interests of the Tunisian people, to attempts to place aU responsibility for the acts of bloody aggression, committed by the French colonialists in Tunisia, on the shoulders of this same Tunisian people which is so beloved of the French Government. Anyonepresent in the Council during the French representative' s statemert could have heard aU this. Neither today nor earlier has he answered the two foUowing questions, though 1 hope he wiU now do so, 128. First, on what basis, on the strength of what provisions of international, national or other lawlaw which we, Members of the United Nations, solemnly undertook to support whenwe signed the Charter of our Organization-do the boots of French soldiers continue to tread the soil of Tunisia? Where are the provisions that might be cited to justify the continued foreign occupation of a part of Tunisian territory? 129. Secondly, wiU there be an end, and when, to the French armed forces' occupation of Tunisian territory, including the territory on which the Bizerta base is situated? We have had no answer likewise to this second essential, 1 might even say key, question which is before us here and to which a reply must be given if we want to give serious consideration to the situation which has developed in that region. 130. We have tried with all our attention to follow the arguments contained in the Frenchrepresentative' s speech, but we have failed to find the slightest thing that might be described, interpreted or understood as an announcement by the French Government of its wiUingness at any stage, in accordance with its own thesis (to which 1 will now revert), tohold negotiations 131. Even today' s announcement by the French Government went no further than to state that the French Government was prepared to hold negotiations with the Tunisian Government. What willthese negotiations consist of? What will they be about?Whatwill be their purpose? To the settlement of what questions will they be directed? 132. We know that the TunisianGovernment is rightly and lawfully struggling for the liberation of Tunisian territory from foreign occupation, from the presence of foreign troops, there, and that in its view the negotiations should coyer that subject. On what subject does the French Government intend to hold the negotiations to which the French representative here referred? It would be interesting to learn, and it would also be valuable for some definite period of time to be set, within which the French troops would, in accordance with theFrenchGovernment's announcement, be withdrawn from Tunisian territory. 133. We can find no answer, in the Frenchrepresentative' s statement, to these two key questions which 1 have mentioned, or to my several additional queries. On the other hand, there was in that speech no shortage of threats addressed to the Tunisian Government, which, it was said, must bear a heavy responsibility for the consequences of its actions. 134. We shall return to this aspect of the matter somewhat later, when we come to analyse the factual state of affairs as it has developed over the past forty-eight hours on Tunisian territory. At the present moment we wish to stress that the Security Council is waiting for the French representative to give an answer to these questions-anunambiguous, forthright answer which could and should shed some additional light on the dangerous situation which is unfolding in that area. 135. For this reason we would emphasize that, when the Tunisian Government was for three years exhausting every means of obtaining fromtheFrenchGovernment simply an answer which could serve as a basis for further negotiations, the TunisianGovernmentwas asking merely for recognition of the principle that Bizerta should be evacuated. That was the limit to which it went in the statement of its Just and lawful demands. When no answer was forthcoming, even to that question, and when the Bizerta base became an area in~o which French armed forces began to be poured and concentrated, the Tunisian Government, with full justüication, asked France to reply to the question which has been put to it: did it in general intend to base its actions on the principle that Bizerta was under Tunisian sovereignty with aIl the consequences emanating from that principle? 136. In the same document S/4862 from which 1 have already quoted, we can see how the French Government replied to this just demand by Tunisia. In this document we read: "The Tunisian Government, after its many approaches, expected that the French Government wOlùd give serious consideration to the withdrawal of its forces from the base at Bizerta and from 138. We know that subsequent events took thefollowing course: the French side nevertheless ordered its military air Îorces to invade Tunisian territory. This circumstance was very delicately described in the French representative's statement to the Security Council. He said: "We sent help and supplies". The word "supplies" always sound very humanitarian, but the wo:...d "help" was not explained. This help consisted in the fact that about 1,000 armed paratroops were dropped on Tunisian territory, despite the Tunisian Government' s prohibition and despite France's own recognition of Tunisian sovereignty over the country's entire territory, including Bizerta, after the illegal intrusion of French armed forces into Tunisian air space. It was this operation which was delicately described by the word "help"; andnaturaUy if this is not made clear, and if what was actuaUy involved in the intrusion of aImost 1,000 paratroops into Tunisia is concealed, it mightperhaps be possible to follow that logical line of reasoning which the French representative endeavoured to presen.t here. 139. Having said this, 1 should like to emphasize that, so far as the accounts of the events leading up to the first shorts fired on Tunisian territory are concerned, there is no material difference between the version given by the Ti..._jsian side and that presented by the French side. Thefactshavebeen clearly established, and in essence neither side denies them. There was an invasion of Tunisian soil, by almost 1,000 French paratroops, and the first warning shots which were fired by the Tunisian armed units were warning shots directed against this invasion, as a reply to it. 140. In other words, there are here no conflicting versions, such as so often arise, as tothe events; and this, in our view, makes the Council's task easier. We can consider that the facts have been established with the utmost clarity, but the question whether or not this operation organized by the French armed forces should be described as an infringement of Tunisia's sovereignty and an intrusion into its territory, or, in accordance with the French representative' s endeavours, as something more delicate, is naturally one for the Council to decide. 141. So far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, we cannot understand how, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible ta accuse Tunisia ofha.ving started military action, of having been the first to use force. Tunisia's use of force, as we are nowaU quite aware, took place in reply to the intrusion of French armed 142. l think that this must be clear, even to 'the French side. The whole trouble stems from the fact that neither in large nor in small matters can the former possessors of the colonial territories yet break themselves of their old habits of thought, which may have been suitable for the nineteenth century but which are abs01utely inapplicable at the time when you and l are living upon the earth. 143. It is said that sometimes you can see the whole world reflected in a drop of water. l do not know whether you, Mr.· President and my esteemed colleagues, noticed one rather short passage in the French representative's statement in which he spoke of what, from his point of view, were the original causes of the present sitution in Tunisia. He said in effect: "We, the French authorities in Bizerta, decided to place a piece of Tunisian sail, within the previously existing boundaries of the base". He said this in somewhat different words, and added that the strip of land in question was only two to three metres long. Whatever the length of that strip might be, it was clearly not French sail but Tunisian soil. But there was in the French representative's statement no trace of regret for these arbitrary actions aggravating the presumptuousness of theFrenchauthorities in making free with Tunisian Territory in the region of their military base at Bizerta. This makes us think of the psychology of a man, sitting at table, who cannot imagine that one fine day his servant, or some one regarded by him as his servant, may also sit at that table and eat with him. Indeed, just think what a horrible crime the Tunisian authorities have commïtted: the French authorities have snipped off a piece of territory in arder to widen their airport, and this action has brought about a corresponding reactian-the taking of appropriate action by the Tunisian authorities! This, in the view of the French representative, lS inadmissible and is one of the causes of the present conflict. 144. In this small example can be seen a typical instance of the colonial attitude of disregard for the property of others; and in a more important instance, representing the crux of the matter that we are considering, we can see the very same attitude when, it would seem, the intrusion of almost 1,000 French paratroops into the air space and territory of Tunisia was not a crime (on the contrary, it should be fully accepted and endured by the Tunisian Government), but the warning shots which, incidentally, caused no one any harm-I say this because we have heard of none here; there were no casualties at that stageconstltuted an act of aggression for which, if Wl:) 146. And finally. if all these circumstances andfacts still do not suffice to convince those who here support or intend to support the French position, is it not at least possible to find some common language. some common denominator. some agreement here in the Security Council that the maintenance of colonial Powers' military bases on the territories of their former colonies. despite the wishes of the peoples of those countries. and all these attempts to maintain colonialist domination by any means possible, are intolerable-Intolerable because they carry with them the germs of the most serious complications and involve the danger of large-scale armed conflicts, the consequences of which are often, in present circumstances. ?ifficult to predict. 147. 1 must place aIl possible emphasis on the fact that the Soviet Government has repeatedly pointed out that the policy of creating military bases on foreign territories is dangerous for the cause of peace; it is a policy of militarism. of the preparation and initiation of aggression. 148. In this connexion it is relevant to recall the words which the Chairman of the Council ofMinisters of the USSR. Mr. Khrushchev. used at a meeting of the General Assembly on 23 September 1960. He then said: "Like a deep-seated fQrm of acute infection in a living organism, these bases disrupt the normal political and economic lüe of the States upon which they have been foisted. They hinder the establishment of normal relations between those States and their neighbours." ~ 149. Just as trade relations served as a basis for the extension of the colonialist régime to many socalled "remote countries" at the dawn of thecolonialist era. so now. when colonialism is disintegrating. the colonialists use the military bases they have set up in the countries of Asia. Africa and Latin America as a kind of base of operationsfor the bloody repression of the peoples' nationalliberation movement, for the forcible retention of their influence in those areas of the world and for the exertion of unceremonious pressure on the under-developed independent States. To be convinced of this, it is enough torefer to events of the pasttenyears. to very recent events which we aIl have witnessed, or tothose situations which have more than once been brought before the Security Council or the General Assembly. 150. We know. for example. that the mllitary bases of the colonialists in Africa and in the Mediterranean 152. It should be added that in the events in Tunisia which the Council is now considering, as in many similar aggressive acts by the colonial Powers, the interests of one colonial Power-in this case, France, in Bizerta-are closely bound up with the interests of its other partners in military blocs. We know that in actual fact the military base at Bizerta is not merely a French military base but is a basefor the cOtmtries . belonging to the so-called North Atlantic bloc. 153. If anyone still retains any illusion that the alliance of the NATO countries is supposedly not directed against the African and Asian countries, the events in the Bizerta region provide new and fresh proof of the fact that, as in many other countries, NATO serves as the main military force for an that remains of the coloniaiist system of enslavement and oppression. 154. That is why there is ample justification for the claim that it is now high time for the colonialist Powers participating in NATO, in particular, tocease to use African territory as a site for the establishment of military bases or for the testing of at~mic weapons. 155. Before advancing those proposaIs which we regard it as necessary for the Council to examine and adopt in order to settle the question under consideration, l should like to draw attention to one more circumstance, against the background and in the light of which the concrete situations that this meeting of the Council has been called to consider should be studied. 156. In the light of the events in Tunisia and the other colonialist acts of aggression, the ominous significance of the fact that a number of Powers, including France, did not flnd it possible to vote for the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of states Mémbers of the United Nations on 14 December 1960 [resolution 1514 (XV)], is now clearer. '--. ~, 157. l should like to emphasize that it is precisely that document, of universal historical significance, which draws attention to the fact that conflicts resulting from the denial of, or impediments in the way of, the freedom of the peoples constitute a serious threat to world peace. l quote further.: "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter ftAlI armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right ta complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected." 159. It is becoming increasingly clear that those averse from supporting these and the other important principles mentioned in the Declaration continue to cherish the vain illusion that they are still able to arrest the march of history and prevent the collapse of the colonialist system. They are, of course, free to hold such illusions. But when such illusions, such lack of realism, lead to acts of aggression, to the violation of States' sovereign rights ,and territorial integrity, the Security Council must resolutely put a stop to such acts. 160. Taking into account aIl that has been said here, we consider that the Security Counci! should immediately take the following urgent measures. 161. The Counci! should condemn France's actions as constituting an act of aggression against Tunisia and a violation of its sovereignty and independence, an act which endangers peace in the region of North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. These actions by France, involving the use of armed force ta protect its colonialist interests, constitute a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 162. In our opinion, the Council must compel France to cease its aggression against Tunisia immediately, to withdraw all its forces from Bizerta and from the territory of Tunisia as a whole, and to terminate any other operations which violate the sovereignty and independence of Tunisia. 163. This demand must be categorical, for the Council cannat show the slightest leniency in cases like the one we are considering, where a colonialist Power has started a war against an African country which has recently attained independence. If the French Government, is, as it claims to be, really ready for a cease-fire, then, since it bears the responsibility for the aggression against Tunisia, it is the French Government which, without any prior conditions, must forthwith arder its armed forces to cease military operations. 164. The Council must campel France to respect Tunisian sovereignty and to comply with the clearly expressed will of the Tunisian people regarding the immediate withdrawal of French troopsfromTunisian territory and the liquidation of the French base at Bizerta. 165. We are fully in agreement with, and support, the sta.tement by the Tunisian Government that "the presence of the French army on the national territory of Tunisia, an independent '1nd sovereignState, against 166, Now. however. the Council should. in our view. unequivocally pronounce itself for the unconditional and Immediate wl.thdrawal of the French troops from aU Tunisian territory. 167. Experience has convincingly proved to us that any appeasement of an aggressor is completely inadmissible. That is why we think that the responsibility resting on the Security Council for the maintenance of the peace and security of the peoples compels the Council to act quickly and resolutely, This is what the delegation of the Soviet Union callsuponthe members of the Security Council to do. 168. MI'. BARNES (Liberia): The Council has before it the complaint of the Government of Tunisia charging the French Government with acts of aggression infringing the sovereignty and security of Tunisia. and threatening international peace and security, Thus. we are faced with the tragic spectacle of Tunisia and France. which not only should be. but which have. in fact, been good and intimate friends, confronting each other in a conflict in which Tunisia has been forced to defend itself. and now facing each other in this world forum. Yet. the very situation of this double confrontation is not entirely a cause for dismay. Rather. it is a measure of the progress mankind has made toward controlling the forces whichhave plagued us and plunged us into bloodshed and turmoil in all the generations of man. For. as long as nations have a tribunal before which they may seek a solution to the problems which have precipitated an armed conflict. there is hope that that conflict maybe contained. and a peaceful solution achieved. 169. Let us hope that the matters of common interest will assert their ascendancy and that the carefully wrought ties subsisting between F rance and Tunisia will not evaporate in an atmosphere befouled by the smoke of battle. That there is good ground for this hope is evident from the fact that the Government of Tunisia has promptly brought this matter to our attention. 170. The complaint before us is based on the charge that a portion of Tunisian territory has been under attack by the French Navy and Air Force. that Tunisian airspace has been violated by the action of the French forces in dropping paratroopers overBizerta. that French warships cruising off Bizerta:have strafed the area during the night of 19 to 20 July. killing and injur~ng many Tunisians. and cau!3ing considerable material damage. and machine-gunning of civilians, including children. 172. We must strive unceasingly for a worldinwhich sovereignty can be exercised within the framewôrk of the interdependence of nations. The rights of all nations must be respected. Nations guard their sovereignty with extreme zealousness and sensitivity, and until these rights are completely acknowledged we cannot expect that nations will voluntarily yield as much of their sovereignty as is necessary to establish the interdependent world order necessary to establish peace and security. We must recognize that nations will not permit any derogation from their hard-won rights. Thus it might well have been foreseen that Tunisia could not stand by while there remained in its midst tangible evidence of the control of a part of its soil by the former colonial Power against the will of the Tunisian people. 173. No one can accuse Tunisia of irresponsibility. It has a record of mature statesmanship and complete devotion to peace. What has occurred, therefore, must be understood in the light of the Intolerable strain which has been imposed upon the Tunisians bythe actions of their old friends, the French, in refusing to enter into negotiations regarding the Bizerta base as required by the 1958 agreement. 174. According to the explanatorymemorandumfrom the representative of Tunisia to the President of the 8ecurity Council [8/4862J, Tunisia andFranceentered into an agreement on 17 June 1958providingfor evacuation of French troops from the whole of the Territory with the exception of the" base at Bizerta, which was to be the subject of negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on the method of its evacuation. 175. The memorandum further states that since that date the Tunisian Government has approached the French Government. with a view to obtaining the evacuation of the base at Bizerta and that despite many attempts at peaceful settlement of the dispute, the Tunisian Government has met only with delays or dilatory replies from the FrenchGovernment. Instead, as the memorandum points out, the French Government has indicated a determination not merely to maintain the unacceptable status guo, but even to reinforce its present position by enlarging the landing strip at Bizerta. 8uch enlargement, in fact, was the Immediate occasion for the renewed insistence by the Tunisian Government on compliance with the obliga- 177. 1 am certain that the Council will wish ta act promptly and vigorously to bring an immediate cessation to the armed conflict now raging. To that end, the Council should call for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal or return of all forces to their previous positions. 178. Furthermore, since it could not have been contemplated that Tunisia would have agreed to the introduction of forces on its territoryfor utilization against Tunisia itself, it would be proper for us to call upon the French to withdraw immediately theirforces which they have brought in since 19 July 1961. Certainly the Tunisians could only regard the introduction of such forces as an act of provocation. 179. The Council should also call for a peaceful solution andfor negotiations between the parties concerned, having regard to the principle of evacuation in accordance with the expressed wish of the Tunisian Government and people. By taking such action the United Nations, that is, the Security Council, would demonstrate again the indispensable l'ole which it plays in today' s troubled world.

1 give the floor to the representative of Tunisia, in the exercise of his right ofreply. 181. Ml'. SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): In the statement previously made by him, the representative of France painted a picture which, quite honestly and seriously, 1 consider in no way to reflect the reality of the events either before or during the aggression of which my country has been the victim since 19 July. 182. However, 1 have said that 1 shall avoid entering into polemics, though not because 1 am afraid of being unable to furnish sufficient convincing proof of the facts which 1 have stated, for we have always shown the seriousness with which we treat all questions, whether they are under consideration by the General Assembly, by the Committees or, with still more reason, by the Security Council. 183. It is painful for me to note, however-and this according to the French representative's own statement-that Tunisian troops or Tunisian guns on the ground began to shoot at aircraftcomingfromoutside, and that the attacks on Tunisian positions around Bizerta were fil'st of aIl, and throughout the first day, launched by aireraft coming from abroad and attempting to land paratroops on Tunisian soil despite the prohibition by the Tunisian Government of flights over the territory around Bizerta and despite the opposition of the Tunisian Government to the entry of these troops inta Tunisian territory. 185. 1 might. perhaps-I stress the ward "perhaps"- have been able ta understand why the French representative would speak of se1f-defence if the attacks against Tunisian civilians and troops. on Tunisian sail. had come from ground bases occupied byFrench troops. It would have been understandable for French troops on the group. believing themselves ta be threatened by some danger or other. ta have retaliated against Tunisian troops or Tunisian. civilians demonstrating peacefully in the streets. but ta use the expression" se1f-defence" ta describe shooting byfighter aireraft coming from the Arromanches as it lay in the vicinity of Tunisian territorial waters and by aircraft coming from Algeria for the purpose ofdropping paratroops on Tunisian sail in defiance of the Tunisian Government's ban on flights-that is really beyond my understanding. 186. It is distressing ta me ta note this. It is especially distressing ta me ta do sa when my people are continuing ta be the abject of attacks from aircraft and artillery. It is distressing ta me ta note this in view of the attempts ta occupy areas which were not included in the base of Bizerta, attempts ta occupy the town of Bizerta itse1f. and efforts ta foree a passage through the Bizerta channel with the aid of three destroyers of the French navy coming from outside. As 1 say. it is distressing ta me ta note aIl this. but in a debate as' serious as this before the 8ecurity Council. one should try to suppress feelings and passions and to discuss the situation calmly and quietly. 187. It has been said that the French Government is ready ta negotiate. It has also been said that the French Goveniment is ready to discuss with the Tunisian Gove:l'mnent arrangements for a cease-fire. What are we to think of an aggressor who éomes from abroad. attacks an independent and sovereign country. tries ta occupy positions to which he has no right and then says: "1 am rendy to discuss arrangements for a cease-fire"? 188. That in itse1f is a strange notion. but frCim what has been said by the French delegation during this afternoon's debate, it does, mo:r.eover, appear that the French Government is ready ta enter into negotiations. Negotiat'ons on whnp On the fixing of a provisional arrangement for tt.3 Bizerta base under the terms of the agreement of 17 June 1958 [8/4869]. 189. On this point. 1 shall take the liberty of analysing this agreement of 17 June 1958 one final time. On first sight, the agreement seems to contain two contradictory undertakings. The first is a unilateral undertaking by the French Government: "The French Government, which does not intend to maintain any armed forces on Tunisian territory 191. The second point on which theFrenchdelegation seems to lay, great stress and which appears to be in contradiction with thefirst part ofthe paragraph, reads as follows: "The French Government ... proposes to open negotiations with Tunisia as soon as possible and at the latest upon completion of the withdrawal schedule. The purpose of these negotiations will be to establish by joint agreement between the two Governments a provisional arrangement for the maintenance of the strategie base of ;Bizerta ...". 192. The French Government now seems to confine its attention to this part of the sentence. It statesit has done so just this afternoon-that it is ready to negotiate a provisional arrangement for Bizerta with the Tunisian Government. This sentence saysclearly, as l have pointed out: "the purpose of these negotiations will be to establish by joint agreement ...". It seems to me, however, that it is a question of establishing something foreign on the soil of an independent and sovereign 8tate. This independent and sovereign State, which l represent, has recently stated, and l repeat this clearly and solemnly before this Council, that it is no longer prepared to negotiate a provisional agreement on Bizerta unlass these negotiations for a provisional agreement have as their ultimate end the evacuation of French troops from the Bizerta area. The word provisional implies an agreement leading up to an ultimate settlement. What ultimate settlement? As an independent and sovereign State, we declare-and no one will deny our right to do sothat we are no longer prepared to negotiate a provisional agreement on the Bizerta base unless thatprovisional agreement has in view as its ultimate end, affirmed from the start, the evacuation of all French troops from the Bizerta area. 193. We have, it is true, for a long time and until very recently remained hopeful and have continued to exert every effort and to consent to every necessary sacrifice with a view to co-operating with France and strengthening our friendship with France. However, we can only conceive of friendship and co-operation on the basis of respect for the dignity and sovereignty of states and nations. 194. The position is clear and unambiguous. We are no longer, perhaps, in the same frame of mind. l am sarry to have to say that at a time when the French Government and the French delegation seem to he representing themselves as ready for a cease-fire, we are not attacking the French bases at Bizerta. We are being attacked. Who is preventing the French Government from ceasing fire? Indeed, it would have been helpful. wise and perhaps profitable to have "The attack on Bizerta was begun this morning"- local time is five hours ahead of New York time. "Aircraft are bombing the town. Machine-gun fire and rocket bombardment. "2 p.m. Bizerta bas been eut off from Menzel- Djemil and fromMateur" -Menzel-Djemilis 20 kilometres from Bizerta, and Mateur 45 kilometres. "Bizerta is being invaded by land and from the 'air by paratroops, and napalm is being used against our positions at Sidi-Ahmed" -this despite denials by the French authol'ities. "Bombing is being resumed against Metline and EI-Alia"-Metline is about 6 kilometres away on the other side of the Bizerta channel and EI-Alia is about 25 kilometres to the north of Bizerta-"situated 40 kilometres from the field of operations, and three aireraft are flying over Medjez el-Bab" -60 kilom,etres fromMateur- "and the Enfida station. "3 p.m. French tanks coming from Djebel-Nigrou are entering Bizerta"-the town in which there are no French military installations. "6 p.m. Party headquarters attacked by paratroops: four dead, two wounded. Aireraft flying over the Governor' s residence. "6.10 p.m. As l send this message, thebattle continues to range withinthe urbanperimeter of Bizerta. Population being virtually massacred" -1 am sorry to use these words. My delegation and my Government have never been accustomed to using words which do not correspond to the facts. Extortions and atrocities being committed by paratroops against unarmed civilians, women and children. Reinforeements have been announced by French Press Agencies. French military objective apparently to reoccupy whole region. Parachuting, fighting 8.J.ïd occupation of surrounding villages such as Menzel- Blurê, Alia, Menzel-Djemil, Menzel-Abderrahmane. European civilians unfortunately joining paratroops in firing on population. "6.20 p.m. Paratroops looting (wornen' s jewellery) in Bizerta area, in particular at Sidi-Ahmed and Tindja. "6.45 p.m. Menzel-Bourguiba brickworks bombed. "7.15 p.m. After leaflets were dropped over Bizerta"-by French aircraft-"reading 'Raise the white flag', troops landed from launches near consulate at Bizerta. street fighting continues, and one of our high-ranking officers has been killed. The Sport nautique"-place reserved for aquatic sports- "opposite the Governor's residence has been occupied, and machine-guns are directed at the build- 1 have, in addition, received the following regrettable report to which 1 draw attention since it indicates the seriousness of the situation: "One hundred fifty bodies have been handed -over to the Tunisian authorities at Menzel-Bourguiba. We immediately recognized"-we have doctors- "among the bodies a number of civilians who had been captured the previous dayby the FrenchArmy." 196. The atrocities which 1 have just mentioned may seem to have been exaggerated, but aH those who, in recent years, have seen evidence of how the paratroops act will find it easy to believe that there has been no exaggeration. This i8 a very serious situation, and it seems to me that the Council should consider it with aH the seriousness which it deserves.

1 should like to give the Council sorne particulars on the points raised by the representative of Tunisia in the statement he made earlier this afternoon and in the statement he has just made. 198. First of aH, 1 should like to deny once more, absolutely categorically, that the French authorities or the French command have dropped napalm bombs from B-26 aircraft, as the Tunisian authorities claim. 1can state categoricaHy that the Frenchcommandhas no napalm bombs and no machines capable of using such bombs. 199. Similarly, the French authorities categorically deny that the Bizerta command carried out a bombing attack 35 kilometres from the base or stopped a Tunisian ambulance at Menzel-Djemil. 200. 1 am making these categorical denials because 1 have been authorized to do so by my Government, which 1 consulted by telephone only a short while ago. 201. The French Government also denies the aHegation made here before the Gouncil that the French Consul at Bizerta sent an ultimatum to the local authorities demanding the evacuation of the Tunisian garrison from the town. The French Consul only discussed-as he is bound to-questions of supply with the Governor of Bizerta. Nor is it true that the French Consul announced that the railway line from Tunis to Bizerta had been sabotaged. 202. In the eloquent and moving statement he has just made, the representative of Tunisia mentioned atrocities committed by French paratroopers. 1 am not the sort of man to take such news lightly or to agree that any methods at aH may be used in military oper- . ations; but 1 must say that the categorical denials made by my Government, only a few moments ago, of certain information that we were given here allow me to hope that these new atrocities are a fiction and, as 1 believe, are not in keeping with the facts. 204. 1 must remind him that, unfortunately, the French did not return fire-the Tunisian representative challenged the assertion that this was a case of legitimate self-defence, but it was so-formanyhours after provocation, after being fired upon, after miUtary operations against French organizations at the base. We have been told that aircraft ct-me from outside the country, but the first aeroplane to come under the fire of Tunisian automatic weapons was a helicopter from the base, not an aeroplane from the Arromanches. The first shots fired by the Tunisian artillery were at aircraft that were on the runway of the base and were not from outside the country. There is, therefore, no question of intervention by forces from outside the base; the aggressive actionby Tunisia was directed against the base itself very early in the morning of the 19 JU~y. 205. In this connexion 1 should like to add to the information 1 have already given the Counci! today. 1 have reviewed the events of 19 July and of part of 20 July. 1 should now like to add some information about subsequent events at Bizerta and the events which occurred concurrently in the Sahara. 206. At Bizerta, during the day of 20 July and the night of 20 to 21 July, the Tunisian forces continued to attack the French installations with their mortars and automatic weapons. They also tried to occupy some of these installations. The French forces were compelled to continue their counteraction, first and foremost by occupying the emplacements from which they were being fired on, for the firing had causedand was and is still causing-many casualties among the French troops of the base. 207. In addition, on 21 July our forces were compelled to undertake operations to clear the installations of the base and re-establish communications between these different parts, communications which are essential to their security. This was particularly so in the case of the channel giving access to the gates of Bizerta, which the Tunisian authorities had blocked. 208. The aim of these operations has been represented as the conquest of the town of Bizerta. It was obviously nothing of the kind. The sole aim was to restore the essential conditions for living, operating and security which the action undertaken on the instructions of the' Tunisian Government had endangered. This action was undertaken regardless of the consequences it might have, particularly the loss of human lives on both sides which it rendered inevitable and which both my country and 1 myself regret as keenly for one side as for the other. It goes without saying that our objective will have been achieved 210. Tunisia is trying to change this frontier line by force, by sending its troops to occupy the points held-and legitimately held-by the French forces. In other words, Tunisia is trying to use force to settle a dispute with another Government and the Security Council is now being asked to condemn the country against which aggressive action has been taken. 211. Tunisia's invasion of a foreign territory led to fighting and there have already been casualties on both sides. AlI that we, for our part, have done is to exercise, on our own territory, our right of legitimate self-defence. 212. This movement on the part of Tunisia was, of course, taken in a much broader and more important context, that of the future of the Sahara. Everybody is aware of the claims in that respect made by the Tunisian Government on the occasionof riegotiations which took place in another connexion andtowhichit was not a party. 213. l leave it to the Security Council to judge this method of enforcing one's claims by such action. In its note of 20 July to the Tunisian Government-which that Government pretends it does not wish to receiv0 but the terms of which it knows perfectly weIl-the French Government announced that it was ready to give the necessary instructions for the conditions of an immediate cease-fire to be discussed with the Tunisian authorities. The. representative of Tunisia made light of these proposaIs and tried to minimize them, but l do not think they can be minimized. 214. From the very first day, conscious of the grave consequences that Tunisia' s action would inevitably have, France offered to put an irnmediate end to the military operation that had been undertaken, although it was, as l have shown this afternoon, the victim of aggression. If that offer had been accepted, muchloss of human life and destruction of property could have been prevented. The Tunisian Government ignored that offer, pretending to know nothing of it, and continued its attacks, as though the objective it had in view was to make things as bad as possible. The Tunisian Government has even given us to understand today through its representative that an undertaking to evacuate Bizerta was to be the condition for a cease-fire. But would it not be encouraging the use of force if the party which had resorted to force was allowed to renounce it, once force' had enabled it to achieve the desired result without negotiation?

l calI on the representative of Tunisia to exercise his right of reply. 217. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (translated from French): Thank you. Mr. President. Once again. l wish to state that in this very serious discussion before the Council l shall not indulge in facile and perhaps uncalledfor polemics and shall avoid starting a controversy between two delegations. My position is clear-eut and reasonable. and l have substantiated it with abundant proo! and argument. 218. l should. however. like to returnto a point which l already explilined this afternoonbutwhich still seems to be a bone of contention. It concerns the frontiers of southern Tunisia. In re-examining this matter. l shaH base myself on irrefutable evidence. 219. The French delegation seems to think that the southern frontier between Tunisia and Libya stops at mark 220. known as Fort-Saint. and seems to contend that our claim to go further south towards mark 233. known as Garet el-Hamel. is based on nothing more than a covetous desire for certain resources of the Sahara. 220. My Government and my country have never entertained. do not entertain. and will never entertain exorbitant desires for anything. 221. However. let us come back to our frontier. With regard to mark 233. know as Garet el-Hamel. which is situated 25 kilometres to the south of Fort-Saint (the site of mark 220), l rely simply and solely on an official United Nations document, Treaty No. 4340 of the Treaty Series, entitled "Exchange of letters constituting an agreement to delimit the Franco-Libyan frontierll • These documents are as well-known to the French delegation as they are to me and my delegation. May l explain that in the term IIFranco-Libyan" the word "Franco" represents Algeria because this was supposedly a French territory. This exchange of letters took place at Tripoli between the French Government and the Libyan Government and is dated 26 December 1956. The letters, which were signed by "H. E. Mr. Jacques Dumarcay, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the French Republic" and "H. E. AliSahli". include a "document B". entitled "Definition of the frontier line between Rhadaml:ls (Garet el-Hamel) and Rhat (parallel of the Great Mosque)". A map is annexed and appears in the relevant volume of the United Nations Treaty Series. 223. l now refer to this "copy annexed heretoll , entitled IIRecord of the demarcation of the Franco- Turkish frontier in 1911". l must explain tbat at that time the treaty was concluded between Turkey, exercising its sovereignty over Libyan territory, and France, exercising its sovereignty over Algerian territory. After a list which begins with mark 211 and includes marks 212, 213, 214, etc. we read "mark 223 (small model), 2,800 metres south-west of mark 222, on a rock of the northern edge of the Sebkha situated, etc.Il. l now reach the paragraph which COncerns mark 233. It reads as follows: "Mark 233, 2,600 metres south•••"That mark was situated on a point visible from far away (high hill known by the native inhabitants as Garet el-Hamel) and lying at a distance of some 13 kilomet:res from the town of Rhadamès, the Commissioners of the two Governments agreed to end the demarcation of the frontier at that point and decided to give that last mark (No. 233) a height of 2 m. 50." 224. This document clearly shows that the frontier between Algeria and Libya begins at this mark 233 (Garet el-Hamel) and that the frontier betweenTunisia and Libya has its southern end at this same mark. For myself, this is neither an assertionnor an explanation. l am merely reading from a United Nations official document, published as Treaty No. 4340 in the Treaty Series. 225. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l apologize for taking the floor a second time. l shall not speak for more than two minutes. 226. In the last part of his second statement, the French representative said that at a given stage France-as 1 understood from the interpretationwould be prepared to resume the conversations relating to the present question. l do not know whether this matter is clear to the other members of the Council; but l should like to have, in regard to that very important part of the French representative' s statement, an answer to the following question. 227. Will the subject of these conversationsto which the French representative has referred by the question of the complete withdrawal of the French troops from the BizeT~a base and from aH Tunisian territory? Yes or no? If the answer is liNo", what will the subject of these conversations be? 228. l should be very grateful for an answer. l think that this question is of interest not only to me but also to the other persons attending this meeting. 229. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Since no member of the Council had expressed a desire to speak, l should like to say that l regard this 'situation involving the loss of human lives with deep concern and regret. l consider that it is a serious and urgent situation and l am prepared to continue to work day and night, if necessary. 232. In the course of the day, the Tunisian Government has threatened to take serious measures against French civilians living in Tunisia. 1 just want to point out the very grave consequences of unjustüiable reprisaIs against civilians who have taken no part in the operations and who live in areas where no action has been undertaken. 233. 1 feIt it was my duty to bring this information to the Council's attention.

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