S/PV.964 Security Council

This meeting has been called following the circulation of a request submitted by the representative of Tunisia in a letter dated 27 July 1961 [S/4893]. 2. The provisional agenda for this meeting appears .in document S/Agenda/964. If there are no objections, the provisional agenda will be considered to have been adopted. The agenda was adopted. Telegram dated 20 July 1961 addres!ied to the President of the Security Couneil by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia (5/4861). Letter dated 20July 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia addressed to the President of the Security Council (SI 4862)

Before proceeding with the item on the agenda, l wish ta state that l have been requested by the French representative to place before you the following letter dated 28 July [S/4897] addressed to the President of the Council: "On the instructions of my Government, -1 have the honour to inform you of the following: "The French delegation has no new facts to communicate to the Council. The cease-fire at Bizerta and in the Sahara has been establisheçl and is being observed. Of course, agreement still has to be reached between the French and Tunisian authorities concerning procedures for restoring normal "1 should be grateful if you would bring tUs communication to the attention of the Security Council." 4. As the members of the Security Council will have noted, the representative of Tunisia has requested permission to take part in the debate [8/4893]. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, l propose to invite the representative of Tunisia to take a seat atthe Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mongi Slim (Tunisia), took a place at the Council table.

l am pleased to draw the attention of members ofthe Council on the one hand to the telegram dated 25 July, sent to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Senegal [S/4895], requesting that a representative of Senegal should be permitted to participate in the debate on this item, and on the other hand to a letter bearing today's date, in which the representative of Libya has also requested permission to participate in the Council's debate [3/4901]. If there is no objection, l shall ask the representative of Senegal and the representative of Libya to take places at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. OUsman Socé Diop (Senegal) and Mr.. Mohieddine Fekini (Libya) took places at the COUDcil table. 6. The P~ESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council will now proceed to discuss the item on the agenda. The first speaker on the list is the representative of Tunisia. 7. Ml'. Mongi SLIM: (Tunisia) (translated from French): l thank the President and the members of the Council for allowing my delegation to take part in this meeting in order to c'Cplain the request which we submitted on 27 July [8/4893]. The main reason for this request-apart from the issue of substance, which was not decided by the Council during its previous debate-is the newand highly serious situation arising out of the non-observance by the French military authorities· of an interim decision made by the Security Council at its 962nd meeting vn 22 July 1961 [S/4882]. 8. On 22 July, the Security Council, though seized of the complaint submitted by the Government of Tunisia against the French Government on 20 July [S/4862], adjourned without making any decision on the substance of the Tunisian request for an end to the aggression ta which Tunisia has been subjected since 19 July 1961, and for the evacuation from my country of aU the French forces which are occupying it against the will of the Tunisian nation as expressed by the Government of Tunisia in the complaint that it laid before the Security Council on 8 February 11. It must be recalled that the Counci! adjourned a few hours after making its interim order, having held a debate followed by votes on two draft resolutions which failed to obtain the required majority. In view of this adjournment without a decision, the President of the Republic of Tunisia sent the Secretary-General the following message on 23 July 1961, inviting him to come to Tunis: "The gravity of the situation in Tunisia ..• and the need for an urgent and thorough consideration of the consequences following from Tunisia's appeal to the Security Council make a direct and personal exchange of views necessary and urgent." [8/4885, sect. 1.] 12. The Tunisian delegation is happy to pay tribute to the goodwill displayed by the Secretary-General in responding to this invitation, and tothe impartiality of his approach to the situation in Tunisia. But it also wishes to express its regret at the unfortunate incident which befell our guest and which, though we did our utmost to prevent it, we must still regard as a breach of the sacred laws of hospitality. 13. l wish to revert now ta the decision taken by the Security Counci! at its morning meeting of 22 July. l wou1d remind members that at the opening of the meeting, which took place the same afternoon, the French representatiVe made the following communication to the Security Counci! at precisely 3.15 p.m. New York time: "In accordance with the decision taken this morning by the Council, AdmiraI Amman, who is in command of the Bizerta base, immediately received instructions to contact the Tunisian authorities at once, with a view to: first, the establishment of a cease-fire as soon as possible and, in any case, before the ear1y hours of the morning of 23 Ju1y, Tunisian time; second1y, if, as is hoped, the ceasefire is concluded at that time, the organization of a meeting tomorrow afternoon to commence discussions on the means of returning to normal conditions." [963rd meeting, para. 3.] Once again, the question is the return to a normal situation. The French representative then said: "1 would add that French troops have already received instructions to stop aIl action and merely to rep1y to any attacks made on them." [Ibid., para. 4.] !I Officia! Records of the Securlty Council, Thirteenth Year, Supplement for ]anuary, February and March, 1958, document 5/3952. 15. Unfortunately, although Tunisia has for her part executed quickly and in good faith the Security Council's interim decision set out in resolution S/4882, France has not. The French forces have a,dmittedly stopped their systematic massacre of civilians, but they have continued to behave in a high-handed and provocative manner, backed by a show of arms, and at the same time to extend their activities and to bring in more men and equipment, aIl in breach of the Security Council's decision. 16. In contrast, the Tunisian Government, as soon as it had notice of the resolution ofthe Security Council, being fully aware of its dutY under Article 25 of the Charter towards the Council's decisions, ordered its forces operating in the town of Bizerta to stop aIl offensive operations and to return to their positions. These instructions, of course, also applied to t~e Tunisian troops operating near the Libyan froutier in the south. 17. AImost at the same time the acting Governor of Bizerta made contact with the French Consul-General in order to apprise him of the Tunisian Government's decision and to inform him that the acting Governor had been authorized to discuss with AdmiraI Amman any problems resulting from the Security Council's decision. 18. From that moment telephone calls and correspondence were exchanged between the acting Governor and AdmiraI Amman; but these did not produce any agreement on a meeting-place. AdmiraI Amman, indeed, refused either to go himself or to send a representative to the Governor's palace, the seat of civil authority in Tunisia, and finally suggested through the Consul-General that the meeting should take place at the office of the port authority, whither the AdmiraI would go by launch to the pilots' landing stage. The acting Governor again suggested that the meeting be held at the Governor's palace; but _so far the Tunisian Government has received no reply from the French Government. 19. On the same day, 22 July 1961, the French Government published the following communiqué, which seems to us to contradict the statements made here by the French representative: "Our troops, having freed our military installations from the blockade to which they were subjected and secured the unhampered operation of the base, have been ordered to cease their operations "An identical offer is being made in respect of thé Sahara, where our troops have closed the frontier." 20. The French Consul-General in Tunis approached the Tunisian Government and informed it that AdmiraI Amman had been instructed to make the following proposaIs to the Tunisian authorities: first, that both sides should order a cease-fire as soon as possible and in any case not later than the early morning of the following day, Sunday, 23 July; and secondly, if this offer were accepted, to arrange a meeting for the following afternoon to discuss the conditions for a return to a normal situation (once again we have this epithet, a "normal situation"). The cease-fire offer also applied to the Sahara. 21. Through its representatives the Tunis~anGovernment replied as follows: On the fil'st point; we can do no more than take note of the French proposaI; for as far as we are concerned offensive operations in Bizerta stopped at 10.00 p.m. on 22 July 1961. On the second point,we ask that the French forces reestablish freedom of movement as saon as possible by withdrawing their troops and armoured vehicles from the roads and intersections. We consider that two hours should be allowed from the moment when freedom of movement is restored, to permit the emissaries of the Tunisian Government to transmit the requisite instructions to their representatives and to implement a cease-fire in the Bizerta. area. Thirdly, in view of the gravity ofthe problems following upon the cease-fire, the contacts necessary for their discussion must be established without delay. 1 1 î ;J 'j 22. It is apparent from the documents 1 have Just cited that, first of aIl, the French Government has from the outset made no mention in its communiqués of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council resolution; the only allusion' was in the statement made here by the French representative. We have just found confirmation of this in the latest official communiqué published by the French Government after a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 26 July, which totally ignores the Security Council decision and merely lists the one-sided measures that the French Government intends to force on the Tunisian Government. 23. We consider that this attitude has two serious implications. First, the French Government, in attempting unilaterally and improperly t'o decide the fate of a substantial part of Tunisian territory without regard to the legitimate rights of Tunisia-an independent, sovereign State-or to the unanimous feeling of the Tunisian people, is outraging Tunisia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Secondly, by ignoring the Security Council's decision of 22 July the French Government shows contempt for the United Nations and its Members, and disrespect for the decisions of the Security Council. Thus, to challenges .] :j ! :J -jq i :;t 'j 25. In fact the Fren~h forces regard the cease-fire, not as a consequence of the Council's decision, but as justified only by the fact that the French troops have attained the objective which inspired the aggression. This is clear from the official communiqué of 26 July [8/4894, sect. II], which states: "The operations ... were ended on the afternoon of 22 July, the French Government made it known that it had giventhe necessary orders to cease fire •••". As you see, no mention is made of the Council's decision, which alone led the Tunisian Government to take the initiative of a cease-fire. 26. An this, once more, is in flagrant conflict with the statement made here on 22 July by the French representative, who said: "In accordance with the decision taken this morning by the Council, AdmiraI Amman, who is' in command of the Bizerta base •.. ". 27. The communiqué of 26 July clearly reveals the true intentions, which we have denounced, of the French Gover,nment. Today there can no longer be any àoubt that this is a typical premeditated armed aggression. The French Government's determination to found its presence in Tunisia on force alone, excluding any intervention by international organizations, proves clearly that the aggression committed against Tunisia was premeditated and amply justifies my country's exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. 28. Thus the French Government has no intention of implementing the resolution of the Security Council. That is the unhappy conclusion that we have reached. 29. In the first place, as far as the cease-fire itself is concerned, this resolution has been only partially carried out. After it carne into force, as we have pointed out, various acts of violence were committed by the occupying forces, more particularly by parachute troops and soldiers of the Foreign Legion coming from Algeria, whose misdeeds and crazy violence wherever they have gone, in Asia, in Africa and even recently in France-at Metz, to be precise-are notorious. 30. l would merely recall that in the morning of 23 July, only a few hours after the resolution had entered into force, French parachute troops carried out a full-scale mopping-up operation inside the town of Bizerta, pillaging and ransacking at rifle-point many dwellings, including those of the secretary general of the Governor's staff and of the Governor's represent~tive. They occupied the Governor's palace and tore down the Tunisian flag from its façade. They searched the office and took personal belongings and silver plate embossed with the arms of the Tunisian Republic. On the sarne day, the City Hall was re- 32. At Menzel-Djemil, a village ten kilometres from Bizerta on the Tunis road, French soldiers called several times at the office of the National Guard, forbade the Guard personnel to foregather more than eight at a time and ta carry arms, and obliged them to give their identity• 33. At Menzel-Bourguiba, a village twenty kilometres south of Bizerta, five paratroopers visited the delegation-a "sous-préfecture"-and asked for information about the "préfecture" staff. In Bizerta itself posts and sections of the National Guard were completely ransacked and rifled, and some motorcycles have vanished. 34. The civil prison at Bizerta has been occupied by French troops since 6.50 p.m. on 23 July. The Tunisian warders were relieved of their watches, cash and jewellery, and locked up. The cash-box in the prison registry was emptied. Moreover, stocks of food intende-d for the prisoners were misappropriated for somebody's benefit. 35. On the morning of the following day, 24 July, the offices and workshops of the Public Works Department were occupied by the French Army, whichforthwith commandeered the vehicles parked in the sheds of this civil authority which maintains the roads and bridges. Furthermore, two houses inhabited by local agents of the Department were entirely ransacked by French soldiers, who also searched the premises of the Merchant Ma.rine office, playing havoc with the files and furniture and wrecking the telephones throughout the building. Paratroopers also ransacked the local agency of the Compagnie tunisienne de navigation, whose employees were stripped of their watches and cash. The chief clerk was very roughly handled. 36. The Portland cement works, which was bombed and nearly destroyed by aircraft from the Karouba base at the outset of hostilities, is still occupied by paratroopers who prevent the workmen from entering the factory. Moreover, the offices have been rifled, the files destroyed, and the furniture and telephones broken up. 37. A large amount ofmaterial,precisionmachinery, and electrical and mechanical control equipment belonging to the works has been pillaged or destroyed in the stores. A large safe was broken open with a blow-torch and 2,000 dinars and some important documents were taken. The damage to the cement works is provisionally estïmated at $143,000, and repairs lasting six or seven months will be needed to put it back into working order. J 38. The members of the Council will realize what this sort of damage means to us if they remember that ours is a younr -'1d new country working very hard to develop its ;"ources and improve its economic situation. 41, The forestry station at Remel is still occupied by French soldiers. The private quarters of the section chiefs-whose names 1 have in my file-were visited by paratroopers, who beat up some women and children with the butts of their rifles. 42. The staff of the radio beacon at Cap Blanc, north of Bizerta, comprising four officiaIs of the state secretariat for Public Works, have been eut off since the beginning of the aggression by the French army. On 27 July one of these officiaIs who had gone out in search of supplies was severely mishandled, deprived of his money and obliged to return to the beacon by a party of paratroopers. 1 would point out that the Cap Blanc radio beacon is fitted with up-to-date equipment and supplies the signaIs needed by international shipping. 43. On 23 July paratroopers using sub-machine guns broke into and occupied the educational centre at Bizerta, including the offices and residence of the inspector of primary education in the Bizerta area. 44. Early on Monday, 24 July, paratroopers ransacked the Customs offices at Menzel-Bourguiba. 45. In Bizerta itself the general dispensary was twice ransacked by French soldiers after the ceasefire. 46. 1 shall not weary the Council by recounting aIl the other offences deliberately committed after the Tunisian authorities had ordered a cease-fire. The French forces have let no chance go by of defying Tunisian sovereignty, particularly by laying their hands on State offices and officiaIs in the manner that has been described to you. 47. Thus the French army has respected the ceasefire in only a very relative sense. What is more, the French military authorities categorically :.:efuse to act on the second part of operative paragraph 1 of Council resolution S/4882: to return their troops to their original position. This part appears closely linked to the cease-Ure, in the same paragraphe Furthermore, the French have taken advantage of Tunisian observance of the cease-fire to extend the perimeter of their area of occupation, build up their military potential and violate Tunisian air space, provoking border incidents. 48. 1 shall give some particulars of each of these charges. In regard to extension to the perimeter, the situation at the moment of the cease-fire was this. Apart from the military installations occupied before 19 July-the Sidi-Abdallah arsenal, the AdmiraIty , the Karouba naval base, the Sidi-Ahmed air base, the Cap Blanc radar installations, Nador Camp and the Menzel-Djemil anti-aircraft posts-at the time of (Q) Both sides of the Bizerta Channel; (Q) Towards Tunis, starting from the posts near Menzel-Djemil, which is ten kilometresfromBizerta, a roadblock was set up on a line with Menzel-Djemil. 49. Let me now describe the situation onWednesday, 26 July. Since Saturday evening the French forces had operated not only between their original positions and between those and the new posts they occupied, but beyond these in the following directions: (ê,) To the south and south-west of Menzel-Djemil, French forces advanced to the villages of El Alia and El Azib five kilometres on the road to Tunis, that is, three kilometres south of Menzel-Djemil; (Q) To the west and south-west of Bizerta, French soldiers control road GP 41 linking Bizerta with Menzel-Bourguiba; (g} Four kilometres west of Menzel-Bourguiba, a paratroop unit attempted on Monday, 24 July, at 11.25 a.m., to encircle the town of Tindja; (g) French forces occupied Menzel-Abderrahmane, six kilometres south of Bizerta; (!2) To the north-west of Bizerta, on Monday, 24 July, a regiment of 900 parachutists under the command of Colonel Langois occupied Sidi Sid near Bechateur, fourteen kilometres from Bizerta. 50. Moreover, in Bizerta itself aIl the buildings in the European quarter having balconies and situated at strategie points were systemat~callytaken over from Sunday, 23 July onwards, and turned into machine-gun nests. Most of the public buildings were likewise, as 1 have noted, occupied and ransacked, including the prison-house, the court offirst instance, public schools and the public works shop. 51. 1 come now to the build-up of French military potential since the cease-fire was declared. After French forces had occupied both sides of the Channel and raised the cable barring the Narrows, naval units on patrol in the Bizerta roadstead, in the territorial waters, began to enter the port and the Channel on Sunday, 23 July, landing reinforcements, armaments and supplies. The vessels were the cruisers de Grasse and Colbert-the latter left just two days agoand the escort vessels Maillé Brézé, Malgache, Bourdonnais Kersaint and Chevalier-Paul. othertroop and supply ships put in at Bizerta, at La Pêcherie or at thj3 Karouba naval installations on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, 24-26 July: the Cheliff, the Saint- Louis, the L.C:!'. Edic 9093, the Baise, the L.C.T. 9095 and the Bouvet. 52. When the airstrip of the Sidi-Ahmed airfield had been cleared, seven new Nord-Atlas aircraft landed 54. l come now to the fourth point-border incidents. Taking the opportunity of the aggression against Bizerta, the French forces stationed in Algeria have directed particularly heavy artillery fire against Tunisian territory since the cease-fire. l cite the following instances: (~J On 22 July, at 11.45 p.m., 105 mm. guns opened fire on the town of Remida in the Thala "délégation" about 200 kilometres from the Bizerta district; (t!) On 23 July, startingatl1.33p.m., 155 mm. shells fell on two ham1ets of the border sheikhdom of Ouchtata in the Ghardimaou "délégation": (Q) On 25 July. firing became mure frequentandwas directed against many places in the governorates of Soul-EI-Arba and El Kef, causing a number of forest fires. At 7.45 a.m., at a place called Rabil in the Ouled Moslem sheikhdom, Ain Draham "délégation", 155 mm. shells wounded one person. At 10.45 a.m., at a place called Mezaizia in the Kalaat Senan "délé- gation", artillery shells wounded the following persons, the first of them critically: Mohamed ben Amor, Amal' ben Younès and Abdallah ben Younès. At 11.50 a.m., at a place called Oued Nechaa, Ouchtata sheikhdom, Ghardimaou "délégation", 100 shellswere fired. At 12 noon, at a place called Hazlaza, sheikhdom of the Ouled Sedra, Ain Draham "délégation", thirty shells were fired. At 1.30 p.m., at a place called Koudiat El Press, Khmairia sheikhdom, Ain Brahim "délégation"... 55. But l will not continue this enumeration. My reason for giving it was to refute the claim that the object was to protect French forces in the Bizerta area, and to show that the intentions are far wider and more dangerous. Thus on Tuesday, 25 July, a group of French armoured vehicles from Algeria crossed the Tunisian border and was repulsed by the Tunisian army at Mezaizia. The French soldiers carried off 220 head of cattle, and two Tunisian civilians have been reported missing. Far from showing any inclination to abide by the Council's decision, the French troops have made use of our observance of the decision to consolidate and exten::i their aggression. The Council cannot allow its deoision to be exploited in this way, to multiply the aggressor's activities instead of reducing his force. 56. Encouraged by the strength of our case, we have so far succeeded in avoiding the worst; but the situation is untenable and cannot endure much longer. It carries within itself the germs of new battles the consequences of which will be most grave and severe. 57. France's clear dereliction of dutY as a Member of this Organization and as a permanent member of this Council cannot be ignored by the Council, which must in our view "duly take account of [this] failure" in compliance with Article 40 of the Charter and act vigorously to enforce its decisions. 58. Indeed, if the Council's decisions do not bind the large nations, what protection will the small nations have? For its part, my Government will not fail to draw the proper inferences from the negative attitude of the French Government. It can no longer tolerate the occupation of part of its territory against its will despite the status of Tunisia as an independent and sovereign state. My Government considers that the time has come to find a permanent solution to this problem, and we hope that the Security Council will give us one. 59, We remain convinced that this problem, if not quickly settled by the Council, will continue to be a source of disturbance and a serious threat to Tunisia's security. The example given by the aggression against Tunisia since 19 July is bound to strengthen our legitimate resolve to free our country from the last traces of colonialism. 60. The last provisional casualty list drawn up twenty-four hoursago of the French aggression against Bizerta illustrates painfully what the presence of foreign military forces in our territory ca~ mean for Tunisia: 812 dead, 1,155 wounded, and 639 missing or taken prisoner; in addition, extensive material damage has been deliberately done to industrial, health and cultural establishments, to administrative departments, to means of communication and to electric power, water and telephone systems. 61. We are bound to point out the cruel and inhuman conduct of the French troops, who have shown a total disregard for human rights, particularly those stated in the Geneva conventions. They have systematically massacred civilians, not sparing women, children or the aged, and have even killed their prisoners in cold blood. Thus on 20 July a number of civilians were arrested at Menzel-Bourguiba and taken inside the base. On the following day French military personnel delivered to the Tunisian authorities 150 dead bodies and two days ago another 130, most ofthem with their hands still tied behind their backs. . ] 1 ,'1 1., ,:1 J., 63. l must also stress the serious obstruction by French troops of the activities of the health service and Tunisian Red Crescent. Ambulances have been machine-gunned, destroyed or carried off, medical personnel wounded, Red Crescent armbands pulled off, and diggers burying the dead machine-gunned as they worked. 64. Are these really the objectives stated in the communiqué of 26 July to have been assigned to the French forces since 19 July 1961? 65. My Government is determined today more than ever to have done with the enclaves which the French Governmenf maintains on our territory against the will of our people. This foreign presence on our soil has been imposed upon us and has no legal basis whatsoever. The presence of French forces is illegal both in Bizerta and in the southern region. 66. In the exchange of letters of 17 June 1958 [Si 4869] the French Government undertook not "tomaintain any armed forces on Tunisian territory other than those which may be statioued there by virtue of agreements negotiated between the two states". 67. Thus, as matters stand, the presence of French forces at Bizerta with no contractual justüication and against the will of the Tunisian people and Gove:rnment constitutes a violation of France's commitment to maintain no forces except by agreement with Tunisia. The Tunisian Government cannot accept the French argument that the military installations in the province of Bizerta are a permanent part of a specified defence system. Bizerta, l repeat, is before all else an integral part of Tunisian territory, under Tunisian sovereignty and under that sovereignty alone. 68. The same applies to the southern border zone occupied by the French in violation of the international treaties to which l referred during our last debate. The zone in question, to which Tunisia lays immediate claim, is defined by the 1910 Treaty between France and TurkeyY and by the Franco-Libyan Treaty of 19562/ as an integral part of Tunisian territory. l had occasion to point this out several days ago. This question is therefore entirely independent of the problem of Saharan space, which Tunisia will settle y Convention relating to the frontier between the Regency of Tunis and the "vilayet" of Tripoli; signed at Tripoli on 19 May 1910. 2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 300, 1958,1. No. 4340. 70. From this first part of my statement there foUow 10gicaHy a number of conclusions which l venture to submit and which pertain both to the nonexecution by France of the provisional measures decided upon by the Security Council, and to the substance of the problem with which the Tunisian request is concerned. 71. In regard to the non-execution by France of interim resolution S/4882, we and the Council are alike bound by Article 40 of the Charter to take account of a serious failure by a permanent member of the Council whose responsibilities we feel should be proportionate to its power of veto. It is for the Council to draw the necessary conclusions from this failure, in accordance with the Charter and with precedents in similar cases. 72. For our part, although we thought it useful in the first hours of the cease-fire ordered by the Council to establish contact between the respective local authorities so as to facilitate the reciprocal return of aH armed forces to their original positions, for the moment we no longer find such contact necessary. As far as we are concerned, we have fulfilled the obligations arising from the two closely-linkedprovisional measures set forth in operative paragraph 1 of resolution S/4882. There now onlyremains for France to carry out the return of aH its armed forces to their original position-and that according to the resolution, not to the latest letter from the French delegation [S/4897] speaking merely of "restoring normal conditions". 73. To return the armed forces of France to their original position means: first, to evacuate aIl the troops-parachutists, legionaries, naval troops and others-landed on Tunisian soil since the beginning of the aggression on 19 July 1961; in other words, to evacuate aH reinforcements brought in since that date; secondly, to evacuate from the Bay of Bizerta and from Tunisian territorial waters an warships and troop transports which since 19 July 1961 have entered the waters of Bizerta either to land troops or supplies or for military action; thirdly, to evacuate aU military aircraft-fighters, bombers and troop carriers-which since 19 July 1961 have made raids or dropped paratroops on Tunisian territory or have landed on Tunisian soil; and fourthly, to recall aIl French armed forces-land troops, naval troops and tanks-which since 19 July 1961 have left the instaIla- A l n ~ ; 75. Pertinent legal arguments have been advanced to show that the non-execution of measures, whether provisional or final, decided upon by the Security Council constitutes in itself a case of aggression. But for the mOll}.ent l shall spare the Council legal argument on this subject, the political side ofwhich seems to me more important at this stage than the legal side. 76. We believe it would be very difficult at present, especially since the Paris communiqué of 26 July, to deny that since 19 July 1961 Tunisia has been the victim of armed, premeditated and continued aggression by France. 77. It would seem difficult for the Council to evade its Charter obligations in this matter. Relevant precedents are certainly not lacking. l shall refer solely to those that Tunisia has known since joining the United Nations and taking part in its work. l can cite the precedent of the Congo,.in which theCouncil found itself confronted with deliberate and so-ealled provoked aggression and took vigorous and direct action to have B~lgian troops evacuated from the Congo. It is gratifying to recall that some oftheCouncil's decisions in this matter were taken with the affirmative votes of both the United States and the Soviet Union delegations. l may further recall the well-known and even more characteristic case of the Suez incident of October 1956, where, failing a decision by the Security Council owing to the use of the veto, the General Assembly met in special session and took effective decisions ol'dering the y,rithdrawal of the foreign troops which had invaded Egypt. l am gratified to recalI that in this case, too, the Soviet and United States delegations voted on the same side. 78. l know full weIl that one case is never exactly the same as another, but it seems to me very difficult to maintain, and for public opinion to agree, that there is any fundamental difference between the basic components of the Suez aggression and of the aggression just committed against Tunisia. That is the reason for which the Tunisian nation looks to the h r 80. l must apologize for making a somewhat lengthy statement, but l wished to make our complaint very clear and will ask for the floor again li any further particulars or details are necessary. We are among those who believe, as always, that in this troubled world there can be no justice so long as there is one truth for our friends and another for our enemiesas was said solemnly and justly during the crisis which followed the Suez incident.

The representative of Liberia has asked to speak on a point of order. l am pleased to give him the floor.

In raising a point of order l should first wish to be permitted to express my deep appreciation and that of my Government to the Secretary-General for bis whole-hearted and prompt response to the invitation of the President of Tunis~a to visit that country. We believe that the invitation and the acceptance thereof were entirely 83. I am certain that the Council will share the wish of my delegation for a statement from the Secretary- General in relation to his visit to Tunisia, and I therefore respectfully request, Mr. President, that the Secretary-General be called upon at this juncture to make a statement. I trust he is prepared to do so.

The representative of Liberia has suggested that it might be appropriate for the Security Council to hear a statement by the Secretary-General. I have the pleasure and honour of asking the Secretary-General whether he wishes to make such a statement, which will certainly be of the utmost importance to the Security Council.

I am happy to meet the request of the representative of Liberia. He has recalled that I have paid a short visit to Tunisia in the last few days at the invitation of the President of Tunisia. I arrived there in the afternoon of Monday, 24 July, and left in the afternoon of Thursday, 27 July, that is to say, yesterday afternoon. In the course of my visit I had the opportunity of having extensive personal contacts with President Bourguiba and with senior members of the Tunisian Government. I think that you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council will appreciate that both the character of this visit at the invitation of President Bourguiba and the limits which naturally impose themselves on me in a situation where a matter is pending before the Security Council restrict the field that I should cover in any reply to the question of the representative of Liberia, but I shall say what I feel I can sayat this time. 86. As the invitation of President Bourguiba and my reply have been circulated as Security Council documents [S/4885], the Council will have noted that the aim of the visit was defined by President Bourguiba as a direct and personal exchange of views regarding the developments following the interim resolution of the Security Council of Saturday, 22 July. TheCouncil will also remember that I noted in my reply that the question of substance-to which operative paragraph 2 of the resolution may be considered to refer-was. considered by me as falling outside my personal competence in view of the fact that it was pending before the Council. The scope and character of my visit are thus clearly defined by these two documents. Quite apart from the fact that it is naturally the dutY of the Secretary-General to put himself at the disposaI of the Government of a Member State, if that Government considers a personal contact necessary, my acceptance of the invitation falls within theframework of the rights and obligations of the Secretary- General, as Article 99 of the Charter authorizes him to draw te the attention of the Security Council what, in his view, may r€''1resent a threat to international 87. My discussions in Tunis, as well as the visit to Bizerta on which 1 decided, fell entirely within the framework thus outlined. 1 had the advantage of getting from the Chief of State and his collaborators a full picture of their views on the situation and their problems-specifically as regards the implementation of the resolution of 22 July. 1 also was in a position through personal observation to become acquainted with the circumstances relevant to the implementation of the resolution. 88. Without, of course, in any way assuming the role of mediator-a role for which obviously neither the terms of the Tunisian invitation nor the invitation of itself could provide a basis-but with a view to getting a better understanding of the difficulties with which efforts to establish a direct contact between the parties have met, difficulties which might be explained by a lack of commlmication, 1 took the initiative of expressing to the French Government my hope that it would inform me about its views regarding the questions on which 1 had been informed of the Tunisian viewpoint. The letter 1 addressed on 25 July to the Foreign Minister of France with that in view has been circulated to the Security Council, along with the Foreign Minister's reply [S/4894 and Add.l, sects. 1 and Ill, and 1 have therefore no reason to go further into this aspect of the matter. 89. As is weIl known, and as appears also from my letter to the French Foreign Minister, the implementation of the Security Council resolution of last Saturday remains so far L'lcomplete. It is true that the cease-fire has been established, but that does not seem to have led to an immediate cessation of an actions which, under such a cease-fire, should be ruIed out; nor, as the Council knows, does it mean that the integral demand by the Council for a return of the armed forces to their original positions has been met. 90. In view of the need for co-ordination of st13pS to be taken from the two sides, various efforts have been made to establish a contact between the two parties prior to the full implementation of the resolution. The two delegations most directly concerned have both referred to those efforts. The Council is of course aware of the fact that so far the efforts have not met with success. The situation is unprecedented, and that may in part explain the difficulties which have arisen. In part it may, as alreadyexplained, have been a question of a lack of communication. But there are questions of substance involved regarding the place for the contact, and perhaps also its objective. As stated to the parties, it seemed obvious to me from the resolutioli and from the general principles of the Charter, that the objective of such a contact should be the co-ordination of steps needed for the implementation of the resolution, and that the choice of modalities should take into account the prevailing legal situation. 91. By personal observation 1 can confirm the already well-~own fact of the presence in the city of 92. Regarding the facts of the situation, l should perhaps add that testimony given in personal contacts-testimony which l have reason to regard as trustworthy-appears to cOIliirm that actions difficult to reconcile with the principle of a cease-fire have also occurred after the time of the cease-fire, and that French military personnel have been involved in these actions. l must, however, repeat here that, since l have no information from the French side regarding these same matters, my statement should be evaluated with that in mind. 93. It is not for me here to pass any judgement on the situation either in terms of what it may involve by way of risks of a breakdown in the cease-fire in case of an incident, or in terms of the resolution, or in terms of international law. l feIt that l should limit myself to a factual statement, and l feel that it is for the memberl;l of the Security Council to make comments and draw conclusions. 94. In view of the aims of the present meeting of the Security Council, and in view also ofmy interpretation of the limitations· of the competence of the Secretary-General in the present phase of the work of the Council, l have naturally not touched upon the wider problem of substance involveJ.

l thank the Secretary-General for his important statement and l have pleasure in calling on the representative of Ceylon. 96. Mr. WIJEGOONAWARDENA (Ceylon): l should like to place on record my delegation' s appreciation of the role played by the Secretary-General inplacing himself at the disposaI of the President of Tunisia for a. direct and personal exchange of views. We wish that the same kind of contact had been possible between the Secretary-General and the French authorities. Whatever would have been the formaI positions, some kind of personal contact still would have been of immense help to aIl parties concerned. 'J7. We profoundly regret finding that there has been no recognition of this fact and that the valuable initiative taken by the Secretary-General in seeking such personal contact has not been availed of. 98. The letter of 25 July 1961, [S/4896 and Add.1 and 2] which is signed :JY thirty-nine States Members of the United Nations, and the sympathy and support that so many others have expressed for the contents of that letter provide ample testimony of the state of world public opinion on this subject. If world public opinion is, therefore, a real guide-as indeed it should be-to those of us who live in the present-day world, we cannot fail to pay heed to these views. 99. As we understand it, the Tunisian armed forces have withdrawn to their original positions but the 100. We should like to make a special appeal to France in this regard, in the interests of the maintenance of international peace and security. 101. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It is only six days sinca the Council adopted the interim resolution obliging France to cease fire immed:lately and return its armed forces to their original position; but today it must be recognized that France has openly stated that it is disregarding this resolution of the CounciI. 102. The French Government is continuing its armed aggression against Tunisia and has decided to repudiate the statement, made here in the Council on 22 July, that France had submitted to the Council's demands for a cease-fire. 103. Let us give some evidence in addition to what the representative of Tunisia has already said here. AlI the members of the Council remember that the representative of France in the Council said at its 962nd meeting that he was not taking part in the vote on the resolution adopted at that meeting because an appeal for a cease-fire had long ago been made by France itself, so that there was no reason for France to vote for that proposaI. 104. Furthermore, you aU well remember that at the beginning of the next meeting of the Council, the 963rd, the representative of France said-and this part of his statement has been quoted here by the representative of Tunisia-"In accordance with the decision taken this morning" (1 emphasize this, as the representative of Tunisia did) the FrenchAdmiral at Bizerta "immediately received instructions tocontact the Tunisian authorities at once, with a view to ... the establishment of a cease-fire as soon as possible...". 105. In conjunction with the first two faets, this clearly shows that, on 22 July, France stated at the meeting of the Council that it intended to comply at least with the first part of the resolution adopted by the Council, concerning the cease-fire. 106. Since France's refusaI to implement this decision has been sufficiently clearly shown today in documents which have been circulated to the members of the Council, we can apparently discount these facts. However, from the point of view of the Soviet delegation this is extremely important as an explanation of why and how France used the six days which have elapsed since the Council adopted this resolution to build up its forces afresh and to prepare and expedite aggressive acts against Tunisia. 107. Let us turn now to the communiqué by the French Government of 26 July 1961. In this statement, contrary to the position adopted by France at the meeting of the Council on 22 July, no one can find the least indication that in ordering a cease-fire 108. Even with regard to the cease-Ure at Bizerta, therefore, the French Government has now said-on 26 July, yesterday, and today in the documents which we have read-that it has not implemented the decision taken by the Counci!. How can we explain this obvious change of position during the past six days? It is not difficult to understand the motivation and explanation of this statement. This new statement of 26 July, and the statement made an hour and a half ago in Paris on behalf of the French Government, are quite unambiguous assertions that as soon as France finds that in its opinion the actions of Tunisia again make it "inevitable" -from the French point of viewfor the French troops to open fire, firewill be opened immediately regardless of the Security Counci! decision of 22 July 1961. 109. This is why l think that the time suent by the representative of Tunisia and myself in analysingthis part of the evidence is of essential, important and vital interest to the Counci!. Illdeed, we cannot allow the actions of France in regard to the cease-fire to give the false impression that France has complied, if only in part, with the Security Council decision of 22 July 1961. We must fully realize that the Tunisian people are still living under the real threat of a repetition of the bloody events of 19-22 July, the echoes of which have been heard here and there during these six days which have elapsed since the Councills decision. 110. Another important fact must also be emphasized. The Council's decision of 22 July had yet another integral part. It would indeed have been unthinkable on 22 July to adopt a resolution on a ceasefire without specifying, as the Council's resolution did: "a return of all armed forces to their original position". But what about compliance with this part of the resolution? France has not complied with this part of the resolution, any more than with the first part, and does not intend to do so; and in the communiqué by the French Government of 26 July we read that it is: ". .. impossible for the cease-fire to be ensured merely by the fact of our forces returning to their former positions. What is needed is a return to peaceful conditions." [.bid.] 111. What beautiful words-"a return to peaceful conditions"! They are really touching. But what does France mean here by this "return to peaceful"-or, as Is written in other French documents, "normal"- conditions? This is not difficult to discover, by reading the same document-the statement by the French Government of 26 July. Peaceful conditions or normal conditions according to the French interpretation, as can be judged from these documents, mean in this case nothing but the full recognition and confirmation 112. Meanwhile France is in fact occupying, as has already been firmly established, not only the town of Bizerta, but also its environs over a radius of twenty to forty kilometres. The authority of the Governor and the activities of all the administrative and judicial authorities are paralysed. Introducing emergency regulations and imposing a curfew, the French paratroops are continuing, as the representative of Tunisia has convincingly demonstrated here by a huge mass of evidence, to inflict violence on the peaceful population of Bizerta. 113. It should be pointed out that, even after the announcement of the cea.se-fire, French troops captured a number of administrative buildings at Bizerta in order to extend the territory under occupation and improve their strategie positions. The territory of Bizerta and the neighbouring areas occupied by the French are being mined, machine-guns are being placed in the streets and on the roofs of houses, and artillery, mortars and other reinforcements are being brought up. 114. New contingents of French troops are being sent to the town from the Bizerta military base and from outside the Tunisian frontiers. The guns of the French warships in the Bay of Bizerta have been trained on the town and every minute threaten to hurl death at its peaceful population. Between the town of Bizerta and the town of Menzel-Bourguiba, twentyfive kilometres to the south-west, French parachutists are systematically combing the sheikhdom of Louata, inflicting violence and crude outrage on the peaceful population. 115. Is any further proof needed here of the cynical refusaI of France to obey the SecurityCouncilresolution of 22 July? ls any further proof needed that France has used the past six days since the Council adopted the resolution of 22 July to reinforce the Tunisian territory cccupied by its troops and to prepare still further acts of aggression against the Tunisian people? 116. That is the actual position now, at our resumed meeting to examine Tunisia' s complaint of aggressive acts of France. Every sensible person is bound to ask himself why all this was possible. Why is the army of the aggressor continuing to trample on Tunisian soil, every hour and every minute threatening the freedom and independence of the Tunisian people? Why is all this happening? 117. The answer to this question seems to us quite clear. We have spoken of this at earlier meetings of the Counci!. All this is happening primarily because France is supported by its allies, the other colonial Powers and other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. 118. As all here well remember, at the meeting on 22 July the representatives of these States in the Security Council refused to give priority to the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic and Liberia. Why did they refuse priority to tbat very 119. It i8 said that the appetite grows with what it feeds on. Undoubtedly France, sensing the atmosphere of impunity resulting from the attitude of a number of the members of the Security Council here, has now decided to issue an ultimatum, openly disregarding the Council' s decision of 22 July and flouting the United Nations Charter. 120. At the meeting on 22 July we heard some indications-at least on the surface, in these communications from the French Government stating that in pursuance of the Security Council resolution the Ft'ench command had given orders to cease firethat although France would not vote for the resolution it did not reject it, or at any rate the part about the cease-fire. However, after less than a week there are now no traces of that attitude. 121. The main reason for the obstinacy with which the French continue their aggression against Tunisia is exactly the support of the NATO countries, which before the eyes of aIl the peoples of Africa, Asia and the whole world have in fact chosen, in this as in several other cases, to support colonialism in its most monstrous forms. 122. The correct solution to the problem is still quite ~. :mple. AU the facts are clear and obvious. Clearly Tunisia is sovereign, independent and equal with France and all the other States Members of the United Nations. Obviously the Bizerta base, where the French troops are stationed, is an integral part of Tunisia. Indisputably the presence offoreign armed forces in the territory of aState against its will is violence and an act of armed aggression incompatible with the United Nations Charter. Obviously also the expulsion of the foreign armed forces is in this case an act of self-defence within the meaning, for example, of Article 51 of the Charter. 123. It is also quite clear that military bases and armed forces on foreign territory are a serious threat to international peace and security, not to mention the threat to the national integrity and security of countries where foreign armed forces and foreign military bases remain against the will of their sovereign governments. 124. This is why all members of the Council who are sincerely interested in the maintenance of international peace and security and are striving to re- 125. The Security Council has neither the power nor the right to disregard or refuse attention to the mounting wave of universal indignation at the colonialist armed aggression unleashed by France against Tunisia. 126. We feel bound to recall the severe condemnation of the acts of the French colonialists uttered by the Council of the League of Arab states on 24 July 1961. This resolution reads: "The Council vigorously denounces the unjust French attack on Tunisia and the violation of Tunisian territory by French troops, which have embarked on a war of extermination on unarmed Tunisian citizens, including old people, women and children, have set fire to villages and houses and killed prisoners and unarmed population, in direct contradiction with undertakings entered into by France in international treaties and instruments prohibiting acts of extermination, including the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 which provides that civilian persons should be protectedfrom the dangers of war, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations Charter." [S/4888/Rev.1.) 127. The Soviet delegation has already, in the debate on the first complaint by Tunisia of the aggressive acts of France, drawn the attention of the members of the Security Council to the threat to international peace and security arising from the existence in foreign territories of military bases of Powers which are members of aggressive military blocs. In the light of recent events, marked by France's disregard of the SecurityCouncil resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of the armed forces to their original position, and in the light of the continuing French aggression against Tunisia, the peoples' demands for the abolition of all military bases in foreign territories takes on new force. 128. We are necessarily reminded of the striking speech made by the President of the Republic of Ghana, Ml'. Kwame Nkrumah, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly,~ in which this outstanding statesman called for a ban on the establishment or maintenance on the Africancontinent of military bases of foreign States. Everyone will also remember the speeches made at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly by the representatives of many States of Africa and Asia, including India, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, -Morocco, Mali, Cambodia, Nepal, Ethiopia and a number of other States, strongly supporting the proposaI of the President of Ghana, Ml'. Nkrumah, which was based on true concern for the strengthening of international peace and security, and for the security of small countries and peoples. 129. We find these profoundly right and justdemands expressed in the letter which the representatives of 130. We cannot help remembering the speech recently made in support of the just struggle of the Tunisian people against the French colonialists by Mr. Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic; Mr. Abubakar TafawaBalewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria; Mr. William Tubman, President of Liberia; and others. 131. In answer to all these just demands expressing the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world, the Security Council should resolutely condemn and immediately suppress the French aggression against Tudsia, and see that aU French troops arewithdrawn from the territory of this country. The Council should warn France-seriously warn France-that if it continues to disregard the Council's decision, theCouncil will consider whether to use against it the sanctions provided in the United Nations Charter. 132. For this one month of July, have there not been too many shockingly cynical instances of refusaI of the colonialist Powers to comply with the provisions of the basic document on which the whole United Nations rests-its Charter? Just consider that this July the Committee on South West Africa headed by Mr. Rodrfguez Fabregat, about which you, Mr. President, are fully informed, was not allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of South Africa. This situation obviously merits our most serious attention. We have just been informed that the Government of another colonial Powe.-the Government of Portugal-has abruptly rejected the legitimate demands of the Sub-Committee on the situation in Angola appointed by the General Assembly and asked by the Security Council to visit the territory of that longsuffering country in order to investigate the situation and submit its report to the General Assembly and the Security Counci!. The situation in that country, as is well known, also merits the closest attention of the Security Council. In this same month of July we have noted a third cynical violation before the eyes of the whole world of the basis of our Charter, now being committed by the Government of France, contrary to every idea of justice and of the rules which should be followed and observed by aState which has signed the United Nations Charter. 133. ls this not too much? ls it not too heavy a burden, not only for the smaU people of Tunisia, who have heroically joined battle with the French aggressors, but also for our whole Organization? 134. That is what the members of the Council should consider now, before defining their position with re- 135. This is why the Soviet delegation is prepared to support here in the Security Council the most decisive measures to make France respect the sovereignty of Tunisia and to eliminate the threat to peace in North Africa and the Mediterranean region. 136. At this crucial time the Soviet delegation again appeals to all members of the Security Council to fulm the duty imposed upon them by the Charter. The authority of the whole United Nations and the cause of the maintenance of peace will be most seriously undermined li France is allowed to continue. unlawfully and before us all. to flout the United Nations Charter and other basic provisions of international law. The Council must put an end to this.

When. a few days ago. the Security Council adjourned without adopting a resolution on the aggression of French forces in Tunisia. we thought. we hoped that nevertheless the interim measures adopted on the recommendation of the Secretary-General for an immediate cease-fire and the return of all armed forces to their original positions might put an end to the conflict if France were willing to reconsider its position and. in recognition of the justice of Tunisian claims. to free Tunisianterritory from the armed forces still occupying portions of it. That humane. urgent and temporary measure might. we hoped. do more than could be done by a decision on the whole controversy. on which the Council was split; it might perhaps. by its repercussions. solve the whole problem. 138. The representative of France implied in his statements that no Power was more deeply pained than France by the regrettable events which had been brought to the Security Council's attention. He quoted. at the 961st meeting. a passage from the statement made by the French Premier to the Senate: "We fervently hope that an end will be put without delay to a deplorable test of strengthwhich can only result in a serious deterioration in the relations between two nations destined by nature and history to co-operate." And the representative of France concluded: "That is the wish of al] Frenchmen". 139. The Security Council has helped to fulfil that wish by taking an interim decision which gives France an opportunity to show its goodwill by stopping the fighting and withdrawing the forces it brought in to reinforce the base at Bizerta; in short. restoration of the situation as it was on 19 July could have been a first step towards a solution of the whole controversy. 143. That would he a good topic for a dissertation on the value of our institutions and the authority of their decisions. But 1 do not despair; surelythe Council will find a way to ensure compliance with resolution S/4882, which was adopted almost unanimously by its members. The big nations should set the small an example of respect to an institution in which they bear the weightiest responsibilities. The Couneil will not be entitled in the future to impose on small States decisions which it could not impose on l~!'ge. It is essential, therefore, to secure compliance to the resolution adopted on 22 July, as it stands. 144. Since that is so, and since the affair of Bizerta is once again before the Council, we are bound to consider it as a whole, since a few days aga we failed to find a resolution for which a majority would vote. 145. My delegation hopes that the present situation resulting from France's {ailure to comply with the Council's resolution will bring us closer to a solution to the problem as a whole. That solution can only be recognition of Tunisia's right to Tunisian territory by liquidation of the French bases temporarily granted to France on part of that territory and by withdrawal of aIl foreign occupation forces. 146. 1 said "temporarily" because nobody can have imagined that Tunisia could permanently renounce its sovereignty to any portion of itsterritory. Whatcountry would do so? Tunisia" like every country jealous of its sovereignty, certainly has never entertained that ideae 147. The question is thus to determine the conditions and duration of the agreement between France and Tunisia-if any-entitling France to maintain a base on Tunisian territory. There is in the archives an Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between Mr. Mokaddem and Mr. Bénard, dated 17 June 1958 [S/4869], which provides that agreements shall he negotiated between the two States "as soon as possible, and at the latest upon completion of the withdrawal schedule", that is, within four months-to establish by mutual consent of the two Governments 148. We are the judges and assessors of what the permanent agreement could and should be. Common sense tells us that it could only be the total liheration of Tunisia. 149. Moreover, we are now living in a century of emancipation of peoples and countries, which no longer want to retain any vestige of the old oppression. Tunisia, already an independent country, cannot tolerate another obstacle to its sovereignty. 150. A study of the document of 17 June 1958 reveals that it certainly did not grant France any advantage; on the contrary, it was intended as a time-table for the conclusion of an agreement the purpose of which, though not specifically mentioned, could only he the liquidation of the Bizerta base. Tunisia, which nevertheless found this agreement of advantage as a basis for total liberation, then vainly sought to establish agreements which would dispel aU misunderstanding. 151. France had only one argument, which in the end. was conclusive, and which it used with telling effect at the eleventh hour when the Tunisians, exasperated by the long delay and the constant provocation of the foreign base at Bizerta, made themselves heard. 152. Then France put forward the military argument, the one which overrode all others. This is what we call colonialism and imperialism, which liberal and civilized countries repudiate nowadays and which freedom-loving countries find more repugnant than any other concept. 153. Our fear is that the maintenance of French troops on Tunisian soil will soon result in another tragic crisis like the one we have just been through. 154. We know that the whole world regards martyred Tunisia with sympathy; but what we really want is for the world to help it to save itself by recovering its freedom. And we, the United Nations, cannot stand idly by and watch what is happening there without adopting a categorical, just and humane decision. Justice here requires not only an end to the aggression, but the restoration of law. 155. This unhappy business of Tun,isia is of the greatest concern to very many countries. In a letter dated 25 Juiy [Si4896 and Add.l and 2] nearly forty delegations expressed their anxiety and fully acknow- 157. The Council of the League of Arab States, through the Secretary-General, had sent the Security Council a most categorical message of protest and statement of its position [S/4888/Rev.1], citing the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations Charter. Was the Tunisian population protected by those laws and institutions against the French aggression? 158. In order to prevent a recurrence of those events, my delegation is asking the Security Council to take aIl the necessary steps to ensure compliance with its decision calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the troops to their original positions. 159. But only by solving the problem as a whole can we avoid having to come here again on the Bizerta question, with a tragic account of burnt villages and of old people, women and children mown down by machine-gun fire. 160. My deleg9.tion, with the delegations of Ceylon and Liberia, has submitted a draft resolution[S/4903] amounting to a reaffirmation of the Security Council's decision calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops to their original positions. We have the intention of submitting another draft resolution. The two texts are being presented in agreement with the delegations of Liberia and Ceylon.

My delegation, as we said on the occasion of our previous meeting, most deeply deplores the tragic and substantial loss of life, military and civilian, that has occurred at Bizerta, and it extends its profound sympathy to those who have been so deeply afflicted. My delegation again expresses its sincere hope that the traditional friendship between two countries, both of whom the United States regards as its friends, may soon he restored to their mutual advantage and to the advantage of aIl countries which desire a peaceful world. 162. We have noted with serious concern that the Security C.ouncil resolution of 22 July [S/4882] has not yet been fully implemented. On the other hand, we have also noted that both parties have indicated a firm desire to impleroent that decision. Apparently the difference of opinion arises from the claim that the resolution implies a return to a fully peacefuJ. situation, to what the Secretary-General in his statement to the Council on 22 July [962nd meeting] descrihed as a "return to the status guo ante", and that that in turn involves assurances that peaceful communication and supply among the various separate parts of the French base at Bizerta shall exist after 164. There have been indications that both parties might be willing to meet on the spot to work out the return to original positions and accompanying arrangements. Difficulties have arisen in bringing about such a meeting and questions have been raised as to whether it is necessary. The opinion of my delegation is that whether or not such a meeting is necessary, it would be extremely useful. If there is anything we can do to facilitate its taking place, we of course should be happy to do so. But whether or not it takes place, the principal objective must be the execution of the resolution of 22 July accompanied, as we believe it should be, by any other measures which seem usefuI to the maintenance of peace on the spot. 165. We continue to believe that means can be found to satisfy the interests of both parties on this score. In the meantime there must of course be absolutely no aggravation of the present situation. At the same time we understand the Tunisian concern that the broader question of a permanent settlement of the Bizerta problem, a settlement based on respect for Tunisian sovereignty, should be included as an integral part of this Council's consideration of the problem. 166. In the draft resolution presented to the Council on 22 July by the United Kingdom and the United States [S/4879], it was recommended to "the parties, in accordance with the Charter, to negotiate promptly a peaceful settlement of their differences". 167. We reiterate this recommendation at this time and urge that, even though that draft resolution failed of adoption, nevertheless both parties accept this recommendation and proceed speedily to negotiation of their differences, which would of course include as a principal element a settlement in regard to the Bizerta base. 168. In summary, what the United States delegation urges is first, a rapid implementation of the resolution of 22 July involving a return of armed forces to their original positions under mutually acceptable arrangements; secondly, a prompt initiation of negotiations between the parties to work out a settlement of their differences, including that concerning the Bizerta base.

l give the floor to the representative of Libya.

l would first like to express my thanks and appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having been good enough to allow me to speak, at this stage of the debate on the Tunisian complaint, in order to explain te 172. We could, for example, invoke the close and brotherly relations existing between our two countries in aIl fields-relations whose international significance has been confirmed in a treaty of brotherhood and good-neighbourliness, stimulating our healthy cooperation for the promotion of our common interests and the safeguarding of peace and tranquillity in our part of Africa, still shaken, alas, by the colonialist war which for more than seven years has been in progress near our western frontier. 173. We could cite our two countries' membership of the same regional organization, associating aIl the independent .countries of the Arab world, which only a short time ago sharply condemned French aggression in Tunisia. 174. We could further rely on the imperative requirements of African solidarity, lending as they do a broader and deeper significance to co-operation and ties throughout the entire African-Asian world, which has assured Tunisia of its whole-hearted support. 175. But, over and above these various considerations, we feel justified in taking part in this debate as representatives of a country which attained independence and sovereign status under the auspices of the United Nations, in resolution of a colonial problem; and because we are accordingly convinced that, when events have reached so serious and dangerous a point, it is the duty of the United Nations and of the Security Council to defend the territorial integrity of a small country and to help in removing, once and for aIl, the remaining traces of colonialism which, as events at Bizerta have just shown, are one of the most serious causes of breaches of peace and security throughout the world. It is therefore a matter of the greatest urgency that the Security Council should fulfil its duty of putting a speedy end to this situation, which threatens the security and integrity of one of the small Member States and constitutes a general menace to peace in this already sorely tried part of Africa. 176. The representative of Tunisia has recounted the background to this question of the Bizerta base. He has clearly described the constant attempts made by his Government, during the past few years subsequent to Tunisia's attainment of independence, to achieve a reasonable, negotiated solution to the problem of the evacuation of the Bizerta base, which is one of the so-called "matters in dispute" between France and Tunisia. 177. We have followed the course of these peaceful efforts by the Tunisian Government with interest, and 178. We consider that it is this lack of understanding and realism, this absence of a sane approach, and the blind and desperate eagerness of outmoded colonialism to have its own way-together with its morbid sensitivity and its complexes-which have caused the question of the Bizerta base to develop so tragicaHy, with heavy loss of life during the bloody events of the past week, involving furious and unreasonably violent attacks against the brave Tunisian defence forces and against unarmed civilians, women and children included-and this at a time when most of the Tunisian army was dutifuHy serving the United Nations in the Congo. 179. l will not hide our disappointment on seeing that the Security Council was unable to act quickly and take the measures which the gravity of the situation demanded. We quite regret that political opportunism inspired perhaps by the general international situatIon and by the wish to deal tactfully with one's allies, should have outweighed this need in the minds of certain permanent members of the Security Council. We think that such a policy is shortsighted, and that there is more to be gained by honestly pursuing the purposes and principles of the Charter, and upholding law and justice, than byapplying an international policy of "one law for the rich and another for the poor". 180. We have however noted, with aH the admiration and appreciation due to the delegates of a sister country, the efforts made by the representatives of Liberia, the United Arab Republic and Ceylon. These efforts have been rewarded by the adoption of an interim resolution calling for a cease-fire and for the troops' withdrawal to their original positions. In our relief that hostilities have ceased, we are grieved to note that, despite the attempts made by the Tunisian leaders to implement the Council's resolution, French troops are still occupying Bizerta and are behaving like parachute commandos in a conquered country. The truce is a precarious one, the situation remains explosive and the latent complications are fraught with danger for Tunisia's territorial integrity and for international peace and security, both in general and throughout that specifie area. The challenge thrown down to the United Nations by a permanent member of the Security Council can only be interpreted as an ill omen for world peace. 1 J ~j 1 1, 181. We hope that the members of ·the Council will realize the seriousness of the situation created by the refusaI of the French army of occupation to comply with the resolution's provision for the troops' -'J 1 1 ·1., ({ 182. We also hope that this time the Security Council will take e necessary measures which will permit Tunisia to achieve its desire to free its soil from an unauthorized foreign armed force whose presence Tunisia can no longer tolerate. At the same time, we trust that these steps will enable the evacuation of Bizerta to be effected without further bloodshed. 183. l shall end my statement by extending to the representative of Tunisia the most heartfelt condolence of the people and Government of Libya upon the deaths of those hundreds of victims who fell on the field of battle while defending the honour and dignity of their motherland. l assure him, once again, of our most brotherly and most active support and solidarity. 184. We are certain that, with the help of all peaceloving and freedom-loving nations, our efforts will be crowned by the fulfilment of all our aspirations, foremost among which is the total liberation of Tunisia and the restoration of its national independence and territorial integrity. 185. May l conclude by associating myself with the expressions of appreciation addressed to the Secretary-General for his prompt response to Tunisia's invitation. We should have been happy had he had the same chance of establishing similar contact with the French authorities; this might have paved the way for contacts between the two parties, at United Nations level.

There are no further speakers on my list. Before adjourning this meeting, l should like to express my hope that both parties will refrain from taking any steps or decisions which might aggravate the present situation while this matter is being considered by the Security Council. l believe that in voicing this hope and appeal l am expressing the sentiments of most if not all of the members of the Council. 187. il' the:re is no objection, the meeting will now be adjourned and we shall meet again tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. 188. Ml'. CHEHLAOUI (United ArabRepublic) (translated from French): About haif an hour ago we submitted a draft resolution to the Council. We should have liked the Council to vote on that draft resolution this evening because we regard it as a mere formality: it simply reaffirms the decision adopted by the Council a few days ago. It will not take long, and l do not think that this would be too much to ask of the membbrs of the S,"curity Council. 189. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l strongly support the proposaI just made by the representative of the United Arab Republic. This time l am glad to say l have no cause for complaint about delay in circulating 191. Viewing the situation with the utmost objectivity, we cannot help but come to the conclusion that it is essential and imperative that the provisions of the resolution adopted by the Council on 22 July [S/4882], which, in addition to calling for an immediate ceasefire, called for a return of all armed forces to their original positions, should be implemented without further delay. 192. We therefore commend the draft resolution [S/4903] to the favourable consideration of members of the Cùuncil.

1 think 1 understood the representative of the United Arab Republic to ask for an immediate vote on the draft resolution in document S/4903. As this request was made while 1 was holding consultations on the adjournment of this meeting, 1 should like to know whether the Council is ready to vote on the matter.

My delegation has just seen, in the French language, the draft resolution submitted by the representatives ofCeylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. My delegation has had no opportunity of considering this draft, and we should certainly not find it convenient to vote on it tonight; we certainly want time to consider it further and to consult our Government about it.

1 am not pressing the matter, since the United Kingdom representative cannot vote at once. But we should like our draft resolution to be taken at the beginning of tomorrow's meeting.

1 should like to thank the representative of the United Arab Republic for that statement. 197. In the absence of any objection, the meetingwill now be adjourned and the Council will meet again at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow. It l'Vas so decided. The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m. AFRICA/AFRIQUE BELGIUM/BElGIQUE: ET MESSAGERIES 14-22, rue du Persil, CZECHOSLOVAKIA/TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE: èESKOSLOVENSKY Narodni Hida 9, Praha DENMARK/DANEMARK: EJNAR MUNKSGAARD, Nprregade 6, Kpbenhavn, FINLAND/FINLANDE: AKATEEMINEN KIRJAKAUPPA 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki. FRANCE: ÉDITIONS 13, rue Soufflot, Paris GERMANY (FED~RAL ALLEMAGNE (REPUBLIQUE R. EISEN SCHMIDT Schwanthaler Str. 59, ELWERT UND MEURER Hauptstrasse 101, Berlin·Schëneberg. ALEXANDER HORN Spiegelgasse 9, Wiesbaden. W. E, SAARBACH Gertrudenstrasse 30, CAMEROUN: LIBRAIRIE DU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Gérante, B. P, 1197, Yaoundé. ETHIOPIA/ÉTHIOPIE: INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY, P. O. Box 120, Addis Ababa. GHANA: UNIVERSITY BOOKSHOP University College of Ghana, Legon, Accra. MOROCCO/MAROC: CENTRE DE DIFFUSION DOCUMENTAIRE DU B.E.P.I., B, rue Michaux·Bellaire, Rabat. SOUTH AFRICA/AFRIQUE DU SUD: VAN SCHAIK'S BOOK STORE (PTY.), LTD. Church Street, Box 724, Pretoria. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/ RÉPUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE: LIBRAIRIE "LA RENAISSANCE D'ÉGYPTE" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha, Cairo. ASIA/ASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE: CURATOR, GOVT. BOOK DEPOT, Rangoon. CAMBOOIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMÈRE DE LIBRAIRIE Imprimerie & Papeterie, S. à R. L., Phnom-Penh. CEYlON/CEYLAN: LAKE HOUSE BOOKSHOP Assoc. Newspapers of Ceylon, P. O. Box 244, Colombo. CHINA/CHINE: THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTD. 99 Chung King Road, Ist Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD. 211 Honan Road, Shanghai. GREECE/GR~CE: LIBRAIRIE KAUFFMANN 28, rue du Stade, Athènes. ICELAND/ISLANDE: BÔKAVERZLUN SIGFÛSAR EYMUNDSSONAR H. Austurstraeti 18, Reykjavik. IRElAND/IRLANDE: Dublin. ITALY/ITALIE: LIBRERIA COMMISSIONARIA Via Gino Capponi 26, & Via D. A. Azuni 15/11., LUXEMBOURG: LIBRAIRIE SCHUMMER Place du Théâtre, Luxembou NETHERLANDS/PAYS.BAS: N. V. MARTINUS NIJHOFF Lange Voorhout 9, 's·Gravenhage. NORWAY/NORVÈGE: JOHAN GRUNDT TANUM Karl Johansgate, 41, PORTUGAL: L1VRARIA 186 Rua Aurea, Lisboa. SPAIN/ESPAGNE: L19RERIA BOSCH 11 Ronda Universidad, L1BRERIA MUNDI·PRENSA Castellô 37, Madrid. SWEDEN/SUÈDE: C. KUNGL. HOVBOKHANDEL Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm. 'SWITZERLAND/SUISSE: LIBRAIRIE PAYOT, Lausanne, Genève. HANS RAUNHARDT Kirchgasse 17, Zürich HONG KONG/HONG·KONG: THE SWINDON BOOK COMPANY 25 Nathan Road, Kowloon. INDIA/INDE: ORiENT. LONGMANS S·ombay, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Madras & New Delhi. OXFORD BOOK & STATIONERY COMPANY Calcutta & New Delhi. P. VARADACHARY & COMPANY Madras. INDONESIA/INDONÉSIE: PEMBANGUNAN, LTD. Gunung Sahari 84, Djakarta. JAPAN/JAPON: MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD. 6 Tori·Nichome, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. KOREA (REP. OF)/CORÉE (RÉP. DE): EUL·YOO PUBLISHING CO., LTD. 5, 2-KA, Chongno, Seoul. PAKISTAN: THE PAKISTAN CO·OPERATIVE BOOK SOCIETY Dacca, East Pakistan, PUBLISHERS UNITED, LTD. Lahore, THOMAS & THOMAS Karachi. PHILIPPINES: ALEMAR'S BOOK STORE 769 Rizal Avenue, Manila. SINGAPORE/SINGAPOUR: THE CITY BOOK STORE, LTD., Collyer Quay. THAILAND/THAïLANDE: PRAMUAN MIT, LTD. 55 Chakrawat Road, Wat Tu k, Bangkok. VIET·NAM (REP, OF/RÉP. OU): LIBRAIRIE·PAPETERIE XUÂN THU 185, rue Tu·do, B. P. 283, Saigon. TU~KEY/TURQUIE: LIBRAIRIE HACHETTE 469 Istiklal Caddesi, UNION OF SOYIET UNIO!,! DES REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES: MEZHDUNARODNAYA KNYIGA, Smolenskaya UNITED KINGDOM/ROYAUME·UNI: H. M. STATIONERY P. O. Box 569, London, (and HMSO branches Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, YUGOSLAVIA/YOUGOSLAVI CANKARJEVA ZALOZBA Ljubljana, Siovenia. DRZAVNO PREDUZEéE Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Beograd. PROSVJETA 5, Trg Bratstva i Jedinstva, PROSVETA PUBLISHING Import·Export Division, Terazije 16/1, Beograd. EUROPE AUSTRIA/AUTRICHE: GEROLD & COMPANY Graben 31, Wien, 1. B. WOLLERSTORFF Markus Sittikusstrasse 10, Salzburg. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agencies have ,not yet been or to Sales Section, United Nations, Les commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays où il n'existe ONU, New York (É.•U.), ou à la Section des ventes,