S/PV.9676 Security Council

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor.

For the record, we would like to register our principled disagreement with the decision of the presidency to invite the representatives of Ukraine and the European Union to this meeting. It is clear that those participants have nothing to do with the regional issue proposed for discussion under the agenda item “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and will not make any meaningful contribution to the discussion. It is also clear that the sole purpose of their attendance at this Security Council meeting is to politicize it and to join the chorus of Western States members of the Security Council in the unfounded, tabloid-like allegations that they replicate. All this is being done to allow those participants to contribute to the unfounded allegations that we know will be made here today. We find it regrettable that, in order to suit the opportunistic interests of the collective West, the South Korean presidency has yet again chosen during its term to violate the principle of impartiality, by which the President of the Security Council is duty-bound to abide. Not only does this constitute an abuse of the presidency of the Security Council, but it also represents a failure of the presidency to discharge its duties. Unfortunately, that is a great stain on the reputation of the Republic of Korea as holder of the presidency of the Security Council. I want to state from the very outset that I have no intention of listening to the statements of those speakers.

The representative of the United States has asked for the floor.

I would like to make a brief statement in support of Ukraine’s participation in this meeting under rule 37 and of the European Union’s under rule 39. Ukraine’s participation is relevant to this agenda item. Russia is launching ballistic missiles against the Ukrainian people that it unlawfully procured from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. There is substantial and credible press reporting and open-source analysis referring to weapons from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea found in Ukraine. Reuters has reported that the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) recently inspected debris in Ukraine from a ballistic missile fired into Kharkhiv on 2 January, concluding that it was definitely made in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Similarly, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency has published analysis showing a visual comparison of images confirming again Russia’s use against Ukraine of ballistic missiles made in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. With the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts disbanded, the Council needs to remain seized of developments relevant to the violations of sanctions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, given the security implications that those developments have for Europe, the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region. The invitation to, and participation of, relevant Member States and regional organizations is critical to ensuring that relevant information is brought to the Council.

The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom also strongly supports the decision by the presidency to grant the participation of Ukraine and the European Union in today’s debate. This is really a very clear-cut case. As everyone in this Chamber knows, there is plenty of evidence that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea weapons are being used to sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine, a war which has direct implications for the stability and security of Europe. It is clear that the interests of both Ukraine and the European Union are affected by the proliferation of weapons from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is therefore proper, right and consistent with the provisional rules of procedure that we hear from them. It is true that they may not have participated before under this item but, then again, it is only relatively recently that Russia has started openly violating the United Nations sanctions and using Democratic People’s Republic of Korea weapons in its war in Ukraine. Obviously, the Council has to be able to adapt its practices in response to events in the real world.

I thank you, Mr President, for giving me the floor. Like the previous speakers, I wanted to express my clear disagreement with the statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and my clear support for your proposal to invite Ukraine and the European Union to participate in this meeting. As my British colleague has just said — and I think our meeting will fully demonstrate this — the security of Ukraine is obviously at stake because of what is happening between North Korea, Russia and perhaps other parties, and obviously the security of the European Union is at stake too. Therefore, the participation of Ukraine and the European Union in this meeting is absolutely legitimate. Again, I think this meeting will show that. I would like to conclude by saying that, obviously, I hope that we can clarify things in public today at the Security Council, and beyond clarifying things, that we can also take action and return to full compliance with Security Council resolutions and stop meeting against a backdrop of shameful violations of those resolutions.

I take note of the points raised by the Council members. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Ukraine to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; and Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director, Conflict Armament Research. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I also invite His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mrs. Nakamitsu. Mrs. Nakamitsu: I have been asked today to brief the Security Council under the agenda item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, in order to discuss “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea weapons transfers in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions”, at the request of France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Council has recently been briefed on a number of occasions regarding the launches of ballistic missiles or satellites using ballistic missile technologies by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In recent months, there have also been allegations of transfers of ballistic missiles and ammunition from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, allegedly for use in the conflict in Ukraine, which is being waged in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. I note that, in its final report dated 7 March 2024, the Panel of Experts that supported the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) states that “[t]he Panel is investigating reports from Member States about supplies by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of conventional arms and munitions in contravention of sanctions.” (S/2024/215, summary) I understand that, as per that reference in its final report, the Panel of Experts was reviewing, before the expiration of its mandate, a report by Ukraine on missile debris recovered in Ukraine, following information about short-range ballistic missiles manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and used by Russian armed forces in Ukraine. On 30 April, the mandate of the Panel of Experts that supported the Committee expired, after having been continuously extended since 2009 when the Panel was first established by the Security Council. However, it is important to note that, although the mandate of the Panel of Experts expired, the Sanctions Committee continues its work and will still oversee the implementation of the sanctions regime. The illicit and unregulated trade in and the diversion of weapons and their ammunition has long been a major concern for the international community. To respond to the risks associated with illicit and unregulated arms transfers, States have established a number of international, regional and bilateral arms control treaties, agreements and frameworks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in and diversion of conventional arms, to regulate the international arms trade and to promote transparency in weapons transfers. Security Council sanctions regimes are at the top of such international collective efforts to maintain peace and security and to prevent illicit transfers of arms. I recall that the relevant resolutions are legally binding on all States Members of the United Nations. At the international level, those efforts are complemented and reinforced by various other instruments, including, for instance, the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its International Tracing Instrument, and the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management. Those instruments vary in scope, and the numbers of States that are parties to the relevant treaties also vary, but all are guided by the overarching principle of preventing and combating the illicit arms trade. Universal participation in the relevant instruments, as well as their full and effective implementation, must remain a priority. Importing, transit, producing and exporting States must act responsibly at every step along the arms and ammunition transfer chain to prevent diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse. Pre-transfer risk assessments, marking and record-keeping practices and tracing capabilities are of the utmost importance. Effective physical security and stockpile management of arms and ammunition, and customs and border control measures are also key. Any transfer of weapons and ammunition must be compliant with the applicable international legal framework, including of course, relevant Security Council resolutions and the sanctions regimes that they establish. As the Secretary-General has stated, any relationship that any country has with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the Russian Federation, must entirely abide by the relevant Security Council sanctions. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues its nuclear weapons programme and the development of its means of delivery. It has significantly increased its ballistic missile launch activities in recent years, in line with its five-year military development plan, unveiled in January 2021. Since 2022, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has conducted more than 100 launches of ballistic missiles, including solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile and space launch vehicles using ballistic missile technology, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017). Most recently, on 26 June, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea undertook what has been reported to be a launch using ballistic missile technology, which reportedly exploded shortly after the launch. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea claimed, however, that it successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of multiple-warhead missile. With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s continued pursuit of its nuclear programme, Mr. Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated on 21 December 2023 that the discharge of warm water from the cooling system of the light water reactor at Yongbyon was observed, which is indicative that the reactor has reached criticality. More recently, in his opening statement to the IAEA Board of Governors on 3 June, Director General Grossi said that the IAEA also observed indications of the ongoing operation of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility in Yongbyon and the expansion of another facility in the Kangson complex. While there are no indications of recent changes at the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, the site remains occupied. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s persistent pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, continues to undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that underpins it. We have followed with concern the reports of malicious cyberactivities attributed to actors affiliated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. According to the final report of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), a high volume of such malicious activity continues, in particular through the targeting of cryptocurrency-related companies. Other trends observed include the targeting of supply chains. Such reported behaviour is not in line with the universally endorsed General Assembly framework for responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communication technologies in the context of international security, but it increases risks to international peace and security and undermines trust and stability between States. In conclusion, I reiterate the Secretary-General’s call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fully comply with international obligations, including those under the relevant Security Council resolutions. All relevant States must avoid taking any action that could lead to further escalation — not only in the Korean Peninsula, but also in other regions  — and further undermine the arms control and non-proliferation regime. The Secretary-General calls for the resumption of talks and for all concerned to foster an environment that is conducive to dialogue. Diplomatic engagement remains the only pathway to sustainable peace and the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

I thank Mrs. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Leff. Mr. Leff: I would like to begin by thanking the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for giving me the opportunity to brief the Security Council today, and I congratulate the Republic of Korea for its accomplishments during its current membership. For decades, the international community has sought to control the conventional arms trade in order to minimize weapon diversion, which is the loss, theft or intentional retransfer of legally acquired arms to unauthorized users. A lack of concrete data and detailed reporting has consistently hampered those efforts, with most reports failing to record unique weapon-identifying information, providing little indication of weapon provenance and, consequently, offering few avenues for further and effective investigation. Ungrounded and incomplete reporting has thwarted arms control policymaking efforts to understand the dynamics it seeks to control and mitigate. That is precisely the gap that my organization, Conflict Armament Research seeks to fill. Our independent approach recognizes that the most effective way to determine the origins of diverted weapons, ammunition and related materiel is to document them first-hand on the battlefield — or as close as possible to the point of capture, seizure or recovery. Conflict Armament Research places the physical item at the centre of its investigations. Deploying field investigation teams on the ground in conflicts, my organization recovers unique, traceable information from weapons, ammunition and related materiel, such as serial, lot and batch numbers, which identify an item individually from the point of production and enable it to be traced through the supply chain. With the cooperation of Governments and industry, Conflict Armament Research traces each item’s transfer history through sales and transfer records. To date, we have documented nearly 1 million weapons, ammunition and their components. By aggregating data on thousands of traced items recovered on the battlefield, we provide a dynamic picture of global supply chains, indicating precisely where weaknesses in those chains result in diversion. Conflict Armament Research has been operational in Ukraine since 2018, documenting and tracing weapons used in attacks on its territory. Since the current conflict commenced in February 2022, we have documented more than 270 advanced conventional weapons, namely uncrewed aerial vehicles and missiles that have been used in attacks in Ukraine. Throughout this year, we have uncovered a trend in the conflict: the use of conventional weapons manufactured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In January 2024, a Conflict Armament Research field investigation team physically documented the remnants of a ballistic missile that struck Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, on 2 January 2024. These are the remnants of the missile that we encountered. Conflict Armament Research documented the missile’s rocket motor, its tail section and almost 300 internal components, manufactured by 26 companies from eight countries and territories. Based on several unique features observed during the documentation, we determined that this missile was either a KN-23 or KN- 24, manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2023. Following the initial documentation, our teams inspected three additional identical Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles that struck Kyiv and Zaporizhzhya earlier this year. Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2270 (2016) prohibit United Nations Member States from procuring arms or related materiel from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and prohibit the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from exporting that materiel. Our reporting on the matter was the first public analysis of such weapons fired outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in the war in Ukraine. Conflict Armament Research has reached the conclusion that the missile was manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based on the following unique characteristics: its diameter, its distinct jet vane actuators, the bolt pattern around the igniter, the presence of Korean characters on some of the rocket’s components and the repeated presence of marks that likely refer to the year 2023 in the Juche calendar, coupled with the presence of electronic components dating back to 2023. As part of our assessment, our investigators compared the characteristics of the missile documented in Ukraine against features of official photos of missiles published by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and another similar system manufactured by another Member State. Our investigators found that the missile recovered in Ukraine on 2 January 2024 had a tail section measuring 110 centimetres in diameter, whereas the other missile’s tail section only measured 95 centimetres. Furthermore, the tail section of the missile documented by Conflict Armament Research investigators featured four jet vane actuators, which are components that direct a missile’s thrust, and thus influence its trajectory. The missile that we attributed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had jet vane actuators that were unique and clearly differed in size, shape, and construction from those of the other missile systems of different origin. Here Council members can see the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea actuator and the one of other origin. Conflict Armament Research also documented a bolt pattern on the front section of the rocket motor that strongly resembles that of the identical missile manufactured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and shown in official State photos. In both Conflict Armament Research’s documentation and in factory images, the missile’s rocket motor exhibits a central disc featuring 20 bolts evenly distributed around its circumference. On several internal components of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missile, Conflict Armament Research investigators documented the presence of Korean characters. Here is one example. Finally, Conflict Armament Research investigators documented the presence of the mark “112” on several different components found in the missile wreckage. That mark likely refers to the year 2023 in the Juche calendar, the official calendar of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That hypothesis is corroborated by our documentation of electronic components found in the missile’s wreckage, featuring date marks indicating manufacture in 2023. In fact, a significant number of the missile’s internal components were produced within the past three years, and 20 per cent of the components that bore date marks were produced in 2023. The evidence I mention, which my organization observed and thoroughly documented first-hand, irrefutably establishes that the missile fired on Kharkiv was indeed of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea origin. On a subsequent visit, in which 1 myself travelled with a team to Ukraine for further documentation, we observed additional conventional weapons manufactured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that had been seized on the front lines and had not been observed on the battlefield previously in Ukraine, including an artillery rocket produced in 1977, which reports suggest may have been part of a recent larger consignment of rockets. Conflict Armament Research will continue to monitor that new and emerging trend in the Ukraine conflict and report on any new identifiable developments. The proliferation and use of missiles manufactured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leads to further erosion of global non-proliferation regimes. Specifically, any exports of ballistic missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea carried out following the introduction of United Nations embargoes on the country in 2006 represent violations of the sanctions regime. Security Council resolutions also forbid the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from developing its ballistic missile programme, meaning that individuals and entities involved in facilitating the transfer of key components and materials may also have committed sanctions violations. Conflict Armament Research’s discovery of recently produced, non-domestic electronic components in the missile highlights the significant challenges currently facing global non-proliferation regimes. Here is one shot of the electronic components that our team documented. It shows that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been able to produce advanced weapons, integrating components produced as recently as 2023, despite Security Council sanctions that prohibit the production of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It also suggests that the country has developed a robust acquisition network capable of circumventing, without detection, a sanctions regime that has been in place for nearly two decades. Conflict Armament Research’s findings highlight once again how field documentation and monitoring are critical to the effectiveness of any export control and sanctions mechanism. Conflict Armament Research’s findings also demonstrate the challenges associated with effective regulation and control of the export of commercial components. Conflict Armament Research is currently tracing the supply chains of components documented in the missile. None of those components were manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, highlighting the reliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on external acquisition networks to sustain its domestic missile programme. Preliminary findings show that the global nature of the semiconductor industry, in particular, and its reliance on third-country distribution channels should also raise concerns for the export control and sanctions compliance of other Member States responsible for implementing those regimes. Since January of this year, Conflict Armament Research has received responses to its trace requests identifying the intermediaries and last known custodians based in third countries that have acquired some of the electronic components found in the missile documented in Ukraine. In one instance, we recently received information from a company regarding a microprocessor that was supplied to a Member State in late 2017 and then retransferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea thereafter. That shows that, although the transfer chain is complex and layered in nature, Conflict Armament Research’s boots-on-the-ground approach —characterized by field documentation, collaborative tracing with industry and Governments, triangulation and targeted trade mapping  — allows for the effective identification of entities of concern. Conflict Armament Research’s field investigation teams will continue to document weapons systems used in the conflict in Ukraine and will endeavour to highlight developments as they occur, including the continued use of weapons that violate Security Council sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

I thank Mr. Leff for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu for her briefing. I also thank Mr. Leff very much for his briefing. His presentation was quite compelling. Let me start by taking this opportunity to condemn in the strongest possible terms the June 25 ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which violated yet again the Council’s long-standing prohibition on missile testing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It only underscores the contempt that Pyongyang consistently demonstrates towards the Council and its mandate to ensure international peace and security. Russia ended the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in March with China’s tacit support, depriving all the States Members of the United Nations of crucial and objective information that helps them implement their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. We are grateful that independent and well- regarded experts from organizations like Conflict Armament Research continue to publish open-source investigations that provide clear reporting on violations of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The briefing we just heard shows that Russia and China cannot prevent the public from learning about the unlawful arms transfers occurring between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia. The unique features of ballistic missile debris that Conflict Armament Research has presented as evidence clearly establish that a ballistic missile that struck Kharkiv on 2 January was manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Russia’s procurement of such ballistic missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea violates the Security Council resolutions that Russia itself helped to adopt by consensus. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has a responsibility to uphold and strengthen international peace and security. Yet Russia is launching ballistic missiles, which it unlawfully procured from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, against the Ukrainian people. Alongside the dozens of missile transfers Russia has carried out from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it has unlawfully transferred more than 11,000 containers of munitions from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Russia. Here again, Russia has violated the United Nations arms embargo on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that Russia itself voted to adopt. Russia and China continue to shield the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from joint action in the Council. We understand Russia cynically obstructs the Council on the implementation of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its vain bid to escape reproach for its own violations. But by refusing to condemn Russia’s violations, China only emboldens the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to further provocations with ballistic missile launches and other behaviour that ultimately destabilizes China’s regional security. Conflict Armament Research’s independent findings corroborate what we have seen in press reporting and other open-source analysis. On 29 April, Reuters reported that the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) recently inspected debris in Ukraine from a missile fired into Kharkiv on 2 January. As reported, the Panel of Experts independently and conclusively determined that the debris derived from a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Hwasong-11 series ballistic missile, which was a violation of the United Nations arms embargo on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel of Experts reviewed telemetry from the Ukraine Prosecutor General’s Office showing that the ballistic missile was launched from the Russian Federation, which, in conjunction with the Panel’s identification of the missile as a Hwasong-11, helped to confirm that the Russian Federation procured the missile from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in violation of Security Council resolutions. On 29 May, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency also published additional analysis showing a visual comparison of images from Democratic People’s Republic of Korea State media with images of missile debris from Kharkiv, Ukraine, again confirming Russia’s use of missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against Ukraine. Earlier this month, Vladimir Putin made a State visit to Pyongyang, where he and Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that included mutual defence obligations. The implications of that partnership against the backdrop of ongoing military cooperation should elicit grave concern from all of us here. Finally, it is critical to underscore that all Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remain in effect, all Member States are obligated to implement relevant provisions and the Council must take seriously its responsibility to vigilantly monitor implementation to counter the threats posed to international peace and security by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

I thank Mrs. Nakamitsu and Mr. Leff for their briefings. For months now, we have seen increasing and overwhelming evidence of arms transfers between Russia and North Korea, in violation of Security Council resolutions. Last September, during Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia, military equipment, including drones, was offered to the North Korean delegation. Last March, the final report of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (see S/2024/215) presented information regarding the delivery to Russia of containers of North Korean ammunition, which were then transported to Ukraine. Today independent research corroborates the North Korean origin of ballistic missiles that were used to strike Ukrainian territory. France condemns North Korea’s export of those missiles and their use by Russia. Those transfers are flagrant violations of resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 of which prohibits all Member States from supplying arms to North Korea or acquiring them from it. The resolution was adopted by the Council unanimously. Russia supported it, as did all other members of the Council, but now it is violating it. During his recent visit to North Korea, the Russian President said he did not rule out strengthening military and technical cooperation with the country. Russia will convince no one that its military cooperation with North Korea is linked to the legitimate development of a so-called traditional friendship. Nor will it convince anyone that such cooperation could help to reduce tensions in the region. With the new agreement between those two Powers, the risk of the transfer of ballistic and nuclear technologies has become very real, as has the risk of complete impunity for the North Korean regime in the pursuit of its illicit military programmes. Russia’s support emboldens North Korea, which has carried out more than 100 ballistic launches since 2022, and encourages it to continue its provocations. On 27 May, North Korea attempted to put a new military satellite into orbit. A few days ago, on 26 June, it attempted to fire a ballistic missile, again in violation of Council resolutions. By sourcing weapons from North Korea, Russia is choosing to prioritize the continuation of its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine to the detriment of the international non-proliferation regime. It jeopardizes regional stability and our collective security. In March, Russia vetoed the renewal of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Committee (see S/PV.9591) mandate, which it had previously supported for almost 15 years. By depriving the Committee of that valuable instrument, Russia intends to prevent any independent investigation into its violations of sanctions regimes. Today’s meeting, requested by France and several of its partners, demonstrates that the Council will continue to inform itself and Member States about violations of its resolutions. Those resolutions are still in force and must be fully implemented by all States. We continue to call on North Korea to comply with its international obligations, abandon its illegal weapons of mass destruction programmes and finally engage in dialogue to achieve complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization.

I thank Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director at Conflict Armament Research, for their sobering and extremely alarming briefings. I must begin by condemning yet another ballistic missile launch by North Korea on 26 June, local time. North Korea continues to develop its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programmes unabated, brazenly violating Security Council resolutions. What is more, it is evading Council sanctions with the help of other actors. It is highly regrettable that, despite the affirmative support of 13 Council members, the Council was compelled to silence the Panel of Experts (see S/PV.9591), which had played a crucial role in countering North Korea’s proliferation activities. Its renewal was blocked by the Russian Federation, which, as a permanent member of the Council, should bear the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security but instead wielded its veto power to defend North Korea’s unlawful conduct. If the Panel still existed, its reports would have certainly included further investigations into sanctions evasion and even violations by Russia itself. Japan condemns in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of ballistic missiles in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of those missiles against Ukraine. The transfer of those weapons supports Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and will increase the suffering of the Ukrainian people and exacerbate the situation in Ukraine. It could also affect the entire international community through its deleterious impact on the non-proliferation regime and by destabilizing the very foundation of the global security and economy. We have witnessed disagreements  — or dare I say deliberate obstructionism  — in the Chamber on this file. Let me remind members that, whatever the policy differences among us, there is one thing that no one can or should deny — previous Security Council resolutions that the Council adopted unanimously. They are in force and must be reinforced. Let us say it clearly: all Member States, including North Korea and anyone sitting in the Chamber, should fully implement and abide by the existing resolutions, no matter how different our views may be on the geopolitical circumstances or the root causes of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Let us stop insisting on deceptive excuses for not adhering to the resolutions to which we have an obligation to adhere. We recently witnessed the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, paving the way for a further deepening of military cooperation between the two parties, which are blatantly violating the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions. I believe that no additional reasons are needed to affirm that this development should be of grave concern to the rest of the international community. Right after his visit to Pyongyang, the Russian leader even suggested the possibility of providing weapons to North Korea. It is hence no exaggeration to say that we stand at a critical, historical juncture for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. No one benefits from weakening the global non-proliferation regime. If those acts go unchecked, it will be shaken to its foundations. If proliferation by North Korea cannot be addressed and if evasion and violations of sanctions are condoned, significant consequences will spread far beyond Asia. This is an urgent non-proliferation crisis confronting the entire globe. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I join others in thanking High Representative Nakamitsu and Mr. Leff for their briefings. Since 2006, the Council has adopted nine resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. All nine condemned the nuclear and ballistic missile activity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cease this activity and imposed sanctions, including prohibiting the transfer of arms and related material between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and any State Member of the United Nations. All nine were unanimously adopted by the Council. Russia has violated those resolutions repeatedly. There is now a continuous flow of cargo between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That includes munitions and ballistic missiles, as reported by United Nations experts in April and by our briefer today. As well as weapons and the flow of goods between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is also procuring refined petroleum from Russia, which is likely to exceed the cap mandated by the resolutions. Russia does not even attempt to hide its behaviour. It brazenly vetoed (see S/PV.9591) the renewal of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and, during President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang this month, Kim Jong Un praised the active cooperation between the two countries, including in military affairs. In return for the weapons and Russia’s protection in the Council, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is seeking trade and military assistance, in further circumvention of United Nations sanctions and increasing the risks to regional security and stability. Those violations have serious consequences for millions of people worldwide. North Korean missiles are being used, as we heard today, in the destruction of Kharkiv, bringing misery, injury and death to Ukrainian civilians. Ammunition is helping Russia prolong its war, which continues to exact a heavy toll on women and children. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea built its missile programmes by diverting resources from the North Korean people, and it continues to use forced labour. And by damaging the fabric of the non-proliferation regime and reducing constraints on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military programmes, Russia’s actions are making the world a more dangerous place for all countries. The United Kingdom will therefore work with all willing countries to identify, expose and counter Russian attempts to acquire military equipment from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to protect the global non-proliferation regime. It is an abuse of the Organization and its principles that the Russian Federation so openly and deliberately violates the United Nations sanctions regime, on top of its flagrant breach of the Charter of the United Nations in Ukraine. This is all unacceptable. All of us who believe that the Council must call Russia out clearly must commit to working together to protect the United Nations, the non-proliferation system and global peace and security.

I also thank High Representative Nakamitsu and Mr. Leff for their informative and sobering briefings today. We welcome the holding of this timely meeting. Malta is deeply concerned about the growing evidence, including through independent reports, of Russia’s procurement and use of missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Utilizing those missiles against Ukraine not only furthers the suffering of the Ukrainian people, but it also constitutes an opportunity to test their efficacy and reliability on the battlefield against defence missile systems, which contributes to the advancement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. Through those actions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation demonstrate their willingness to undermine the global non-proliferation architecture and violate the Charter of the United Nations itself. The transfer of arms, ammunition and related materials to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1718 (2006), on the sanctions regime. In that connection, we reiterate our deep disappointment at Russia’s decision to veto (see S/PV.9591) the renewal of the mandate of the 1718 Panel of Experts. The Panel played a crucial role in investigating crimes and violations of the sanctions regime and served as an invaluable source of information for the wider membership. The Panel of Experts may be gone but sanctions remain in place. They must be implemented by all Member States. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful WMD programme threatens international peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The Council should collectively work to change this course, instead of facilitating its advancement. Furthermore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regime continues to prioritize its military spending, blatantly ignoring the needs of its people. The United Nations and other humanitarian agencies estimate that over 40 per cent of the population is food insecure and in need of assistance. Yet the regime continues to divert its scarce resources towards its illegal and dangerous WMD programme. It is disquieting that, while borders remain closed to humanitarian actors, including the United Nations country team and the Resident Coordinator, the regime welcomes visits by foreign delegations of its choice. We are particularly concerned about recent reports of a mutual assistance pledge between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We reiterate that any agreement that involves the transfer of arms or ammunition is a violation of the 1718 sanctions regime. To conclude, we call on all Member States to respect and fully implement the sanctions regime. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reopen its borders to humanitarian actors and to engage in meaningful dialogue towards the complete abandonment of its unlawful and dangerous WMD programme.

I begin by commending you, Mr. President, and your team for your conscientious leadership of the Council throughout June. I am grateful for the information provided by Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu, and I listened attentively to the representative of Conflict Armament Research. Before turning to the subject for which we are gathered, my delegation joins the categorical condemnation of the recent launching of a ballistic missile by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  — an act made, yet again, in defiance of the provisions of the Security Council. Any transfer of weapons and munitions must comply with the applicable international legal framework and the relevant Security Council resolutions, which are binding. Any illegal transfer of arms must be stopped and cannot be accepted, even implicitly. It is therefore regrettable that the independent information verification mechanism was dismantled, owing to the veto exercised in March when the Council considered the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (see S/PV.9591). That has weakened the Council’s ability to respond at a time when, on behalf of the international community, it must act, given the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s continued violations of Council resolutions. The search for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution on the Korean Peninsula requires concerted action to avoid the implementation of measures that exacerbate tensions and jeopardize regional and global stability. Ecuador reiterates its belief that dialogue in good faith is the path to mutual understanding and the best way to address differences and conflicts. Ecuador also reiterates its willingness to work with all actors concerned in order to enable lasting solutions to promote sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. In conclusion, today as never before, the cooperation and collective commitment of the Security Council is required to confront and overcome the challenges to international peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

I thank Mrs. Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Leff for their briefings. I acknowledge the presence of the representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the European Union and Ukraine in this meeting. Guyana expresses its deep concern at the recent missile launch and test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We call upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, again, to honour all its obligations under the relevant Council resolutions. We also urge all Member States to take steps to strictly enforce the measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as items relevant to nuclear and ballistic missile programmes or other weapons of mass destruction. We took note of the recent signing of the treaty on the comprehensive strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the concerns that it has sparked among Member States. We stress the obligation of the parties to ensure that the treaty and the implementation thereof fully align with international law and with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As the situation on the Korean Peninsula remains volatile, Guyana stresses that denuclearization is critical for de-escalating tensions and resolving the conflict, thereby creating a path to sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. To that end, we urge the early resumption of dialogue among the parties concerned. We also encourage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. That is critical for achieving the global aspiration for a nuclear-weapon-free world. In conclusion, Guyana reaffirms its commitment to the Council’s efforts to fully implement the resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to advance the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. We further reiterate our position that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is vital to ensuring international peace and security.

I thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her important briefing. We take note of the contribution of Mr. Jonah Leff. Sierra Leone will make three points regarding the agenda item under consideration. First, we wish to reiterate our unambiguous position that all transfers of weapons in conflict situations should occur within the applicable international legal framework and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and should include pre-transfer risk assessments and end-user verification to prevent the diversion of arms and ammunition. In that regard, we wish to recall the importance of the work and reports of the Panel of Experts established to support the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), which was tasked with providing verifiable and evidence-based reports on the ongoing situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is regrettable that the Security Council and its members can no longer benefit from such a valuable source of information. We therefore call for an urgent solution to fill the gap to ensure that the Security Council is provided with relevant information for informative engagement and decision-making on that critical sanctions regime. Secondly, the easy availability of weapons exacerbates existing conflicts, whether internal or international, and increases the risk of new ones. The consequences, as we regrettably observe, include civilian casualties, displacement and the destruction of infrastructure. The transfer of advanced weapons technology increases the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other lethal weapons and undermines global efforts to advance the non-proliferation of such weapons. Thirdly, while we do acknowledge the legitimate framework for States to engage in the arms trade, within the applicable international legal frameworks, we underscore the importance of strict adherence by all parties to the aforementioned international legal regime in all weapon transfers. That includes bilateral engagements, which must comply with and fully respect Security Council resolutions and sanctions, which are binding on Member States, and form part of the very bedrock of the collective security scheme of the Charter of the United Nations. Let me therefore close by reiterating our position and by reminding and urging parties to conflicts to fully comply with their international obligations, including all relevant Security Council resolutions. In particular, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must refrain from any act that constitutes a violation of the Security Council’s arms embargo. On peace in the region, we condemn the recently reported missile launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take steps to achieve sustainable peace by agreeing to resume dialogue at all levels without preconditions. We strongly believe that that is the only sustainable path towards addressing the complex security situation in the region.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu for her briefing and have listened to the introduction by Mr. Jonah Leff. I welcome the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to this meeting today. China and the Korean Peninsula are linked by rivers and mountains and their security and futures are inter-connected. No one is more concerned than China about peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and no one looks forward more than China to development and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Currently, the persistent tension and intensifying confrontation on the Korean Peninsula is deeply disturbing to China. Looking around the world today, the crisis in Ukraine has dragged on, the Gaza conflict has not yet come to an end, and geopolitical tensions are escalating, with spillover effects constantly emerging. The world is already chaotic enough, and there must not be further trouble on the Korean Peninsula. If there are war and chaos on the Korean Peninsula, the entire North-East Asia region will be deeply affected. Peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific, which has been maintained for more than half a century, will suffer a blow, and the global strategic security pattern will also be changed as a result. A peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula serves the common interests of the countries of the region and the common expectations of the international community. The more tense, fragile, complex and sensitive the situation becomes, the more important it is for all parties to remain calm and exercise restraint and be prudent in their words and actions. China calls on all parties concerned to work together to cool down the situation and join hands to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The question concerning the Korean Peninsula is, in essence, a security issue. In order to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue, we must uphold the vision of common security and bear in mind the principle of the indivisible security of all countries. The idea of building one’s own security on the insecurity of other countries and the practice of pursuing one’s own absolute security at the expense of the security of other countries will not work at all. Certain countries use the Korean Peninsula issue to advance their geopolitical strategies, increase their military presence and strengthen their extended deterrence. Such actions will only lead to camp confrontation, exacerbate tensions and make it more difficult to achieve the goal of long-term peace and security in the region. History and past practice have repeatedly shown that only when all parties engage in dialogue and negotiation and show mutual goodwill and flexibility in order to agree on a proposal that takes into account the concerns of all parties and follow up with serious implementation in good faith can the situation on the Korean Peninsula move towards détente and the political settlement process make progress. Otherwise, the situation on the Korean Peninsula will fluctuate, with ups and downs, and can easily descend into a spiral of escalating confrontation. China calls on the parties concerned to be rational and pragmatic and to make joint efforts to find a solution to the situation. A certain country in particular  — I can point it out clearly, it is the United States — should end the myth of deterrence and pressure and demonstrate sincerity in unconditional dialogue through concrete actions. As the lingering legacy of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula issue has dragged on for decades. The crux of the problem is the lack of mutual trust between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the absence of a peace mechanism. In order to fundamentally resolve the question of the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to realize a transition from the armistice to a peace mechanism, which China has been calling for and actively working towards for many years. Recent developments have further brought to the fore the urgency and importance of establishing a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. China reiterates its call on all parties concerned to act in the interest of maintaining regional peace and stability, resolve the difference properly and move towards the same goals so as to make joint efforts to promote a political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. Just now, the United States Representative, in his statement, again attacked and made accusations against China’s position and role on the Korean Peninsula issue. China emphatically rejects and will never accept his allegations. The current situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to be tense. How did that come about? The United States should ponder that question and focus on its own actions, instead of blaming others and shirking its own responsibility, as it habitually does. For a long time, China has made unremitting efforts to ease the situation on the Korean Peninsula and promote a political solution, and it has played an important role in that regard. China’s efforts and role have been widely recognized and appreciated by the international community, and there is no room for them to be discredited by the United States. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that, as a close neighbour of the Korean Peninsula and a responsible major country, China will play a constructive role in its own way for the realization of long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

I thank Mrs. Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her briefing. I also listened attentively to the remarks made by the Mr. Leff. Algeria acknowledges the Security Council agenda item to be “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, and discussions should be limited to that issue. We believe that discussions within the Council on this matter should be guided by a spirit of constructive dialogue and a sincere willingness to find a lasting solution. We also believe that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) remains the most appropriate and relevant forum for discussing and addressing matters related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions regime. The Committee’s mandate and expertise make it better suited to handling those issues in a technical and less politicized manner. Algeria reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and the relevant Security Council resolutions. That should be our shared objective. However, we must emphasize our concern about the potential for excessive politicization of this issue. We believe that a more balanced and comprehensive approach is necessary in order to address the very complex situation in the Korean Peninsula. Sanctions alone are unlikely to be sufficient to resolve the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear issue. Algeria remains deeply concerned about the impact of sanctions on the country’s civilian population and calls for a more effective implementation of humanitarian exemptions in order to alleviate the suffering of civilians. We support the idea of a gradual road map that could include limited sanctions relief in exchange for specific denuclearization measures. We advocate a more flexible and comprehensive diplomatic approach that addresses the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s underlying security concerns and aims to build confidence through progressive and reciprocal measures in the region. A two-track approach  — pursuing denuclearization in parallel with the establishment of a permanent peace mechanism in the Korean Peninsula through dialogue  — seems more promising to us. Algeria urges all parties to exercise restraint and engage in constructive dialogue. We encourage the resumption of direct diplomatic negotiations and support all efforts to reduce tensions in the region. In conclusion, our common goal must be the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we believe that that objective will be better served by sustained diplomatic efforts and inclusive discussions on non-proliferation that take into account the concerns of all parties involved.

Allow me to start by thanking the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, and Mr. Jonah Leff for their insights. We also welcome the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to this meeting. The escalating situation on the Korean Peninsula is of deep concern and poses a threat to international peace and security. The confrontational rhetoric and military activities have pushed the region to the brink of conflict, endangering millions of lives and undermining the foundations of international stability. The growing trend of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a significant and real risk, and it deserves our redoubled attention. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an existential threat to humankind. We urge all Member States to take decisive steps towards reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear arsenals. That requires compliance with the agreed international instruments and mechanisms, in order to ensure that the new technologies are used to promote the progress of humankind towards peace. In that regard, Mozambique aligns itself with the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, which has the potential to prevent the nuclear disaster that is on our horizon and thus to secure a better future for all. We encourage all States Members of the United Nations to strengthen collective actions to ensure the reduction, elimination and eradication of nuclear weapons. Mozambique believes that, if there is sufficient engagement, the excessive accumulation of weapons of mass destruction will be reversed, leading to a safer world. While geographically distant from the Korean Peninsula, Mozambique recognizes that nuclear proliferation threatens all nations. The potential for nuclear materials to fall into the hands of non-State actors poses a particular risk to countries with limited defence capabilities. Therefore, the international community must strengthen controls on arms transfers to prevent weaponry from reaching unauthorized actors. Mozambique recognizes and reaffirms that the right to self-defence must be exercised within the bounds of international law, with strict adherence to the principle of proportionality. Mozambique calls on all parties involved in the Korean Peninsula matter to exercise maximum restraint. Unilateral actions that escalate tensions must be avoided at all costs. We urge a return to diplomacy, while emphasizing that dialogue and negotiation are the only viable paths to lasting peace and security in the region. In conclusion, we stand ready to support any initiatives that promote the peaceful resolution of this crisis. The stakes are too high for inaction. Let us work together to ensure that the spectre of nuclear conflict is banished from our world — not just for our sake, but for the generations to come.

I wish to thank the briefers  — the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Nakamitsu; and Mr. Leff, of Conflict Armament Research  — for their contribution to today’s discussion. Let me make three points on behalf of my delegation. First, Security Council resolutions are binding and must be implemented. They are not guidelines that can be unilaterally dropped when they do not suit political or military interests. The persistent and flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unacceptable. Slovenia calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cease its provocative actions and return to dialogue and diplomacy. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should ensure the full implementation of all relevant United Nations resolutions, with a view of abandoning its nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Until then, we will keep calling on all States to implement fully and effectively the sanctions in force. Secondly, with regard to the termination of the work of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), a considerable void has emerged after the Russian veto eliminated the Panel of Experts. Not only are the work of the 1718 Committee and that of the Council suffering, but the absence of the Panel is also a tremendous setback for the non-proliferation architecture as a whole. The only viable way forward in that regard is decisive Council action. Slovenia still sees a chance to bring the Panel back, and we should spare no effort in doing so. Thirdly, with regard to military cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, there is credible evidence available from multiple independent sources that Russia procured ballistic missiles of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea origin. That was confirmed by the panellists of the 1718 Panel of Experts, and separately to us here by the comprehensive briefing by Mr. Leff of Conflict Armament Research. While the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is illegally developing its ballistic missiles, Russia is illegally procuring those same missiles. That is a dangerous situation that is destabilizing two separate parts of the world at the same time. Given the strengthening of ties between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and in view of the comprehensive strategic partnership recently concluded between them, we have every reason to believe that that cooperation is only about to expand, in gross violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. It is not friendly cooperation between two separate States. It is military cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which involves arms transfers. It is illegal and dangerous for the neighbours of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for the region and for international peace and security. Those trends are deeply disturbing. Countries cannot keep declaring their support for multilateralism and the Charter of the United Nations while invading sovereign countries and procuring weapons from sanctioned ones. The Council should support actions and initiatives aimed at reversing those dangerous trends. However, it will remain up to Member States to consistently implement our existing and future collective decisions designed to uphold international peace and security.

We thank Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu and Mr. Jonah Leff of Conflict Armament Research for their briefings. We welcome the participation of the representatives of Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the European Union in our deliberations. We are concerned by the reports we just heard. Switzerland is appalled by the way in which Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine apparently continues to be fuelled by transfers of arms and munitions from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Any arms transaction with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a flagrant violation of the Council’s sanctions regime. That includes the sale, purchase, import and export of weapons to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the heart of the same sanctions regime lies the demand that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea abandon its ballistic missile programme. Yet, according to reports by Conflict Armament Research, ballistic missiles produced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea appear to have been used against Ukraine. One violation of international law thus supports another — breaches of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea support Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. In that context, Switzerland deeply regrets that the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea failed owing to a veto (see S/PV.9591). The veto was used while the Panel was investigating those arms transfers. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), the Security Council and Member States relied on the trustworthy and independent information provided by the Panel. The briefings that we just heard demonstrate how important it still is for us all to continue to follow those issues closely if we are to remain firm in our disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. More than ever, therefore, all Member States must demonstrate vigilance and integrity, and we must renew our efforts to break the supply chains for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programme. Finally, we underline the importance of maintaining the non-proliferation architecture through the effective implementation of multilateral agreements and instruments, including those related to arms transfers. The test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of a ballistic missile just two days prior to today’s meeting reminds us once again that sanctions measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea play an important role in that architecture and must be respected by all States. At the same time, we must strengthen the foundations of that architecture, in particular through the universal ratification of the Outer Space Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty. As the Secretary-General underscores in his New Agenda for Peace, putting a stop to the disintegration of the non-proliferation architecture and getting back on the road to progress are priorities. The Council must assume its responsibilities to maintain the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, of which it remains one of the guarantors. That role should go hand in hand with a commitment to dialogue, de-escalation and the search for diplomatic solutions. For its part, Switzerland will continue its commitment within the Council, the sanctions committee and the region for a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons and at peace.

The goal of the group of countries that requested today’s meeting is crystal clear: they are once again trying to use the Security Council to spin anti-Russian and anti-North Korean narratives and disseminate unfounded allegations to divert attention from their own destructive actions, which are fuelling escalation in the region. However, Washington and its allies will not be able to obscure the array of threats generated in North-East Asia and their real sources in a fog of propaganda. It is no secret that the United States has long been engaged in military expansion in the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to consolidate its hegemony there and impose a bloc mentality on the countries of the region. After all, small geometric formats such as the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership, created in the image of NATO, and the new triangle of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea allies serve the same purpose. We regret the fact that our long-standing friends and partners in Seoul are rapidly losing their independence under pressure from Washington, putting at risk their own national interests, which are driven, among other things, by the objective geographical realities of the region. That is an extremely dangerous path, and nothing good will come of it for Seoul. Everything that has been unfolding in North-East Asia over the past few years is a direct projection of Washington’s policy of creeping militarization of the Asia-Pacific region. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has defended its right to independent development according to its own political, social and civilizational models, rather than according to patterns imposed by the West. It has thereby become a bone in the throat of the United States that must be removed at all costs. That is the real reason for the escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Under the pretext of the North Korean threat, the United States has been consistently building up its military activity in North-East Asia, deploying strategic strike capabilities there and overtly running scenarios for a hypothetical armed conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons. And since we are gathered today to discuss the non-proliferation agenda item, I would like to ask my colleagues: how does Washington’s and Seoul’s policy to seek nuclear-conventional integration under the auspices of a specialized bilateral group correlate with their non-proliferation commitments? Against the backdrop of the allegations of escalation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a number of manoeuvres have been conducted, such as Freedom Shield and Freedom Edge, among others. It is unclear whom those exercises are intended to liberate. Earlier this week, a United States strike group comprising the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and the Aegis- equipped destroyers USS Halsey and USS Daniel Inouye arrived again in the port of Busan. What is completely unacceptable are the four-day air drills conducted by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea using fighter jets and an American fire-support aircraft practicing live firing drills in the skies above the Yellow Sea during President Putin’s State visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. What were they trying to demonstrate by that move? Was it that they are ready to raise the degree of escalation to the boiling point? Let us imagine such manoeuvres being carried out near the place of negotiations between, say, the leaders of the European Union or NATO countries. How would their members interpret such moves? Attempts to strangle the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are not confined solely to military campaigns. Illegal Western unilateral sanctions have been in force against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for many years, preventing the supply of food, medicine and other essentials to the country, thereby worsening the situation of ordinary people. All that is justified by hypocritical claims of concern for the rights of the North Korean people. There are an increasing number of questions about Security Council sanctions. We have repeatedly called for a meaningful conversation about their effectiveness and their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country. Over the course of many years, one harsh decision has been followed by another, contributing in no way to political dialogue, and, as a result, the entire sanctions structure has been paralysed. It is evident that sanctions can in no way facilitate the achievement of the stated goals. Failing to recognize that means denying the truth. In May (see S/PV.9630), we once again proposed that our Council colleagues start a serious conversation on that issue, and we submitted the relevant draft resolution (S/2024/383), but again we were rebuffed. For Western countries and their satellites, the Security Council’s sanctions regime is not a way of solving complex problems in the field of international peace and security within the framework outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, but another truncheon with which they hope to beat an inconvenient opponent. Instead of a constructive discussion, Western delegations have been churning out one open meeting of the Security Council after another to smear the North Korean authorities. Against that backdrop, any calls by Washington for dialogue with Pyongyang frankly look hypocritical and ridiculous. The bull-headed, reckless actions of the anti-Pyongyang bloc are bringing the situation in the region to a dangerous threshold. The opponents of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are literally obsessed with a destructive agenda against Pyongyang, and they are sending clear messages that nothing can stop them. Under those circumstances, Russia has an obligation to react to the escalation of the situation on our eastern borders. The policy of extended deterrence that the United States has been implementing in the region poses a real threat not only to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea but also to our country. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was concluded on 19 June so that it could play a stabilizing role in North-East Asia against the backdrop of an unprecedented escalation of tension. The Treaty is supposed to make a positive contribution to the balance of power in the region on the basis of the principle of the indivisibility of security, reduce the risk of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, including with the use of nuclear weapons, and become part of a robust security architecture in the region. We emphasize that article 4 of the Treaty provides for mutual military assistance only in the event of an armed attack against one of the parties. This arrangement should not arouse national security concerns among any countries that are not planning military aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The frenzied — indeed hysterical — reaction of the West suggests that precisely such plans have been thwarted by the conclusion of the Treaty. Therefore, the West can now only speculate about various aspects of Russia’s cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which has always been conducted in full accordance with our international obligations. Our cooperation with Pyongyang is exclusively constructive and legitimate and, more important, does not threaten anyone, unlike the belligerent activities of the United States and its allies. Those who the disingenuous adversaries of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have tried to convince otherwise can corroborate what we are saying by reading the Treaty, which is publicly available. It fully complies with the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law and customary international relations. After all, the Charter of the United Nations, including its Article 51, is the same for everyone. Speculation about Russia’s use of North Korean missiles in the special military operation in Ukraine is unfounded. The so-called inspection report (see S/2024/215) on such use, provided by the Panel of Experts, is a textbook example of a made-to-order document, compiled by amateurs, who made numerous procedural and logical errors, who were kindly provided by the Kyiv regime with the fragments of unidentified missiles. Among those experts there were no professionals in the field of ballistics and their report includes no confirmation of the authenticity of the missile fragments. Equally telling is the composition of the group. Of the seven experts, only three travelled to Ukraine — the representatives of Great Britain, the Republic of Korea and Japan. That is suspicious in and of itself. Some members of the Panel of Experts tried to rubber-stamp their speculations based on information from biased sources, including United States authorities and United States-controlled media, in line with the theory of “high probability” favoured by the West. The report prepared by the three experts is not a report of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), as has been alleged today. The Panel of Experts has deservedly disappeared into oblivion, where it belongs. Because of their aggressive, hegemonic ambitions, Western countries leaders have completely destroyed the established security architecture in Europe. Having lost any vestige of common sense, they continue to fan the flames of the Ukrainian conflict, pushing Europe to the brink of a new great war and violating their own many commitments in the field of arms exports. It seems that that is not enough for the West, and it insists on igniting a hot conflict in North-East Asia as well. Its confrontational actions and hawkish rhetoric against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the countries that support it can hardly be interpreted in any other way. Its efforts have kept the diplomatic process deadlocked for years, and all constructive peace initiatives have been paralysed. Instead of spreading morbid fear and fomenting military tensions and baseless allegations, we urge the United States and its allies to return to the path of professional, responsible and pragmatic diplomacy. First and foremost, we urge them to implement the Council’s resolutions, which provide for the resolution of existing problems on the Korean Peninsula by political and diplomatic means, without threats of the use of force and attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of States. The West seems to have forgotten such principles and is fixated on the sanctions regime. Furthermore, it unconditionally rejected the humanitarian resolution on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea proposed by China and Russia. Everyone can see the serious problems the Security Council is facing in implementing the resolutions it has adopted, especially those that imply any kind of constructive approach. Today our Western colleagues baselessly accuse Russia of violating those resolutions, preferring not to mention its own track record, which provides material for a very long read indeed. Today let us cite only two examples: that of resolution 2202 (2015), containing the Minsk package of measures, the implementation of which the West cynically sabotaged, later admitting as much in the words of Angela Merkel, François Hollande and Petro Poroshenko, and that of the shocking speech of a permanent member of the Security Council, who stated that the Council’s resolution on Gaza was non-binding. Should they be lecturing others?

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Republic of Korea. I thank Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing and Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, for his informative and convincing briefing. The Republic of Korea condemns the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile on 26 June, local time. Whether successful or not, any launch of ballistic missiles constitutes a further violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately stop any further provocative actions, including missile launches and the uncivilized act of sending hundreds of balloons filled with human waste and trash. We just heard a vivid presentation from the civil society briefer, which clearly attests to the military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. The explanation could not be clearer. The briefer personally visited the site and analysed every part of the remnants of ballistic missiles, from dimensions and layouts of the missile to the presence of Korean alphabet markings and the distinct number 102, which denotes the year 2023 in North Korea’s unique Juche calendar, counting years from the birth of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung. It was concluded that the missile was manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That assessment coincides with the conclusion drawn by the Panel of Experts after their visit to Ukraine in April. They also concluded that the debris recovered from a missile that landed in Kharkiv on 2 January this year is from a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Hwasong-11 series missile. We take note of the fact that the briefer also mentioned that additional North Korean weapons had been seized on the front lines. That corroborates several intelligence reports to the effect that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea provided Russia with a massive amount of munitions. The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defence assessed that, since the Russia-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea summit held last September, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shipped at least 10,000 containers to Russia, which could hold as many as 5 million artillery shells. The Republic of Korea authorities have also found that 122-mm artillery shells made in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were included in the weapons Russia used against Ukraine. Those are all clear violations of the relevant Security Council resolutions adopted unanimously in the Chamber. Given the aforementioned evidence, I wonder how much more proof is needed to verify that the munitions are from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. With lies and disparagement, one may try to hide the truth or even run away from it. But one cannot cover the sky with one’s hand, as the saying goes. Sadly, all of these investigations and reports could have been part of the activities of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), which is now defunct for reasons we all know too well. In that regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes today’s briefing, as this is the first public Security Council meeting proactively shedding light on a flagrant sanctions regime violation  — arms dealing between Moscow and Pyongyang  — since the Panel ceased to exist. Despite the Panel’s regrettable dissolution of the Panel of Experts, the Council must remain seized of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions violations or evasions. This briefing presents an alternative way to provide valuable information to United Nations Member States in a timely manner and on a regular basis. And today’s meeting is just the beginning. From illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum and coal to frequent violations of sectoral bans and luxury goods, illicit cyberactivities, overseas North Korean workers and further arms dealings, there is a long list. We expect to have a series of briefings on one item after another, and we call on all Council members for their cooperation in that regard. The Republic of Korea is deeply concerned that, in spite of repeated warnings from the international community, the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea openly mentioned military cooperation through a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, which implies the restoration of a military alliance between the two countries. Article 10 of that new treaty lists several areas of exchange and cooperation between the two countries. President Putin even mentioned at a press conference on 19 June in Pyongyang that, “the Russian Federation does not rule out developing military and technical cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, under the document signed today”. Such activities would directly violate multiple Security Council resolutions, further threaten international peace and security and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Before February 2022, it was hard to imagine that the war in Ukraine would pose such a direct threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula. But now we are facing a new reality. All these developments could bring about a shift in the global security landscape, and the potential long-term effects are dangerously uncertain. Let me once again highlight that any direct or indirect action that helps enhance North Korea’s military capabilities constitutes a flagrant violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, all of which were adopted unanimously in the Chamber. The Republic of Korea will resolutely respond to any actions that threaten our security by working with the international community, including our allies and friendly nations. Our response will be prudent and measured, and any change in our policy depends on what Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will do. We will maintain dialogue and communication with key countries of the region. We will remain committed to the goal of the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United States has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I apologize for taking the floor again. But I do need to respond briefly to some points that were made by the representatives of China and the Russian Federation. First and foremost, with regard to the Chinese representative’s remarks, if indeed China is so concerned about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, then it needs to use its influence with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in order to dissuade it from undermining regional and global security. It should also use the influence that it has with Russia, through its new no-limits partnership, to persuade its partner to end this increasingly dangerous military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia. To the comments from the Russian Federation, Russia’s statement and threatening rhetoric is nothing new in the Chamber. Its threats against countries are also not new. Russia should understand that its growing military cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is dangerous and will only further isolate it. I want to make one last point with regard to a refrain we hear in the Council quite often about some countries on the Council wanting to demonize Russia. No one in the Council is trying to demonize Russia. It is Russia, through its threatening and unhinged rhetoric, that is demonizing the country.

The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I would like to respond briefly to the statement just made by the United States representative. As I mentioned in my earlier statement, China has always taken a prudent and responsible approach to the issue of the Korean Peninsula. China’s role and efforts in that regard are evident to the international community. China will make its own decisions on its policy and position with regard to the Korean Peninsula issue and does not need the United States to tell us what to do.

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I have taken the floor to say only that I will not waste my time nor the precious time of the Security Council to reply to the remarks made by my colleague from the United States.

The representative of the United States has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I apologize for taking the floor again, but I will be very brief. As I have said before in the Council, my delegation will continue to call out China and any other State that is indeed violating Security Council resolutions, particularly with regard to issues concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Ukraine. As I said, this type of cooperation, particularly between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia, is a growing threat to international peace and security. And the countries with influence need to use that influence, because what is going on between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia is of great concern, not only to the Council, but to other Member States in the United Nations. I therefore appeal to my Chinese colleague to understand that if indeed the situation on the Korean Peninsula continues on its current trajectory, the United States and its allies will have to take steps to defend their security. I therefore appeal to my Chinese colleague again for China to use its influence. It has a great deal of it.

The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

First, with regard to the issue of the Korean Peninsula, I would like to emphasize again that China has been promoting dialogue and has been making positive efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but China’s efforts also require the cooperation of all parties concerned, especially the United States. In addition, I would also like to propose to my American colleague that the United States change its old habit of shifting blame to others rather than examining its own role. That is not a constructive practice.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

At the brigandish request of the United States and its follower forces, the Security Council has convened an illegal meeting that runs entirely counter to the main spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, which seeks to promote the development of friendly relations and cooperation among nations. Those countries that called for this meeting, including the United States — the world’s biggest arms exporter  — are invariably the main culprits behind disturbances of the peace, deserving the criticism of the international community, as they have caused social instability and tragic bloodshed through extensive shipments of weapons to various parts of the world. On 23 June, the army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) provided to the Ukrainian authorities by the United States hit the Russian territory of Sevastopol, causing a death toll of more than 150 innocent civilians, including two children. That shows that the countries that should be called to account and condemned in the Security Council are none other than the United States and its followers, which supplied weapons of mass destruction to Ukraine. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea denounces the United States in the strongest terms for delivering cluster bombs and other inhumane lethal weapons prohibited under international law to the neo-Nazi puppet authorities of Ukraine and its allies. The same denunciation goes to the Kyiv authorities of Ukraine for their brutal terrorist acts. Ever since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the United States has escalated its military aid to the Kyiv authorities, including multiple-launch rocket systems, main battle tanks and depleted uranium bombs, to the tune of $100 billion. Of late, it has given the neo-Nazis of Ukraine free rein to strike any part of the Russian territory with United States weapons, thus driving the whole of Europe into a dangerous phase of all-out armed conflict and a new world war. It is already well known to the world that Israel’s bloody genocidal operation, which mercilessly took the lives of 37,000 innocent people in the Gaza Strip, was supported by bunker busters and other United States- made weapons. Despite that fact, the United States has called for a Security Council meeting, speaking of someone’s alleged weapon transfers. It is indeed an extremely brazen act, like a guilty party filing the suit first, and a mockery of and insult to the Charter of the United Nations. The pro-American countries’ act is all claims of legitimacy and of contribution to peace and security. Yet, when it comes to sovereign States that stand against the United States, even the exercise by those States of their legitimate rights is considered to be illegal and a threat to peace and security. That bald-faced argument is a typical example of double standards, which should never be tolerated. The United States and its allies are engrossed in hegemonic ambitions and hell-bent on pursuing bloc- forming foreign policy and strengthening aggressive alliances, casting a cloud of war over every corner of the world. Such disturbances of the peace by the United States and its allies are the urgent matter that should be debated in the Security Council today. The United States created the Ukrainian crisis with NATO’s reckless eastward policy. It has formed military and political blocs of an exclusive and confrontational nature, such as the Australia, United Kingdom and United States (AUKUS) partnership, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is accelerating the establishment of a tripartite military alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea, in a desperate effort to form an Asian version of NATO. In particular, the United States and the Republic of Korea have already put into motion the Nuclear Consultative Group, the mission of which is to jointly plan, operate and execute a nuclear attack against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They recently finished drawing up the joint guidelines for nuclear war and are scheming to conduct an actual nuclear operation drill on that basis in August. In recent years, the United States decided to sell to Japan 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles, used for long- range attacks, and to deliver to the Republic of Korea 25 F-35 stealth fighters, 36 SM-6 ship-to-air anti-missile missiles and other cutting-edge military hardware worth an astronomical amount. The United States supply of arms to Japan and the Republic of Korea is a crime, as it exports confrontation and war in order to stoke military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia, while maintaining its hegemonic position, at the expense of destroying world peace and stability. United States strategic nuclear assets appear frequently on the Korean Peninsula and its vicinity, under the pretext of providing extended deterrence. Even at this very moment, the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea are frantically conducting a tripartite joint military drill codenamed Freedom Shield around the Korean Peninsula with the participation of the nuclear carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. As evidenced by this meeting, behind the hysterical reaction of the United States and its followers lies the sinister trick of veiling their crime of undermining world peace and security and of rendering illegal and obstructing the development of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-Russia relations that hinder the establishment of the hegemonic order. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has the legitimate right to foster good-neighbourly relations with independent sovereign States, including the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law on developing friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples. Unlike the aggressive and exclusive alliance of the United States and its follower forces, which destroys the strategic balance and security of the region and invites war, the relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia are completely of a peace-loving and defensive nature, as they do not target a third party, but instead promote the progress and well-being of the peoples of the two countries. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever for any party to be concerned about the development of their bilateral relations, unless that party has intentions of undertaking a military invasion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is committed to fulfilling its duty to accelerate the process of building a new world free from domination, subjugation, hegemony and high-handedness and to reliably defend the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and region. We will also continue to strengthen and develop friendly and cooperative relations with independent sovereign States, including the Russian Federation. The international community should never tolerate the high-handedness and arbitrariness of the United States and its followers, who are seeking to obstruct the exercise of the legitimate rights of sovereign States and the development of friendly relations and to impose unilateral and hegemonic order. Instead, it should redouble its vigorous efforts to realize genuine international justice.

I now give the floor to Mr. Lambrinidis. Mr. Lambrinidis: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia, as well as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, align themselves with this statement. First, let me start by expressing our condemnation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s most recent ballistic missile launch earlier this week. Turning to today’s meeting, I would like to thank the briefers for their interventions, both of which were extremely useful and informative. Today’s meeting is a timely opportunity to discuss the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal and destabilizing behaviour as demonstrated through its continued pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, its deepening military cooperation with Russia and particularly the transfers of arms for use in Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine  — a war that is itself a manifest violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Those arms transfers openly violate Security Council resolutions and endanger peace and security in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula as well. The urgency is highlighted by the 19 June summit in Pyongyang, at which Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea concluded an agreement aimed at deepening cooperation, including in the military domain. We note that President Putin said that Russia would not rule out developing military-technical cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That indicates that the two parties are inclined to further violate Security Council resolutions. Russia is trampling on the Charter of the United Nations, while pretending, as recently as at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), that the Charter should be at the core of international relations — a patently selective and insincere approach to international relations, speaking of hypocrisy. The EU and its member States stress that the transfers of arms and related equipment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are a clear breach of multiple Security Council resolutions, which unequivocally prohibit any arms exports or imports involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Multiple independent entities have confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has provided ballistic missiles that Russia has used against Ukraine on several occasions. Such intentional attacks, including against civilians and civilian infrastructure, add to the growing evidence of war crimes, as reported by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. Such arms transfers between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia support Russia’s war of aggression, increase the suffering of the Ukrainian people and fundamentally undermine the global non-proliferation regime. They show that Russia continues to gear up for a prolongation of its illegal war and clearly show that Russia’s proclamations about a ceasefire in Ukraine and negotiations are insincere. We reiterate our strong call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia to abide by all Security Council resolutions and to immediately cease all activities that violate them. Russia should be held to account for those violations, which are undermining the work of the Security Council and multilateralism as ways of maintaining international peace and security. Recently, Russia vetoed the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (see S/PV.9591). The EU strongly condemned that irresponsible act as a clear effort to conceal illegal arms transfers between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia. The United Nations sanctions regime itself remains in place, as will the 1718 Committee responsible for its implementation. That remains more important than ever. The objective of the sanctions is to curb the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes, which are continuing in direct violation of numerous Security Council resolutions. Sanctions also serve as an important tool to incentivize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take up offers of dialogue by the main parties in view of finding a diplomatic solution leading to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The EU will continue to do its part in working towards that outcome in close cooperation with the international community, and we urge everyone else to do the same.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine.

I recognize the continued occupation of the seat of the Soviet Union by the dictator’s envoy. I would like to start by thanking Under-Secretary- General Nakamitsu for her briefing. I also extend my appreciation to Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, for presenting the organization’s findings related to the remnants of ballistic missiles recovered in Ukraine. Today the only thing that is closer to Ukrainians than the representative of North Korea sitting next to me are the North Korean missiles that are killing Ukrainians. Since the end of 2023, the Russian Federation has been using ballistic missiles originating from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and procured from Pyongyang in its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. Among the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles used by Moscow against my country, at least 21 have been found and examined by Ukrainian authorities. However, today I would like to focus on one particular case. As already mentioned, on 2 January, the city of Kharkiv in Ukraine was struck by several missiles. The inspection of the remnants of one of the ballistic missiles conducted by Ukrainian authorities confirmed that the missile is of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea origin. In that regard, Ukraine also provided Conflict Armament Research, which has been working in Ukraine since 2018, with the opportunity to physically document the debris of a ballistic missile that struck Kharkiv on 2 January. As stated today by the Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, the organization concluded that the remnants of the ballistic missile launched at Kharkiv are of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea origin. The transfer of ballistic missiles, along with any other arms or related materiel, from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Russia flagrantly violates multiple Security Council resolutions. Ukraine has been informing the Security Council of violations of the arms embargo by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia for at least six months already. In that regard, I would like to mention that in response to the relevant request by the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006, in January, Ukraine provided the Panel with evidence-based information on that matter. In its final report (see S/2024/215), the Panel of Experts confirmed the receipt of relevant information from Ukraine, which it was examining. Russia ended the mandate of the Panel of Experts (see S/PV.9591), depriving Member States of fact-based, objective and independent assessments, analysis and recommendations regarding the implementation of United Nations sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As just mentioned by some Council members, from 17 to 19 April, at Ukraine’s invitation, the Panel of Experts visited my country to inspect the debris of a missile found in Kharkiv. As also reported by some Council Members and the media, the Panel concluded that the debris recovered from a missile that landed in Kharkiv derives from a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Hwasong-11 series missile. It was also confirmed that no evidence was found that the missile had been manufactured in Russian. Finally, the Panel concluded that the missile constitutes a violation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (b), which prohibits Pyongyang from exporting such items. We are concerned that further menacing developments may follow last week’s signing by the leaders of Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the so-called treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership. As that agreement effectively paves the way for a further deepening of military cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the impact on the security situation both in our region and on the Korean Peninsula could be detrimental. Ukraine highlights the importance of further monitoring by the 1718 Committee of reports of the use of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles and conventional weapons by Russia. We also urge all Member States, including all members of the Security Council, to join us in condemning the flagrant Security Council resolutions violations by Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to utilize the existing United Nations mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of Pyongyang’s weapons and ammunition and, accordingly, an increase in security threats to Europe and Asia.