S/PV.973 Security Council

Before passing to the adoption of the agenda, 1 take pleasure in welcoming to our meeting the Acting Secretary- General of the United Nations, Ambassador U Thant, who is present with us for the first time. Adoption of the agenda

The provisional agenda of ~his morning's meeting will be found in document S/Agenda/973 which is before the Council. If there are no objections 1 shall regard the agenda as adopted. l call on the representative of Liberia. 3. Ml'. BARNES (Liberia): 1 wish to l'aise a point of arder in connexion with the provisional agenda which has been submitted for the consideration of the Council today. By a letter dated 13 July 19601/ the Secretary- General of the United Nations brought to the attention of the Council the situation prevailing in the Congo (Leopoldvillc), which he considered as a threat to international peace and security and suggested that a meeting of the Council should be convened to consider that question as a matter of urgency. 1have noted that from the 873rd meeting of the Security Council, on 13-14 July 1960, until the 942nd meeting on 20-21 February 1961, during which period there were, 1 believe, forty-five meetings of the Council devoted to the Congo, the agenda has bo~ne this item: "Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/438l)lf. 5. We believe that the item on today's agenda relates only ta the question of lawless acts of mercenaries in the Congo, but a broader aspect of this problem should be discussed by the Security Council, and therefore my delegation proposes that the agenda should be modified ta include the letter from the Secretary-General con-' tained in document S/4381.

The point which has just been made by the representative of Liberia was also in the mind of my delegation, and it seems ta us ta be an important one. 1 should like, therefore, ta support w1;lat the representative of Liberia has just said. An our previous discussions of the situation in the Congo have been underthe heading of an item entitled, "Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Seeretary-General addressed ta the President of the Seeurity Couneil (S/4381)". My delegation sees no reason ta justi~y a departure from tnis formula. We think the point is an important one beeause the United Nations involvement in the affairs of the Congo has been a eontinuing proeess and goes right back to that original request from the Secretary-General. My delegation thinks we must keep this point eontinually in mind and that the best way of doing so is to word the title of our item in the way in whieh the representative of Liberia has just suggested. 7. There is also the point that sueh a title embraees the whole of the Congo, and since it is the unity of the Congo as a whole whieh is so muchat stake, my delegation thinks it would be highly &ppropriate ta bring this point out. In our discussions here, and possibly in any decisions we may reach, we shall want ta take account of aIl the developments which have happened over the last year, and we can more fittingly and more efficien:ly do sa if the title on the item of our agenda is worded as it has been before. It will then naturally be appropriate ta list the document containing the letter from the Permanent Representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan [S/4973] immediately beneath, if this is the wish. 8. Ml'. STEVENSON (United States of AmBrica): Ml'. President, first let me say that the provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council authorize the President of the Security Council ta calI meetings at any time he deems necessary. But the practice has grown up over the years that the time for meetings is set only after adequate consultation between the President and the Council members. We of the United States delegation think that this is a very good practice. In the case of today's meeting there was ample time and opportunity for consultations. While there was generai cc~sultationta the effect that there should be a Counoil meeting sometime this week, we, at least, were not consulted about the specifie date for a meeting. 1 would hope, Ml'. President, that we might enjoy in the future the consideration that we have received in the past in that regard. 10. We have held, as we a!l know, numerous meetings relating to the Congo sincE' July 1960, and 1 suspect that we will have other occasions to meet on matters relating ta the Congo. 1 would urge, therefore, that we keep a general agenda item wbich will cover aH types of cases and an types of problems, as we have in the pasto

Are there any further observa~ions on the agenda? If there are no observations 1 shaH, as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, make two brief remarks in connexion with the proposaI wlJich has just been putforwarà by the representatives of Liberia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 12. My first remark concerns the wording of the agenda. The immediate reason for calling the present meeting of the Security Counci! was a request by the Governments of three States, namely, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the Sudan, which in t~eir letter of 3 November stated that they were requesting a meeting of the Security Council ta consider the situation prevailing in the province of Katanga (Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville), caused by the lawless acts of mercenaries. This, strictly speaking, was the immediate reasonfer convening the Security Counci!. AIso, that is why tbis letter was included as an item in the provisional agenda. 13. However, the representative of Liberia, and with him the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United states, think we should go back to the original letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 13 July 1960-that is, over a year ago-wbich was the direct reason for starting discussions on the Congo question. Of course, one could agree with that because one may weH go back to sometbing of a year, or even more than a year, aga. But in my view we must pass ta consideration aI tbis question in connexion with the concrete situation which is now of concern ta those countries that brought the question before the Security Counci! and which is now of the mast topical natureo 14. However, as the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 shaH not abject if that letter, referred ta by the representatives of Liberia, the United Kingdom and the United States, is also placed on the agenda. 1 simply think that tbis adherence ta the first letter scarcely helps us with the substance of the matter, because the substance of the matter relates ta the concrete situation with which the COUDCi! has ta deal at this time. 15. But 1..1...., the discussion in the Counci! itself will show, and accordingly there seems ta me ta be no point in argl.ling about the matter. 1 shaH therefore l'aise no objection to the step proposed. Letter dated 13 J uly 1960 from the Secretary-Gene7al to the President of the Security Council (S/4381): Letter dnted 3 November 1961 from the Permanent Repre- sentative!> of Ethiopio, Nigeria and Sudan to the Presi- dent of the Security Council (S/4973) 17. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russianl: 1 would now like to make a secund brief observation since the representative of the United States has indirectly repToached me regarding consultations between the President and members of the Council in connexion with the preparations for the calling of this meeting. 1 must naturally answer this reproach, so that there shall he no misunderstandings about the matter. AlI 1 need do is recount the facts. On 3 November the representatives of the three States sent to me, as President of the Security Council, a letter requesting me to calI a meeting of the Council. On 4 November, 1 held consultations with the Acting Secretary-General and after those consultations 1 reached the conclusion that the Council should be convened at a very early date. After consulting the representative of Ethiopia, 1 thought that a meeting should be called for the middle of the following week, not later. 1 began separate con- sultations with individual members of the Council, and thereafter requested the Secretariat to sound the members of the Council as to the possibility of con- vening the Council either on Thursday evening or on Friday morning. According to the information given to me by the Secretariat, most members of the Council advocated that a meeting of the Council should not be cal1ed for Friday but should be deferred to the beginning of the following week. 18. By that time 1 had also received a request from Mr. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, to the effect that the meeting should be held not on Friday but on Monday, 13 November. By that time 1 had, further, held consultations with the representative of Ethiopia, who likewise considered it expedient to convene the Council on lVIonday morning. 19. Bearing in rnind that both sides, so to speak--the side requesting a meeting of the Council, the repre- sentative of Ethiopia, and the side which to a given degree is connected with this convening of the Council, since Belgium is directly concerned in this matter- considered that 13 November was a suitable date for the Council's meeting, and bearing in mind also that most members of the Council thought it necessary to convene the Council at +'"te beginning of the following week, 1 thought it entirely reasonable that the Security Council should be summoned for Monday morning, and 1 so informed all the members of the Council. l think that, if most mernbers of the Council feIt it necessary to convene the Council at the beginning of 20. 1 feel that 1 acted reasonably. '1 he representativt:l of the United States, apparently, does not entirely agree with me. 1 am sarry he does not agree with me, but 1 feel that everything which could have been done on my part, by way of consultation with members of the Security Council, was in fact done. Iintend to continue in the future ta consult aH members of the Council on the calling of meetings of the Council, and 1 think that all members of the Security Council will co- operate with me in this matter. 21. 1 am very glad that the repreaentative of the United States has confirmed that rule 1 of the provi- sional Rules of Procedure empowers the President of the Council ta call meetings of the Council at any time he deems necu,sary. Nevertheless, 1 thought it essential ta consult an members of the Council, and that i8 what 1 did. 22. Such is the explanation which 1 thought 1 ought ta make, in arder that there should be no misunder- standing about the matter. 23. If there are nofurtherobservaticns, we shaH pass to our next business. 24. Certain representatives of States which are not members of the Security Counci! have requested per- mission ta participate, without the right to vote, in the Security Counci!'s discussion of this agenda item. 25. In a letter ta the President of the Security Counci! [S/4977] the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia has requested that he be invited ta participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's a~nda. In a telegram to the Acting Sec:r-etary-General [S/4978], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium has asked to be invited te participate in the discussion of the item on the Couneil's agenda. In a letter ta the President of the SecurIty COUDcil [S/4979], the Permanent Repre- sentativ'.J of India has asked the Council ta invite the Indian representative ta participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In a letter ta the Acting Secretary-General [S/4980], the Mitüster for FOl'eign Affairs of the Republic of the Congo (Leopold- viUe) has also asked ta be allowed to attend the dis- cussion of the item on the Counci!'s agenda. If there are no objections ta these requests, 1shall invite these representatives ta take places at the Security Counci! table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy (Ethiopia),' Mr. Paul-Henri Spaàk (Bèl- gium),' Mr. Krishna Menon (/ndia) and Mr. Jus tin Bomboko (Congo, Leopoldville) took places at the Security Council table. 26. The PRESIDENT (transldcd from Russian) : Would any member of the Council like ta begin the discussion of this item? As no member of the Counci! wishes ta speak, 1 shaH call first on the representative Of Ethiopia, who has asked ta speak on this item. 27. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Mr. President, 1 am grateful ta you and ta the members of the Counci! for aHowing the Ethiopian delegation ta participate in this meeting of the Council. 28. On 1 November 1961, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie l, Emperor of Ethiopia, my august sovereign. 29. Two days later, on instructions from my Govern- ment, 1 had the honour, together with the delegations cf the Republic of the Sudan and of the Federation of Nigeria, to request the Security Council to meet and consider the situation prevailing in the province of Katanga, Republic of the Congo (Leopoldvillel. 30. Here 1 must say that our interest, because of our involvernent both in troops and material resources, is undoubted. It is because of these considerations that we have asked for the meeting of the Council. 31. Sixteen months after the Congo operation became a necessity, we find ourselves further removed ft'om ending the foreign intererence which was, and re- mains, the sole reason for. the political turmoil, recurrent crisea, chaos and uncertainty in that land and, above all, for the continued defiance by the K~ 'anga authorities both of the United Nations and the Central Government of the Republic. Duriug these sixteen months, we have known moments of agony, despair and fear of the real possibility of an outbreak of large- acale hostilities engulfing the whole continent, and at times we have caught a glimpse of the lights of settle- ment and peace-only to see them extinguished by reckless outsiders and vested interests. 320 The drama has orought about the loss ofprecious lives: the lives of innocent Congole~e and the lives of those gaUant soldiers of peace who serve under the United Nations in the Congo. Patrice Lumumba, the great African patriot and leader, was murdered because he stood for the wlity of his country. Dag Hammarskjold, that great man of peace, gave his life, ae did his colleagues, while in pursuit of peace for the Republ1c. MateriaUy, the operation has become a drain on the n'leagre financial resources of the Organization and may weIl lead it to bankruptcy. 33. It is therefore necessa~ to review the operation, to take stock of developments since last February, and to take firm, forthright and, above aU, unequivocal and clear measures if disas' , is to be avoided both for the Republic and for this vrganization. otherwise, we fear, this institution may weIl meet the fate of its predecessor: extinction for failure to act promptly and y Document A/4~51. 3·!' 1 now wlsh to recapitulate the march of events which let! to the present uneasy stalemnte. Perhaps thls mlght brlng forcefully to the fore exactly what we expect from the present meeting of the Security Councl!. 35. It must be recnlled that the tragic episode of the Congo began when, in June 1960, the Belgian Govern- ment intervened milltnrily in the Congo, ostensibly ta protect the lives und the property ofits nationals, who, it was said, were threatened by the deterioriation of public orcier in the Congo as n result of mutiny and disorder ln sorne quarters of the Congolese National Army. On 14 July 1960 the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General: "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide the Government with such militaryassistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government, with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces ma}' !Je able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." 21 36. It was also hoped that the United Nations presence would remove any pretext the Belgians might have for keeping their military forces in the Congo. The deli- !Jerately protracted delay of the Belgian Government in withdrawing its armed forces gave rise to nume~ous difficulties. The Security Council, by its resolutions of 22 July and 9 August 1960,!I demanded the immediate withdrawal of Belgian military forces from the Republic of the Congo, and particularly from Katanga. These same Security Council resolutions called upon "aIl States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order ... and ... which might undermine the territorial integrity and the politica\ mdependence of the Republic of Congo". Ail along, however, under the caver of the Belgian presence, the secession of the province of Katanga from the Republic of the Congo was organized under the Presidency of Ml'. Tshombé. 37. Unhappily, the problem of the Congo was further aggravated by the differences among the leaders of the Central Government, which resulted in the establish- ment of two rival Governments, in Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Again, the General Assembly, on 20 Sep- tember 1960, requested the Belgian Government ta withdraw its troops. No sooner, however, were the bulk of the Belgian regular armed forces withdrawn than Ml'. Tshombé began building up an army which was, and st:n is, led and trained by a corps of foreign mercenaries" . 38. When the march of events reached such a critical stage, my Government repeatedly expressed the view that the problem of the Congo could only be solved by the Congolese themselves, within the framework of the Congolese constitution, in an atmosphere free of direct and indirect foreign intervention and intrigues and that no United Nations Member should aggravate the differences among the leaders of the Central y Offkial Records of the Secunty CounL'il, Flfteenth Year, Supplement fOg!Uly, August and September 1%0, document S/4387, 4 ~" documents S/4 ,OS and S/442., '..- .. "',' , " " . 39. For reasons which are very painful to explain now, the natural and logical course of action, which Ethiopia, and many other countries whose motives in the Congo are above and beyond suspicion advocated, did not receive the immediate endorsement it deserved. When time showed the wisdom of tbis course of action, it was after the Congo had gone throughfurthertrials, agony, and bloodshed. 40. The essential mandate of the United Nations presence in the Congo, wbich was to help the Central Government to restore and maintain public order was further defined by Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961,~ which, inter alia, authorized the United Nations to take "immediately aU appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of a11 military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort", and the "immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of aIl Belgian and othel'foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nation? Command, and mercenaries." The desirability of 00nvening the Congolese Parliament with the assistance of the United Nations also became a practical policy of tue United Nations Operation. 41. With the effective assistance ofthe United Nations, the Congolese Parliament met at Lovanium University, Leopoldville, from 22 July to 2 August 1961 and con- firmed a Central Government in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the Republic. This step, as you would understand, was a great source of satis- faction to my Government, which has always maintained a strict policy of neutrality towards the genuine inter- naI differences amongthe Congolese leaders, believing that the Congolese and the Congolese alone could solve their problems. At tbis stage, we rightly feIt that the only obstacle that remained in the whole Congo18se episode was the secession of the province of Katanga, materia11y aided and maintained by foreign elements. The secession of Katanga, in our opinion, was nevel' the result of genuine internaI dispute, as it was cIeal' from the beginning that the Katanga secession was engineered and maintained byforeign mercenaries and financial interests. The secession of Katanga is indeed a clear and unequivocal manifestation of Belgian and other foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo. The acts of terrorism, 'il! Ibid.• Sixteenth Year, Supplement for 1anuary, February and March 1961. document 5/4741. 42. In the meantime, the ambiguity of this aspect of ONUC 's mandate, which largely resulted from the failure of the Security Council to give clear and unequivocal directives, gave Tshombé and his foreign clique the time they badly needed to consolidate their positions by eliminating internaI opposition and accu- mulating equipment and weapons for the "gendarme- rie!!. The additional allies Tshombé found in fugitives from French martial law and from officers who were involved in the recent abortive coup d'état in Algeria was also timely. By September 1961, Tshombé, secure in the knowledge of his foreign-built power, began an intensified direct campaign of slander, threats, and incitement ta riot directed against the United Nations. This was precisely done at the time when the United Nations Command was labouring to enforce the Security Council resolution of 21 February and evict aIl foreign, military, paramiEtary personnel and mercenaries. Tshombé and the consular officers in Elisabethville, some of whose nationals were involved in the Katanga adventure, appeared to accept in principle the injunc- tion of withdrawal, made preparations for departure and then re-infiltrated the Katanga "gendarmerie" to continue directing their acts of hostility against the United Nations. The deliberately created atmosphere of hate and suspicion posed a physical threat upon the operations of the United Nations and led it on 28 August to take what the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo in his report to the Secretary-General, dated 14 September 1961,21 called "precautionary measures" by placing Radio-Katanga, the "gendarmerie" headquarters and other key instal- lations in the city of Elisabethville under United Nations protection. After taking these measures, the United Nations Command renewed its efforts to impress upon Tshombé the absolute necessityofwith- drawing aIl foreign elements and mercenaries from Katanga. In the meantime, the foreign elements in Tshombê's "gendarmerie", which had simulated an apparent withdrawal, began to resort to more aggres- sive acts. 43. As the report of 14 September 1961 indicates, the United Nations Command had specifie knowledg-e of the fact that Ml". Munongo and llls police, which is f , led by mercenaries, were planning to carry out a~~acks on United Nations personnel, military as weIl as civilian. 44. To prevent such physical attacks and to curb inflammatory broadcasts and other threats to the maintenance of law and order while it carried out the task of apprehending and evacuating all foreign ele- ry Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1961, document S/4940. 45. As is weIl known, it is at this point of the crisis that the Secretary-General left on his ill-fated flight to Ndola to meet Ml'. Tshombé. He did so, it must be recalled, after he had made it clear to Tshombé that no prior conditions for a cease-fire would be accepted. The death of the Secretary-General removed the ulti- mate executive leadership from the United Nations Operation in the Congo. It is, however, inour opinion, to the great credit of the United Nations Command in the Congo, and the senior officers of the Secretariat at Headquarters, that in the düficult weeks and in the uncertainty that followed the death of Ml'. Hammar- skjold they carried out the Congo operations without departing from the essential line of the United Nations presence in the Congo. 46. Coming nearer to the situation in which we find ourselves today, a cease-fire arrangement betweenthe United Nations and the Katanga authorities was finalized on 20 September 1961,ZI which established a joint commission of four members to supervise the application of the agreement, and which was to "seek ways of placing the relations between the United Nations and the Katanga authorities on a basis of mutual understanding and harmony and also to fix the respec- tive positions of each side's troops." The cease-fire agreement was approved by Headquarters in New York only àfter the Secretariat had informed Ml'. Tshombé that the agreement was of a strictly military nature and had no political value: in brief, after it put exact conditions on the application of an the resoluèions of the Security Counci) and of the General Assembly in the province and also after it had included in the agree- ment provisions safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Republic. Yet, we disapproved of the agreement and said so at the time, because of implications that may be placed upon the agreement. 47. This agreement and the protocol y that followed later seemed a setback to the decisions of the Security Counci! and of the General Assembly, and even a violation of the constitution of the Republic. We must, li Ibid., document S/4940/Add.7, para. 6. §J Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1961, document 5/4940/Add.LI, annex 1. 48. This brings us directly to the situation in which we find ourselves today in the Congo. Foreign elements and foreign vested interests using Tshombé as a front are strengthening their milital'y build-up in Katanga. The newspapers have reported the recent acquisition of aircraft by the foreign conspiracy in Katanga. Another foreign element which we had suspected all along to be in the Katanga conspiracy is now overtly manifesting itself. l refer to material aid that could be coming to Tshombé only from persons in the territories having common frontiers with Katanga, from people who are against Africans attaining inde- pendence. It must be recalled that on 12 September, Ml'. Kimba, the so-called Foreign Minister of the Katanga government, announced that negotiations had been opened for reinforcing Katanga units with per- sonnel and equipment from Rhodesia. Though we have no authoritative knowledge of the results of this meeting, we do not put it past these people to start waging war against the United Nations. 49. The mercenaries are still in Katanga in great numbers. In spite of the many repeated appeals made to Tshombé by the United Nations Command to evict his foreign agents, it is clearto us that Tshombé would not and could not evict of his own free accord the mercenaries serving with him. Without them Tshombé will crumble. Without them the interests of foreign companies cannot be defended. The United Nations Command in Katanga reports that new diffi- culties have arisen since 28 Augnst 1961, as these mercenaries are now serving in civilian garb and have become difficult to identify and to apprehend for evacuation. Nor has the cease-fire agreement prevented Tshombé from carrying out offensive mili- tary actions outside the provincial limits of Katanga. Paragraph 6 of the report dated 2 November 1961 of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo states: "The gravest and most dangerous flouting of the cease-fire terms by the Katangese authorities has been the recent bombing attacks in Kasai by the so-ca11ed 'Katanga Air Force'." 2.1 Al- though the whereabouts of the Fouga aircraft seem to be vague for the moment, there is no doubt in our minds that they will soon appear from across a we11- known frontier and, joined by such relics as Dornier and Dove aircraft will resume their war against the 21 !!1!!!., document S/4940/Add.12. 50. 1 have described the major developments in the Congo in the last sixteen months and the rather ambiguous peace now obtaining in the Congo in the hope of making our views and reasons clear so that in the fulfilment of its duties and obligations under the Charter the Security Council would know what to do to meet the Katanga situation. 51. First, we believe that the mandate of the United Nations operation in the province of Katanga shouldbe clarified and made precise to meet the new situations that have arisen owing to Mr. Tshombé's refusaI to evict foreign mercenaries from his army and "so.reté Il and, what is more, due to the latest military build-up and aggressive actions undertaken by Tshombé and his foreign clique. It should be clear beyond the slightest doubt that Mr. Tshombé could not and would not evict his mercenaries of his own free will. Clearly, the Security Council must examine this situation thorough- ly and issue clear directives to meet the challenge of the military build-up which is financed and supported by foreign interests. It should in our view authorize the Secretary-General to impound, deport and evict the mercenaries by force. Experience has shown that there is no other way of dealing with these merciless people. 52. Secondly, in our opinion, the original task of the United Nations operation which was essentially to provide the Central Government li ••• with such mili- tary assistance, as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may he able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks", is getting lillurred. It has been clear from the outset of the crisis that the Central Government has been seeking effective United Nations assistance to restore law and order in that part of its territory called Katanga. The Central Government of the Congo has recognized the secessionist movement as a foreign-inspired attack against the territorial integrity of the Républic, which the United Nations forces were called upon to safeguard. Whatever justi- fication there may have been for the interpretation placed on the above provisions in the past, we should now open a new chapter in the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council as there exists a Central Government elected and confirmed by Parlia- ment. The United Nations Command should help the efforts orthe Central Government forces in restoring law and order in the province of Katanga, and should take measures to remove thê real threat of foreign intervention against the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. 53. In this connexion the directives, as reported by the Press, given recently by senior officiaIs at Head- quarters ta the Command that they destroy marauding 55. Although we have a clear position about this aspect of foreign interference in the Congo, it is not, I believe, for my delegation to present evidence without prejudging the :"esponsibility of certain Powers and without bringing unnecessary acrimony into the debates of the Security Counci!. We aU know the high esteem in which Tshombé is held in the Rhodesias and South Africa. My delegation, however, requests the Security Counci! to address itself to this interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo from territories border- ing Katanga. It is for the Security Council to ascertain the magnitude of the interference; and, in addition to any information the United Nations Command and Secretariat may give on this subject, to establish, if need be, a special machinery to control this aspect of foreign interference. In our view, the Security Council show.d calI upon the States that are responsible for the international conduct of the Governments of these territories to stop this interference forthwith. 56. Fourthly, I should like to recaU to the attention of the Security Council the problem that the United Nations Commandfaces in evictingall foreign elements and especially mercenaries, as covered by the Security Council resolution of 21 February. When suchmerce- naries are apprehended, the most that the United Nations Command can do is to hand them over to their own consuls for repatriation. Lately a problem has arisen because mercenaries who have been appre- hended and handed to their consuls with the promise of 57. This Belgian Consulate, besides being illegally established contrary to the expressed wishes of the Central Government which has final authority in the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, has, we are informed, among its staff twelve regular officers from the Belgian Army. The New York Times of today reports this to be accurate, and 1 should like to read this extract: "It also was reported here today"-that is to say, in the Congo- "that the Belgian Government had informed the United Nations in Katanga that it was prepared to withdraw ten Belgian army officers who formerly served with the Katanga army. They now are working with the Belgian Consulate in Elisabeth- ville. A United Nations spokesman said the Belgian move was 'a weIcome sign'." 58. In our view, the Security Council should calI upon Belgium to stop its interference in Congolese internaI affairs and pull out all its troops from the Congo, wbatever the pretext, be they mercenaries or former Army troops. 59. The mercenaries serving in the Katanga "gendar- merie" are serving of theü' ("'ln freewill. No Govern- ment, as far as we know, has accepted responsibility for their actions. These mercenar.ies know, and should know, that they are violating the laws of the Republic of the Congo when they kill peo1Jle and commit arson in Katanga. No defence offinancial inducement or mis- guided motive of defence against communist expansion should absolve th. ~ mercenaries from their crimes and the punishmeiic they deserve according to the laws of the Republic. 60. There is a Central Government of the Congo which, like all governments of sovereign States, has exclusive jurisdiction over aU persons, nationals and aliens alike, in the Republic. The Security Council, we believe, must now give clear directives to the Command that such military and paramilitary personnel and mercenaries as are covered by part A, paragraph 2 of the Security Councii resolution of 21 February should be handed to the legaUy constituted authorities to stand trial according to the law of the Congo. 61. Fifthly, to us it isclearthatMr. Tshombé and his conspirators would not be able to defy the Central Government and the United Nations were it not for the financial support extended by the Union minière and others who see in the unitY of the Congo a threat to their vested interests. We, therefore, ask that the Security Council adopt effective measures to hait aU financial assistance to Mr. Tshombé. 62. In this connexion, we are bound to bring to the attention of the Security Counci! the fact that the Union minière has converted cars and trucks into armoured cars and trucks for use by Tshombé forces. These activities bring the company under the resolution 64. Lastly, 1 believe it to be the dutYof the Security Council to assist the Secretary-General in securing effective contributions from Member States in terms of both its material needs and troops. Whenthe Congo operation was initiated we joined in this noble task by providing assistance from our resources to the best of our ability. Lately, however, only a few States have remained steadfast to their commitments to the Congo operation. We believe it to be in the interest of all those middle-sized States to convert their devotion to the Charter into making assistance available to the Secretary-General. 1 trust the Security Council will, therefore, call upon all States to render such assistance to the operation as is feasible to them. 65. 1 have now indicated some of the measures which the Security Council must adopt. The constitutional crisis that plagued the country is over. 1;'here is also a new Secretary-General in office, removing the uncertainty of the ultimate executive responsibility for the operation which has existed during the past two montr It is now clear that the United Nations must support and support resolutely the efforts of the Central Government in ending the secession of the province of Katanga. As His Majesty the Emperor emphasized in his message to the President of the Assembly, it is at the request of the Central Government that the "United Nations forces are present in the Congo to assist in the eviction of Belgian and other mercenaries in the ser- vice of the Katanga secessionists and to aid the Central Government to reintegrate Katanga into the Congo and restore peace to this strife-torn nation." 66. In this connexion, 1 cannot fail to emphasize two fundamental points in the present context of the Congo crisis. The first point is the inherent danger of the deterioration of the Central Government if it faiL;; in its efforts to reintegrate the province of Katanga into the Republic. If this happens, this time the tragedy will be a complex one, and it will not be as simple as finding a Head of Government who is as responsible a person as Prime Minister Adoula; it will be infinitely more difficult to find a person who is acceptable to aIl the Congolese factions. Secondly, and as a direct consequence of the failure of the United Nations in its essential missions in the Congo, the continent and the world may well be plunged into a crisis and even a conflict from which this Organization may never rise. 68. Ml'. BOMBOKO (Congo, Leopoldville) (translated from French): Ml'. President, 1 should like to thank you and the members of the Security Council for allowing me to participate in this meeting, which concerns the future of my country. The entire popu- lation ûf the Congo hopes that this Council will help it finally to resolve a crisis which has lasted aIl too long. 69. The situation that has developed in Katanga is too serious for the future of my country, of Africa and of the world to allow me to leave the slightest uncertainty regarding the position and the intentions of the Congolese Government. 1 shall ùerefore speak clearly and unequivocally. Time and again we have made it clear that the whole problem of Katanga was created by foreigners, who from sordid interests are tryingto perpetuate colonialist domination in Africa. Long before my country's accession to independence there were Europeans in Katanga who wanted to detach that province from the l'est of the Congo and turn it into a dominion where only the white element would enjoy political rights. They were encouraged in that idea by the example of Rhodesia, and above aIl by the example of South Africo., These criminal plans were frustrated by the opposition of the Congolese and of the Belgian Administration, the latter fearing that the intransig- ence of the colonists and the financial groups estab- lished in Katanga would get beyond its control. 70. At the first communal elections we saw, notwith- out anxiety, that the colonists ilad ùrganizedthemseIves into political parties with programmes fundamentally based on separatism. It was these same groups which, a few days before the proclamation of independence, induced Ml'. Tshombé to annOunce the secession of Katanga. The attempt miscarried, thanks to the swift reaction of the authorities at the time, but ~his act of rebellion went unpunished. For reasons which we do not know, the Ambassador, a Belgiancitizenappointed by Ml'. Tshombé, was merely expelled from the Congo and the authors of the plot were pardonedby the Belgian Administration; The Katanga separatists did not disarm and, taking advantage of the disturbances which occurred in July 1960; they ordered the provincial authorities ta proclaim the independence of this region of the Congo. Theil' criminal enterprise was made aIl the easier by the fact that they were able to count on the support of Belgian parachutists. 71. 1 have no intentio:l of going over past history, which everyone knows. 1 simply wish ta demonstrate the propulsive l'ole which certainforeign persons have continued ta play in my country's affairs. As an example, 1 shaH read out the account of a press con- ference given on 12 July 1960, the day after Ml'. Tshombé's decision, by Major Weber, a senior officer of the Belgian metropolitanforces. This account "Major Weber also briefly explained the new organization of the province. Political affairs re- mained exclusively within the competence of the Katanga Government, under whose orders he \",tas working for the maintenance of order and security. He had appointedMr. Lebrunashis 'Chef de cabinet'. Five departments had been set up: Military Affairs, Information, Supply, Refugees, and Public Health. The various heads of these departments ware to report to him within twenty-four hours on the organization of their ·respective services. He said that he hoped to regain control of the whole of Katanga as soon as possible. He had harsh words to say of those who had abandoned their posts of responsibility. He added that Victor Lundula, the so-called General-in-Chief of the 'Force pùblique', had been neutralized. The very energetic attitude of !\J1:ajor Weber made a strong impression on aIl those in the room. He seems to be sparing with words and prefers action." 72. Major Weberwas subsequently appointedpersonal adviser to Mr. Tshombé. By his fanaticism, this man prevented reconciliation between the provincial Presi- dent of Katanga and the Leopoldville authorities. 1may add that Major Weber was expelled from the Congo, as a mercenary, by the United Nations forces. 1have told aIl this in order to show you the nefarious role this Belgian soldier has played in Katanga. 73. As you are aware, the United Nations has encoun- tered many difficulties in getting the Belgian troops to leave Katanga. Further resolutions by the Security Council were required before that province could be occupied by United Nations trElops. The resistunce thus offered by Mr. Tshombé's political advisers 'was supported by associations of white settlers in Katanga. Here, as an example, is a communiqué issued at the time by ASEKAT-the Association des entreprises du Katanga-comprising the seventy-five most impoI'trmt mining, industrial, -agricultural and transport entt~r­ prises in the province: "ASEKAT confronts the United Nations with its responsibilities. It notes that, after the events whieh occurred at the beginning of July, the commonsense and calmness of the authorities and personnel per- mitted full resumption of the various economic activities of the province, in order and tranquillity. "The sudden decision of the United Nations to occupy the province is causing disturbances and will 74. Rere is another appeal, from the Union profes- sionelle agricole du Katanga (UPAKAT), an association which, like the others, has an exclusively European membership: "UPAKAT, which represents farmers and stock- breeders of an nationalities, is receiving many visits and alarming appeals from farmers, following the ill-advised and untimely decision that Katanga should be occupied by United Nations troops. AlI these farmers, who represent an important part of the country's agricultural economy and employa large number of Congolese workers, are considering abandoning their farms if United Nations troops appear. The United Nations would alone be respon- sible for the breakdown of these activities and the ensuing chaos, as well as for any disturbances and their consequences. The responsibility for revoking that decision lies with the United Nations alone. UPAKAT counts on the spirit of justice and equity of the United Nations to ensure that it reconsiders its position." 75. 1 should also like to quote a communiqué from UCOL, which is an association of middle-class colonists who are still in Katanga: "L'Union pour la collaboration des classes moyen- nes au Katanga, representing all independent persons in Katanga, craftsmen, tradespeople, farmers, plant- ers, stock-breeders, contractors, carriers etc. of all nationalities, has received appeals from every corner of the territory following the ill-advised decision that Katanga should he occupied by United Nations troops. An these appeals express the anxiety of our members over that decision. They inform us categorically that they are making all arrangements to leave the country as quickly as possible, leaving their staff-some 42,000 Congolese-without work. We hold the representatives of the United Nations and the Organization itself responsible for all the moral and material ills that will arise from their unfortunate decision in an area which is peaceful and whicl) was prosperous. Wefeel it our dutYto send this communiqué to all representatives of foreign Powers." 76. The Council will thus see that the hatred that is apparent in Katanga today i8 to a great extent deliberately cultivated andkept alive byforeigners, not for the benefit of the Congolese but mainly in order to preserve their own economic interests and the enter- prises which they have set up, in Katanga and to con- tinue their exploitation of our wealth without any control by the lawful authorities of the country. 77. These colonists and heads of enterprises have not only brought about the secession of Katanga but have 78. These same circles, intent on defending their position in Katanga, sought to have the right to self- determination applied in this Congolese province. Their arguments may be summed up as follows:first, the Congo as a national entity never existed; it was an artificial creation of Belgian colonial policy. According to the principles of the United Nations, the Belgian colonial administration was bad and had to be elimi- nated, but with a guarantee of self-determinlttion for the indigenous population. Secondly, immediately after the departure of the Belgians, the people of Katanga expressed the wish to form an independent sovereign State, refusing to accept the régime set up by other Congolese tribes sorne thousands of miles away. 79. We know that no country in the world was ever created as the result of work in a laboratory-a country exists simply owing to a historical, diplomatic facto The Congo acceded to independence within its frontiers as they existed on 30 June 1960. In denying that the Congolese nation really exists and claiming that it is merely a Belgian creation, they are also denying the existence of Katanga, since that province did not exist before Belgian colonization and its frontiers were drawn solely for administrative expediency. 80. There never was a State of Katanga prior to Belgian colonization. Hence this argument will not hold water. Those who hold that Mr. Tshombé's supporters have the right to self-determination should surely recognize that right for the Baluba, who are massacred day after day by Tshombé's racialist mercenaries because they refuse to accept the secession. Thousands of Baluba have been massacred because they opposed Mr. Tshombé' s secession. Yet, as 1shall demonstrate, the Baluba constitute the majority of the population of Katanga. 81. A year ago, speaking in this very forum, 1 proved that Mr. Tshombé did not by any means represent the majority of the population of Katanga, and 1should like now to give you the history of the establishment of CONAKAT. The CONAKAT party is the Confédération des associations ethniques du Katanga. It came into being as a combination of aIl the tribal groups existing in Katanga at that time. At the beginning Mr. Sendwe, the future president of the Balubakat party, was also a memberofCONAKAT, butowingtopersonal rivalries between Mr. Tshombé and Mr. Sendwe and as a result of ethnie clashes, too, the CONAKAT party, which was at first merely a tribal association for mutual aid, split into two, one part composed exclusively of Baluba and the other comprising the Lunda and other ethnic groups. Subsequently the Balubakat, Mr. Sendwe's party, joined other ethnic parties such as AKTAR, forrning what came to be known as the Cartel katangais. 82. At the communal elections of 1959, Mr. Sendwe Won a crushing victory over Mr. Tshombé and succeed- ed in having burgomasters appointed in almost aIl the towns of Katanga. But, as a result of intrigues at the time of the legislative elections, Mr. Tshombé managed 83. At that point, amazingly enough, the Political Committee in Brussels, of which Iwas a member, was asked to agree to an amendment of the "Loi fondamen- tale" ta enable Ml'. Tshombé to form his government an the same. Against the advice of the Political Com- mittee, against the advice of the General Executive Council at Leopoldville, the Belgian Parliament amen- ded the "Loi fondamentale", thus enabling Ml'. Tshombé to set up a homogeneous government. 84. Ml'. Sendwe protested, but his protests fell on deaf ears. Consequently, it is simply incorrect to claim that Ml'. Tshombé represents the majority of the people of Katanga, because the one who does repre- sent the majority of the Katangese is Ml'. Sendwe, who was kept out of Elisabethville by those who did not want the Congo to be genuinely independent. It is there- fore futile to say that the peoples of Katanga supported Ml'. Tshombé in his secessionist move. That simply is not true. The Central Government of the Congo is pursuing the same policy with respect to the dissident province of Katanga as it pursues with respect to any other province, in strict observance of the law, which is already being restored over a wide area of the Congo. 85. As I showed earlier in my statement, Tshombé is provincial President precisely by vil'tue of the "Loi fondamentale", which he continues to repudiate. If he repudiates the "Loi fondamentale", he ceases to be provincial President. As I have pointed out, if the Congo is, geographically, a Belgian creation, so is the province of Katanga. Katanga has the same legal status as Kivu, Oriental province or any other province which was an integral part of the national territory as on 30 June 1960. It has its provincial assembly, its Presi- dent, the members nf its provincial government. Ita jurisdiction is stricLly circumscribed by the "Loi fondamentale" . 86. As the Prime Minister said when the Congolese Parliament cast its vote of confidence, even if Katanga had been an arid, desert land we should still have claimed it. That is our absolute right. No Member of the United Nations would agree to surrender any part of its territory. Not one of them would consent to be divided, and it is surprising to note that those who would use armed force in their own countries to put down any rebellion are the first to encourage rebellion in the Congo, that those who would not hesitate to send in jet aircraft to massacre the peoples under their rule are the first to want to give Ml'. Tshombé substantial assistance so that he can resist the efforts to bring about a reconciliation among aIl the peoples of the Congo. 87. For nearly a year and a haU we have been striving for national unity, with the help of the United Nations. Today the Katangese secession is still the aggravating factor in the Congo crisis. For a year and haU we have been patiently followingthe difficult roads to reconcili- ation by peaceful means. At every opportunity,Tshombê and his clique have found a pretext for not keeping 89. Ml'. Tshombé had asked for a conference of aIl the Congolese leaders in the Congo itself. He had suggested Elisabethville and after sorne discussion we had agreed that it should be held at Leopoldville. When the conference was convened Ml'. Tshombé refused to attend, on the pretext that what was urgent was the signing of military agreements. 90. Was the problem to be approached on non-political grounds? Agreements for military and economic co- operation were signed at Elisabethville. Not one of them was honoured by Ml'. Tshombé and his clique. It was then decided that the crisis was more in the nature of what is called a constitutional crisis. The Tananarive Conference appeared to be the last hope. O.'1ce again, however, Ml'. Tshombé took advantage of the occasion to balkanize the Congo and impose a confederation which in fact gave Katanga independence. Moreover, Tshombé did not even try to legalize the Tananarive resolutions by obtaining Parliamentary approval of them. 91. The dissatisfaction of those concerned with the preservation of legality soon revealed the need for a meeting atCoquilhatville. Atthat meeting Ml'. Tshombé again made impossible demands. Besides his total failure to recognize the authority of the Head of State, he imposed, as pre-conditions, the outright denuncia- tion of the agreement for co-operation concluded bet- ween the United Nations and President Kasa-Vubu and the exclusion of Ml'. Jason Sendwe, President of the Balubakat, the opposition party in Katanga. It is hard to understand how anyone inspired with the peaceful intention of bringing about a reconciliation could demand the sabotage of a peace-Ioving organization like the United Nations and the exclusion of a leader representing the majority of the population of Katanga province. This was another clear proof that the seces- sion was being deliberately maintained and that the massacre of the peaceful Baluba people had been irrevocably decreed. 92. The Government then decided to prevent the agi- tators from returning to Elisabethville. The Coquil- hatville Conference adopted decisions on the institu- tions of the country, the most important of which was on the convening of Parliàment, one of the sources of legali'ty. In retreat at Leopoldville, Ml'. Tshombé was better able to understand the problems-at least we hoped so-from a more national and Congolese point of view. 93. In the meantime, on the initiative of the Leopold- ville authorities, peaceful negotiations were going on at Milan between the representatives of Elisabethville and those of Leopoldville. The two delegations announced complete agreement on a number of important matters relating to the authority of the Head of State, the 94. Alas, the treason of this fellow-countryman is more criminal than ever. He failed to ablde by any provision of the agreement and refused to send his parliamentary representatives, thus depriving the Congolese people of the province of Katanga of the;r right to express their views through their freely elected representatives. Where is the honour of this man, who habitually betrays and deceives, this man who pretends to be a champion of freedom, this man who claims he is anti-communist? Those who would defend freedom must know how to honour it. 95. Any negotiations with the so-called Katangese authorities, and in particular with the rebel Tshombé, are utterly futile. Ml'. Tshombé, who is supported by mercenaries, Ml'. Tshombé, who nowbelieves himself to be the most powerful man in the Congo, will not agree to any negotiation unless his independence is recognized beforehand. 96. We Congolese have known Tshombé for a very long time. Even before independence, we knew all the tricks he could play. Later, to avoid sheddingthe blood of our Congolese brethren in Katanga, we repeatedly tried to restore thp. territorial integrity of the country through peaceful negotiations. All our efforts were doomed to failure owing to the obstinacy, egoism and duplicity of Ml'. Tshombé. 97. More recently, the United Nations authorities have been able to see for themselves how little weight should be given to Ml'. Tshombé's promises. On 13 October 1961, a protocol for a permanent cease-fire in Katanga was signed at Elisabethville by Ml'. Khiari and the rebel Tshombé. At the time, the Congolese Government and 1 myself expressed the most categori- cal reservations regarding the contents of that agree- ment. Today, after the continuous violation by the Katangese authorities of the Agreement of 13 October 1961, the United Nations, and all the countries of the world, can no longer have anydoubt regardingthe real intentions of Ml'. Tshombé and the methods to which he resorts in QI'der to maintain his so-called State of Katanga at all costs. 98. What is more, a few days following the signing of the permanent cease-fire agreement, the rebel troops of Katanga launched a fierce attack in the province of Kasai, that is, outside the borders of the province of Katanga. 99. On tnat occasion, too, we heard statements from certain mercenaries who boasted of their exploits. For example, Major Delin, a Belgian, said that he used two Fouga aircraft, placed at his disposaI to bomb Congolese villages, and that statement was publicized by all the Belgian newspapers. Major Delin's statement can be found in Le Soir and La Libre Belgigue. 101. AlI 1 have just said shows how right we are to be sceptical about peaceful negotiations with a man who does not respect the pledged word. As far as we are concerned, there is nothing to negotiate at the consti- tutional leveI. The "Loi fondamentale" was drawn up following the political Round Table Conference held in Brussels in February 1959. Tshombé was at that Conference and he even sent a representative to the Political Committee who took an active part in the drafting of the "Loi fondamentale". It is on the basis of that "Loi fondamentale" that Tshombé can now calI himself President of the provincial government of Katanga. If he wants it to be possible for us to reopen negotiations on the arrangements for his return to the Republic of the Congo, he must be able to respect the very law on the basis of which he is today the President of the provincial government. He must be able to accept the authority of the Head of State, which is also based on the same "Loi fondamentale". That is the sine qua !!Q!! of any possible negotiation about arrangements with regard to the return of the President of Katanga province to the Republic of the Congo. 102. The Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960 authorized the Secretary-General "to take the neces- sary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks". 103. That first Security Council resolution on the situation in our country is more timely now than evel'. It was in response to the formaI request from the President of the Republic and the late lamented Prime Minister, made in their telegrams to the Secretary- General dated 12 and 13 July, 1960.ll!I The United Nations intervention in the Congo at that time was prompted by the fact that a state of open hostility existed between the Congolese troops and the Belgian forces. That hostility is still there, in a more dis- guised, more camouflaged, but at the same time more internationalized, form. 104. The mandate of the United Nations was defined by the late Secretary-General in his report of 18 July 1960.!l/Since then, substantial changes have had to be made in that mandate owing to political circumstances: the Katangese secession, the fall of the legal Govern- ment, the deterioration in the political situation as a result of the intervention of foreign elernents, the division of legal authority, etc. At aIl those very different stages the action of the United Nations con- tinued to be guided by the same considerations. Up to the mEleting of Parliament and the appointment of the Central Government, United Nations action was justi- !QI IbiUfteenth Year. Supplement for JulV. August and 5eptember !.22Q. document 5/4382. !l/ !!lli!.• document 5/4389. 105. Effective support of the Central Government, set up by Parliament, is the only means whereby we may ovel'come the present situation. That support must be total in order to eilable the Government to fight effec- tively against aIl secessionists, mercenaries and others who stand to gain from maintaining the existing chaos. It is a foregone conclusion that Tshombé will not negotiate with the Central Government unless he is convinced that the balance is not in his favour. 106. After the recent incidents in Katanga and the signing of the cease-fire between the United Nations and the Tshombé government-an agreement of which the Central Government has never approved, but with which, in its desire for conciliation, it has been careful not to interfen:-Tshombé is more convinced thanever that he is in a very strong position. Evidence of that can be seen in the way in which he and his colleagues are constantly violating the provisions of the cease- fire, organizing raids on peaceful Kasai villages, for example, and in the mendacious campaign of slanderous abuse broadcast day after day by Radia-Katanga which is destroying the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of the African masses. 107. There is therefore no likelihood of serious nega- tiations, although it is quite possible that Tshombé's friends may persuade him to make a further pretence of negotiations to put himself in the right in public opinion. It is also unlikely that without intensive train- ing the Congolese National Army will be able, unaided, to stamp out the Katanga secession. It would be an illusion to believe that Tshombé would, of his own free will, dismiss the mercenaries, on whom his entire system depends. It is not only the rightbut the dutY of the United Nations to expel these mercenaries and to deliver them to Congolese justice, for ifitdoes not do so the resolutions will remain a dead letter. 108. It is worth noting that the term "mercenaries" now covers almost aIl the European settlers and employees of the foreign companies operating in Katanga. 109. According to information we have received-and the representative of Ethiopia has referred to this-it would appear that at Kolwesi sorne employees of com- panies establiAhed in Katanga have started to convert transpc rt lorries into armoureâ cars for resistance against the United Nations forces. We have also learned that thE bombs recently dropped on Kasai villages were manufa tured in the factories of certain companies. Tshomb\ and his powerful secret supporters bear a heavy responsibility. They are committing a crime against humanity. Through the activities of the merce- naries in their pay they have been highly successful in recreating the atmosphere that prevailed in July 110. We have already had occasion to emphasize this point before the General Assembly: "The United Nations resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the mercenaries and for control also solemnly called on Member States to prevent the return of the mercenaries to the localities from which they had been expelled. "There has been a deliberate attempt to make a farce of these resolutions. Dozens of mercenaries expelled from Katanga have come back and resumed their vile work of hatred and destruction. My Govern- ment cannot tolerate this situation. If the United Nations is unable to authori~e its representative in the Congo to detain the arrested persons, then nothing can prevent the Congolese Government from acting on its own initiative to detain, try and sentence to severe penalties any foreigners who, in defiance of the Congo's laws, are organizing an irregular army on our territory and taking part in subversive and terrorist movements."!Y 111. Every member of the Security Council is weIl aware that in his own country rebellion would never be tolerated and that any rebellion is severely punished. Why, then, should it be tolerated in the Congo? Why are foreigners able to engage in subversive activities on our territory? Why are they allowed to leave without being p...rlÎshed? Why can these foreigners not be brought before Congolese justice to be judged according to Congolese law, which provides severe sentences for those who bear arms against the lawful authorities of the State? 112. 1 went on, in my speech to the General Assembly: "The situation is serious. Either we solve these problems once and for aIl or we allow this farce to continue and as a result wilfully expose the lives of United Nations soldiers and civilian officiaIs to grave danger. My Government cannot accept respon- sibility for such a policy. "Certain countries have not only tolerated and facilitated the recruitment of mercenaries by allow- ing recruiting offices to be opene:: in their territories but have extended their collaboration so far as to supply Katanga with heavy armaments and fighter aircraft." !li 113. Moreover, in conformity with the same resolu- tions, the United Nations should give the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo direct aid in the pursuit of the common aim: the restoration of law and order and the maintenance of territorial integrity. That is the objective that was assigned to the United Nations when it received the mandate to aid the Congo. But as the representative of Ethiopia has pointed out, that mandate requires clarification. Now that we have a legal Government, there must be more direct and more efficient collaboration between the Republic of the Congo and the United Ne.1.:ions, in order to put an end to this chaotic situation. Today, over a year after the passage of these resolutions, the unitYof the Congo has still not been restored. 114. On 21 February 1961 the Security Council adopted another resolution in which it calledfor the withdrawal of military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers. In spite of that resolution, the rebel Tshombé is still using foreign mercenaries to carry out armed raids into the territory of other Congolese provincer;, and he is doing so with impunity, for an the world 1;0 see. The resolutions of the Security Council can thus be defied without fear. Is the United Nations anytlùng else but a powerless and useless body? That is the question 1 venture to ask the Council. 115. It will be said, as 1 know full well, that the United Nations cannot intervene in the internaI affairs of aState. It seems to me, however, that the legitimate Government of that State is entitled to remove any scruples the United Nations might have in the ma:ter. It will be said, 1 know, that in its resolution of 9 August 1960 the Security Council reaffirmed "that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influ- ence the outcome of any internaI conflict, constitu- tional or otherwise". But frankly, is it still possible to speak without hypocrisy of a purely internaI con- flict in Katanga? 1 really do not think so. The foreign influence in that province is not disputed by anyone. There is no denying that at this moment the imperial- ists are launching a new and formidable attack on the Congo. The Katanga secession is, of course, a purely internaI conflict, whose solution is within the exclusive competence of the Congolese authorities. That, how- ever, is only one aspect of the question; for, from the international point of view, that secession is being openly encouraged by the active forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism. All the world knows that Tshombé is nothing but a figure-head, that those who are really responsible are still pulling the strings. Sc long as theil' action oontinues, there will be no frank and sincere discussion between Leopoldville and Elisa- bethville. 117. To sum up my Government's point of view, we expect from the United Nations, in the first place, direct aid and real and efficient collaboration between the United Nations forces and the Central Government. This is entirely in keeping with the initial mandate of the United Nations, which was to help the Government of the Republic of the Congo tomaintainlaw and order and public peace. We must be helped in that task. The United Nations must give us the means that will help us to reorganize our own police and security forces. When that has been done, it will be for us alone to decide that the United Nations action has come to an end, and to thank those who have given us that help. 118. In the second place, we demandthatall the mer- cenaries should be handed over to us. These merce- naries who have committed offences punishable under the Congolese Penal Code must be brought to justice and tried according to our laws. 119. We likewise request the United Nations to calI upon all the countries who today are still supporting the Katanga secession to withdraw their support from it and to take steps to prevent any further aircraft and weapons being delivered to Katanga. 120. Finally, my Government trusts that the Security Council will be able to assume its responsibilities and to specify clearly what action the United Nations must take. 121. We appeal to an countries of the world to unL.er- Stand that the situation in the Congo may have grave consequences. It is precisely in order to avoid those consequences that we are asking the United Nations to take effective steps to put an end as quickly as possible to this chaotic situation, whichis beingmain- tained by people who would like to retain interests in the Congo which are not those of the Government and the people of the Congo. 122. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russianl: I would have suggested that we now adjourn, but the representative of the United Kingdom has asked to speak, and I therefore calI upon him to do so. 123. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdoml: I shall be very brief indeed. My delegation will study with care, and in detail, the statements which have been made this morning by the representatives of Ethiopia and Congo (Leopoldvillel. There are two points, however, which I should like to deal with at once, though very shortly. 124. First, the representative of Ethiopia has made a number of veiled allegations suggesting that material aid and munitions have been coming to Katanga from Rhodesia. I will wish to see the text of what he has said and will wish to comment indetail thereafter, but I should like at once to contradict the allegations that 126. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russianl: If the members of the Council do not abject, 1 shall give the floor once again, for a short statement tefare we adjourn, ta the representative of Ethiopia. 127. Ml'. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopial: 1 am grateflù ta the representative, of the United Kingdom for his state- ment that he is goingto read my speech. 1 think the way he put it was rather obliq"e, but 1 will leave it ta him ta read it and ta tell us here the exact l'ole of Rhodesia in the Katanga secessionist movement. 128. It is our understanding that it was the Rhodesian Air Force people who transported Ml'. Tshombé. This was brought out in the newspapers, and 1 have never seen a denial of it by the Government of the United Kingdom. Secondly, it has been brought to our know- ledge that private contractors are improving the road between Katanga and Rhodesia. Thirdly, private con- tractors are improving the airf'~ld in Katanga. These are private contractors from Rhodesia. Fourthly, it is known that mercenaries using Katanga insignia have been given facilities at Ndola airport. Fifthly, 1 refer the Council to document S/4940/Add.1,!.i/in which the Secretariat lists Rhodesian mercenaries. Sixthly, 1 have already referred ta the statement of the so-called Foreign Minister of Katanga, who had negotiations with the Rhodesian authorities. 129. If these facts do not constitute interference, if the rep;'esentative of the United Kingdom wants the armies of Rhodesie. to intervene more directly, that is, of course, another matter. l submit that these people have no business whatever dealing with Katanga, directly or indirectly, and :lobody can satisfy us that this is not inte!ference. Th'~s is interference. One may rightly ask what the R1:lodesian mercenaries are doing in Katanga. They are not helping the Central Govern- ment. They are aiding the Katanga secessionist move- ment. 130. 1 WélCOil1è the state- 'lent of the representative of the United Kingdom that his Government does not support the secessionist movement of Katanga. 1 hope that, next time he takes the floor, he will make that statement more forthright and say that he is against it and that his Government will direct an its territories l1/ .lfficial Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supple- ment for July, August and September 1961.

1 think we can now adjourn and make arrangements for our next meeting. For the moment, there are no further speakers on my list, but 1assume that members of the Council will carefully study the views which have been expressed today and will prepare their own views which we sha11 hear at forthcoming meetings. 133. 1 think it would be convenient for us to meet either tomorrow afternoon or Wednesday morning, if that is possible. 1 have found out fromsome members of the Council-I have not had an opportunity to consult every member-that the majority would probably agree to a meeting on Wednesday morning, 15 Novembsr. If there are no views ta the contrary, we might arrange accordingly. 134. Ml'. YOST (United States of Amp.rica): Wewould be happy to meetonWednesday.lunders~and,however, that there is to be a meeting of the First Committee on Wednesday morning at which the subject of disarmament will be debated. Sorne of the members of the Council, including ourselves, might wish to be present at that meeting. Therefore, 1 wonder whether Wednesday afternoon would be agreeable for the next meeting of the Security Council.

1 must say that we are a11 more or less in the same position, because we a11 participate in the work of the First Committee and are a11 vitaUy interested in the discussion of disarmament questions, which, as the Chairman of the First Committee has told me, will begin tomorrow. Precisely because this discussion is scheduled ta l'egin tomorrow, 1 did not propose ta caU a meeting of the Council fortomorrow, the more sa as l, as representative of the Soviet Union, and to the best of my knowledge the representative of the United States, bath intend ta speak in the First Committee tomorrow. 136. Consequently, we cannot avoid clashing with the work of the First Committee and of the General Assembly-because a11 the Committees are at present working intensively-and 1 fear tnat it will be impossible for us to hold meetings of the Council on days when there are no Committee or plenary meetings. 1 therefore leave it to a11 themembers of the Counci! ta solve this problem in the mast convenient way. But 1 am afraid that even if we meet on the afternoon of Wednesday-the day after tomorrow-we shaH not then be able to finish our business and shaH have to carry the meeting over to Thursday morning. In that event our meeting will again coincide with that of the First Committee, which is also sitting on Thursday. Here again, then, clashes are inevitable. It would therefore seem to me more convenient that we should meet on Wednesday morning, if, of course, that is suitable for aIl members of the Counci!. If Wednesday afternoon is more convenient for the majority, 1 shaH have no objection, but 1 repeat that we may notbe able ta avoid a clash with the First Committee on the following day. 137. Ml'. YOST (United States of America): 1 realize that it will not always be pussible to avoid conflict between the meetings of this Council and the meetings

Taking into account the views which have just been expressed by the representative of the United States, 1 think that there will be no objection to our arranging the next meeting for Wednesday, 15 November, at 3 p.m. If there are no objections, we will decide accordingly. It was so decided. The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m. Litho in UoN. Priee: $ U.S. 0.50; 3/6 stg.; (or equivalenc in other eurreneies)