S/PV.979 Security Council

Inactordance with previous decisions of the Council! shall, f the Council agrees, invite the representatives of ithiopia, Belgium, India, Congo (Leopoldville) and weden to take places at the Council table. 1. aux I'assentiment l'Ethiopie, (Léopoidville) table At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tesfaye iebre-Egzy (Ethiopia), Mr. Walter Loridan (Belgium), ar. C. S. Jha (India), Mr. Justin Bomboko (Congo, -eopoldville), and Mrs. Agda Réssel (Sweden), took laces at the Security Council table, (Ethiopie), (Inde}, Mme Conseil. The interpretation into English and French of the tatement made at the 978th meeting by the President, peaking as representative of the Union of Soviet et en socialistes iocialist Republics, was given. » Mr. BOMBOKO (Congo, Leopoldville) (translated rom French): In my short speech I shall, I think, be ery frank because I represent a population of 14 dtillion here and I have certain obligations. I accordgly think it my duty to lay before the Council certain 2. courte parce dthabitants qu'il observations minute. sont icts which I have only now noted. Hitherto this Council as worked in a spirit of frank co-operationand under~ tanding. But it seems to me thata new factor has now, 4, The problem of Katanga has been hefore the United Nations for over a year, and various resolutions on it have been adopted during that period; yet none of these resolutions has brought about a perfect solution of the problem. We are here in order totry to throw light on the situation and to give the Secretary-General clear and precise directives which will enable him to carry out his mandate effectively. But when am. ndments or sub-amendments to the draft resolutiouw of the three African-Asian Powers are submitted, I have the impression that there is some sort of misunderstanding or lack of understanding, the only effect of which will be that the problem of Katanga is overlooked, that a coid war atmosphere is created here and that problems arising from conflict between the Powers are created. The suffering people of the Congo do not, however, need this cold war; and I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to ensure that we can consider this problem with the necessary objectivity. 5. When I spoke at the last meeting, I myself did not want to go into details, because I thought that everyone had understood the problem—particularly after the brilliant speech of the representative of Ceylon~and that a vote would be taken immediately. Now, since see there is some hesitation, I should like to give you the point of view of the Congolese. Butfirst may I quote a Congolese proverb, which says: "A paralytic who can still walk wants you, not to carry him on your shoulders, but to give him your hand in order to help him walk", The Congo, in a way, is just such a paralytic. Some people want to take it and put it on their shoulders. No, Mr. President: in the Congo there are men, and I believe that the Congo problem can be solved only if use is made, on the spot, of these men. 6, That is why, regarding the reorganization of the army, my Government agreed, with the United Nations Secretariat, upon measures toprovide my country with an efficient army, as a means of maintaining order. No one can conceive of the existence ofa country lacking such an instrument—an army and a policy force. We appealed to the United Nations precisely because we lacked such a means of maintaining order, as a result of the troubles of July 1960. E do not see why, then, there should be any objection to aid being given to the legal Governmeut of the Congo with a view to providing my country with an efficient, well-trained army equipped to prevent any secession. In my opinion, if the Central Government could cali upon such an army there would be no needtoask the Security Coun~ cil ‘or United Nations assistance designed to end any form of secession. My Government, like any other Government, would simply shoulder its responsibili~ ties, have the secessionists arrested, and disperse any illegal army formed in the Congo. country wants is precisely to avoid being committed, to avoid following in the wake of any particular nation and accepting assistance given on political conditions. This is why we appealed to the United Nations, and I think that the sixth amendment in document 8/4989, which speaks of the assistance which shou!dbe given te my Government to enable it to reorganize its forces of law and order—that is, its army and police—entirely meets the wishes of the Central Government. 8. Certain objections have been raised, and mention has been made of other movements of secession. I must tell you that, at present, there is no secession apart from that of Katanga, andthatyouare right when you pronounce against any digression from the question at issue, which is how to endthe secession of Katanga. 9, I think it is quite inorder to affirm principles upon which we are all, here, agreed, What are these prin~ ciples? We should respect each country's territorial integrity and forbid any secession. I do not therefore see why there should be any argument about first af~ firming the principle that the United Nations is opposed to any secession and then condemning the seces~ sion of Katanga and taking steps against it. My Govern~ mont fully agrees that there shouid be a statement of certain general principles in virtue of which the secession of Katanga can be condemned. I do not see how these principles can in any way conflict with the principles under which the secession of Katanga is condemned. 10. Moreover, my Government completely agrees that all remaining aircraft and all arms and mercena~ ries brought into Katanga by the secessionist movement be eliminated. I do not think there is any disagreement on that point, Previous resolutions confirm this, since they say that the illegal introduction of arms into the Congo must be prevented. These aircraft and arms were brought in illegally, and in these circumstances the United Nations is perfectly entitled to seize them or to eliminate or neutralize them. 11. I believe that these few factors which I have just brought to the attention of the Council are encugh to dispel any misunderstanding arising from the debate on the draft resolution, and particularly on the amend-~ ments and sub-amendments introduced. 12. I think the Security Council should be able to adopt a resolution to that effect. I said at the last meeting that there was no inconsistency between what was stated in the draft resolution and the amendments which have been submitted. If there is any real desire 13, The Congolese can enjoy their independence only if they, too, can co-operate with you in carrying out the resolution which you are going to adopt. i4, Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like at this stage to make a brief state~ ment in explanation of the votes which my delegation may shortly be called upon to cast upon the various resolutions and amendments before the Council. 15, First, let me briefly recapitulate our attitude to the original draft resolution submitted by the delega~ tions of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. [8/4985] 16. As I said in the statement I made in the Council on Friday last [976th meeting], there was much in that draft resolution with which my delegation agreed; but it seemed to us unsatisfactory intwo chief particulars. First it failed adequately to take account of seces= sionist or divisionary activities andtendencies in parts of the Congo; other than the Katanga. Secondly, the terms in which were set out the Secretary~General's authority in respect of the remaining mercenaries seemed to my delegation both imprecise in defining the people to whom these measures should apply, and too permissive in the extent to which these measures could be taken. My delegation was convinced that, were the Secretary-General encouraged by a decision of this Council to proceed in the manner described in operative paragraph 4 of this draft resolution, there could be a very grave risk that the situation in Katanga would be disastrously worsened. Instead of maintaining law and order in the Katanga, the United Nations might merely be importing disaster, And by concentrating their forces and resources on this one problem of the mercenaries in Katanga, the forces available to help the Congolese to maintain law and order elsewhere in the Congo and to avoid civil war would have been dangerously weakened. Recent events in Kindu, Albertville and Luluabourg show only too well how easily this could happen. The end, therefore, of our labours here might then merely be to bring chaos and further bloodshed to both the Katanga and other areas in the Congo; and all this without any certainty that we might thereby resolve the political complexities of the Congo. 17. Having said this and in the light of my earlier statement, it will be clear to members of the Council that my delegation welcome the revision which the sponsors themselves have made to operative paragraph 8 of their revised draft resolution [S/4985/ Rev.1], and we similarly welcome the first, second and third amendments proposed by the United States delegation in document S/4989/Rev.1. The effect of ali this is to widen the scope of the original draft, thus meeting the first of my delegation's two preoccupations which I have already mentioned. sections of the Congolese armed forces. The second of these new paragraphs which would request the Secretary-General to take steps to bring about the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo is, of course, wholly desirable. Indeed, my delegation believe that this has always been centralto the Secretary-General's mandate in the past; but it is right that at this moment the Security Council should emphasize this point, and in particular should draw attention to the need for negotiation and conciliation, 19. There remain the fourth and fifth amendments submitted by the United States delegation—and here, Mr, President, I must express very strong reserva~ tions. 20. The nature of those reservations will have been apparent to all from what I have already said in the course of this debate. The United Kingdom Government are strongly opposed to the activities of the mercena~ ries and we fully agree that they must be got rid of, We are not in the least anxious to protect them-and indeed the resolution of 21 February 19614/ seems to my delegation to deal with their position very well. But, in discharging this particular part of their man~ date, the Secretary~General and the United Nations forces and officials in the Congo must not act in such away that the outcome is further fighting and greater chaos. My delegation caanot associate itself with any wording which could be interpreted as encouraging the local command to use an added measure of force which might well endanger the uneasy peace now prevailing in the Katanga and leadtoafurther series of reprisals and counter=reprisals which would take us further from a solution than ever. The warning given to the Council on this by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium must, in the view of my delegation, be heeded. The proper task for the United Nations—I must say it yet again for my delegation attach the utmost importance to this basic principlethe proper task ‘or the United Nations is conciliation and pacification. My delegation earnestly hope that the Secretary~ General will interpret this particular part ofhis man- Jate with that principle in mind. However ,the wording xf operative paragraph 4, as amended, still seems te ny delegation to go too far. 11. I now turn to the United States fifth amendment vhich has itself been sub-amended severaltimes. This ntroduces a new operative paragraph 6 into the draft ‘esolution. My delegation has somewhat similar mis< sivings about the wording, which again seems to us to io too far in authorizing action which could result in vorsening the present situation. Furthermore, there is he important point that the United Nations has entered nto a cease-fire agreement with the Katanga authoriies.2/ The existence of this cease-fire cannot be gnored or forgotten; nor, clearly, must the implelent for January, February and March 1961, document $/474}. 2/ Ibid, Supplement for July, August and September 1961, document /4940/Add.7, para, 6. 22. In spite of these misgivings about the amendments which will now be, if adopted, operative paragraphs 4 and 6 of the draft resolution, my delegationis prepared to vote in favour of the resolution as a whole, on the assumption that if is amended as proposed in document §/4989/Rev.1 and on the assumption that the amendments contained in document S/4991 are re= jected. We would do so in the knowledge that this resolution would entrust the Secretary-General with an extremely delicate task which will have to be carried out with great skill and wise judgement, both in its direction from the United Nations Headquarters in ‘New York and in its execution in the field. I must make it clear that the continued full support by the United Kingdom of the Congo operation must depend on the skill and wisdom and the conciliatory manner with which the United Nations carries out its mandate.

I think the Council is fortunate to have the Foreign Minister of the Congo (Leopoldville) participate in our debate, for the reason that, while we are endeavouring tofind solutions to the vexing problems of the Congo, we have the advantage of having him here to tell us what we ought to do in giving the desired relief to that troubled country. In his statements before the Council, the Foreign Minister of the Congo has certainly been very constructive, and the many things he has said have enlightened us to a great degree on the needs of the Congo. I believe that what he said has in some measure inspired some of the amendments which are before the Council today. I speak about the question of the re-training and re-or~ ganization of the Congolese troops. Indeed, there have been previous resolutions of the Security Counciland, I think, of the General Assembly, to the effect that it is imperative that the United Nations lend its assist~- ance and support to the re~organization and retaining of the Congolese troops. 24. Recent incidents in the Congo testify, [believe, to that need, and we would be abdicating, in my opinion, our obligations and our responsibilities if we denied to the Congo our help in remedying this great need. I heard it stated here at the last meetingthat it was not within the purview of the United Nations to undertake this task or, if it did undertake it, that it would be a lengthy operation. But I must point out that some Members of the United Nations have troops in the Congo. Does this mean that our troops must remain there indefinitely? Does it mean that the Congolese troops will never be reorganized, that they will never be re-trained, and for that reason we must bear with the situation and have our troops remain in the Congo indefinitely ? Not at all. We could hasten the withdrawal of our own troops from the Congo by assisting that country in the reorganization and re-training of its troops and in the development of its armed forces so as to enable it toundertakethe tasks which confront it. 25. I therefore believe that it is cur clear duty, the duty of every member of this Council, to assist the Katanga. I believe also that we are irrevocably opposed to secession taking place in any other part of the Congo. Several of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly have expressed this general principle against secession, because we have insisted upon the territorial integrity and the national unity of the Republic of the Congo. And what is wrong with any resolution or any amendment which restates this general principle and yet, at the same time, pin-points the secession which is taking place in Katanga? 27. I think it is our clear duty to re-affirm these resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council expressing our opposition to secession as well as laying our finger onthe secession whichtakes place in Katanga; and that is reflected inthe amendments as well as in our draft resolution. 28, The third consideration is the question of nego~ tiation and conciliation. The Charter of the United Nations itself insists upon negotiation and conciliation, When it was brought to the attention of my delegation that Mr. Tshombé was seeking conciliation or negotiation with the Central Government of the Congo and that he was doing that within the context of the recage nition of Katanga as a sovereign and independent State, I thought it was necessary that that information be brought to the attention of the members of the Council; and therefore we requested the Secretary=General, in whose possession that document then was, to make that information available to the Council. 29. We certainly cannot support any form of nego» tiation or conciliation within the context of the recog= nition of Katanga as a separate and independent State, and therefore in the amendments submitted by the United States we note a clause which rejects out of hand any claim of Katanga to being a sovereign and independent State. Certainly, if the Secretary-General were given the authority or were requested to negotiate or to seek conciliation tothe end of unifying the Congo, no one would expect that the Secretary-General, inhis own wisdom and with his integrity, would undertake such negotiation or conciliation with Mr. Tshombé in the recognition of Katanga as a separate and indepen~ dent State. I think that the unanimity which accompanied the appointment of U Thant as Acting Secre= tary~General is a clear demonstration of our willing= ness to assist him to do an effective job in that post. I certainly believe that he, in carrying out those duties, will retain not only his own integrity but the integrity of the United Nations as well, andcertainthere should be no fears, no apprehensions or arxieties that if the Secretary-General were called upon to negotiate or conciliate for the unity or territorial integrity of the Congo, he would do sotothe disadvantage of the United Nations. 30. I have made these remarks in an effort to appeal to members of the Council to assist the Congo to solve its problems. I do not think it is enough for us to make brave and courageous statemer; are in the Security Council and then be unwillin, .o demonstrate our desires, as expressed, to relieve that situation. We have a saying in Liberia~the motto of the True Whig at his feet: that as a result of this, the chaos in the Congo was increased. 31. I would therefore appeal to those members of the Council who are against these amendments, who are against our draft resolution, to reconsider their position, because these things are taking place in Africa, and if the cold war is introduced into Africa, it wili be disastrous for us. There is something I want to say which is close to my heart: the peoples of Africa have just begun to breathe freely, and we praythat you will let them breathe in peace.

Mr. President, I take the liberty of speaking only on the asumption that there is no one else who wants to speak, in view of your inquiry a moment ago. 83. I must say that in view of the Soviet threat of a veto at the last minute this morning and the strong statements of the Foreign Minister of the Congo which we have heard this afternoon, I am wondering if we should not adjourn before voting in order to see if something can be worked out which wouldbe acceptable to all, which would constitute a positive service to the Congo, to the Secretary~General and to the United Nations. After ten days of meetings here paralysis and no action whatever would be 4 positive dis-service to the Congo. In spite of the present discouraging impasse, I do not personally despair of doing something to save the situation and toadvancethe interests of the international community in peace, in order and in progress in the Congo.

Dees anyone else wish to speak? If not, i should like, speak= ing as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SO- CIALIST REPUBLICS, to say a few words in connexion with the last remark made by the representative of the United States. 35. I do not think that the United States representative had any justification at all for insinuating that we do not want to take any positive decision and that we are in some way threatening the Security Council or the Government of the Congo. There is absolutely no justification at all for thisfor,fromthevery beginning of the discussion of the question of the Congo in the Security Council, everyone has seen that the Soviet delegation has made every effort to find an acceptable solution and to ensure that that solution satisfied the basic requirements put forward both by the Government of the Congo and by the African-Asian countries which breught this matter before the Security Council. 36. The proposal which was submitted by the representatives of the three African-Asian members of the Council at once received the full support of the Soviet 37. Who, then, is obstructing the adoption of a positive decision? Certainly not we. We are ready to vote on that resolution immediately. Let us take a vote. If you are in favour of a positive decision, there is one for you, designed for a specific purpose—to eliminate foreign intervention in the affairs of Katanga—and giving adequate powers to the Acting Secretary- General to enable him to carry out those tasks in conformity with the Security Council resolutions, 38. Why, then, do you object to that? Why do you need additional decisions? Why are you introducing additional amendments? It is because you want to extend both the powers and the tasks which you wish to entrust to the Acting Secretary-General. You want to distract the attention of the Council and the Organiza=- tion as a whole from the main issue on our agenda which we have been discussing in some detail. 39. We did not hurry the Council. We listened at~ tentively and carefully to what was said here. For a long time we made no objection to the postponements of the Council's meetings because we wanted to pre~ pare a draft resolution which would be acceptable to the majority of Council members. 40. Why, then, did you say just now that we are obstructing the adoption of a positive solution? Because that positive solution does not suit you. I would go even further and say that itisnot so much you zs your allies that it does not suit. But everything does not necessarily have to suit both you and your allies. The important thing is that this decision should suit the Congo and that it should be appropriate for the main task which is at this particular time before the United Nations for consideration—the main task this Organization must now cope with in view of the specific situation in Katanga. 41. Furthermore, we are ready to adopt many of the amendments you have submitted, We agreed to the amendment to operative paragraph 8, although we do not regard that amendment as necessary. We com= promised on it because we realized that you consider it necessary to broaden somewhat your conception of the tasks at present facing the Acting Secretary- General. We welcomed that correction and did not object to it although we did not consider it necessary to introduce that amendment to operative paragraph 8. We accepted everything we could in order to achieve an acceptable and necessary solution within the frame=- work of the main task. 42. However, you want more than that. You want a Council resolution which would be a tool for implementing a policy completely unrelated to the specific task now facing the Congo in view ofthe present situation. Yet the situation is ciear: we are dealing with 43. We have not made any threats. We have found it possible to accept some amendments, even some which in our opinion were unnecessary, in the interests of achieving an agreement. But we cannot, of course, agree to amendments which would side-track the Council and provide a platform for carrying out a policy diametrically opposed te the basic solution of the problem under consideration by the Council. Here no amount of persuasion will avail. We take a definite position on this question and we will not depart from it. We are acting in the interests of the Congolese people and in the interests of the United Nations, and we think that the experience acquired over the past sixteen months confirms that our position has been justified by events. 44, But you, by the position you have taken, are contributing to an ever-increasing crisis in the Congo. Eight months have already passed since the Security Council adopted its resolution of 21 February 1961. You yourselves and the whole world can confirm that during that time the Soviet Union has not interfered in any way whatever in the affairs of the Congo. As the United States Press has said, the Soviet Unionhas been watching events, 45. But what have you been doing in those eight months? You had your machinery there—an entirely Western machinery. Yon had United Nations troops. You had your own leaders in charge ofthat machinery, you had the United Nations Command, acting under your instructions. And what did you achieve? The collapse of the operations, the murder of Hammarskjold and a new crisis in the Congo and in Katanga. Those are the actual facts. They are inescapable. Did the Soviet Union intefere with you there? Not at all. It was the incorrect policy of the colonialists which led to the new crisis in Katanga, just as we forecast a year ago. Unless the colonialists are completely expelled from the Congo, there will be nopeace there, and this expulsion can only be brought about by decisive action, Katanga above all, which is what is proposed in this resolution. 46. You do not want decisive action. You want, on the one hand, to convey that you are opposedto colonialist activities in Katanga, but on the other hand you want to extend the front of those activities to the whole of the Congo. 47. We say that if you wishto co-operate with us and, with our support, really to put an end to colonialist intervention in the Congo and in Katanga—if, above all, you wish to put an end to colonial domination in the Congo—we will support this resolution with you, even with those amendments which we are willing to accept. If you want something other than that, we will not support such a resolution and will not support your policy. That is our position and it is quite clear. 48, Ido not think Ineed give any further explanations, Either the United States and the other Western Powers will take the course of genuinely strengthening the 49, That is all that I have to add, To sum up, itis not we but you who are preventing the adoption of a position decision, If you are ready to take a decision, let us vote immediately. As President Iam ready to put the resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic to the vote immediately. EF you do not press some of your amendments, we shall adopt the resolution unanimously, If you do press them, we shall vote against some of your amendments, We shall accept some of them and we shall obtain the largest possible majority of the votes. 50, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): I had hoped to avoid a further intervention, Mr. President, but in view of your last statement I am obliged to say something further. 51, Everyone in this room who has expressed himself, and that includes the representative of the Congo, has approved this resolutic - as amended, except the Soviet Union. Yet you say thet it is not you but we who are obstructing the Council's action. What you are saying is that we are all obligedto accept your version of what should be done, including the Congo itself, or you won't play. 52. I regret this very much because I do not admire dictatorship in any form but I regret it more because of its effect onthe Congoto whichthe United States has contributed a great deal of money and a great deal of help through the United Nations and will contribute more, even as others who are here have contributed blood and treasure. I noticed your boast that the Soviet Union had contributed nothing. It is not helpful to use this occasion as just another exercise in rhetorical anti-colonialism. This is an emergency, a crisis in the affairs of the Congo that demands prompt attention by means of the resolution, as amended, that ali have approved who have spoken before you. 53. Accept it, I beg you, andlet Mr. Bomboko go hack to the Congo and that unhappy country start a new chapter with a new mandate for our new Secretary- General. If you cannot, I must then press my motion for adjournment under rule 33 of the provisional rules region of the Congo" being deleted. That is what the Soviet Union's amendment will consist of. All the rest has already been included in the revised text of the United States amendments. 55. Now if there are no other observations Ishall cali for a vote, since a motion that we should proceed to a vote has been made by the representative of the United States.

I moved a vote to adjourn under rule 33—the last paragraph—of the provisional rules of procedure. 57, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): As I understand the representative of the United States, he has moved the adjournment of the meeting, In that case we must obviously decide when we are going to resume our work. There is a proposal that we meet tonight at 8.30 inorder to continue and finish our work.

So far as I know, it is not necessary to fix the time of the next meeting. It can be fixed by call of the President at any time that accommodates the interests of the members, As far as meeting this evening is concerned, I would be very happy to meet—but, of course, we would not possibly be in agreement on anything. I would therefore suggest that the President put to the vote the motion for adjournment sine diein other words, without having the date fixed at this time—and, when we have something that we hope willbe agreeable to all concerned, the President included, it will be possible to call a meeting, which Ihope can take place very soon,

I note the suggestion that we adjourn until 8.30 this evening. In my opinion, a meeting at 8.30 would serve no useful purpose. The reason for adjourning would be to endeavour toarrive at some understanding or some harmony among the members of the Security Councii so that we might be able to get a resolution adopted by this body. 1 would propose that we adjourn now, to meet again on Friday 24 November, at 3 p.m., and tothat end I invoke paragraph 3 of rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure.

A proposal has been made in accordance with rule 33, paragraph 3 of the provisional rules of procedure, to hold our next meeting on Friday. Are there any remarks concerning that proposal? One, which is made under paragraph 2, was introduced by the representative of the United States of America, and the other, under paragraph 8, was introduced by the representative of Liberia. Rule 33 says: "The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting: tt "2. To adjourn the meeting;*" (thatis, without mentioning a date); "3, To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour." 63, My delegation assumes that under rule 33, the motion of the representative of the United States takes priority, not only because it was introduced first but because it is made under paragraph 2, and that the motion of the representative of Liberia would be considered only if the United States motion were rejected. 64, I do not know whether this is the right interpretation of rule 33, and I request clarification on that point.

Before giving an explanation to the representative of Ecuador I should like tofind outfromthe United States representative whether he wishes to press his motion under rule 33, paragraph 2, I call on the representative of the United States of America,

I think the interpretation of the representative of Ecuador is entirely correct. However, I gladly accept the proposal of the representative of Liberia for Friday afternoon, and I hope very much that we can all celebrate Thanksgiving here by agreement, even if it is a day late,

I understand from the statement of the United States representative that he is not pressing his motion under rule 33, paragraph 2, but is supporting the Liberian representative's motion under rule 33, paragraph 3; I shall accordingly invite discussion of the matter, since motions under paragraph 3 may be debated. 68. Does anyone wish to comment on the Liberian proposal that we should adjourn our meeting to Friday for further discussion of the item? 69. If no one wishes to speak on this matter I shail say a few words in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, 70. The proposal made by the United States representative showed that he is in no hurry to reacha decision on the question of the Congo, although his earlier remarks indicated that he was impatient for a decision to be taken and he said something to the effect that someone was obstructing the adoption of a decision, Yet when it came to the point of taking a decision he preferred to adjourn the meeting without even setting a date for the next one. 72. Accordingly, to postpone the adoption of a decision for such a long period—until Friday—seems to us unjustified and not conducive to a solution of the problem. I very much regret that the Liberian representative should have taken this step towards the postponement of a decision. Naturally, I understand his reasons for doing so. He is seeking a concerted decision. I fear, however, that his good intentions may aggravate the situation rather than improve it. I therefore hope that the representatives in the Security Council will realize that no postponement will contribute to a solution of the problem if the position of certain countries is aimed not at the actual adoption of decisions in the interests of driving the colonialists out of the Congo but at the maintenance of the deplorable status quo. If that is the goal which members of the Council seek, then of course no positive decision can be taken. The good of the Congo will in no way be served by a deferment of the Council's decision, We should like to be able to hope that the representatives of countries taking part in the work of the Council will adopt another course, that they will again ponder the draft resolution which has already been submitted and consider the possibility of adopting an agreed resolution providing for really effective measures to bring about a prompt and far-reaching solution of the problem of driving the colonialist forces out of Katanga, whichis the basis for the settlement of the Congo problem as a whole. That can be done either tomorrow or today. However, if the majority of the members ofthe Council consider that the decision can be postponed, the Soviet Union, of course, as a member of the Council, cannot take a different decision for the Council as a whole, but we regret the postponement. We should prefer to decide this question today for we consider that sucha decision could be taken today. If, however, the other members of the Council consider it possible to defer sucha decision, then we shall have to take that fact into account. 73. There appear to be no further speakers on this matter. Therefore, after I have made a further brief statement as PRESIDENT and if there are no objections, I shall adjourn our meeting, and hold our next meeting on Friday, as has been suggested. It was so decided, Statement by the President 74, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian}: Before adjourning the meeting I should like to draw attention to a letter which has just been circutated to the members of the Council in document S/4992 of 21 November, entitled *Letter dated 21 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the President of the Security Council", In it the representative of Cuba, acting on the express instructions of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, requests that the Security Council should be convened immediately to discuss the question of the threat of aggression by the United States against the Dominican Republic. 75. I should therefore like to consult the members of the Council to ascertain whether we might meet tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

Tam informed by the Secretariat that the French text will be ready in a few minutes. As far as Iam aware, however, the representative of France knows English well enough to understand that the question raised by the representative of Cuba is urgent, for I read out in Russian that Cuba requests an immediate meeting of the Security Council and that was interpreted into French for him. Iam not suggesting that the Council should be convened at once; I propose that it should meet tomorrow morning. Within half an hour at most the French text will be ready and I think that we can agree now on the convening of the Council. All the documentation will have been circulated to all members of the Council within half an hour. The English text is already available to all members of the Council, as is the Spanish. If there are no objections, perhaps we can agree to meet at 10.30 tomorrow morning,

Like my French colleague, I find myself in some embarrasse ment about this. Although, as you say, the text is available in English, I do need time to consider the document which has been put in front of us, to consult my Government and to gather information. I would suggest to you, Mr. President, that it would be more convenient perhaps if we were to consult through the usual channels privately before deciding when we could meet to consider this letter, 79, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Are there any further remarks? If there are noother proposals, I will convene the Council at3p.m. tomorrow. It was so decided. The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m. AFRICA/AFRIQUE BELGIUM/BELGIQUE: ET MESSAGERIES 14-22, rue du Persil, CZECHOSLOVAKIA/TCHECOSLOVAQUIE: CESKOSLOVENSKY CAMEROUN: LISRAIRIE OU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Gérante, B. P. 1197, Yaoundé. ETHIOPIA/ETHIOPIE: INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY, P. O. Box 120, Addis Ababa. Ndrodni Trida 9, Praha DENMARK/DANEMARK: EJNAR MUNKSGAARD, Ngrregade 6, Kébenhavn, GHANA: UNIVERSITY BOOKSHOP University College of Ghana, Legon, Accra. MOROCCQ/MAROC: CENTRE DE DIFFUSION DOCUMENTAIRE DU B.E.P.L., 8, rue Michaux-Bellaire, Rabat. FINLAND/FINLANDE: AKATEEMINEN KIRJAKAU 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki. FRANCE: EDITIONS 13, rue Soufflot, Paris SOUTH AFRICA/AFRIQUE DU SUD: VAN SCHAIK’S BOOK STORE (PTY.), LTD, Church Street, Box 724, Pretoria. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/ REPUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE: LIBRAIRIE “LA RENAISSANCE D’EGYPTE” 9 Sh, Adly Pasha, Cairo. GERMANY (FEDERAL ALLEMAGNE (REPUBLIQUE R. EISENSCHMIDT Schwanthaler Str. ELWERT UND MEURER Hauptstrasse 101, ALEXANDER HORN Spiegeigasse 9, Wiesbaden. W. E. SAARBACH Gertrudenstrasse GREECE/GRECE: LIBRAIRIE KAUFFMANN 28, rue du Stade, ICELAND/ISLANDE: BOKAVERZLUN SIGFUSAR EYMUNDSSONAR Austurstraeti 18, Reykjavik. IRELAND/IRLANDE: Dublin. ITALY/ITALIE: LIBRERIA COMMISSIONARIA Via Gino Capponi 26, & Via O, A. Azuni 15/A, LUXEMBOURG: LIBRAIRIE SCHUMMER Place du Thé&tre, NETHERLANDS/PAYS-BAS: N.Y. MARTINUS Lange Voorhout 9, NORWAY /NORVEGE: JOHAN GRUNDT Karl Johansgate, 41, PORTUGAL: LIVRARIA 186 Rua Aurea, Lisboa, SPAIN/ESPAGNE: LIBRERIA BOSCH 11 Ronda Universidad, LIBRERIA MUNDLPRENSA Castell 37, Madrid. SWEDEN/SUEDE: KUNGL, HOVBOKHANDEL Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm, SWITZERLAND/SUISSE: LIBRAIRIE PAYOT, Lausanne, Genave. HANS RAUNHARDT Kirchgasse 17, Ziirich TWRKEY/TURQUIE: LIBRAIRIE HACHETTE 469 Istiklal Caddesi, UNION OF SOVIET UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES: MEZHDUNARODNAYA KNYIGA, Smolenskaya UNITED KINGDOM/ROYAUME-UN}: H. M. STATIONERY P.O. Box 569, London, {and HMSO branches Sristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, YUGOSLAVIA/YOUGOSLAVIE: CANKARJEVA ZALOZBA Ljublana, Slovenia. PRZAVNO PREDUZECE dJugoslovenska Knjiga, Beograd. PROSVJETA 5, Trg Bratstva i Jedinstva, PROSVETA PUBLISHING Import-Export Division, Terazye 16/1, Beograd. ASIA/ASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE: CURATOR, GOVT, BOOK DEPOT, Rangoon. CAMBODIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMERE DE LIBRAIRIE Imprimerie & Papeterie, $. aR. L., Phnom-Penh. CEYLON/CEYLAN: LAKE HOUSE BOOKSHOP Assoc. Newspapers of Ceylon, P, 0. Box 244, Colombo. CHINA/GHINE: THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTD. 99 Chung King Road, lst Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD. 211 Honan Road, Shanghai. HONG KONG/HONG-KONG: THE SWINDON BOOK COMPANY 25 Nathan Road, Kowloon, INDIA/INDE: ORIENT LONGMANS Bombay, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Madras & New Delhi, OXFORD BOOK & STATIONERY COMPANY Caleutta & New Delhi. P, VARADACHARY & COMPANY Madras, INDONESIA/INDONESIE: PEMBANGUNAN, LTD. Gunung Sahari 84, Djakarta. 4JAPAN/JAPON: MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD, 6 Tori-Nichome, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. a ff KOREA (REP. OF)/COREE (REP. DE): EUL-YOO PUBLISHING CO., LTD. §, 2-KA, Changno, Seoul. PAKISTAN: THE PAKISTAN CO-OPERATIVE BOOK SOCIETY Dacca, East Pakistan. PUBLISHERS UNITED, LTO, Lahore. THOMAS & THOMAS Karachi. PHILIPPINES: ALEMAR'S BOOK STORE 769 Rizal Avenue, Manila. SINGAPORE/SINGAPOUR: THE CITY BOOK STORE, LTO., Collyer Quay. THAILAND/THAILANDE: PRAMUAN MIT, LTD. 55 Chakrawat Road, Wat Tuk, Bangkok. VIET-NAM (REP. OF/REP. DU): LIBRAIRIE-PAPETERIE XUAN THU 185, rue Tu-do, B. P. 283, Saigon. EUROPE AUSTRIA/AUTRICHE: GEROLD & COMPANY Graben 31, Wien, 1. B. WULLERSTORFF Markus Sittikusstrasse 10, Salzburg. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agencies have not yet been or to Sales Section, United Nations, Les commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays ot il n’existe ONU,” «York (E.-U.), ou a la Section des Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.35; 2/6 stg.; (or equivalent in other