S/PV.9820 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Ukraine to participate in this meeting. The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor on a point of order.

We wish to state for the record our principled disagreement with the United States presidency’s proposal to invite Ukraine to participate in this meeting, as well as, under rule 39, the representatives of the European Union and of the non-governmental organization (NGO) Conflict Armament Research. This month, the United States presidency — from the very first week until today — has shattered every grim record when it comes to violating the established practices of the work of the Security Council, transforming Council meetings into a politicized act of buffoonery. We are under the strong impression that our United States colleagues have forgotten that the Security Council is not a Democratic Party convention. In this Chamber, there is a need to comply with the established rules in order to bolster the authority of the Security Council and to ensure the effectiveness of its work. Each day for three weeks in the Security Council, we have observed a number of individuals invited under rule 39. Their competence is, to put it mildly, dubious, and they are blatantly advancing, in front of the camera, Washington’s political playbook. Moreover, we learn about these individuals only on the eve of the meetings, which prevents any discussion about the relevance of their invitation. That is disrespect for the Security Council, its rules and procedure and a complete waste of our time and attention. We already heard Mr. Jonah Leff back in June (see S/PV.9676) when he tried to convince the Council of the North Korean origin of the missiles in his pictures. Conflict Armament Research, the organization he represents, is funded by NATO and the European Union. Can we expect, therefore, any independent or impartial assessments from him? Of course not. It is quite clear whose political orders that particular NGO is following. The methodology of its work is highly primitive. Experts only examine what is proposed by the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Their conclusions are based solely on data from Ukrainian laboratories and low-quality satellite images. When assessing the missile debris, they put forward patently conspiratorial versions — for example, indicating the year of manufacturing according to the North Korean calendar. Such materials are of no value when it comes to a serious discussion. Provide that data to CNN or the BBC. They will appreciate it and happily broadcast them. Do not, however, bring it to the Security Council. As for Ukraine and the European Union, it is clear that these participants have nothing to do with the agenda item “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. They have nothing to do with this regional issue, and they will provide no meaningful contribution to the discussion. It is also clear that the only goal of their presence at the Security Council is to politicize it and echo the baseless allegations advanced by Western members of the Council, which are at the level of cheap press reports. All of that undermines the authority of the Council, as well as trust and confidence in its resolutions and decisions.

I support the briefing by the Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research. Mr. Leff already gave a presentation at the meeting on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in June (see S/PV.9676), during the presidency of the Republic of Korea. At that time, most of us found his presentation informative and relevant. I also support the participation of the representatives of the European Union and Ukraine, given that North Korean ballistic missiles, which potentially are a means for delivering nuclear weapons, are being launched on a European battlefield, and given that the agenda for this meeting is “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.

Regarding the briefer from Conflict Armament Research, he participated in the Security Council meeting in June and provided very meaningful information (see S/PV.9676) with details of global non-proliferation issues, including the provision of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia, along with evidence-based arguments about the expansion of North Korea’s military involvement. Where the participation of the representatives of the European Union and Ukraine is concerned, the expansion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military involvement is no longer a regional issue but a global concern that also directly affects the situation in Ukraine. And of course we are all aware that North Korea participated under rule 37 in the recent Security Council meeting on Ukraine last month (see S/PV.9796). We understand that North Korea itself does not deny its engagement in the situation in Ukraine. Japan therefore does not consider the participation of those parties to be an issue — in fact we consider it desirable. Japan supports the list of speakers proposed by the presidency.

Clearly, it is important that the Security Council has the best possible evidence to inform its deliberations, but since Russia vetoed the Panel of Experts of the Committee pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (see S/PV.9591), we have been forced to look elsewhere for credible civil society organizations to fill that gap. The Conflict Armament Research group has a strong record of evidence-based independent reporting, which we believe the Council should hear from. As to the presence of the European Union (EU) and Ukraine, as our colleagues from Japan and the Republic of Korea have said, there has been substantive evidence of munitions and missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea being used in Ukraine. We now believe that troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have engaged in direct combat with Ukrainian forces. Ukraine therefore has an evident reason to participate in this meeting and so does the EU, given that this is clearly an issue of European security.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I have been asked to brief the Security Council today on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s adherence to the non-proliferation regime and on its military engagements. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been actively working towards acquiring new military capabilities, in line with the five-year military development plan that it unveiled in January 2021. In 2024, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), four intermediate-range ballistic missiles and multiple short-range ballistic missiles. It also attempted to launch a military reconnaissance satellite. The intermediate-range launches were associated with the testing of what the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea notes to be “hypersonic manoeuvrable controlled warheads” and multiple warhead missiles. In addition, there are indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to actively pursue its nuclear programme. In September the State media of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reported on an inspection of a uranium enrichment base by the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That appears to corroborate earlier reports about the existence of a second, yet-to-be-declared uranium enrichment plant in Kangson, in addition to the uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon. Furthermore, on 20 November, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that the Agency had observed that the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon was not operating between mid-August and mid-October. According to IAEA experts, that gap would have provided sufficient time to refuel the reactor and start its seventh operational cycle. In November this year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also openly displayed its weapon delivery systems during an exhibition in Pyongyang. The authorities showcased the most recent solid-fuel Hwasong-19 ICBM, which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched for the first time on 31 October. The missile set new records for the longest flight and highest altitude reached by any Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ICBM launch. The Hwasong-19 and other weapon systems in the exhibition are produced in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. Their open display demonstrates that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is far from slowing down its ballistic-missile programme. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes undermines the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. As we approach 2025, the final year of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s current five-year military plan, we reiterate our calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fully comply with its international obligations. International attention has also recently focused on the reported increase in military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. According to media reports, since 2023 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has transferred to the Russian Federation more than 13,000 containers of ammunition, missiles and artillery. The artillery includes 170mm self-propelled guns and 240mm multiple rocket systems. Russian forces have also reportedly used short-range ballistic missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to strike Ukraine. Furthermore, and again based on media reports, more than 10,000 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea troops have been sent to the Russian Federation since October, where they have received training and equipment. According to United States and Ukrainian officials, they are now deployed in Russia’s Kursk region, fighting alongside Russian forces. While the United Nations is not in a position to verify those claims, they are a cause for concern, as noted by the Secretary-General in a statement on 3 November. On 18 November, in remarks I delivered on his behalf in the Council (see S/PV.9788), the Secretary-General stressed that the reported deployment of thousands of troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the conflict zone, and their involvement in the fighting, adds fuel to the fire, further escalating and internationalizing an explosive conflict. We reiterate our call on all relevant actors to refrain from any steps that may lead to spillover and intensification of the war in Ukraine. While the Security Council did not renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts that supported the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions regime and the Committee remain in place. I would like to reiterate that international engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guided by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), as well as resolutions 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017). In line with those resolutions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should cease the export of all arms and related materiel and all Member States should prohibit the procurement by their nationals of such arms and related materiel from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. I recall that relevant Security Council resolutions are legally binding on all United Nations Member States. As the Secretary-General has stated, any relationship that a country has with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must entirely abide by the relevant Security Council sanctions. We remain deeply concerned about the growing tensions on the Korean peninsula, which have increasingly global ramifications. It is imperative that the Council act decisively to uphold the non-proliferation regime and international norms. The situation on the Korean Peninsula — a key peace and security issue — must be an area for cooperation. The Secretary- General has consistently called for de-escalation and the urgent resumption of talks. Diplomatic engagement remains the only pathway to sustainable peace and the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In that respect, we welcome the willingness and offers to engage in dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea without preconditions. We also recall the Security Council’s commitment expressed in resolution 2397 (2017) to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation on the Korean peninsula. The Council must also remain attentive to the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We reiterate the call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to expedite the return of the United Nations country team and on the international community to strengthen support for its people and advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Leff. Mr. Leff: I would like to begin by thanking the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations for giving me the opportunity to brief the Security Council today, and I congratulate the United States on its accomplishments during its presidency. My organization, Conflict Armament Research, documents and traces weapons and their components used in conflicts around the world with the aim of assisting States in countering diversion and proliferation. When I last briefed the Council in June, I presented findings that my organization had generated in January and February (see S/PV.9676) after examining the remnants of a missile recovered in Ukraine. In January 2024, a Conflict Armament Research field investigation team physically documented the remains of a ballistic missile that struck Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, on 2 January 2024. Conflict Armament Research documented the missile’s rocket motor, its tail section and almost 300 internal components manufactured by 26 companies from eight countries and territories. Based on several unique features observed during the documentation, we determined that the missile was of the Hwasong-11 series manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2023. In the days following that initial documentation, our teams inspected three further identical Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles that struck Kyiv and Zaporizhzhya. Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea prohibit United Nations Member States from procuring arms or related material from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and prohibit the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from exporting such material. Our reporting on the matter was the first public analysis of such weapons launched outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in the war in Ukraine. Conflict Armament Research has reached the conclusion that the missiles were manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based on the missile’s unique characteristics. The evidence that my organization observed and thoroughly documented at first hand irrefutably establishes that the missiles fired on Ukraine were indeed of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea origin. The Panel of Experts assisting the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, whose mandate has since not been renewed by the Security Council, subsequently confirmed Conflict Armament Research’s findings. Two months after my briefing to the Council in June, our team in Ukraine documented additional remnants of four missiles that we also attributed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Those were recovered in July and August. On one of those missiles, Conflict Armament Research documented marks indicating missile production in 2024. That is the first public evidence of missiles having been produced in North Korea and then used in Ukraine within a matter of months, not years. Conflict Armament Research’s most recent field documentation and analysis highlight three key observations. First, it confirms the continued use of freshly manufactured North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Secondly, the discovery of a 2024 production mark on one of the missiles reveals a very short period between the production of those ballistic missiles, their transfer and their eventual use in Ukraine. Thirdly, the presence among missile remnants of recently produced non-domestic components — some bearing 2023 production marks — illustrates North Korea’s robust acquisition network for its ballistic missile programme, despite United Nations sanctions prohibiting the transfer of that material for military purpose. Indeed, none of those components were manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That highlights the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s reliance on foreign-manufactured components to sustain its domestic missile programme. While formal tracing with the industry is ongoing, Conflict Armament Research has in one case identified a company incorporated in an East Asian country as the last known custodian of microprocessors that were documented by Conflict Armament Research in three separate Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles this year. Conflict Armament Research has also documented 200 non-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea drones and missiles that have been used against Ukraine, consisting of thousands of components. Of those components, the vast majority also bear the brands of companies based in Europe, Japan or the United States. Through Conflict Armament Research’s collaborative approach with the industry, we have ascertained that the components found in the remnants of weapon systems used against Ukraine derive from supplies provided by third-party distributors, mostly based in East Asia. Although the semiconductor industry is complex and layered in nature, Conflict Armament Research’s boots-on-the-ground approach, which is characterized by field documentation, collaborative tracing with industry, triangulation and targeted trade mapping, allows for the effective identification of entities of concern, including repeat cases of acquisition. That information is crucial to Member States and industry. The proliferation and use of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles leads to the further erosion of global non-proliferation regimes. Specifically, any exports of ballistic missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea carried out following the introduction of United Nations embargoes on the country in 2006 represent violations of the sanctions regime. Security Council resolutions also forbid the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from developing its ballistic missile programme, meaning that individuals and entities involved in the facilitation and transfer of key components and materials may also have committed sanctions violations. Despite nearly two decades of sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it has demonstrated this year its ability to produce and supply ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine within just a matter of months. Conflict Armament Research’s global field investigation teams will continue to document the weapon systems used in the conflict in Ukraine and will endeavour to highlight any developments as they occur, including the continued use of weapons manufactured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

I thank Mr. Leff for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

At the outset, I would like to thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo for her presentation to the Council, as well as Mr. Leff for his briefing. For many months, it has been clear that North Korea is complicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine through its provision of massive military support to the Russian war effort. In addition to supplying large quantities of munitions and artillery systems, it has been shown that North Korean ballistic missiles are being used to strike Ukraine, as in Kharkiv in January and again in July and August. France condemns the transfer and use of those weapons, which constitute serious violations of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council with the support of Russia itself. That poses a direct threat to the security of Europeans and to international security. North Korean support for Russian aggression has reached a new stage with the deployment of North Korean soldiers in Russia and their involvement alongside the Russian armed forces. France condemns in the strongest possible terms the direct involvement of those troops, which represents an unacceptable escalation and a dangerous extension of the conflict. It is clear that the increase in North Korean military support reflects the difficulties encountered by Russia, which is seeking by all means to continue its war of aggression, with the deleterious consequences that we are all aware of for the international community as a whole. The increase in illicit military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is also a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime, one of the fundamental pillars of our collective security. In return for the military support it receives, Russia has become a provider of impunity and assistance to North Korea’s illegal weapons of mass destruction programmes. Last March, Russia alone vetoed the renewal of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), thereby depriving all Member States of an essential source of information on the implementation of the Council’s resolutions. Last September, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs went one step farther by describing the denuclearization of North Korea as a closed issue. Those remarks constitute an unacceptable challenge to the objective, established by the Council’s resolutions, of the complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons programmes. When its missiles are used to strike civilian populations and infrastructure in Ukraine, North Korea gathers information on their performance, which it can use to develop its ballistic programme. Those missiles could be used in the future in other theatres and as delivery systems for nuclear weapons. We can only worry about the other quid pro quos that Pyongyang could demand, in terms of military and technological assistance for its weapons of mass destruction programmes, for its complicity in this war of aggression. It is Russia’s responsibility to respect its obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council. Therefore, we once again call on Russia to put an end to its war of aggression. We urge Russia and North Korea to comply with their international obligations, including the resolutions of the Council. We urge North Korea to return to dialogue, with a view to complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization. Finally, we reaffirm our determination to support Ukraine as it defends its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I thank you, Madam President, for convening this critical meeting, which was requested by seven Council members, including Japan. I also thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, for their briefings. As we just heard from the briefers, there is enough evidence for the existence and expansion of military cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Their unlawful military cooperation, including direct support by North Korea for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, marks a dangerous expansion of the conflict, with serious consequences for European and Indo-Pacific security. Russia is continually attacking Ukraine using weapons supplied by North Korea, violating the relevant Security Council resolutions. The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia and their engagement in combat against Ukraine constitutes a clear violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We, as a responsible Security Council member, cannot just sit still and watch this situation unfold, as the relevance of the Security Council, which has been cultivated over eight decades, is undermined. The members of the Security Council are the ones who, above all, should take the lead in adhering to the Council’s resolutions, but Russia behaves in the opposite manner. No excuse can justify that fact. The Panel of Experts, established in 2009, was regrettably forced to cease operating, owing to the veto by Russia in April (see S/PV.9591). The Panel had been a treasure trove of information over the past 15 years. No reasonable person would doubt that it was Russia’s clear intention to veil its unlawful military cooperation with North Korea. We now stand at a crossroads. Do we take action and raise our voices to maintain the international order based on the rule of law, guided by the Charter, or do we remain silent in the face of this unprecedented threat to the values and the order of the United Nations system and the relevance of the Council? Japan, particularly as an elected member of the Security Council over the past two years, has been taking action to defend the values of the United Nations and will continue to do so for all time to come. Consisting of only 15 Member States, the Security Council is responsible for addressing challenges to global peace and security on behalf of all 193 States Members of the United Nations, and that role should never be cast aside in the name of a single country’s national interest. The threat of North Korean military activities goes beyond the region and now extends around the entire world. North Korea continues to conduct provocations, including an intercontinental ballistic-missile-class missile launch at the end of October. The missile had the highest and longest-length trajectory of any missile that North Korea has launched to date, with an estimated range capability of 15,000 km, covering three fourths of the globe, not to mention that recent nuclear developments, including the release of images of a uranium enrichment facility for the first time in September, are also of grave concern. Those reckless nuclear and ballistic missiles developments by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea jeopardize the global non-proliferation regime. In that connection, there is a big question about what North Korea has gained or will gain in return for its military support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Any support or benefit to North Korea related to its development of nuclear and ballistic missiles is a menace to the global non-proliferation regime. I would like to conclude my remarks by recalling that the advancement of the nuclear and missile activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an imminent threat to the entire globe. I call on all States Members of the United Nations to uphold the non-proliferation regime, the very foundation of the peace and security of the international community. Today’s agenda item, “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, clearly describes the reason we are here to have this discussion at this critical moment. Japan is committed to addressing this global challenge, not just as a member of the Security Council, but also as a responsible adherent to the United Nations, anchored by the Charter.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo and Mr. Leff for their comprehensive yet worrisome briefings. We joined the call for this meeting because we are deeply concerned about the growing military cooperation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the Russian Federation, including in support of its aggression against Ukraine. As we have stated multiple times, the transfer of arms, as well as ammunition and related materials, to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions and of the sanctions regime of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). Over the past two years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to advance its unlawful programme on weapons of mass destruction, including through a record number of ballistic missile launches. Throughout that time, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea enjoyed external support for its ever-evolving architecture of sanctions evasion, and the Council has not been able to speak with one voice to condemn it. Multiple reports show that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea transferred ballistic missiles and ammunition to the Russian Federation in support of that country’s war in Ukraine. We strongly condemn such actions. They are a blatant violation of the sanctions regime, gravely undermine the Charter of the United Nations and contribute to prolonging the suffering of the Ukrainian people. We also reiterate our disappointment about the termination of the 1718 Panel of Experts. The Panel’s reports represented a crucial source of information on implementation of the sanctions. Its absence greatly facilitates violations, with the results that we are witnessing today. We are equally concerned about the fact that the regime continues to prioritize its unlawful weapons of mass destruction programme and military engagements over the needs of its people. Despite the fact that an estimated 40 per cent-plus of the population are in need of direct assistance, the regime continues to deny access to United Nations and international humanitarian actors. The threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is no longer a regional one. Its advanced missile capabilities, and its active involvement in and support for Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, have detrimental consequences for European security as well. That is unacceptable, and the Council should send a clear and unified message to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Sanctions remain in place, and it is imperative that all Member States implement them fully. In that connection, we encourage the 1718 Committee to continue to engage actively with the wider membership and the relevant international organizations to ensure a constant flow of information. Years of inaction on the part of the Council, combined with external support, have emboldened the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We deeply regret that during Malta’s term on the Council, that threat to international peace and security has continued to grow rather than being addressed, as the Council’s mandate would dictate. As we prepare to conclude our term on the Council, we will continue to engage on this file towards the ultimate goal of lasting peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. To that end, we urge all members to set aside their differences and address the situation collectively.

I thank you, Madam President, for convening this important meeting. I would also like to express my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Mr. Leff, Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, for their briefings. As the year comes to an end, I want to take this opportunity to recap the significant developments that we have witnessed in North Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction programme in 2024 and how it has continued to threaten international peace and security. First, North Korea’s redefinition of inter-Korean relations, announced early this year, marks the culmination of its nuclear policy. For a couple of years leading up to 2024, North Korea had been taking unprecedented steps to develop tactical nuclear weapons, diversify delivery vehicles and lower the nuclear threshold. In addition to launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such as Hwasong-19, in late October, Pyongyang test-fired various types of short- range ballistic and cruise missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads. In 2022 North Korea also adopted a nuclear policy law that significantly lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and in 2023 it incorporated that policy into its Constitution. Then came the final piece of the puzzle, when at the beginning of this year Kim Jong Un announced a policy shift on inter-Korean relations. By scrapping the seven-decade-long policy of unification and redefining the Republic of Korea as a hostile foreign State, the North Korean leader eliminated the final psychological barrier to justifying a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the Republic of Korea. As a follow-up, in October North Korea took the substantial military step of completely cutting off road and rail links to the South. Secondly, this year saw a marked and qualitative shift in the military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. Besides providing a huge amount of ammunition, ballistic missiles and artillery to Russia, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, North Korea dispatched more than 11,000 troops, thereby joining Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine as a belligerent party. North Korean soldiers are already engaged in combat operations, with some reportedly having been killed in action on the battlefield. That illegal military cooperation goes far beyond anything we could have imagined. When the war first broke out, we never expected that North Korean troops would be fighting on the European battlefield or that Russia would rely on North Korea’s military to such an extent. What is all the more worrisome is that no one knows how far that military cooperation will go or where it might end. As the situation unfolds, they might move the goalposts as they see fit. Through their recently ratified comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, Russia and North Korea have formalized their illicit military cooperation. In addition to gaining first-hand experience in modern warfare and economic benefits from Russia, Pyongyang could acquire advanced military technology, material and equipment for its nuclear and missile programmes. We believe that Russia has provided North Korea with air defence missile systems. Furthermore, Russia is accepting North Korean workers, who represent one of the few revenue sources for cash-strapped Pyongyang. It is deeply troubling that local authorities in Russia are openly speaking out about hiring North Korean workers to fill labour shortages, which would be a clear violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. In our assessment, 4,000 North Korean workers have been sent to Russia this year alone, and North Korea could use regular passenger rail service, which resumed earlier this week, or other means to dispatch more workers to Russia. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Minister’s description of North Korea’s denuclearization as a closed issue could seriously undermine the global non-proliferation regime. If Russia abandons its long- held position on the denuclearization of North Korea, it will erode the very foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime. Such an outcome is in no one’s interests, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, including China and, eventually, Russia. This year is indeed an inflection point. Going forward, however, we must expect further uncertainties looming on the horizon. North Korea has a history of provocative actions during United States presidential transitions, designed to grab attention, raise the stakes and set the stage for direct negotiations with a new Administration. That pattern could recur in the next few months. This time, it could be another ICBM, a military satellite launch or even its seventh nuclear test. As members of the Security Council, we should stand united in addressing North Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction programme and remain prepared to deal with any possible provocations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We bear a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and upholding the global non-proliferation regime, underpinned by the NPT. We must therefore ensure that all the relevant Security Council resolutions will be fully implemented by all Member States.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Mr. Leff for their valuable contributions. My country is deeply concerned about the expanding military engagements of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, especially its military cooperation with Russia, which represents an escalation of Russia’s illegal war on Ukraine. First, evidence of arms transfers cropped up. Millions of artillery shells and numerous missiles were reportedly transferred to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine. Secondly, evidence has now emerged of the presence of troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Europe. What is more, the latest reports indicate that they are now actively involved in the war. Those developments represent blatant violations of Security Council resolutions and seriously imply that Russia is willing to undermine the Council and the United Nations to achieve short-term military advantages. At the same time, the North Korean leadership is profiting immensely from this rekindled cooperation. With no consideration for international law, the Charter of the United Nations or Security Council resolutions, there are indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is acquiring new armaments and military technology from Russia. In addition to that comes a deeply troubling statement by Russia’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Lavrov, who has said publicly that Russia views the notion of denuclearizing North Korea as a closed matter. Slovenia is deeply concerned about the possibility that as a consequence of those developments, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leadership will be able to further sustain its illegal ballistic, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programmes to the detriment of its own civilian population. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea no longer represents only a regional challenge but is destabilizing two parts of the world at the same time. It is high time for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to cease its provocative activities and return to dialogue and diplomacy. At the same time, Russia must discontinue its illegal support for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We need to employ all diplomatic means to bring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea back to the negotiating table. There is no legitimate alternative to dialogue and diplomacy, and we will need a lot of both to comprehensively address the imperative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s denuclearization.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Mr. Leff for their briefings. Over the past year, we have seen the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea providing increasing support for Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine, through the supply of munitions, ballistic missiles and now manpower, with the deployment of more than 10,000 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea troops to Russia. The Council should be deeply concerned that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea troops are now engaging in direct combat operations against Ukraine, involving themselves directly in the largest war in Europe in a generation, a war that the General Assembly has repeatedly described as a violation of international law. While Russia’s growing reliance on third-country support comes as no surprise given its weakened state and its desperate efforts to steal more Ukrainian territory, that is a grave error on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We call on Pyongyang to withdraw its forces from the theatre of combat and encourage all countries with influence in Pyongyang to use it accordingly. It should by now be crystal clear to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that its support of Russia’s illegal war in war in Europe is not in its interests. It must cease that support immediately and return to meaningful engagement with the international community. The deepening military cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has significant implications for security and stability in Europe, the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. We should all be worried about a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with improved military technology and an enhanced capacity to export weapons. Recent reports that Russia intends to transfer MiG-29 and Su- 27 fighter aircraft to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea further expose Russia’s willingness to raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula and undermine regional stability in the Indo-Pacific — all in service of its war against Ukraine. And Foreign Minister Lavrov’s declaration that the notion of denuclearizing North Korea is a “closed issue” is a reckless departure from the agreed principle of complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament and undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call on Russia — a Non-Proliferation Treaty depository State — to align its words and actions with its stated commitment to global nuclear non-proliferation principles. We will continue to impose costs on Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for that dangerous expansion of the war. If Putin was truly interested in peace, he could end this war today by ceasing his deployment of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea troops on the front line and ending his country’s aggression against Ukraine.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo and Mr. Leff for their briefings. I also acknowledge the presence of the representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ukraine and the European Union at this meeting. Guyana reiterates its condemnation of all ballistic missile launches in 2024 by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to adhere scrupulously to its obligations under those resolutions, abandon its nuclear weapons programme, as well as its ballistic missile programme, and destroy all other existing weapons of mass destruction. We also encourage all Member States to comply with and implement the relevant Council resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In that regard, we stress that any military engagements with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should fully align with international law and with those resolutions. The Security Council, through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), maintains its mandate of overseeing the implementation of the measures outlined in Council resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, despite the expiration of the mandate of the Committee’s Panel of Experts. We recall that the fulfilment of the objectives of the Security Council resolutions is critical to reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, through a peaceful and comprehensive solution. To that end, we will continue to support alternative options within the Council that seek to address the gaps in reporting and monitoring the sanctions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We stress that a continuous flow of information on the implementation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions regime remains critical to the work of the Committee in the execution of its mandate. In addition, Guyana believes that dialogue and diplomacy remain critical to resolving the tensions on the Peninsula. In that regard, we again urge all concerned parties to resume dialogue so that progress can be achieved in de-escalating tensions. In conclusion, Guyana reaffirms its commitment to the Council’s efforts to bring about full compliance with its resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including through the 1718 (2006) Committee. We also reaffirm our commitment to the advancement of the global non-proliferation and disarmament agenda and call on States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We further reiterate our support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which we believe is one of the key aspirations towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and ensuring international peace and security.

The current global security environment continues to deteriorate, with geopolitical tensions reaching unprecedented levels, while the situation on the Korean Peninsula is becoming more sensitive and complex and its future path is unstable and uncertain. Against that backdrop, the international community should work together to promote the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. First, greater weight must be given to maintaining stability and preventing chaos. Maintaining peace and stability and preventing war and chaos on the Korean Peninsula serve the common interests of all parties and are in line with the common expectation of the international community. Therefore, they are the greatest common denominators among the positions and proposals of the parties. Under the current situation, all parties should remain calm and exercise restraint, and should refrain from any words or deeds that might intensify conflicts and tension in order to prevent the situation from further deteriorating or any unexpected events from developing. Secondly, an atmosphere conducive to dialogue must be established. History and past practice have repeatedly shown that as long as all parties are willing to engage in dialogue and make compromises, the situation on the Peninsula can be eased and progress can be made in the political settlement of the Peninsula issue. The relevant parties should be rational and pragmatic, resume contact as soon as possible to build mutual trust and restart dialogue, and work together to break the current deadlock. One particular country should abandon the false belief in sanctions and pressure and take tangible steps to truly demonstrate goodwill and sincerity for dialogue. Thirdly, a fundamental solution must be sought. The Korean Peninsula issue, as a vestige of the cold war, is rooted in the long-standing failure to achieve a transition from the armistice to a peace mechanism and the severe lack of trust between the parties, especially between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. To resolve the Korean Peninsula issue in a fundamental way and achieve long-lasting peace and stability in the region, both the symptoms and root causes should be addressed and comprehensive measures should be adopted. A vision of common security should be promoted and the reasonable security concerns of the countries of the region should be kept in mind in order to advance a transformation from the armistice to a peace mechanism. To that end, the dual-track approach and the principle of phased and synchronized steps proposed by China are effective ways to promote a political settlement and achieve long-term peace and stability on the Peninsula. Fourthly, the cold war mentality must be abandoned. Although the Korean war ended more than 70 years ago, the shadow of the cold war lingers on the Peninsula and has become ever more prominent. A particular country is obsessed with the cold war mentality and zero-sum game, constantly manipulates the situation on the Peninsula and takes every opportunity to promote its Indo-Pacific strategy and strengthen regional military alliances. In particular, it has increased military force and strategic asset deployment on the Peninsula and in surrounding areas, seriously undermining the security interests of the countries of the region, including China. That country should stop making the mistake of using the Peninsula issue to promote its geopolitical strategy and provoke bloc confrontations. Otherwise, it will be difficult to achieve smooth progress in the political settlement of the Peninsula issue. China has noted that some members have mentioned the relationship between the current situation of European security and the Peninsula situation in their statements. It needs to be emphasized that the issue of Ukraine and the Peninsula issue are completely different in origin and nature. Linking the two will only make both issues more complicated and difficult to resolve. Using concerns about security and its interconnected implications in Europe and Asia and the Pacific as a pretext to push NATO to act outside its borders and extend its power in order to become involved in Asia and the Pacific will only further intensify regional antagonism and exacerbate confrontation. China firmly opposes that approach. In conclusion, I wish to point out that the priority and position of the Security Council, in its handling of the Peninsula issue, should be to promote a political settlement process rather than use unilateral pressure, much less political showmanship. All resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea adopted by the Security Council should be implemented completely, accurately and in a balanced manner. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has always diligently implemented the resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and fulfilled its international obligations. At the same time, as a close neighbour of the Peninsula and a responsible major country, China has been playing a constructive role in its own way by promoting the early resumption of dialogue and maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula, and achieving long-term peace and stability in North-East Asia. We call on all parties concerned to join hands with China to continue efforts to that end.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing. We listened carefully to the representative of civil society. At the outset, Algeria reaffirms its commitment to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to the implementation of Security Council resolutions. We believe that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) remains the most appropriate and relevant forum for discussing matters related to implementing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions regime. The Committee’s mandate and technical expertise make it best suited to handle those issues in a calm and objective manner. We emphasize the importance of maintaining the Committee’s ability to fulfil its technical functions effectively. In that context, we appreciate the Committee’s continued efforts to process humanitarian exemptions and facilitate the provision of essential assistance to the civilian population. With regard to the various concerns expressed, Algeria maintains that such matters should be addressed through established technical channels within the 1718 Committee framework. That approach ensures the proper assessment of information while avoiding any undue politicization. Algeria continues to advocate for a more comprehensive diplomatic approach that addresses the underlying causes of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. We believe that sanctions, while part of the Council’s toolkit, should be implemented alongside meaningful diplomatic initiatives aimed at building confidence and promoting dialogue. In that regard, we support the development of a gradual road map that could include reciprocal measures to encourage concrete steps towards denuclearization. Experience has shown that an all-or- nothing approach is unlikely to yield sustainable results. On the other hand, we remain concerned about the impact of sanctions on the civilian population, and we call for continued attention to be paid to humanitarian considerations. The Committee’s exemption mechanism plays a vital role in that regard, and we encourage its efficient implementation. Looking ahead, and in order to achieve sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula, Algeria calls on all parties to engage constructively within the framework of relevant Security Council resolutions. We would like to stress the importance of the following measures: adherence to the technical assessment of sanctions implementation, enhanced humanitarian support for the civilian population, step-by-step confidence-building measures and sustained diplomatic engagement to address the security concerns of all parties. In conclusion, we encourage all stakeholders to work towards reducing tensions and creating conditions conducive to meaningful dialogue. Our shared objective remains to establish lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means.

We thank Under- Secretary-General Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo for her important briefing. We take note of the contribution of Mr. Jonah Leff. At the outset, Sierra Leone reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the principles of disarmament, non-proliferation and international peace and security, and calls for concerted and concrete efforts to combat proliferation efforts worldwide. We reiterate the provision of the Charter of the United Nations that states that all members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s advancement of its nuclear and ballistic missile programme is a cause for concern and requires the highest level of attention. We reiterate our call for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to respect and fully comply with its obligations under the numerous Security Council resolutions that prohibit its continuous and alarming nuclear and ballistic weapons programme. In that regard, it is crucial for the Security Council to strengthen and increase its efforts to address the growing concern of nuclear expansion in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which further heightens tensions on the Peninsula and undermines ongoing efforts for a sustainable and long-lasting solution to this very serious issue in the region. We also reiterate our call for the strong support and implementation by Member States of the Security Council resolutions that outline the sanctions obligations to deter further escalation and advancement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. Such efforts will give credence to the Council’s authority and to global non-proliferation action. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s humanitarian crisis and economic constraint is highly complex and intricate. It is therefore important that due focus be extended to addressing the underlying humanitarian and human rights issues in the country. In that connection, we call for increased diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to negotiations to end its nuclear programmes unconditionally and irreversibly. We also call on it to engage bilaterally and multilaterally to unequivocally commit to transparent, complete, verifiable, irreversible and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. In addition, we reiterate our call for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force, noting its valuable contribution to halting the further modernization and increasing vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament. We conclude by echoing our previous call for the need for a holistic and comprehensive assessment of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, drawing on the global efforts for non-proliferation in order to promote international peace and security.

My delegation would like to thank Under- Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing. We also listened carefully to the briefing from the representative of civil society. Ecuador would like to express its deep concern about the repeated actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which are flagrantly violating Security Council resolutions, undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime and exacerbating regional and global tensions. Its constant ballistic-missile tests and continued development of nuclear weapons constitute direct threats to international stability and the global non-proliferation architecture. Added to that are the recent reports of shipments of weapons and munitions and the mobilization of North Korean troops to Russia’s front lines in Ukraine, which are alarming and dangerous actions. The lack of consistency and absence of a united message from the Security Council in the light of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s defiant behaviour are damaging its credibility. The Council’s silence is sending an ambiguous message to Pyongyang. In the past the Security Council was able to send a unanimous, clear message with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s violations, but today I must deeply deplore the deadlock in the Council’s deliberations. As long as these differences continue to stand in the way of an effective collective response, the threats to international peace and security will grow. The wider membership of the United Nations requires the Council to send a message regarding the importance of respect for and compliance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security Council. We must remember that the Charter gives us the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. That principle should guide our decisions over and above any other consideration. Unilateral actions that prioritize military power over dialogue and cooperation erode the pillars on which our Organization was built. In that regard, Ecuador calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately cease its provocative activities and to fully abide by its international obligations under the Charter. Since this is the last time that my country will have the opportunity to address this issue, as our two-year term on the Council is ending, we once again urge the members with the greatest influence on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to renew their commitment to searching for a solution based on dialogue and avoiding unnecessary escalations that could have disastrous consequences. Diplomacy must prevail.

We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We listened to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo with astonishment. It was a very peculiar briefing from a senior official of the United Nations, based on press statements that the United Nations cannot verify. Why is she presenting that information here in the Chamber? Those listening to her did not take in her last sentence, and they will accept her retailing of insinuations in the press as fact and as representing the views of the Organization. As a result, she is participating in stirring up a politicized narrative, in breach of her obligations under Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations. I have already spoken about the nature of Mr. Leff’s assessments, and I will not repeat myself, just as I will not repeat myself regarding the conclusions reached by members of the now defunct Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) who visited Kyiv, none of whom was a ballistics expert. In the past few years, at the initiative of the United States, the Security Council has held a large number of meetings about the situation on the Korean Peninsula, under duplicitous pretexts. They have been routinely convened each time the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has taken due measures to enhance its own national security in response to military provocation from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. The meetings had two main objectives — on the one hand, pinning full responsibility on Pyongyang for the deteriorating situation on the Peninsula, and on the other, portraying themselves as the principal regional peacekeepers. However, things are not so simple, in fact quite the contrary. The situation is deliberately being turned on its head, as if it were not the United States and its allies who are expanding their military presence in the Asia-Pacific region as fast as possible, systematically destroying the prospects for the establishment of a collective security architecture there that is not based on blocs. It is as though it was not Pyongyang’s adversaries who in the past few months were carrying out large-scale military exercises entitled Freedom Shield, Freedom Flag and Freedom Edge, with joint nuclear planning. What exactly is this freedom they are talking about? Those provocative acts have been compounded by the hundreds of units of air assets, ground troops, navy personnel and special-purpose units massing at the borders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We should remind the Council that those exercises include rehearsals of scenarios of hypothetical armed conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and the physical elimination of the North Korean leadership. As we all know, those policies violate the Security Council’s resolutions on resolving the Korean situation, which stipulate that problems on the Korean Peninsula should be settled exclusively through peaceful, diplomatic and political means and through dialogue. That is explicitly set out in the very resolutions that members of the Council are always referring to. As far as cooperation between Russia and Pyongyang is concerned, we have repeatedly outlined our position. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is our close neighbour and partner, with which we are developing relations in all areas, as is our sovereign right. Russia’s cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the military and other arenas is in accordance with international law and not a violation of it. It is not directed against any third countries and does not pose a threat to States in the region or the international community. And no one should have any doubt that we will continue to develop that cooperation. A comprehensive strategic partnership treaty was ratified between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 12 November. The document sets out core principles for the further development of Russian-Korean relations, focused on deepening partnerships and strategic cooperation on a broad range of priority areas for both States and forging a fair international system. The treaty is non-confrontational. It is defensive in nature and is aimed at maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. NATO members have always pointed out that, according to their rules, NATO is a defensive alliance, so why are they so anxious now, if we too are talking about joint defence? I wish to respond to the arguments made by the representative of the Republic of Korea. Before holding forth on the consequences of Pyongyang’s actions, he would be well-advised to first get to the bottom of what is happening in his country. And I am not referring to the internal political situation alone. Based on media leaks, in recent months Seoul has tried to deliberately trigger an acute escalation of tensions on the Peninsula. To that end, drones were sent to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in order to provoke a harsh reaction from Pyongyang. There is also information that the former Defence Minister of the Republic of Korea was planning to hit locations in North Korea where trash-filled balloons were being launched. If that is the case, then Seoul’s baseless claims about the alleged dangerous nature of cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea appear absurd and hypocritical. Before today, the alarmist requests for the convening of Security Council briefings on this issue seemed to be a routine fulfilment of political instructions, which, apparently, were intended to impress the domestic audience. In other words, after the escalation they themselves triggered, they attempted to demonstrate that they are allegedly monitoring the developments on the Peninsula and are trying to engage the Security Council to do something about it. All that is borne out by the exceptionally brief and concise statements made by those who convened today’s meeting and by their identical arguments. This entertaining meeting could have been made even shorter if they had designated only one person to speak on behalf of all seven countries that requested this meeting. That would not have added or taken away from their narratives. However, the choice of topic for today’s meeting is utterly preposterous. What right do the United States and its allies in the region have to lecture about expanding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military engagement, when it is precisely Washington that has consistently engaged in such policies throughout the world, with the most devastating consequences? Apart from being hypocritical, these accusations are nothing but an attempt to divert attention from the deadlock both inside Ukraine and on the line of contact, as well as to justify the participation of NATO military specialists in the conflict. The Franco-Anglo- Saxons openly talk about the hybrid war they are waging against Russia, with the aim of inflicting a strategic defeat on it. And as part of this proxy war, they are not only pumping the Kyiv regime with various types of weaponry, but also deploying their troops to Ukraine. Troops from Western armies are now fighting in the ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces — that is a fact. They are not volunteers, but officers, without whom it would be impossible for the Ukrainians to use not only Western long-range weapons, but also Ukrainian long-range combat means. Without their participation and without space reconnaissance data, which — as everyone understands — Kyiv cannot obtain on its own, and without specialists in flight-assignment programming, the Ukrainians would simply not be able to use missile-related equipment. It is thanks to Western military assistance that the Kyiv regime managed to pull off the incursion into Kursk in August, which, essentially, was an unprovoked attack on peaceful civilians in Russian cities. The Ukrainian armed forces ruthlessly shot civilians at point-blank range, abducted people and prevented their evacuation. We spoke about that in detail during the informal Arria Formula meeting held in October, with eyewitness testimony that attested to the fact that this reckless attack was carried out with the active involvement of foreign personnel. But the Western delegations in the Chamber prefer to brush that aside with hypocritical rhetoric about Ukraine’s right to self-defence and their willingness to provide as much support as is necessary to Ukraine. Today we heard references to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team for implementation of Security Council resolutions regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a mechanism that is presented as some sort of replacement for the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. However, we see it engaged solely in copying information verbatim from newspaper articles, just as Ms. DiCarlo did today, and has thus totally discredited itself. We wish to stress that this tool, established in circumvention of the Security Council, therefore has no legitimate international mandate. Its establishment directly contravenes the Charter of the United Nations by undermining the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of its sanctions measures. Consequently, any products developed within that format will be entirely illegitimate and — we have no doubt — will be nothing but fabrications and disinformation. I now turn back to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and note once again, in that regard, that the Security Council would be well advised to fundamentally reconsider approaches to end the dangerous deadlock rather than further escalate tensions. We have repeatedly stated where it would be possible to move towards normalization, but for that to happen, Western capitals need to fundamentally reshape their mindsets, which are stuck in a cold war mentality. The sooner Washington and its accomplices stop thinking in that obsolete way, the sooner the Security Council will manage to successfully improve the situation in the region.

We thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Mr. Jonah Leff of Conflict Armament Research for their briefings. We welcome the participation of representatives from Ukraine, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the European Union in our deliberations. The briefings just delivered are deeply disturbing and, if confirmed, would not only constitute violations of international law, but would represent a development that risks having serious consequences for European, Asian and global security. Three aspects seem particularly important to us in this connection. First, from a legal point of view, a deployment of armed troops by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, if proven, would add to the growing number of substantiated reports of illegal arms transfers to Russia. Any arms transaction with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea constitutes a violation of the Council’s sanctions. That includes the sale, purchase, import and export of weapons to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The use of KN-23 ballistic missiles and the impact of their use on the Ukrainian civilian population also raise questions about respect for international humanitarian law. Military cooperation, as described, would also be prohibited under resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2270 (2016). While resolution 2397 (2017) provided for the repatriation of all foreign workers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the presence of thousands of troops is irreconcilable with the letter, let alone the spirit, of that and other binding resolutions. One violation of international law thus feeds another: breaches of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea support Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. Switzerland deeply regrets that the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, failed due to a Russian veto (see S/PV.9591), even though the Panel was investigating allegations of illegal arms transfers between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia. Secondly, Switzerland condemns Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. It is appalling that, despite clear and repeated calls from the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice, Russia continues its military aggression. Sending armed forces from third countries to support it would run counter not only to these appeals, but also to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations itself. We call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and all third parties to refrain from any action likely to fuel Russian military aggression. And we once again call on Russia to cease hostilities immediately and withdraw its troops from all Ukrainian territory. Finally, with regard to the non-proliferation architecture carefully constructed over the past five decades, we call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take concrete steps to abandon its nuclear weapons, ballistic missile and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to abide by its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Switzerland calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return as soon as possible to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Russia, as the depositary State of the NPT, is called upon to strengthen the Treaty, not weaken it. It is the responsibility and duty of the Council to respond to the dual challenge of military aggression against Ukraine and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. With regard to Ukraine, Switzerland continues to support the search for a peaceful solution and remains ready to contribute to all efforts to promote peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of territorial integrity and independence. Nothing can justify the disastrous humanitarian, social, psychological and economic consequences of that military aggression. It harms everyone and benefits no one. We will also remain committed to a denuclearized and peaceful Korean Peninsula and encourage the use of the Secretary-General’s good offices for a return to dialogue, de-escalation and the search for diplomatic solutions. We encourage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to engage in constructive dialogue with the Security Council and the United Nations system.

Mozambique wishes to commend the presidency of the United States for convening this briefing. We thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Mr. Jonah Leff, Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, for their briefing and update on the subject under consideration. We acknowledge the presence of the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in this meeting. We also acknowledge the participation of the representative of Ukraine and the representative of the European Union in this meeting. We have several times expressed in this Chamber our deep concern about the persistence of weaponization throughout the world, which undermines global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is sensitive owing to its potential to further escalate tensions across the region. The situation poses risks, in particular with regard to the proliferation of weapons, which could fall into the hands of terrorist groups or unauthorized entities, thus endangering international peace and security. It is in that context that we continue advocating the exercise of moderation and restraint and the avoidance of unilateral actions or inflammatory language. The international community has a crucial role to play in promoting dialogue conducive to lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Our collective responsibility is of the utmost importance, since it may contribute to preventing and eradicating the threat posed by nuclear weapons. We call upon all importing and producing States to comply with their international obligations through effective dialogue and cooperation to ensure sustainable peace and stability in the region and in the world at large. Peace and security anywhere will be possible only through the enforcement of international measures and instruments. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant United Nations resolutions play a critical role in that regard. This is the best time for all of us to converge around the Secretary-General’s appeal in his Agenda for Disarmament. In conclusion, a world with less nuclear proliferation will always be a world with more peace and security. Otherwise, as long as the current trend towards competition and the nuclear race prevails, world peace and stability will face a permanent threat.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States of America. I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Mr. Leff for their briefings. In vetoing the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (see S/PV.9591), Russia sought to prevent crucial, objective investigations into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s violations of Security Council resolutions to shield the world from the truth about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s dangerous actions and Russia’s complicity in them. The loss of the Committee makes organizations such as Conflict Armament Research all the more critical. And the United States is grateful that its independent, well-regarded experts continue to provide clear and credible reporting on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related violations. Those reports show why Russia was so desperate to overturn the mandate’s renewal: Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are engaging in unlawful arms transfers and training, in brazen violation of numerous Council resolutions. Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2270 (2016) collectively prohibit United Nations Member States from receiving any arms, related materiel, arms training or assistance from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or providing them to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Those resolutions were adopted in response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. They are evidence of our sacred obligation to uphold international peace and security. Russia knows that. Russia voted for each and every one of those resolutions (see S/PV.5551, S/PV.6141 and S/PV.7638). And yet, Russia has violated them in both directions. We assess North Korea has now sent Russia more than 20,000 shipping containers of munitions to date, containing at least 6 million heavy artillery rounds, along with well over 100 ballistic missiles. The Centre for Armament Research’s independent findings corroborate what we have seen in press reporting and other open-source analysis. Those missiles have subsequently been launched into Ukraine, impacting near civilian infrastructure and populated areas such as Kyiv and Zaporizhzhya. And the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued preparations to transfer more missiles to Russia in late 2024. We also have information that a large number of 170-millimetre long- range self-propelled artillery pieces and 240-millimetre long-range multiple rocket launchers of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea origin are being introduced into the conflict. And now Russia turns to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for manpower and munitions in order to carry out its war of aggression against Ukraine, welcoming more than 11,000 troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea onto its soil. And that information is not from the press, it is from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. And these are not just any soldiers: North Korea sent elite special forces units to Russia. This marks the first time North Korean troops have participated in large-scale ground combat operations in more than 70 years and the first time they have done so outside the Korean Peninsula. And Russia is likely to use the deployment as a basis for future combined training exercises with the Korean People’s Army. This is not a one-way street. The more Russia relies on the support of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the more the latter extracts in return, exacerbating threats to peace and security not only in Europe, but across the globe. In recent months, Russia has provided training to the troops of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in artillery, uncrewed aerial vehicle systems and basic infantry operations, including trench-clearing, an indication that those troops are participating in front-line operations and directly engaging in hostilities against Ukraine. We also have information that Russia has transferred air defence systems to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Kremlin continues to provide free and subsidized refined petroleum to the Kim regime, above the United Nations-mandated 500,000-barrel cap, as well as to sell dual-use technology and equipment. What is more, we are particularly concerned about Moscow’s intent to share satellite and space technologies with Pyongyang, which the war in Ukraine has plainly demonstrated is crucial to an army’s communication and intelligence gathering capability on the modern battlefield. And Russia continues to shield the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from joint actions in the Council, obstructing the implementation of sanctions against the country, while attempting to escape reproach for its violations. Alarmingly, we assess that Russia may be close to accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, reversing Moscow’s decade-long commitment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. We believe that Moscow will become more reluctant to criticize Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons and will further obstruct the adoption of sanctions or resolutions condemning North Korea’s destabilizing behaviour, as we have already seen. Every single one of us must call out this recklessness. For far too long, China has provided political cover for Russia’s violations, emboldening the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to continue its ballistic missile launches, among other dangerous, provocative behaviour. That is not the behaviour of any responsible Member State, let alone two permanent members of the Council. Responsible Council members take seriously their duty to counter threats to international peace and security. Responsible Council members uphold resolutions that curb proliferation and demand recourse for human rights abuses. Responsible Council members have no reason to fear independent, objective experts. And responsible Council members do not enable tyrants for their own political gain. Just two years ago, I visited Ukraine. I saw up close the devastation and despair — a mother in Kyiv who had to hold her daughter’s lifeless hand after a Russian attack on her apartment building, a child who desperately wanted to return to school, and a humanitarian aid worker who was detained and tortured by Russian forces and was so traumatized that she could barely speak. I will never forget the horrors unleashed by Putin. But I will also never forget the resilience of the Ukrainian people. For years, they have defended their land, their freedom, their identity. And they have defended one another, too: taking in neighbours who lost their homes, risking their lives to feed those in need, nursing orphans back to health and showing the world that community is a form of resistance. Today, they face new threats, dangerous threats. No veto can deny that harsh reality. I know that the people of Ukraine will continue to stand up to oppression, to imperialism, to reckless proliferation. But all of us must stand up with them. The United States therefore calls on Russia once again to cease military cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to end this senseless war of aggression against Ukraine and immediately withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory within its internationally recognized borders. I also want to respond to China about engaging in dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We have said repeatedly that we are open to unconditional dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Each time we have reached out, it has responded with a clenched fist. And we would welcome further dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as I speak here today. Finally, we have to continue to work to meet our responsibilities as members of the Council to uphold the Charter of the United Nations, which we have all sworn to protect. The people of Ukraine demand this of us, they deserve it from us, they deserve a just and lasting peace. Therefore let us all do our part to help them realize that. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Originally, I had not planned to take the floor again. However, the President, in her capacity as the United States representative, repeatedly mentioned China. I therefore have no choice but to briefly reply. In her statement, the United States representative distorted and smeared China’s policy and position on the Korean Peninsula. This is completely unacceptable. As a responsible major country and a permanent member of the Security Council, we have always advocated for the peaceful settlement of disputes based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We have always promoted the political settlement of regional conflicts and tensions. Whether on the issue of Ukraine or that of the Peninsula, China has always spoken out for peace and made efforts towards dialogue and the maintenance of stability. We will continue to do so. At the same time, we hope that the United States will play a positive role for the final settlement of these issues.

I shall now make a further statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States. I am not going to respond directly because the issue at hand is whether China has been providing support for Russia’s efforts and protecting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We have seen that to be the case over and over in the Council. I therefore leave where I started in my statement. My statement, as I delivered it, stands. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

This year draws to a close as the most complicated and tragic year in modern history. However, even today we continue to witness a repetition of abnormal practices in the Security Council, where discussions of practical matters directly related to international peace and security are put aside while certain individual Member States unreasonably take issue with independent sovereign States for the sake of their narrow geopolitical interests. This meeting is yet another example of how the Security Council is neglecting its important duties assigned by the international community and is being abused as an instrument of the United States for political pressure and a propaganda platform for spreading sinister public opinion. I strongly denounce the United States and its following forces for convening this unlawful meeting, which is an attempt to turn black into white in pursuit of their selfish geopolitical interests, without any regard for the Charter of the United Nations or recognized international law. The United States and its allies are none other than the main culprits who have incited confrontation and discord among nations and fomented ceaseless massacres of civilians with irresponsible and illegal military interventions year-round throughout the planet. Since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the United States military aid to the Zelenskyy clique has far exceeded $60 billion. That fact alone demonstrates how much it has contributed to the destruction of peace and stability in the region and beyond. In particular, the outgoing United States Administration allowed Ukraine to strike Russia’s interior with United States- supplied long-range weapons, and some other Western countries followed suit, thus driving the Ukrainian crisis to a more dangerous phase and giving rise to concerns about an outbreak of a new world war. It is also the United States and its allies that have caused the present total chaos and disorder and the worst- ever humanitarian disaster since the Second World War in the Middle East. The reckless military acts of the United States that seriously undermine international peace and security are already overstepping their limits on the Korean Peninsula as well. The United States has deployed tens of thousands of troops and all kinds of high-tech military hardware on permanent standby for several decades on the Korean Peninsula and has staged aggressive, frantic war exercises annually, mobilizing its strategic nuclear assets. It recently elevated its alliance with the Republic of Korea to a nuke-based military bloc, thus the outbreak of a nuclear war in north-east Asia is no longer a possibility but a matter of time. While indulging in military interventions and war threats against sovereign States around the world, the United States has called for this meeting, talking about someone’s alleged military engagement. That is truly an example of the guilty party filing the suit first. Whatever pro-United States countries do, it is all legal and contributes to peace and security, but when anti-United States sovereign countries exercise their legitimate rights, it is all illegal and threatens peace and security. Such a brigandish argument is totally unacceptable and a typical example of double standards. When it comes to the normal development of cooperative relations between sovereign States, which fully conforms with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, that is not the kind of matter in which there can be any interference. The Korea-Russia relationship is based on the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, which came into effect in recent weeks. It promotes the welfare of the peoples of both countries and serves as a security mechanism for easing tension in the region and guaranteeing the strategic stability of the world. It will be a positive contribution to international peace and security and cannot by any means be a subject of criticism. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will never tolerate the arbitrary and high-handed practices of the United States and its following forces in their attempts to impose a hegemonic, unipolar system of domination. It will fulfil its responsibility to defend genuine international justice and safeguard global peace and stability.

I now give the floor to Mr. Lambrinidis. Mr. Lambrinidis: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Mr. Jonah Leff for their briefings. I will focus my intervention today on two main themes that are linked in an ever-more dangerous way today: first, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s continued violation of its non-proliferation obligations, and secondly, the increasing military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia, which constitutes a dangerous escalation and expansion of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with serious and direct security implications not just for Europe, but for the whole world. With regard to non-proliferation, the nuclear and missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pose an immediate security threat to all countries and to the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must comply immediately with its obligations under Security Council resolutions by abandoning all its nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile programmes and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and cease all related activities. Virtually everyone in this Chamber has said this today. All United Nations Member States, especially members of the Security Council, must ensure the full implementation of United Nations sanctions. We stress that those sanctions remain fully in place, despite the Russian veto that prevented the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) from continuing its work (see S/PV.9591) . We also reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take concrete steps towards that goal and to return to diplomacy. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will never be accepted as a nuclear-weapon State. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must return to compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, we urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without any preconditions or further delay. Turning to the issue of the expansion of military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia, including direct engagement in combat against Ukrainian armed forces, let me stress again the EU’s unequivocal and strong condemnation of such a significant escalation in Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The presence of thousands of troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cooperating with the Russian military constitutes a serious breach of international law, including the most fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and a flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. That is a hostile act by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which carries serious consequences for regional and global peace and security. Russia is knowingly spreading instability and escalation not just in Europe anymore, but also on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider Indo-Pacific region. But the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia have been deepening their military cooperation in other areas as well. There is clear evidence that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been providing arms to Russia, including artillery shells and ballistic missiles, which Russia has used against Ukraine. Any arms exports or imports involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. Russia itself, a permanent member of the Council, is directly accountable for those violations. We urge third countries to cease all assistance to Russia’s war of aggression. That includes not only direct military support but also the provision of dual-use goods and sensitive items that sustain Russia’s military industrial base. The interlinked character of these developments is increasingly evident and alarming. The European Union is particularly concerned about the potential for any transfer of advanced military capabilities or technologies by Russia to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In the light of this, Russia’s apparent shift of position on the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is highly suspect, dangerous and unacceptable. Russia abandoned its key obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including to prevent nuclear proliferation, and is violating multiple Security Council resolutions — adopted with Russia’s support, lest we forget. What is at stake is potentially monumental, in terms of its proportions and consequences for global international peace and security. The Council needs to intervene before it is too late.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine.

I thank Under-Secretary- General Rosemary DiCarlo, and Executive Director Leff for their briefings. The direct involvement of the troops of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is now a matter of fact. Starting from 14 December, at the latest, a great deal of evidence, including video footage captured by Ukrainian drones, confirm the participation of North Korean soldiers in assaults on Ukrainian positions. The Russian forces have integrated those units into joint formations, employing them in operations against Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region. As seen in the video footage, North Korean troops utilize specific tactics. They primarily advance in large numbers on foot across open terrain and in extended chains. That approach bears a striking resemblance to infantry tactics employed during the Second World War, but is highly unusual for the Russian-Ukrainian war. Another notable feature is their lack of awareness regarding such modern weaponry as uncrewed aerial vehicle systems. Available video evidence reveals that North Korean soldiers seem unprepared to respond to drone attacks and lack even a basic understanding of measures to counter drone-related threats. They have already suffered noticeable losses. As of 14 December, the estimated losses of units composed of Russian and North Korean personnel amounted to about 200 servicemen. Against that backdrop, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to supply weapons and ammunition to Russia. In particular, since December 2023, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has transferred over 20,000 containers of munitions and military equipment, as well as over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia, used by Moscow against Ukraine. The most recent case was registered last Friday, when Russia used a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missile in its massive strike against Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure. The delegation of Ukraine informed the Security Council of that strike at the meeting on Monday (see S/PV.9816). It should be stressed that, through these arms transfers, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are flagrantly violating the United Nations arms embargo on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea envisaged by multiple Security Council resolutions. Moreover, Russia’s training of troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also violates the same resolutions. I wish to reiterate that neither Russia or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be able to produce missiles at the current level if components manufactured by third countries were not available to Moscow and Pyongyang through various loopholes in sanctions regimes. Russia also uses the existing loopholes to provide its own military assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including sensitive technologies. There is no doubt that the components from third countries and military technologies from Russia, which likely include advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, are contributing significantly to the development of the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, including ICBMs, of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. There are about 7,000 kilometres from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Ukraine. I do not need to remind anyone of the range of ICBMs and what countries are within that range. This clearly illustrates that the issue of Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula are clearly not separate issues. The actions of Moscow and Pyongyang have caused them to become interconnected. The steps by Moscow and Pyongyang undermine international efforts aimed at achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In that regard, we commend recent decisions by our partners to strengthen sanctions against Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and call for further decisive measures on the matter. Due to Russia’s expansion of the war against Ukraine, security in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific are now directly linked. Putin wants to create more problems for the world in Asia. That is why the Russians are training North Korea in modern warfare. The actual involvement of North Korea in hostilities should be met with tangible pressure on both Moscow and Pyongyang for the sake of compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and punishment for escalation.