S/PV.990 Security Council

1 should like ta thank you sineerely, Mr. President, for the sympathy you have just ex- 2. pagnol]: naissance, léances l'occasion d'assister 1, pr~ssed on aceount of the sadeventwhiehforced me ta be absent from the last meeting ofthe Seeurity Couneil. 1\ 1 3. 1 also take this opportunity ta eonfirm the views put forward at that meeting by our alternate representative, Mr. Tulio Alvarado, who said that it is a great honour for Venezuela ta be seated in the Seeurity Couneil and that, in assuming this post, we are aware of our responsibility and will discharge it in that spirit of respect for the prineiples of the United Nations Charter whieh has alwa.ys governed our policies. 3. confirmer le Alvarado, pour et ponsabilités, sa la 1 1 ; Ji Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1 should like also briefly ta say a few words about my predeeessor in this Chair, Sir Patrick Dean of the United Kingdom. Happily, Sir Patrick is weU lmown to us aU, as are his skills as a 4. aussi Dean, au 5. Speaking personally, 1 have come ta value very much his friendship and his wise couusel. Therefore, on behali of the members of the Council, 1 should like ta express our appreciation ta him for the way in which he has guided our work during the past month, and he can now relinquish the Chair with the satisfaction of a job very weIl done. Itremains for us who will follow in this Chair ta live up ta the fine example he has given us, an obligation of which 1 am deeply sensible. 1 might conclude, Sir Patrick, by saying that the eagerness with whichyou relinquished this Chair is exceeded only hy the reluctance with which 1 accept it.

Ml'. President, mindful of the nat-olre of our last meeting in titis Council, perhaps 1 should reassure you that 1 am not speaking in arder ta answer a point of order. In fact, the only question of arder at issue ju~t now is that happy circumstance of the alphabet which places the United States in the Chair immediately following the United Kingdom. Your very kind reference ta my month's tenure of the President's Chair and myself were as kind as they were characteristic, and 1 thank you very warmly for them. May 1 in my turlJ. wish you a successful and untroubled tenure of your high vifice as President for the month. We are aIl confident that nnder your wise guidance the important work of this Council will prosper. 7. Ml'. President, you may think it a little hard that this work should be taken up sa promptly on the very first day of your Presidency. Ifitisany consolation ta you, may 1 remind you that at least the month of February has three fewer days than my month of January and if my e-xperience is anything ta go by, it is the last three days that count.

Thank you, Sir Patrick. Yonr confidence in me exceeds only my own-I should say, except for the choice of month in which to preside and also ta he barn. Adoption of the agenda The Indic.Pakistan question Letter dated 11 January 1962 from the Permonent Repre. sentotive of Pakistan to the President of the Security Counci! (S/5058); Letter dated 16 January 1962 from the Permanent Repre- sentative of India to the President of the SecurityCouncil (S/5060 and Corr.1); Ill, '1Ill, il Illi il 1: ri Il 10. sentant sans le ment d'objection, du At the invitation of the President. Mr. C. S. Jba (India). look a place at the Council table. prend Il. va Pakistan. sur du Pakistan la du 16 présente convocation constateront l'Inde ment Enfin, renouvelé 11. The PRE8IDENT: The Council will now proceed with its examination of the rndia-Pakistan question. In this regard 1 should like to draw the attention of the members to the pertinent documents pertainingtothis item. In a letter dated 11 January 1962 [8/5058], the representatîve of Pakistan outlined the position of the Government of Pakistan on the India-Pakistan ques- tion, and requested a meeting of the Security Council. ln a letter dated 16 January 1962 [S/5060], the repre- sentative of India put forward hls Government' s views on the Council's meeting on this question; members will note that on 31 January the representative of India a1so submitted a corrigendum to that document [Si 5060/Corr.1]. This applies only to the English and Russian texts. Finally, on 29 January the representa- tive of Pakistan renewed his request for a Security Couneil meeting [8/5068]. Il1 '1: 1i 1"' "il l" li 1, ! Il Il il li I:i '1 12. The first speaker inscribed in my list is the representative of Pakistan who will now proceed. 12. le

1 am very grateful ta the president and the members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity of placing before the Council the present situation with regard ta the dispute over the accession of the 8tate 'of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to India. It will be necessary, 1 fear. tosketchverybroadlythe factual situation behind the dispute; that i8 ta say the figures and history not of the dispute so much as of the terr~­ tory itself, before 1 place before the Council the situation which is causing acute apprehension to my Government and anxiety to the people of pakistan. 13. glais]: aux d'exposer différend et pensable, lignes différend; faire territoire situation gouvernement Il 14. The ward "Kashmir", which in the eighteenth century, and even in the nineteenth century, used to he spelled "Cashmere", is a familiarwordalmostaf:ound the globe, and caUs to mind a romantic land reputed for its art. In one ward 1might submit that in Kashmir there has been, at least from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of this century, a poignant contrast between the bounties of Providence and the miseries imposed upon man by man., 14. encore anglais, qui arts. milieu régné dons misêres '1 15. discussions de 15. The expression which is used constantly in the discussions before the Security Council is the "8tate of.Jammu and Kashmir". It is a composite 8tate made • 16. The aeute state of the miseries and tribulations of the people of Kashmir bagan early in the ;\!ear 1846, the year in which the British defeated the Sikh rulers of the punjab and took OVel' the administration of the Plmjab. This change from SikhruletoBritishruIe was embodied in the Treaty of Lahore of 9March 1846, and the handing over of Kashmir ta l\'Iaharajah Gulab Singh was effected through the TreatyofAmritsarwhiehwas signed a week later on 16 Mareh 1846. 17. It \Vas a p\I1'ely Hnancial transaction. It is needless to recall ta the members of the Couneil that the British at that Ume were represented in the subcontinent as agents of the EastIndia Company, and, though the operations of the East India Company had for a long time gone much beyond mere commerce, the payment of dividends was still one of the principal duties of the eli1'ectors of that company. COllsequently, there was a finaucial aspect of the Treaty also. Gulab Singh was asked to contribute a sum of7.5million rupees ta the expenses of the war that had just beeu concluded, and as the result of which the British occupied the Punjab. Blit they were ~nallak shahill rupees, as they were then caUeel; l have ascertained that the value of a "nallak shahill rupee today would be 15 cents, so that the total amount of the contribution was approximateq $1,100,000. In 1'eturn the British handed over to Maharajah Gulab Singh aIl the hill territory between the River Ravi andtbe River Indus. The word lIKaslunir" is not mentioned, and it ts curious that one of the documents already 1'eferred to by me in the earUer debates of the Council states that Gulab Singhstole the amount from the treasury of the defeated Sikh rulers of the Punjab. Nevertheless, as soon as he tüok possession of that territory a period of stark misery started for the people, so much so that within a year Lord Lawrence himself, then the Governor-G6neral of India and a party to the Treaty of Amritsar of 16 March 1846, had ta write quite a severe letter to the Maharajah calling to mind his duties as a ·rnler. And the Resident, as he used to be called, the agent of the Governor-General in the Punjab who conducted relations \Vith the fuelian States, was even severer in his 1et:ers and reminders to the Maharajah. This is Dot the occasion forme ta gointo details and to reeaU them aIl to the members of the Couneil. But facts like this are mentioned: lIMy dear friend, l understand thatyou have proceeded even t6 tax grass and other such articles in your territories. Il Anyway, those conditions continued more or less for 101 years. 18. During the nineteen thirties, quite au active movement for the assertion. of 'elemelltary human rights and for the obtaining of representative institutions started in the State, a movement with which everybody outside the State was in complete and enthusiastic sympathy. In the forefront of this movement , 19. Aiter these preliminary facts of history, 1 might spend a few minutes on the geographical juxtaposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir vis-~-visPakistan. AlI the three main rivers of Kashmir, the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus, flow directIy into Pakistan. Bath the main roads (one of which later branched into two) which before the partition ran from Kashmir into India, still run from the State into Pakistan, though one of them-the one out of Jammu-is not of much use 19. quelques de Pakistan. - ment (dont partage, relier - utilisée. now~ 20. The principal article of export which origlnated in the forests ofKashmirwas timber, whichcame down the two rivers, the chenab andthe Jhelum, into Pakistan, and came to the timber market at Wazirabad, Sialkot and Jhelum. Another principal item of income for Kashmir on account of its loveliness andthe boun- Ues to which 1have already referredwas tourist trade. The main tourist trade came from the areas which are today Pakistan. The principal port of export and import was Karachi. But much more than aIl this were the cultural affinities which bound and still bind the people of Kashmir ta the neighbouring province of Pakistan, so much so that throughout thousands of families have been divided between Kashmir andWest Pakist.m, with sorne members living in Kashmir and others in Pakistan. 20. forêts amené jusqu'au Sialkot recettes naturelles risme. constituent d'exportation plus affinités la Pakistan, réparties d'=!ntal, et :, l,l ·:; i 1l"lli 1H . 1 .! i Il ri li l' 1 .' 21. ment manifesta indépendance, maharadjah 21. .For aIl these reasons, when independence came there was an upsurge of longing among the people of Kashmir to participate in that full independence, to be rid of the rule of the Maharajah and to accede to Pakistan. 22. voyait niques Pakistan du et reste des résolu PActe niques l 22. The scheme of the Indian IndependenceAct.1947, was that while what was known as the BritiÈh pro- '·1" vinees would become independent-in·the shape of pakis- .•. tan and lndia, contiguous Muslim majority areas in the north-west and the north-east forming Pakistan, and ..·..1 ICOdntiguousimajOrity nhon-Mbuslim areas in the rest of .. n ia form ng India. T e pro lem ofthe PrincelyStates, as they were called, was resolved through the machinery, the foundation ofwhich was laid in section 7 of the Indian Independence Act; that is to say, Britaiu withdrew or renounced its suzerainty over the Princely States and left them free to accede either to India or to 23. In spite of this advice, it appeara that the Maharajah Hari 8ingh, whom Ihave already mentioned, had different designs. He did enter into a stand-still agreement with Pakistan in order that the matters which by treaty used to ba looked after by Britain should still he looked after, and that there should he no gap or interruption. This providadforsuchmatters as post and telegraph services, security and aIl the relationships that he had with Britain. Nevertheless he would not make up his mind with regard to accession one way or another. This caused deep anxiety among the people ofthe 8tate, particularly the Muslims, and a freedom mOVBment started at Poonch, that part of the 8tate which had been a feudatory of the Maharajah, the rulers being the senior line of Maharajah Gulab Singh. 24. As 1 have said, 1 shannot go into too much detail, suffice it to say that thismovementgatheredforce and the result was that the Maharajah in persontook command of his forces to put it down. He proceeded to do so ruthlessly and, according ta the account published by The Times of London of 10 Octoher 1947, 237,000 Muslims were exterminated. 25. Memhers of the Couneil will realize that this would cause great inflammatory uprisings in those areas and would also upset and perturb people in the neighbouring areas of Pakistan, when they rememher the close ties to which 1 have already a11uded. This feeling continued and spread over iuto the tribal areas, from which tribesmen poured iuto the Vale ofKashmir to assist this freedom movement. Maharajah Hari 8ingh was repudiated over the greater part ofthe 8tate and he laft Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and went to Jammu. He naturally was trying to obtain help to stem this tide of the freedom movement, because his own forces had proved iIiadequate, and he turned to India for military assistance. He was advised by Mr. V. P. Menon, then Political srecratary in the Government of India-the sarne name but, 1 believe, no conne~don with the Defence Minister of India-that he should offer accession to India, which he did. That accession was accepted by Lord Mountbatten. thenthe Governor-General-and 1 sha11 say sa ac1visedly just now but without going into further detail-on condition that the question of the accession of the State to Pakistan or ta India should he finally decided by the freely expressed wishes of the people. That is where this question of accession on the basis of the freely expressed wishes of the people originated. 26. As a side observation, 1 might submit thatduring recent years, it has been repeatedmore andmore that India will negotiate the settlement of this dispute only on the basis of its sovereignty over the whole of the 8tate of Jammu and Kashmir. Again 1 shallnot go into detail but shall only say that the very question of sovereignty can he decided only by the freelyexpressed wishes of the people. After aIl, that is what accession means. The question of accession can he decided only by the freely expressed wishes of the people of the 27. India's position over the accession appearS very clearly from the several statementG made before the 8ecurity Council. 1 shalI refer ta only one here. On 23 January 1948, Mr. Setalvad, representative oflndia on the Security Council, said: 27. tachement faites pellerai représentant primait "The Indian Government was careful, even though the request came from both,"-he means the Maharajah and the leader of the people, 8hÎ:'likhAbdullah- "ta stipulate that it was accepting the accession only on the condition· that later, when peace had been restored, the expression of the popular will should he ascertained in a proper manner. Tt was on that condition, and that condition alone, that the Indian Government accepted accession." li i; : ~, 28. As a matter of fact, even much earlier, in his telegrams to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India had said that very clearly. In his telegram of 27 Qctober 1947 he had said: 28. qu'il le sanS gramme "1 should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the -.yishes of the people, and we adhere to this view." ! li 29. In 'an.other telegram he was pleased to state that he gave this pledge not ouly ta the Government of Pakistan but also to the people of Kashmir and ta the world. That again is the basis of the whole effort of Pakistan: thatthose pledges shail he carried into effect. 29. de non mais le le soient "i: l! H i J,iili fi i' Ilii " ii ii li li li 30. rt is true-it needs not even to he pointed outthat these pledges, these declarations, these messages from one Government ta the other, said: when the trihesmen have withdrawn and law and arder have been re"Stored, the wishes of the people shalIhe ascertained through a free and impartial plebiscite. Those two , conditions also were inberent, and it is obvious that a plebiscite could be held only after the disturbances that were taking place had been quelled or got rid of, but those were the only two conditions. 30. que de les aura au deux il lieu dres; 31. On 1 January 1948 India hrought the matterto the Security Council, where it has been pendingduringthe last fourteen years. 1 will not again go into the history of what the Council did, the draft resolution that it first put forward and the resolution thatwas eventually passed on 21 April 1948.Y But suffice itto say that the Security Council set upthe UnitedNations Commission for India and Pakistan-composed of three members and later enlarged ta five-and instructed it ta study the matter and seek a settlement on the basis of a 31. de jour a résolution, 1948Y. a et de rechercher 11, 1 J 1;J, No 33. When the Commission arrived in Karachi, on the very first day that 1 had the honour to receive its members-as ·1 was then Foreign Minîster-I brought the whole situation tatheir notice in detail, with the aid of maps and dispositions and sa on. The Commission had referred ta this matter in its first interim report Y as a material change in the situation; in consequence the Commission several times made changes in its proposaIs for a resolution in arder ta meet India's objections arising out ofthepresenceofPakistan troops on the Azad Kashmir side, which subsequently was divided between· the two sides by the cease !ire on 1 January1949. 34. 1 have referred to this matter inasmuch as it will he found, later on in the discussions, that a good deal of reference is made to this fact in arder ta build up the charge that Pakistan is an aggressor in Azad Kashmir. This question of aggression, this question of troops on both sides, was, as 1 have said, discussed backward and forward during the sUmmer of 1948 between the Commission and the two Governments. Finally, the Commission proposedaresolutîon on 13 August 1948;'Y as itcou~Jnotbeaccepted at that stage, mainly by the Pakistan Government, the Commission elaborated part III of the resolution, which related to the holding of a plebiscite, andthat elaboration took the shape of a second resol~tion, supplementary to the first, knowti as the resolutîon of 5 January 1949. ~ Baththese resolutionswere aeeepted by bùth sides and became the international agreement between them, as they were reeorded also by the Seeurity CouDeil, with referenee to the settlement of the dispute. 35. In April 1949, the Commission cal1ed upon both sides to put forward a scheme ealled the "demilitarizatîon of the State", in order to carry out those parts of the resoluUons whieh related to the withdrawal of the Pakistan armed forces from the Azad Kashmir side of the eease fire line of 1 January 1949 and the bulk of the Indian army from the Indian-occupied side of Kashmir. But no progress could be made with that as no plan was agreed upon. And that is really where the y Ibid.. supplement for November 1948. document 5/1100. y Ibid.. document S/1I00. p. 32. §j Ibid.. Fourth Year. Supplement for January 1949, documentS/U96. p.23. 36. Again, a very briei observation: the representatives of India have said in the Security Couneil that pakistan i5 in default with regardta these resolutions, bath because it has augmented its forces in Azad Kashmir, and aIse because it has not appealed ta its people and the people under its control forthe creation of conditions which would enable the plebiscite to he held. Both these allegations were contested by Pakîstan. The United Nations representatîve was satisfîed ' that part 1 of the resolution had been împlemented. 36. sentants le parce Cachemire à sous à ont des de j 37. Another allegation is that part fi ofthe resolution of 13 August 1948 has also not been complîed with. With regard to certain clauses of this part, both the Commission and the United Nations representatîve have affîrmed that it has been complîed with. The tribesmen had withdrawn long ago, and other people who had entered the territory of the State from outside, on the Azad Kashmir side, had withdrawn. The only question now is to know when the withdrawal of the troops .is to begin. The Indian stand is that Pakistan was to hegin .the withdrawal and to withdraw its troops before India. was under any oblîgation to do tlte same. On the other hand, Pakistan considers-and it will be borne out by the explanations of the Commission and also the reports of the UnitedNations representative-that a truce plan has firsttobeagreed upon under section C of part n of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Once it is agreedupon, Pakistan is to begin the withdrawal, and then the withdrawal is to proceed in a synchronized manner until the whole of the Pakistan troops, on one side, and the bulk of the :rndian troops, on the other, bave beeu withdrawn. 37. de pectée. reprises présentant été puis venant ritoire question commencera que ses de sera et Unies mément résolution conclu, et et tanaises, de 1 1 Il Il Il, li!! 1 1 1 1 1 j 38. That, again, is a necessary part of the history. r have again not tried to apportion blame. 38. indispensable. chercher 1 j !] 39. The being the situation, suggestions have beeu made that the questions in dispute, beingmoreor less questions of fact-bar;> Pakistan done or not done what it was bound to do under· the resolutions?_might be settled by arbitration. -For instance, in February 1957, Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring, representative of Sweden, when President of this Council, was requested by the Council.21 to proceed ta the subcontinent andtosee whether he could movethemattertowarrlasettlement. He found that the settlement was obstructed by this allegation on one side and its denial on the other side, and he suggested that the question of whether Pakista'tthador had not complied with its obligation might be sett1ëd by arbitration, in the sense thatby arbitration it might he determined what the actual facts were, and if, in fact, there had been !lome default in compliance, what 39. surtout conformé par arbitrage. V. par Président, examiner ment; part impossible arbitrage conformé l'arbitrage de ,1 . &1 Ibid., Twelftb Year, SUpplement for January, February and Marcb ~. document 5/3793. !22, 41. The present position is this: the last re501ution of the Security Councilwas adopted on 2 December 1957.7.1 Operative paragraph 2 reads as follows: nThe Security Council, , nReguests the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan ta make any recommendations to the parties for furtber appropriate actionwith a view to making progress toward the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and toward a peaceful settlement.n 42. Ml'. Frank P. Graham, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, has made many diligent efforts and severalwise proposais with regard ta the achievement of the purpose that was laid down in this resolution. He again proceeded ta the subcontinent and made a report on 28 March 1958,.!Y almost four years ago. 1 have no doubt myself that when the Security Council cornes ta start a consideration ofthe merits of the dispute, it woufd no doubt feel that it would he heiped considerabIy ü, hï addition ta his report, it aiso heard the views of the United Nations representative with regard ta the J.ll"6sent situation. 43. The United Nations representative had also recommended that parties shouIdtryto'makeprogress toward the settlement of the dispute by negotiations between themselves. He had even suggested a:meeting of the two sides under his auspices. That was not agreed ta, but the recommendation remained that they should try ta agi-ee between themselves. Accordingly, severai attempts at negotiations were made. 44. These attempts were made on 15 September1959, when the President ofPakistan met the Prime Minister of India at the airport in Delhi and again, during May 196,0, when both the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister ofIndiawere participating in the Prime Ministers' Conference in London and had severai opportunities of getting together to see whether any progress could be made; then at Karachi and Rawalpindi in September 1960, when the Prime Minister of 11 Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December1957. document S/3922. §j Ibid., Thirteenth Yeu. Supplement for January, February and March 1958. docwnem: S(3984. 46. And there the matter rested. Within the last two or three days the Press has reported the statement of the Prime Minister of India that he has renewed his invitation to the President of Pakistan to visit him in Delhi.. 47. The position of the President of Pakistan is still the same. He wouldbe happyto go ta Delhi if there was any indication that during their meeting they wouldtry ta settle the dispute or at least agree upon some method which would be bound to result in a settlement. ; : l', il , i. 48. At this stage 1 might also make a comment on the announcement made in the Press that the Prime Minister of India has renewed an offer of a no-war declaration between India and Pakistan, which he had also suggested to the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, the late Liaquat Ali Khan. 1 tOOn had the honour of being the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, and 1 am fairly familiar with the somewhat lengthy correspondence that then ensued between the two Prime Mlnisters. In response to the invitation of the Prime Minister of :rndia that the two Prime Ministers makeadeclaration of that kind, the Prime Ministerof Pakistan stated that the tension existing between the two countriesthe two countries were in a state of tension at that time also-would not·he eased merely byadeclaration that there would he no war between the two countries. The tension had its origin in the disputes which were pending between the two countries and that so long as the disputes continued and no way could be found of settling them, the' tension would continue. Merely saying that we would not fight over it would not help. The Prime Minister of Pakistan therefore made the followingcounter proposition: let us first make an effort at the settlement of our disputes. Ifwe finct that a prolonged effort is necessary, then letus agree upon a procedure for the settlement of our disputes through negotiations, "through mediation, throughany channel thàt may he acceptable to both sides, but finally provide that if any of these methods doos nQt hring us to a settlement of the disputes, then we shall have recourse to sorne procedure which would automatically bring a settlement like international arbitration or judicial settlement. Having agreed on. thi.s procedure, we could then make a no-war declaration and proceed to satisfy our people: "Do notworryoverthese thlngs, do not get excited if time passes overthese processes because ultimately'if we cannot do itQY agreement, by negotiation or by mediation, we shaH settle these disputes through a process which will be automatic." That was not agreed to by India, and that is why the question of a no-war declaration hung fire and that is encore demeureraient sisteraient mettre ment pas. contreproposition de effort sur par autre mais tissait procédure ment, judiciaire. dure, recours satisfaction le décision ces ou aboutira n'a 50. Unfortunately, during the last month and a hall or 50, tensions have again mounted and they have mounted up to a dangerous degree, so much so that dec1arations of responsible people, leaders in India, people in official positions, though hedged and conditioned by certain general declarations, havecreated a sense of crisis in Pakistan, as apprehension, a foreboding that perhaps on this occasion it might be difficult to maintain peace between the two countries. In deference to my friend Mr. Jha, for whom 1 have great respect-I even have affection for himi our personal rE;llations are extremely good-I might say (otherwise he would be forced to say it) "AlI right, the fauit does not lie only on one side, it lies on both sides." Assume that on bath sides things have been said or things have been done which have contributed toward the spiraling of the tension. 51. But there is no denyingthe fact that tension exists, and the Security Council, being the organ ofthe United Nations carrying the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and for the resolving of situations and disputes that threaten the maintenance of peace. is now faced with a very grave and specifie responsibility. 52. Let me now place before the Council sorne of tbese declarations which are part of the material that tends to show that the situation is of the kind that 1 have described. Before 1 do so,however, 1should like to point out the reasons why tbese declarations raised apprehensions, even though, taken just generally and without any specifie situation, they may not have amounted to a threat or raised any apprehensions. 53. The Indians now generally say-particularly the Defence Minister of India-that Pakistan is in forcible and illegal occupation of part of Kashmir, meaning thereby the Azad Kashmir area. Repeatedly it is said that Pakistan is an aggressor against India, that Pakistan has committed aggression, that Pakistan continues in aggression and that that aggression must be vacated; if that aggression cannot be vacated through peaceful means, the area under the control of the· Pakistan forces must be "liberated"-and 1 use the word "liberated" within quotation' marks, its signüicance having become different from the mere meaning of "making free ". 54. When these declarations are read against that background, each one of them constitutes, in the eyes of the Government and the people of Pakistan, a threat to the maintenance of peace. 1 have given this preliminary explanation so that each time when 1 read 55. At the aonual session. of the Indian National Congress Party at Patna, on 4 January 1962, Mr. sanjiva Reddy, the President of the Congress, duringtheflaghoisting ceremany. which ls one of the mast saleron occasions in these Party gatherings, asked the Congressmen-and 1 am quoting from a very wellknown paper published in Delhi, The Times of India, of 5 January 1962"':'to take a pledge to get the Chinese and Pakistan aggressions vacated as had been done in the case of Goa: 55. Congrès le de plus aux 5 publié agressions été i "1! i, J! ',i:, iI ll Ulit! "Under this flag, let us assure the Prime Minister and our Government that every one of us, in a disciplined way, is behind them in any stepthe Government may take to have these aggressions vacated. "The whole country will be behind the Government in its efforts to liberate the party of Kashmir which is under the forcible occupation of Pakistan. Let us hope.in a short period-of course the GovernD'.ent has to choose the appropriate moment-the Government will give relief to that part of Kashmir also." ;,, l l lj Ce sentiments cette This one extract alone would be enough to show what are the feelings being publicly expressed in India with regard to this situation. 56. Ram a Delhi 56. Another member of the Congress Party,Dr.Ram 8ubhag 8ingh, who is a member of the Indian Parliament, said on thatoccasion-andthis istakenfrom The statesman of Delhi of 5 January 1962: ".•. the time had come when Pakistani and Chinese aggression on'Indian soil had also to beended. Even though Pakistan was in military alliances'like SEATO and CENTO, it was quite clear that India would not tolerate its aggression on Kashmir for long. Itwould be good if the Chinese also realized that their aggression in Ladakh and other areas would be vacated by armed force if necessary." i, L. 'ri1 And then these are the actual words usedby Dr. 8ingh: "Both China and Pakistan should know that India would take steps to end their aggression on Indian soil just as it had ended Portuguese a.ggression in Goa." Puis, le mesures sion â 1lli 57. The Statesman of 6 January 1962, uncier dateline of 5. January, reported from the headquarters of the Congress session: 57. dépêche Congrès: ~ 1 J "The resolution"-that is to say, the resolution on international affairs atthe Congress session to which 1 believe my friend Mr. Jha has made reference in his letter of 16 January addressed to the President of the Security Cou'ncil [S/5060]-"bracketed two neighbours-China and Pakistan-asaggressors 'who continue to be in illegal and forcible occupation of our te!"ritories' .•• An angry note ran through most of the debate on the resolution. 1 ] q i "Member after rrember demanded immediate action by India to vaCffi;e the aggressionby China ane Pakistan, and more thanoneofthemdemandedaction in three months .•• 58. Aisa from The Statesman of 6 January. 1read the following: "Ml'. Jagat Narain LaI was angry at thecircuitous way of saying things, as was evident particularly in that part of I-'ae reeolution which referred to the aggression in India. He demanded a declaration 'from this platform of the people of Iudla' thatthe aggression on India by China and Pakistan wouldbe vacated îmmediately. He said sandalwood gave a sweet and soothing ameU, but if it was rubbed too bard it would aisa light fire. So he warned hostile countries that they should not try to take advantage oflndia's policy of non-violence and peaceful coexistence. n 59. The weekly Blitz, in its issue of 6 January 1962, carried this front-page headline: nAfter Goa we clean up Nagaland to c1ear the decks for Pakistan and China. n The report itself, first drawing attention to the situation in Nagaland and the action which s!lOuld be taken against the Nagas ta suppress their nrebellionn-an internaI matter for India which 1 shall not enter into before the Council-concluded by saying: nElimination of the festering sore in the Naga area should be seen as the preludetp preparingthe people to tackle effectively the two remaining problems, the Pakistani and Chinese aggression.n 60. The Times of India of 7January 1962, in reporting the speech of the Defence Minister on 6 January, had this ta say: nAn equally important declaration on Kashmir came from Mr. Krishna Menon who spoke on the international situatiùn immediately after Mr. Nehru at the morning session. About 42,000 square miles of Indian territory was under th6 occupation of Pakistan. He said that Pakistan 'must vacate the aggression' if peace was to be established. India,he added, did not have an aggressive policy towards Pakistan and would for itspart 'abide by its commitmeots to the United Nations'. But he hastened to add that 'we shaH not have other ·people iuterpret these commitments as they wish'. Kashmir was an inalienable part of Iodia. n 6L 1 quote agaiu from The Times of Iodia of 7 January: "Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, UtiionDefence Minister, speaking on the resolution on international affairs at the open session ofthe Congresshere, said: 'According ta our agreement with the British and also according to the United Nations resolution, the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir is a part of the Indian Union as much as Bihar i8 apart of India' ... Pakistan had no right to be on Indian territory and if peace had to be maintained twe have no option but to safeguard our security'." 62. The meaning i5 clear. It is reaEy begging the question when Mr. Menon says that according to the 63. ce national "Kashmir and the India-China border issue, which naturally came up for discussion at Patna, brought forth sorne clear affirmations of Indian policy. The Prime Minister did not speak much on these subjects. He left it to the Defence Minister to reiterate India's position. On Pakistan, the Defence Minister said: 'India would abide by its commitments, but it would not allow others to interpret them as they wished'. i 1"!1 "The Defence Minister's reference to Kashmir and the Prime Minister's description of the recent utterances of the Pakistan dictatoX' as betraying a diseased mind left many AU-India Congress committee members wondering whether new developments were in the offing. Il Il r 1 ,[ Les cette That kind of feeling does not exist only in Pakistan. It existed in the Congress session itself. 64. le qui 64. Under the dateline Bombay, 20 January, The Times of India of 21 January 1962,reportsthe following: 1 1 fi Il li Û fl,' Il 1 "Mr. Menon said that Pakistan should first vacale its aggression in Kashmir, withdraw the battalions of Azad Kashmir forces and the armed police in the area and stop the psychological warfare againstthis country as a prelude to negotiations. Addressing a public meeting under the joint auspices ofthe Bombay Pradesh Committee and the Bombay Kashmir Committee, the Defence Minister declared that if there was a 'serious breach' of the cease fire line by Pakistan, India would not hesitate to retaliate." 65. so'n suivante 65. 1 shall quote again from The Statesman of Delhi of 22 January 1962, dateline Bombay, 21 January: "Mr. Menon said there was nothing forei~n about India's foreign policy which was only an expression of her national sovereignty. If China or Pakistan, which had occupied' 42,000 ,square miles of Indian territory, did not vacate, lndia would not take the initiative in any war-like action. But he said that did not mean that India was any less determined to repulse the aggressor. It could be done either by negotîation or tbrough other methods, but when and how this would be done should be left to the Government because it could not be discussed inany public meeting, Mr. Menon added." 1 j 66. une rapporte lui-même du 66. The Times of London of 25 January 1962, under datelîne Delhi, 24 January reported the following with regard to the Prime Minister himself, who was speaking at Ferozepore just across the river in West Pakistan: " IIAn audience of 50,000 people in thisfrontiertown heard Mr. Nehru say that India had to keep an army 67. The editorial of The Times of Indiaof25 January 1962, said: "The Indian Governmenf can never agree to a plebiscite which seeks to undo the accession of the State. Any peaceful settlement must be based on the premise that its accessiOn to India is final and irrevocable. " This i8 in face of the many declarations made by the representatives of India before the Security Council, that the choice isthefreechoiceofthe people of Kashmir and that even if this should entail the amendment of the Consb:tution of India, that.amendment would be undertaken. : :J j 1 ·1 j 68. The Free Press Journal, in its issue of 29 Jalluary 1962, publishes a report alleging increased hostile activity-by Pakistan-both from across the cease fire tine in Jammu and Kashmir and the State's regular borders. The report concludes: "Pakistan itself has doubled the number of infantry divisions in occupied Kashmir." 1 will not even discuss whether that is sa or not, but assume forthe moment-not that 1 am accepting it-that what is alleged has happened, that adds ta the tension, it does not ease it in any manner. 69. In the Hindu of Madras of 31 Januaryl962, under dateline Bombay, 31 January 1962, the following is stated: "Indian Defence Minister, Ml'. Krishna Menon, in a statement, ruled out a plebiscite as solutionfor the Kashmir problem. He said: 'As long. as there is a Government in the country worth its name, there wiU be no plebiscite to decide-.future of Kashmir'. He also said mediation of this issue was impossible, and there will be no negotiations on the motif of surrender of Ollrsovereignty." 70. Now, when it is said repeatedly that the method of negotiatlons hà.s not been exhausted, Ishouldlike ta be told, in view ofthis declaration, what scope is there for negotiations? Vv'llE.t are the partius ta negotiate on? "That no Government worth its name will ever agree to the plebiscite", "mediation on tbis issue is impossible", "there will be no negotiations on the motif of surrender of our sovereignty"-do these expressions hold out any promise for negotiatiolls? And when that expression 1s used-"surrer,der of our sovereignty"- it means giving up, whetl,;h' or not as the result of a plebiscite, of any portion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 71. The Hh,dustan Times of today states: "Defence Minister said in Delhi on 31 Januarythat India had rejected Kennedy's mediationhecause there -could he no arbitration on the country's sovereignty."-NoMdy had suggested that-lIIndia baâ 72. Finally 1 1 would lîke ta submit tlûs ta the Council. In the tirst place, though there ia adispute and a very serious dispute oveT the question of the accession of the 8tate of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to !ndia-between India and Pakistan-the primary people affected by this dispute are the people of Kashmir. The fundamental question involved here is the self-determination of the people of Kashmir, their right to decide their own future freely without interference from one sir!a or the other.Again,Iwill not go Ül.to the question of apportioning blame or praise, but assume for one moment, for the sake of argument, the proposition (we contest every aspect of it) that Pakistan is the aggressor, that India is the victim, that Pakistan is in forcible and illegal possession of parts of the 8tate, that Pakistan has committed this default, that crime and is in contravention of resolutions , whatever you like. But does that mean that if Pakistan is to blame, that Pakistan had committed defauIt, that pakistan is an aggressor, the people of Kashmir have lost the right of self-determination'? Even iftherehadbeen no agreement at aIl, that right remained. 72. d'abord, la Cachemire entre sés fondamentale peuple ment des savoir un cette l'Inde illégalement l'Etat, cette lutions, si s'il du toujours, ! ',, 73. But the agreement is contained first in Lord Mountbatten's condition attached te the acceptance of accession. It has been said that the acceptance of the accession is oontained in the two words, III accept ll and signed IIMountbattenIl; it was only in an accompanying letter that a wish was expressed that the final decision would be through the freely expressedwishes of the rpeople;, wûortunately that wish cànnot be fulfihed. There is no question that merely a wish was heing expressed. Responsible ministers of India itself and its representative here, have stated that the acceptance of the accession was conditiona10nthe final decision being made Qy the freely expressedwishesof the people of Kashmir. Mr. V. P. Menon himself, who was in a sense the author ofthe Maharajah's accession, states it c16arly in his book. That is the fundamental thing which must govern the situation. 73. la ceptation du "J'accepte d définitive primée ne simplement responsables à était sion primée Menon, sion livre. situation. ilIl 1'] il., i 74. It is sometimes saiel: IIWell, the situation has contÎllued for fifteen years and is now more or less stabilizèd. It would be a pity ,to disturb it. Why uproot everything'? Wlly not be content with what exista' and then let us talk about adjustments. 1I l,do wish very solemnly to assure the members of the CouDeil that Dot fifteeu years, but if 150 years were to pass this dispute will not be settled except through the freely expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir. That is thei.!' right and they are entitled to exercise that right. 74. dure lisée toutbouIeverser'? qui sibles. du 150 ment aurait et 75. cité 11 suppose, dira individuel, Congrès par à 75. It is said that the Pakistan representative has quoted from individual speeches in his 1etter of 11 January 1962 [8/50581. 8ubsequenUy, 1 suppose, also regarding my letter of 29 January (8/5068] it will be said that 1 have quoted expressions oi.views by individuals; but that the resolution adopted by the Congress was that through peaceiul methods asettlementofdisputes should be reached. It is true, but there are two answers ta that: one is that the resolution itself cites 76. In an official pamphlet issued on behalf of the Government of Indla in January 1962.entitled Kashmir and the United Nations it 15 stated quite clearly with respect t':l this so-called aggression, IIIndia 18 prepared to he patient and tolerant ••• but it 15 obvious that there la a limit to patience and tolerance." If this ia not a threat of the use of armed force, what would be clearer? 77. But the situation remains. 1 will say again, take it at tts very least, that newapapers, individuals-both responsible and irresponsible-leaders, even ministera ail both sides have said things which contribute ta this tension. But thistensionhaabecomevery sharp agaiust the background of the things which 1 have brought ta the notice of the Security Council. Therefore, the Cirst duty of the Security Councilis ta take steps ta ensure that no recourse shaH be had ta threat or the use of force for the purpose of a settlement of the dispute, and that this shaH be made sa clear that the tension would be eased and people will stop thinking that there may be armed action, by one side or the ather, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow or next week or the week after that. 78. 1 should like respectfully ta draw the Security Council'a attention to the geographical position of Kaahmir. 1 have mentioned other factors in the beginning. 79. Kashmir, on its north-west corner, abuts on Afg'hanistan-at least the territories that used to be included in Kashmir; across a very narrow strip of territory, on the USSR; then, over a whole stretch of territory, on China; and, finally, with regard to its western., southern and eastern side, on Pakistan and on Indta. Sometimes expressions are used which say that lndia will not invade Pakistan, that India will Dot attacle Pakistan, and if anything occurs of the kind not only hinted at but expressly stated in these extracts that 1 have read out to the Council with regard ta the a9-called vacation of aggression or liberation of the Azad I<ashmir area, that technically may Qot be an attack by India against Pakistan. It might be claimed to be a mere vacation of aggression, and it might be saicl that if thare i8 8ubsisting aggression, vacating l\ggl'essiou ia not itseU agg,l'ession but the right of self- çl(lfenoe. Howevel', it is not neoessary for me ta empha- 8t~e thnt the comUct thl;lt then might ensue would be j;)ound to spread and would net \:le Qoufined merely to ~nshmir, as the earl1er rtghting was. And in vîew of the e;eograplxi,cal ju.'daposition of which 1 hlilve just spoktln-l wiU not sketch the picture any fll):thel'- nu~mbers of the Oounoll CM easily conclude for themsÇlIV(l;1'I that :11 a conüagrati(>n starts in that nrea it will not bo oonfilWct to the subcont.J:nent or Elven te the whole conUn,ont oX Asia. 81. Toàay the membership of the United Nations la composed of 104 sovereign States. The permanent members of the Security Couneil are thera of the1r own l'1ght; the non-permanent membersaretberepresentatives of the remain:lng Members of the United NaUons. Together you represent the whole world, and you are entirely responsible to the whole worîd. 1 shuH not take up your time longer than ta say that your first obl!gation is to securethatnothinguntoward of the kind that 1 have submittedhappens. Your second responsibility ia tù take up the consideration of the dispute and bend aIl your earnest, zealous energies towards secur:lng a settlement of it on the basis of justice and equity and ta secure ta the people of Kashmir the exerciae of their right of self-determination. ln that respect 1 have Ilodoubtthatyou will start, when you come ta that consideration, with the latest report of the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, and, as 1 have already stated, 1have no doubt that you will wish ta see it representing the situation today and not merely the situation that subsisted four years ago. 81. Les l~ représentent nisation semble sables votre obligation malheureux ne d'examiner ces, règlement et de je problème, récent et que qu'elle ment 1 liII 1l, ,1 82. Ml'. JHA (lndia): Allow me ta thank you, Ml'. President, and the members of the Council for giving me the opportunity ta make a brief statement. 82. remercie, membres brève 1.1 ~' 83. [8/5058 prétendu ciaüons la gravement venons thème. ment, que son ment délibérément en indien. du Au donner Pinde 83. The representative, of Pakistan, in bis letters of 11 and 29 January 1962 [8/5058 and 8/5068], alleged that efforts for direct negotiations had failed and that there was a grave threat to the maintenance of peace in the Kashmir region. In the statement we have just heard he has elaborated and embellished the same theme. 1 have alrearly, on b-'lhalf of my Government, stated in my letter of 16 January 1962 [8/5060 and Corr.1] that these contentions of the Pakistan Government andtheir representative are cornpletely unfounded, and that the Government of Pakistan is de1iberately attempting to exploit the CoUbcil as a propaganda forum against the Government of Indla. Nothing the representative of Pakistan has said today aIters that position. On the contrary t itfurnishes confirmation of the attempt to build up an artificial and wholly false impression of Pakistan I gbeing threatened by India. 1J 1!1j 1 84. pour Cachemire une vient le le rons 84. 1 have asked ta be allowed ta appear before the Council not for the purpose ofparticipating in a substantive discussion of the question of Kashmir or of making detailed refutation of the many charges and allegations which have just been made in the statement of the representative of Pakistan. The Ume for that will be at a later date when the Council is in a position ta hear the representative of the Government of India, and we hope thatthe meeting will be held after 19 el 86. This question, as the Council is aware, has a history of fourteen years, and it was last considered by the Council in December 1957. At that time also Pakistan brought up the matter on the eve of a general election. It is obvious that, ongroundswhichappear to us to be specious, Pakistan has again tried to take advantage of the Indian Government's preoccupation with the election. We are deeply disapPQinted that the Council, in its wisdom, did not think fit not to have a meeting now as requested by us. The convenience of the Indian. Government has not beeu consuited and, overriding our objections, the validity and force of which have beeu acknowledged ta usbymanymembers in conversation, the Council has thought fit to hold a meeting. As 1 have already statèd, it is highly inconvenient for the Government of India to take substantive part at this time in the Council's discussion of the Kashmir question. 1have, therefore, been-instructedby my Government ta requestthe Council to defer the discussion of this matter to some appropriate time after the Indian general election ta enable the new Government to participate fully in the discussions. 87. While making this request Ishouldliketotake the opportunity to state briefly but categorically thatthere is no threat of use of force to Pakistan from India. We have repeatedly made it clear that we shaH ooi: attack Pakistan or use force against Pakistan. We have made it equally clear that if attacked we shall defend ourselves. That has been always our position, and that is our position today. Members of-the Council areaware that on numerous occasions my Governmenthas offered to enter into a simple, unconditional n6-war declaration with Pakistan. The object of this was to create an atmosphere free from any apprehension, and thereby to facilitate the holding of any negotfations or discussion.s between ourselves for the settlement of tbis issue. That offer stands, and itwas repeatedyesterday in a public statement by the Prime Minister of India. The representative of Pakistan has also referred ta the suggestion made by India for a no-war declaration , but he has said that Pakistan wanted first certain matters to be settled, and that in particular it wanted the processes for the settlement of the Kashmirquestion to he decided upon before it cotild enter into a nowar declaration. 88. However, if Pakistan has a sense of fear or apprehension of an attack, of aggression by India, or 89. That is the position that 1 would like to bring before the Council. But from the leaders of Pakistan and from the Pakistan Press cornes a constant barrage of threats of using "other means", includingthe use of force for the "liberation" of Kashmir, and appeals to religious fanactismand "jehad", which means holy \Var. 90. 1 have here before me several volumes ofreprints i-' of such published statements. One of these is already i; on the records oftheCouncil,andperhapsat a suitable time my delegation will take the liberty of circulating these volumes to the mernbers of the Council for their perusal. It is not my intention ta burden the Council with these at the present moment. Ishallonly cite two instances. 91. du pakistanaise, ne mire le du intention menacer EtatS-Unis, américaine le pays 91. On 7 October 1960, according to the newspaper Dàwn of Karachi, the President of Pakistan declared: "The Pakistan army as a defender of the motherland could never afÎord to leavethe Kashmtr issue unsolved for an indefinite Ume", and as late, as a few days ago~ according ta The New York Times of 21 January 1962, l i:".; he announced his intention ta use arma supplied them by the United States Mutual Security Act against any- 1- i one, îrrespective of United States wishes, whom he conl,:,( sîdered a threat ta Pakistan. Andtodaythe representa- - tîve of Pakistan tells us that Pakistan is threatened 1i by India. 92. aux pour J'ai qui toire, nous chaque ration, siéger. sous peut Inde. à. que en très les ration", 92. 1 only mention these facts and 1 leave it to the members of the Council to place them injuxtapositi0n 1\ in arder to view this matter in the right perspective. l '.: 1 also do so to show that the complaint of threat by Indîa to Pakistan is nothing but, lf 1 may use the IJ expression, a bogy. If we were disposed ta come ta 1) the Security Council in connexion with sllch statements, Id 1dare say that thisaugustbodywouldbe perpetually in session, because thesevolumes are a testimonyto what 1 am saying. 1 dare say that the representative of Pakistan can also find sorne statements which have been made in India. As a matter of fact the campaign against India of the character ta which 1 have just referred that cornes from Pakistan is so great that occasionally it is a fact that there are reactioHs in 'j India and statements are made. But 1 would say that 1 the scale is very much weighted on their side by statel ! ments against India and provocatîve utterances and ..•J-1., incitements to "liberation", "jehad", and so forth. , 93. The representative of Pakistan has picked out a 93. déclarations, du semaines, Mais Congrès, étrangère a sentant aussi: . -.J,' few statements, notably one said ta have been made by Ml'. Sanjiva Reddy, the President _of the Congress ") Party, some weeks ago 'at a flag-hoistîng ce:o:-emony. '._-1' But as a matter of fact, subsequentlyatthe very ,same • Congress session and after a thorough discussion of -1 the Government's foreign policy, the Indian National 1 Congress formally adopted a resolution which the .î representative of Pakistan has quoted and which 1 :1 shall also quote. :.1'. "The Congress emphatically supports the Govern- , ment in its policy in regard to our neighbouring States; Pakistan and China, who continue to be in illegal and forcible occupation ofourterritories. The Congress considers that consistent with India's basic policy and methods, the Government should seek aH 95. Grievance i5 made of the faet that we call the occupation of a partofKashmirbyPakistanan aggression, It is true we say that, but we do not just say it today, We have been saying that for the last fourteen years. That was the case with wbich Indiacame ta the Security COWlCU. namely that there had been aggression and an invasion of Kashmïr. But the mere fact that we adhere ta our point ofview cannat be regarded as aggressive or as a threat ta Pakistan, 1 really fail ta understand that argument. 98. ls it not clear from what Ihave just read out from the resolution of the Indian National Congress, wbich is the largest political party of the country, that we are in favou!' of peaceful settlement of our disputes with Pakistan, including the question of Kashmir? 97. ln bis letter of 29 January ta the security Council, the repres.entative of Pakistan quotes a statementfrom the TribWle of India of 12 July 1961 said ta have been made by the Defence Minister of India. In this statement itself the Defence Minister has clearly stated: "We do not want ta settie down ta a war situation... We still stand by the commitments we have entered into. But if aggression Cornes, we are determined ta and we will meet it. For our sovereignty, dignity and honour are involved in Kashmir." l 1 98, 1 very respectfully submit that this is not a warlike statement. On the contrary it is, as the COlmeil knows. a reaffirmation of something which we have stated again and again and which is ourbasic position, namely that there has been aggression againstIndiain Kashmir and that Kashmir is an integralpartof India, Also, we have statedintheCouncil timeand again since 1948 that tlûs aggression must be .vacated. and when we say that we meanta say vaeatedby peaceful means. It is a reaffirmation of our intention ta defend our position in KashInir and topreventanyfurtheraggression, SUrely it is given ta a responsible' mi~ster of government ta state the determination of his government ta defend the territory of his country and its rights. Such a statement, incidentally, one seesalmost every day in the Press by members ofGovernments of many nations sitting' round this very' table in the security COWlcil. 99. Grievance is made of the statementoftheDefenee Minister of India on 20 January 1962 that India was prepared to negotiate with Pakistan any time on the Kashmir issue !lbut not on the basis of surrender of our sovereignty". Again this is quoted.in the letter of 29 February from the represerltative of Pakistan ta the Security CouncU. New what i8 wrong with this statement? It is a plea for negotiations without surrender of sovereignty. ta which none can reallyabject.. 101. sionner pèserait crainte et rations 101. The representative of Pakistan bas sought ta impress the COW1cil with the grave threat ta Pakistan. In our view, no rational basis for any such apprehension exists, and 1 should like ta placebeiore you some statements from my Prime Ministerwhich should leave llO ground for apprehension. ~ , 1 l'i 102. au 102. Speaking in the Lok Sabha (the LowerHouse),on 16 August 1961, the Prime Minister said: Il Au déclarait "We want Pakistan ... ta co-operate with us, and we shaH co-operate with them because that is a normal thing for two countries, any two adjoining neighbouring COlUltries to do, more especiallywitha COWltry like Pakistan which bas been a part of us-I am saying even now; there are sa rnany contacts, human contacts, apart from geography, cultural and historical contacts, but somehow, aU this is almost wasted." 1' He was referring to the negativeapproachofPakîstan. The Prime Minister, speaking in the Rajya Sabha (the Upper House), on 22 August 1961, stated: Est-il "We are not going totakeanymilitarymeasu:res ta push out the pakistan Army or the controlling apparatus from tbat area,"-This means the area under Pakistan occupation- ~It is our right, and we are prepared to considerthatwhenthetimecomes in a peaceful way." -and 1 should like the CoUDcil ta note this-"That is going pretty far,: as the House will appreciate, when we say thatwe are notgoing ta take any military steps in that areawhich is occupied by Pakistan." What can be clearer than this statement? 103. à. New a de tout 103. At a press conference in Ne'f Delhi on 28 December 1961 the Prime Minister, among other things, said: "We have always agreed to talk with Pakistan on this subject as on everyothersubject. We have never refused. Il 105. There are many more statements of this nature right through the years and up ta thepresent time-up ta the last few days as a matter of faet: These are statements by the Head of the Government whieh Pakistan wishes ta make out is threatening the territory of Pakistan. 106. In his letterof 29 January 1962, the representative of Pakistan quotes from The Times of London of 25 January 1962-and the representative has repeated this here-in whieh the Prime Minister of India is reported ta have said that India "had ta keep an army on the PWljab frontier because it did not trust the intentions of Pakistan". 107. 1 have not seen any authoritaUve report but let us asswnl;} tbat tbat is a correct version of what the Prime Minister said. Let us look at the facts. After the events of 1947 and 194B, when Pakistan-aided tribesmen and Pakistan forces invaded Kashmir, and in the context of the statement and the cries for "jehad" raised in Pakistan, can fudia be blamed for taking precautions? But this does not affect our deternrlnation ta seek settlement of our outstanding problems with Pakistan peacefully and throughnegotiations and to live in friendship with itand indeed with aIl our neighbours. lOB. India has always made itolear, and1repeat now, that patient discussions and negotiations and the continuing seareh for a possibility of accommodation are the only aecepted ways of reaching an amicable settlement. As recorded in The NewYorkTimesthis morning the Prime Minister has statedonlyyesterday: "We have clearly said tbat whether they [the leaders of Pakistan] agree with us or not on any point, we will not start a war against Pakistan," 109. It is a eontinuing policy of India ta settle its disputes with Pakistan by negotiation and through peaceful means. The Prime Minister of Illdia has sent an invitation ta President Ayub Khan for a visit ta Delhi to talk over the differences between the two Governments. We hope that this invitation will be .accepted and that nothing will be said or done, either Îllside the CowlCil or in Pakistan, ta spoil the atmosphere of the talks after the general elections. 110. 1 have deliberately made various quotations from our prime Minister because 1 sholÙd like ta show that there is no desire in India, and 1 repeat there is no desire in the Government of India, ta settle oUl' dUferences with Pakistan by MY but peaceful means and by negotiations. It ia the earnest desire of the people of India-and 1 think 1 may say without fearoi contradic- 1i people. l 1 1 111. Having said tilla, 1 go back to where 1 atarted i from and 1 would urge that the Security Council 111. je remettre ultérieure l'Inde, formation mettre rales Conseil i should defer its consideration of this matter until a " convenient time in the future which is agreeable ta ·i Pakistan and to India after the Indian general eleci tians and the formation of the new Government, with H a view to giving the new Government of lndia an opj portunity after the general elections ta participate Mly ' in the discussions in the SecurityCouncilandmake its submissions ta this Counc11. l':, !! J "H, j

1 have no further speakers on my list, and if there are none 1 will preswne to malte sorne commenta as President of the Council. 112. aucun ne quelques sident. 113. Members of the Security Council have heard statements by the representativ'es ofPakistan and India conoerning this question and if 1 interpret their remarks oorreotIy 1 believe both Governments have indicated their desire to deal with the differences between them on the Kashmir issue in a peaceful manner and without the employment of force. Next, members of the Council will also have taken _ote, 1 believe, of the statement by therepresentativeofIndia that it would be more convenient for bis Government te explain its views on this question more fully after the oonclusion of the elections now under way in India. 113. le bien deux pacüiquement férend part, pense, selon même i :.ii c'itli 1. 1) J :1i i 11 .J ' apr~s en 114. fiques que l'avis question se consultation Il du 114. In the Ught of these assurances of peaceful intentions which the COlUlcil has heard, and of the comments ta whiohl have referred, llUlderstand that members of the Council feel that any further consideration to be given ta the question by the Council should be deferred, possibly until sorne time after 1 Maroh, and then resumed after consultation with the members of the COUIlcil and the parties. Meanwhile the Security COUIlcil will continue to be seized of this issue. ,.'[ 115. In conclusion, therefore, 1 take it that themembers of the Councll would urge the parties ta refrain from any use or threat ofthe use of force in connexion with this problem, and 1 take it thatit is also the consensus that nothing should be done or sald by either of the parties or byothers to aggravate the situation or inorease existing tensions. As President of the Security COWlcil, 1 urge those directIy concérned, as weIl as members of the COUIlcil and of the United Nations, to co-operate in these endeavours. Ifthere ls no objection, 1 would conclude with the suggestionthat in the light of this consensus of ·views the Council should adjourn its deliberations on the basis 1 bave stated. 115. du s'abstenir de cordent ou aggraver ma j'engage Conseil Unies, tion, le ~,j 'j .J 116. soviétiques) à soviétique observation.

1 have but one remark to make in connexion with the President' s statement, with which my delegation is in agreement. 117. l'heure quer la 117. As everyone knows, the VSSR feit thatthe urgent convening of the Security Couneil on this item at the present time was unnecessary and uncalled for, and objected ta the meeting being held. Sinee, however, the 118, That is an 1 had ta say in signifying agreement with the President's view, The meeting rose at 5.25 p.rn.