S/PV.991 Security Council

1 should like ta say atthe outset that Mr. stevenson has asked me ta extend to the. Counci! his sincere regret for being unable to be here today. He had, of course, intended to preside over our deliberations, but was unavoidably delayed in Washington. In his absence 1 shaH do my best to carry out bis ftmctions as President of the Security Council in the high traditions of this office, and in sa doing 1 beg the indulgence of my fellow Counci! members. 1 ; f i '::1 1i ! 1i,J ;1 \j

1 would lUte to make a few remarks on the question of the adoption of the agenda which is con~ined in document S/Agenda/991. It is not often done in this COlUlCil ta question the adoption of the agenda proposed for it. Indeed, 1 think it is right that there should be a predisposition in favour of inscribing any complaint brought ta the security COWlcil and of giving full hearing ta the complainant. But each case must be examined on Us merits and there have been instances in the past, and there undoubtedly will be again in the future, when it would Dot be right to adopt the proposed agenda automatically. In particular this is the case where it seems possible that resort to this Council may be abused. This we should be particularly vigilant to avoid. It can do this Council nothing but harm if it lends itself to efforts to use its authority for purely propaganda exercises. 3. In the present case, my delegation has reluctantly concluded that tbere can be no other purpose in the letter from the representative of Cuba rS/5080J which ia listed as item 2 of the agenda whose adoption we are now considering than ta reiterate charges and theses which have already been debated fully. 6. Members of the CouncÙ cannot have forgotten that as recently as 20 February the General Assembly [1105th plenary meetingJ-the fOrum in which the representative of Cuba ~rlm~ chose ta lodge bis complaint-disposed of just such a complaint by Cuba against the United States. After more than two weeks of consideraticn the Assembly made it perfectIy clear that it found no substance in the Cuban charges; and it did not even adopt a resolution on the item. This being the case. 1 cannot see any vaUd justification for resuming this same debate in the Security CowlCil as the Cuban letter, written only two days after the Assembly's decision, asks us to do. 7. There is another possible purpose in the letter in question, namely, to seek a ruling by the Security COWlCi! upon the relationship of the Security CowlCil to action taken by regioual organizations. If it is indeed this that we should be debating were we to inscribe the item, then again 1 must conc1ude that this Courrci! is being asked ta waste its time and effort. 8. Possibly the Government of Cuba pad overlookec! the fact that this Courrci! gave very full consideration to precisely this issue in September 1960. 1 would remind the Counci! that the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. then representing his Governm.ent in tbis COUDcil, requested a debate on the question of whether or not the application of diplomatie and economic san(:tions by the Organization of American states required the approval of the Security COWlcil. The issue was then raised in relation to the Dominican Republic, but no doubt the representative of the Soviet Union already had in mind the application of bis arguments in a different context. 9. The COWlcil debated tbis question at its 893rd to 895th meetings. After a full consideration, the upshot was the adoption of a resolutionl! clearly showing that it was not necessary or appropriate for this COWlcil -aithet to approve or to disapprove-or indeed to pronoWlce at aIl upon-resolutions or actions of the kind taken at that time by the Organization of American States. The COWlcil simply took note of these actions, which had been duly reparted ta it. The vote at that time was 9 in favour, with abstentions. 1 should have thought that that vote had disposed of the arguments which are now reiterated in document s/5080. 10. The Council will note that the decision then related to precisely these actions--eoncerning diplomatic and economic relations-of which the Cuban delegation now complains. 1 cannot see that anything ! 11. In sum, Ml'. President. we can deteot in the 11. de puisse perspectives. fort noue valeur. de l'ordre de leurs . 1 Cuban letter no indication that a debate based upon Ws letter could he fruitful or break auy new ground. For these l'easons my delegatioa has serieus doubts 1 whether a debate upon this letter which figures in our ,j provisional agenda would he of any value. l accordi ingly request you, Sir, ta put the question of the 1 adoption of the agenda to the vote, sa that all mem- ! bers of the COUIloil may have an opportwlity of l'ei carding the11' view. 12. pagnol]: 1962, approfondi Conseil que est n'a de de fond

For two weeks, from 5 to 20 February 1962, the question for which the Security Counci! has been convened was the subject of careful consideration in the General Assembly. Despite the empr.asis now placed on certain of its aspects, the. problem is fundamentally unchanged. The General Assembly did not see fit to adopt any resolution or ta make any recommendations to Member States or to tbe Security Counci!; in other words, it rejected the substance of the complaint. ; ' 1 j ' I J 1 1 1 13. mais, doit sœurs lution mission nière, une doit 13. My delegation, of com'se, represents Chile, but at the same Ume, bere in the Security COlmcil, it must also reflect the views of its sisterLatin American Republics. Nineteen Latin American Republics took a common stand on the draft resolutions put forward in the First COInmittee and in the General Assembly. The attitude which they adopted must necessari!y influence my delegation's attitude today. ; 1 1 14. semblée ,de roulé table considération jours reçu Commission générale de maintenant analyser 14. Although no resolution was adopted either in the First Committee or by the General Assemb1y in plenary meeting, the long and exhaustive debate provided some material of undoubted value, the full implications of which should he studied by aIl Mem· ber states. rt was not until a few days ago that some Governments received the records of the meetings of the Fii'st Committee and of the plenary meetings relating ta this question;Y these records, together with other background material. have ta he read and analysed by the experts in our Foreign Ministries. 15. In view of the recent debate in the General Assembly, it is most expedient and entirely logical tbat we should do our utmost to avoid sharpening a dispute which might intensify ill-feeling, lead to the extension and deepening of the cold war. and cause permanent rifts between Members of the United Nationa. 15. puisque récents, ne d'exacerber guerre entre < " 16. que senter rien Etat le 16. 1 should like to make it quite clear that our doubts regarding the advantage ta he derived from reopening a dispute do not in any way change our traditional inclination ta allow any Member State ta brtng its problems to the Security Council. 17. This attitude applies ta the Cuban case also. ChUe has no feelings of hostility towards Cuba. 1 17. Cuba. Premlilre plênières, 18. As far as our position as a member of the Organization of American states ls concerned, the Chilean Government complies scrupulously with the obligations whioh derive froID its membership of that regional body. Any doubts regarding the legal relationship between the üAS and the United Nations, ID respect of decisions reached by the regional body. were disposed of by the Security Caunoil itself at its meetings heid in September 1960, 19. We have weighed the reasons for and against convening thi.s meeting of the Security OOWlcîl and we are n.ot convluced that a reopening of the debate could make any contribution ta the cause of peace. 20. These doubts and considerations will determine our vote on the adoption of the agenda. Our vote will therefore be a moral act, according with our principles but at the sarne time recognizing the advisability of avoiding situations which might deepen any conflict. 21. Chile would like ta see aU unrest e11minated from the American continent and any situation avcided which tnight intensify the dispute and make it a centre of the cold war. The Latin American countries are at a crucial point in their history and they need peace and quite in arder ta devote themselves ta the arduous task which can no longer be postponed: the economic and social rehabilitation of Latin America, sa that our masses may attain the well-being, freedom and dignjty to which they are entitled.

The delegation of Ghana is intervening very briefly ta state its position on the matter before the Security Council, that is to say, the approval or otherwise of the provisional agenda. 23. The letter from the representative of Cuba to the President of the security Council [S/5080J contains a nwnber of points which must be elalJorated. In the last paragraph, it ls stated: IlAccordingly, acting upon the express instructions of my Government. 1 request yeu ta caU an immediate meeting of the security COWlcil sa that it may adopt the measures necessary to bring ta an end the 1llegal action taken by the Governmoot of the United States against the Government of Cuba and thus prevoot the development of a situation which endangers international peace and security. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba is making this request Wlder Articles 34 and 35, paragraph l, .of the United Nations Charter and aIso invokes Article 24, paragraph l, and Articles 41, 52, 53 and 103 of the Charter and the relevant articles of the provisional rules of procedure of the security CO\U1cU.1I That is te say, there i8 a real grievance on the part of a Member State of the United Nations and this grievan.ce has been brought before the Counc1l. 24. Without go1ng inta the substance ofthe grievance. 1 think: the Security Council is duty bound ta 11stoo 1 f0r the p3aceful solution of problems wbich interfere with friendly and neighbourly relations among states " 1 :.: or threaten international peace. It ls this right whîch the delegation of Cuba is trying ta enjoy, and 1 think j! we have a dutY to grant it this right. 1 do not think we ~'I are being asked to take any action on the grievance i; which they bring here; but, at least to start with, my i] delegation feels that every opportunity sholÙd be 1 given to the delegation of Cuba to state its case. Il 25. The Government of Ghana is very friendly with aU oountries in tbis hemisphere: the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, all the LatinAmerican cOW1trîes. We think that nothing sholÙd be done ta make one of them feel ostracized or treated badly. That is why my delegation considers that the provisional agenda should be adopted. 25. plus ocoidental: Brêsil, Selon l\ cisme gation être ~'il ~ ~l, Il, ,li ri, ' 11If

We are witnessing something whîch, as the United Kingdom representative said, Is not often done in tIlls COUDcil-the adoption of the provi.sional agenda being questioned by certain repl'ësentatives, including the United Kingdom representative himself, at the very outset of our discussion. 26. soviétiques) sence représentant a-t-il sentants Uni, pas 27. The considerations put forward by the United Kingdom representative lead me ta conclude that the main reasons why he objects to the adoption of the agenda are essenUally political, although he failecl to mention them. He advanced a number of forma! arguments and presumably considerations of common sense. 27. nous de des abstenu ments blent ri ·f '1 28. d'abord Royaume-Uni nait cette membres il pas que accusations probable. enfin, vité être paraissait 28. The USSR delegation woilld like to begin by examining these arguments. The United Kingdom representatlve's first argument was that the purposè of raising this question at the present Ume was not clear to him. As aIl members of the COUDcil will remember, he made various guesses. He suggested that it might be a propaganda exercise; yes, it appeared ta be a matter of propaganda. Then he said that perhaps it was a preface to a complaint of aggression: yes, it appeared to be the case. Laatly, he said that perhaps the item had been proposed in cO,nnexion with the action taken by the Organization of American States. That could weil bel he was wiUing to accept that possibility toc. ,1, 29. par ment du s'agit, soulevée? a pourquoi tures? pour Tout dant, 29. If one were really to be guided by ordinary common sense, one might aak, why sholÙd the United Kingdom representative try to divine why the item is be1ng proposed? Why not adopt the agenda, listen ta the representative who proposed the item, and find out that way why it was proposed? Why try ta read tea-leaves? It is much simpler to hear out those for whom the question is a serious, indeed, a vital one. and it will then be clear to us all.why the question was raised. But for sorne reason the United Kingdom representative-although, as 1 believe is generally recognized, his cOWltrymen have plenty of common 30. The United Kingdom representative said next that if the item relates to the action taken by the Organization of American states, that issue was already debated in september 1960 and aIl the arguments concerning the relationship between the regionaI organlzations and the United Nations are known ta the Council. 31. First of aU, in 1960 the issue was ralsed in relation ta action taken against the Domi.nican Republic-and that Is. surely, not the same thing. Or is the country immaterial-does the United Kingdom represent.ative regard cOWltries as so many ciphers. so that it does not matter which country is involved? It matters ta us: the Dominican Republic is one thing. Cuba is· another. Chile a tlûrd. etc. Each country has Its own interests and its own prôblems, and the United Nations was set up in order to take into aecoWlt the lnterests of each and every cOWltry, great or small. We cannat treat cOWltries as if they were aU alike. Secondly, the United Kingdom representative claims that all the arguments are known. What maltes him so omniscient? What makes him think that there are no arguments other than those put forward in September 1960? 1 have the greatest respect for the United Kingdom representative, but 1 hold none the less that he is not the final arbiter of what is right and that the possibiUty should be taken inta account that new arguments. which were not advanced in 1960. may be presented in 1962. In any case, to deelare in advance tbat one knows aU the arguments is, to say the least. Immodest. 1 feel that this argument does not deserve acceptance either. 32. The United Kingdom representative sald further that, when the Council considered the rélationship between the Organization of American States and the United Nations in 1960. it teck. no definite decision on the matter but merely teok note of the actions of the OAS. Very good; but it dllÎ discuss the matter. it adopted lts agenda and taok a decision. It is true that the decision was merely ta. "take note"; .but then, who knows, perhaps this time too the Counci! will decide te take note of the aciion of the OAS. That too would be a decision. Then why refuse te diseuss the ·present item and take a slmilar decision? Why refuse tad~y so much as te adopt the agenda, contrary to what was done in 1960 and. in my view, done rightly: the agenda was adopted, the question discussea and a declsion taken. Why reject this sensible way ·of dealing with the matter? Such reasoning seems ta me en~rely invalid. We are not prejudging the COWlcil's decisions. We merely wish ta adopt the agenda in order 33. Lastly, the United Kingdom representative argued that nothing had happened sinee September 1960 which would cause delegations to ehange their point of view on sneh matters. 1 should simplY like to ask the United' Kingdom representative: has nothîng happened since 1960? Can he have forgotten ,that in April 1961 there was an intervention ln Cuba? Or does he regard it as of no significance? It has significance for us and. 1 bel1eve, for the entire world. It is a new event which causes us to take èl new look at aIl questions having ta do with Cuba. Where the United Kingdom representative is concerned, nothing new hapnened; but for the rest of the world, an act of aggression took place. This act of aggresslon was eondemned by \vorld public opinion and by a great number of states, which are determîned ta prevent a recurrence. passé d'agression par qu'il . 34. The United Kingdom representative says that nothing new has happened. But there was the Conference at Punta deI Este.:li Did that tao represent nothi:tg new? 1 b~g to differ; it did. It was an attempt ta transform the Organization of American States ioto a tool of the aggressive poliey of the United States-a further development of United States poliey in that regio~. It i8 a new circumstance. a new element, which deserves the most careful consideration, for it implies a change in the political situation and creates a threat to peace both in the Caribbean and in the entire world. We do not feel that nothîng new has happened; on the contrary, and in the light of these new happenings a discussion of the item befui'e us i8 called for. 34. veau; deI un, mer ment et des veau, plus situation dans Non, bien question 35. Sa much for the arguments cf the United Kingdom representative. 1 believe that my remarks should have made it clear tbat these arguments do. not constitute a valid ground for refusing to diseuse the question or to adopt the agenda. 35. avancés ce d'eux la 36. 1 refrain for the time being from commenting on the substance of the question or interpreting the letter from the representative of Cuba to the President of the Seeurity CoWloil. 1 shaH come ta that in a moment. But 1 wanted first ta reply to the arguments advanced by the author of the proposaI tbatthe agenda showd Dot be adopted. In my view. his arguments mord no basis for takîng such a decision. 36. tion que du mais dont ce que 37. 1 should like ta draw attention ta one of the remarks of the Chilean representative, who also spoke on this issue, for it contained a very important idea. He Baid that he did not deny the right of every 8tate, including Cuba. ta bring its problems before the Security Conneil. and, lndeed, regarded it as a legitimate right. That was roughly the mean'log of what he said. 1 will not vouch for the actual words. but tha.t was the meaning. This ls, in my opinion, a very important principle. IncidentaIly. it was supported later by the representative of Ghana. 38. If we in the Secur;~, Council shauld deprive any State of the right tor, ~lg any question which the 37. de aussi, retenir. Etat au comme l'idée tude c'est ment 38. de :li Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Mlnisters of Foreign Affairs of the American States. held at Punta deI Este. Uruguay. trom 22 tO 31 January 1962. rieures 22 39. That, however, is not the poUcy of the United Nations, and it is not in accordance with the Charter. Under the Charter, any State has a full right to bring up any question, no matter how annoying it may be to any country reprèsented around tbis table. We must ensure the exercise of that right. and not merely talk about'it and keep it on our books. 40. The Chilean' representative was of course right, sinee today it is Cuba which appeals ta the Security GOUDcil for protection, but tomorrow. for all we know, Chile may have ta ask the Council for help. For no one can teU what course events may take in Latin America, and that course is naturally of major importance. If we want the United Nations ta live up to its full potential, if we want Governments ta CaIne ta it, instead of acting behind its back, we are in duty bound ta give a hearing to any country, any Government, which brings a question before the Secutity Council. otherwise there will be no United Nations. There will only be a group of countries which acts outside the COUDcil and maltes use of the Council only in arder to settle the problems it wants settled by the CouncU. But this is contrary to the Charter and the members of the Security Council naturally cannat accept it. 41. As regards the Security Council's authority, to which the United Kingdom representative referred, that authority can be truly great only il the Gouncil does not refuse to discuss any questions, whatever they may be and by whatever country they may he submitted, but il instead it accepts these questions for discussion and renders its mature judgement 'on them. We must have the courage ta discuss even matters we find disagreeable. 42. Let me now tum ta the substance of the item before us. What exactly are we being asked to consider? 1 am taking the liberty of making these comments as part of the debâte on the adoption of the agenda, since the United Kingdom representative has already dealt with the substance. 1 shall do likewise, especially as, to judge by bis and bis colleagues' attitude, there appears to be no desire to have a substantive discussion. Consequently 1 must clarify certain matters during the discussicn of the agenda. 1 can do notlùng else, as this is the only opportunity 1 am afforded. 43. As 1 have already shawn, the arguments being advanced against the inclusion in the security Council's agenda of the item proposed by theCub.:.n repre- 44, In other words, that was a question concerning unilateral aggressive action by the United Stafes itself against Cuba. However, the question which it is DOW proposed that the Security Council shauld place on its agenda is of quite a different nature, as can be seen from the letter from the representative of Cuba dated 22 February, 45. Cuba is asking the Security Council ta consider a question the substance of which, it seems to us, is that the United states, no longer confining itself to its own aots of flagrant intervention in the domestic affairs of Cuba and the preparation of further military intervention against it, is now making one of the regional organizations, the Organization of American States, serve its aggressive purposes against Cuba, despite the fact that a nwnber of the largest countries of Latin America which are memhers of that ûrganization have spoken out against such use of the OAS. 45. veulent 46. commettent profitant 46, In tbis instance, just as with its unilateral aggressive actions against Cuba, the United States is grossly violating the fundamental provisions of the United Nations Charter. In this case the United states is bringing pressure ta bear on the OAS, by exploiting the dependent position of the aritbmetical majority of its members, to make it take enforcement measures against Cuba which that regional organization is not entitled to carry out without the authorization of the Security COUIlcil. i 47. These violations of the United Nations Charter also consist in the fact that the decision being forced on the Organization of American States by the United States are directIy at variance with the Purposes and Principles and the basic provisions of the Charter. 47. Unies Etats-Unis en ne 48. Ta cite the exact words of Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, no enforcement action shaU be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security COUIlcil. This restriction imposed by ·the Charter is very important, and its observance has a direct bearing on the task of maintaining peace and security in general. Enforcement measures within the meaniog of Article 41 of the United Nations Charter are collective actions by States aimed at compelling another State, without the use of armed force, ta follow a certain course of action against the will of that State. This coercion of a sovereign State is per R missible under the Charter only in a case where a State threatens international peace and security by its behaviour. This means, of course, that the decision in the matter of ernploying enforcement measures is the exclusive prerogative of the Security COUliCi!. 11i, 1 !1, 1;j, 1i 50. In tills connexion 1 would recall the colourflÙ words spoken last year in the Security Council by the representative of Ceylon as he stressed the extreme danger of such a situation. He said: l'The danger is that the United Nations would break ioto pieces, explode like a band-grenade from with1nll {983rd meeting, para. 28]. Advocating the suppression of such tendencies, he went on ta say: "It should be done before organized and regional intervention becornes elevated to a juridical concept, and becornes a new type of aggression." [Ibid., para. 34.] We cannot but agree with this. -- 51. That is why the proposaI to discuss the flagrant illegality of the enforcement action taken against Cuba upon the decision of a regional organization at Pilllta deI Este-despite the importance of such a discussion for the maintenance of peaee in the Caribbean region-goes far beyond the limits of the relations between Cuba and the United States. 52. If today the Security Council fails to nulltly the unlawful decisions thus taken against Cuba, then tomorrow similar action may be taken against any other country of Latin America, Mrica, Asia or any continent whose neighbours, upon sorne pretext or other, having assembled at a regional meeting, arbitrarily decide to apply ta it the maehineryof coercion in the form of eIÛorcernent action, thus usurping the prerogatives of the Security Counei1. 53. In the course of the discussion in the General Assembly of Cuba's protest against aggressive actions by the United States, various questions have already been raised that bave a bearing on the matter which has now been submitted by Cuba for discussion by the Security COUDcil. In particuIar, a largenumber of States Members of the United Nations, including cOW1tries of Asia and Africa and even of Latin America, pointed out in the oourse of the discussion the clear contradiction between the actions which the United States had forced on the Organization of American States with regard ta Cuba and the basic provisions of the Charter of tbe United Nations. 54. Many of the delegations at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly also pointed out that the decisions imposed on the Organization of American States by the United States at PW1ta deI Este are at variance with the Charter of the OAS 11 itself and were adopted despite the objections of six major countries of Latin America, representing threequarters of its population, which refused to support 11 United Nations, Treaty Series. voi. 119 (1952).1. No. 1609. 56. But does not the action taken at Punta deI Este directly contravene that provision of article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American states? There is no doubt whatever that resolution VIn [see 8/5075] on partial suspension of economic relations with Cuba and on the desirability of total suspension of those relations, and also resolutions VI and VU [ibid.] regarding. the organization of a political boycott of Cuba by excluding it from the Organization .of American states, constitute enforcement measures within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations~ Those decisions are aimed directly at compelling a sovereign state Member of the United Nations, namely, Cuba, to change the system of government chosen by its people. The fact that these measures are in the nature of an enforcement action is especially evident in paragraph 3 of resolution vnr, where it is stated in substance that these measures may be discontinued if Cuba submits to them, if its social and political system is changed in accordance with the wishes of the United states imperialist monopolies. It is hardly necessary to point out that measures such as the complete or partial interruption of economic relations are 8pecüically mentioned in Article 41 of the Charter, which enumerates the enforcement measures which may be carried out by the Security COWlcil or by a regional organization with the CowlCil' s authorization. 56. [voir de tiquement Etats tives Unies. Cuba, le ment pourront ricains. des plète visées mérées le 1 1•, • J 1 1 1 1, 57. Although this does not call for any comment, it should perhaps be stressed that the enumeration in Article 41 is not exhaUstive, aince it appears aIter the words "These may include...". This means that, in order to compel aState to behave in the way prescribed by the Charter, any other measures can he used which may serve the purposes of such enforcement action. An eIÛorcement measure such as the declaration of a political boycott, ta which reference has been made, is of course no less seve~~e in its nature 01' significance than, for example, the severance of diplomatic relations which i8 ·specifically mentioned in Article 41 of the Charter. peut-être figurant elle ci contraindre prescrite toutes diplomatiques, ticle ; 58. There can accordingly he no doubt that the resolutions adopted at Punta deI Este under pressure from the United States, as the resuU of a policy of what the United States Press has called "arm twisting", are basically concerned with the use of precisely those enforcement measures which under the Charter can be applied against States only on a decision of the Security Couneil. 59. That seems ta us to be the essence of the matter which should he discussed by the ÇOWlcil. Why, then, are objections heing raised to the discussion of this matter, and even to the adoption, of the agenda? The real reason for the objections to adopting the agenda 60. That is pracisely why the representative of the United Kingdom has just spoken against the adoption of the agenda. He does not want the Security Council to consider tbis matter in detail, because lt is a matter which is disagreeable to the United states, the United Kingdom's aIly, and the position of the United States and of the Western allies in this matter is extremely weak. The whole worId is talkîng about the violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States. In so far as we are concerned, this is a question which demands serious discussion immediately. for if we permit the United Nations Charter to be violated in this important matter, we open the way to further violations of the Charter and to direct aggression against Cuba. We wish to avoid this. and 1 tbink that this is a matter of concern to an the peoples of the world. It is precisely in order to prevent this that the question submitted by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba must he fully discussed in the Security CouDcil and that no attempt must be made to avoid discussing it. 61. The Soviet delegation will therefore vote for the adoption of the agenda. It considera, moreover. that the representative of Cuba shoufd be allowed to taIre part in the discussion of the agenda because, as the representative of. the United Kingdom had doubts on the substance of the question, it would be useful also to hear how the representative of Cuba regards the substance of this question which has been brought bafore the Security Council at his Government's request. 62. There have been similar precedents in the Security Conncil, and 1 think that the Security Council could take steps ta hear the representative of Cuba in the discussion of the question of adopting the agenda.

1 was able to deduce that the representative of the United Kingdom does not agree with the representative of the Soviet Union about the adoptiqn of the agenda. The representative of the United Kingdom suggested that the agenda should not be adopted. He has reminded us of the discussion that took place in this Council in September 1960. May 1 be al10wed to quote here, from the ninth annual report of the Secretary-General, the late Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, to the General Assembly, a passage that 8eems ta me ta be pertinent ta our discussion today. In the introduction ta his ninth annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General stated in July 1954: "The balance to be struck here must be struck with care. "For example. the importance of regional arrangements in the maintenanœ of peace is fully recognized in the Charter and the appropriate use of such arrangements is encoura.ged. But in those cases where resort to such arrangements is chosen in the first instance, that choice should not be permitted to cast any doubt on the ultimate responsi- , 1l i i • 65. As a matter of prÏl1ciple our delegation cannat deny any Member State the right of aecesa to this Couneil, the right of presenting Its case and obtaining the opportunity for the fuIlest discussion and the fairest review of such a case by this body. This we fee'! is an obligation Inherent in the spirit and letter of our Charter, and for thesB reasons WB support the adoption of the agenda. In doing this 1t 1s obvious that we do not give any opinion or pass any judgement on the complaint itself at this stage. Indeed, we cannot do tbis before hearing most attentively the arguments that May he advanced to us by an concerned. And here WB would like to assure the representative of Chile that the opinions of aB the Latin American States will have the greatest weight in our consideration because we consider them, as we have already said in the First Committee of the GeneralAssembly, to be the countries primarily concerned and especially informed. It is precisely to hear aIl points, of view that we share the opinion expressed by the representative of Ghana and we intend to vote accordingly. 1 1 1 :; { 1 i1 66. Ml'. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): The Venezuelan delegation will abstain from voting on the adoption of the agenda. This decision does not in any way imply a change in Venezuela's attitude regarding the substance of the question. My delegation reaffirms the position it stated clearly in the debate on this sarne subject some two weeks aga in the First Committee, during the second part of the sixteenth session of theGeneralAssembly. 1 ! \ l, Este er déCIsion queraient 67. My delegation considers that the matter has already been settled by the General Assembly, which in deciding not to adopt any resolution dismissèd the Cuban complaint as being without foundation. 68. Moreover, as re~ds the Cuban allegation that the Punta deI Este resolutidns must be approved by the Security Council in order to be vaUd, my Governmentis view is already known, having been clearly stated before the security Council in 1960, on the occasion of a similar discussion respecting the decision by the Organization of American States imposing sanctions on the TrUjillo rêgime for its participation in the attempt on the life of Ml'. R6mulo Betancourt, President of Venezuela. On that occasion, which was of direct concern to Venezuela, the Venezuelan delegation maintained that the Council's approval was only necessary in the case of measures implying the use of force. J , \,,

Various arguments have been put forward by members oï the Security Council who have opposed the inclusion in the agenda of the question raised by the representative of Cuba in his letter of 22 February; but, in our opinion, these arguments are groundless. Ali those who are present here know very weil that, both in the First CommUtee and in, the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, the United States delegation has brought pressure to bear to suppress debate, to reduce still further the number of representatives ready to express their views and, in particular, to prèvent the adoption of any resolutions, even if they contained only certain fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. 71. We are now witnessing the same tactics. The objections raised by some members of the Security Council have the sarne purpose, which is to prevent members of the Council from giving their views on the question raised by the representative of Cuba. Such an attitude violates not only the democratic principles which should govern this Organization, but aIso the fundamental rights of Member States, as set forth in Articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations Charter, especially the right to as~ the Security Couneil ta debate and resolve questions which endanger the security and independence of States. 72. My delegation has carefully studiedthe letter from the representative of the Republic of Cuba and it is convinced by his arguments in favour of holding a Security Couneil debate on the resolutions adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation at Punta deI Este, which affeet his country' s security and the maintenance of peace in the Caribbean. 73. During the debates of the First Committee, a number of delegations pointed out the contradictions between the decisions of the Conference at Punta deI Este and the fundamental principles of the United Nations. Referring to these resolutions, for example, Mr. Malalasekera, the representative of Ceylon, said: "What concerns my Government in this issue is that ta our great regr~t and sorrow the decisions taken at the Punta deI Este Conference affect the fate not only of the members of the OAS but also of eveI:Y nation represented in this Chamber."21 74. At Punta deI Este the United States forced the Organization of American States, a regional agency of the United Nations, to take decisions thatflagrantly violate both the fundamental principles of the United NatiollS and the explicit provisions of the Charter. É! This statement was made ar the 1240th meeting of the First Commlttee. the official record of which Is published only ln summary form. ~ 76. By these measures, which show contempt for 76. plus Unis par légal, indépendance forme seule interaméricain. ~ the most elementary principles of international law, "I! the United States is trying to undermine the political , system set up by the Cuban people, to unseat the ';;1 legal Government of Cuba and to force the Cuban ,ï people to give up their political and economic in- 'l dependence and to adopt the form of government , imPosed by the United states, which is declared to be the only form compatible with the inter-American .j system. 77. If we consider these decisions in the light of the fundamental principles of the United Nations and the explicit provisions of the Charter, we note thefollowing points. . 77. principes expresses 78. Article 52 of the Charter provides that the activities of regional agencies must he' consistent "with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". The decisions adopted by the OAS at Punta deI Este are in complete contradiction with the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter, as set forth in Articles 1 and 2, with the principle of peaceful coexistence and international co-operation, wlth the principle of the sovereign equality of Member States, etc. These decisions flagrantly violate the pr'ovisions' of Article 2, paragraph 7, which forbids interference in the domestic affairs of another State. 78. des "avec Or, sont mentaux aux tence avec Membres, flagrante qui d'un 1 ,J :1, 79. au sanctions ment la expresse mesures telles !a au flagrante 79. Articles 5, 6 and 41 of the Charter provide that only the 8ecurity Council may apply sanctions against aState Memher of the United Nations, and only in the cases provided for in the Charter. Moreover, Arti:" cIe 53 of the Charter explicitly forbids l'egional agencies to take enforcement action. Yet this is exactly what the Eighth Meeting of Consultation has doue by its decisions, thus usurping the place of the Security Council and flagrantly violating the provisions of the Charter. 1 .;j J, 1 i 1j .!! 80. Whatever legal texts may be invoked in tbis respect, the decisions of Punta deI Este are illegal, because Article 103 of the Charter provides that: "In the avent of a confliet between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shaH prevail.n 80. invoque restent mentionne: des sente autre dront. 81. sation ouvert la 81. These iIlegal resolutions, which the United States forced the Organization of American States to adopt, have opened the door to arbitrary action and have brought the law of the jungle iuto international relations. J i J 82. We cannot foresee the effect of these resolutions on international peace and security. but they ·are a matter of particular conoern to world public opinion for this very reason. 82. et elles diale. 1.l .'i 83. Refel'ring to these resolutions, the representative of Ceylon said recently in the Security Council: "Here are a few questions which arise: cao a regional organization legally decide what kind of governments its members can have? Can a regional organization take sanctions against one of its members for reasons of the kind of government it has, 83. Ceylan 84. The representative of Brazil expressed,the same concern ln the First Committee when he said: " ... If we were to disregard the legal guarantees which should surround important political acts involving heavy responsibilities. we should shake the very foundations of international law. If international law is not respeeted, the rules of coexistence between peoples are a mere fiction; and the dangers of international illegaIity weigh most heavily on the small States which have no force at their disposai except the force of law." lJ 85. But the Meeting at Punta deI Este represented only one stage in a complex of measures which the United States i8 now taking against Cuba. Later events have shown that the United States needed the decisions taken at Punta deI Este to enable.it to aet behind the screen of a collective agency. The United States is now: putting pressure on the members of NATO to reduce or end their trade with Cuba. AlI these intrigues increase international tension in the Caribbean, and at any moment they could lead to a conflict of which the consequences cannathe foreseen. 86. Thus it is clear that the United States is using the illegal 1"esolutions of a regional agency of the United Nations in an attempt ta leadagrowing number of Members of the united Nations to commit actions inconsistent with the spirit and fundamental principles of the Organization. These actions not only undermine the United Nations, but endanger peace itself and international security. 87. These are the reasons why my delegation considers that the problem raised by the representative of Cuba should be plaeed on the agenda of the Security Couneil. We think the Security Couneil sbould make a detailed stucly of the resolutions of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation and should inquire into their lega1ity in the 11gbt of the fundamental principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter and of their possible consequences in international life. 88. If we refuse to adopt the agenda and to discuss these questions, this will mean that the Security Council has refused to fulfil the tasks for which it was established. li This statement was mal': ,'.t the 1234th meeting of the Flrst Com. mlttee. the official record of ,,\,ch is published only in summary form. 90. In his letter addressed ta the President of the security 'Couneil, the representative of Cuba charges that the United StateS'- Government has converted the Organization of American States into an instrument for aggression against Cuba. That charge has been made before and aiso rejected. Today it has been again refuted by the representative of ChUe, reflecting not only the views of bis own GO\ '.rument, but also tbose of the other Latin American countries. This particular cbarge of Cuba demonstrates that the question raised is unwortby of consideration by the Security Couneil. 90. Conseil le l'Organisation d'agression déjà réfutée qui gouvernement, l'Amérique question par 9;1.. Without going into the substance of the matter, 1 wish ta sayat· tbis stage that the Organization of American States, composed of the independent and sovereign American States, has always been tl'Ue ta its objectives, which are also the objectives of the United Nations. It is fully competent under Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations to deal with regional matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. My Government always has great respect for the opinions of those tweuty American Republics. We give great weight to their judgements. In the present case, we also respect their views and, for these reasons, my delegation is unable ta support the adoption of the agenda. 91. ment compose nent lesquels Nations des connaî'tre sant nationales. ment l'Amérique prix pectons gation jour [ 1 1 l 1,

1 speak now as the representa_ tive of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 92. maintenant ETATS-UNIS 1, 1 11 [ 93. Just one week aga today, on 20 February, the sixteenth session of the General Assembly concluded an exhaustive, audif 1 may say so, anexhausting consideration of the so-called Cuban complaint against the United States. During two long weeks Cuba and the other members of the communist bloc made exactly the same repetitive cold war charges against the United States and the same attacks on the Organization of American States and its decisions at Punta deI Este that are contained in the letter now before this Council and which the representatives of the Soviet Union and Romania have repeated tbis aiternoon. Not one of those charges was substantiated. Not one iota of proof was brought forward. It was as if 93. une très sant Unis Cuba tour accusé et américains deI la saisi et 94. Now the communist bloc seeks to bring this cold war item, so decisively defeated in the General Assembly, into the Security Council. This is a c1ear attempt, by misusing the processes of the United Nations. ta tenew the communist bIoc's propaganda offensive in its continued cold war against the free world. 95. My Government believes deeply in the principle that aIl nations, large or small, deserve a hearing in this Organization; but my Government also believes that the workings of our Organization should not he perverted and disrupted by constant repetition for propaganda purposes of groundless and self-serving charges that-have a1ready been thoroughly considered and thoroughly rejected. 96. In Us letter ta the President of the Security Councîl, the Cuhan communist rêgime hoped to create the impression that this is not the sarne itemthe sarne "grievance", to use the expression of the representative of Ghana-which has aLeady been so thoroughly diswssed in the First Committee. There are references to the Organization of American 8tates and to Article 53 of the UnitedNations Charter. This is merely a diversionary attempt ta create the erronous impression that there might be some reason for the security Council to go aIl over again the ground already sa completely covered by the General Assembly. Yet the Cuhan régime itself maIres it perfectly clear what it is reaIly talking ahout, and that these references to Article 53 are just an irrelevant backdrop for the same old charge that the United States, by means of coercion and interference, "is preparing the way for fuTther intervention, that is, direct armed aggression against our territory on a large seale" [8/5080J. This is preeisely the same charge which was sa thoroughly considered by the First Committee and so thoroughly rejected by the overwhelming vote of 50 to 11, with no support whatsoever outside the eleven communist votes. 97. As to Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations, the question of Security Connci! approval of decisions such as those taken by the Organization of American States at Punta deI Este was thoroughly discussed in 1960 in relation to the Dominican Republic. At that time the Organization of American States had decided that aU its members should break diplomatic relations with the then Governmeut of the Dominican Republic and should' partiaUy interrupt econoroie relations witb that Government, beginning with the immediate suspension of trade in arms and implementa of war. In accordance witb Article 54 of the Charter, these decisions were reported to the ·-1 "l' :! i '1 1 j, j ,1 98. The representative of the United States in the Security Council at that time said: nIt is noteworthy that Article 54 clearlyenvisages the possibility of activities by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security, in regard to which the responsibility of the regional organization to the Security Council is purely that of keeping it informed. "It is also noteworthy that, in the present instance, either of the actions which are being taken collectively by the members of the Organization of ;.\merican States could be taken individually by any sovereign nation on its own initiative.n [893rd meeting, paras. 49-50.1 99. The drait resolution subsequently sponsored by Argentina, Ecuador and the United States. therefore, simply ntook noten of the deeisions which the Organization of American States had taken. This resolution1l was adopted by 9 votes ta none, with 2 abstentions, those of the Soviet Union and Poland. The Council thereby rejected the Soviet contention that decisions of the sort with which we were then dealing-decisions which went much further than those taken at Punta deI Este-did require Security Council authorization. It ia even clearer that no authorization is required in the matter which we have been discussing this afternoon, and there is no more reason to go over this question again than there is to reconsider the other stale claims il). the Cuban letter. j 1 1 1 1 fi 100. At the sixteenth session of tbe General Assembly, the United States did not abject in the General CommUtee [138th meeting] to the inscription of the Cuban complaint. We did not object because we believed that, regardless of the falseness ofthe charges. ariy Member of the United Nations. should be free to have its complaint thOroughly consid~red by this Organization. Furthermore, we did not object when. after a six months' delay by Cuba. the item was carried over ta the second part of the sixteenth session. Now the item has had that thorough consideration. The Cuban régime had at its disposalover two weeks of the time of the General Assembly in which to present its case. The United Nations membership has rendered its decision. ·Despite the inten- ~I 1, 101. 1 now continue in my eapacity as PRESIDENT. The representative of Cuba had previously requested an invitation, under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to participate Î!l the discussion of the question proposed for our agenda. Late this aiternoon, he indieated to me his desire also to participate in the discussion on the adoption of the agenda. 1 might remind the members of the Council that it has been the practice of the Council that matters of procedure, such as the adoption of the agenda, should be decided upon by the Council memhers themselves, without the participation of non-Council members. In this regard, there have been several recent cases in whieh requests ta partieipate in the discussion on the adoption of the agenda have been refused by the Seeurity Couneil. For example, the members will recall that in 1960 the Union ofSouthAfrica requested permission of the Couneil to he heard on the adoption of the agenda. Again, in 1961, Portugal made a similar request. In bath instances, the Council deeided against granting such permission, on the ground that it is for the members of the CouncU ta decide on matters of procedure. If, however, any member of the CouncU wishes to propose that the representative of Cuba be seated for this purpose, 1 shall, of course, put this question for the decision of the Council.

Mr. President, 1 should like ta draw the Council's attention to the pravisional rule of procedure to which you yourself referred. Rule 37 reads as follows: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a memher of the Security Council may he invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security COUDcil when the Seeurity Couneil considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter ta the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter." 103. If we examine this rule ciosely, it becomes quite clear that in the present instance we have an example of the very case envisaged in the rule. Cuba, which is a Member of the United Nations but not a member of the Security Couneil, has brought a question before the Security Council. The interests of this Memher are specially affected by the question. So far, 1 think, there is na dispute on this score. Further, the letter of the representative of the Revo- 104. ter de au s'il 104. Uoder rule 37 we may decide ta invite the representative of Cuba ta participate in the discussion of the question submitted by Cuba. and to participate in the discussion of the question whether or not ta adopt the agenda. 105. le qui des se nellement les depuis s'en la le n'étaient surgi: Etat question des participer séance]. défaut. appel et fournir n'en tout qu'il produit, un à 105. You, Mr. President, have referred ta severai cases in which the Security CoUDcil declined ta invite non-members of the COUDcil to participate in the discussion of procedural questions. It i8 true that there have been such cases. There was, however, a case which 1 for one remember-and 1 think that members who have sat in the Couneil for sorne time or at least during the last year and a hall will very likely also rernember-when during one of the discussions of the question, as 1 recall, of the Congo, an invitation ta participate was extended to several non-members of the Council, and then a controversial question arose concerning the invitation of yet another non-member of the Council to participate in the discussion. The President extended ta the representative of Yugoslavia, one of the non-members, the right ta partieipate in that procedural discussion (899th meeting]. 1 think that my memory does not fail me in this instance. If members think back, they tao will remember this ·case, and 1 think that the Secretariat might supply us the necessary reference in this matter. The President has not given us this reference now, but perhaps he did not have in mind aIl the cases relating .to the present issue. 1 simply wish ta recall that there was such a case and that we therefore have a precedent where a non-member of tbe Council took part in a proceduraI discussion. 106. Thus it seems to me that on the basis of rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and tbe existing precedent, we may allow the representative of Cuba ta participate, without vote of course, in the discussion of the adoption of the agenda, and 1 make a formaI motion ta that effect. 1 would request you, Mr. President, ta put to the vote my motion ta invite the representative of Cuba ta participate in this discusEt.:on. 106. ticle précédent sentant bien et aux sentant ':i

1 am sure my colleagues will not hold it against me if 1 speak for a few minutes on tlie question we are now debating, which is whether to hear our Cuban colleague. 107. voudront minutes nous, 108. 1 listened carefully ta the explanations given by the representative of the Soviet Union and 1 must say frankly that 1 cannat agree with him. It is an established practice that rio Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council can be invited to take ~ place at the Council table until the agenda has been adapted. There are no exceptions ta this rule, which the Council has always interpreted very strictly, even if, in the debate before the adoption or rejection of the agenda, one or more members of the Council have tried tû" evade the rules of procedure by coming immediately ta the substance of the question. Even then the President must strictly adhere ta the rule laid down in Article 31 of the 108. cations dire, son de membre il tion pas prétée débat jour, à diatement 109. Our Soviet colleague told us that there has beeu one exception. 1 cau remember it myself, because 1 was pre,sent at that meeting of the Couneil. With aU respect to the representative who was then our President, 1 must say frankly that he made a mistake. This ia particularly clear because, when oue countryasked to speak after Yugoslavia on a proœdural question, the President, realizing his mistake, refused this request. Thus we have a firmly established practice and we should be making an innovation today if we were ta change U. 110. The representative of the Soviet Union has just told us that we should show common sense. well, let us show common sense for a moment: What is the question? It is whether we wish ta debate the substance of the matter or ta reject the proposed agenda and not ta debate the question. If we decide ta discuss the subsumce of the matter, 1 agree that we should admit the representative of Cuba ta this table. But if we are discussing the question'·whether or not we should adopt the agenda, then, according ta the established rule of this COl'.ncil, 1 do not think his presence at this table would be in order. 111. 1 thtnk that the essential decision we must take is whether or not we wish ta adopt the agenda. If we are not ready ta adopt U, 1 do not see how we cau agree to the presence of our Cuban colleague at this table. 1 say this Dot because 1 have any particular feelings about his Government-the French Government has diplomatie relations with Cuba-but simply because this is an established practice and 1 think it would be a serious matter if the Council were ta depart from it.

think that the President invited members of the Council ta speak on this subject of inviting a country which is not a member of the Security Council ta discuss the adoption of the agenda. The President has shawn tbat it was not usual for parties not members of the Council ta be invited while a discussion on the idoption of the aG~nda was taking place; he has given many examples. . 113. But 1 should like ta recall ta the members of this Council that there has been an exception, at least ône. In January 1948, while discussing the Ka,shmir question the President, who was then the representative of Belgium, said that it was. not usual for parties not members of the Security Council ta take part in discussions on the adoption ofthe agenda [231st meeting], but he proposed, however, that the Council make an exception. On that occasion, in view of the delicate nature of the question that the Indian representative had raised-the changing of the title of the

As there are no further speakers on this matter, 1 now put to the vote the motion of the representative of the Soviet Union that Cuba be invited to the table ta participate in the discussion of the adoption of the agenda, witbout vote. 114. autre question, sentant sentant cussion 1,

We now come to the adoption ,of the agenda. Does the representative of the Soviet Union wi8h to make a staternent? 115. venons l'ordre désire-t-il

,1 am afraid that 1 may 1 delay the members of the Council somewhat. 1 could Postpone my' statement until tomorrow if members 116. soviétiques) quelque d'ailleurs les je complémentaires sieurs arguments représentant 1", think it appropriate. If not, 1 shall venture to make a few additJonal remarks in connexion with the statements made here by sorne members of the Conncil and in connexion with the additional arguments advanced pllrticularly by the representative of tbe United states. :i 117. In the first place 1 must express my regret 117. que jugé participer du fond si Mais puisqu'elle ments pos 118. certain Cuba il. pour cussion chaque 1 that the majority of the Council did not find it pos- -- sible to invite the representative of Cuba to partici- ] pate in the discussion concerning the agenda, even j though it was clear to all that in form as well as in -1 substance this could have and should have been done "1 if we wished to have an objective discussion of the '1 matter. 1 shaH not, however, go further iuto this Î question, since it has already beeu disposed of, but 1 l shall refer to the further arguments voiced on the 1 subject of the agenda. ," 118. The representative of the United States said; 1 ~ daresay with sorne regret, that an exhaustive and ,,' ,p'drhaps eXdhausakting dliScus~ionhof Gthe CubaAil qUestbi10n , a alrea y t en p ace ln t e eneral ssem y. Well, that discussion was not exhausting so far as the Soviet delegation was concerned. Of course, each delegation expresses its reaction in the way it feels them. 119. l'opinion accusations s'agissait froide Nations pagande. 119. The further comments by the representative of the United States were mainly intended to show tbat the charges made in the course of the discussion were not proved, that this was a cold war item and that the workings of the United Nations and its organs should not be disrupted for propaganda purposes. 120. des 120. Regarding these comments of the representa- H'ire of the United States, 1 should like to cite a report 121. This 18 hardly our propaganda, and 1 think that what t8 reported in a United States newspaper and is not refuted by anybody does deserve some attention, particularly s'ince this person, Mirô Cardona, is weIl known as one of the organizers of the earlier in,vasion of Cuba in April 1961. If he so confidently says that IIthe United States has fought outside her own boundaries for democracy before and will do it again, 1 believell, and then adds that "we want the Organization of American States to conduct a joint action to free our countryll, then 1 think that this does after a11 deserve serious attention. These are the latest reports, published very recently. 122. Of course the United States could reject any charge out of hand il there were no real facts-but there are real facts. Was there not, after a11, an invasion in April of last year? Nobody could possibly deny it. And il, afterwards, the same organizers among the Cuban emigrants say that there will be another invasion, that this invasion will be aided and abetted by the United States and that the organizing role in the invasion will be played by the Org~niza­ tion of American States, then, inthe light of the !'ecent decisions at Punta deI Est.- and of a11 the recent actions of the United States, these are serious utterances, and we cannot afford to ignore them. 123. 1 should like to draw attention to' yet another facto The New York Herald Tribune, whiçh 1 believe is also a United States newspaper and not a Russian one, states in an editorial, also quite recently: IIProfessor Walt W. Rostow has been in Paris on a mission to persuade our NATO allies to reduce or eliminate their trade with Cuba. But the mission itself cuts a strange figure. First at Punta deI Este we unsuccessfully sought a complete and final condemnation of Cuba by the Lati.n Americanrepublics. Now we are asking Europe ta take the pledge too. Could such agreement by our NATO allies be worth risking a refusaI of it? How much does Cuba depend al; present on Western Europe for its foreign currency earnings? Would it not be better to ask the countries that may trade with Cuba not to, individually and discreetly?1I This is an editorial, a leading article, and not simply a correspondent's item. The New York Herald Tribune appaJ;'ently knows something, anyway. 125. What, then, is the situation? To begin with, in the United States itself those who organized the inter- 125. Etats-Unis d'avril intervention et le sentants, ses commerce vention last April are saying that a new ip.tervention . will take place and that both the United States and the Organization of American States will be taking !' ,:.1 part in it. Secondly, the United States Government .. has sent Us representatives, of whom 1\,1'. Rostow is " one, to Paris for the purpose of persuading its NATO .j allies ta reduce or break off their trade with Cuba. '! 126. Now we are being told that all this is propa- 126. propagande, Non, est pourquoi propagande : ganda and part of the cold war. 1 disagree. This is . aldn to' a shooting war since the point at issue is the preparations for a new invasion. That is why we can- 1 not dismiss it simply as a matter of propaganda or :1 of the cold war. ] 127. peut a débat et de gande je question qu'il ;'1' 127. Besides, 1 must say that in my opinion our discussion today can hardly be described as being in l the spirit of the cold war. We have had a calm and i i reasoned discussion in which arguments were put '.,,1" forward and defended in order to prove a case and not simply to be dismissed as a matter of propaganda or the cold war. In any event, the evidence 1 have just adduced indicates that this is far from being 1 a matter of propaganda or the cold war, but that we are dealing with preparations for a shooting war. . 128. The United States representative has referred ta the discussion which took place concerning the decision 'of the Latin American States in 1960 regard- '! ing the Dominican Republic. He has asserted that the Security Counci! rejected a Soviet request to the effect that aH actions taken withregardtothe Dominican Republic allegedly required Security Council endorsement. 1 must say, however. that the United States representative has misinformed the Security Counci!. The Council did not reject any Soviet proposaI, nor could it have done so, since no Soviet proposaI was put to the vote. 128. concernant américains blique sécurité laquelle République le Etats-Unis pas faire, mise 129. A vote was taken on a Latin American proposaI which took note of the statement or, more precisely, the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States. That was a11. There was no rejection of any Soviet request by the Council. Furthermore, it is cornmon knowledge that when the decision to "take notel! was adopted, the USSR representative stated that we regard this "taking note "as constituting an endorsement of the decision by the Organization of American States. This is our interpretation. While it ie true that the United States representative has said that he does not subscribe to the point of view, disagreement between two members of the Security Council is of course possible, particularly when they happen to be the representatives of the United States 129. d'Amérique ou Etat.;; d'une de l'Union le approbation Etats chose. a Conseil' d'accord, de 131. Lastly, the United States representative has referred ta Article 54 of the United Nations Charter, which states fuat: nThe Security Couneil shaH at aIl Urnes he kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security." The United States representative relied on this Article in an attempt to prove that regional organizations may deal with questions of the maintenance of international peace and security, merely keeping the Security Council informed of their activities. He would have been right if Article 54 was the only relevant Article. There is, however, also Article 53 to which we have aU been referring and which cannot be ignored. It states without any ambiguity that: " •.. no enforcement action can be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council". Article 53 exists, it is part of the Charter and as such cannot be dismissed. 132. Consequently, what the United States representative must now do is ta prove that no enforcement action has been taken. He has not, however, done this. He has merely said that Article 53 does not apply, but saying such a thing is not enough; one must prove it. We, for our part, argue that any action of· th~ kind takeQ at Punta deI Este constitutes enforcement action. Indeed, how can it be said that the breaking-off of trade relations or expulsion from the Organization on grounds which make readmission conditional on a change of system is not enforcement action? It is clear to one and aU that this is enforcement action and strong enforcement action at that. 133·. If we refer to the provisions of the United Nations Charter we shaU see, as we aU know, that the expulsion of a Member requires a decision by the Security Council, which must then be confirmed by the General Assembly. Furthermore, Article 18 of the Charter provides that "the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership" is one of the important questions which require a two-thirds majority. 134. The United States has suspended Cuba's rights and privileges in a regional organization, but the United States representative nevertheless argues that that ts not enforcement action but something quite natural and in the order ôf things. But who does he expect to convince, and who can prove this when he himself cannot prove it? 135. Everyone knows that the United States has excluded Cuba from the membership not only of the OAS but also of the Military Defence Committee. According to press reports the United States even had Cuba's chair removed from the conference room at Washington. This was done before any decision 136. The United States representative has notproved anything ta us in this respect. He has merely beeu asserting that Article 53 of the Charter does Dot apply. We, on the other hand, maintain that it does apply, and if we had the opportunity for a full discussion of the question, the United States would come to realîze that it does not have a single provision of the Charter or any legal or moral arguments on its side. 136. êtes ne que procéder reconnaître vous sur 137. It is precisely because the United States representative is unable to defend his position that he is objecting to the agenda's being approved. He realîzes that there are serious flaws in his position and that he cannot defend it; nor to use his own words, does he waut to get involved in another exhausting discussion of this question. 137. l'ordre défendre comporte maintenir, encore épuisant. 138. He will appreciate, however, that there are many things we might want or not want in a particular United Nations organ. The maintenance of peace and security, however, requires the members of the Security Counci! ta hold discussions, even tbough they may be exhausting and unpleasant, because worid peace is at stake. If we want the United Nations ta play a positive part in the matter, we cannot shun discussions of such questions merely because the United States representative finds them exhausting or unpleasant or because the United States is the guilty party. 138. ou dans tien du cussions, paix nisation pouvons simplement qu'elle coupable. 139. est bilité, lecture 139. This is precisely what the United States does uot want proved. This is the crux of the matter. The fact of its guilt is however demonstrated by the latest reports 1 have just quoted. 140. nérale contre Etats-Unis, des vote. Alors Vous d'Etats tement pas Beaucoup nette en prendre savez vous les faits velle 140. The representative of the United States is invoking the fact that the voting in the General Assembly did not confirm the charges against his country, but the representative of the United States is well aware that over hall the members of the General Assembly did not take part in the voUng at aIl. He is also aware of the reasons why they behave that way. SA why does he feigu ignorance? He knows full well that the overwhelming majority of States did notwant, by casting their votes, ta come out openly for one side or the other. 1 shaH not go iuto tbeir motives because they are known ta every one of you. Many of these States took a definite stand during the debate, and this stand was not favourable ta the United States. It is precisely because the United States representative knows that the position of many neutral States will not be favourable to the United States that he does not want a new discussion and so he says that the charges were not upheld. But facts will remain facts, and they are there to show that a new intervention is being prepared. This is the cr~of the matter. 141. 1 say ta the United states representative that try as hard as you may to stifle the discussion by using the majority you command in the Security 141. disposez une

1 wonder if the representative of the Soviet Union would, in view of the lateness of the hour. agree ta walve the consecutive interpretatian. This, of course, would not create a precedent.

Since it appears that this question will not he concluded at today's meeting, 1 am prepared to dispense with the interpretation.

There being nofurtherspeakers on my Hst 1 shall put to a vote the provisional agenda. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Ghana, Romania, Union of SovietSocialist Republics, United Arab Republic. Agafnst: None. Abstafnfng: Chile, China, France, Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela. The result of the vote was 4infavour. none against. with 7 abstentions. The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m. AFRICAjAFRI QUE BElGIUM/BELGIQUE: ET MESSAGERIES DE 14·22. rue du Persil. CZECHOSLOVAKIA/TCH ÊCOSLOVAQU CESKOSLOVENSKY NarOdn; nida 9, Praha DENMARK/DANEMARK: EJNAR MUNKSGAARD, N1lrregade 6. K\!lbenhavn. F1NLAND/FINLANDE: AKATEEMINEN KIRJAKAUPPA 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki. FRANCE: tOITlONS 13. rue Soufflot, Paris GERMANY (FEO!,RAL ALLEMAGNE (REPUBLIQUE R. EISENSCHMIDT Schwanthaler Str. 59. ELWERT UND MEURER Haupt"trasse 101, Berlin.Schoneberg. ALEXANDER HORN Spiegelgasse g. Wiesbaden. W. E. SAARBACH Gertrudenst'asse 30, GREECE/GRê:CE: LIBRAIRIE KAUFFMANN 28. rue du Stade, Athènes. IC.ELANO/ISLANDE: BOKAVERZLUN SIGFUSAR EYMUNOSSONAR H, AUSlurstraeti 18, Reykjavik. IRELAND/IRLANDE: Dublin. ITALY/JTALIE: L1BRERIA COMMISSIONARIA Via Gino Capponi 26, & Via D. A. Azuni lSfA, LUXEMBOURG: LIBRAIRIE SCHUMMER Place du Théâtre, Luxembourg, NETH ERLAN DS/PAYS_BAS: N. V. MARTINUS NIJHOFF Lange Voorhout 9, 's·Gravenhage, NORWAY/NORVÈGE: JOHAN GRUNDT TANUM Karl Johansgate, 41, PORTUGAL: L1VRARIA 186 Rua Aurea, Lisboa, SPAIN/ESPAGNE: L1BRERIA BOSCH 11 Ronda Universidad, L1BRERIA MUNDI·PRENSA Castellô 37, Madrid. SWEDEN/SUÈDE: C. KUNGL. HOVBOKHANDEL Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm. SWITZERLAND/SUISSE: LIBRAIRIE PAVOT, S. LaUsanne, Genève, HANS RAUNHARDT Kirchgasse 17, Zürich TURKEY/TURQUIE: LIBRAIRIE HACHETTE 469 Istlklal Caddesi, UNION OF SOYIET SOCIALlST CAMEROUN: LIBRAIRIE DU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Gérante, B. P. 1197, Yaoundé. ETHIOPIA/ÉTHIOPIE: INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY, P.O, Box :20, Addis Ababa. GHANA: UNIVERSITY BùOKSHOP University College 01 Ghana, Legon, Accra. MOROCCO/MAROC: CENTRE DE DIFFUSION DOCUMENTAIRE DU B.E.P.!., 8, rue Michaux·Bellaire, Rabat. SOUTH AFRICA/AFRIQUE DU SUD: VAN SCHAIK'S BOOK STORE (PTY,l, LTD. Church Street, Box 724, Pretoria. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/ RÉPUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE: LIBRAIRIE "LA RENAISSANCE D'EGYPTE" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha, Cairo. ASIAjASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE: CURATOR, GOVT. BOOK DEPOT, Rangoon. CAMBODIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMËRE DE LIBRAIRIE Imprimerie & Papeterie, S.... R. L.. Phnom·Penh. CEYLON/CEYLAN: LAKE HOUSE BOOKSHOP Assoc. Newspapers of Ceylon, P, 0, Box 244, Colombo. CHINA/CHINE: THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTD. 99 Chung King Road, Ist Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD. 211 Honan Road, Shanghai. HONG KONG/HONG_KONG: THE SWINDON BOOK COMPANY 25 Nathan Road, Kowloon. INDJA/JNDE: ORIENT LONGMANS Bombay, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Madras & New Delhi. OXFORD BOOK & STATIONERY COMPANY Calcutta & New Delhi. P. VARADACHARY & COMPANY Madras. INDONESIA/INDONÉSIE: PEMSANGUNAN, LTD. Gunung Sahari 84, Djakarta. JAPAN!JAPON: MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD. 6 Tori·Nichome, Nlhonbashi, Tokyo. KOREA (REP. OF)/CORÉE (RÉP. DE): HJL·YOO PUBLISHING CO.. LTD. S, 2·KA, Chongno, Seoul. PAKISTAN: THE PAKISTAN CO·OPERATiVE BOOK SOCiETY Dacca, East Pakistan_ PUBLISHERS UNITED, LTO. Lahore. THOMAS & THOMAS Karachi. PHILIPPINES: ALEMAR's BOOK STORE 769 Rizal Avenue, Manlla. ~~~?E~lg~~:EP~~zL~'t~~sA~gglr~'k~~TES KNYIGA, SmOlenskaya UNITED KINGDOM/ROYAUME.UNI: H. M. STATIONERY P, O. Sox 569, London, (and HMSO branches BristOl, Cardill, Edinburgh, YUGOSLAVIA/yOUGOSLAVIE: CANKARJEVA ZALOZBA Ljubljana, Siovenia. DRZAVNO PREDUZEéE Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Beograd. PROSVJETA 5, TrI' Bratstva i Jedinstva, PROSVETA PUBLISHING Import·Export Divi.ion, Terazije 16/1, Beograd. SINGAPORE/SINGAPOUR: THE CITY BOO~. STORE, LTD., eollyer Quay. THAILAND/THAILANDE: PRAMUAN MIT, LTD. 55 Chakrawat Road, Wat Tuk, B-angkok. VIET_NAM (REP. OF/RÉP, OU): LIBRAIRIE-PAPETERIE XUAN THU 185, rue Tu-do, B. P. 2B3, Saïgon. EUROPE AUSTRIA/AUTRICHE: GEROLD & COMPANY Graben 31, Wien, 1. 6, WÜLLERSTORFF Markus SittikusstraS5e 10, Salzburg. Orders and inquiries Irom countries where sales agencies have not yet been Dr to Sales Section, United Nations. Pala;s Les commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays o~ il n'e~iste ONU, New York (E,·U,), OU â la Section des ventes, Priee: $U,S. 0.35 (or equîvalent Litho în V.N.