S/PV.992 Security Council

Before taking up the consideration of our agenda, 1should like ta express the gratitude of the members of the Security COlmcil to Mr. 8tevenson, the UnitedStates representative, for his skilful guidance of the Council's work dUl"ing the month of February, when he was in the Chair. 1. nous voudrais des sécurité tant de 2. 1 should like ta exten:d this gratitude also ta Mr. Plimpton, who served as President at the last meeting of the Council, in Mr. Stevensonls absence. 2. M. réunion 3. de le aimables nant sécurité ont quable temps. paroles M. mercie.

Mr. President, may 1 tell you how grateful 1 am for your most gracious words about rny services ta the Security Council during the last month. It occurs ta me, my services were particularly distinguished by the fact that 1 was able ta be out of town rnost of the month. AlI the sarne, 1 am deeply appreciative of \",'i.at you have said, and 1 am sure my colleague, Mr. Plimpton, is likewise. Thank you, Sir. 1 1 .1 j ;j, Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. 1 11 .1 ..! Lettre, 4. signaler du qui question a Cuba cussion. letterdated 8 Marc:h 1962 from the Permanent Representa~ tive of Cuba to the President of the Security Counc:il (5/5086)

Iwish ta inform the Council that 1 have received a letter dated 13 March 1962 [S/5088] from therepresentative of Cuba requesting that he he allowed ta participate in the discussion of this item in the Council. Therefore, il there are no objections,·1 shall invite the representative of Cuba to take part in the discussion, without the l'ight of vote.

when the question of Angola was being diseussed in the General Assembly, a certain representative spoke the following words: Il••• Men and nations always run the risk ofthinking that their grievanees are unique and that their impatience is justified. If the numerous instruments of peaceful change and peaceful settlement do not provide a solution acceptable tethem, there is a great temptation to claim that the possibilities for peaceful settlement have been exhausted, that the situation can no longer be tolerated and that there is 'no alternative' ta a resort to force. But 1 submit that in 1962 bath the risks and the responsibilities must be pondered \Vith the greatest of care. Even in 1945, before the age of atomic weapons had really begun, men and nations concluded that the holocaust of war \Vas too terrible tobe an instrument of poUcy, and it was for that reason thatthisQrganü;ation \Vas created, \Vith its ways and means for tackling the grievances, the disputes and the injustices which vexed us. "The provisions of the Charter are quite clear. Article 2, paragraph 3. states that 'AlI Members shaU settle their international disputes by peaceful means T. This Organization, over the sixteen years of its life, has built wisely upon related Charter provisions. We have available a wide range ofinstruments through which peaceful change can be facilitated and peaceful settlement effected." !J Later on he said: "If anyone in our world feels that his case is special or Sa unique that international procedures can be ignored and obstacles crushed by military force, let him consider the risks. Can exceptions be made from standards of conduct we have aU accepted without risk1ng fuat they will he foUowed in other cases? Can anyone believe that the use of force can he prohibited in certain types of national diSpUtes if it is allowed in others? ln our inter-dependentworId what 1s done in one place, however remote, reverberates around the globe, and the implications grow as they travel. No longer is it possible ta rely on conflicts being localized. If one of us taIres the law into his own hands he may force the hand of others who also feel that they have special cause. The representative who spoke in this fashion was the representative of the United States of America and he used these wards at the very time at which ·his country's Secr,?tary of State was using the powerful resources of the Government of the United States to persuade the Foreign Ministers of America toimpose collective enforcement measures on Cuba, contrary to international law and in violation of it. 7. This contrast between the wards of the United states representatb'e in the General Assembly and the attitude of his Secretary of State at the Meeting at punta deI Este1/ was due ta the fact that in the United Nations the United States was defending a colonialist military ally, while at Punta deI Este the United States Government was confronting the Government of a amall Member State which is fighting colonialism, nationalizing foreign companies. wiping out illiteracy and elimi.nating racial discrimination; li. Gov€'rnment which does not belong to any military alliance and which, of aU the Governments which met at Punta deI Este, was the only one that hact actually been the victim of aggression.. 8. Genocide in Angola and aggression against the people of Angola put the United States Government in the position of seeking to avoid eanctions by any means. Yet illegai enforcement measures had to be taken against the triumphant nationalliberation movement in Cuba, the object of United States armed aggression. 9. Thus at Punta deI Este collective eniorcement measures were adopted against Cuba in violation of regional instruments and of the principles ofthe United Nations Charter. And these illegal decisions have been implemented without the approval ofthe Security Council, which is required for such measures. In other words, resolutions'[see S/5075] that are unlawful have been taken and unlawfully put into effect in a twofold violation of the United Nations Charter and i.ntern.ational law and of the competence and hierarchical position of this Council. AlI these unlawful and unfriendly activities were carried out in support of aggressive acts of international piracy committed against Cuba by the United States Government and in order ta conceal fresh acts of aggression which are being prepared against my country. 10. When we say that the Punta deI Este decisions are contrary ta the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocai Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947.U Wlder whichthe meetingwas called, contraryto Y.!!1.!.!!:. paras. 39_40. y Eighth Meeting of C<:>nsultation of Minist;rs of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta dei Este, Uruguay, trom 22 to 31 January 1962. V United Nations, Treary Series. vol. 21 (1948). l, No. 324 !!.. H. The procedure of c'Jnsultation between representatives of the countries of the American continentwas instituted at the Inter-American Conference f0r the Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires, from 1 to 23 December 1936, inordertodefend the American Continent against extracontinental aggression. From the start, the Organ of Consultation was conceived as: an instrument for the collective defence of the security of the continent against acts of aggression by externa1 Powers. 12. Thus a Meeting of Consultation requires, from the outset, as an indispensable prerequisite, the prior occurrence of an act or situation of attack, of effective aggression. of real and positive danger to the peace and security of tbe American continent. It is, by its very nature, an extrao-rdinary and emergency type of international procedure. The history of Meetings Consultation held since the 1936 Conference proves beyond a11 doubt the validity of these arguments. 13. These arguments are confirmed also by the Act Of Chapultepec and the Inter-American Treaty Reciprocal Assistance; in fact at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held Mexico City in 1945, theprincipleofco11ectivedefence was defined and stated categorica11y as follows Resolution VIII (Act of Chapultepec): lIAny attempt on the part of a 110n-American State against the integrity Or inviolahility of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shaH he considered as an act of aggression against aH the American States. n Hence the attack, actof aggression, or violation of territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence constitutes an ineluctable and essential precondition for any Meeting of Consultation. 14. In compliance with the Act of Chapultepec, an Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance Continental. Peace and Security was held at Petropolis, State of Rio de Janeiro, from 15 Augustto 2 September 1947, to determine the measures to he appliedas sanctions against an aggressor nation. At this Conference it was specified once again with the utmost clarity that there must necessarily he an asgression, a definite and positive attack on the territory or sovereignty of a State, for the machinery of international solidarity and collective defence to be called into operation. addition, it was decided at this Conference that the organ must he convened on the request, complaint or proposaI of the State or States directly attacked. 15. These are the antecedents whichformedthebasis for the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty y !!Wb. vol. 119 (1952). 1. No. 1609. 16. ·These facts, which form the background of the In"tsr-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, must necessarily he borne in mind when interpreting the treaty, in arder to clarify the meaning and purpose of those provisions under which the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in question was convened at the Colombian representative's request;§J 17. When trying to discover the real meaning ufthe provisions of international treaties ft is a good rule of legal inn ::-pretation to investigate the circumstances in which they were negotiated. We havealreadyinvestigated the background of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in connexion with the real motives which may serve ta set in motion the collective defence machinery-in this case the Meeting of Consultation-what these real motives must be in each case, and who is entitled to initiate the extraordinary and emergency procedure of consultation, These real motives, these effective and unmistakable causes, must he genuine "attacks" on any American State. These nattacksn, according ta articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Treaty, may he armed attacks or aggression of auother kind, but in the latter case they must reveal themselves in acts 'which imply aggression or which unmistakably and objectively affect the peace and security of the continent. 18. Organs of public law-unlike individuals, whomay do anything that the law does not prohibit-are only entitled to do what is authorized in the law under which they were constituted. Cons~quently,whentheyexceed their mandate, they place themselves in a position of absolute incapacity for objective action; in other words, they act arbitrarily, outside the law. 19. Let us look more closely into the legal aspect of the problem which we are submittingforthe consideration of the Security Council. Article 6 of the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was tbe provision whicb was used to authorize the convening of the Eigbth Meeting of Consultation.. The article reads as follows: "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shaIl meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must he taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or. in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defence and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." 21. If we examine article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance carefully, we shaH seE.' that lts provisions not only define specifie facts and situations, but also that the facts and situations enumerated quite clearly depend grammatically and logically on the conditional proposition with which the article opens. In other words, for a Meeting of Consultation ta he held it is essential that there should in fact have occurred one of these three situations: an aggression which is not an armed attack; an extracontinental or intracontinental confUet; any other faet or situation that might endanger the peace of America. 22. This enumeration is specüic and exclusive, not simply d,emonstrative or declaratory. The provision refers speeificaUy to "an aggressionlr , "a conflict", "Olny other faet or situation", in other wordsto events that have occurred in the real world; or, ta use the phraseology of the article itself, it is necessary that the American States should have been affected by an aggression, conflict, fact or situation. The article refers to something which has really occurred and not to fantastic suppositions. h L ' 23. Our exegesis of the article does not, however, end here. It will also he observed that each of the situations specifically enumerated depends upon the original proposition, namely, that the "aggression", "conflict", "fact" or "situation" should affect the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of an American 8tate. 24. The Colombian proposaI did not state which American State had been affected or what type of aggressioo, conflict, fact or situation had so affeeted it; what \Vas proposed was that the Organ of Consultation should enter into the examinatioo of hypothetical questions and shouId inelude in the concept of "threat of aggression" facts or situations which are compIetely irrelevant from the point of view of international Iaw, since they faU within the sole competence of eaeh American 8tate, as is the case with the economic and social régime which the Cuhan people in full exercise of their sovereignty baveadopted for themselves. 25. These circumstances were sufficient in themselves to require the rejection of the Colombian propOAa1. Nevertheless, the Council of the Organization of American States took up that request, ignoring the system laid down in the Inter-American Treaty of ReciprocaI Assistance, a treaty which can come ioto operation only after the occurrence of specific situations which clearly and unroistakably threaten the peace or the security of the continent. 26. This argument was put forward by the Mexican representative at a meeting of the Council of the Or- 27. It must therefore be ;:;oncluded that the Meeting of Consultation was invalid from the start, because the fundamental prior condition 'required by the international law in force, namely the occurrence of a fact or a situation which genuinely and effectively threatened the peace or the security of the continent, was lacking. ~i 1 28. Nor was it permissible to invoke, in support of the Colombian proposal, article 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the opening paragraph of which states: "In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following shaH be considered as such ..." 28. la interaméricain graphe qui, caractérisés sidérés 29. It is true that fuis provision admits that the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression "other actslf in addition to those specifically enumerated in the two following paragraphs, but neither article 9 nor any other article in the treaty authorizes the Organ to consider hypothetical situations, or to define new types of aggression having no analogy with those defîned in sub-paragraphs a and bofthe article. Above aIl, these "other acts", accordfng ta article 6 of the treaty. must affect the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of sorne American State. 29. réunion actes ceux alinéas autre pour définir pas définis ces du grité politique 30. The function of the .organ of Consultation is oot to define new types of aggression but to "consider problems of an urgent nature and of cornmon interest to the American States" as laid down in general terms in article 39 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. Its function is to consider the "measures" to he adopted to counter an aggression already committed and not to prevent a possible aggression. As the Chilean representative said at the meeting of the COWlcil of the OASon4 December 1961: 30. de "d'étudier d'urgence américains à Etats sures agression agressions sentant l'OEA "We are being asked to wideo the scope of the Treaty of Rio de Janiero and of the Charter of the ûAS itself, which in its article 25 textually reproduces the provisions of article. 6 of that treaty .... The system established at Rio goes ioto effect for the specifie reasons enumerated in the treaty ...If 31. In connexion with the meaning ta he attributed ta the opening paragraph of article 9 of the Inter- American Treaty ofReciprocal Assistance, the Chilean representative quoted the following paragraph from the book by the Colombian Foreign Minister entitled El panamericanismo: 31. paragraphe ricain a panamericanismo, affaires "The article expressly defines two cases of aggression and authorizes the Organ of Consultation to inr1ude otheTs. This implies a difference of proced" :' in the two instances. Thus, in the two situation... "xpressly envisaged, the aggression is defined americano, l 1/ Antomo Cornez Robledo. eu;,--,>~,g,~=,de'd"-",o}e'e"c"~''-'e',-=cl,-,,,oe'ue'e'o'''''' amenca"o f' '- co a,.", 1960}. - ., 32. The representative of Colombia, despite the views of his Foreign Minister and without author-itytodo so, managed to induce the Council of the OAS to Gonvene a Meeting of Consultation for the purpose of defining new types of aggression in the : :}:t of hypothetical facts or situations, giving a.., ;lrbitrary interpretation to articles 6 and 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 33. Furthermore. it is extremely debatable whether article 9 is applicable, since it authorizes the Organ of Consultation to "characterize as aggression" other acts than those exclusively Hsted in its sub-paragraphs ~ and :Q.. l must point out that the Charter of the Organization of American States-apart from ranking higher in the international order-is of a later date than the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistanqe, and although article 25 of the Charterwhich reproduces article 6 of the Treaty-states at the end that nthe American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defence, shaH apply the measures andprocedures established in the special treaties on the subjectn, which implies a partial' ratification of the Treaty in question, such a provision does not entitle the Organ of Consultation to define new types of aggression beyond those limitatively listed in article 25 of the Charter. 34. In regard to the application of rules intime, it is a general principle of law that an earliergeneral rule is superseded by a later specific one whenever there is any conflict between them. Article 25 ofthe Charter of the OAS defines, specifically and exclusively, the various types of aggression that are "not an armed attack". Consequently, the Organ of Consultation cannot embark upon new definitions; its task is to apply the relevant rula in t'\1e Charter to the case submitted. for its consideration. !ts function is similar to that of a jurü,dictional body, which does not define a crime but confines itself to the task of considering the act within the framework of the mIe. In the inter-American system the Organ of Consultation has the judicial function, while the Inter-American Conference has the constitutive and legislative function. 35. According to article 25 of the Charter ofthe OAS, the special treaties in force apply only in respect to what are specifically refert'ed to as nmeasures and procedures" 36. In short, a 711eeting of Consultation can he held only for the purpose of consideringurgentproblemsof cornmon interest in the light of specific facts or situa- §j José Josquin Caicedo Castills, El pansmericallismo (Buenos Aires, Roque Depalma. 19(1). p. 193. 37. The concept of collective aggression is clearly set forth in article 24 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, which reads as follows: 37. définit son "Every act of aggression by aState against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shaH he considered an act of aggression against the other American states." Oniy when the situation defined in that article arises can article 19 of that sarne Charter he regarded as taking effect, under which the principles ofnon-intervention and the inviolability of national territory (articles 15 and 17) may be disregarded when the specifie purpose is the "maintenance of peace and security". C'est peut charte, non-intervention tional de 38. In other words, collective self-defence is sanctioned in articles 19 and 24. Both articles, however, must be taken' in conjunction with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which states: 38. sacrent Mais de savoir: "Nothing in the present Charter shaH impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary ta maintain internationalpeace and security ...." 39. Only on that assumption of armed attack can the exception provided for in article 19 of the Charter of the Organization ofAmerican States take effect. Otherwise each and every one of the States which are associated in that Organization for geographical reasons is contractually bound by the provisions of articles 15 and 17 of its Charter, which enshrine the principles of non-intervention and the inviolability of the territory of each State. And here it is necessary to emphasize that, under article 15, the principle of nonintervention "prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements". 39. sion l'article américains. tous des dispositions quels celui Et sister ploi toute tatoire tiques, 40. Furthermore, self-defence is a juridical institution that has received ample study in criminal law. The accepted authorities and current criminal law bath lay down as a basio condition for the invoking of self-defence the existence of an unjust act of aggression neither provoked nor purposely sought by the person defending hîmself. 'l'he first part of that proposition is restricted to any act of assault committed without justifiable reason on another person with a view to causing him harm. The second part covers what the accepted authorities have called the npretext of self-defence", in other words'the manufacturing of a spurious state of necessity. In such a case there' is, logically, no state of necessity. It has rightly been said that the persqn acting in selfdefence must behave with' a certain candour, which meanE tha~ the concept of self-defence cannot be 4G. tution pénal. exigent. puisse agression bérément de contre quelconque, élément texte de hypothèse, lement justement, d'où 42. In the case of the Colombian proposaI we are nnquestionably faaad with a pretence of self-clefence, sinee an attempt has beau made ta manufacture a threat of aggresston out of hypothetical situations in order ta establish grounds for collective self-clefence. The assurnption ts more or 1ess as follows: if Cuba ts socialîst, it is a satellite of the "Sino-Soviet system" and therefore coustitutes a threat ta the peace and security of America. Such a conclusion is based on two faise premi8e8: first, that Cuba i8 a satellite of the socialist countries; and secondly, that those countries constitute a threat to world peace. 43. It is also important to remember that existing international law does not recognize putative selfdefence, let alone false self-defence. When a nation is subjected to an armed attack-as was Cuba in April 1961, when we had to defend ourselves against the invading forces sent against our independent Government by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and did so victoriously, thanks to the strength of our people-It has an absolute and unlimited right ta defend itself. When it is threatened by imminent aggression, it can only take preventive action, taking account of the real emergency of the dat:J,ger; it cannot demand sanctions, since they can only be imposed when aggression has actually taken place. That i8 the opinion of the most authoritative writers on internationallaw. Bath Hans Kelsen andSirW. EricBeckett21 are of the view that the rightafself-defence under the Charter is limited to action after an armed attack has occurred.!:.QI 44. It should also be remembered that on 1950 the report of the Investigation Committee of the Organ of Consultation, established in connexion with the question that arose between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, had this to sayon the subject: "The Committee holds, therefore, that the attitude of any American Government resorting to the threat or the use of force, even ongrounds of self-defence, in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, and without having made every reasonable attempt at peaceful settlement, constitutes a violation of the essential norms of Inter- American relationships." 45. This means that no State or group of Stateswhich is the case of the Organization of American 2J See Hans Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations (New York, Frederick A. praeger Ine., 1950), p. 791, and Sir W. Erie Beckett, The North Atlantic Treaty. the BrusselsTretltyand the Olarter of the United ~ (London, Stevens and Sons Ltd.. 1950), Po 13. !QI See Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr.. Non-Imervention (Dalias. Southern MethodiSt Univeristy Press, 1956), p. 124, iOOtiiOte 91. 46. As the Cuban internationalist, Antonio Sânchez de Bustamante, has said: "The independence and sovereignty of weak States becomes an empty phrase when any strong State cao impose its will upon them by aIl kinds of coercive measures, making itself the sole arbiter of their expediency, timeliness and scope ... No rule of law should be of such a nature that in a community of equals the powerful nations can use it as they wish and the meek nations cannot invoke or apply it. Any juridical rule or recourse which operates only ta. the advantage of a few and ta the detriment of the others constitutes a monopoly and a privilege and therefore ine.vitably becomes an injustice."!!! 47. The Charter of the Organization of American States represented the culmination of the struggle \.Jegun by the peoples of Latin America against the reprehensible right of intervention, used so often by the Government of the United States throughout the history of our continent for motives so clear in aIl cases as to constitute the best proof that it should be repudiated. Intervention is not arightand,conversely, in upholding the honour of international lUe, nonintervention is the most sacred of duties. That is why the principle of non-intervention bas always beeu regarded as the cornerstone of the so-called inter- American system. devraient non-intervention que 48. When a juridical system created precisely to ensure respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of the American States is used as an instrument for legalizing arbitrary action, it becomes a hateful and contemptible weapon. when arrangements for the protection of the security, integrity and independence of nations become instruments ofdomination for the use of a great Power, free peoples will become enslaved peoples and international treaties and organs will he nothing but tools of oppression. 49. How cao the Organization of American States provide safeguards for the self-determination, sovereignty. independence. security or peace of our peoples if the interpretationofthecriterlalaiddown in international treaties is left to the whim ofa mechanieal majority? 50. The representative of Colombla, in defending his proposaI, admitted that article 6 ofthe Inter-American T-reaty of Reeiprocal Assistance was not applicable in this case, and he quoted the opinion of his Foreign Minister on the subjeet, as expressed in the book El panamericanismo. The relevant passage reads as follows: "... the applicability of the article is !i.mited by its terms, from which it follows that the existence of an action or situation likely to endanger peace is not sufficientj in addition, that action or situation must affect the inviolability, territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independellce of aState. !li Antonio Sâncbez de Bustamante y Sirv;;n, Derecho int"rnacional ~ (Havana. 1933), vol. 1. pp. 310-31/.. 52. Those were the circumstances inwhich the Eighth Meeting of Consultation \Vas convened. the original pretext having been changed and the Meeting made rest on hypothetical faets for the purpose of creating an imaginary threat ta the peace and secnrity of the continent. 53. Thus the following faise hypotheses were developed: first, poUticai propaganda or political, economic or military aSsistance for the purpose overthrowing a foreign Government; secondly, extracontinental intervention designed to impose on American State a form of political and social organization which would violate its sovereignty and independence; thi:i:'dly, establishment of mîlitary bases designed to threaten the countries of the continent and to ensure the predominance of certain lines offoreign policy favouring extracontinental Powers. 54. None ofthose false hypotheseswas contained inthe original proposaI, no+" were any of them substantiat€.'Ci at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation. Consequently, the decisioJ;ls taken at the Meeting have no real foundation. 55. His proposaI, saidthe representative of Colombia, was "limited to consideration of those situations"", and "does not contain", he added. "anyelementwhich might he regarded as an act of intervention; ... in any event, there was article 19 of the Charter ofthe Organization of American States. which settled the ~atter ..." And he concluded by stating: "This convocation will pave the way for eliminating dangerous situations in future, thus ensuring the peace of the continent." 56. As is obvious, the language usedwasdeliberately ambiguous; it did not state concrete facts nor did specify: first, what Sta~ was preparing aggression; secondly, against whoin the aggression was being directed; thirdly, what American State had beeu subjected to intervention or ta auextracontiuentalrêgime foisted upon its people in violation of its sovereignty; fourthly. which were the bases designed ta thl'eaten the peace of the continent. 57.. AlI this fantasy was built up for the purpose creating hypothetical facts of such importance and gravity that they forced the Organ of Consultation apply article 19 of the Charter, ~hich establishes exception to the principle of non-intervention in the case of "measures adopted for the maintenance peace and security" whenever the latter have been disturbed. 58. In short, an attempt was made to deduce a threat ta the peace and security of the continent from inference based on facts totally irrelevant ta international law. Although ft was not expressed in a clear !li José Josquin Caicedo Castilla. Elpanamericanismo(BuenosAlres. Roque Depalma. 1961). p. 191. 59. By that complicated and artiticial fabrication, they 50ught ta prepare the \Vay for "elîminating this dangerous situation"-those were the actual \Vords of the representative of Colombia-and that way, beset with dangerous snares, naturally led finally to the most serious sanctions, in self-defence against an imaginary aggression. In other words, the attempt was to create a IIpretext for self-defencell by means of a gross manœuvre, the success of which entailed the most flagrant violation, not merely of existing international law, but of the most elementary rules of good faith, proclaimed in sub-paragraph .2. of article 5 of the Charter of the Organization of American States as one of the basic principles on which it rests. bonne 60. The law was twisted in orderto"legalize ll collec_ tive aggression against a small nation whose only crime was ta have chosen, inexerCiseofits inalienable rights, socialism as its form of political, economic, social and cultural lue. An aggression was prepared outside the law, characterized by premeditation, treachery and cruelty, with aU the exacerbatingfactors common to gang warfare and bribery. 61. At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation. the conspirators against Cuba only partially achieved their objectives and ta do so they had once again to violate the rules of international law. 62. In effect, because the Cuban people had made a decision in keepingwith its right to self-determination, sovereignty and independence, it was decidedto exclude Cuba from the inter--:oAmerican system, with the qualification, however, that it was the Government of Cuba which was being excluded, as if international law allowed for such an artificial differentiation. 63. The Cuban State is organized politically in conformity with its fundamental law, and violations of that law are to he determined by the Supreme Court of Justice of Cuba, and not by international organiza_ tions. Moreover, the Government is the emhodiment of the State, so that by excluding it-despite the fact that it continues to he vestedwith the political powerthey are actuaUy excluding the State wh~ .'. it represents. Under international law, the territory, nation, State and Government aU constitute that indivisible entity known as the "memher State ll • Consequently, by their action, the Republic of Cuba was in practice excluded from the Organization of American States as a result of the application of a sanction for which no provision is made in American international law. 64. Only the United Nations May expel a Member State and it may do so only if the State "has persistently violated the Principles contained in the Charterll • 65. According to article 102 of the Charter of the Organiz.ation of American States, none of the provisions of that Charter shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations. The Eighth Meeting of Consultation went much further, however, when created a reason for expulsion and imposedasanction not established in the Charter of the Organization of American States. The violation is so glaring and sa obvious that it needs no further examination. 66. It may be asked, however, whether an attempt is actually being made in this year of 1962 to make Marxist-Leninist rêgimes illegal. Today almost half mankind lives under social régimes based on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The United Nations Charter was signed for the very purpose of "developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Article 15 of the Charter ofthe organization of American States regards as a violation of the principle of non-intervention not only the use of "armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its polit.ical, economic and cultural elements". 67. Hence the Foreign Ministers who met at Punta deI Este were not empowered to say that it was unlawfuI for the Government of Cuba to havedeclared itself Marxist-Leninist, for that amounts ta a violation of specifie legal rules which establish values achieved at the present stage of the historical development of humanity. 68. There is no international unlawfulness, just as there is no penal, civil c,r administrativeunlawfulness. The concept of unlawfulness is covered by the general legal system, takîng into account the political, social, economic and moral conceptions predcminating at given moment of history. 69. Just as the States which accept the capitalist régime have the right to consider that régime to be the best one to ensure the advancement of peoples, so the socialist States are equally entitled to say that their system Is the only one capable of liberating mankind from the traditional exploitation, poverty and ignorance which are preventing the vast majority of peoples from enjoying the conquests of civilization. It is not force, therefore, that will decide which of the two systems is the best, but peaceful competition within the framework of the United Nations. The expulsion of Cuba from the inter-American system, by a flagrantly illegal procedure, shows one thing only: that the imperialist régime of the United States, which 18 behind that expulsion, relies solely uponforce in order to achieve its objectives. 70. The resolution of the Eighth MeetingofConsulw.- tion excluding Cuba from the inter-American system goes beyond the limits of the Charters of the Organization of American States and of the United Nations, 71. In a strictly legal sense, the resolution violates the right of peoples to self-determinatiàn, recognized in articles l, 5 (b), 6, 9 and 13 of the Charter of the Organization of American States and in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations; it violates the right of non-intervention granted to States in the inter- American community by article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States and Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter. 72. The resolution also infringes and ignores Cuba's right to free and active membership in the inter- American system, as stipulated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and article 9 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. The Charter signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogot§' in 1948 includes no provision which prescribes that member States are obliged to organize themselves in accordance with a specifie social system or which forhids their identifying themselves as Marxist-Leninist Governments; on the contrary, the Charter states that they may organize themselves as they see fit. 73. Finally, the resolution implies a constitutional amendment of the stipulations of the Charter of the OAS and, as Mr. Osvaldo Dortic6s, the President of the Republic of Cuba, stated at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, as such it ignores article 111 of the Charter, inasmuch as that article implies that adecision of that type should he adopted under the terrns of the Charter. As there is nothing in the Charter which allows for the adoption of such a decision, it would first he necessary to amend. the Charter, and that can be done only at an inter-American conference convened specially for that purpose, as. is stated in article 111. 74. The resolution adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation also violates and ignores the clear provision in article 102 of the Charter of the OAS to the effect that the pr'ovisions which it contains shaH not he construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations. And this violation is the Most unusual aspect of the resolution. The Organization ofAmerican States, as a regional agency, is dependent on the United Nations, which is the parent organization. Article 52, paragraph l, of the United Nations Charter states that; "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relatiijgto the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 76. The American States are Members of the United Nations and are obliged ta respect the principles of the Charter signed at San Francisa on 26 June 1945. This is also stated in the preamble of the Charter of the Organization of American States when it says that its member States were resolved, in order to constitute it, "ta persevere in the noble undertaking that humanity has conferred upon ~e UnitedNations, whose principles and purposes they solemnly.reafÎirm". The most salient and transcendental of these principles is that of peaceful co-existence among States with different political and social systems, which form the very Organization itself. In order to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", thè nations that met at San Francisco proclaimed thatthey shouldunite in order ta practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and they decided ta estabIish the United Nations. 77. Under its Charter socialist and capitalistnations were united, thus proclaiming peaceful coexistence. Thus the United Nations is the international forum in which countries with very different social andpolitical systems meet. The American Governments representing States Members of the United Nations, where they coexist peacefully with socialist countries from other continents, in deciding illegally ta expel cuba from the Organization of American States on the grounds that it was "Marxist-Lenïnist" have violated the fundamental principle that Is the basis of the United Nations Charter, which they are obliged to support and respect, and have insulted and outraged nations which have a socialist system of government and nations which, while not havingasocialistsystem, make peaceful Coexistence among States witb different social systems a principle of their foreign policy. 78. From the point of view of strictly hierarchial order, the resolution expelling Cuba from theOrganization of American States could not he adopted eUher by the Organ of Consultation or even by the Inter- American Conference, hecause the power to expel Member State is vested exclusively in the General Assembly of the United Nations, as laid down in Arti ,:~, 6 of the San Francisco Charter, and for the reaslv'-'.B stated in that Article, as l pointed out earlier. 80. Here in the United Nations, in the debate on the item in the First Committee,"@/ we heard sorne representatives speak of "unanimity at punta deI Este" and refer to "slight formaI differences" among important Governments of the hemisphere. We shall quote the actuaI statements made by important Latin American delegations at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, statements which confirm the illegality of Cuba's exclusion from the regional system. These willnot he our words; they are thewordsofForeign Ministers of very important and respected countries of Latin America. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic stated at the Meeting in explaining his vote: "The Argentine delegation decided to abstain in the vote on paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resalution regarding the exclusion of the government of Cuba, for juridical and political reasons. When the Foreign Ministers meet in an Organ ofConsultation, our powers are basically determined by the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. In our interpretation, the Organ of Consultation lacks the power to order the suspension or exclusion of a State member of the Organization. The measures which may be taken on any of the grounds stated in article 6, are, in our understaoding, set forth limitatively in article 8 of the Treaty. What is more, to strengthen the concept that no measures can he taken other than those stipulated in article 8, that article begins with the words: 'For the purpose of this Treaty' . "When, in this type of agreement, international law desires to confer broaderpowers, thatisclearly expressed in the agreement itself. For example, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides that: 'The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to he employed to give effect to its decisions', andin mentioning these measures it uses the broad formula: 'These may include'. "The Argentine delegation accordingly considers that this Meeting of Ministcrs of Foreign Affairs, serving as an Organ of Consultation, lacks the power to adopt deciBions of this type. It would Beem ta us a most serious matter toestablisha precedent of exceeding the powerS conferred upon this Organ of Consultation by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Internationallaw is basically restrictive in application, since it presupposes concessions of sovereignty by States to the community of nations. There can he no going heyond what is' stipulated, unless prior consent ta this effect is obtained in accordance with the established forms and procedures. liA treaty is revised by the consent of the parties, above aIl when the instrument in question is applied through decisions made by a two-thirds majority. W OfficilÙ Records of the GeneralAsllembll'. Sixteenth Session. Flrst Comminee. 123lst and l243:-d meetings. "The Argentine Republic has a traditionofrespect for the· application of existing international legal rules, but it is at the sarne time a zealous defender of its sovereignty. which it cannot in any way 8ubordinate to arguments by analogy or ta interpretations which go beyond the spirit and letter of the law. "We must remember that it is afundamentalprinciple, and a principle recognized in international law, that if the instrument constituting the agency has no clause concerningthe exclusion or suspension of a member State, the Organization has no right to suspend or ta exclude. "This principle 1s based on an essential rule of international law-a rule fundamental to its entire structure-which holds that consent is the basis of aU international obligations and that au organization is not entitled ta take action of this kind without the express agreement of the signatory members. "The ouly possible exception to this principle arises when aState memberoftheOrganizationpersists in maintaining its membership while at the same time refusing to ratify an amendment to the Charter of the Organization when that amendment has entered into force in accordance with the procedure established in the Charter. "Save in the case,f tbis possible exception, there is no presumption in international law in favour of the Organization's exercise of power to suspend or exclude a member in the absence of a specifie provision to that effect. No obligation may be placed on aState member of an international organization unless that obligation is expressly laid down in the constituent instrument. What has not been granted as a right to the international Organization cannot be presumed, and the Charter of the Organization of American States contains no express provision for this situation, unlike Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter of the United Nations, which refer to such measures. "My country, 1 repeat, respectful of juridical mIes as the b:J-sic principle of its international life, cannot vote in favaur of this resolution, which it considers to go far beyond the powers to which it has given its consent. "The reasons we have stated with reference to paragraph 3 of tbe dratt resQlution apply likewise to·paragraph 4. which ls it8 corollary." 81. Let us now turn to the explanation of vote given by the Ecuadorian delegation, which was as follows: "Ecuador considers that no State member of the Organization of American States may be subjected to either immediate or deferred expulsion, exclusion or suspension. "In accordance with the Charter of the OAS membership requires ratification of the Charter, and thu5 the Organization of American States is cOIP·~ posed of the twenty-one constituent States which have ratified the Charter inaccordance with article 2. "We are aIl fully aware that article 34 of the Charter of the Organization of American States gives aIl member States the right ta he represented at the lnter-American Conference, the most importantbody in the system. "In public law, only that which is expressly permitted and established ,may be done. This is the major difference between public Iaw andprivate law, under which anything that is notexpresslyprohibited may be done. Inter-American law is public law, the more so in the case which now concerns us. Since the application of a sanction is involved, this is what we might call public international penallaw, which gives even greater force ta the argument, since domestic penallaw is a branch of public law. "The Charter of the Organization of American States is to the peoples of America that have signed it what its political constitution or basic charter is to each country of the world. The Charter of the OAS is the political covenant orfundamentalcharter establishing the system which lays down aIl the rights and obligations of States. AU inter-American law derives from the Charter of the Organization of American States, the supreme juridical statute; henee any pact, agreement or decision which is adopted in contravention Of the rules of the Charter lacks legal validity, just as in domestie lawany act, regulation, deed or contraet which is in contradiction ta what is prescribed by the constitution of the republic has no juridical value. "It is always neeessary to have principles, but 1 think that it is far more important ta be able to maintain those principles in allcircumstances, even adverse circumstances. We must always aet in confor mity with juridical rules and we cannat adoptany arbitrary measures. Only the searchforfittingways of completing and perfecting the legal structure of the system is admissible. "The adoption of any resolution which goes beyoud the limits of the Charter is an arbitrary act which endangers juridical order and may bring about the failure of the system, which none of us would want. lt would likewise set a grave and dangerous precedent threatening American unity and the very "There is not sufficient juridical basis for applying the lnter-American TreatyofReciprocalAssis~­ ance in this case. Ecuador wishes to ensure that this Treaty is upheld and its prestige unimpaired, for the Treaty must stand in aH its force as the basic instrument for preserving the unity and solidarity of America, and for its collective defence against any aggression, whether extracontinental or intercontinental." 82. We shaH now turn to the explanationofvote given by the Mexican delegation: "The delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter of record in the Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that, in its opinion, the exclusion of a member State is not juridically possible unless the Charter of the Organization of American States is first amended pursuant to the procedure established in article.H1." 83. The explanation of vote of the Brazilian delegation was as follows: "In point of fact, as has been brought out here in al! clarity, in public international law we cannot allow ourselves thesè broad applications, which assume that certain acts are permissible merely because no reference is made to them in the instrument. lNhat is not precisely defined in the instrument, what the States which signed it did not agree to as a limitation on their own autonomy, cannot be deduced by means of any interpretation." 84. Let us now see whatthe Boliviandelegationstated in explanation of its vote: "The Government of BoUvia entertains justifiable doubts about the competence of the Coulleil to exelude aState from the Organization of American States. It also doubts whether the measure adopted is not of a punitive nature. "Beeause of the bitter experience which Ihave had occasion to recount in a statement to the Foreign Ministers, the Bolivian Government does not support this type of measure. "Observanoe of the law is for the powerful nations the measure of their greatness. Observance of the law is for the smaH nations the guarantee of their independence." 85. Let us now turn to the statementofthe delegation of Chile, whose representative is a distinguished member of this Council: "ChUe, as a country that respects its international obligations and faithfully complies with the treaties to which it has affixed its signature, cannot admit anytbing but the most scrupulous respect for the Bogotâ Charter. This Charter does not provide for expulsion and it would have to be amended before expulsion could be ordered. 86. It is well that the distinguished members of this council should know what were the views and attitudes of many Foreign Ministers at Punta deI Este on aspects of the question before us. 87. On the question of CubaIs exclusion from the regional system because of its social system, each and every representative of the African and Asian countries who took part in the discussion.oUhe Cuhan complaint in the First Committee expressed himself in favour of the right of the people of Cuba, and of aH peoples, to adopt whatever social system they desire, without as a result suffering interf'9rence. Ml', Malalasekera, the representative of Ceylon, who until very recently was an outstanding member of thLS Council, demonstrated the illegality of this action in a brilliant statement. 88. In addition -to resolution VI concerningexclusion, the Punta deI Este Meeting adopted re50lution VIII, in which it was resolved, inter alia: to suspend immediately trade \yith Cuba in arms and implements of war of every kind; to charge the Councilof the Organization of American States, in accordance with the circumstances and with due consideration for the constîtutional or legal limitations of each and every one of the member States, with studying the feasibility and desirahîlity of extending the suspension of trade to other items, with special attention to items of strategie importance. 89, 1 think it will be useful if 1 quote the statement of reservation on this resolution which the Ecuadorian delegation made at the Eigbth Meeting of Consultation: "Ecuador abstained from voting, inasmuch as sanctions are being applied, by invoking the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, sanctions that begin with the suspension of traffic in arms with the possibility of being extended ta other items, with special attention ta items of strategic importance, a concept that might include basic necessities of which the Cuban people should not be deprived and thus make the present situation more critical. " 90. Resolution VIII was the one to which the Government of the United States had recourse in order ta decree the total economic boycott of our country, and to which it also resorted when, in its maniacal persecution of our country, it urged blocs of nations which are Members of the United Nations and military allies of the United states to join collectively in the enforcement action illegally adopted againstourcountry. The Press of the entire worldhasgathered ample information on these activities, and members of the Council are quite familiar with the mission of Mr, Rostow/in Paris, among the countries which constitute the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This has enabled us to state positively that the Governmentof the United States intends-and is indeed determined-to impose upon us collective sanctions outside the inter- American system, 91. If anyone harbours any doubt about the coercive nature of the economic measuresadoptedagainstCuba r nI am pleased to have thia opportunity to diseuss trade with Cuba as weIl. It ia a particularly timely subject in the light of the decisions taken at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta deI Este. The Foreign Ministers declared the Marxist-Leninist Government of Cuba incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system and excluded the Castro régime from the inter-American system. The Foreign Ministers further votedta suspend immediately aH trade with Cuba in arms and implements of \Var and instructed the Council of the OAS to study the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension to other items, \Vith special attention to items of strategie importance. r ftAs you know, we have been concerned that the Castro régime continues ta earn badly needed bard currency from the sales of its exports ta this country. The President proclaimed, therefore, on February 3. 1962. the prohibition of aU Cuban imports into the United States. "We would expect that increased control of trade with Cuba by the United States and the Latin- ,American countries will make evident ta the member Governments of NATO and other States friendly to the United States and ta the objectives of the free world the need ta re-examine their trade policies and the extent of their commerce with the Castro communist Government of Cuba. "Our allies are co-operating in the prevention of unauthorized trans-shipment of U.S.-origin goods to Cuba through their territory. The imposition of licensing and related contraIs by other countri!;!s on the trans-sbipment of U.S. products has greatly assisted the United States ta keep to a minimum violations of U.S. export contraIs. The United States intends ta maintain a vigilant watch to insure that U.S.-origin goods are not trans-shipP,ed ta the Castro communist régime. ft W 92. It is perfectly clear, from the very words of the United States Secretary of State, that the embargo which his country has împosed agaîul:lt Cuba was ordered in the light of the Punta deI Este agreements. It is also clear that it is {rying to ensure that not only the countries which are members ofthe NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization but also other countries friendly to the United States impose controls on CubaIs trade. It is perfectly clear that, in the absence of international agreements and without the authorization of this Council, the United States is flouting aH charters and aH principles, is scoffing at standardsofinternational morality and is trying to impose coercive economic measures on a member State because of the social W -U.S. Departtnent of State Bulletin. 26 February 1962, vol. XLVI. No. 1183.• p. 346. 93. The breaking-off ofrelations with Cuba by various countries before and after the Meeting of èonsu1tation were other de facto coercive measures applied against Cuba. The breaking-off of relations, 1ike economic sanctions, constitu~es a coercive measure within the inter-American system because the only case in which an American State is permitted to break off diplomatie relations unilaterally is when such a step constitutes a measure of self-defence in the case of an armed attack. 93. réunion mesures l'encontre une ricaie, il un relations constitue d'attaque 94. Janeiro, et chacune les que ter 94. According to article 3 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, on the request of the State directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation, each one of the other Contracting Parties may individually break off diplomatie relations as a measure of collective seIf-defence, in order to come to the assistance of the victim of the aggression. 95. When an act of aggression which affects the sovereignty or the political independence of aState has beeu committed, whether by armed attack or by any other means, the Organ of Consultation may also request the other American Repuhlics to break off diplomatie relations with the aggressor as a measure of collective sanctions. 95. la contre Etat, mander les de 96. In 1948, the Bogotâ Conference adopted resolution XXXV (Exercise of the right of legati.:m), which in one part states that the continuity of diplomatic relations among the American States is desirable and that the right of suspending diplomatie relations with another Government shall not be exercised as a means of individually obtaining unjustified advantages under international law. The resolution also states that the establishment or maintenance of diplomatic relations with a Government does not imply any judgement upon the domestic policy of that Government. Yet many countries have broken off relations with us preclsely on the grounds of judgernents about our dornestic policy. 96. légation), déclare entre droit un obtenir le blissement nement intérieure breux émettant politique. ·11 97. The principle of non-intervention embodied in the Charter of the OAS is sa worded that it prohibits not only arrned force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elernents. Economie sanctions are coercive measures, not only for the reasons 1 have given earlier, but also because, in accordance with the Eco.. nomic Agreement of Bogot! and with theBogot!C~r­ ter-both signed in 1948-tbey constitute a right and a principle by vlrtue of which the economic nieasures which it la attempted to impose on an American State are expressly qualified as coercive measures. 97. Charte non toute menace éléments sanction en formément à droit mesures mique 1! 1 :1 98. From a cornmon-sense point of view, the Punta deI Este agreements have been fully proved ta be illegal because they violate the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States, as also the very Treaty under which the Meeting was convened. 98. décisions-de le Charte traité voquée. 99. As we said at the outset of our.statement, however, there has been a twofold violation ofthe Charter of the United Nations: not only have resolutions been adopted which are in conflict with its principles but 99. exposé, des décisions 100. It lB c1ear that, in the light ofthis Article, l'esolutions VI and VIn adop~d at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, and which reter to the incompatibilityof Cuba \Vith, and 1ts exclusion from, the inter-American system on account of its social system, and to the suspension of the trade in arms, which may be extended to other items, entail coercive measures against Cuba. This was recognized by Mr. Schweitzer, the representative of ChUe, wben on 9 February, in a statement in the First Committee in reference ta the Punta deI Este resolutions, he said: nThe anti-dpmocratic influences being b!'ought to bear on Latin America cannot be fought solely by coercive or isolationist measuresn.!§j If someone whowasnotadistinguished jurist had made this statement, it might be thought that there was sorne error of judgement involved, but when these words are pronounced by a jurist who ls also a member of the Security CouncU they constitute a clear and conclusive definition ofthe content and nature of the îllegal measures adopted at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta deI Este which malte a mockery of aU principles and international charters. 101. As we have said, the expulsion of a member State is a measure for which no provision e'xists either in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro or in the Charter of the Organization of American States, althougb the Charter of the United Nations does provide for it as a coercive measure of a special...nature when it refers in Article 6 to the expulsionofa Member State. Expulsion and suspension, to which reference is made in Article 5, are coercive measures of an extraordinary nature in that, to protect the rights of any State, special procedures are necessary for their approval. 102. In such a case the Security Council might even, by a decîsion of its members, use force, as is clearly laid down in Article 42 of the Charter. The Security Conncil may not, however, adopt a resolution suspending the rights of a Member State or expelling it from the United Nations; the most it cau do is to recommeud such action. And, according to the Charter, such a decision must be upheld by more than the u~ual majority of the General Assembly-a two-thirds majority, as is stipulated in Article 180fthe Charter. 103. This question deserve.e= careful consideration. In the case of the suspension ofthe rights of a Member State of the United Nations, it is alao a prerequisite that preventive or enforcement action shaH have been taken against that State by the Council ïtself. And in this sense suspension becomes a more severe measure than any of those adopted in accordance with Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. lli This statement was made at the 1235th meeting Jf the First Cornmittee, the official record of which is published only in s1llJlmary form. t~re d'un de l'Organisation. 105. The literai interpretationoftheterm, moreover, clearly indicates that a coercive measure may be taken to contain, restrain or control the action of a state. This interpretation is confirmed by the Charter of the United Nations when in Article 41 it establishes the purpose for whieh such action may be taken, namely: 105. neus objet d'un Charte l'objet "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are ta be employed to give effect to its decisions." Dans Bogota The Bogot! Charter supports this interpretation when it states in article 16: "No State May use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order ta force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." 106. de extérieures Cuba: nos Si coercitive dant dans n'y 106. This is precisely what the Foreign Ministers did at Punta deI Este, making a mockery of the Charter of the OAS. They said to Cuba: "If Cuba adopts a social system which is to the liking of our Governments, then it can stay in our Organization." If resolution VIII does not constitute a coercive measure of an economic or political character aimed at forcing the sovereign will of the Cuban State ina matter which is its sovereign concern, then we must throw logic and common sense to the winds. 107. It is obvious that the measures adopted atPunta deI Este constitute coercion exerted by a group of member States against another member State because of the social system which that state has adopted and is entitled to adopt in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter~ 107. Punta un membre, a principes 108. ici essentiellement Etat, situation de formel: n'autorise affaires tence 108. 1 do not think that anyone here willdeny that the social system of aState is a matter essentially wit4in its domestic jurisdiction, whatever its size or geographical position; Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." 109. sous exclu tion nationale, lutions elles ration application, tels économiques relations 109. At Punta deI Este a group of member states, under pressure from the United States Government, excluded Cuba, which is also a member State, for a qUestion which is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction-its social system. If the Punta deI Este resolutions were not coercive, they would be no more than empty words; but when they were implemented these resolutions became coercive actions, sucb as the exclusion of -Cuba from the OAS, the economic measures in resolution VIII and the breaking-off of diplomatie relations. 112. The Punta deI Este resolutions do not only seek to impose sanctions against Cuba. They are the first step towards the armed interventions which at this moment are' being discussed in bigb Government circles in the United States and which represent a very serious threat to us. Naturally, so far we \lave been protecting ourselves with international law; naturally, too, we are Dot alone and very serions conflicts will arise if the United States tries to commit suicide-and perhaps to make the world commit suicide-at the expense of the Cuban revolution. 113. The Security Council must also, in tbis case, protect its own autbority. It seems ta us that we have given vaUd reasons in defence of tbe Council's autbority to take enforcement action and to ensure that the principles of the Cbarter are respected by the regional agencies; and we are so deeply convinced of tbe validity and legality of our reasoning that we are requesting the advisory opinion of the Court. According to Article 96 of the Charter, the Council may request such an advisory opinion from a United Nations organ whose fUnction it is ta settle legal questions. 114. Wbat argument can be used against requesting such an opinion, if not a lack of faith in the legality of the Punta deI Este agreements? If international decisions were taken in good faith, as they should be, this request by Cuba should he unanimously supported by all those at this table. 1 do not think that aoy State should be afraid of the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. We, who know that int,;,j:national law is on our side, do not fear the dec1sions of the International Court. This is why we are asking for them and why we think that, before taking any action in this matter, this Conncil should obtain the advice of an organ ofthe United Nations.lt is a question which per, se is of a highly legal character, although it undoubtedly has political implications. U5. Let us imagine for a moment that the Court's opinion will be requested unanimously. Let us hope 117. An organ such as this one, responsible for protecting international peace and security, should take aH measures with great care and, in strictly legal matters, should listen to aIl the opinions which may instruct and enlighten it when the time cornes to take a decision on such a serious and grave question, since these continuaI violations of the law are disturbing international peace. 117. sur avec cueillir, juridiques, l'heure grave constantes nationale. 118. We have circulated here the questions which, in our letter dated 8 March [S/5086 J, we requested the Council to refer to the International Court of Justice. We persist in this request and we also persist in our request that the Court shouid be asked to give priority to this question. We also urge that the Council should ctecide to suspend the iUegal agreements of Punta deI Este together with any ~easures that may have beeu taken under these agreements and that the regionai organization should be notified to that effect. 118. notre au nationale et priée insistons suspendre ainsi de l'organisme 119. If aggression is justified when a country has a specific system which is not to the likingof the United States Government; if regional agendes are not obliged to comply with the principles of the world 01'- ganization of which they c1aim to be Members and whose principles they are obligedtofollow; ifan these unlawful activities conceal aggressive designsagainst a small Member of the Organization on the part of a group of other Member States, whic.h are engaging jointly in these activities with the object of changing the social system of a Member State; if the United Nations organ responsible for protecting international peace and security remains passive while a11 this is happening; if the Security Council does not protect its oIVn jurisdiction or the principles of the Charter; if the Court is notevenconsultedaboutthelegality of our arguments, we shall Dot be responsible for any harm caused to the Organization or for the breaches of the peace which this will undoubtedly provoke, and at no di.stant date. 119. dès de organismes les prétendent les une de Etats changer Nations sécurité si principes sulter nous tort paix délai. 120. Cuba is not alone, as the United States weIl knolVs, and cannot be subdued by anything, let aione by sanctions. The reason why recourse was had to sanctions, under pressure from the aggressors, against the State which is the victim ofthe aggression is that they are trying to use these manœuvres to conceal new acts of aggression. This is very important: the representatives of twenty-one States met at Punta deI Este and the only State which was condemned there was the State which onAprii 1961was the victim of an invasion organized by the Central Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Government. And everybody is aware of this. 120. bien, feront on Jtagression, objet est sont été été central des 122. We areasking the Security Council ta obtain the opinion of the Court, so that the legal principles of internationallaw mayprevail. Whatorganofgreater authority than the Court could be requested to give this verdict? If this is prevented by the use of a mechanical majority in the ConncU, this willbesolely because of a destre to prevent the verdict of the International Court of Justice going against the unlawful activities of the regional agency, which would force this Council to restore tbe right thathas been violated before events develop and reach their mostdangerous and uncontrollable limits. 123. We shall continue 10 defend Cuba, its rights, its principles and the inviolability of its sovereignty with the last drop of our blood. For the sake of peace-for Cuba is a small peace-loving State; for the sake of peaceful coexistence-for Cuba is a small State which loves peaceful coexistence; and for the sake of the principles of international law, which Cuba follows, we want the Council 10 re-establish the law and to force the regional agency to adhere to the rules it had violated· and whose violation is seriously endangering the peace of the hemisphere and of the world. 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