S/PV.993 Security Council

Within a mere two weeks of its meeting on 27 February 1962 (991st meeting], the Security Council bas met again to consider a problem connected with the alarming faet that an increasingly dangerous situation, which threatens international peace and security is arisIng in the Caribbean area as a result of ceaseless hostile acts by the United States Government against Cuba. 2. soviêtlques) juste séanceJ, pour inquiétant: dangereuse i'ité des nement Cuba. 3. Unis· d'objections l'ordre Sans niable, contrairement faire tous cause diale 3. It is noteworthy that on this occasion the United States and its allies in the Council did not dare ta oppose the inscription of the item on the Couneil's agenda, as they had done on 27 February. Theyevidently recognized, at long last, the irrefutable faet that their attempts ta obstruct-eontrary to the United Nations Charter-the unquestionable rightofanycountry, especially a small one, to bring its case ta the Security Council had been condemned by world public opinion. 4. tactique que 4. Furthermore it is obvious that ·this change in taeties has been largely brought about by the positive Position adopted by the representatives of the neutral 5. fi the members of the Security Council refer to the letter dated 8 Mareh 1962 [8/50861 from the. Cuban representative addressed to the President of the SeciJ.- rity Couneil and to bis impassioned statementyesterday [992nd meeting] in defence of the righteous cause for which the Cuban people is struggling, they will becorne convinced that both the former and the latter furnish further evidenee of Cuba's fervent desire to defend its freedom and independence. Cuba IS position as stated in the Council bath now and in the past indicates this country's expeetation that, in Us noble strivings for a new and better life, it will :receive the necessary support and protection against the ever-recurring atternpts from outside, made in violation of the United Nations Charterandofall principles of justice, to overthrow the social order established by the Cuban revolution and to impose upon the Cuban people a régime convenient and profitable to the United states monopolies. 6. in our opinion, the Security Couneil has taken the ftrst step in the right direction by agreeing ta 'discuss the substance of the question submitted by CUba. A second and even more important step now lies ahead. It is now the Council's responsibility to adopt a correct decision, consistent with the interests ofpeace-loving mankind, on the questions raised in the Cuban representative 's letter and statement. 7. The Cuban delegation's specific proposaI on this occasion is that the International Court of Justice should be asked for an advisory opinion on a nnmber of important questions of internationallaw. A correct and impartial answer to those questions wouldlargely determine the adoption by the Secnrity Conneil of the appropriate political decisions which would ensure a radical improvement of the threatening situation in the Caribbean area. The questions which have now been put do not, of course, exhaust the issue. They relate to recent attempts by the United States ta make the other Latin American countries, and particillarly the Organization of American States, toe the Une of its aggressive poliey against Cuba. 8. These attempts, which found expression particulariy in the decisions imposed by the United States of America on the Latin American countries atthe Punta deI Este conference,.!! renect the objective factthatas is b.eing admitted in the,United States itself-after the failure of last year's intervention in Cuba a new 11 Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Minlsters of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta de1 Este, Uruguay. from 22 to 3l January 1962, " i, l, ~ 1. ,, 10. At the same time, it should be pointed out that it would be wrong to underestimate the political significance of the United States actions in question, which have led to the adoption of.decisions, concerning recourse to enforcement action against Cuba, that, in their letter and spirit, are contrary both to the Charter of the Organization of American States.Y and to the United Nations Charter. At Punta deI Este the United States tried in essence to present Cuba with an ultimatum, backedby collective enforcementaction, with a view to ensuring a change in the social order set up by the Cuban people as a result of the victory of the revolution. 11. That fuis new stage in hostile action by the United States against Cuba bodes ill for the cause of world peace and international security is a fact which can be properly understood and evaluated ouly by relating it to certain major, important landmarks of recent United States policy towards Cuba. These landmarks, therefore, 1 will now venture briefly to recall. 12. Two years ago, on 17 March 1960, Mr. Eisenhower, the former President of the United States, issued orders to begin the organization, training and arriving on United States territory, of gangs specially intended for the invasion of Cuba. The United States Government had set 30 November 1960 as the first date for the ·launching of intervention in Cuba. The second date set for intervention was 1 Marcb 1961. The third date was 17 April 1961, when the armed attack on Cuba, which had been organized, prepared, equipped and financed by the United States Government, was in actual fact carried out. It is known that the United States Government spent $45 million on the preparing and effecting of this intervention. 13. The armed intervention by mercenaries against Cuba, which the United Statesorganizedelevenmonths ago, ended in dismal failure. The Cuban people rose 10 a man ta defend the freedom and independence of its motherland, and took no more than j3eventy-two hours in which ta crush the mercenaries. Suchwasthe stern tesson of the recent pasto jj United Nations. Tres!}' Series, vol. 119 (1952). 1. No. 1609. 15. The harsh and irrefutable faets showthat.2.s !Joon as the sound of the last shotsfired by the mercenaries at Piaya Giron had died away, the United States Government began preparations for a new armed invasion of Cuban territory on an even larger scale. These preparations are ·still under way. The aim of aU tbis activity remains 'the same: the forcible overthrow of the existing arder in Cuba. 16. It i5 for precisely this purpose that iuthe propaganda field the United States Governmenthaslaunched an unprecedented campaign of slander against Cuba, designed tG justify {resh military intervention against the Cuban revolution. 17. It is for precisely this purpose that in the economic sphere the United States is making effort after effort to undermine Cuba's economy, by placing a complete embargo on tr;>de with Cuba and by urging its allies, including its NATO allies, to join in this embargo. 18. It is for precisely this purpose that in the political sphere the United states is taking one step after another to isolate Cuba from theother LatinAmerican countries and is trying, by the use of naked pressure and military blackmail, to utilize the apparatus cf the Organization of American States. 19. Again, it is for precisely this purpose that in the military sphere the United States is training mercenary units for a new invasion of Cuba. This time the training ia being done openly, in the ranks of its own armed forces. As in the past, the territory of Latin American countries such as Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama is also being used for this purpose. 20. Within the past few days it has become known, from United States Press reports, that the United States Government is hastily transferring its seventh special forces group of 6,200 men, exclusive of technical personnel, from Fort Bragg in North Carolina to the territory of Panama. It should be recailed that the special forces which took part in the preparations for tbe invasion of Cuba in April 1961 were concentrated with similar urgency. 21. In the circumstances, it is no accident that certain organs of the United 818te::: Press are betraying concern at the intensification of United States preparations for fresh military intervention in Cuba. Thus, the New York Post stated in its issue of 1 March 1962 that: "••. the direction of Cuban policy in Washington and the hemisphere [appears] to he moving toward a climax which could have even more far-reaching consequences titan the tragic fiasco of last April". It Is clear, from what follows this passage, that the writer has in mind the current United States preparations for large-scale military intervention in Cuba, which, according to Press reports, is to begin either through an engineered act of provocation involving a so-caUed Cuban attack on the United States base at 22. The way in which this new military attack on Cuba is being prepared can be seen, in particular, from the 16 March issue of Time magazine, which reports the following: "In the past five months, more than 800 marines with battle packs have landed in Guantiinamo, boostiog garrison strength to at least 1,100 marines and 2,000 sailors. With the reinforcements has come modern equipment-new rapid-fire M-14 rifles ••• And there is inereasing support nearby-an on-call marine battalion in Puerto Rico, a U.S. fleet now stationed regularly off Guanmnamo Bay and the carrier-based, swept-wing F4H Phantom II jet fighters ••• " It is therefore clear that a powerful United States military striking force Is being conC'è!ntrated off Cuba's shores, as weIl as in Cuban territory at the United States military base of Guantiinamo. 23. Thus, as the members of the Couneil will apprcciate, the situation is very serious: a new military aggression by the United States is being prepared against Cuba. The imperialist forces preparing to launch a new act of aggression against Cuba should not, however, forget the lessons of the recent pasto They should also remember the statement made last February by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba: "The Cuban people are making ready to beat off threatened aggression, and they are as determined to defend their right ta 5elÏ-determination and to the independence and sovereignty of their country as they are ta defend the gains of the Revolution and to make the heaviest sacrifices for its further development. " 24. For our part we deem it necessaryto stress with aIl emphasis that those preparing a new military invasion of Cuba should know full weIl that in its just struggle the Cuban people is being and will be supported by aIl the peace-Ioving peoples which value a people's right to freedom and independence. As for the Soviet Union, its warnings to the advocates and organizers of a new military adventure against Cuba are extremely clear. Toquote the SovietGovernment's statement of 18 February 1962, "Cuba is not alone. It has many friends, not only in Latin America, but throughout ,the world, and among them is the Soviet Union. The Republic of Cuba, as Ml'. Kbrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, has clearly stated can always rely on the aid and support of the Soviet people. The Soviet Government's public warnings to the enemies of democratic Cuba remain in force today." li 26. As we have already said, the new and dangerous element in the course of events consista, particularly. in the faet that the launching of aggression against Cuba is now being linked by the United States directly with the results which it 18 seeking to obtain from the steps it has takén in political, economic and ideological preparation for the invasion. Here are the facts. 27. In imposing upon the Punta deI Este Meeting decisions which would compel the Organization of American States to become an accomplice iu the act of aggression being prepared against Cuba, the United States openly violated the fundamentlJ.l principlesproclaimed by the OAS and the fundamental provisions of its Charter. 28. In imposing the adoption ofthe so-calledprinciple of incompatibility between the system prevailing in Cuba and the inter-American system, the United States has violated article 9 of the Charter of the OAS, according to which every one of its member States "has the right ••• to organize itself as it sees fit". 29. In imposing restrictions on trade with Cuba and a bt\ll on such trade, the United States has violated article 16 of the Charter of the OAS, which says: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." 30. In irnposing upon the Organization of American States resolutions VI and VII concerning Cuba's expulsion [see 8/5075], the United States has again violated the Charter of that Organization since the latter has no provision at a11 for the expulsion of member States. In this way the United States drove the Punta deI Este conference to violate article 111 of the Charter of.the Organization ofAmericanStates, which provides that: "Amendments to the present Charter may be adopted only at an Inter-American Conference convened for that purpose", inasmuch as the expulsion ofa member State requires a prelirninary amendment of the Charter of the OAS which would make such expulsion possible. 31. It is, in particular, in this connexion that statements have been made by the representatives of sorne of the most influential and most povulous LatinAmerican countries, in which they have used abundantly clear language to protest against such a solution of the problem. 32. We deem it necessarytodrawparticularattention to the fact that the use by the United States of a regional organization for its own aggressive purposes, in violation of the fundamental provisions ofthe Charter of the OAS and of the purposes, principles and basic provisions of the United Nations Charter, constitutes a new factor fraught with danger for the cause of peace. In our opinion, the Security Council must react ta it. In ather wards, whereas until now the United" States, by Us acts af aggression against Cuba, has been grossly violating the fundamental provisions 33. As we have already said, thenewgrossviolatîons of the United Nations Charter bythe United 8tates·cori.- sist, in particular. in the circumstance that·tbe latter i8 driving the Organization of American States to use enforcement action against Cl,lba despite tli~ obvious fact that tbis regional organization.is not competent to apply any enforcement action without special powers from the Security COUDan. These violation!:? .of the United Nations Charter consist, however. notonly in what 1 have already said, important though thatis, but also in the fact, that in essence, there are no grounds at aU, either under the United Nations Charter or under the Charter of the Organization of American States, for the application of sllch enforcementaction. 34. It should aIso be stressed that the point at issue now is not only the inadmissibility of such action against Cuba but also the need for defence of and complianee with the fundamental prineiples of the United Nations Charter in general, and the need for, putting an end to sllch illegal action which today is directed against Cuba but tomorrow coulri be directed against any other Member of the United Nations. 35. Members of the Council will recaU tr.at at our meeting of 27 February, when we were considering the adoption of the agenda, we had a broad discussion, despite efforts by the United States and its supporters who objected to the inclusion of this question in the agtmda; and during that disct'Esion the important 'significanee of many legal aspects of the questions placed before the Security Council by Cuba was, in particular, revealed. 36. These legal aspects of the question' have been set forth in the letter from the representative of Cuba dated 8 March 1962, in .the form of a number ot' entirely concrete questions. 37. Here we must emphasize-turning to the text of this letter and the corresponding part of the Cuban representative's statement-the indubitable goodwill repeatedly demonstrated by Cuba in .the search for a peaceful and just seUlement of. the problem. 38. As the Cuban representative explained in bis statement yesterday, it was already clear from the Council's discul!s.ion of27 Februarythatseveralmembers of the Council disputed Qot only a number of political points, but also a Rumber of important legal points which must be settled'before an answer cao be found to the correct political conclusions whic/:J. must and can be drawn. Cuba is nqw proposirig, as a preliminary step, tbat a :requestbe a,ddresaed to the International Court of Justice for ,an advisory opinion on these important legal questions, in order to help the Council to take Just and well-grounded deCisions. 39. ,'! 090 doing, the Government of Cuba is acting in StI'let' conformity with Article"96, paragraph l, of the United Nations Charter. which provides ~t: ftTbe General Assembly or the Seclll"ity Counqil may reques~ the International C~urt of Justice ta give an advisory 40. In making this proposaI, the Government of Cuba is ODce again demonstrating ta the whole world its business-like approach ta the settlement of a question wh10h directly affects its vital interests; thatGovernment i8 once again confirrning Us desire for a peacefuI settlement. This latest step by the Cuban Government once more underlines the p~'''. eful nature of the Cuban Revolution's aims and agaL manifesUy gives the lie to the fabrications of those who seek to portray Cuba, quite unfoundedly, as a menace in the Caribbean area rather than as a victim of that menace, as Cuba really is. 41. What is the essence of the questions now being raised by the Republic of Cuba,andwhyis ft important that these questions should receive a clear and unambiguous answer'? 1 shall not here quote the full text of these questions. It is contained indocumentS/5086, it was explained in detail by the Cuban representative in his statement yesterday, and 1 think that no impartial and objective person who 3tudies the purpose of the questions formulated inthe Cuhanrepresentative'e letter can have any doubt that a serious analysis of these provisions of the Charter and of a number of principles of international law. which Cuba requests the International Court of Justice ta take up, is direetly relevant to the task now confronting the Council. 42. In the final question posed in this document, the International Court of Justice is asked tosaywhether, in the light of replies given to a number of foregoing preliminary questions, th<l resolutions adopted at Punta deI Este by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding the expulsion of aState member of the regional agency because of its social system and the adoption of other enforcement action against that state withoutthe authorization of the Security Council are or are not in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro•..v 43. It is clear to everybody that an objective answer to these questions will-and of this we are deeply convinced-make it impossible for the United states 'of America, and a number of other States whichfollow it, ta continue ta use the Bmake-screen behind whichthey are now making politieal, economic and militarypreparations for a new attack on Cuba. If this smokescreen is dispersed, that circumstance willhelpto put a stop ta these insidious plans of the United States directed against a freedom-loving Latin American republic such as Cuba. 44. We know that attempts may he made here to maintain that the questions which it is proposed to put_ to the International Court of Justice are political ones. Such pronouncements have already been made y Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal AssiStance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on.2 September 1947; see lJni'~Nations.T'reaty Series, vol. 21 (1948), l, No. 324 i. nStevenson, Chief United States delegate, did not take part in the debate, but he said afterwards: II think that what we are really facing is not a legal problem, but a political effort ta extend the Soviet veto.'n Such words could only be spoken by the representative of a country which had decided in advance to set aside any idea of the need to observe the Charter of our Organization or to observe universally recognized elementary principles of internationallawtowhichthe United States of America, among others, subscribes. 45. An impartial observer has only to acquaint him- self with the list of questions in the Cuban represen- tative's letter to see that, in the interests of an objec- tive and impartial settlement of this question, Cuba is seeking the arbitration of a body such as the Interna- tional Court of Justice which is elected bythe General Assembly of the United Nations and which most Mem- bers of our Organization-though not, apparently, the United states-consider competent to give an impartial and objective reply on the legal points, the points of internationallaw, that govern the just decision,inline with the United Nations Charter, which the Security Council can and must take. 46. Attempts have already been made, and we may expect that attempts will be made again, to maintain that the decisions taken at Punta deI Este do not concern the application ofenforcement measures with- in the meaning of the Charter of the, United Nations. These assertions are likewise entirely unfounded. We need only bring forward a number of proofs relating to this last series, this lastcategory ofwhat we regard as incorrect assertions. 47. It is compIetely obvious that in the political sphere the Punta deI Este conference decided, under pressure from the United States, toexclude Cubafrom participation in the inter-American system. Thisdeci- sion, based on the thesis of the alleged nincompati- bilityn of the system existing in Cuba with so-called nrepresentative democracyn, is obviously a kind of npunitiven action which is to go on, accordingto thesé decisions, for so long as the present system continues ta exist in Cuba. It. is thus in fact nothing other than enforcemEmt action against Cuba, the purpose ofwhich is to force the Cuban people ta renounee the system which it has chosen. . des tative tive", à de 1, i, 48. In the economic sphere the United states imposed on the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS a deeisionto ceasetrade with Cuba. Just as in the previous case, the eoercive nature of this step with regard to Cuba is eviaentfrom the very texl; of resolution VITI, which says that the decision D'lay be revoked "at such time as the Government of Cuba demonstrates its compatibility with the purposes 1( 49. Are there any real Or profound reasons why the Security COUDoîl should put legal questions ta the International Court of Justice? We replyintheaffirm-- ative. Yes, there are, in view of the faet that it was on just these legal questions that serions differences of opinion emerged in the Security Couneil, and earlier too-during the second part of the GeneralAssembly's sixteentb session. 50. In particular. la the question as ta whether the Organization of American States had the righttoadopt the said enforcement measures without the sanction of the 8ecurity Couneil of importance for the safe- gnarding of the principles ofthe United Nations Charter and of international security? Yes, this question is very important; for Article 53 of the Charter of our Organization explicitly states: "••• no enforcement action shaH be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Conncil". It is precisely this provision ofthe Charter, as ls evident ta aU, which was grossly vio- lated by the United States when it impelled the GAS ta act vlithcut consulting the Security COUDcil. 51. Grave conceru is felt throughout the world at the fact that these actions taken under United States pressure by the Organization of American States- actions in which the United States is now trying to involve aU countries allied to it ordependentupon it- not only constitute a gross violation of the United Nations Charter in that the OAS has exceeded its powers, but-and 1 draw your particular attention to this fact-undermine the fundamental principles of the Charter, the very essence of the activity of the United Nations. 52. The unlawful enforcement measures recently undertaken with regard to Cuba not only go beyond the competence of a regional organization, but are also a gross violation of the Charter ofthe United Na- tions as a whole, for under the Charter's Article 52 the activities of regional organizations must be sub- . ordinated to the principles of the Charter; they are admissible, as the Charter says, only "provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Prlnciples of the United Nations". 53. But what is the purpose of the measures which have now been imposed on the Organization of Amer- ican states? ls it really consistent with the purposes and principles, with the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter? 54. As you ail know, the United Nations Charter stipulates that States Members of the United Nations are under an obligation, as the Charter says, "to praetise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours". The decisions recently adopted at the bidding of the United States are based on the principle of absolute intolerance vis-à-vis of the system established in Cuba, and proceed from the alleged impossibility for the other LatinAmerican States to live together with Cuba in peace-or ,to quote the pertinent resolution adopted at Punta delEste,are based on the principle of so-called "incompatibility". 56. To proceed further: the United Nations Charter aiso categorically forbids intervention inthe domestw. affairs of other States. In spite of thîs, we see a series of enforcement actions, being mounted against Cuba, while that country is formallynotified thatthese actions will continue until it renounces the existing system confirmed as a result of the victory of the Cuban people's revolution. But what is this, if not direct intervention in the domestic affairs of Cuba, if not open disregard for the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter. 57. Everyone now sitting at the Council table, every unprejudiced and honest person, can see that the course on which a number of States members of the Organization of American States have now embarked, acting unfortunately in contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations as well as to their own Charter, is a consequence of the very strong pressure exerted by the United States in its attempt to make use of the Latin American countries infurtherance of its aggres- sive policies. We want to underline that today this pressure is concentrated against Cuba; tomorrow it may be concentrated against anyother LatinAmerican State. 58. Let us consider what would happen if the United Nations allowed regional organizations, whose task is to help the United Nations maintain peaceful rela- tions between its Member States and aU other states, ta be built according to the plan on which, behind the back of the United Nations, the United States is now trying to reconstruct the Organization of American states, to reconstruct it regardiess of the provisions of its Charter. Surely it is obvious that if in such a case the United Nations adopted and approved, sup- ported and agreed with the principles propounded at Punta deI Este, the United Nations would he sanction- ing its own destruction. 59. The Soviet Government drew particular attention to these consequences of the latest actions of the United States, which are so dangerous for the United Nations when in this connexion itsaid, inits statement of 18 Fehruary: , "If we agree with the logic hy which 1Jnited States statesmen are guided with regard to Cuba, tbat is, if we recognize the right of every State to press for the removal of another State from international organizations merely be:;ause it has a different social system, it is easy to see what would become of the United Nations. for instance. The imperialist 'States would then demand the exClusion of socialist States and the socialist States would demand the 1 1, l 61. In the meantime a situation is in fact being brought about which. as we have already l'emarked, is entirely intolerable, for it is tending to undermine the United Nations itself and threatening peace throughout the world. 62. The importance of respectingthebasicprinciples of the United Nations Charter and preserving them from any kind of violation is completely obvious. 63. AlI this once again testifles ta the fact that the question which Cuba bas submitted for consideration by the Security Council is a vital and urgent one. Hence the Security COWlcil must naturally not only, as a matter of urgency, request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal questions enumerated by Cuba, but also request the Court ta give its opinion on these questions as rapidly as possible and aocordingly ta give them priority in its work. 64. As soon as the Security Counoil receives the pertinent opinion of the International Court of Justice a further meeting of the Security Council should be immediately convened, sa that it may take further, supplementary decisions on the questions submitted by Cuba. 65. We consider that the proposaI put before the Seourity Counci! by the representative of Cuba in lûs statement yesterday, tbat the Council should under- take a number of supplementary aotions and measures on the basis of Article 40 of the United Nations Char- ter, also deserves the most serious attention, and approval. on the part of the Councn. 66'. As we know, Arli.cle 40 of the United Nations Charter envisages such provisional measures as may be taken by the Security Council ta prevant an aggra- vation of the situation. Applying tbis to wbat we are now discussing, namely to the request ta the :{nter- national Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the important questions of internationallawformulated in the letter from the representative of Cuba, we be- Heve tbat the Security Council has a right and a duty ta suspend implementation of the decisions taken at the Punta deI Este Meeting, and of any decisions de- veloping or supplementing them which may be taken, until such time as the Security Council has received and considered the advisory opinion of the Court. 68. In our view. a provisional measure of tbis kind not only conforms to the spirit and letter of Article 40 of the United Nations Charter, but is the onlyone possible in existing conditions, when there is no UIl- animtty among the members of the Security Counoil about the nature of the final decision, on the legal and politinal problems, wbich the Security COUIloil could take in connexion with the question raisedby the Cuban Government. 69. A provisional measure of this sort. as envisaged in Article 40 of the Charter ofour Organization, would be without prejudice ta "the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned", because it would not pre- judge the nature oftheSecurityCouncil'sfinaldecision on the question submitted by Cuba but would prevent actions wbich could be irrevocable-I stress "irrevo- cablell-at a time when their legality is questioned by many States Members of the United Nations. including members of tbis Council. 70. The Soviet delegation therefore fully supports the proposaI of the Republic of Cuba that the Seourity COUIlcil should immediately request the International Court of Justice ta give an opinion on the questions listed in docwnent S/5086, suggesting that the Court give priority to the consideration of these questions, and that the COUIlcil should suspend the agreements of the regional agency UIltil it bas obtained the advisory opinion of the Court and bas taken a final decision. 71. At this crucial moment, before it is too late, the Soviet delegation urges aIl members of the Counoil to heed tM voiee of reason and take concerted action so that the Seeuritl' Council may be in a position ta take at least preliminary but important deoisions which would then help to ereate 'an atmosphere of peace and calm in the Caribbean reglon. Such a deci- sion would show the peoples that the Secl'''''ity COUIloil is truly able to asswne aIl the responsib..âty for the maintenance of international peace and security en w trusted to it by the CJm,rter of the United Nations. 72. Ml'. STEVENSON (United states ofAmerica): This is the third time in about two and a hall months that United Nations organs have discussed complaints by Cuba,. And the complaints have aIl been essentül1ly 73. When the Cuban Government tried ta bring its last attack on the United States before the Security COWlcil on 27 February, just after almost two weeks of examination of the same charge in the General Assembly,~ my Government opposed further discus- sion of the complaint. At this time, we have not op- posed placing the item on the agenda of the COWlcil- not, as 1 say. because it differs in its political content, but because we believe that tbis COWloil should dis- passionately examine any request for an opinion by the International Court of Justice. This ia the reason why the United. states does not oppose tbis proceed- ing the intricate and tortured explanations of the representative of the Soviet Union ta the contrary notwithstanding. 74. The representative of Cuba, has, regrettably,not presented bis request for a judicial opinion in a very judioial manner. Rather, by the tone and substance of bis speech here yesterday afternoon, it is clear that he is again arguing about a poUlical dispute which his Government has created.-a dispute between it, on the one band. and aIl of the Republics of the Western Hemisphere, on the othe:r. This time, the attack is against the Organization of American states. But it is clearly aimed at aU regional organizations: it!s an attempt to subject the activities ofal1regionalorgani- zatioD:S to the Soviet veto in the Security COWlcil. Let there be no mistake about the objective. The Cuban letter is camouflaged with legalisms. but the issues it raises are 100 per cent political. The principal issue is whether a regional organization, one wbich has co-operated Mly with the United Nations, has the right to manage its own affairs and ta defend itself against a foreign-donûllated Government, or whether the Soviet Union ls to li:.- allowed to paralyse that organizationls activities through the exercise of the veto power in this Council. 75. We believe that everyone who recognizes the great contributions to the progress of the worldwhich regional organizations have made and can make, whether it be the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States, or some future regional associations of African or Asian States, will join in rejecting this threat ta independence and vitality of such regional organizations, and this effort of the Soviet Union to extend its veto over tbeir actiVities. 77. de les américains sion menace tionales", de sous citives" bation, Charte 77. What is it tbat the Cuban letter before us is ask- ing the Security Counci! to do? The letter contends that the resolutions adopted by the Organlzation of Americart Sta,tes at Punta deI Esteconstitute"aggres- sion against the sovereignty of our country and a serious tbreat to international peace and security"; that they required the authorizatlon of the Security councn, Wlder Article 53 of the Charter, on the grounds that they constitute "enforcement action" wlthin the language of that Article, and that without such approval they violate the Charter of the United Nations. 78. So that we may not forget what the real issue at Pilllta deI Este was, and so that we may determine whether its decisions did or did not constitute aggres- sion, did or did not violate the Charter, or require Security COWlcil approval, 1 must ask your indulgence while 1 deal with each of the PWlta deI Este resolu- tians. They are aIl set forth in full in the Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of ConslÙtation, which is before the Security COWlcîl. 78. blème puissions constituaient de Conseil chacune Leur la le 79. In the first place, resolution 1 relatesto the offensive by the commWlist bloc against theAmerican republics. 1 shaH read from the first tbree para- graphs of that resolution wbich was adopted by the unanimous vote of aIl the American republics, except Cuba. 79. du caines. paragraphes par de [The speaker read paragraphe 1, 2 and 3 of reso- lutionf, contained in the Final Act of the Eighth Meet- ing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the AmerlcaIl States (5150'15).1 80. membres à dental qui lution l'OEA, laquelle devant précisément l'Organisation 80.. Here, then, is a resolution in which the members of the Organization of American States have Wlani- mously alerted the Western Hemisphere tothe dangers of communist aggression in the form of subversion. This resolution is a statement of poUcy by the OAS, except, of course, for Cuba, and a statement of its great concern about the communist threat ta our security. It was ta deal with just such problems that the Organization of Amerioan States was established in the first place; 81. Contrevient-elle requiert-elle Bien question 80. Does suoh a resolution constitute aggression? Does such a resolution contravene the United Nations Charter or require Security COWlQil authorization?Of course, it does not, an~ it would be pointIess to ask the International Court of Justice whether it does. 82. Resolution II, adopted 19 ta l, with 1 abstention, requested the Counci! of the OrganizationofAmerican States to maintain aH necessary vigilance for thepur- pose of warning against any aets of aggression, sub- version, or other dangers to peace and security, resultlng from the oontinued intervention of Sino- Soviet Powers in the Western Hemisphere. 82. avec des saire subversion paix des occidental. 84. Doea sllch a ·resolution constitute aggression, or contravene the United Nations Charter, or require security COWlcil authorization? Of course it does not- and it would be pointless toasktheInternational Court of Justice whether it does. Clearly the resolution is an exercise of the inherent right of nationsto prepare for their own self defence, whether individually or oollectively. And sa to prepare was elementary pru- dence in the face of this extracontinental threat. 85. Resolution III reiterated the Foreign Ministers' adherence to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, and inparagraph 2 urged theGovern- ments of the member States to organize themselves on the basis of freeelections tOOt express, without restriction, the will of the people. The Cuban régime voted against-I repeat, "against"-free elections and voted against the resolution itself. Everyother Amer- ioan republic voted for that paragraph and for the resolution. 86. Does such a resolution. calling for freeelections to express the peoples' will, contravene the United Nations Charter or require Security Council authori- zation? Of course it does~ot-anditwouldbepointless to ask the International Court of Justice whether it does. The real problem in the Caribbean is disclosed by the fact that the Cuban régime feit compelled to vote against such a basic right, a basic right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 87. Resolution IV recommended that Governments whose structure or acts are incompatible with the effective exercise of representative democracy should bold free elections, in order ta guaranteetherestora- tion of a legal order based on the authority of the law and respect for the rights of the individuaL The Cuban régime also voted against that resolution, again deny- ing the principle of free eleotions. Every other Amer- ican republic voted for free elections and for the resolution. 88. Does slloh a reoonunendation constitute aggres- sion, or contravene the United Nations Charter, or require Security COUDcil authorizatio:il? Of course it does not-and it would again be pointless to ask the International Court of Justice whether it does. 89. Resolution V, also unanimouslyadopted,declared in part: "1. That the preservation and strengthening of free and democratic institutions in the American repuhlics require, as an essential condition, the prOl"'f,t. accelerated execution of an unprecedented efforZ to promote their economic and soo~aldevelop- ment for which effort the public and private, do- "2. That it is essentiai to promote energetica11y and vigorously the basic industries of the Latin American COWltries, to Hberalize trade in raw materials by the elimination of undue restrictions, to seek to avoid violent fluctuations in their priees, to encourage the modernization and expansion of services in order that industrialization may rest on its own appropriatebases, tomobilizeunexploited natural resourees in order to increase natural wealth and to make such inereased wealth available to persons of aIl economic and social groups, and to satisfy quickly, among other aspirations, the needs for work, housing, land, health, and education.Il 90. Does such a resolution-and it is interesting to note that tbis resolution has beenvigorously attacked by Cuba-eonstitute aggression, or contravene the United Nations Charter, orrequire Secretary Council authorization? Of course it does not-and again it wotùd be pointle8s to ask the International Court of Justice whether it does. 91. Resolution VI is entitled ftExclusionofthe Present Government of Cuba from Participation in the Inter- American System". This resolution is one of those most critical of the present Government of Cuba, and for this reason it has provoked strong Cuban reactions. But criticism does not make the resolution lIaggres- sion" or make it subject to Security Councilapproval. 92. The resolution refers to the Report of the Inter- American Peace Committee. which stated: ft4. As regards the 'intense subversive activity in which the eountries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are en- gaged in America and the activities of the Cuban Government ... it is evident that they would con- stitute acts that, within the system for the 'political defence' of the hemisphere. have been classed as aets of 'political aggression' or'aggressionofanon- military eharacter'.' Sueh acts represent attaeka upon inter-American peace and security as well as on the sovereignty and political independenee of the American States. and tlierefore a serious violation of fundamental principles of the inter-American system. as has been repeatedly and explicitly de- clared at previous inter-American conferences and meetings of constùtation." 1 1 93. Based on these faets, amongothers, resolution VI went on to declare: "That, as a consequence of re- peated aets, the present Government of Cuba has vol- untarily placed itself outside the inter-American system". The resolution goes on with two operativeparagraphs, reading as follows: "1. That adherence by any member of the Organi- zation of American states to Marxiam-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and These two paragraphs were adopted by the W!animous vote of the twenty American republics. withCuba alone dissenting. po these two paragraphs. expressing the convictions of 'UleOAS membership. COnstitute aggres- sion or contravene the United Nations Charter or re- quire Security Counoil authorizatton? Of course they do not. and it wOUld he poinUess once more ta ask the International Court of Justice whether they do. They are statements of the unanimous views ofthe members of a regional organization-not onIy fully within Us rights but specifically witbin the purposes for which the organization was established. . 94. There were two further operative paragraphs in tha~ resolution, which 1 quote: "3. That this incompatibil1ty exclUdes the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter- American system. "4. That the Counci! of the Organization of Amer~ ican States and the other organs and organlzations of the inter-American system adopt without delay the measuresnecessaryto carryoutthis resolution.1I As to thesetwoparagraphs, fourteen countries, namely two thirds of the membc,,:'ship, voted in favour, Cuba voted against, and six abstained. Those abstenti"ôns in no way afiected the unanimous decision, in which an except Cuba joined, that the Castro régime and its aggressions are incompatible with the American system of democratic freedom. 95. Cuba and the SovIet Union claimed that these paragraphs constitute "aggression" and that they re- quire Security COWlcil approval. Let us look for a moment at these two contentions. First, do the para- graphe constitute aggresslon against Cuba? The an- swer to that is obvious. To clalm such a resolution ls aggresslon ls to distort the meaning of words beyoIid an reason. Clearly that resolution was a defensive reaction to the Cuban régime' s subversive activitiee againet the free institutions and security ofthe Amer- teM republics. Those aggressive activities were the cause of the resolution and are the source of present tensions. 96. Let me reView tbe faets brought out at the PWlta deI Este conference. It was there clearly shawn tbat the Castro régime, with the assistance of local com- munist parties. ls employing a wide variety of tech- niques and practices to overthrow thefreedemocratic institutions of Latin America. It is bringing hWldreds of Latin American students, labour leaders, intellec- tuals and dissident politieal leaders to Cuba for in- doctrination and for training to be sent back ta their countries for the double purpose of agitating infavour of the Castro régime and undermining their own Gov- ernments. lt ls fostering the establishment in other Latin American cOWltries of so-ealled "eommittees of solfdarity" with the Cuban revolution. Cuban diplo- matie personnel encourage and finance agitation and 97. The Cuban régime is flooding the hemisphere with propaganda and with printed material. The recent inauguration of a powerflÙ short-wave radio stationin Cuba now enables the régime ta broadcast its propa- ganda to every corner of the hemisphere and these broadcasts have not hesitated ta caU for the violent overthrow of established governments. Such appeais have been directed ta Peru, Brazil, Guatemala. and. mast recently. the Dominican Republic. On22January of this year, Radio Havana beamed a broadcast to the Dominican Republic calling on the people to "overlhrow the Council of State"-theverydemooratio Council which is now expressing the will of the Do- minican people to be free of the last remnants of the Trujillo dictatorship. propagande à tant de n'hésite violence destinés quelque 22 destinée population démocratique exprime tiges 98. The military training of Latin Americans in Cuba by the Castro régime, and the wide distribution throughout the hemisphere. of the treatise onguezorilla warfare by "Ché" Guevara. Castro's chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Castro régime will use guerrilla operations as another important device for gaining Us objectives. The large amounts of arms which Castro boasts oÎ baving obtained from the com- mwllst military bloc place mm in a positionto support such operations, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean countries. notably Panama and the Dominican Republic. If we are to believe Castro's threats made prior to and during the Punta deI Este conference, there will almost eertainly be further Cuban inspired guerrilla operations against its Latin American neighbours. 98. Cuba dans écrit Castro, ment ses Castro communiste rations, des notamment caine. Castro Este, contre presque 99. What the Organization of American States de- cided, unanimously, is that Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a base for commwrist aggression. intervention. agitation and subversion against the American republics. The American republics unani- mously recogni'IJed that this situation is a serious threat to thelr security and the abilityoftheir peoples ta ahooae freely their own form of government and to pursue freely their goals of economic well-being and of social justice. 99. décidé, d'hui soviétique d'agression. sion Celles-ci menace pour gouvernement bien-@tre 1 1 i 1, J 1, iJ 100. tendre de lI'1.is - contre cubain exclusion. qui plaint nécessaires créées. pouvoir pour sa. 100. In the face of these faets it is absurd to cqntend that the Punta deI ~ste re;solution, excl':ldingl?otCuba, but the present Cuban régime fromtheOrganizationof American States, constitutes aggressionagainstCuba, when it is the Cuban régime's.own aggression against the Organization of American States which has caused that exclusion. What the Cuban régime has done is ta create a condition which makes ûASactionnecessary. and then appear before this COuncil to complainof the action made necessary by the very condition they ! - ~hemselves 'created. Clearly a reglonalorganization can determine for itself the conditions ofparticipation on it. If it could not so decide, it would be incapable of its own defence and tberefore have no reason for existence. 101. qui 19 con:re 101. EquaUy clearly such self-exclusion, caused by Cubais aggressive acts against members of the OAS, Is not "enforcement action" wlthin the meaning of 102. The ürganization of American States 18. in the language of Article 52, paragraph l, of the United Nations Charter, a regional agency for the main- tenance of international peRce and security. Burely the ûrganization of American states. like any ather regional agency. 18 and, as an agencyfor the collective se1f...(lefence of the hemisphere. mustbeentitledtode- termine who shouldparticipate inits proceedingswith- out being subject to a Soviet veto or any ather veto in the 8ecurity Council. The COÙQcil cannat pretend to determine what governments should and should not parjicipate in allch a regional agency like the Organi- zation of American states. the League of Arab states, or some future African or Asian regional agency. 103. It should be noted that the Cuban Government's self-exclusion from the Organization of American states was not based on its "social system", as Cuba aUeges. It was based on that Government's violations of the ChaJ;'ter of the OAS ta which Cuba had solemnly subscribed. In violation of that Charter, the present Cuban Government has conducted aggressive and subversive activities against its fellow American republics. and in violation of that Charter it has sup- pressed the fundamental rights of the individual. 104. Surely it is not a violation of the United Nations Charter ta suspend a government for theveryaggres- sive activities which the United Nations Charter ls designed ta prevent, and surely it ls not a violation of the United Nations Charter ta suspend a govern- ment for suppressing the hwnan rights andfundamental freedoms which the United Nations Charter is designed ta uphold. Nor did the framera of the United Nations Charter intend it ta protect a government from the consequences of such aggressive activities and such violations of hwnan rights and funciamental freedoms. The Organization of American States is clearly en- t~tled ta suspend the participation of a government which deltberately violates basic principles and obli- gations of the Organization. 105. The reasoning by which the representative of Cuba has sought to justify his contention that" the suspenslan-or, as he put It, the expu!slon-of the Cuban Government from the Organization ofAmerican States was unIawful was this: since the OAS Charter, an international treaty, contains no clause expressl:?" authorizing suspension or expulsion, such a right of suspension or expulsion cannat be implied. He claimed that treaties must be interpreted restrictively, and that the principle of restrictive interpretation of treaties in this case prohibited implying a rigbt of suspension. 106. The Cuhan representative is wrong in this re- gard for three" reasons. 107. First, it ls for the Organization of American States ta interpret !ts own Charter. The reCiUired 109. Thirdly. it is obvious that no regional body can be forced to accept the presence of a government which the members of that regional body determine ta be violating the very terms of the charter of that body. In this case, an of the members of the Grgani- zation of American states. except Cuba, determined that the Cuban Government ls violating the OAS Char- ter to wlùch Cuba had solemnly subscribed. The inde- pendence and effectiveness of regional agencies would be wholly destroyed by a rule that required them ta continue in their midst governments that oppose them- selves to the organizations' principles and violatetheir charters. 110. To return to the Punta deI Este resolutions, resolution VIT, wbich was also unanimously adopted by all of the American republics with the exception of Cuba, excluded the present Cuban régime from the Inter-American Defense Board Wltil it should be determined by the Council of the Organization of American states that participation of the Government of Cuba is not prejudicial ta the work of the Board or ta the security of the Western Hemisphere. 111. Now. does such a resolution constitute aggres- sion or contravene the United Nations Charter or require Security Council authorization? Of course it does not-and it would be pointless to ask the Inter- national Court of Justice whether it does. The Inter- American Defense Board consists of military and naval experts whose function it is to study and recom:- mend measures for the defence of the Western Hemi- sphere. Surely the American republics are entitled, without subjecting themselves to a Soviet veto, to exclude from such study aGovernmentwhich is hostile to the very purposes of the Board and which is an acknowledged member of a bloc constituting the very threat which the American republies are attempting to defend themselves against. j J1 1 112. Resolution Vill, adopted by a vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions. recited the statement in theReport of the Inter-Arnerican Peace Committee that the in- tense subversive activity of the Sino-SOviet bloc and of the Cuban Government in America constitutes lia serious violation of fundamental principles of the inter-American system", and it resolved as follows: "1. To suspend immediately tracte with Cuba in arms and implements of war of every kind. "2. To charge the COUDCU of'the Organization of Amer1can States, in acco:rdance with the circum- stances and with due consideration for the constitu- tional or legal limitations of each and every one of 114. As regards extending the trade suspension to other items, the resolution instructs the COWloil of the OAS ta study the feasibility and desirabiUty of such an extension. with due consideration for the con- stitutional or lagal limitaUons of the member States. Obviously no Renforcement action" was involvedhere. 115. 1 nOw come ta the final resolution, adopted by a vote of 19 to i -with Cuba voting against it-and 1 abstention. This Resolution IX recommended that the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rtghts be revised to provide for further respect for these rtghts in the Western Hemisphere countries affected. 116. Does slloh a resolution constitute aggression or oontravene the United Nations Charter or require Security Council authortzatton? Of course it does not-and likewise 1t would be pointless ta ask the International Court of Justice whether 1t does. 117. From this suney of the nine resolutions of Punta deI Este. three conclusions emerge: first, the only aggression involved is the documented aggressive acti'littes of the Cuban commw1ist régime which the CQllolltries of Latin America fOWld Wlanimously to be direoted against the free democratic institutions of the American republicsi secondly, nothing remotely resembling a violation of the United Nations Charter is here involvedi and thirdly, nothing is involved wlùch would just1fy the COWlCU in tnvoking Article 53 of the United Nations Charter. The responslbi11ties of the OAS were satisfied when ft reported under Article 54. 118. There is accordingly no question which merits submission to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. 119. Furthermore, the issue ls one wlûch the Secu- rlty Counci! has already thoroughly considered and as ta which ft has reached a clear-cut deoiston. 1 refer, of course. ta the decision taken by the COWlcil on 9 September 1960 [895th meeting] as to whether the COWlCll considered Us authorizationto be required for the action that had then been taken by the OAS 120. In that case, the Soviet Union, as does the Castro régime here, contended that the resolutions of the Organization of American States constituted "en- forcement action" under Article 53 of the Charter which had to be authorized by this Council, and intro- duced a resolution to that effect. An extensive debate followed during which the Security Council's authority and responsibilities with respect to Article 53 were thoroughly examined. The Soviet resolution received no support and the Soviet representative ultimately did not even put it ta a vote. Instead, nille members of the Council supported a resolution sponsored by Argentina, Ecuador and the United States, thepurpose of which was explicitly to limitSecurityCouncil action ta "noting", not authorizing or approving or disapprov- ing, the OAS action which had been reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 54. i ~ I i' 121. We have, then, a square decision by this Coun- cil,..2I after thorough debate, as to the extent of the Council's autbority under Article 53. That decision was that measures even more far-reaching thanthose now bafore us do not involve "enforcement action" within the meaning of Article 53, and therefore do Dot require Security Council authorization. It is even clearer that the milder Punta deI Este resolutions now before us involve no such "enforcement action" and require no security Council authorization. 122. 1 cannat help but refer, Ïn this connexion, to the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union at the meeting of the Security Council held on 27 February 1962, when he said, referring to the Interpretation of Article 53 in the DominicanRepublic case: "First of aU, in 1960 the issuewasraised in rela- tion ta action taken against the Dominican Republic ... It matters to us: the Dominican Republic is one thing, Cuba is another, Chile a th;'~·d." [991st meet- ing, para. 31.] Here is the representative of the Soviet Union 00- mitting that Soviet polltical considerations control their interpretation of the United Nations Charter. 123. We do not believe that the other members of this Councillook upon the interpretationofthe Charter in a spirit of such cynicism. The Soviet Unionrs at- tempt in the Dominican Republic case to have this Council authorize action which they approved was recognized at the time as a prelude ta a later effort to employ its veto against the Organization of Amer- 125. Moreover, the insubstantiality of the questions demonstrates that there ls aven less reason for the Couneil ta consider the Cuban demandthatprovisionai measures be adopted. under Article 40, ta suspend the implementation of the resolutions -of Punta deI Este. 126. The United States Government has repeatedly made clear that it favours increaséd recourse to the International Court of Justice. But it does not favo'lr use of the Courtfor coldwar politicalpurposes foreign ta the Charter and the Statute ofthe Court. lt is signi- fieant, in this connexion, thatthe Soviet representative, whose Government is consistently hostile to the use of the Court for the settlement of genuine legal dis- putes between States, and has deprecated the Court' s advisory jurisdiction, shouldsoenthusiasticallyfavour submission ta the Court of the rhetorical and self- serving que"stions which bave been conjured up by the Cuban representative. 127. There is no reason why we should reopen the decision of the OAS in the Dominican case. There is even less reason why we should again give any con- sideration ta the substance of these charges of OAS aggression against Cuba or to tbe Cuban régime's effort ta prevent the OAS from reacting ta the situation which that régime itself created. 128. What we have here is not a legal dispute. What we have is a cold war political attack. through the Cuban Communist régime, oD. the Organization of American St:'t.es. What is more, what we have here is an attempt ta shackle the OAS with the Soviet Union's security Conncil veto. If that attempt were ta he successful, it would mean the impotence not only of the Organization of American States but of aU other regional organizations. We do not believe that the members of this Council, or, indeed, the members of the General Assembly, wish to have any regional or- ganization sa fettered and made sa impotent in the future.

1 calI on the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of repIy. 130. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Those who listened attentively to the speech by the United States representative at this meeting of the Council must have easily been able ta detect the difference of principle- 1 might say, the political düference-between a number of the propositions made here by the United States representative and the statements we have heard throughout the discussion of the Cuban question-the question of the aggression by the UnitedStates against the Republic of Cuba. 132. bn the other hand, in their speeches the representatives of Cuba and ofthe Soviet Union have adduced indisputable and concrete facts and praof showingthat the United States is continuing to prepare armedintervention against the Republic of Cuba, and thatboth the territory of the United States and the territory of a number of Latin American republics in the Caribbean region are being used for this purpose. 133. There are of course two answers tothequestion of why there is now such a striking difference in the speech we have just heard. As human beings, we can understand that Mr. Stevenson wants to avoid a repetition of the terrible, 1 might say alarming and frightful situation in which he found himself last year, when on 17 Aprii 1961, speaking as the UnitedStates representative, he said: nDr. Roa, speaking for Cuba, has just charged the United States with aggression against Cuba and invasion coming from Florida. These charges-Mr. Stevenson resoundingly stated-are totally false, and 1 deny them categorically.".11 134. It is weIl lmown that on that very day detachroents of interventionists, trained and armed inUnited States territo:ry, directed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and protected by the UnitedStates Navy, landed on the ter,ritory of Cuba. 135. It is well known that in April 1961, in an official statement from the White House, the President of the United States acknowledged the responsibility of the United States Government for fuis operation and that, a few months later, the President of Guatemala confirmed that he had allowed the territory of the Republic of Guatemala ta be used for these operations, at the request of the United States Government. ! 1 1, 136. Of course, in such a situation and from the standpoint of not once more finding himself in sucb an alarming and frigbtful position, Mr. Stevenson is right not to touch upon this topic again. As 1 have already said, as human beings we could understand him and not insist that he should again find himself in the position, in this building and under this roof, of being responsible for carrying out the camouflage operations of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, We do not insist on this. If we have recalled this fact here, it is only because Mr. Stevenson, like aU of us, speaks here not as a notable persan but as a representative of his Government. If, in reply to the concrete proof that has been gfven of the aggres- 1J This statement was made at the l1S0th meeting of the First Corn_ minee, the official record of which is published in summary form. 137. This shows that the United States representative. as the representative of bis country. is unable to refute the actual, concrete facts which have beeu adduced in this connexion; that DOW the United States Government is even abandoning the polie}" of camouflaging the preparations against Cuba. However. if you compare this with the position now adopted at this meeting. namely the reiterated accusation that a sman peace-loving country. Cuba. is preparing aggression. diversion, sabotage and terrible anddestructive activities-what have we not heard!-that of course sounded like an appeat for approval and continuation of these preparations and for the creation of the political atmosphere, of which we spoke in our statement, now regarded by the United States of America as one of the essential elements in the new military intervention"against Cuba which it is preparing. 138. An that was said in the statements by the repre. sentative "of Cuba and the representative of the Soviet Union on the subject thus naturally becomes even more meaningful in the light of this Most significant position adopted by the United States representative which, in my opinion. needs no comment. 139. For this re~Son. when we turn to the question ra~sed by the representative of Cuba, which does not represent an immediate solution ta the basic problem but which lays the foundation for a fair and responsible solution by the Security Couneil of the question of the suppression of attempts at an armed invasion of Cuba with the aim of changing the political system established there as a result of the Cuban revolution; when we turn to the practical and quite modestprogramme, which concerns only one aspect of the matter, as we have already stressed, suggested here at this meeting tif the Council j,n the plan in which the Republic of Cuba emphasizes this, we should DOW weigh not only the proof given here" in the course of the discussion about the military preparations for an armed invasion of Cuba by the United States-preparations which are undoubtedly continuing-but also the position adopted on this matter by the United States representative. 140. The situaUon ia becoming even more alarmingj and the role of the President and of aIl other members of the Coul).cil is becoming even more important, if urgent measure~ are to ~ taken to suppress the new intervention against the Rel'V-blic of Cuba. 141. In his speech, Mr. ~tevenson devoted considerable attention to a numberofthe legalquestions raised in the statement by the Soviet Union representative who, as is weIl known, suPPOrted the presentation of them given in the letter from the representative of Cuba. 1 must say that, although 1 do not agree with any of the arguments which Mr. Stevenson used in connexion with these legal problems and questions before the Security Council, nevertheless, however 143. Imagine that a plaintiff has appealed ta a court and made a whole numbel' of proposaIs, whichhe asks should be accepted; he requests the court to consider them and to deliver a verdict against the defendant. The next day, the plaintiff goes tothecourt and sees a large lock on the doors-the court is closed. In front of the door stands a judge, dressed in a robe with aU the trimmings of a judge. The plaintiff cames nearer, looks at the judge and sees that it i6 the defendant in disguise. The plaintiff waits ta see what will happen next. The defendant disguised as judge gives aU the answers to the questions contained in the plaintiff' s appeal to the court. 144. What would Ml'. Stevenson, who bas considerable legal experience, say about sucb a mockery of justice? Yet wbat he has done here before our eyes is exactly what 1 have just tried to de6cribe. He enumeratednot even very faithfully, in other words, he dlstortedthe questions raised by the representative of Cuba and tried there and then ta give aIl the answers ta them. At the end of these answers to the questionswhose formulation, as 1 shaH show, was considerably distorted-he said: why go to court? Everything is so clear. To me, Stevenson who before us aH is playing the l'ole of the International Court of Justice and, as it were, laying down the law on behali of the Court, everything is clear. No one else must ask questions. AlI the others have ooly one right: to agree with what Ml'. Stevenson has decreed here. 145. However, times have changed and the United States no longer has any material basis upon which it can here impose its will so categoricaUy on the whole world. Times have changed, and we have notmet he1'8 in the Council for this purpose; we have not met to hear the answers to questions, wllich should be put to the International Court of Justice, given in the words of Ml'. Stevenson whom no one has authorized to give the categorical ruUng which can, and must, he given by the Court. 146. It was very easy ta follow the main thread of Ml'. Stevenson's statement, which consisted in diligently declaiming before the Security Council a number of the Punta deI Este resolutions that the United States of America, without any substantiation or foundation, imposed upon several Latin American countries-not aU, but several of the Latin American countries which met at punta deI Este. It is not the tirst time that Ml'. Stevenson has done this. During the discussion in the General A.ssembly, we have already heard this declamation. He declaimed these Unsubstantiated resolutions and said: "There, 1 have produced brilliant evidence for you; no further proof is needed, everything is quite clear." Certainly every- 147. We reserve the right toreverttotheformulation of the questions as given here today by Mr. Stevenson, sinee this took up about three quarters of his statement and we shaIl need to follow the reasoning with the written text. However, the methodwas quite simple and uneomplicated and consisted in saying, after the reading of each resolution adopted at Punta deI Este: "This is not aggression, so why gotothe International Court of Justice?1I He read another resolutioll and said: IIThis is not aggression either, so why go to the Court?1I In this way, he quite deliberately-and 1stress this, because he is a qualified andtrained lawyer-departed from the substance of the questions as they were formulated by the Cuban delegation. He formulated them in his own words and completely ignored the fact that in the Cuhan statement of the question, which we are supporting here, there are two key points. 148. The first point is the question put to the International Court of Justice aboutwhetherthe resolutions adopted at Punta deI Este by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, regarding the expulsion of aState member of the regional agency because of its social system, are or are not in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. 149. The second point concerns "the adoption ofother enforcement action against that State without the authorization of the Security Councilll • 150. Thus, no one is asking the International Court of Justice whether the Punta del Este resolutions, in~ cluding resolutions VI and VIII to which the document submitted by the Cuban delegation quite obviously alludes. constitute or do not constitute aggression. In the formulation given by thé Cuban delegation and supported here by the Soviet Union delegation, you will not find that question, which the United States representative has so repeatedly put ta the Council. The question is quite düferent. The question is whether or not a regional agency can be given the right to violate the principles of the United Nations Charter. Can regional agencies take action which is directly contrary to the Charter, given the Charter's specific statement that regional agencies are established in order to help the United Nations to fulfil the purposes laid down in the Charter? 151. Article 52 of the United Nations Charter specifically states: IINothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such ar- 1:1. régionaux". 153. In essence, the difference between the United States and the Soviet Union positions on this question resides in the fact that the United States is pursuing specific political objectives, chief of which, in Cuba, is the overthrow of a system which is not to the liking of the American monopolies, and wants to trample underfoot the principles of internationallaw, theUnited Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization o'f American States itself. And theUnited States wants the Council to endorse this interpretation ofthe reorganization of the OAS which the United States tried to set on foot at the last conference at Punta deI Este. However, in support of the Charter of the Organization of American States, very influential Latin Amerkan countries were categorically opposed to such reorganization. 153. et Les minés, est aux aux la nisation Conseil ont deI influents 154. It is in support of the UnitedNations that we are speaking here. If we speakofthe illegality of the adoption at Punta deI Este of decisions for enforcement action against the Republic of Cuba, we areemphasizing the significance of these measures primarily from the standpoint of strict observance of legality by this Organization. 154. l'Organisation du tendant la de strictement 1 1, 155. des ne crire semblée facétieux national est ciation en soutenir sécurité, assurer procéderait gitime, des position ce nismes Charte, des appuyés oonstituent rité 155. At the last session of the General Assemtly; a jesting catch-phrase was invented bere by certain cynics-though it is not supportedby us-in regardta the activities of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. This jesting catch-phrase was: "There is np place for internationallaw inthis international Organization.n This is a cynical phrase, 1 am led ta quote it because, by a quite legitimate association of ideas, it came ta my mind when the UnitedStates representative tried ta c1aim that the struggle of the Soviet State and the Soviet delegation, here in the Security COUDCit, for strict observance of the standards of the Charter could he described as a desire ta exert over the activities of the regional agencies sorne sort of influenoe which is illegal, unlawful and contrary to the Charter, No: Our position is not dictated by these considerations. We have held, and we still hold, that our Organization should do everythingto support regional agencies which act in accordance wîth the Charter, withîn the framework of the Charter, and not contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter, as one of the means of strengthening international peace and security and of ensuring the reinforcement and triumph of the principles of the United Nations Charter. i i 1 1 \ ! 157. The fabricated American propaganda and the idea, which appeared yesterday for the first time in the pages of the American Press-if you can caB it an idea-that the Soviet Union is attempting in desperation to forge for its own use sorne ridiculous instrument such as a veto on the activities of regional agencies are devoid of auy substance from beginning to end. 158. 1 must therefore stress that when he attempted to answer the legal questions raised by the Cuhan delegation, which are still entirely pertinent, Mr. Stevenson merely resorted to declamation. He tried to answer these questions hut answered them wrongly. lt is important for us to emphasize this, in order once again heartily to endorse the minimal measures recommended by the Cuban delegation, so that our Council may not become like the court which was closed with iron locks and from whîch the plaintiff could not obtain justice. 159. If we understand our responsibility, we must act strictly within the framework of law and of the United Nations Charter, in support of the purposes and principles of the Charter; and the Soviet delegation appeals to aB, including the United States delegation, ta do so. ISO. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arah Republic): ln view of the lateness of the hour, 1 wonder whether the representative of the USSR would agree ta waive the English and French consecutive interpretations of bis statement.

The representative of the Soviet Union has heard the suggestion made by the representative of the UnitedArab Republic. 1 must inform the members of the Council, however, that 1 have aiso on my list of speakers the name of the representative of Cuba, who wishes to exercise his right of reply at this meeting.

1 think it is for those who speak English and French to decide when they want ta hear the consecutive interpretation of what 1 have just said. However, if there are no objections on the part of the members ofthe Council, 1 will certainly agree to the suggestionby the representative of the United Arab Republic that the interpretation of my statement sbould not be given at this meeting.

If members of the Council agree that there should be no consecutive interpretation into French and English of the statement of the representative of the SovietUnion,

ln view of what has just been said by the representative " of the Soviet Union, and in view also that the name of the representative of Cuba is on my list of speakers for the exercise of his right of reply at this meetinga right that 1 cannat grant him before the interpretation of the statement by the Soviet representative- 1 have no alternative but ta request that the last statement by the representative of the Soviet Union he interpreted now.

My delegation quite understands that the consecutive interpretation cannot be postponed until after the statement by the representative of Cuba. If, however, the representative of Cuba has no objection, my delegation would suggest that we might resume the meeting at 10.30 tomorrow, on the understanding that we shall begin with the consecutive interpretation of the statement by the representative of the USSR and then hear the reply of the representative of Cuba.

If 1 understood the representative of Chile to propose the adjournment of the meeting until tomorrow, and if the representative of Cuba has no objection, 1 would like to second the motion.

Since the representative of Chile has used the word "suggestn, May 1 ask if it is to be regarded as a motion under paragraph 3 of rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure? j 1

It is not a motion. 1 made a suggestion, subject ta what the representative of Cuba may decide.

1 give the floor to the representative of Ghana on a point of arder.

When 1 raised my hand a long time aga, 1was going to make a motion that, in view of the lateness of the hour. we might adjourn untfl tomorrow morning at10.30 andstart afresh at that time. 1 am Vüry tired.

1 put ta the Council the motion which the representative of Ghana has just submitted and which 1 understand ts that provided for in paragraph 3 of rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure.

In view of what the representative of Ghana has just said, and if there i8 DO objection, 1 shaH caU on the representative of Cuba ta reply ta the question put ta him.

1 shouid like te thank the representatives of Chile and Ghana, as weIl as the Couneil, for their kindness in hearing our views on the suspension of the meeting. 176. We shaH gladly agree ta it. In accepting the suggestion of the representatives of Chile and Ghana, however, 1 should merely like ta addthatwhen 1 asked ta speak today it was because 1 feIt that my country had been unjustly attacked and because a sense of patriotism and truth-which we feel to be on our sideprompted me to reply this very day, without delay or further study, giving full vent ta my feelings and convictions. I 177. In view of the reasonable requests, based onthe lateness of tbe hour, made by the representatives of Ghana and Chile, 1 shallbemostgratefulif the Council will give me the opportunity tomorrow of making the reply which, 1 repeat, 1 had intended to make today under the impetus of the aoger provoked by the unjustified attacks on my country.

ln view of what the representative of Cuba has just said and of the views of other members, 1 think that we can now adjourn the meeting until 10.30 tomorrow, when we shaH begin with the interpretation-left over from today-of the USSR representative's reply. It was so decided. The meeting rose at 8.5 p.m. CYPRUS/CHYPRE: P"'N 10 Ale..nde, lhe G'e.t CZECHDSLOIlAKIA/TCMÉCOSlOy AFRICA/AFRIQUE eAM[ROON/CAMEIlOUN: l'BRA'R'. ou PEUPLE AFRICAIN L. Gè,~nte, B. p, \197. Y.~uM';. DIHUSIDr-! INTERN"rlONALE CAMEROUNAISE DU LIVRE ET DE LA PRESSE. Sansmol,m•. CONGO {té.poldv;llel: INSTITUT ?OttrIQUE CONGO....,S, B_ P. 2307. L~O~ol."dl•. ETHIOPIA/ÊTHIOP1E: IriTERNATIDHAL PRESS AGENey. P. O. 80. 120. "'0... Aba~8. GHANA: UNIVERS,TY BOOI(5HOP Un...,,,,, CQlleg~ oT q.Mn~. luon. AcC". KENYA, THE •.S,A. BOOKSHQP Be. 30167. Nai.obi. MOROCCO/MAROC: CENTRE DE DIFFUSION DOCUMEtlTAtRE DU B.E.P.I. B. 'ue M'c~.u.·B.II."e. Ra~.l. SOUTH URIC,l,fAFRIQUE DU SUD: VAN SCHAIK"S BOOK STORE (PH.l. 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