S/PV.994 Security Council

In aeeordance with the decision tliken bythe Couneil at its 992nd meeting 1 shail, if there are no objections, invite the representative of Cuba to take a seat at the Council table sa that he may participate, without the right ta vote, in the discussion. 1. mément 992ème d'inviter la vote, Inohaustegui et (Union 993ème At the invitation of the President, Mr. MarioGarcfà /nchâustegui (Cuba) took a place at the Council table. The interpretation Into Engllsh and French of the statement made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub1ics) at the 993rd meeting was given.

The Permanent Representative DOW speaking was in Cuba in April 1961. For those of us who saw the United states squadron off the coast of our homeland, for those of uS who buried our Cuban brothers murdered by United States bornbs and sheils in an act of war against our people organized and directed by the Government of the United States and known in the history of that country as "The Cuban iiaseo"-for those of us who have had such experiences it is düficult to listen calmly to talk of fancied and grotesque aets of aggression by Cuba against the whole of Latin Ameriea and the United States. above aU from the representative of a Governrnent which has comrnitted real acts of aggression against our Country. 2. l'espagnol]: parle Nous le enterré et prise dirigée restera . sous témoins notre agressions contre Unis, même réels j, 1 3. Because of the respect which we owe to the United Nations and because we hold firmly to our convictions 3. et 4. The representative of the United States has expressed his point of view and has commented on our request ta the Security Couneil [8/5086] in terms which, among other things. seem ta us ta Iack aoy legal foundation. If the United States representative is so sure of the rightness of his position, why lS he against requesting the International Court of Justice for an opinion? And if not-and his attitude is quite clear from the way he acted in the Couneil yesterday-of what value iB his statement that his Government favours increased recourse to the Court? 5. He said that neither the expulsion of Cuba on grounds of its social system nor the other unlawful coercive measures taken by the cOnference ofAmerican Foreign Ministers.!l against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba constituted violations of the United Nations Charter. You have heard me quote the words of the representatives of Mexico. Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina, aH agreeing that the expulsion was illegal from the point of view of international Law. One of the fundamental principles of our Organization, and unquestionably the most important one, is that of the coexistence and tolerance., within the United Nations, of States with different $ocial systems. Yet the United Statesrepresentative teels that the principles of the Charter are still untouç:hed and that neither interference in the internaI ~lrs of aState 001' ooeroion have ooourred when a groJlp of States, acting at the instigation of and under pressure from the United States Government, attempts to change the social system ofanother State. He see's no act of aggression against the constitutive elements of that State so arbitrarily penalized. even when the laws of the regionalorganization and. the laws of the United Nations cOntain not a 5ingle article on which suoh measures can be based, but do on the contrary oontain many articles and prinoiples which prohibit their adoption. 6. It would seeytl. that what the United states representative deems lawful for the regional organization is not lawful for the international body. Such is the "legalft notion of tb:,e United States delegation. 7. It also seems that in the opinion of the United States our communism is more subversive than the Marxist-Leninist systems adopted by other Member States \Vith which the United states maintains quite normal relations and which the United States Government accuses of in"piring our alleged subversive activities in the hem\sphere. Not that we are against such normal relation!.1,; on the contrary, we consider that normal relations between States having different social systems enhançe peaceful coexistence. What we do find strange 5s that a small state which has adopted the Marxist-1Jeninist system as the result of ,a people's revolution shoUld be made the target of so li Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers Qi Foreign Affairs of the American States, held Olt Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 22 to 31 January 1962. 8. 1 wonder whether sllch a difference in treatment ia due to the faet fuat we have no nuclear weapons? Or could it be due to the nationalization of the monopolistic concerns which the gentlemen of the Kennedy régime owued in Cuba? For if a régime, because it ls Marxist-Leninist, ls incompatible with the Organization of American States, which iB a regional body that claims to incorporate the principles of the United Nations. logic would lead one to beli8ve that it was also incompatible \Vith the United Nations. If aState is expelled"from the OAS because 1t is Marxist-Leninist and if other coercive sanctions are imposed upou it t it should also logically be possible to expel it from the United Nations for the same reasons. Nevertheless. as the President and members of this Council know perfectly well., both law and the roost elementary logic make that impossible, whether in the case of the Orgànization of American States, the United Nations or any other organization that has a little self-respect._ 9. Article 102 of the Charter of the Organization of American States tells us that none of the provisions of that Charter shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States nnder. the Charter of the United Nations. And Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations confers upon the latter Organization, and this body specifically, the task of ensuring that regional agencies do not make agreements or engage in activities tbat are inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 10. Can it be that, in their intolerance, the United States are proposing to unleash a holy war against aIl Marxist-Leninist régimes? Or is this persecution mania directed only against the Cuban Marxist- Leninist Government? Ta start a war against a Member State because it is Marxist-Leninist is a highly dangerous thing and in no way helps "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". On the contrary, it helps to provoke war. 11. The United States representative spoke of subversive activity by our Government throughout America, as if that were feasible, as if it were logicaUy possible for a small country blockaded by the Government of the world's second greatest military Power to subvert a who1e continent. The causes of the unrest in America are to be found in the abuses and profits of the exploiting United States companies and in the conditions of misel'y and discrimination in which the masses live. As we s~id in the First Committee [1231st meeting], at the six.teenth session of the General Assembly, the Cuban revolution canm~t he blamed for setting an example and it is not going to stop doing so. 12. Tbere has been taIk of ideological aggression against the countries of the hemisphere, as though Radio Havana and our publications could compete in resources with the United States press, radio and television with their powerful networks and subsidi- 13. Why does not the United States Government declare political persecution and intolerance to he incompatible with democracy? Why does it not declare racial discrimination ta he incompatible with democracy? Why does it not declare United states assistance ta and participation in the colonial wars and against the nationalliberation movements throughout the world to te incompatible with demouracy? Who gave the United States the right to decide how other peoples should exercise their rightto self-determination? How can the United States Government, without its representative showing even the faintest trace of a blush speak of human rights in a country where every kind of phobia exists and come here, to the United Nations, in New York-where even highly distinguished members of this Organization have been victims of these savage phobias-to accuse of violating human rights a people which bas done away with aU differelices among its sons, a people truly of equals in which there are no whites, no blacks, no Indians, no rich, no poor, but only working citizens? 14. .It has also been said that the opinion for which we are asking is not judicial but exclusively political. On the basis of that thesis Article 96 of the Charter, which authorizes requests for opinions, would also be inoperative, one more of the many Articles which are inoperative in the eyes of the United States delegation. 15. Are our questions judicial or are they not? And if they are not, why not allow the Court to give a ruling on that point? If we, as political bodies, did not have to discuss legal aspects from time to time, Article 96, which authorizes such essentially political bodies as the General Assembly and the Security Council to make requests of this type to the Court would he purposeless. Furthermore, in order toblock any possibility of requesting an advisory opinion it would always be possible to use the excuse that political questions are discussed here and that politic.al interests are uppermost. In such a serious question as the scope of the Articles of the Charter that relate to the competence of this Council and are linked to such extraordinary measures as the expulsion of a Member State from a regional organization and the imposition of coercive measures on that State witbout the authorization of tbis Council, surely the least that can be granted is the right of that Member State, and of the international juridical community, to a clear and final ruling, made by those who are qualified and have the knowledge and mission ta do so, on whether or not the international norm has been complied with? How can the effectiveness of treaties 17. There has been no answer from the United States representative either to our allegations, based on the law, or our charges of aggression. That is due ta the faet that the United States is atthis moment preparing new invasions and provocations in the Caribbean and is embarking upon new military adventures against us, just as it embarks upon military adventures against national liberation movements at the four points of the compass wherever those movements appear. That is a political line of the United StateR Government: the smothering of the nationalliberation movements of every country in the world. The behaviour of the United States delegation confirms it. , 18. International law is not violated with impunity, for that means replacing law by violence. The very sources of the law have been destroyed. We can on!y hope that the Council and the Court can do something to protect standards. We know the aggressive plans of the United States and we mention them here sa that there may be nO misunderstanding when they are earried out. We in Cuba are ready to resist. Cuba, as we have said time and again, will not be Sllrrendered; Cuba will oot capitulate. We shall conquer because reason is on OUT side, beeause history is on our side, because every people in the world is on our side and because on our side, too, arepowerful States where the peoples are sovereign.

The representative of the United States has asked to be allowed to exercise his right of reply. 1 shall therefore give him the floor. 20. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): Mr. President, yesterday we listened to a speech br the representative of the Soviet Union, and this morning, another by the representative of Cuba. 1 must take occasion to comment briefly on both of these utterances. 1 1 21. The representative of the Soviet Union has made allegations ta whieh 1 feel 1 cannot subscribe by silence. Mr. Morozov has abused me for not talking about the invasion of Cuba which, he says, the United States is preparing. Evidently, he has not read the letter from the representative of Cuba which is the subject before us on our agenda, and which makes no referenee ta the United states 1 plans for invasion of Cuba. This seems surprising, because 1 thought the Soviet representative was familiar with that letf;er: indeed, 1 thought he wrote it. 22. 1 think we could improve the efficiency of the United Nations if we, at least, tried to stick to the subject before us; but eVidently, the Soviet reprer 23. 1 might also add that the vehemence and violence of the Soviet Union's attack on the United states and on the Organization of American States, and his repetition of these threadbare charges which are not even included in our agenda, are proof positive that what we ar~ faced witb here is no legal matter, no court problem, but an out-and-out political effort by the Soviet Union and i.ts new satellite, Cuba, to impose a veto on regional agencies, thereby destroying their self-eietermination and independence. 24. The Soviet representative says tbat no question of aggression is involved in the questions Cuba would have submitted to the Court, and, therefore, that my statements, demonstrating that the Punta deI Este resolutions {see 8/5075] do not cOnstitute aggression, are irrelevant. Again, 1 fear, he has not read the letter from the representative of Cuba which we are supposed to be discussing, because it states expressly, in the second paragraph: "Tbe sanctions in question constitute aggression against the' sovereignty of our country ...." 25. The Soviet representative also claimed that 1 was attempting to aot as judge of the Cuban question, and wished to leave the Council no choice but to agree . with me that there' is no substance ta Cubais proposed questions for the Court. That charge, too, merits no repiy except ta say that. o~ course, the Council is the judge of whether Cuba's questions are substantial or Dot. The Council is the judgeof.whether it wishes to reopen its decision in the Dominican Republic case or not. The COUDcil, and not the United States, will express its decision through its vote on any draft resolution that may be submitted to it. 26. Finally, the representative of ,the Soviet Union has said that 1 have given no persuasive reason for 1 1 1 1 27. Now 1 must turn to what the representative of Cuba hr.s just said. He said it was hard to listen ta words of hypothetical aggressiol! by Cuba. My only comment is that neither the words, nor the aggressions, are hypothetical. They are the words of the Organization of American States; they are the words of a11 the neighbours of Cuba. As for the aggressions and Cuba's threats ta peace and security in this hemisphere, the findings, in fact, \Vere not by the United States, but by a11 the neighbours of Cuba. j 28. As to the demand that the questions advanùed by the representative of Cuba be put to the Court, 1 am confident of my conclusion that they should not. 1 must say that 1 have feIt that this matter has beeu appropriately deaIt with, and at length in my origi.:al statement; it would serve no purpose to restate aH those reasons. l : 29. Nowa word about the charge of the Cuban representative that 1 have lied about his country; 1 will say only that \Ve do not use such words lightly in this country, which is another happy difference that we have with Cuba. 1 attribute-and with great charitysuch intemperate and insulting language to the desperation of bis case, on the one band, and, on the other hand, to the standards of communistic polemics with which we are familiar in other parts of·the wodd, and with which Cuba, as a faithful pupil of communist techniques, is evidently going to debauch the courtesies which have so long'ennobled and humanized OUF dialogue in the West. We sha11 not compete in the technique of the big lie: we surrender. 1 1 1 1,, 1 i,

My delegation listened carefu11y ta the interesting legal and political analysis which the representative of Cuba made in this Council last Wednesday [992nd meeting]. We agree. with sorne of his views and disagree with others, but above aU we regret that we cannot concur in the conclusions which he reached. -1 31. The representative of Cuba constantly refel'red with sorne heat to the attitude taken by Chile at the Meeting of Punta deI Este. He quoted accurately from the speeches which the represe:J.tative of ChUe made 32. Chile's attitude at the Meeting of Punta deI Este is weIl known. In the debate on the question of calling tbat Meeting, my Government put forward sound legal arguments ta show tbat tr..e subject of the Meeting of Punta deI Este was not in accordance with the letter or the spirit of the Treaty uoder which lt was called. namely the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. 33. My Government abstained from glvmg its approval to the caUing of the Meeting of Punta deI Este, but it took part in the Meeting because it was held under a majority decision of the Council of the ürganization of American States. 34. The fact of disagreeing with a view which is finaUy accepted by the required majority does not mean that Chile or any member of an international organization should fail to respect in a spirit of democracy the resolutions of that organization-in this case the resolutions of the Council of the üAS with whose dêcisions we are bound to comply. 35. At the Meeting of Punta deI Este we expressed Our agreement with some of the measures which were taken, but we disagreed with sorne of the proposed measures against the Government of Cuba. In particular the Government of Chile considered that the exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from the inter-American system and the organs depending on it was not legally consistent with the terms of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. For this reason we abstained from voUng. 36. It is true, as the representative of Cuba stated, that the Minister for External Relations of ChUe said: "Chile, as a country that respects its international obligations and faithfully complies with the treaties to which it has affixed its signature, cannot admit anything but the most scrupulous respect for the Bogotâ Charter. This Charter does not provide for expulsion, and it would have to be amended before expulsion could be ordered." 37. We cannot hide the fact that in certain circles of public opinion in our countries it is thought that the exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American system was a mistake, not only because there were no solid grounds in law for the exclusion but beçause it would not lead to any practical solution of the kind sought by those who advocated exclusion; in the opinion of those circles the sole consequence of such a measure would be to drive Cuba even further into the arms of the other blocs and thus maintain a permanent state of disquiet and alanI: in the Carib~ bean. This view of the matter may continue to be a subject of controversy and will have some historical signtlicance, but it is not an argument that can he used in this Security Council debate, which has a different subject and a different purpose. 39. My Government has Dot changed fts standards and continues ta act in accordance with the principles we have always upheld in this delicate and painful matter. 40. Sorne American countries have broken off diplomatie and trade relations with Cuba. There are other countries, like Chile, which still maintain such relationS-, The decisions taken at Punta deI Este impose no collective obligation in tbis respect. Each State has the sover~ign right ta act according ta its own judgernent in these matters, and 18 responsmle for its own conduct. 4l. What has been called the "abstentionist" attitude taken by Chile and other countries at Punta deI Este has been given sorne political emphasis in the United Nations and the world press. But our attitude was not intended to lead to a rupture of inter-American unity, uor was this Hs effect. ! 1 .l 42. We are told that the most important American States in Latin America did not express their agreement with the decisions of Punta deI Este. The truth is that the Organization of American States does not comprise States tbat are more important or less important. We are all equal before the legal standards which govern our common life. The smallest States are as important as the largest. \1 43. Ch'ile, like the other American States, is loyally and enthusia~tically devoted to the common cause of strengthening the security of the continent, offulfilling its obligation to practise representative democracy, promote respect for human rights, uphold the principles of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples and initiate radical economic and social reforms. l 44. Here in the Security Council we do not intend to stifle or to apologize for any differences onthe Cuban question which we may have with our sister Republics of America, for we respect their views as they respect ours. On the contrary, we think it will be an advantage to world public· opinion to know that the Organization of American States is not afraid to bring its differences into the open and contront its political or legal principles. This proves that we are not subje.ct to pressure or protectorates. It aiso proves that the United States, in spite of what has been said here, has not put pressure on us in order to impose its policy. On the contrary, its rep~esentativesat Punta deI Este showed a deferent and conciliatory attitude throughout "th<€! negotiations. 45. It has always been our intention that the regional Organization should not be a olosed bloc composed of automata but an open association of sovereign nations having free recourse to collective decisions; and these decisions, once they have been adopted by the required majority, are undeniably valid. This is what \ 1 ! 46. My Government thinks that the question DOW before the Security Couneil, while lt 15 undeniably related to the specifie case of Cuba, has different and wider legal implications. It tends to cast donbt on the right of a regional agency to take action in regional affaira. Today this applies ta the ürganîzation of American States, but tomorrow it may apply to auy other regional agency. 47. Politically, we are considering the question of Cuba. Legally, we are considering the autonomous jurisdiction of a regional organization. We mustavoid falling into a confusion which would have unfortunate consequences. 48. We are not asked to pass a moral or political judgement on the tenor of the decisions of Punta deI Este. We are considering whether the COUDcil should approve or disapprove of those decisions or of any others which May be taken in the future, and whether the Council should seek the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter. !l1 49. In 1960 the case of the Dominican Republic was discussed. Today it is the case of Cuba, and tomorrow it May be another. Each case has its own characteristics and its own political implications. Each case May give rise to a new debate, and the COUDoil may put a different interpretation on each decision of the regional Organization, acc0rding to varying political stan!lards and according to the shifting ideologies of internationallife. i 50. In the case of the Dominican Republic, for example. where the decisions were of a more serious nature than in the case of Cuba, there were sorne members of the Security Council who wanted the Council to declare explicitly that it approved resolution 1li adopted at the Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States held at San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960. Now, il. the case of Cuba, the opposite is happening. We are asked to seek the advisory opinion of the Court, which involves a form of Cisapproval of the decisions of Punta deI Este and a denial of the authority of the competent organ which took those deoisions. 51. While we do Dot wish ta cast doubt on the Council's right to take up any matters it considers worthy of its attention, we think it is necessary ta make it quite clear that it is fully in accordance with the principles of the Charter for a regional organization to take decisions, and that when these decisions are transmitted ta the Security Council they do not require its endorsement but official acknowledgement of what has been done, provided only that this is in acccrdance with Article 53 of the Charter and that li 5ee document 5/4476. 53. It is important ta every Amerioan country, quite apart from its views on the question of Cuba, that the relations between the Organization ofAmerican States and the United Nations should be made clear. This is also important to Cuba, because we are sure that one day, which we hope will he soon, that country will once more beoome a part of the ïnter-American system, to the establishment and development of which it has made such a great contribution. It is important for the future of our regional Organization and for the co-operation and harmony which should exist between the regional order and world order. 54. We should remember the determined effort in this direction made by the American States at the San Francisco Cooference in 1945 to ensure that there should be no danger that resolutions of the regional Organization would he subject to the endorsement of the five great Powers seated in this Council, since these Powers could otherwise use their privilege of the veto to paralyse the regional Organization, with the most serious consequences for peace and even for the interests of the five great Powers themselves. For their own safety, these Powers should not interfere with the freedom of the regional organizations. We were trying ta prevent the regional system from becoming a potential sphere of influence. We were anticipating the day when it might become necessary ta protect the regional system from the blasts of the cold war. We must recall that it was on the initiative of the American States, and of ChUe in particuIar, that Articles 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter were introduced. 55. We repeat that we do not question the Security Council's right ta consider any regional question which may affect international peace and security and thus show its concern with events in any part of the world. 56. Nor do we question the right of any Member States-particularly if, as is the case of Cuba today, it feels that it is affected-to express its views, its doubts and -its objections in the Council or in llny other competent organ of the United NationS. But we do not think that it is beneficial to the future of a regional organization-as the representative ofArgentina said on a previous occasion-to make a false distinction between universaliam and regionalism, as factors that exclude rather than as factors which contribute to internationalorder. 1 j l 57. The new and promising feature of contemporary international life is the graduai and harmonious movement away from the sovereign State ta the regional organization in any of its forms, and from the regional organization to the international Organization of the United NationS. 58. Sovereign States which will not submit voluntarily ta a lligher body in arder to achieve international co-operation are at the mercy of an arbitrary 59. Fortunately this is not the case with the United Nations, nor is this the prevailing tendency in contemporary international llie. Fortunately, 1 repeat, we have discovered a just and flexible way to enable a regional organization ta develop within the international sphere. Moreover, the American States preferred not ta accept the Security CounciPs offer ta approve the resolutions of the Organization ofAmerican States. 60. This is true, for instance, of Venezuela. At the Security Council meeting of 8 September 1960, although Venezuela was in favour of one of the draft resolutions subnlitted to that Conncil concerning the acts of aggression and intervention of the Trujillo tyranny, it preferred to acknowledge that the specifie reference made in that drait ta Article 53 of the Charter "would create very serious obstacles to the efficient functioning of regional organizations, since it would imply recognition of the need for authorization by the Security Connci! in order to complete decisions which ••• are valid and complete in themselves" [S93rd meeting, para. SOl. 61. It may be useful ta warn those who now advocate interfering with the inter-American regional organization that tomorrow other regional. organizations founded on the association of States for geographical reasons or for reasons of political, religions or econontic identity, may acquire legal forro and confront the United Nations. It would be most disturbing if a precedent were set for the interference of the Security Conncil, where the five great Powers have the right of veto, in the affairs of regional organizations which are entitled to establish themselves by agreement and to impose obligations upon their members, in order to advance regional interests or the principles which determine the attitude of sucb regional agencies. 62. At the present time, ouly the Organization of American States, as a regional body, has chosen ta place itself within the framework of the United Nations. The OAS is not yet complete. It lacks the new countries which will emerge froID the old colonies that still remain in our continent. It lacks Canada, which would naturally be unwilling ta join a regional organization whose decisions are subject ta the veto. 63. As was pointed out yesterday by Ml'. Stevenson, this question is of interest to the African and Arab States. It aIso concerna western Europe, which is progressing rapidly towards integration. The countries which we know as the people's democracies of eastern Europe are affected by it too, for, if they decide in the future ta transform themselves iuto a regional organization, they would certainly not like 65. What is the meaning of the enforcement action referred to in Article 53? The English term "enforce_ ment actionn is mueh stronger than the Spanish term "coacciôn", which means the use of force or violence. The sanie is true of the French text: the term "me_ sures coercitives" cornes from the verb "con_ traindre", which means "to use violence". But at Dumbarton Oaks the more accurate term "acci6n compulsivall Vias being used. 66. The Charter itself in Articles 41 and 42 makes a distinction between the two types of measures which the Security Council may adopt: those which involve the use of armed force and those which do not. The latter, according to the Charter, include complete or partial interruption of econonûc relations, etc. The former include action by air, sea, or land forces and also "demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations". 67. Articles 44 and 45 refer explicitly to the use of force. Article 45 relates "international enforcement action" directly to the employment of armed forces. Undoubtedly, therefore, the purpose of Article 53 is to prohibit the "use of armed force"-or physical violence-by regional organîzations, without the authorization of the Security Council, with the single exception of individual or collective self-defence. 1 , 68. The identity of meaning between enforcement action and the use of force may alsobe gathered from the Council's discussion of the question of sanctions against the Dominican Republic in September 1960. [893rd to 89Sth meetings.] 69. Although at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation my Government did not agree with the expulsÏCn of Cuba from the inter-American system nor with the resolution on economic relations, it must admit that such measures do not amount to enforcement action or the use of force. 70. The Cuban representative asserted that Mr. Schweitzer described the measures adopted at Punta deI Este as enforcement action. In fact, the representative of Chile did not refer to those agreements but recalled the statement of the Chilean Foreign Minister at Punta deI Este ta the effect that the antidemocratic threats looming over America could not be warded off by enforcement action or isolationist measures. Mr. Schweitzer stated further: 1i 1 "The threat to American democratic institutions and the apprehension feit by our countries in the face of subversive penetration' and the influence which extracontinental Powers are trying to exert have not only the Cuban revolution as a cause. This 72. In accordance \Vith these arguments, myGovernment feels that, once té has discussed the matter, aH that the Security Couneil cau do ia to take note of the decisions of Punta deI Este. The measures have been adopted by a competent organ and there are no further implications in sa far as Article 53 is concerned. 73. These measures faU exclusively within the internaI jurisdiction of the regional body and are in accord with the machinery which it adopts for the fulfilment of obligations. They only take effect within the regional sphere and not, of course, within the international sphere, and even less within the sphere of action of the United Nations. Member States which have or do not have diplomatie relations with Cuba will continue to coexist with it. No American 8tate has claimed or can claim te deprive Cuba of the rights and privileges which it enjoys as a Member of the United Nations. 74. My Government does not consider it appropriate that the Security Council should apply to the International Court of Justice for an opinion and regrets that it will have ta oppose any move in that direction. Our position is not inspired by political motives; nor is it based on the attitude which we adopted at Punta deI Este of the opinion which we have of the Cuban case. 75. It is determined strictly by legal cOFlsiàerations. It is weU known that Chile has always been a zealousl might almost say a rigid-observer of juridical standards, placîng them far above any other considerations, even above its own interests, and we believe that these standards should be applied scrupu- IOllsly bath within individual States and in their intérnational relations. 76. Our attitude is also based on the conviction that the Council must not establish a precedent that would be desastrous for the existence anddevelopmentoftbe inter-American system. This system is not static but is subject ta constant evolution and of course can be greatly improved, especially now that the countries of Latin America are beginning ta introduce profound economic and social reforms. If reforms had been carried out years ago we would not perhaps be examining the Cuban question today. As President Kennedy pointed out a few days ago; nThose who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." 77. Our attitude is also determined by the need to safeguard the autonomy of the Organization ofAmeril

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