S/PV.995 Security Council

In accordance with an earlier decisiontakenby the Council, and if there are no objections, 1 shaH invite the representative of Cuba to take a seat at the Counoil table in order to participate, without the rightto vote, in the discussion of this question. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mario GarcIa IncMustegui (Cuba), took a place at the COUDCJl table. The interpretation into Englisb and French of the statement made by Mr. DIaz Casanueva (Cmie) at the 994th meetJng was given. 2. donner séance M. d politiques tiens M. qualités tueront M. que seil vœux 1 2. The PRESIDENT (tra'lslatedfromSpanish):Before I 1 give the floor ta the first speaker on my lisi for tbis meeting, 1 should lilte to introduce to the mernbers af the COUDeil Mr. Evgeny Dmitrievieh Kiselev, who has 1 today taken over the post of Under-Secretary for I Political and securityCouncilAffairs. Atthe sarne time 1 should like ta welcome Mr. Kiselev on our behalf. 1 ! am confident that biS personal qualities and wide experience will be of great value ta our Organization. Mr, Kiselev has taken over thepost previously held by 1 Mr. Georgy Petrovich Arkadev, whom 1 should like to " thank for ms services to the Security COUDcil and whom 1wish every success in the future. 1 1 1 3. Conseil [8/5095J, Président la conformément provisoire 3, 1 should like to draw the Couneil's attention to the letter dated 19 March 1962 [S/50951 addressed to the Chair by the representative of Cuba, transmitting a draft resolution sl1bmitted in accordance with rule 38 of the Council's provisianal rules of. procedure. i 5. 1 should aisa like to associaf.e my delegation with the expression of gratitude which the President ex- tended to Mr. Arkadev and to thank mm, on behalf of my delegation, for aU the work he has done for the Security COWlcil and to wish him a very happy and successful future. 6. 1 now turn to the item under discussion. 7. Bath in tms Council and in the General Assembly. the Government of Cuba has taken many opportwlities to voice grievances against the Governrnent of the United States of America. These grievanceshavebeen given a very thorough hearing. What is remarkable is that the relevant organs of the United Nations have repeatedly decided to make no recommendation, to take no action on these complaints. This history-and the very recent conclusion of a debate which covered. and dismissed,. the whole range of Cuban charges against the United States-led this COW1cil on 27 February [991st meeting} to decide not to adopt its agenda when it was asked to take up these sarne charges once again. My delegation thinks tbat Ws decision was right. 8. The present series of meetings, however, wereset in train by the letter dated 8 March 1962 [S/5086] from the Permanent Representative of Cuba. Reading this letter, it appeared that itwas no longer the United States which the Cuban Government sought to place in the dock. Indeed, in theirpresentwritten complaint the Cuban Government seems implicitly to have accepted the contention of the United States and the other mem- bers of the Organization of American States that the quarrel is not bilatera1 but multilateral. The com- plaints in the letter before us were directed at the Organization of American States as an organization, and at the deoisions which ithasrecentlytaken. There was no reiteration inthatletterofthefamiliar accusa- tions of impending United States aggre8sion. Instead, the ~.etter in question proposes that certain questions affecting the Organization of Atnerican States as a regional organization should be addressed to the inter- national Court of Justice in the form of a request for an advisory opinion. These questions include the in- terpretation of certain provisions of the Charter ofthe United Nations and of the Charter of the Organization of American states. This is a new proposai, and as such, certainly one which it i8 right that this CoUIloil should consider. 9. What 1 bave said already is, Ithink, enough ta dis- pose of the inaccurate reasons advanced by the repre- sentative of the Soviet Union to explain why my dele- gation, together with severai others. were~reparedon tbis occasion ta vote for the adoptipD of the present agenda without question. "Whether ... the resolutions adopted at Punta deI Este ... regarding the expulsion ofaState member of the regional agency because of its social systemand the adoption of other enforcement actionagainstthat State without the authorizationofthe Security Council are or are not in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter o~ the Organization of American States and the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro." The purpose of tbis last question is clearlya political one, and accordingly aIl the questions whichleadup ta it must be considered as primarily political in both their content and their intent. This conclusionisrein- forced by considerationofthepenlÙtimateparagraphof doetunenf 8/5086, which requests the Security.COWlCU under Article 40 of the Charter tocallfor the suspen- sion of the Punta deI Este.!! agreements [see S/5075} and of the measures ordered in pursuance of these agreements, pending the opinion of the Court. 1 think it would be reasonable for the Councilta conclude tbat tbis proposal represents the crux of the matter. , 1 , ! [ ,1 1, i IL This internaI evidence, together with the history of Cuban complaints in thepast and thegeneral charac- ter and tone of the speêches made by the representa- tives of Cuba and the Soviet Union during the present meetings, leaves no doubt whatsoeverthatalthoughthe questions are framed as legal ones, the motives behind the proposaI that they sholÙd be put ta the Court are essentially political. and that the 8ecurity Council is, in fact, being asked to put ta the Court a question of an essentially political character. 12, Indeed, in listening ta the Soviet and Cuban speeches 1·began to wonder_.M'hether 1 nad misread the Cuhan letter and whether, after all,itdidreiterate the old dünredited accusations against theUnitedStates- or at least, whether itwas not ta be regarded primarily as a vehicle for their reJteration. The repJ;'esentative of Cuba, for example, again usedphrasessuchas" .. , they are trying to use these manœuvres ta concelll new acts of aggressian" [992nd meeting, para. 1201. The representative of the Soviet Union addressed himself eV"en more frankly to renewing a blatantly cold war campaign. He spelled out his charge thus: "a new military aggression by the United States is beingpre- pared agai....st Cuba" [993rd meeting, para. 23J. He complained vigorously that the representative of the United States had not, once again, specifically denied charges of aggressive preparations against Cuba, which were not contained in the documents constituting our agenda, and which were primarily introduced into this present debate by the Soviet representative him- self in the course of a speech which he misdescribed de à froide. ~ .1, li Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affail's of the American States. held at Punta dei Este, Uruguay, from 22 to 31 January 1962, 13. 1 do not wish to he miSWlderstood on this point. 1 am Ilot compiaining because the matter bafora us la politien!. This le, after n11, a political body. My point la simply tllat we must not be misled by the form in which tl1ese proposaIs are put to us, into thinlting that these are purely tagal questions, inspired merely by a thirst for tagal knowledge. No. theyarepoliticalques- tions dîsguised in a tagal form, If they are to be 001\- sidered at aU, they should be considered in that light and on that basis. Fol' this reaeon 1 shall not be able to support any proposaI to refer the questions set out in document S/5086 to the International Court of Jus- tice. F 14. 1 now turn to the actual questions posed by the representative of Cuba. These, as 1 have already indicated, seem to faU luto two broad categories: those which concern the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, and those which pertain dlrectly to the Organization of American States iteU. 15. As to this latter category, 1 prefer ta accept the vlews of those more directly concerned and 1therefore listened with particular attention ta the reasoned, closely argued andpersuasive statements of the repre- sentatives of Chîleand the United States. lwould like, however, to comment on one point. The representative of the Soviet Union was eloquent in foreseeing that the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of ~merican States would lead ta the expulsion of most Members from the United Nations. 1 tbink he knew that he was letting bis imagination l'un away with him. Had he paused ta reflect, he would have seen that bis analogy ..vas false. The whole point of the United Nations is that it iB a world-\Vide organization which is open to ail States that subscribe to certain basic principles. The whole point of other, less comprehensive, group- ings of nations Is that these groups allow their mem- bers to supplement the relationship enjoyed in the United Nations with other relationships with States with wbom they have an especially close identitY,Jf views. My delegation la not aware of any provision in the Charter of the United Nations which would justüy a claim that this Organization should assume respon- sibility for ruling upon the membersbip or qualifica- Uons of more limited groups. It would, indeed, be strange if the United Nations, let alone the Security Council, were to have the authority ta tell individual States with whom they may associatethemselvesoron what conditions membersbip of these groups cau he change<!. The membership of other and ind-ependent organizations is, surely, not a matter upon wbich the Uru:ted Nations has any locus standi to prono\Ulce. tlThè Charter of the United Nations doesnotdefine the term 'enforcement action'. In the opinion of the United Kingdom GO\Ternment, it is common sense ta interpret the use of this term in Article 53 as cover- ing only such actionsaswouldnotnormallybe legiti- mate except on the basis of a Security COUDoil resolution. There is nothing in internationallaw, in principle, to prevent any State, ifitsodesires, from breaking off diplomatic relations or inatituting a partial interruption of eoonoil~c relations with any other Stat(l. These steps ... are acts of palicy perfectly within the compete.uce of any sovereign State. lt follows, obviously, that they are within the competence of the members of the ürganization of American States acting collectively. trIn other words, it la the vlew of my delegation that, when Article 53 refers 'to'enforcementaction', it must be contemplating the exercise of force in a manner which wOlÙd not normally be legitirç.ate for any State or group ofStates except Wlder the authority of a security Counci! resolution. Other pacifying actions under :regional arrangements as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter which do not come into this category have simply ta be brought to the atten- tion of the Security COWlcil under Article 54." [S93rd meeting, paras. 96 and 97.] 17. lt will be evident from what 1have just said that 1 agree with the interpretation which the representative of ChUe, speaking in the Counoil last Friday 1994th meeting], gave to the worda "enforcement action" in Article 53 of the Charter. In our view, as in bis, that term meiUlS coerclve action involving the use of physical force. Action of this kind-with the sole exception of legitimate individual or collective defence-requtres the authorization of the Security COWlcil under Article 53. The kind ofaction envisaged in Article 41 of the Charter, that is, "measures not involving the use of armed force", does not require such authorization. 18. If it is necessary ta say anything furtber in the circumstances of tbe present case, 1 wOlÙd direct the attention of tbe COUDcil to the wording of Article 54, itself. This Article specifies that "activities .•. by regional agencies for the maintenance of Ù).ternational peace and security" shouId be reported ta the Security COWlcil. Taking this Article together with thosewhich p)'ecede it, it is clear that aucb activities include'any measures falling short of the use of force and, there- fore, that it is this Article, and not Article 53, which is applicable to an measures of this kind. In the present càse, the ürganization of American States has per- fectIy properly reported the contents ofthe resolutions they have adopted. No doubt, they will continue to keep tbis COWlQil informed of any subsequent decisions they may take. 'i 1; 1 :1 20. Ml'. HSUEH (China): In September 1960. whenthe Security CoW\cil was considering the question raised by the Soviet Union in connexion with another resolu- tion of the Organization ofAmerican States, the repre- sentative of China, Mr. Tsiang, tad this to say: "Juririically, the application of Article 53 to the present question i8 indeed dubious. Politically, it is mischievous; if the security CO\Ulcil shouldbecare- less in this regard, all regional organizationswollid have their bands tied. In subjecting the resolution of the Organization of American States to review by the Security Ca\Ulcil, the Soviet Union is in effect trying ta subject allfuture actions oftheOrganizatton of American States ta review and, thereby, ta the Soviet Union veto." [893rd meeting, .para. 104.J Thal was what the Soviet Unionwas trying to do at that lime. Obviously, the Soviet Union tad in mind questions sucb as the one now being raised by Cuba. Contradic- tory to the provisions ofthe Charter, the Soviet position was rejected by the majority of the members of the COUDcil. Consequently, the Soviet effort failed. 21. Since the PWlta deI Este Meeting, Cuba has been renewing the Soviet effort, Th\. !irst Cuban effort also failed at the 991st meetingoftheSecurityCoWlciL The letter of the representative of Cuba (8/5086] is but a continuance of the same effort. The question brought up at this timemayappearsomewhatdifferentin form, but the substance is the same. My delegation therefore maintains the sarne view on the question ofthe agenda of thi3 meeting asI expressed at the 991st meeting. We have refrained from raising objection ta the adoption of the agenda only in deference to the members of the COUDcil who represent the views ofthe members of the Organization of Amerioan states. 22. On the substance of the question, what the.repre- sentative of China said on 8 September 1960and which 1 have just quoted, applies equally to the present case. In the view of my delegation, the legal as well as the political issues involved are clear. There is no need for the COWlcil ta requestanadvisoryopinionfrom the International Court of Justice as suggested by the representative of Cuba, 23. As we all know, the Organization of American States is a regional agency authorized under Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations to deal with i1 1 1 1 " 1., 1 24. Let us examine another decision taken at PWlta deI Este, which Cuba considers also objectionableand unlawfuI, namely, the decision to suspend trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war of every kind. That is' an action which any individualStatecan take in exercise of its sovereign right. Sa can any group of States. Nothing in the Charter of the United Nations could be interpreted as prohibiting suchan action. Now wotùd not the position-so-calledjuridical-be clearer if another Memper of the United Nations, for example, Albania, should today also come before the Security CowlCil and say that if a group of other States Mem- bers shotùd decide ta withdraw their embassies from that country and ta suspend trade relations with H, such decisions should be subject to the approval of the Security COWlcil? Sometimes one gets confused in thinking of Cuba alone. j 11 t J 25. Thus it i8 clear that the resolutions of the PWlta deI Este Meeting do not require the authorization of the Security COWlcil. The representative of Cuba has invoked Article 53 of the Charter on the assllll1ption that enforcement action within the meaning of that Article included measures other than the use offorce. Let us accept such an assumption for the sake of argu- ment. The scope of that Article 53 is defined in the first sentence of paragraph 1 which reads as follows: "The Security COUDCi! shan, when appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforce- ment action under its authority." 26. Obviously, enforcement action taken by regional agencies in such circumstances would create obliga- tions, though not necessarily in a direct manner, for aU Members of the United Nations under Articles 24, 25, 48 and 49. Therefore, Article 53 goes on ta provide for the requirement of the authorization ofthe Security Council for enforcement action. Now the Punta deI Este Meeting was not held at the initiative of the Security Council, nor do the resolutions that itadopted create obligations for Members of the United Nations not belonging to the regional organization. My delega- tion fails to see Mw Article 53 could be made app- licable to the resolutions. i 28, It 18 clear ta my delegation that no onein the Organization of American States seeks ta interfere in the internaI affaire of Cuba or inher political or social system. What 18 troubling Cuba today 18 the Cuban régime' S own potioies. Whatever might have beeu lùe original intentions ofthe twenty-eight menwho crossed the Gulf of Mexico, Wlder the leadership of Fidel Castro, the régime they set up in Cuba was 8ub- .s.equently seized by intel'national communism. Like aU ather communist régimes, the present Cuban ré- gime has become oppressive at home and aggressive abroad. 29, The Cuban régime has only itself ta blame for having incurred adverse international reaction because of its own interference in the internaI affairs of other caWltries and its own subversive activities abroad. The facts which have been disclosed and which became generally known are numerous. Idonotproposeto take up the Ume of the Council ta dwell on them in detai!. Besides, other representatives are more authoritative than 1 am on this matter. Nevertheless, mention of a few examples to illustrate my point may be in order. 30. The representative of Cuba surely remembers the circumstances in which he himself was ordered ta leave Uruguay by the Government of Uruguay on 12 January 1961, when he was the Cuban Ambassador ta that cOWltry, It is reported he was charged with par- ticipating in subversive activities in connexion with pro-Dastro demonstrations and streetfights inMonte- video. SI. When in Brazil President Quadros resigned on 25 August 1961, Premier Fidel Castrobroadcast a speech over the television network in Cuba on the following day, in which he advised the Brazillan people ta wage guerrilla warfare against "reactionary militarists". who, he charged. were responsible for forcing Presi- dent Quadros out of office. It is, indeed, a serious matter of the first order for the prime minister of a COWltry ta go sa far as ta incite the people of another cOWltry ta civil war at any Ume, and particularly at a time when the latter cOWltry 18 Wldergoing a political crisis. Yet that is exactly what the Prime Minister of Cuba did on that occasion. Ifthatisnot interference in the internaI affairs of another c01Ultry, 1 do not know what i8. 32. Let me cite just one more example, whichoccur·· red in the Philippines, a next door neighbour to my COWltry. On 28 September 1961, a member of the Cuban Embassy in Manila revealed ta the Philippine authorities that .the then Cuban Chargé d'affaires in Manila was an "active and militant Communist", and was using the Cuban Embassy as a centre for com- munist subversion. On the following day, President 33. These are ouly a few examples ta show what the Cuban poIicies abroad have been leadinE ta. Similar events have happened in other countries, particularly in those of Latin America. Ta a fair-nünded observer these events, which have given rise ta a sense of danger and fear in the countries affectect, are concrete situations and not fantastic dreams. The reaction ta such policies ls natura!. Diplomatie and trade relations wHh Cuba had been severed by many cOl.U1tries befare the Punta deI Este conferencewas convened. In a sense, the Punta deI Este resolutions are justajoint expres- sion of whatmany individualGovernments havealready been doing in reaction ta the policies of the Cuban régime. li IIi Hil·; 1i lj 34. Now 1 will only say a few brief words about the domestic policies of the Cub~ régime. 1 would not touch upon them at al! were it not for the fact that the representative of Cuba himself discussed them at length in the United Nations. When the Cubancomplaint was recently debated in the First Committee y of the General Assembly, we heard the Cubanrepresentative speak of the economic development and social progress achieved in present-day Cuba. 1ii [ ; 35. But the Cuban people Mve told a different story. We have heard from the 150,000 Cuban refll8ees the tragic staries of the deprival offlUldamentalfreedoms and of great sufferings and misery. We believe they have told the truth. If so many people out of a popula- tion of less than 7 million have chosen ta leave their homes, their business and their relatives tolivea llie of exile in foreign lands, we know that there must be sometbing seriously wrong in Cuba. When Premier Fidel Castro and bis twenty-eight men once decided ta leave their homeland, was it not also because they fOlUld the situation in Cuba at that time to be intoler- able, and because they wanted to change it? And did not they come back from acrOss the Gulf of Mexico in order ta ùhange that situation? i: J1 : y 36. Thus the problems facing the Cubanrégimetoday are caused by Hs own policies at home and abroad. To lay the blame at the doorsteps of the neighbouring States wouId not solve those problems. Nor would the current, presistent effort ta subject thePuntadelEste resolutions to review by the Security Council be of any help. Instead, the Cuban régime should subject Hs own policies ta review by the people of Cuba. 36. aujourd'hui propre jeter h actuellement Conseil ne Gouvernement au 37. Ml'. BERARD (FranCe): As a member of. this Council, 1 feel H my duty ta express my opinion of the Cuban Government's request ta us ta submitanumber of questions to the International Court of Justice. 37. ce demande, nement internationale tions. y See OWcial Records of the General As~mbl'l, Sixteenth Session, First Commit!ee, 1231st (0 1243rd meetings. sion, 39. 1 should like ta make a few preliminary remarks about the inclusion in the agenda of the questions sub- mitted ta us on 27 February [991st meeting] and 14 March [992nd meeting], The representative of Cuba told us in bis letter of 8 March [8/5086]: r lIThe fact that the Security Caunoil faHed ta adopt the agenda ... has depriveda State Member of the United Nations of its right ta appeal ta the highest body competent to deal with coercive sanctions." 40. My delegation thinks that it would be incorrect and improper to liken this Council to a kind of crimi- nal court which, like a court of domestic law, is obliged to swnmon 'and hear the plaintill. Obviously this is nottheideasetforthinthe Charter. By refusing to adopt the provisional agenda, the Council has net beC0me guilty of some kind. of denial of justice as would. a court which refused to hear a case within its jurisdiction. 41. The reason why the substance of the Cuban 0001- plaint was not considered on 27 February was that the Counci! considered that it had sufficient information about the questions raised by the Havana Government and, as one of our colleagues quite rightly said, it thought that there was nothing in the letter of 22 February [8/5080} from the representative of Cuba ta make it appear that a debate on the contents of that letter might be profitable or might break new ground. 42. In bis letter of 8 MarchourCubancolleague drew attention ta certain views expressed inside or outside the COW1Ci! by various Members oftheUnitedNations, who maintained that the measures adopted by the con- ference of Punta deI Estewerea violation of the United Nations Charter in that they constituted enforcement action and should therefore have l;leen authorized beforehand by the 8ecurity Council. 43. These views are certainly interesting, but they are only individual opinions and cannot prevail over a decision of the Council. The important question of the powers of the Security Council with regard to thé decisions of regional organizations was settled by the Council in 8eptember 1960, when it discussed the question of the Dominican Republic [893rd to 895th meetings], and it Olay be assumed that this position was implicitly confirmed on 27 February, when the Counci! decided not ta adopt the agenda. 44. Although no new element has appeared since 27 February, the rnajority of members of the Council, including my delegation, did not wish to question the adoption of the agenda this time. The representative of Cuba gave his complaint a legal aspect and we decided to give bis request what 1 might caU the benefit of the doubt. We have now ta decide whether there are legal 45. 1 have studied the Cuban delegation's letter of 8 March with the greatest care. 1 have listened atten- tively to the detailed statement which our Cuban col- league made at this table and 1 have re-read and ex- amined his arguments. J ll 46. 1 note that a large part of bis statement was an attempt to show that the FWlta deI Este Meeting itself was illegal and had been convened in violation of the Charter of the Organizatiou of American States. 1 do not wish to enter lUto a legal discussion of tbis matter. 1 shaU merely point out that the meeting proposed by the delegation of Colombia was agreed tOWlanimously by the other American States, with the exception of Cuba, and 1 wonder whether all the American States except the one which was accused could really have been mistaken about the legality of the meeting in which they agreed to take part. • 1, 1 11 1, 1J! 47. 1 naturally listened carefully to the statements which our Cuban colleague read out ta us and in which certain members of the OAS explained why they tad abstained from voting on the motion expelling Cuba from the inter-American system. The statements show that these countries feU sorne hesitation about the method by which the Government of Cubawas excluded from the system. Their hesitation did not, however, prompt them to vote agalUst the motion. Theyabstained from voting, and only because of the method adopted, for they agreed that the Cuban régime was incompatible with the principles of the OAS. 1, 1 J j 48. 1 now come totheCubanGovernment'srequestfor an application ta the International Court of Justice. 1i 49. My country thinks there can be no question of refusing aState Member of the United Nations the right to initiate a justified ccnsultation of the Inter- national Court of Justice. The French Government is among those which show the greatest loyalty and respect to that high tribunal, which it considers an irreplaceable instrwnent for the peaceful settlement of disputes. But matters must be laid before the Court in accordance with theprovisions which define Us com- petence. What does Article 96 0.J; the United Nations Charter say? It reads: nThe General Assembly or the Security COllncil may request the International Court of Justice ta give an advisory opinion on any legal question." Note these words: "on any legal questionn. But in the matter before us today, is the proposaI that the seven questions put by the Cuban Government should be submitted to the éourtas they stand really a request for a legal opinion? Is it not rather a device- rather a tendentious one, 1 am afraid-to raise the essentially political question of the present relations betv,reen Cuba and the rest oftheWesternhemisphere? français faut-il dispositions ticle de Justice dique." Mais, d'hui, qu'elles par tablement pose-t-elle tendancieuse tique de •1 1 11 !1 1i Î 1 51. To return to the resolutions of PwltadeI Este. we note that resolution II is entitled; "Special Consultative Committee on security against the Subversive Action of International Communism". Resolution III is en- titled: "Reiteration of the principles ofNon-interven- tian and Self-determination". And resolutionVI. which excludes ."the present Government of Cuba from par- ticipation in the Inter-American System", is carefulta state that the militarY assistance given ta Cuba by extracontinental conununist Powers is one reason for the decision. It also shows clearly the concern of the members of the OAS to protect themselves against subversive movements. 52. Thus it appears that the exlusion of the Cuban Government from the inter-American systemisbased on somethîng very different from social considera- tions. In fact it involves a problem of security. 53. In the circwnstances, is there not re:ison ta fear that the Government of Cuba may be trying. behînd a Bcreen of legality, ta inveigle the International Court of Justice into giving an opinion on questions whose legal nature cannat be separated from their political aspect? 54. For this reason. my delegation doesnotthinkthat Article 96 of the Charter can be invoked in support of this request before us. 55. OUr Cuban colleague not onlyasksforanadvisory opinion' of the Court, but he asks the Security Council, under the terms of Article 40 of the United Nations Charter. ta caU upon the Council of the OAS and the organs of the inter-American system provisionally to suspend the decisions taken at PWlta deI Este and any measures which may have been ordered in pursuance of those decisions. 56. The representative of Cuba maintains thatArticle 40 of the Charter applies because the measures adopted at Pwlta deI Este are illegal and threaten international peace and security. If we were ta take that view of the matter, we shO\ùd automatically reopen the debate on the substance of the question. Need 1 recall that last month bath the General Assembly and the Security Council considered this aspect of the complaint by Cuba and that neither of them found the Cuban charges 57. If the COlmcil were ta accede ta the Cuban repre- sentative's request, it wouldbegoingbackuponits own decision, when there are no new factors to justify a fresh consideration of the matter. It would also mean admitting that the action taken by the OAS at Punta deI Este comes within the scope of Article 53 of the charter of the United Nations. In our opinion, nothing colÙd be more doubtful. On this delicate question of the relations between regional organizations and United Nations organs 1 can only repeat the views 1 had occa- sion to set forth in the Counci! in september 1960, in connexion with the Dominican Republic affair. 1 said, in effect, that the OAS, as the regional organization concerned, ha,d a competence which wasrecognizedby the Charter and which it sho14d be able to exercise flÙly, but that the competence of the, United Nations could not be excltrled by claimingabsolutepriorityfor the regional organization. 1 added that, while we could not declare outselves in favour of exclusive regional competence, neither could we declare that the United Nations is necessarily competent in aIl cases. 57. représentant décision justüiant drait à de n'est rapports organes la seil, nant que l'OEA, qu'elle mais cependant pour ne pétence nous saire, Nations " , 58. le toujours constater exprimé collègue culier cises il d'imprimatur deI 58. When 1 reread the main statements made in the First Committee last month on tbis same question of Cuba, 1 noted that several delegations OOd expressed a yiew very similar to our own. In particular, our Ghanaian colleague-who is my neighbour-said that, in spite of the precise requirements of Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. therewas no point in trying to make the decisions taken by the OAS at Punta deI Este subject to a kind of "imprimatur". 1 i 1 1, 1 !1 59. On the basis of the position of principle which 1 have just reaffirmed, and after a careful study of the debates and resolutions of Punta deI Este, mydelega- tion considers that Article 53 does not apply and that the action taken by the Meeting of ConslÙtation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS is essentially a matter of collective protection wbich ls justified lUlder Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 59. de et Considère l'action affaires action fication Unies. l1 j j, l, 60. The fact that this action wastakenwithina regio- nal organization which exists in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations makes no difference. As far as the exercise of the right of seIf-defence is concerned, we' consider that the oilly obligation incumbent upon the Organization of Ameri- can States under ArUcle 54 of the Charter is to keep the Security Council fully informed of activities under- taken or in contemplation for the maintenance of inter- national peace and security. dans réclame Unies cice i:l. ticle courant sur l'Article ne ne 61. That is my delegaUon's position. On the basis of what we consider to be a reasonable interpretation of Article 96 of the Charter, and in the conviction that Article 53 cannot be invoked in the pres.ent case, we cannot support the idea that the International Court of

1 should Uke ta thank the President and the representative of the United Kîngdom mast warmly for the kind wards they have said about my predecessor, Mr. Georgy PetrovichAr!mdev. and aIse for the goodwishes which they extended ta me. L 6·'. The PRESIDENT (translatedfromSpanish): Ithank Ml'. Xiselev. In view of the lateness ofthe hour, tmless there are any objections, 1 shaH adjourn the meeting until tomorrow, at 10.30 a.m. It was sa decided. The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m. i !