S/PV.998 Security Council

Inaccordance with the decision taken earlier bythe Counci! 1 shaH, if there are no objections, invite the representative of Cuba to participate, without the right ta vote, in the debate on the item on the agenda. At the invitation of the President, Mr. MarioGarcla lnohé1ustegui (Cuba) look a seat at the Cotuloil table. ~ L'1oMustegui

The Council is approaching a fateful moment. It will shortiy bave to take a decision on the question placed before itby Cuba. The world willlearn once again whether the Security Council is capable of fulfilling its obligations, under the United Nations Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. 2. soviêtiques) un prononcer monde est au qui Unies. 3. exposêe qui dêposê être règlement comme mande puisse, nationale ênoncées aspects sion sur de ment monde f ~ 3. Tbe Soviet delegation's position has already been l stated in detail, and there is no need now to repeat aH l that bas already been said. We support the draft reso- 1 :'.'. lution submitted by Cuba [8/5095], and consider that it should be put to a vote in the Council in acc~rdance with rule 38 of the provisionalrulesofprocedure. We, l1ke certain other delegations, have already statedthat 1 in our view this draft resolution represents the mini- ~ mum required to enable the Council. after obtaining an ~ \'" advisory opinion from the International Court of Jus- - tice on the legal questions enumerated in the clraft resolution, to revert to the solution of the political aspects of the question and adopt a decision which , .fraught with the danger of serious complications, not lonly ln the Carlbbean area but~rnngboutthe world. ~ would finaHy remove the serious tbreat overhanging - the security of the Cuban Republic-a threat which is 5. In his statements of 15 and 16 March [993rd and 994th meetings], the United States representative complained that this was the third time in two and a hall montha that United Nations organs were discussing a complaint of Cuba concerning aggressive acts by the United States of America. In fuis connexion 1 should like ta say thatthere is a very effective method whereby the United States may put an end to this situation once and fOr all.lfthe United States is really disturbed by the consistent attention which the United Nations is giving to its poliey with regard to cuba, let it finally stop intervening in the domestic affairs ofthat country. Let it stop preparing a newaggression, let it cease its attempts to export a cOunter-revolution to Cuba, let it cease its efforts to overthrow by force the established régime in Cuba. For uutil the United States abandons its aggressive poliey towards Cuba, it will, whether it likes it or not, ha.'e to be aecountable to the Unitecl- NatiOns. 6. In an attempt ta eOneeal or justify in sorne way a poliey of hostility towards the Cuban people contrary to the United Nations Charter, the United States representative has again and again tried to refer to what he calIs "subversive activities" carried out by the Government of Cuba in the countries of the Western Hemisphere. He has tried to create the impression that the enforcement measures against Cuba recently foisted by the United States upon the Organization of American States were not based on its social system but were ea11ed for by the fact that "the present Cuban Government has conducted aggressive and subversive actîvities". Thus the United states representative has agaiu besn repeating, in the Security Council, this hackneyed theme of American propaganda. 7. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that a11 these accusations are pure inventions, it may be notwithout interest to note that the United states Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, made a statement very recently-on 1 March of this year-to the effect that United States poliey with regard to Cuba actually had no connexion with the so-called subversive activities of Cuba. In reply to questions from Mr. Courtney Sheldon, editor of the newspaper Christian Science Monitor, Mr. Rusk stated quite clearly that United States policy with respect to Cuba would "continue to be the same" regardless of whether or Dot Cuba was engaged in "subversion" • 8. He further admitted, in effect, that the decisions taken against Cuba at the Punta deI Este MeetingJJ were likewise entirely unrelated ta the question of whether Cuba was or was not engaging in subversive activity. 9. We must add that the representatives ofthe United States, as usual, have not deigned to substantiate, in 11 Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Minîsters of Foreign Affairs of the American States. held at Punta del Este. Uruguay. from 22 to 31 January 1962. 10. Everyone knows of the statement made by the Cuban Prime Minister, Mr. Fidel Castro, totheefieot that Cuba has Dot placed and does not intend to place any military bases at the disposaI of foreign Powers, and that the military equipment of the CubanArmy is, !:oy reason of its technical features, defensive and not offensive in nature-designed for the defence of the country's independence, and not for aggression. 10. ments leur servir base versellement preuve, 11. In view of the fact that the United States still retains the base at Güantânamo, contrary ta the' generally accepted princip:.es of internationallaw, the pronouncements of United States officiaIs reveal not only complete lack of any sense ofhumour but , what is even more deplorable, a complete lack of respect for the members of the Security Council whenthey attempt, 50 to speak, to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent and their representatives here make completely unfounded accusations against Cuba. 12. In general ît must be said that the United States adopts a highly original approach to the principles of international law. On the one hand, we know that the United States has broken offallformsofrelations with Cuba. It is carrying out an economic blockade of Cuba and is trying to isolate Cuba politically; it has severed aU the legal-Ues which previously existed between Cuba and the United States. Moreover, the President of the United States, at his last Press conterence,attempted to assert that part of Cuban territory-Guant&1amowas United States territory. When the American correspondents heard this, even those gentlemen doubted the accuracy of that assertion and expressed their doubts tc the President. The President corrected himself somewhat and said that the territory should be regarded as tel'ritory for which the United States was at present responsible. A legitimate question may be asked: is not the United States assuming a responsibility which is undulyheavy and which no one has asked it to bear? Unis. partie cains, êprouvé fallait ment droit pas d'ailleurs ! de diques toutes néanmcins lèges fois le maintenant passe pas avoir ils battage propos manifestement cupe toujours 13. This is indeed an entirely unprecedented interpretation of international law. A country which on its own initiative has severed alliegai ties with Cuba, which has unilaterally terminated aIl its obligations with respect to another country, nevertheless asserts that it can continue ta enjoy specialprivileges irithe territory of that country with which it has broken off relations, privileges which in any case had been originaUy secured by force and which had never beeu sanctioned by the Cuban Governmènt which the United States is now opposing. Isitnotclearthat, if the United States does not like everything which is at present going on in Cuba, it has only to leave that country in peace-especially as, after the severance of ail relations on the initiative of the United States, there is no longer any semblance-I repeat, any semblance-of ; justification for claiming the right to retain a United ~ States mllitary base there? It is therefore ail too obvious that aIl this fuss which has been made here by li the representative of the United States concerning what he called a Sino-Soviet base i8 designed ta mask the completely unjustified occupation by the United 14. It must be noted that,despite aIl this, the Government of the Cuban Republic is displaying extraordinary patience and restraint, and has once more demonstrated its steadfast desire for peace in stating its intention of arriving at a settlement of the question of Guantânamo by peacefui means alone, as it has frequently emphasized and as the representative of Cuba has said here in the Security Council. 15. In this connexion 1 must recall the highly suspicious activity now noticeable in the Guantânamo reglon. We have aIready spoken ofthe concentrationby the United States of a large mU.itary task force in the Guantânamo area. We have pointed out that, according to what is published in the American Press, one of the possible pretexts for military intervention against Cuba might be the provocation constituted by a socalled attack by Cubans on the base. The events of the last few days show that those premonitions were correct. It has just become known that the United States base Commander, Rear-Admiral Edward Q'Donnell, refused to go to Washington a few days aga upon the invitation of a sub-committee of the United States House of ,Representatives, saying that he could not leRve the base because "the situation was tao criticaln. 16. For its part the Government of Cuba was compelled to make a strong protest, on 18 March of this year, against the clashes and skirmishes with Cubans which were being provoked by the -United States armed forces in the area of the Guantânamobase. 1 would add that, according ta a report from United Press International, more and more groups of Cuban counterrevolutionaries are coming to the United States from various places to obtain arms-and this at a time when the question is under discussion by the Security Council. 17. lu the light of aIl these facts, we are obliged to revert once again to the statement made by the representative of the United States at the meeting of 16 March when, addressing the representative of the Soviet Union, he said: "1 want to comfort him by the reassurance once again-I think, for the eleventhtimethat the United States is not planning any armed attack on Cuba." It mustbe emphasized in the strongest terms that, although the United States representative pretends to be tired athavingtoanswerthe same question for the eleventh time, he has actually for the eleventh time not fully replied to the question put ta him. For the question is not merely whether the United States intends to use îts own national armed forces directIy in the armed attack which is being prepared against Cuba. A no less important part of the question addressed to the United States representative was, and still is-we stress this once more-whether the United States is organizing, financing, arming or in some other way preparingdetachments which, although not consisting of United States citizens, are intended for armed intervention against Cubai whether the United States is using for this purpose both its own territory and the territory of certain Latin American countries; in other words, whether the United States 18. It is clear to aIl the world that the United States representative ought not to be offended and utter reproaches to the effect that the United States does not lightly use such words aS "lies". Everyone knowsthat the United States representative has not so far given any explanation of the undeniable fact that on 17 April 1961. namely on the very day when the military intervention against Cuba had already begun,he said, in the Headquarters of the United Nations, the following-I quote it here for the second time and am quite prepared to quote it eleven times and more. until an adequate expIanation has been given for this unprecedented event: "Dr. Roa. speaking for Cuba, has just charged the United States with aggression against Cuba and invasioncomingfrom Florida. These charges are totally false. and 1 deny them categorically."Y 19. But what happened next? Next, the P:esident of the United States admitted that the United States was responsible for the organization of this invasion. In the book, Six Crises, just published by the former Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Richard NixoI].. it is once again confirmed thatthis intervention in Cuba was conceived, planned, prepared and carried out by armed groups trained~ atUnitedStatesexpense, by United States instructors and equipped with United States weapons, Thus, again and again the facts show that Cuba at present stands under thethreatof a fresh armed intervention. t 20. The Soviet Union, like other peaceable countries, once again categorically declares that the time is past when great Powers could behave as they pleased towards small countries and violate the latter's sovereignty and independence with impunity. The Government of the United States is assuming a heavy responsibility for any consequences which may arise from a continuation of its policy of aggressionagainst the Republic of Cuba, 2!. We have already pointed out that, having been defeated in the armed intervention against Cuba organized in April 1961, the Government of tbe United States decided to take steps ta complete preparations for another armed intervention-preparations which began, shortly after the failure of the firstone, with a large number of political andeconomic measures aimed at isolating Cuba from the rest of the world. In this series of measures which the United States Government bas beeu and still i8 carryingout,.with an attempt to involve in those preparations not only the countries of Latin America but also its NATO allies, 1 the actions taken by the United States Government at i the Punta deI Este conference were, as we know, of 1 considerable importance. It was at Punta deI Este that ' the United states forced the regional organization to 1 take against Cuba a number of enforcement measures n' 11 nllS stat..m..nt was mad.. at th.. IlSOth m....ting of the Flrst Com- 1 mlnee. the official record of which IS pubhshed only in summary form. i ~, 22, It was in this connexion that thequestionarose of the need for the United Nations to react with regard to the further hostile measures taken against Cuba by the United States in circumvention ofthe United Nations Charter. During the discussion of this matter at the last few meetings of the Security Council, a number of important IËgal questions were raised; and a correct answer to those questions undoubtedly governs the taking, by the Security Council, ofthecorrectpolitical decision required to frustrate these new attempts by the United States to use a regional orgar.ization like the Organization of Ame.l'ican States as an instrument of its aggressive policy against Cuba. The Cuban Government therefore had the perfectly right idea of asking the Security Council, on thebasisofArticle 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter, to request of the International Court of Justice an advisory opiniononpurely legal questions. The propriety of the action contemplated by the Government of Cuba was acknowledged here in the Council from theverybeginningof the discussion, if ·only because of the fact that the Council agreed to include the question submittedby Cuba in its agenda. 1t was confirmed by the fact that the legal questions proposed by Cuba for consideration were subjected to detailed analysis in the statements made by members of the Council during t~e discussion. We may agree or disagree with particular parts of the analysis and the argument which have beenputforward but no one candeny that the discussion which took place at the last few meetings of the Canncil was largely legal in character. 23. Let us return ta the substance of this discussion. While sorne members of the Council endorsedthe need for placing before the International Court of Justice aIl or some of the questions enumerated in the Cuban draft resolution, others, as we know, objected to that course. We therefore consider it our dutytodeal once again with the essence of these objections. 24. The first is that, although the questions set forth in the Cuban draft resolution are legal in form, they are in fact not legal but political. Consequently, our opponents say, since the questions are political and since Article 96, paragraph l, of the United Nations Charter states that advisory opinions cao be requested from the Court only on Iegal questions, Article 96 is not applicable to the present case. 25. It is easy ta see that this first argument has itself no legal basis, because it arbitrarily declares a priori that the legal questions formuIated in the Cuhan draft resolution are political ones. It must however be examined. since if we were to assume even for a moment that it was valid, there would then he no need ta deal withthe other objections. In this connexion, 1 should like to recallthe dialogue between the Emperor Napoleon 1 and one of his generals who had been defeated in battle. When reporting to his wrathful Emperor on the causes of the defeat, the general said; "Your Majesty, there are at least twelve reasons for 26. 1 shaU now show that theargumentthatArticle 96 of the Charter Is not applicable is incorreetand completely artificial. 27. We know that the Security Council is a political organ of the United Nations. In the last analysis the Council deals only with politicalquestions. ButArticle 96 specüically states that one ofthe organs which may request the International Court of Justice ta give an advisory opinion is the Security Council. There it fs written, in black and white, that the Security Couneil may request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. That does not, of course, mean tOOt the Charter rnakes it incumbent upon the Security Council ta decide any purely legal questions not oonnected with its politieal functions. NaturaUyArticle 96, paragraph l, does not add ta or alter in any way the competence of the security Counoil as defined in chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter, which deal with the duties of the Council as the organ primarily responsible for the maintenance ofinternationalpeace and security, i.e., in the lastanalysisapolitical organ dealing with political questions. From aU this, it follows th2.t the Security Council can and should ask the Court for an advisory opinion only in cases when, while it is dealing with sorne question within its jurisdiction-namely, a political question-sorne legal problem arises on the correct solution of which a correct political deeision depends. U 28. Thus in our view, it is obviously not a thirst for legal knowledge-as the United Kingdom representative in the Security Counoil has said-but a thirst for justice, a desire that the Security Council, in its political decisions, shaH take into acceunt the provisions of internationalIaw and the obligations assumed by States under the Charter of the United Nations, which rnakes the Cuban delegation, andthedelegations here Suppol'ting its stand in varying degrees, insist that the Security Council shaU not disregard the important legal problems which have arisen during the discussion of this question. , 1 . 29. Thus the legal questions formulated in the Cuban drait resolution can by no means be represented as a kind of legal Trojan horse with a politieal stuffing, designed to undermine the r'3ecurity Council's work frorn within and prevent it from dealingwith the question Pt'operly. On the contrary, we are insisting that the legal problems be elucidated, because refusaI to permit an expert and accurate consideration ofthe legal problems WO,,1rl he tantamount to complete denial of the bearing ~: :he Charter and other principles of Ü international __,Ion the Security Council's activity. l 1j îi 1 1 11 31. We must point out that this position of the United States representative differs from that recently taken by the President of the United States. On 25 September 1961, the President of the United States, speaking in the General Assembly, gave a very düferent assessment of the importance of international law in the polîtical activities of the United Nations. He said, in particular: 1 1 1 1, l "•.• the United States delegation will suggest a series of steps to improve the United Nations machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputesfor on-the-spot fact-finding, mediation and adjudication for extending the rule of internationallaw"'.,Y i ~ The legitimate question arises: why is the representative of the United States, and the members of the Council ""ho are prepared to follow him, taking a different approach ta this same issue? J J•1, 1 32. It is clear that this tirst argm:n8nt, according ta which the Cuban questions are not legal but political in nature, is incorrect and must be rejected. Even those who put forward this kind of argument are themselves by no means certain that it is at all convincing. That is why, despite an assertion which would sr,em ta exclude the possibility of any legaldiscussion, there has in fact beeu, in the CounCil, a detailed discussion of the legal problems raised in the Cuban draft resolution. This in turn gives us grounds for consîclering certain important objections put forward during the main debate concerning what are in fact legal problems. 33. What was the main questions around which the discussion centred? It was, of course, the question of whether the measures taken against the Republic of Cuba at Punta deI Este constituted enforcementaction within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. Everyone understands that this is really the main question, because if at Punta deI Este no measures were taken which could be described as enforcement action, it would mean that the decisions ofthe Organization of American States in that connexion were not subject to authorization by the Security Council. For the only case in which the decisions of a regional organization, although in accordance with the United 35. Do we or do we not know what those enforcement' measures within the meaning of the United Nations Charter are? 36. In the view of the Soviet delegation and a number of other delegations in the Council, the Charter provides a clear answer to this question. In the Soviet delegation's view, enforcement measuresaccordingto the Charter are all those measures enumerated in Article 41 ofthe Charter-and possibly other measures as weU-the purpose of which is ta make some States submit ta the will of othe:r States", As Article 41 says, these measures may include a whole series of measures which are enumerated the:re in detail and which, in order to save time, 1 will not repeat here. 37. If the position were that the whole Councilagreed \Vith this view of the Soviet delegation, which has been supported here by certain other delegations, there would be no need ta apply ta the International Court of Justice. But sorne members of the Council have put forward at least two objections: they have said, first, that the term "enforcement action" covers only measures involving the use of force; and secondlytbis was the highly original statement made by the representative of the Unit.ed Kingdom-that eniorcement measures were something of such a special nature that they could not normally be legitimately undertaken against aState. True, the United Kingdom representative did not favour us with an indication of what kind of action he had in mind in his-pardon me the expression-fantastic definition ofwhatconstitutes enforcement action. But he hastened to exclude, from the list of enforcement measures, aU the measures enumerated in Article 41 of the Charter. He stated that the measures enumerated in Article 41 of the Charter could not be regarded as enforcement measures, because-as he said-the interruption of economic relations, the severance of diplomatic relations and the other measures listed in Article 41 could be proceeded ta by any State without fear of incurring the charge of a breach of international legality with regard to the State against which such action was taken. 35. 36. sieurs Charte les toutes Charte, à d'autres à. du 37. à. plusieurs s'adresser certains objections pression quement le. idée prises vrai pas tuent, pardonne il de nières mesures les courir sans international mesures , r ! U ~, 38. That is an entirely fallacious position becausealthough the action mentioned can indeed bJ;! taken by one State against another-when similar action, the same measures, are taken as the result of a decision adopted by an organization of which a numher of States are members, their natgre is thereby changed. Such actions, taken collectively become enforcement measures against another State within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, because they constitute political action the scope and consequently the significance of which are completely differentfrom those of actions which may be performed in isolationby one state in regard ta another State. It is perfectly clear that one State cannat blockade all the other States. The i Bame can be said of the severance ofdiplomatie rela- 1 tians. One State may break off diplomatic relations L 38. un un décision nombre collectivement, tives Nations qui, entièrement viduellement prend Etats à. a Etat de d'Etats With another State, but it is not in a position ta create a polïtical vacuum around that State. It is a different 39. Nor is there any doubt that even our opponents fully appreciate the weaI..-ness of thenposition. That is the l'eason why they put forward an additional argument during the discussion. Whentheir defences based on the first argument were pierced, and ""chen, as l am now explaining, the defences based onlinenumbertwo-the argument which l have just now examined concerlling the nature ofenforcement measures within the meaning of the Charter<-were in their turn pierced, we discovered the third and deepest line ofdefence which had beea erected by our esteemed opponents. This third Hue of defence consists of the additional argument that refer!'ing the qUE:stions formulated in the Cuban resolution to the International Court of Justice would be equivalent to reviewing or even reversing the decision which was adopted by the Security COuneil whell it eonsidered the question of the application of enforeement measur6s against the Dominiean Republie by the Orgânization of Ameriean States. 40. The so-ealled Dominief.in precedent has been referred ta by many members of the Couneil, and the interpretation of the resolution adopted bythe Securi1;y Councililin connexion with the question ofthe Dominican Repnblie which was given by the representative of the Soviet Union in the Couneil as far back as 1960 is Îmown to aH. We are grateful to the delegations that have already reminded the Couneil of this. 41. We stated then and repeat now that the Seeurity Council's taking note of the decision of the Organization of American States to apply enforcement measures against the Dominican Republie meantnothing more or less than its approval, and l emphasize the ward "approval", of that decision. 42. If someone takes note of something without making any objections and if, in addition, a formal resolution is adopted in the matter, then the conclusion to be drawn is that what is noted is approved. In the case in point, the assertion that the Seeurity Couneil was entitled nnder Article 53 of the Charter not to agree with the adoption of enforcement measures against the Dominican RepubHe merely strengthens the argument we have just put forward. How, inthese circumstances, can it be said that the Coullcil, in noting the decision to take enforeement measures against the Dominican Republic, did not consider the taking of sneh measures ta be valid? Such an assertionis eompletely inconsistent not only with the text ofthe formaI deeision adopted b' ·~he Seeurity Couneil but also with the entire diseus.8kn which took place at the time in the Couneil, since the members expressed no fundamental political divergencies regarding the admissibility of taking enforcement measures against the Dominiean Republic. Thus the Council agreed with the deeision and sanctioned it. Thus it discharged with 44. If we have attempted, none the less, ta place ourselves in the position ofour opponents, this was merely to show tbat the very most that they can ask fa!' is a l'e-examination of the whole legal problem arising in connexion with the enforcement measures taken against Cuba. It cannat therefore be said that by referring legal questions ta the International Courtof Justice, as Cuba asks, the Council would be repealing or altering its decision of 1960. 45. It is, however, absolutely necessary, as we already pointed out, and as is obvious even to our opponents, to decide the question of what, in the light of the Charter, is meant by Article 53, which speaks of enforcement action. Unless this important question i6 decided, we cannat make any progress in deciding the other legal questions embodied in the Cuhan draft resolution. 46. We have already saki that the refusaI ta decide the legal questions that are important preliminary factors in the Council's adoption of the appropriate political decision would mean causing irreparable damage ta the prestige and authority of the Security Council and of the United Nations as a whole. 47. Even those who are against consulting the Court real12e the weakness of their argument. That is why they threw up an additional and even deeper line of defence here by resorting to the argument that consulting the International Court of Justice would amount to a campaign against the regional organizations. 48. What a lot has been said on this suhject! The speeches Qf some representatives on this question have gone through a very wide range of toues, from the crescendo and thunder of the United states representative to the piano and pianissimo of the Irish representative. The representativeofthe United states warned that this would mean a Sovietveto on decisions adopted by the regional organizations, the infiltration of the Sino-Soviet bloc into the Western Hemisphere, etc. 1! J• 49. The Irish representative spok'3 in a pntle, 1 might even say, somewhat lyricalmanner. He urged that the United NationS should not become a tree in whose shadow regional organizations would be unable ta tbrive. We do not have enough time to mention aIl 51. lt is understandable that the United States and its military-bloc allies-those, that is, which are represented on the Council-must resort to these tactics iu arder ta misrepresent the realpositionadoptedonthis question by the Soviet Union. That is why the United States has undertaken here, and outside the Council in the Press, a large-scale campaign designed ta mislead the representatives of the smaller countries in the United Nations, which are sincerely interested in the existence and activities of the regional organizatians. This however, is a premeditated and calculated misrepresentatlion of our position. We find it necessary in this connexion to stress once more that the Soviet Union has supported and continues ta support the existence and activities of the regional organizations within the limits and on the basis prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. In any case not a single regional organization bas ever attempted in the past ta organize its activities regardless of, contrarytoor in violation of the Charter, or for purposes other than those defined in the Charter and in harmony \Vith its spirit. 52. We have never suggested and do not now suggest that the Security Council or any other organ should dictate ta or impose its will on the regional organizatians. There is thus absolutely no basis for asserting that we are engaging in a kind of crusade against the regional organizations merely because, acting on the basis of the Charter, we have brought up here the question whether the regional organizations are entitled to take enforcement measures without the sanction of the Security Council. 53. We might be able to underst8.nd our opponents if, instead of absolutely opposing any consultation of the International Court of Justice, theyhelpedto formulate the questions that ought to be put tothe Court. It would obviously be possible to seek and find sorne basis for agreement on this point, but the fauIt lies not with the delegations supporting my view, but with the -United States and its followers in the Conncil who flatly reject, on artificial and far-fetched pretexts, the very ideaof consulting the Court. This, of course, flagrantly contradicts the concepts of internationallegality and juStice. 54. To apply ta the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, as Cuba insists, is folly justified under Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The attempts ta make out that the Court is being asked to reply ta political and not legal questions are futile and groundless and contrary ta the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. They are, in fact, an appeal ta set asiqe international law and to decide questions of international relations on the basis of force and caprice. 55. At this crucial stage, we againappeal tothe members of the Conncil to show that they are equal to 56. 1 should like to add that as an exception to the existing procedure 1 do not 'inaist on the Interpretation of mY speech. In sa doiug, 1 am taking into aecount today's full programme which will make it necessary for many of us to take part in the discussions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spaca and in a number of other importa'nt meetings which are going on s1lnultaneously. 57. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish}: ln view of what the representative ofthe Soviet Union has just said, and since othermembersoitheCouncü have agreed that, as an exception, we should forgothe consecutive interpretat-ion of his speech into English and French on this occasion, we shaH do sa if there is no objection. It was so decided.

Before 1 give the floor ta the next speaker, and in order tr make this procedure quite clear, 1should like to ask l!:a repre5entative of the Soviet Union whether 1 am correct in interpreting bis statement to mean that he has exercised his rightunderrule 38 ofthe provisional rules of procedure ta ask that the draft resolution submitted ta the COUDcil by Cuba may be put ta the vote.

Yeso

Before we proceed to the vote, 1 should like ta summarize hurriedly the arguments which we have heard on this item from the representatives of Cuba and the Soviet Union for an entlre week. 61. What we have heard is literallydailyrepetitionof the identical assertions that were made here on the first day and which have been answered by almost every other membar here present over and over again. But each day the representatives of Cuba andthe Soviet Union disregard what bas been said thedaybefore and begin anew ta solemnly repeat the sarne charges. This procedure could go on for years. It is what we caU in English IIthe dialogue of the deaf'l; in Spanish, 1 believe it i5 lIun dialogo entre sardos", and 1 have no doubt that there is more than one Russian equivalent for endlessly repeating the sarne thing like a stuck phonograph, and refusing to hear the answers. 62. 1 submit that it ia lon.g paat time to brin( "1lis rhetorical endurance contest ta an. end, for we have heard nothing new since the first clay, and befol'e we conclude this undistinguished episode in the' history of this Council 1 will, as 1 say, hurriedly review only those few arguments which relate to the letter filed by Cuba. 63. The Cuhan and Soviet representatives have asserted over and over, with characterïstic deafness for the fa.cts, that Cuba was excluded from the Organizatian of American states because of its social system. [ 64. Secondly, these same delegations have reiterated that the OAS had no right ta exclude Cuba from its membership because of these violations of the OAS charter. On its face this is absurdo It is the inherent right of any regional organization ta determine which countries shaH participate and which shaH not. Yet from what the Soviet representative has been saying this principle applies only in those instances whichfit Soviet political motives. Stripped of polemîcs, whathe would have us believe isthatthe LatinAmerican countries cann0t decide for themselves with whom they wish to associate in their regional organization, and such a propositipn hardly merits serious discussion. 65. Thirdly, the Soviet Union has attempted to separate the Organization of Am.erican states from other regional organizations, present or future. Coun'~ cil members have already drawn attention ta thisdistortion in their statements. The problem we face here today-that is, the problem of extending the Soviet veto over decisions of regional organizations-is not in any sense limited ta the OAS. It applies equally to any regional organization. The Soviet position, in short, is an assault on the whole system .::f regional organizatians and if ft is successful it would nullify a fundamental provision of the Charter of the United Nations. 66. Two days ago the Council heard the penetrating analysis and defence of the regional organization System by the representative of Ireland. He said that regional organizations as such have long since proved their usefulness and daily were growinginimportance and in vigour. He expected that before too long there might be a regional organization in Africa. And this was not surprising. Mr. Boland intimated that, with a growing United Nations, it must be anticipated that much of the work within a region would have to be undertaken by the region itself. This would perforee lead ta the establishment of an increasing number of regional organizations in the days ahead. The Council, Mr. Boland said, sbould therefore be careful to avoid reaching any conclusions which might appear to undervalue or to challenge the principle of regionalorganization. 67. We submit that it 'ïs this very independence and this very integrity of a regional organizationwhich the 68. Finally j the Soviet representative has accused us of trying ta force acceptance of our interpretation of the words "enforcement action" in Article 53 upon the members of the Couneil. This 18 simply Dot true. We are Dot try~ng ta force anything. nor are we attempting ta clefine these words in a way which the Security Counoil has Dot already accepted. We have cited repeatedly here the Dominican case. It was referred to by the representative of Ghana who cited statements by Council members .to support his feeling that the issue may not have been clearly met at that time. The fact is, however, that the Council did decide in the Dominican case that no enforcement action was involved. \ 69. The whole purpose of the Soviet Unioninbringing the case before the Council was ta lnsist that Security Council approval under Article 53 ofthe United Nations Charter was required. The entire debate revolved around whether the resolution of the Organization of American States in the Dominican case did or did not constitute enforcement action under the terms of Article 53. If it was enforcement action, the Security Council was required-not authorized, but requiredto give its approval or disapproval under Article 53. The faet that it refused to actunderArticle 53 is conclusive. The Soviet contention had so little supportthat the Soviet Union declined even to put its draft resolution to the vote at that time.Acolmter resolution presented by Argentlna, Ecuador and the United States, which explicitly did not come under Article 53, was adopted by the Council (895th meeting]. It maynot have defined what enforcement action under Article 53 was, but it most definitely did decide that action of the sort embraced in the Dominican case was not subject to Article 53. 70. For these reasons, we hope that the Council will reject the draft resolution submittedby Cuba, and ln 50 doing the Council will again be making an important contribution towards the preservation and the integrity and the independence of regional organizations of the United Nations. 71. 1 am very happy to waive the consecutive interpretation, in order to save time and not try the patience of members of the Council. la

Members of the Council h\l.ve heard Mr. &tevensonsay that he too is ready to forgo the oonsecntive interpretation of his speech into French, in order that we may proceed more rapidly. 1understand that the other members of the Couneil agree to this. If there is no objection, we shall once more, and as an exception, forgo the interpretation. membres Conseil, de je Conseil s'il à

Before we continue, since there are no more speakers on my list, 1 shouldIiketoreplyto the statement made 73. de d'autres 74. 1 should like ta make two shortremarks about the speech which the representative of Cuba madeyesterday in reply ta my statement. 1 shaH not take up the Council's Ume, which we know ia very limited. r 75. In the first place, the representative of Cuba said: "You speak of freedoDl, democracy and human rights ••• you and 1 use the Bame terms, yet it is obvions that we do not attach the same value ta them." 1 should like ta say ta the representative of Cuba that 1 entirely agree with him about this. We use the Bame terrns, but Venezuela and the present Government of Cuba give them completely different meanings. 76. The other remark relates to the offensive terms whicb the representative of Cuba used in referring to the States which supported resolution VITI of Punta deI Este. 1 sbould like to think that these words arose from the passion of the moment, since otherwise they would be completely inadmissible, and indeed improper, in a speech tmide before this distinguished body by the representative of a Member 8tate invited ta participate in the dehate. 77. We have completed the debate on the itemand we shaU now vote. In my capacityasPRE8IDENTI should like to remind the Council that the representative of Cuba has submitted a draft resolution [8/5095]. The representative of the Soviet Union, in accordancewith rule 38 of the provisional rules ofprocedure,has said that his delegation wishes that draftresolution to he put to the vote. Consequently, a3 the conditions set forth in raIe 38 have béen fulfilled, 1shaH submit that draft resolution ta the Council.

My delegation would request the Security Conncil to take a separate vote on paragraph 3 of this draftresolution.ln making this request 1 caU attention to the statement that 1 made before the Counoil two days ago that, in our opinion, there is a douht as to the meaning of "enforcement action" as contained in Article 53 ofthe Charter, and 1 submit that we quoted a number of authorities wh? had expressed opinions about this matter. 79. We referred specifically to the debate on the Dominican Republic issue, and we concluded thatwhile tbere was a resolution passed at the time, asking the Securiw Council ta take note of the decisions reached at San José, at the Sixtb Meeting of Consultation of ; Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, the debate itself revealed fuat there were differences of opinion as to the meaning of the term "enJ'orcement action". In faet. we went as far as to "quote the repre- , sentative of Argentina, who said that the door should be left open for eventual interpretation of this terro. 80. In asking for the Council tovote separatelyon thls particular question, 1 want ta impress upon my colleagues that ::'.11;' us there is a genuine doubt which we think ought ;,(" be dispelled. We do not think that a question such as this should be decided only by the great Powers. It is very clear tbatthereare differen- 81. Therefore, unless there is au objection, and 1 hope there will he no objection on the part of the moyer of this draft resolution, my delegation would request that there should be a separate vote onparagraph 3 of the draft resolution.

1 give the floor ta the representative of the United Arab Republic on a point of arder related ta the voting.

Would it be possible lirst for the President ta ask whether the mover of this question is agreeable ta having a separate vote?

Iwas going ta expiain that point when you asked ta speak. 85. The representative of Ghana has asked that operative paragraph 3 of the draftresolution ehouldbe voted on separately, in accordance with rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure. In view of the second paragraph of tbat rule, and ofthe fact that it was the Soviet Union which asked that the draft resolution submitted by Cuba should be put ta the vote, 1 should like ta ask the Soviet Union representative whether he bas any objection ta the separate vote requested by the representative of Ghana. 86. The representative of Cuba has just asked ta speak, but at this point, when the debate on the substance of the matter has been closed and statements may only be made on purely procedural questions relating ta the voting, 1 cannat give the floor ta the representative of aState which is not a member of the Security Council. 87. 1 give the floor ta the representative ofthe Soviet Union on a point of order.

1 have great respect for your knowledge of the rules of procedure, Mr. President, but 1 am unable ta find anything in them to the effect that physical participation-since the representative of Cuba is sitting at the table-and, consequently, participation in the entire examination of the question must cease, in sa far as representatives invited here by the Council from countries which are not memblô:rs of the Council are concerned, justat the time whea the Council starts voting. This does not correspond ta our precedents, and, 1 repeat nothing similar ta it can be iound, either directly or indirectly expressed, in the rules ofprocedure.Allthatthe rules of procedure say is that a draft resolution submitted for consideration by a non-member ofthe Councilmay be put ta the vote ifonly one member of the Council so requests, and in the present instance, as is apparent from the Ghanaian representative's statement, not merely one member of the Councilconsiders itnecessary for this draft resolution ta be put ta the vote. A member making such a request does not, however, become the sponsor ofthedraftresolution,asyou have 90. Once again, in arder to save time, 1 do not maist on the consecutive interpretation of my remarks iuta the other two languages. 91, The PRESIDENT (translated fromSpanish): Since it was the delegation of the Soviet Union which requested a vote in accordance with rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, on a draft resolution which could not otherwise have been put ta the vote, 1 asked the representative of the Soviet Union whether he agreed to a separate vote, since under rule 32 it is for him te decide whether or not he accepts this request of the representative of Ghana. 92. Ta avoid a procedural discussion, 1 suggest that the representative of the Soviet Union, who must know the views of the representative of Cuba, should say whether he agrees ta operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution being put to the vote separately. 93. With regard to the question whether the representative of Cuba should he anowed to speak at this stage of the proceedings, 1 do not thinkthat this is the time for an invited state to intervene in the debate. 94. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republies) (translated from Russian): 1 did not ask for the Haar. 1 think, Mr. President, that your interpretation of the rules of procedure is absolutely wrong, and we could go on discussing this matter for an hour and a half. Surely at this late stage you are not going to abandon the impartiality and objectivity which has marked your conduct of our proceedings,andwhichwe have aU noted these past days, by requiring me and other members of the Council to followyour interpretation of the provisional rules of procedure. As a matter of fact, they make no provision-absolutely no provision-for the procedure ta be followed in such cases. 95. 1 am now beginning to think that there is sorne political intrigue behind aB fuis. At first Ihad thought that perhaps sorne member of the Secretariat had advised you wrongly, but now 1 see that you are acting on your own initiative in insisting on such a strange procedure and denying the Cuban representative the floor. He ls sitting here and, as he is apparently endowed with sufficient intelligençe and memory, could tell us whether or not he agrees with the proposaI of the Ghanaian representative. By sa doing he couldend this completely unnecessary discussion. Instead, you insist that 1 say what he wants ta say. 1 can say that, unless you have some ulterior political motives, to present the matter at the last minute in such a way that the fate of Cubais resolution is decided not by Cuba but by someone else, eventhoughactingon Cuba's behalf, is a procedure that is entirely out of order. It is like a photograph taken out of focus, and the result is a bad picture. 1 urge you ta invite the representative of Cuba to speak. Uoless 1 am mistaken, he did 96. In order ta save time, Idonot lnsist on the consecutive interpretation into the other two languages.

1 think it is quite clear that the Chair has given the representative of Cuba every opportunity ta express his views. It was on the basis of my interpretation of the provisional rules of procedure that 1 considered that it was not proper for him ta speak. Ta avoid any suspicion that the Chair is trying ta impose its views, as it is entitled ta do under rule 30,1 should like, before giving a final ruling, to hear the opinion of other members of the Couneil on whether the representative of Cuba may be heard at tbis stage of the proceedings. If tbere is no objection,Ishallthen give him the floor, although 1 myself have reservations about doing sa. 1 1,,

Mr. President, your interpretation of the rules of procedure has be;;:on challenged. 1should 11ke ta say that 1 and my delegation agree with your interpretation. In the present case, as Cuba is not a member of the Council, another State, which is a member of the Couneil, bas submitted Cubais draft resolution. 99. 1 therefore agree with you that that member of the Council should answer the question whichhasbeen askedi but 1 aceept your interpretation and 1 do not think that we should give the representative of Cuba the impression that we are taking a stand against him or trying ta prevent him frorn expressing his opinion. 1 support your proposaI, with the reservation you yourself have made on the understanding that our invitation ta the representative of Cuba ta expresshis opinion on this point is an exception and will not estabhsh a precedent. '\

The representative of France has just expressed exactly what 1 wished to say. In the view of my delegation, thG interpretation which you have placed upon the rules of procedure is entirely correct. If it is the view of. this Council and of you, Mr. President, thatthe representative of Cuba should be aHewed te speak at this moment, 1 shaH certainly raise no objection. But as 1 saY,I regard the interpretation which you have placed on the rules of procedure as being the right one.

1 should like ta beclear as ta what exactly is involved. 1 understand that there

1 should like ta say ta the representative of Ireland that his understanding la correct; we are Dot now discussing the substance of the matter, which has already been disposed of. We were trying todecidewhetheror not a division of the vote on the draft resoluUon submitted by Cuba, and then supported by the Soviet Union, was acceptable.

1 understand that this is the first Ume that a draft resolution bas been presented to this Council under rule 38 of the rules of procedure. There seems to be sorne doubt about who is the author of such a draft resolution. Would it now be the Cuban draft resolution or the draft resolution ofthe mover. the country member of the Council which has moved it1 There seems to be a doubt, and 1 should like to give the benefit of the doubt to the Cuhan representative. 1 think that the President can caU on him. in order to ask him whether or not he accepts a separate vote on paragraph 3.

As the representative of the United Arab Republic has just said, the problem which bas arisen has no precedent in the Council, because motions and draft resolutions are normally submitted by members of the Security Council. 105. As an exception, rule 38 gives aState Member of the United Nations which is invited to participate in a discussion the right to submit proposaIs and draft resolutions, but snch proposaIs and draft resolutions may be put ta a vote ooly at the request of a member of the Security Council. 106. That being sa, my delegation considera that the correct interpretation of the provisional rules ofprocedure i8 the one given by the Chair. Nevertheless, in view of the reluctance of the representative of the Soviet Union ta say whether he abjects to a division of the vote 1 as provided for in the second paragraph of rule 32, there is no reason why, out of courtesy to the representative of Cuba, as an exception and without establishing a precedent, we ahould not give him an opportunity ta say whether or not he agrees ta the division of the vote requested by the repre8entative of Ghana. 107. 1 do not think a consecutive interpretation ofmy words ia nec:eSS[l.ry.

1 should like to thank the representatives who have expressed their views on this question of procedure. Since there are no objections as an exception and with the reservations which·1 have already formulated, 1 shall calI upon the representative of Cuba to say whether, in accordance with the provisions of rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure, he agrees ta a 110. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGU! (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): 1 merely wish ta saythatI agree to thé Ghanaian representative's request. Ill. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 call on the representative of the United Arab Republic for an explanation of vote before the. vote.

Imade it clear, 1 hope, the position ofour delegation vis-à-vis the text ofthe draft resolution presented ta this COUDcil by the representative of Cuba: we couldnothave votec1 for it; we would have had to abstain. Now, however, the separate vote requested bythe representative ofGhana leaves us with an academic question that may he1p in a better Wlderstanding of the Charter: it is also especially interesting in the light ofthe statement rnade two days ago by the representative of Ireland. We find no harm in askingthe Courtfor an advisory opinion on this operative paragraph 3 ofthe draft resolution before us.

We shall nOw proceed to the vote. Since a separate vote has been asked for on paragraph 3 ofthe draft resolution contained in document 8/5095, 1 shall put this paragraph ta the vote first. The paragraph rWlS as follows: nCan the expression 'enforcement action' in Article 53 of the United Nations Charter be considered to include the measures provided for in Article 41 of the Charter'? Is the list of these meaaures in Article 41 exhaustive?n

1 must remind the Cuban representative who has just asked for the floor that 1 cannot give it to him at this stage because we have started the voting. As I<'oon as it is completed, 1 shaH have pleasure in caUîng on him for a statement il he 50 desires.

Mr. President, 1 should like the floor.

1 give the floor to the representative afthe Soviet {Juior;. on a point of order concerning the vote. une

Mr. President, 1 do not consider that you were right juat now in refusing to give the floor ta the representative of Cuba, since the Council has already once allowed him to speak on listes vous de à 118. In arder not ta repeat a scene which, ta put lt roildiy. was scarcely edifying for the members of the public who are present here and in the course of which lt took members of the Counei! twenty minutes to give the Cuban representative a chance to say "yes" or "no" to the question put ta himbythe Ghamtian representative 1 should like to inform you, Mr. President, speaking officially on behalf of the Cuban representative, that if you had given him the floor just now, as you did earlier in the case of the vote by division, he would have said that, since unfortunately seven mernbers of the Council, headed by the United States of America, cast negative votes, and the key question which Cuba proposed to bring before the International Court of Justice concerning the interpretation of the term "enforcement action" used in Article 53 of the United Nations Charter \Vas thus re,iected by the Council, the Cuban delegation does not insistona vote on the remaining parts of the resolution. 119. If you require any formaI or other confirmationand you seern to have become very partial to such formalities during the latter part of our meeting, Mr. President-I am prepared to give the necessary explanations atthe request ofthe Cubanrepresentative, whom you have iUegally deprived of an opportunity of stating here what 1 have just said on his behalf and at his request. 120. 1 do not insist on consecutive interpretation.

1 should like to point out to the Soviet representative that when 1 gave the Cuban representative the floor it was as an exception and subject tocertain reservations, and that in the case in point the proper person to decide whether or not the draft resolution is ta be put to the vote cau be none other than the representative of the Soviet Union himself, because had it not been for that representative's request the draft resolution could net under rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure have been putto the vote. Since, therefore, in accordance with that rule, the draft resolution has been put to the vote at the request of a m.ember of the Security Council, inthe case in point the representative of the Soviet Union, 1consider that only the representative of the Soviet Union is now authorized to withdraw the draft resolution and to requestthat it should not be put ta the vote. 122. That is why 1 decided that it would be improper to call upon the Cuban representative atthis point, but since we know what the request will be and since the Soviet representative does not wish topress for a vote on the dEaft resolution, if there ls no objection from the other members 1 shallmakeanexceptionas before and ask the Cuban representative to confirm what has just been said by the representative of the Soviet Union.

1 understand that bath the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Cuba, who have sponsoredthis cIraft resolution, DOW propose to withdraw lt. 1 mustobject mast emphatically to auy attempt to avoid a vote on this tiraft resolution as a whole. 125. The rules of procedure are very clear. Rule 35 says that a motion or draft resolution can at l...ny time be withdrawn, so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it. A vote has been taken \Vith respect to it. Therefore, the draft resolution can no longer bewithdrawn and 1 move that it be put to a vote, as a whole, forthwith.

Mr. President, 1 am sorry that 1 shaH have to disappoint the United States representative beiore lunch by telling himtbat,evenif he were to ask for a vote onthis draft resolution now, on his own behalf, he would not-to his regret and to our joy-be able to do so under the rules of procedure. 127. The fact is that, in accordance with the second paragraph of rule 35, he could request a vote on the Cuhan draft resolution in the name ofthe United States delegation, but he could do sa only on one condition, namely, if the United States representative had supported that drait resolutionduring the debate. However, we, being of sound and disposing mind and memory , as they say in wills, have heard how the United States supported this resolution. Accordingly, the United States representative has lost the opportunity of availing himself of this pNvision ofthe rules of procedure. 128. Furthermore, the request just made by the Cuban representative under the first paragraph of rule 35 likewise cannot be used as a justification of the position which has been stated here so categorically and resolutely by the representative of the United States. 129. Indeed, the tirst paragraph of rule 35 reads as follows: liA motion or drait resolution can atany time be withdrawn, so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it." But the question is not one of withdrawing a drait resolution on which a vote has been taken. What we have is a case where it was decided to vote on a drait resolution, and the voting on one very important part of tbis resolution actually took place. The members of the COUDcil whichare followingin the steps of the. United States of America in this matter cheerfully and vigorously voted against the members who are representing the socialistcountrieii!. Cuba and the countries of Asia and Africa in the Council, and as a result of this vote not even a part of the resolution was adopted. 1, 1 1, 130. Accordingly, there. are now nO grounds for asserting that a motion or draft resolution bas been entirely withdrawn. If at the beginning of the vote the Cuban representative, or anyone else, had said: III wish to interrupt the conduct of the voUng because 1 ~w_'nt to w,thdraw the draft re,olution and not put any 23 ~ tian is not covere y the first paragrap 0 rule 5. 1.' Of course, this rule can be interpreted in different ways. Let us have a detailed discussionofthis subject with consecutive interpretation into the working languages, let us spend another meeting onthis subject, and let us attract more attention ta our discussion of it. We quite understand the political reaSons for this unwonted activity on the part of the United states and its wish to have a vote taken on the remaining part of the draft resolution, although the sponsor does not insist on such a vote; these seven members of the Council, apparently headed by the United States, will vote just as cheerfully and vigorouslyagainstthedraft resolution, in accordance with the agreement which exists in the Security Council on this matter. No great intellectual powers are required to predict what will happen when this vote is taken. 132. We are not, however, concerned with this nor with the fact that, in its disappointmentatthe outcome of the vote on paragraph 3, the United states is furiously trying to have that hateful Cuban draftresolution put ta. the vote at all costs. 133. After aIl. we are accustomedto a certain amount of self-control and to the observance of the Queensberry Rules, so to speak, in our deliberations, and however heated our debates may become, it would be advisable for aU of us, including the United States representative, not ta become too agitated, for evenif the COuncil has now decided nottoaccedeto the Cuban representative's request, the political picture is already absolutely clear: four members of the Council supported that minimum minimorum of the minimum programme proposed by Cuba, which is the keystone of our whole debate, namely, the true meaning of enforcement action as referred to in the United Nations Charter. 134. We have already pointed out that no progress can be made unless we settle thisproblem.Of course, the Sovie.t delegation supports the view that there are other questions to be raised-and thes·e questions are enumerated in the Cuban draft resolution.If,however, the question of what is meant by enforcement action is for a momenttaken out of the context of these other questions and all the other questions are still asked, the logical sequence of ideas in this draft resolution will be disrupted. If one provision is taken and the others excluded, the resulting formulation of aH the provisions must remain incomplete, but the main idea, the heart of the matter, remains. If we assume that the vote on the Cuban draft resolution, after the rejection of paragraph 3, will result in the acceptance of aU the remaining provisions, the resolution will acquire a somewhat inarticulate character, since paragraph 3 is organically connected witb and is extremely important to the whole system of juridical structures contained in this draft resolution. 135. Even if the United States were so desirous of astonishing the world that it would have its representative say that he was prepared to vote for aE the remaining paragraphs of the Cuban draft resolution, 1 do not know what the Cuban representative's reactioD 136. But let us see if there are auy preoedents not only in the Security Couneil but aisc in the General Assemhly and the United Nations generally. There are none. This is the tirst time in the whole history of the United Nations that aoy rl,'lpresentative bas made such an extraordinary maye as the one just made by the representative of the United states. Against the will of the sponsor of the draft resolution and after certain provisions by which the sponsor sets great store have been rejected, an attempt is still being made to have the remaining part of the drait resolution put ta the vote, in a form which is unacceptable to the sponsor. Even if we set aside for the time being the formaI and procedural aspect, on which we could conduct for several days a debate as useful and brilliant as the one we held just now on allowing the Cuban representative ta speak here in the Council-even if we leave this question aside, na one has yet been guilty of such a denial of elementary courtesy and of respect for the rights of states representedhere in the United Nations. 137. The United States, which commands sevenvotes here on this question, can of course do what it likes; in the final analysis, the politicaloutcome of such a vote is quite obviousandcanintroducenothingnew into our discussion. 1 would say, however, that proposaIs such as the one made by the United States representative can be introduced only in the heat of irritation, when a persan-and a representative is always a person, a human being-momentarily loses control of what he is actually proposing andtakes actionwhich is contrary ta accepted practice and to the concepts of elementary courtesy. Of course such proposaIs can be introduced and cao even be imposedonthe Council, but aU this in no way changes the situation. 138. That is why the Soviet delegation, beingresponsible for the fact that the Cuban draft resolution was submitted and formally discussed in the Security Council, urges that Cuba's request in this matter should he met.

Does the representative of the Soviet Union wish to have the consecutive interpretation of his statement?

Yes, Mr. President, 1 believe that the situation is now such that these procedural discussions have broken down allrestrictions on what can and cannat be done here in the Council. 1 am prepared ta attend five more meetings, or six, or however many more will be required to deal with these questions. If you like, the interpretation can he given now-I amapatientman-butitcanbe given later if you prefer. The consecutive interpretation into English and French of the statement by the representative of the Unio1). of Sovlet Socis11st Republics was given.

In view of the discussionthathasarisenoverthe decision ta allow the Cuban representative ta speak, which would 143. At this moment we are not discussing who is entitled to withdraw the draft resolution. The matter has come up because the representative of the Soviet Union raised a point of order and referred to this question, whereupon the Cuban representative asked for the Hoor. In order nottodeprivehim of the opportunity of speaking again, and purely as an exception, he was againgiventhefloorandheexpressed bis views on the withdrawal of the draft resolution. 144. This relates exclusively ta the question of who has the right to witbdraw a draft resolution, but the case which we are now considering is when tOOt right may be exercised. Accordingto the veryexplicitterms of the first paragraph of rule 35, that time has already expired because a vote has already been taken on the draft resolution and rule 35 states quite clearly that a motion or draft resolution can be withdrawn at any time, as long as no vote has been taken on it. 145. Consequently, Bince a vote has alreadybeen taken with respect ta the draft resolution and since one of its paragraphs has been voted on and rejected, the President considers that at this point no one is entitled to withdraw the draft resolution. 1 shaH therefore putthe rest of the draft resolution to the vote. 146. 1 give the floor ta the representative ofthe Soviet Union on a point of order.

Mr. President, 1 do not consider your ruling ta be correct, since 1 assume that what you said about the first paragraph of ruls 35 of the provisional rules of procedure relates ta a motion or draft resolution as a whole, afterthe voting has begun. The first paragraph of rule 35 nowhere refers to the parts of any proposaI. 1 therefore do not consider that the ruling you have just handed clown is really based on the text of rule 35. 1 hereby reiterate aIl the objections 1 raised earlier, and of course 1 reserve the right ta make an appropriate statement, after the vote On procedure or on any other matter, in connexion with the Council's final decision on this question.

1 should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether 1 am ta interpret bis last statement as a challenge ta the ruling of the Chair.

Yes, Mr. President.

In view of what the Soviet representative has just said, l shall ask the Council, in accordance with rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure, to vote on the 152. 1 give the floor to the representative ofthe Soviet· Union on a point of order. 152. soviétique 153. listes 13 veilles! vous je de cette 153, Mr. MOROZQV (Union ofSovietSocialistRepublies) (translated from Russian); If lt were not half past one in the afternoon. 1 should say that this was a sort of uight of miracles. Now, Mr. President, you have decided to use another manœuvre. against wbich 1 must also protest. Let us firstdecidehow this question should be formulated. 154. Since this Organization was founded-and there are enough people present here who have taken part in United Nations activities for many yearsthe practice has always been ta put the President's ruling ta the vote, and not challenges ta such a ruling. Please be sa kind as at leastto observe the rules of procedure in a case where you have handed down a ruling which cannat be accepted unanimously by the COUDcil. Please put your ruling ta the vote, and not my challenge ta your ruling. 154. il depuis vités l'on et cette fois puisque du au ma

The representative of the Soviet Union is perfectly right. According ta rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedllre, it is the President's ruling which should be voted on, and that is what 1 shaH do. 155. reprêsentant raison. lntêrieur est faire. 156. 1 therefore put to the vote the ruling on rule 35 which has already been stated by the President. 156. qui énoncée.

ln the opinion of my delegation a new complexion has been put on the whole issue by the attempt to withdrawthedraft resolution by the representative of the Soviet Union, supported by the original mover, Cuba. In view of this and the opposition which has nowbeen manifested by the vote in favour of YOlU" ruling, Mr. President, from which we abstained, my delegation will not take part in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole. 157. glais]: retirer soviétique de En constatée dêcision sommes pas lution. 158. allons figurant a l'ensemble paragraphe.

We shaH now vote on the drait resolution contained in document S/5095 as amended by the.deletion of paragraph 3, in other words we shaH vote on the draft resolution as a whole, minus paragraph 3. Abstaining: United Arab Republic. The draft resolution. as amended, WBS rejected by 7 votes ta :1. with 1 abstention. r

Mr. President, despite the faet that paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was excluded as the result of an attack against that paragraph and against the principles of international law by seven meinbers of the Couneil headed by the United States, the Soviet delegation voted in favour of the remainder of the draft resolution, although it was . obvious that the seven members in question-fromthe way they spoke on the substance of the question, after dealing sa arbitrarily with our procedure-wouldnever allow the draft resolution to be adopted. We took that course because we uphold the idea, contained in the Cuban proposaI, of appealing to the International Court of Justice for the solution of a highly important question, which must be examined before a correct decision can be reached On the politicai aspects of the whole problem of aggression and new plans for armed aggression by the United States againstthe Republi~of Cuba. i ~l, "U1 J l J1 .j 160. Unfortunately, the same group of seven in the Security Council, headed by the United States, did not consider even the possibility of adopting that part of the proposaI included in the Cuban draft resolution which contained the important element-namely that we should refer the matter to the Court if we really wished to base the activities ofthe Security Council on the principles of internationallegality, on theobservance of our Charter and on the principles of international law-and having refused ta consider that possibility, they refused to accept that last compromise, that last gesture of the goodwill which the Cuban representative showed here over and over again when he agreed to a vote by division on his draft resolution in order to accommodate the views expressed during the debate and to meetthe request ofthe representative of an African State. 161. Accordingly, these circumstances exclude the very possibility that the seven who have brought the Security CounciPs work of rnany days to this conclusion are really defending a position of justice or have any intention of upholding internationallaw and order or maintaining international peace and security in this specüic case. Indeed, they have once again paralysed the activities of the Security Council as the principal organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. 162. It is very popular in the so-called Western "free world" ta refer to the use of the veto by the Soviet Union. Those who often make such references woulddo weIl to consider practical results and to bear in minci the fact that the Soviet Union's negative notes in the Security Council have always been cast in the interests of maintaining international peace and security. How- 164. We are not here to give advice to the representatives of sovereign States in this Council; they, like ourselves, do not need such advice.lflam speaking of this now, it is merely in order to stress that the struggle of the Cuban people, towhich the Cuban representative in the Council referred, and the corresponding support of the peace-Iovîng peoples ofaU countries, of the whole world, ofaU mankînd, and the cause of the national liberation and weU-being of the Republic of Cuba will not, of course, be stopped or even held back in any way by this decision, which is so discreditable to the Council, or by the outcome of the discussion we have just concluded. 164. seils ont de indiqué par peuples entière développement certainement par qui 165. 1 should like, finaIly,to repeat a passage from the statement made by the Soviet Government on 18 February 1962:.& 165. ration vrier IICuba is not alone. It hasmanyfriends,not only in Latin America, but throughout the world·, and'among them is the Soviet Union. The Republic of Cuba, as Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of theSovietGovernment, has clearly stated, can always rely on the aid and support of the Soviet people. The Soviet Go~l'n­ mentis public warnings to the enemieS ofdemocratic Cuba remain in force today."

The 1 representative of the Soviet Union has rather plaintively complained that the world talks too much about Soviet vetoes, ail nînety-nine of them. We have been talking about the Soviet veto, about the Soviet po1itical attempt, wearing a disguise of legalism, to subject regional organization decisions to that veto. That Soviet attempt has failed, and justifiably failed. 166. de s'est veto nombre de pour dique, veto. §j Document A;S093.

The representative ofthe United Stateshas,as an exception, agreed to forgo the consecutive interpretation into French ~.,ld there are no further speakers on my list. The consideration of the question that was before the Council has thus been completed. The meeting rose at 2.5 p.m. r