S/PV.999 Security Council

Mr. President, the "letter dated 20 March 1962 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republie" addressed to you has been circulated to us as document 8/5096. After you had consulted us about the Ume of the meeting of the Council, it was decided that this meeting would be convened to discuss this complaint today• 2, vous d'inscrire soire. b. quant de plus précieux 2. It seems that a sort of reaction, the other letter referred to in the provisional agenda forthis meeting, under sub-paragraph Q!) of item 2, has beeu received by you and circulated. In your wisdom, you have seen fit to put them bath on the provisional agenda. Although we have certain misgivings about this, in arder to ensure that the Council will dea! with this matter as quickly as pOSSIble and ta save the valuable time of the Council and its members, our delegation will not raise any objection to the adoption of the provisional agenda.

Like the delegation of the United Arab Republic, the Soviet delegation does not intend to present any formai proposaIs or objections coneerning the agenda, but it should be clearly understood that the absence of such formaI objections at the beginning of the discussion cannat be regarded as an admission that the two communicatiOns addressed ta the Council which appear as sub-items (~) and ® of item 2 are equally valid. 3. soviétiques) tique, n'a objections Je d'objections ne reconnaissons l'objet provisoire, 4. Having studied the preliminary material, we have 4. serious grounds for fearing that the communication tation, L'.-·--·,~~~=.t"o,g~o~,~'="l'

Sinee no other member of the Couneil wishes ta speak on the question of the adoption of the provisional agenda, and sinee there is no formaI objection, 1 deelare it adopted. The Palestine question: ~) Letter dated 20 March 1962 from the Permanent Repre. sentative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed ta the President of the Security Council (S/5096); !V Letter dated 21 March 1962 from the Permanent Repre. sentative of Israel llddressed ta the President of the Security Council (S/5098)

In accordanee with the Council's usual practiee in previous debates on this question, if there is no objection 1 suggest that the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel, wlo, in letters dated 20 and 22 Mareh respeetively [8/5097 and 8/5104J, have expressed a wish to participate in the discussion, without vote, should be invited te the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Farid Che~ Jaoui (Syrian Arab Republic) and Mr. Michael Comay (Israel) took places at the Council table.

The item before the COUDcil is the subjectofa letter dated 20 March from the representative of Syria and of a letter dated 21 March from the representative of Israel, which have been distributed as documents S/5096 and S/5098. 8. 8ince these two communications refer ta the same incidents. and sincea report on the matter has already been received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and distributed as documents S/5102 and Add.l, 1 think the COUDcil should consider sub-!.tems @) and <!!) of item 2 together, if there is no objection.

Again, to save the time of the Gouneil and ta comply with your wishes, Mr. President, we will raise no objection.

1 thank the representative of the United Arab Republic for displaying such an attitude of co-operation with the Council and for helping the Chair ta discharge tbis task. 11. 8ince 1 hear no objection, 1 presume that it is decided accordingly. It was sa decided.

We come now to the simultaneous discussion of subitems @) and ili) of the item on the agenda. 1 call 14. In the letters 1 had the honGnr to address to the Couneil, dated 17 and 20 March and circulated as documents 8/5092 and 8/5096, 1 simply mentioned, without comment or explanation. the aets ofaggression committed by the Israel authoritioas against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republie.. They were an exact repetition of an the aets of aggression which Israel has committed sinee it occupied Palestinian territory and for which fuis CanDeü has censured it severe'Iy on several occasiO'J.s. 15. But Israel seems ta defy the decisions and warnings of the Security Council and t0 ignore the principles of public morality and international decency. 16. Today, as in the past, it has come here to make excuses in arder to justi.fy its aggression, forgetting that this Council has already informed it in several resolutions that its allegations provided no reasonable grounds for its machinations. 17. Israel has come back with the same story of feuding, fishing and shots alleged ta have beeu fired from the Syrian bank on fishermen from the other bank. It has come back once more with a longer list of charges-but only after we had made our complaintsince it hoped thus ta mitigate any penalty it might have brought upon itself. The Israel authorities think they can penuade the Security Council ta pass judgement bath on their acts of aggression and on alleged barassment from our side, but these tactics will deceive no one. 18. Here, in aIl their brutality, are the acts comrnitted by Israel against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic OD. the night of 16 ta 17 March 1962. 1 1 1 1 19. At about 11 p.rn. Israel armed forces carried out a mortar attack on the Arab village of Nuqueib; at about midnight, forty Israel armouredlaunches opened fire with automatic weapons on the Syrian military post of Ed-Douga; at about 1.30 a.m. the Israel artillery at Bouria launched a violent bombardment of the city and village of Sqoufiye, which continued until 4.35 a.m. At about 5 a.m. Israel military airerait bombed the Syrian position at El-Al, Fiq and Zaki; and at 5.45 a.m. they bombed the area of EI-Hamma. 20. 1 need not add that thisflagrant actof aggression, carried out under cover of darkness, left several dead and wounded on the Syrian side. The aggressors know better than we do how much this treacherous act of aggression cast t'hem. 21. During this unjustifiable assault the Israe1forces used various types of arms, attacking by land, air and sea. The aggression was carefully prepared nearly a fortnight in advance. Acts of provocation took place every day; armoured launches advanced to within 80 or 100 metres from the eastern shor.e of Lake Tiberias and kept up an unusually intense bombardment on the l two days before the aggression, and particularly to- ._ ward, noon on the day of the attack. 23. On that day the Israelis did everything possible to provoke our forces iota giving battie. for which . tbeir forces were prepared. In despair. they decided te attack, because the Syrian forces remained on the defensive. The purpose of the Israelis was to occupy the whole eastern shore with troops on a war footing, covered by more tban forty tanks. 24. This attack by Israel ia an act of war for which there was no justification, carried out under caver of darkness and the protection ofthe Armisttce Agreement. Article l, paragraph 2, ofthatAgreementreads: "No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea or air-of eitber Party 13hall be undertaken, planned or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other •••". Articles lU and V of this Agreement are still more eloquent on the matter. 25. The Israel authorities have boasted of their "exploits" as if they were glorious actions, and statements have been publisbed, bath in their Press and in the foreign Press, describing this shameful and perfidious act, which stands condemned by the most elementary laws of war, as an act of valour. For even in war tbere is law and morality, which require eacb side at least ta respect an armistice agreement and not to take up arma again unless that agreement bas been denounced. 26. With misplaced pride, Israel has described its aggression in the most inappropriate terms; sorne of its communiqués, for instance, refer ta "punitive" action. 1 prefer not ta enter into a controversy about terms which deserve only ridicule. 27. But, although 1 completely deny IsraePs charges against Syria in its various notes ta the President of the 8ecurity Council, 1 may say that even if tbese charges were proved, they would in no way justify the aggression committed on the night of 16 ta 17 March 1962. Israel bad no right ta take the law into its own hands if, as ft claims, it was provoked. The terms of the Armistice Agreement make this quite clear. 28. Moreover. even if Israel did not or would not understand these terme, the successive decisions of the Seeurity Couneil had brought them ta its attention on more than one occasion-aiter its air attack on the Syrian frontier in April 1951,aftertheQibya massacre in October 1953 and, in February 1955,afteran attack on Egyptian troops in the Gaza strip. A Uttle later, on 12 Oecember 1955, an act of barbarous aggression -this is the least 1 can say-was committed on the Syrian-Israel demarcation line along the whole eastern shore of Lake Tiberias. 30. This is what the United states representative said: 30. a "My Government has repeatedly made its position clear in this Council. We oppose any poliey of reprisaI or retaliation." [692nd meeting, para. 8.] 31. 31. The United Kingdom representative said: "When the Seeurity Council in 1953 considered the situation on the Israel-Jordan frontier after the Qibya incident, it most clearly rejeeted the thesis that retaliatory action was justified." [695th meeting, para. 11.] 32. 32. The representative of France said: "The Israel representative has tried ta justify this attack by relating it to the situation which has prevailed in that region for several months and to represent it to us as a legitimate retaliaticn for the many provocations for which he claims Egypt is responsible•••• But even if that situation is as Mr. Eban has described it to us, nothing in the facts he related could serve as an excuse, and stilliess as a justification, for the act of which the Israel authorities are guilty." [Ibid., para. 21.] 33. les agressions vous son vengeance, 33. If 1 were to quote from aIl the statements made by members of the Couneil about the acts of aggression committed by Israel at the time of the attack on Bteiha, you would be still more enlightened. The entire Security Couneil condemned measures of revenge, even when there had been provocation. 34. vention men 1955. 34. Allowme to read part of a statement made by the representative of the United States when the criminal attack on Bteiha was considered in Deeember 1955. This is what Mr. Lodge said: "We have repeatedly said. in the past that no Government has the right to take the law into its own bands. It is always deplorable for any Governm.ent deliberately and wilfully to pmn and carry out an attack against its neighbourin vioIationofits solemn international commitments. What makes these particular deliberations more serious is the fact that a Member of the United Nations, indeed, a Member created by the United Nations, should now be before this Council for tbe fourth oUence of this kind in two years. , li 111 ! "We have therefore had to'consider well.how best to impress upon that Government not only the fact that its actions ought to be condemned, but that the Council will be faced with having to consider other steps which should be taken il unfortunately another such offence is committed." [710th meeting, paras. 55-56.] J 1 35. And here is a passage from a statement by Sir Pierson Dixon, the United Kingdom representative: ' "Whatever may have been the provocation in this 35. sentant ~__oa~': or ., a re,ult of the P'" iudden" referred 5 "Such a retaliatory attack is bad enougb in itself. but it is aU the more heinous since it cornes as the latest in the series of deliberate retaliatory operations to which 1 have already referred and for which Israel already stands condemned by the Couneil and by world public opinion. My delegation has repeatedly stated in this Council, and the Council itself has formally declared in its resolutions, ±bat the whole principle of retaliation is wrong, morally and politically, but Israel has not heeded these injunctions. The time bas now come for Israel to understand that not only is this policy unworthy of it and morally reprehensible, but also that it is a mistaken policy, a policy ±bat does not pay. "If another attack of the same kind were to be launched, a still graver situation than now confronts us would arise. The Council might then well consider that oral injunctions, even of the most formaI kind, were not sufficient ta meet the circumstarrces of the case. Therefore, the draft resolution submitted by the French, Ut:.ited Kingdom and United States delegations [S/3530 and Corr.ll contains a warning that if the Government of Israel fails to comply with its obligations in the future, the Council will have ta consider what further measures are required under the Charter to maintain or restore the peace. 1 shall not elaborate on what might have to be done, since it is my hope and expectation that the Government of Israel will see to it that that situation does not arise." [Ibid., paras. 35-37.] 36. The representative of the Soviet Union was no less explicit. He said: "This is not the first time that Israel has attempted ta justify its utterly unjustifiable attacks by claiming the right of retaliation. However, the Security Conncil, in its resolutions of 24 November 1953 (8/3139/ Rev.2] and 29 March 1955 (S/33781, expressed the strongest censure of Israel's actions againstJordan in the region of Qibya and against Egypt in the region of Gaza, actions which Israel attempted to justify by c1aiming the right of retaliation precisely as it is now doing in connexion with the incident in the Lake Tiberias area. That the Security COUDcil on those occasions adopted resolutions censuring Israel for its actions ought to have been a serious warning to Israel and it was to be expected that Israel wouid take those resolutions into account. Unfortunately, the incident in the Lake Tiberias area testifies to the contrary. "It is self-evident that Israel's c1aims that it was exercising the right of retaliation cannat possibly justify such attacks as that whicb occurred in the 37. There are duly constituted bodies, such as the Mixed Armistice COmmissions and the Security Council, which should he informed of frontier incidents, and the exercise of a nright of revengen cannot be excused, whatever aggression may he called. 38. Disputes about fishing rights and the clashes to which they lead are daily events which Israel engineers in preparation for a later attack, and, as it believes, in order ta justify or excuse such an attack. Tüda)' it is said that these events were the reason for this atrocious act of aggression, just as has been said in the past and will be repeated in the future. These acts of aggression by Israel, which violate aU morality, are the result of a concerted plan which it has coldly prepared and carried out and will repeat whenever it has an unjustifiable scheme to pùt into effect. 39. When was Israel planning this time? Certainly an illegal action which is unjustandcontraryto established order and which could not be justified by law or by the institutions responsiOle for international security. Israel was planning nothing more or less than to occupY the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias. 40. These continuaI attacks byIsl'aelforces on Syrian territory are not the resuIt of a dispute about fishing rights in the waters of Lake Tiberias, as Is always claimed; from time to Ume, of course, there are difficulties and friction, but these always arise from Israel's refusaI to recognize the Syrians' right ta Hsh in the lake, as laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 7 March 1923,.Y or even to cross the 10-metre strip peacefully to draw water. Thus Israel always begins the fighting and our coastal forces simply reply. ; ,; lil 1; : ~! i 41. This is clear from the report addressed to the Secretary-General on 15 December 1955 by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization concerning the Lake Tiberias incident on the night of Il and 12 December 1955.Y This document also shows how rnany times Israel has alleged-and here 1 am using the words of the report itself-that it was attacked on Lake Tiberias, althougb in none of these cases di~ the Israel delegation ask the Mixed Armistice Commission to bold an emergency meeting, nor did it request an investigation or report that any Israelis hac.l been killed or wounded. No, this question of fishing is only a pretext, and in any case it is no jUstification for these repeated acts of aggression. i j l i i 11 1 i 42. We know the real reason better than aoyone else. It ia implied in" ~ very definition of Israel as aState whose frontiel lould exten.rl from the NUe to the ï ~ y League of Nations. Treaty Series. voL XXIl, 1924, No. 565. 44. And now, what should 1 Rsk the Couneil to do? What cau 1 ask after the repeated aets of aggression by Israel, for which it has beeu condemned on each ocoasion? What can 1 ask after the solemn and emphatic warnings which members ofthe Securi.;Y CouncU have given Israel, saying that nothing coulc ';lSt1fy its repeated aets of aggression? Are they Dot tired of seeing Israel continually returning in the same circumstances, using the same arguments and being condemned for the same reasons? 1 must say frankly that we bave had enough; our patience is exhausted, and the tension which Israel has always maintained in this part of the world has now reached its climax. ~1, ~ ] t j i 45. Neither Syria nor any other Arab country can ever tolerate this policy of expansion or the aggre8sive means which Israel uses to achieve it. 46. When the United Nations decided to give Israel legal existênce, the Arab countries disputed Israel's right to such an existence and, at the same time, expressed their apprehension at having as neighbours men from the four corners ofthe earth, with no homogeneity, who had come ta form a fictitious State at the expense of the legitimate owners of the land over which the new State wished to exercise sovereignty. At the time the United Nations, with the best intentions, brought together men most of whom had not been assimilated into any State. Perhaps the General Assembly was moved by pity for the Hitlerite massacres, and this may also have encoUI'ab"ed the idea that this State could be a peaceful State with no ambition except to live in tranquillity without disturbing anyone. 47. What do you think today, after aU that has happened since the day when the State ofIsrael was born, and particuiarly since the day it was admitted to the United Nations? 48. Article 6 of the United Nations Charter reads: rrA Member of the Un~ted Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. rr 49. Israel is constantly violating the Principles of the Charter by its persistent acts of aggression, which threaten international peace and security. It has already been condemned by the Council several times, but apparently without any effect. 50. Among the documents of. the Security Conncil are the official records of the debate on the acts of aggression against Syria committed on the night of 11 to 12 December 1955 in the area along the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias. Members of the Council informed Israel in their speeches that any further act of aggressîon might lead to serious measures 51. Gentlemen, you must be consistent, for most of the recent warnings have come from representatives of the great Powers which are permanent members of the Security CanDeil. 52. Binee we are convinced that we are in the right, and ainee we have full confidence in your justice, we ask you once again ta cOfiJemn Israel for the act of aggression which it committed on the night of 16 ta 17 March 1962 by sending armed forces into Syrian territory ta kill and loot, in spite of the existence of an armistice agreement. 53. This condemnation must be severe and rigorous and in keeping with the warnings you have addressed ta Israel in the past, not a simple condemnation which will not prevent it from beginning again in future. Only then, perhaps, will Israel understand that there is an authority, the authority of the Council, and an international conscience which disapproves of its crimes. 54. In conclusion, 1 should like ta say that it is not fear which has led us ta submit our complaint. The consequences of this aggression have shown clearly that we can defend ourselves. But we have an unfailing respect for international institutions, particularly the Security Council. May your decision show clearly that we were not wrong ta act in this way, which is the only way in which security andpeacecan be maintained. 55. In my letter of 20 March 1962 1 promised ta submit an explanatory memorandum before the meeting of the Security Council. 1 ask members of the Council to accept this statement instead. , 56. Mr. caMAY (Israel); May 1 first thank you, Mr. President, and the Council for acceding ta the request of my Government ta be permitted ta participate in these proceedings, and for inviting me to be seated at the Council table. 57. The statement we have justheardfromtherepre.. sentative of Syria pretends that on the night of 16 ta 17 March 1962, the Israel armed forces, suddenlyand for no reason at aU, started firing at positions and villages east of Lake Tiberias. This picture will, 1 feel sure, be quite unconvincing to members of the Council. No responsible Government would risk the lives of its soldiers and the good regard of its friends unless it had the roost compelling reasons for doing so. Those reasons derive from the fundamental and inescapable dutY of a Government ta protect its territory and its citizens against armed attack-in this case, attack by the armed forces of Syria. In arder to explain the circumstances of the Israel action, as weil as ta support the two complaints my Government has submitted ta the Council, 1 shall have ta clarify bath the local background ta the incident in the Lake Tiberias area, and the general context in which they l 59. It must he emphasized that the lake in its entirety torms part of Israel territory. Syrian territory nt no point touches, or evel' did touch, the shore of Lake Tiberias. In spite of this, Sy1'1nll al'rned forces have constantly tried to establish a de facto control ovel' the north-easter. corner of the lake. A series of fortified Syrian military positions \Vere constructed on the slopes overlooking the shor~ and the adjacent waters. The topographical advalltng'e is here in favour of Syria, siuce the shore and the water, which is 700 feet below sea level, are dominated by the high ground on the Syrian side, This advantage was consistently exploited by the Syrians ta prevent any access from the Israel side ta the 10-metre strip of Israel territory along the shore, to Hre UpOIl and harass Israel Hshing boats, to attaek the Israel police boats carrying out routine patrols on the lake or escorting our fishing bonts, and togive coverto Syrian fishing boats illegally trespassing on the lake in this sector. That his standing aggression was a matter of deliberate poliey was confirmed by Syrian army orders, captured in the Israel action of 12 December 1955 and subsequently plaeed before the Security Council. Aceording to these orders, the surface of the iake up te 250 metres from the shore was to be regnrded as "Syrian territorial waters" and fire was to be opened immediately ou Israel patrol bonts .vhic.h might venture into this zone. In other words, behind the persistent Syrian attacks and interference with normal Israel activities lay a design virtually to annex this part of the shore-Hne and the waters, and 50 alter by force the terd,torial status quo whereby, as 1 have pointed out, Syria had no nccess to the lake at any point. 1 1j J 60, Practically from the beginning of the armistice period, the Mixed Armistice Commission was called upon to deal with these Syrian violations in the northeastern corner of Lake Tiberias. As eady as 2C July 1950, the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Syria for violating the Armistice Agreement by opening CirC' from the shore of the lake near El-Koursi, killing one Israeli and wounding another, Further incidents occurred repeatedly, and considerable tension was built up, particularly in the period 1954- 1955. Several Mixed Armistice Commissiondecisions at this time confirmed unequivocally that the Syrians had no right of access to the lake and no right to interfere with Israel activities on it. Amongst these decisions, reference might be made to th08e of 15 March and 29 July 1954. The former decision condemned Syria for opening heavy automatic tire on four Israel Hshing bonts on the lake, and stated: "Any crossing from Syria into the 10-metre strip on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias ... is a violation of article IV, paragraph 3, [of the General Armistice Agreement]'t,.'!! It was made plain that such violation included crossings by Syrian civilïans in order to fish in the lake-and 1 can state categorically that no Ylbld., Teuth Year. Supplement for IlInllllry. February and March 1955, doclUnent 5(3343. para. 44. 61. According to the resolution of 29 July 1954-and here 1 think it would be helpful if 1 quoted the text of t1mt decision: "The Mixed Armistice Commission "1. Finds that on 15 March 1954 the Syrian Army positions near Kufr Aqab directed Cire with antitank guns, machine-guns and rifles at two Israel police boats escorting' Israel fishingboats, wounding three Israel policemen, one of them very seriously. and causing severe damuge ta one police boat; "2. Decides that the above warlike act by the Syrian Army constitutes another serious violation of article l, paragrnphs 1 and 2. and al'ticle III. paragraphs 2 and 3, ofthe GeneralArmistice Agreement by Syriu; "3. Notes with great anxiety therepetitionofthese serious incidents on the eastern shore of Lake Tibel'ias; "4. Further notes with great concern the repeated violations by Syria of the General ArmisticeAgreement and caUs upon the Syrian authorities to implement fully a11 their obligations under the General Armistice A~reement and specificallv the Mixed Armistice Commission's resolution that called upon them ta eusure no Interference whatsoever within Israel territory." 62. 1 would ask you, Ml'. President and members of the Counci!. whether thllt kind ofdecision, solemnly taken by the Armistice Commission. accords very weIl with the high moralistic tone we have heard today from the representative of Syria. 63. The situation in that sector continued to deteriorate. By the end of 1955, there had been a great number of Syl'ian attacks, in which three Israel fishermen and two Israel policemen had beau abot ta death, one fisherman and eleven policemen wounded, and four fishermen kidnapped-apart from much destruction of and damage ta police boats, Hahing boats and Hshing equipment. It was in the light of this situation. in which the United Nations armistice machinery had failed to put a stop to the trouble, that Israel armed forces took -action on 12 December 1955 against certain Syrian gun positions nenr the shore, from which the attacks were being made. This action led ta the Secul'ity Counci! debate of December 1955-January 1956-to which reference has already been made-and which resulted in the adoptilin of the resolution of 19 January 1956.§J 1 regret ta saythat my Government regarded that resolution as one-sided and unIair. While it condernned Israel's defensive action, itfailed to condemn or even disapprove of the murderous Syrian aets of aggression and provocation whiclhad led up ta it. The resolution, however, noted. at least in its preamble, "that according to the reports of the ~ Ihld.. E1eventh Yen, Supplement for January, February and March 64. In explaining the resolution, Ml'. Alphand, the French representative, stated in the debate which took place priaI' ta the adoption of that resolution: "•.• the Council, whose function is ta preserve the peace rather than ta dispense justice or distribute a posteriori condemnation and blame, would be failing in its duty if it did not try ta find ways of making it mcre difficult for such incidents ta l'ecur••••It cannot, however, if the parties-Syria as weIl as Israel-continue ta regardthe demarcation line as a barrier which only the adversary is forbidden ta cross but which in no \Vay hampers any incursions the)' themselves may wish to make into the territory of others. "..• Syrian troops commit a breach of the armistice when they fire onboats sailing on Lake Tiberias; a fortiori, the Syrian command is in the wrong in establishing unilaterally, for Syria's benefit, a zone of territorial waters on the east bank: of Lake Tiberias, the whole area of which is on the Israel side of the demarcation line." [710th meeting, paras. 75 and 77.1 65. The lack of balance ln the resolution of 1956, and its relative disregard ofSyrian violations, served, as might have been expected, onlyto encourage further Syrian aggression, instead of stabilizing this sector of the frontier. Syria continued ta violate the Armistice Agreement, exactly as it had done before. In the period following the adoption of the resolution of 19 January 1956, Israel submitted complaints ta the Mixed Armistice Commission regarding fifty-six cases of firing from Syrian positions at Israel fishing or police boats; seventy-two other cases of interference with Israel fishing activities; and 231 cases of illegal Syrian fishing on the lake. The number of further casualties suffered during this period by our fishermen and our policemen were five killed and nine wounded. 66, However, for two years or more, until recently, the situation around the north-eastern shore of Lake Tiberias appeared to remain fairly quiet, and Israel fishing boats and police patrols carried on their normal activities on the lake, without serious molestation. The nare-up this month on Lake Tiberias therefore came, in General von Horn's vivid phrase, "like sudden thunder on the Bea of GaUlee". A few monthe after Syria bad resumed independent existencè, that is, about the beginning of fuis year, there was disquieting evidence that the Syrian Government was embarking upon a more aggressive policy against Israel-presumably under the influence of its internaI situation, and the external conilicts in which it was involved. May 1 say hel'e that tensions with-in and between Al'ab countries do not concern Israel unless these tensions discharge themselves in aggressivenessagaînst Israel. Whatever the underlying reasons, it is a fact that during the last two or three months tension has been heightened by a stream of inflammatory antir 67. At the same time, shooting by Syrian armed forces against Israel villages and civilians became more frequent. In my letter to the President of the Security CouDcil of 19 March 1962 [8/50931, anumber of such attacks are listed, particularly in the area of Dardara, in the Huleh Valley to the north of Lake Tiberias. This list also includes an incident on 25 February, where machine-gun fire was opened on Israel îishermen on Lake Tiberias near the Syrian village of EI-Koursi. This was followed by the three more serious attacks of 8, 15 and 16 March, which are dealt \Vith in the report by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, with which 1 shall now deal in more detail, 68. 1 have put before the Council the background of the Lake Tiberias problem, sa that the latest chapter in it may be seen in its proper perspective, and not as an isolated incident or episode, This background will help ta clarify the nature of the recent incidents, and ta explain why the Government of Israelhas taken such a grave view of the deliberate and calculated revival of this particular form of attack upon us, in this particular locality. J i 69. Coming now ta General vonHorn's report [S/5102 and Add.1], the Council will bave noted that he does Dot definitely find that in the incidents of 8, 15 and 16 March, fire was opened in the first instance by the Syrian land positions on Israel lake craft. This is a formally correct position for him to take, since no United Nations observers were actually on the spot at those times. But no impartial persan reading the report could seriously doubt wbat actually happened. It is apparent from a number of factors; 1 shall refer to five of them, i 70. First, as the report states·, "The best fishing grounds are in the northern part, in the vicinity of the mouth of the Jordan. In these waters, Israel fishing hoats and nets are at a shortdistance from Syrian territory," [S/5102, para, 13.] It follows that the Israel authorities would have hot the slightest reason to provoke trouble in this locality but, on the oontrary, would be most interested in maintaining peacefuI conditions for our fishing activities in such a dangerously exposed spot. U" 71. Secondly, our police patrol boats, wbich figure in these reports, consist of two second-hand open an ing-craft, each carrying five or six policemen, with small arms. These boats are at such a hopeless disadvantage that it would be suicidaI for them to approach close to and below the fortifie.:! Syrian gun 1 positions in broad daylight and open fire on them, as alleged in the rather ridiculous Syrian version of the events. L 1 cl 72, The report describes the damage done to the patrol boat on 8 March as:"..• numerous indentations 73. Members of the COUDoil will aIse have taken note of the description given in paragraph 17 of the report; of the attack on 15 March. The United Nations observer near the mouth of the River Jordan says he saw two patrel boats and a fishing boat moving over the lake. When one of the patrol craft was about 1,400 metres from the shore-and 1 repeat, 1,400 me.. tres-the observer saw a member of the crew point in the direction of Moussadiye, then drop behind the armour plate of the crait and a few seconds later the observer heart a single shot, closely followed by what he calls a IIfire-fightll• The Syrians appeared ta be using anti-tank guns and machine-guns. The Israel patrol craft moved westward a considerable distance and then the firing ceased. 74. Now, what is the Syrian version of this incident? ln General'von Horn's report it is given as follows: Il••• two Israel armoured lighters came ta within 80 metres of the Syrian post of El-Hassel and opened automatic fire on itll [ibid.,para.15]. Ineed not stress how improbable this story is, especially after what had happened to another Israel patrol boat only a week earlier. At any rate, this Syrian story was completely belied by what the United Nations observer reported, as quoted above. 75. An equally far-fetched story is the Syrian account of the third attack, on 16 March 1962. We are solemnly asked to believe that Israel armoure~ lighters opened fire on the Syrian positions at EI-Koursi ata distance of 100 metres from the shore.Icanassure the Council that nothing of the sort ever happened. 76. Thirdly, it is interesting to note what the reactions of the parties are after these incidents. The Chief of Staff reports that following the attack of 8 March, the lIimportance attached to this incident by the Israel authorities was made clear at once" [ibid., para. 10]. He then relates thatthe senior Israel delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission requested an urgent meeting with its Chairman; that he (General von Horn) himself was asked to make clear ta Damascus that "Israel regarded the attack on the police boat as very grave and wished the Syrian Government to realïze that by such actions they were playing with fire" [ibid., para. 12}; and that the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations had been instructed ta express concern to the Secretary-General in New York. All thisisfromthe report. There is no sigu that any such concern was expressed by the Syrian authorities. The reason ia simple: it was Israel which was being attacked and Syria which was doing the attacking. "The Chairman was also instructed ta add that 1 considered it important to take measures to avoid further incidents. 1 referred in particular to the issuance of orders to local commanders strictly to·observe the cease-fire. ft [Ibid.J The report adds that there was another matter which the Chairman, with General von Horn's full approval, taok up in Damascus, and that was that at least one additional United Nations observation post would be desirable on the Syrian side. 1 would suggestto members of the Council that the United Nationsauthorities on the spot had a clear idea from which side the trouble was comitig, and acted accordingly. 78. Fifthly, when the cease-fire of 17 March had been in operation only three days, Syrian forces deliberately broke it with yet another attack of the same kind on one of the police patrol boats, damaging it and wounding two members of the crew. This attack is described in our letter to the Security Council of 21 March 1962 (8/5098]. 79. To sum up this aspect of the matter, the evidence canclusively supports the Israel contention that our vessels had been subjected to wanton attack from the Syrian gun positions close to Lake Tiberias.As 1 have aIready pointed out, this was a revival of a. pattern of Syrian assault wbich had provoked much tension and bloodshed in past years, and for which Syria had a number of times been conden:ined by the Mixed Armistice Commission. This time there was one significant difference. Never before had the Syrian forces used against Israel craft on the lake weapons of such a powerful calibre as the 82 mm. re<::oilless armour-piercing guns, which blew gaping hales in the side of our police launch on·8 March and which were used again on 15 and 16 March. The type of gun can be exactly identified, because one of the unexplcded shells was shown by our representative ta the United Nations observer. The presence of such weapons withiu fut:! defensive area is, in any event, a violation of annex IV to the General Armistice Agreement. 80. 1 wish ta stress that the use of such types of weapons and the identical nature of the four attacks on 8, 15, 16 and 20 March, from different points, establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that they were carried out on arders from above, as a matter of deliberate palicy, and cannot possibly be attributed ta casual and local shooting by irresponsible soldiers or civilians. 1 81. The references to the Israel action of 16 and Ü 17 March, to which 1 now come, are reflected in the _~_ "port in a somewhat confusing manner. The Syrian 15 82. As has been pointed out already in my letter ta the President of the Security Counoil of 19 March [S/5093], the action ofl7 March \Vas taken in discharge of the Israel Government's responsibilities for the protection 0of the life and property of Israel citizens and the territorial integrity of the State, and in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence. 83. The second Israel complaint against Syria, submitted ta the 8ecurity Counci! in my letter of 21 March rS/5098], reads as follows: "Complaint by Israel of threats against its territorial integrity and political indepGndence made by the official spokesmen of the Syrian Government, manifesting aggressive intentions against Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter." Two of these threats are quoted in my letter of 19 March 1962 and 1 need not repeat them. Another typical declaration is that which was broadcast from Damascus Radio on 15 March, that is, immediately preceding the renewed attacks on the lake of 16 and 17 March, which reads in part: "The Syrian Army bas been a sword drawn against Israel ••• the Syrian Army is the lethal weapon and the power of a people who are determined to exterminate the State of bandits ...". 84. These statements, 1 submit, are violations of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, and also a threat ta the peace in terms of Article 39. 1 would draw attention also ta the Security Council resolution of 27 May 1960.21 in wbich the Security Council appealed to aIl Member Governments "to refrain from the use or threats of force in their international relations; to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independencej and ta refrain fromanyactionwhichmight increase tensions". jlf Ibid.. Fifteenth Year. Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4328. 85. The inflammatory Syrian declarations are, regrettably. aggravating tensions on the Israel-Syrian border and making more difficult the task of keeping it under control. My Government, therefore, felt obliged to submit a formaI complaint on this score to the CauDeil, in the expectation that the Couneil will aet to put a stop to such open incitement to war. 86. The CaUDeil ls discussing primarilythe incidents which have occurred on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias, and 1 am loth to widen the range of this debate. At the sarne time, the fact cannot be ignored that these local events are deeply imbedded in a more general problem. In trying to assess the relative weight which should he given to the Syrian attacks upon Israel and the Israeldefensive action of 17 March it may he difficult for the representatives of other States to grasp the abnormal political and security conditions under which we in Israel live our lives, build up our nationhood and promote the progress of our small country. Yet 1 wouId, inallhurnility, submit that those who consider our actions must attempt to see thern in their context of reality. 1 87. As the records of this Council dramatically relate, Israel was invaded in the moment of its hirth by the armies of the surrounding Arah States, including that of Syria. Those hostilities were concluded by the signing of four armistice agreements, the last of which was that with Syria signed on 20 July 1949. The text of the document itself makes it plain that the armistice is not an endinitselfbut was concluded, as the preamble states, "in order to facilitate tbe transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine". Similarly, article 1 twice repeats the objective of promoting the return of permanent peace. Similar provisions occur in the other armistice agreements, and the sarne principle was endorsed by this Council in its resolution of 11 August 194911 in which the armistice agreements were confirmed-, and in a nurnber of General Assembly resolutions which called for a negotiated settlement of aU outstanding differences. J " n'étaient 88. In 1949 it _was expected that peace would quickly be restored, and the armistice arrangements were designed to bridge over a brief and transitory period. They were certainly not conceived as setting up a system of relations hetween neighbouring States for an indefînite period of time•.Yet nearly thirteenyears have gone by since then, without peace having been attained but with far-reaching changes in the realities of life in the area. The Arab countries, however, have continued to behave as if there were still astate of war between them and Israel, in spite of the fiat rejection by the Security Council itself of any such doctrine of beUigerency, AlI our ,land horders are L 1 . y See Report of !:he Securlty Councii to the General Assembly. Offi_ curt Records of the General Assernbly, Flfth SeSSion, Suplement No:2"; pp, 17_19, 89. In this brittle situation, which is one of undeclared wax fought by weapons ofpoliticalandeconomic means, by threats and incitement, and sometimes by the use of armed force against our border areas and population, Israel is at least entitled to insist on the freedom from molestation which is guaranteed to it by the armistice agreements. Vlhen those agreements become the cover for harassing our population and impeding the development of our country, the agreements themselves may be fatally undermined, as did in fact happen with one of them. 90. Since 1948 the history of the Israel-Syrian General Arm~stice Agreement and of the 22-mile border ta wbich it applies bas been one of recurrent crisis and conflict, as the Council weIl knows. Israel and its citizens bave not in fact enjoyed the right to security and freedom from fear of attack which is expressly promised to them by th€ text of the Armistice Agreement, the provisions of which, in this regard, do no more than spell out the obligations of the United Nations Charter itself. Yet, unless those provisions are rigidly enforced, this Armistice Agreement my be seriously prejudiced. 91. 1 have sketched these wider cpnsiderations in order ta make it clear whySyrianarmisticeviolations in the Lake Tiberias area cannot be dismissed by us, and should also not be dismissed by the Conncil, as being of a minor or purely local character. Quite the contrary is the case. When Syrian guns are mounted right on our border, within a few yards from the edge of Lake Tiberias, and fire acroOlS that border to km or maim our citizens, it is a deadly serious matter. If the United Nations is unable ta secure Syrian respect for the armistice in tbis sector the Government of Israel is faced with a cruel dilemma. Either it must take steps to silence the guns which are firing inta our territory, or it mUl;lt surrender tbat part of the Israel shore and the Israel lake to Syrian control and acquiesce in our being driven away from it. Such a surrender is untbinkable for us. NoIsraelGovernment can abdicate or renounce its basic duty to protect its borders and its people, and 1 cannot believe that auy other responsible Government would, in similar circumstances, take up any different position. f}j Bee Official R~ords of the Securit)' COuncil, Sixth Year, 558th meeting, para. S. 93. rappeler et d'armistice; insiste également tera appropriées soumises 93. 1 am authorized by my Government ta reiterate its declared policy of adherence to the principles and obligations of the Charter and the Armistice Agreement. But at the same time my Government must insist that Syria should similarly abide by its obligations. Any resolution adopted by the Council shouldcontain appropriate provisions concerning the two Israel complaints which have been submitted to the Council. 94. le application préoccupation que prennent plus de 94. We are hopeful now that the arrangements which have beeu secured by General von Horn will help 'to preserve the strict observance of the armistice provisions. The sole interest of my Governmet in this context is ta ensure that the threats against US and the attacks upon us should cease; and if that were to happen, there need he no further trouble at all in the Lake Tiberias area. 95. de

We have now heard the positions of both Syrla and Israel about the hostilities in the middle oftMs month, and particularly the Israel attack on the night of 16 ta 17 March 1962. We have also received a report from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations· Truce Supervision Organization [8/5102 and Add.1] on what he describes as "these dangerous developments". In his report the Chief of 8taff tells us that there is an aftermath of tension and that the present ceasefire ia an uneasy one. He also reports on suggestions he has made both to Syria and to Israel, one of which is already being carried out, for strengthening the ability of the United Nations ta restore and maintain the peace. 'Isra~l de's et a avons de lance qu'il port, ont reste qu'il qui sation et ootion. 96. 1956 d'une présentant syrienne. incidents de Nous 96. This is the first time since January 1956 that th~ Security Council has had ta consider a rupture of the General Armistice Agreement of such magnitude on the Israel-Syrian frontier. lt would be tragic indeeri if the border hostilities which preceded the shattering of the peace in the Middle East in 1956 should again he repeated; We trust this is not the case. '7• But in the circumstances and in the light of the _f:t that the coun:, :::::thad the benelit of (;rst- II, 97. tenu l, i1 1 98. 1 think we owe a debt of thanks ta the Chief of Staff for his prompt action in arranging a cessation of hostilities on the night of 16 ta 17 March, and for putting forward suggestions which will help avoid a recurrence of such problems in the future. An we believe that this Council must do everything in its power ta strengthen his position. 99. In the meantime, of course, while the Chief of Staff is returning ta New York, and while the Council is considering what action it might wish ta take, we would urge both Israel and Syria to scrupulously maintain the cease-fire. We also IJ.rge that neither party take any steps which might infiame or aggravate the tensions which evidently are already acute. 100. It is apparent from even a preliminary study of the report of the Chief of Staff that there has been both provocation and retaliation. Bath of these are contrary to the letter and spirit ofthe General Armistice Agreement and cannot be condoned. The report of the Chief of staff is not conclusive on the origin of the events leading up ta theassaultonSyrian positions north of Nuqueib. We do note, however, that in the first of these incidents, on 8 March 1962, the Chief of Staff comments that the statements of Syrian witnesses did not explain the damage done to the Israel police boat. ,, 1l 101. But whatever the facts in this connexion, they do not in our view justify the l!:lrael reversion to any policy of retaliatory raids, which, by the way, Israel representatives evidently foreshadm~'ed on 8 March and which were carried out ten days later. This policy contributed ta the rapid rise of tensions in the Middle East during 1955 and 1956 and it can no more be countenanced today than it was then. Extensive United Nations machinery, including the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the United Nations military observers, and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, and measures to separate armed forces through demilitarized and clefence z~:mes were established by agreement amoug the parties rnany years ago. If the United Nations peace-keeping machinery has not always beeu adequate to' prevent such difficulties, the answer lies in improving the machinery and cooperating with it. It does Dot lie in raising the scale of military action in violation of the Armistice Agreement. 102. In the present encounter a number of lives have been lost, bath among Syrian and Israelcitizens. We deeply regret this catastrophe and extend our sympathy ta the families of those who have suffered. The loss of life is ail the more tragic because this sacrifice is more likely to have set baok the cause of peace than ta have advanced it. 105. The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL:lhavenoted the suggestion of the representative of the United States that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization be brought here for consultation and, of course, 1 will arrange for General von Horn ta come for a few days, if the Council considers it useful and wishes it. 106. 1 must admit that 1 say this with mixed feelings for, in a situation of serious tension such as that now prevailing in the Tiberias area, there are strong and obvions reasons why 1 would like to have the Chief of Staff on the job out there. Moreover, 1 would want the Couneil to be aware that General von Horn, in his report, h,.cl made available ta the Council ail of the information on the reeent Tiberias incidents which the United Nations military observers have been able to provide. 107. Therefore, it cannat be expected that General von Horn will be able to add much information to that already set forth in his report now before you. He could, of course, through being available here for consultation, more fully explain the measures that he has suggested for avoiding a repetition of the recent unfortunate episode.

1 thank the Secretary-General for his statement, and 1 shall now call on the next speaker on my list, the .. epresentative of the United Arab Republic. 109. Ml'. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): 1 should like to sayat the outset that again my delegation wi.ll not object-this time ta the proposaI made by the representative of the United States to call General von Horn, if the Council sa decides. We take this position because we want ta have all the facts before the Council. We take this position because we are not afraid of facts. Our Syria.n friends welcome the facts. 110. We came to this meeting with a feeling of pain and a cold anger shared by aIl the Arab peoples because '.lf the aggression committed against a paxt of our homeland, the villages of Syria. This cold anger should be felt by aIl those who do not accept the pseudo-philosophy of punishment without cr:lme or those who do not allow or recognize that anyone has the right ta take the law into his own hands whenever he feels or thinks that he is strong enough or clever ,,; •, • '-,j f Hl. An of us around this table should Ieel this cold anger. But cold anger can wa1t, and we do Dot abject to ft cleiay uutH General von Horn arrives. 112. We do not propose to discuss the Syrian letter which is before us, nor wiU we discuss other statements before us at this Ume. We shaH not refer ta the report of General von Horn, which has been ruthlessly dissected in an attempt to excuse naked aggression. Eager ta have aU the facts before this Council, we wiU wait. We resist the ternptation to reply to sorne of the statements made. 113. 1 shoul,", like, however, to ask one question. When Syria is asked ta give assurances that it respects armistice agreements, 1 should like to ask about a statement that was made a long time aga, when it seemed possible that the aggression by Israel would be effective. That statement was: "The Armistice Agreement is gone beyond repair." This statement was made in 1956, when the thought that aggression would go unchecked prevailed. It was made by Ml'. David Ben-Gurion, a rather prominent citizen of Israel. 114. Ml'. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet SociaHst Republics) (translated from Russian): On the specifie question of the invitation ta General von Horn, 1 understand and share the doubts which have been expressed by the Secretary-General. 115. We already have, in fact, a report by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which-if we assume that it has not concealed anything from us-is based on the testimony of witnesses and gives a fairly detailed description of the essential events relating to the main questions of concern to us, which the 8ecurity Council has to evaluate. 116. We have sufficient factual material in what has already been presented to us-the existing documentation on the matter, the statements which have been made by the delegations of Syrin and Israel, and the remaining documentation concerning the background of the question. Therefore the delay in the consideration of the matter which would be entailed if it were decided ta invite General von Horn to visit New York would hardly be justified. 117. Nevertheless, in view of the attitude of the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic and the delegaUon of the United Arab Republic which has just been formally stated by the representative of the United Arab Republic, the Soviet delegation will not abject to General von Horn being invited, with a view 119. When we study the material submitted tous,and in the light of the statements which have been made here by the Syrian and Israel delegations and of the documentation hefore us, including the report issued as document 8/5102, wc can and must nt once mals sorne important deductions and comments which, in our view, may contribute to the CouncH's discussion of this question and may thus serve to outline the evnluation and appropriate decisions which we must make at the conclusion of our study and discussion of this subject. 120. In this case the factual side of the matter is the determinant, decisive one. The primary task of the CouncH is to analyse the facts-and not simply il. coliection of facts assembled haphazard, but the main, decisive facts, the most important ones. For if tilis analysis is carried out correctly, if a sufficiently objective picture is presented, we shaH be able to give it a correct political assessment and rench the requisite politica1 decisions which, under the United Nations Charter, are incumbent upon the CouncH. 121. In approaching the analysis of tllis factunl matarial, we have to note that the facts mentioned in the report, in the letters and in the statemeuts which we have heard here can be clearly divided into two categories, entirely different in nature. In the first cnteg'ory are the facts relatîng to the events of 16-17 March. In the second category are the facts relating to the events of aH the other days, from the beginning of March up to 16-17 March. 122. 1 must say that the uttempt made here to lump everything together and present a conglomeration of faets, large and small (those relating to the events of 16-17 Mareh, und those of aH the other days)-the attempt made in the statement by the representative of Israel, to which we listened very carefllllY-is unsound. That attempt is deliberately aimed at distracting the Council from the essential task of Il proper, objective investigation of the fncts and at inducing the Council to make an incorrect political assessment as a result of the distortion of the aatuai truth. 123, Why do we consider that there ia not only a quantitative but alsa Il qualitative difference, adiffercnce in principle, between the two categories of facts which 1 have just mentioned"? It isbecauseon the night of 16 to 17 March there took place an armed aggression, an armed incursion into Syrian territory by Israel armed forces. 124, 1 shall cite only strictly objective evidence. l ask you first to turn your attention to paragraph 22 of the report in document S/5102. In that paragraph is quoted a communiqué which was issued by the spokesman of the Israel Defence Forces and which stated: "In order to ensure normal activîtywithinlsrael's sovereign territory, our forces \Vere compelied to 125. This communiqué, which presumably will natbe repudiated by the representative of Israel, firmly establishes the following fnets: that the armed forces of Israel pelletrated iuta Syrian territory and iuta the demilitarized zone. and that they did so-this la very important-"before midnight". 16-17 Mareh. This la in1portal1t, because this admission contained in an official document from the Israel side is confirmed in the next paragraph of the report ta which 1 have refen·ed. Paragraph 23 (!ù in fact states: "At 0102 on 17 March there was a large volume of Syrian fire (machine-guns, heavy artillery), followed nt 0105 by Israel fire." 128". -if ws look at both statements together, it is quite obvious that the firing which is referred ta in the report as the "Syrian fire" \Vas opened aiter midnight llnd only in respanse to the armed action of the Israel forces which took place, as the spokesman of the Isra~l Defence Forces stated, "shortly before midnight", when the Israel forces assaulted the Syrian positions. We kuow that therecanbenonssault without firing, without the use of weapons and without employmellt of the appropriate means for overcoming the opponent. Aceording'ly, even on the basis of those two !acts alone and even if we take,as a source, simply the statement made by the spokesman of the Israel Defence Forces, we can say with certainty that the initiative in the attnck on the night of 16 to 17 Mareh \Vas taken by Israel, that the attack \Vas a large-scale one in eomparison \Vith aIl the other incidents, that it involved hostilities by a large number of units, and that it transcended in scope aU the remaining facts which 1 have referred to as faets of the second category and which 1 will assess later. 127. Thus, on the night of 16 ta 17 Mareh there took place armed aggression by Israel against Syrin, involving the illegal use of the demilitnrized zone from which the attack was launched. 128. That in itself \Vould be quite sufficient-and in this connexion 1 must fully support the statement made by the Syrian representative, as being entirely sound and well-founded-to warrant the demand, which he put forwarq, that the Government of Israel should be condemned f6r the new acts of aggression committed by it against Syria. But my investigation would be incomplete, even on a preliminary basis, if 1 did not mention the second eategory of facts. 129. The second category of facts involves a whole series of incidents, occurring in the sequence in which they are desc.ribed in the report. In order to save time, 1 shaH not recapitulate these episodes, especially as they have already been referred to here and the Council has had the opportunfty both of reading the report and of hearing the statement made by the Syrian representative. 130. What are these incidents? What are thesefacts? These faets are of course qufte different, in their nature, politienl significance and content, from the fact of the nrmed aggression, the incursion into the demilitarized zone and into Syrian territory which, 132. 1 do not wish nt present ta embark upon a detailed examination of each of tbose incidents or to establish or analyse, in any detail, the circumstances in which they took place; such an analysis would have no bearing on the main question, because, whether we take the view of one side or the other, a11 these facts, which are enumerated in the report and have been recounted here in the Council,are,quantitatively speaking, of a different arder. They are specific clashes occurring in specifie connexions. 132. approfondie pas dans aiderait effet, l'autre rapport caractère: culiers 133. FronUer incidents happen on any frontier, and such incidents have never yet provided grounds for armed aggression. This aggression has not yet, fortunately, turned into a full-scale conflict-but only because these activities were halted by the intervention and mediation of the United Nations. Strictly speaking, it is only because of this that, although the situation remains extrernely tense, the aggression committed by Israel against Syria has ta sorne extent, for the moment, be..en stopped. 133. et une n'a un a l'OrganIsation cette reste certain pable 134. 1 reserve the right ta revert ta the investigation of these cases, which are more in the nature of clashes in the frontier zone, and ta show that the stand which 1 have taken for the moment, as if both sides in the series of small-seale conflicts and collisions were in the same position, is designed merely to simplUy the exposition of the main problem before the Council. ln actual faet, there is enough in the report and in the factual material submitted to us, as weIl as in the evidence of witnesses, ta substantiate the version correct1y and honestly presented here, before the Counoii, in the Syrian delegation's statement. 134. de dents que de ment question le sommes nent ajouter représentant 135. On the basis of these data, we conclude thnt in these cases also-differing in nature from the largescale armed aggression which took place on the night of 16 to 17 March-the guilty party is not Syria, but Israel. But even if the Council were to come to a different conclusion with regard to any of these particular facts, thnt would in no wny invalidate the main assertion concerni.ng the evaluation of the basic , the principal fact-th. events of the night of 16 to 17 March. 135. mettent ments l'agression dans la Conseil propos ne nant la 136. je portant: israéliennes tement regarder prendre d'Israel de de nente. 137. n'a une le liennes ces 136. To finish dealing with tilis second category of facts, 1 \Visll ta stress a very important circumstallce -namely, that aIl these "excursions" by Israelarmed forces along Lake Tiberias have very clearly been provocative in character. A glance at the map of this region of Lake Tiberias suffices ta show that there l'las absolutely no practical, vital or otller need for the Israel armed forces ta parade in front of the posts of Syrian armed forces, keeping them in a state of constant tension. 137. If we add to this the faets wllich have been refuted by no one here, such as the victims of the incidents-a child, a young girl, and several farmers who feU victims to the fire opened from the lake by Israel armed forces operating in these launches and Canying out these obviously provocative raids-we 139. Such is the factual picture of the main events with which the Council has to deal. And here our thoughts turn. justifiably, to the background of the question. 140. If we look at the records of the United Nations, we see that a similar attack was made by the Israel regular army upon Syrian territory on 11 December 1955. The Security Council was obliged to deal with the matter, and it strongly condemned Israel's aggressive actions. A resolution adopted at the 7l5th meeting of the 8ecurity Council, on 19 January 1956,Ustates; IIThe Security Council ••• IICondemns the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel1s obligations under the Charter Il. 141. The Council \Vent on to express lIits grave concern at the failure of the Goverment ofIsrael ta comply with its obligations". Itcalled upon the Government of Israel to do sa inthe future, in default of which IIthe COUDcil will bave to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace ll • 142. It is important ta note that, even then, the chain of so-called IIlogicalll arguments used by the Israel delegation was as like as two peas to the method to which that delegation is now resorting. At that time also, the massive armed attack by the Israel regular army upon Syrian territory was explained onthe same grounds-namely, legitimate self-defence to protect the Israel population against incidents frpm which it had allegedly suffered as a result of the individual, minor border incidents that had occurred. The border incidents were not described objeetively at that time either, for on that occasion also the Israel delegation 'il Ibid.. Elevemh Year. Supplement for lanualY. February and Mardi 1956. docwnent S/3538. 144. The representative of Israel has attempted, here, to represent his country as the victim of aggression by the Arab States. Of course, it is possible to go very far in distorting history and the facts of the matter. But in this connexion we must point out that, in disregarding the numerous Security Counci! resolutions which condemned military action by Israel-not ouly against Syria in the Lake Tiberias area, but also against Jordan in the Qibya area and against Egypt in the Gaza area-Israel went so far that, as we know, in October 1956 it undertook, together with the United Kiugdom and France, an armed intervention against Egypt in which tens of thousands of Israel soldiers took part. 144. senter commise aller des peler du armée le la l'Egypte loin avec vention ont israéliens. 145. We know that Israel's participation in that tripartite aggression was strongly condemned by world opinion and by the United Nations, which resolutely protested against the Anglo-French-Israel intervention. 145. sion par nisation ment israélienne. 146. In any case it is quite inappropriate for the Israel representative ta represent his country, here, as the victirn of aggression. 146. en agression. 147. 1 would also recall that on 1 February 1960 regular Israel armed forces, supported by heavy armoured vehicles, moved into the demilitarized zone and attacked the village of Khirbat at Tawafiq. That armed attack was condemned in a resolution!Q/adopted at the 79th emergency meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission on 16 February 1960. It is not the Soviet delegation which asserts this, but the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. 147. 1960, puyées zone al dans -extraordinaire israélo-syrienne, nation tique 148. On 17 March and then on 20 Apri!1961 Israel, in violation of paragraph 2 of article 1 of the Israel- Jordan Armistice Agreement which prohibits the use of armed forces by one party as a threat against the people or armed forces of the other, introducedheavy armament into the area of the City of Jerusalem for that purpose. That step was taken by Israel despite the decision of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission of 20 March 1961, which condemned that breach by Israel of the Armistice Agreement and warned it to refrain from a repetition of such breaches. That step was taken despite the Security Counci! resolution of 11 April 1961,!Y which endorsed the above-mentioned decision of the Mixed Armistice 149. violant Convention terdit armée l'autre le Israel du jordane-israélienne par en allait 11 1960. document 1!lJlbJd•• Fifteenth Year. Supplement for Januarv. February and Marcb 1960. document 5/4270. annex IV. p. 4.7. Wlbid.. Sixteenth Year, Supplement for April. May and June 1961, dOcument 5/4788. 150. 1 consider that, befare it adopts the forma! decision which it will presumably take as a result of discussion of the question befare it, the Security Couneil should address a quite unequivocal warning and admonition ta the GovernrnentofIsraelconcerning the utter inadmissïbility of actions like those which took place on 16-17 March in the Lake Tiherias area. The Couneil should not ouly caU upon tqe Government of Israel ta take aH necessary steps ta ensure that sllcb action is not permitted in the future, but, as mentioned also in the Security Council resolution of 19 January 1956, should consider what further specüïc measures are required at the present stage in arder ta make Israel comply with its obligations under the Charter and under the Armistice Agreement. 151. 1 think thatan important practicaltask, emerging from our discussions and our 'statements of today on this question, is ta warn the Government of Israel that continuation of that kind of action, and of the policy reflected in the acts of armed aggressioncommitted on the night of 16 ta 17 March, is condemned by the Council, and that the Council calls for the cessation of that kind of activity. 152. AccordinglyI cannat share the opinion, expressed here by the United States representative, that the COUDcil should address that warnîng ta bath parties, both ta the aggressor and ta the victim of the aggression, bath ta the Government of Israel, whîch openly made an incursion into Syrian territory, and to the Government of Syria equally, a1though the latter made no incursion iuto the territory of Israel. 153. That kind of 10gic is incomprehensible to me, and.I cannat support it in relation tothe present case. I support here and will continue to support, most resolutely, everything likely ta induce the Government of Israel finally to comp1y with its obligations under the United Nations Charter and under the Armistice Agreement. 154. Such are the preliminary remarks which the Soviet delegation has considered it necessary to make at this stage of the matter's discussion. We naturally reserve the right to speak again should the need' arise, and also ta take part in discussing such specific proposaIs, in connexion with the matters we have dealt with, as may and indeed must be introduced for the Security Council's consideration.

The Council bas heard the suggestion of the United States representative that it would be useful for General von Horn to be present at these meetings, for consultation and in arder that he may supplement the written report he has submitted. The Council has also heard the statements of the Secretary-General and the representatives of the United Arab Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 158. If 1 bear no objection from members of the Council or from the representative!o who have been invited, 1 shaH adjourn the meeting, and the next meeting will be caHed at a convenient time during the early days of next week, when General von Horn should be here. 158. part vitées, von 159. Ml'. EL-ZP.YYAT (United Arab Republic): Yon are right, Ml'. President; we did not offer any objection ta the visit of General von Horn. Our delegation has tried not ta hinder theworkofthe Council because we were eager to enter into the heart of the serious matter before us. This is why, as we said, we refrained from making any lengthy statement at this meeting. 159. que Nous du le Crest sommes cours 160. que présidence. Conseil que d'avril, prochaine, date tôt 160. We had hoped, Ml'. President, that it would be possible for the Counoil to meet again while you were still in the Chair. As you now suggest next week for our next meeting, 1 hope that our President for April, Ml'. Schweitzer, will convene the Council as early as possible, in the early part of next week, perhaps Monday or Tuesday-or whenever he thinks fit, but as early as possible.

1 thank the representative of the United Arab Republic, and 1 should like ta say that 1 spoke of a meeting during the tirst days of next week, although 1 knew that 1 should not be in the Chair, because the Secretary- General had told me that General von Horn would not arrive until early next week. 161. mercie de plus n'arrive~~ait 162. 1 therefore consulted the representative ofChile -who will take the Chair next month-and he told me he agreed that the Council should be convened as 'saon as possible after General von Horn was available ta answer questions, and that this might be towards the beginning of next week. 162. le dence draccord général sition au 163. 1 think enough has been said about the date of the Council's next meeting, when we will continue our debate on this question. Acetlrdingly, if there is no objection, 1 shaH adjourn the meeting. 163. ~ séance suivrons sence séance. ' The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m. :i L AFRICA/AFRIQUE CTPRUSICHTPRE, P"'N 10 "" •.,nd., .he G'o.1 Strut. CZECHOSlOYAKIA/TCHÉCOSLOV"'QOI(: C...MEROON/C...MEROUN: lIBR"'IRIE DU PEUPlE AfRIC"'IN lo G.,.nt., B. p. 1197. Y.oynde. OIFfUSION tNTERNATIONALE C"'MEROUN""SE DU liVRE ET OF LA PRESSE,S.n8"'."m•. CONGO (Léopo,d.m.l: INSTITUT POLITIQUE CONGOLAIS. B. P. 2307.l~opotd ..II@. ETHIOPI.../iTHIOPIE, INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCV. P. O. Bo. 120, "'dd.. "'b.O•. GH...NA: UNIVERSITY 800KSHOp Un.-@'''tyColI.g.o!Ghan•. l@gon.Aoo••. ~RTlA liD.. 30 v~ Sm~h'on. CESKOSLOVENSKY SpISOV N"OOhI l;id. 9. Pr.n•• 1. OENM RK/D...NEMARK: N." 6. Kabenn••n. FINl"'NDfFINl"'NDE' AKATEEMINEN 2 K"ky.k.lu. Hel.;n~i. FRANCE, ÉDITIONS .... PÉOONE 13, ro~ Souilloi. P.,;, (Ve). GERM"'''lY (FEDER"'L REpU8LIC ALlEMAGNII: {RtpUBUOUII: R. EISENSCHMIOT SOnw.n'h.I@'St.. 59.f.. ELWERT UND MEuRER H.upm..... 101. B~'I,n·S."on.b.'R. ALEMNOER HORN Soi•••,..... 9. W,".b.~en. W. E. SAAR8ACH G.",Yden'I'•••e 30. 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