A/32/PV.53 General Assembly

We shall now take a decision on the draft resolution entitled UEffects of atomfu radiation" recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 7 of its report [A/32/309}. In the Committee, the draft resolution was adopted without a vote. May I take it Llat the General Assembly decfdes to do likewise?

Before calling on the rmt speaker, I shouldlike to propose that the list ofspeakers in the debate be closed this afternoon at 6 o'clock so that we can organize our work. If there is no objection, I shaI consider that the General Assembly approves that proposal.

For the second time the question ofthe Comorian island of Mayotte is being considered in the General Assembly. 8. As it did last year, my delegation will, in the coum of this statement, endeavour to analyse the situation objectively, its sole aim being to put before the General Assembly the facts it requires to fonn an opinion. 9. In order to underst.and the situation correctly, it is essential that an possible light be shed on the matter and that nothing be left in doubt that might cause mlbiguity or confusion, both in regard to France's annexatiomat -1imI concerning the Comorian territory of Mayotte and on my Government's position. 10. When it signed the Charter ofthe United NatiotrlS, 1t1Y Gov~rnment did so with the firm determination to defend its principles and its resolutions. Among those ·principles and resolutions there are some which cannot be the subject of false speculations or int<"rpretations without betraying the spirit and the letter of the Charter. These relate basically to the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence; the denial to any State of my right to 11. In order better to assess the origins of this question and to appreciate what is politically and strategically at stake,it is necessary to review developments. 12. Prior to 6 July 1975, when the independence of the Comeros was proclaimed, a number of decisions designed to ensure a better future for relations between independent Comeras and France and to safeguard these relations had been taken. 13. There waS fast of all the resolution adopted by the local Assembly on 23 ·Decemb~r 1972 that gave the local Govern.'llent the mandate "to study and negotiate with the French Government the accession of the Comoros to indepe~dencein co-operatio!! and friendship with France". 14. Pursuant to the ierms of that resolution of the Territorial Assembly, a Comorian delegation, led by the head of the local Government of the Comoras, went to Paris in June 1973, and at the end of the discussions held with the French Government a document entitled "Joint Declaration on the accession to independence of the Comoro ArcbJpelago"2 was :;igned and made public. This hi~oric act, after ~1aving solemnly recognized the right of the Comoros to independence, explicitly defmed as follows the conditions ·und.er which the Comoros would accede to independence. . 15 First, the period from the date of publication of that Declaration until the day of the referendum on self-determination was termed ''the transitional pe.dod". During that transitional period certain attributes that were exclusively within the competence of the French Government were to be transfer.-~d to the Comorian Government, particularly wnceming the management and general control, at all levels a..ttd in all aspects, of the fmancial system and of technical l!!ssiBtance personnel. In the exercise of certain othei" powers, such as those of justice, national defence, foreign relations, civil aviation. education and radio, the Comorian Government was to be associated. 16. Secondly, this instrument specifies that, from the time of the promu!gat!on of the results of the consultation provided for in point 1 of the Paris Declaration, and ifthe majority of the population were to pronounce itself in favour ofindependence, this over-all res!J1t would: "... have the effect of vesting in the Chamber of Deputies of the Territory in office at that date, the powers of a constituent assembly, and of vesting in the President of th~ Government the powers ofhead of State. The Chamber of O}puties shall then draw up the new -State's constitution7 wl'Jch shall ..• be subject to popular ratification."3 Moreo.-er, that Paris DecllU"3tion was not a private statement made by the two Gilvernments, Fre:ich and local Comoriar•. 2 See Ohicilll Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Se#ion, Supp:.em~ntNo. 23, chap Xl, annex, appendix IL 3 Ibid., para. 3. "The French Government had a long history of decolonization behind it and it felt it had given sufficient proof of its desire to place no obstacles in the way of the wishes of its fonner possessions for independence. There was therefore no need for it to dwell upon its intention to respond faithfully to the aspirations of the people of the Comoro Archipelago."4 Thus, to mark the positive stand of the French Government, the General Assembly, in resolution 3161 (XXVIII), took note with satisfaction of the statement by the representative of France. 18. Nothing in the process of the nonnal accession to independence of the Comoros was overlooked in that Declaration of 15 June 1973. It was left to the two parties to act in the sam~ spirit Qf dialogue and understanding to draw the appropriate inference from and to respect the letter of b\e Declaration. However, it was not understood in that way by the French authorities in Moroni, a~tjng on instru~tionsfrom the Ministry of Overseas Departments and Territories in the rue Oudinot. The French authorities in Moroni tried to take advantage of the transitional period to create conditions favourable to a partisan vote in favour of keeping the Comows witmn the French Republic. Hence, on the eve of the referendum on self·determination of 22 December 1974, the Comeros, with 350,000 inhabitants, had a total of 13 political parties while in 1973 there had only been two, a party in power and a party in opposition. In the light of this burgeoning ofpolitical parties, the local government asked the French Government in June 1974, in the course of the annual joint meeting in Paris, to organize the consultation on self·determinil{ion provided for in point 1 ofthe Joint Declaration of 15 June 1973. 19. In response to that request, the highest authorities of the French Republic replied in the affltmative and laid down the spirit and conditions under which the referendum on self-detennination was to be organized. First, the Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, on 26 August 1974, spoke to the press as follows: "The French Government has opted for an archipelagowide consultation for three reasons: first, for the legal reason: that under the rules of international law a territory retains the frontiers it had as a colony; secondly, a multiplicity of statuses for the various islands of the archipelago is inconceivable; thirdly, it is not for France to set the Comorians against each other; on the contrary, its role is to help to bring them closer together... ". And as if to put an end to any doubts and any support for the separatists of Mayotte. the President of 1.11e French 4 Ibid., Twenty·eighth Session, Fourth Committee,' 2064th meeting, para. 27. archipela~go which constitutes a single entity, situated, as you know, between independent Madagascar and Mozambique-Otr which will, in any case, gain independence in June. The population is homogeneous with practically no people of French origin, or only very few. . .. was it reasona,ble to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have .for its inhabitants, should retain a different status? "I ~elieve that one must accept contemporary realities. The Comoras are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common f.ate, even though some of them-and naturally this affects us, although we must not draw conclusions from it-may have wanted a different solution. "On the occasion of the attainment of independence by a territory, it is not for us to propose to shatter the unity of what has always been the single Comoro archipelago." 20. It was b\~cause of this public stand taken by the President of the French Republic and pursuant to the commitments assumed under the terms of the joint declaration of 15 June 1973, that the French Parliament, by law 74-965 of 23 November 1974 decided to hold a referendum on ~If-determinationfor the Comorian people. It was in that atmosphere of trust and complete understanding that the over-all referendum of 22 December 1974 wa}) held for independence in a spirit of friendship with France. In that referendum 95 per cent of the Comorian voters answered "yel~" to independence within the framework of political unity and territorial integrity. Upon being informed of the results of the referendum, the President of the French Republic immediately issued the following statement to 'che press: "The dignity which had characterized the voting showed the maturity of the Comorian people and the results of the poll, which showed very clearly the desire of the population to accede to independence, would be submitted to the French Parliament for ratification at the next parliamentary session." 21. But instead of simply ratifying the results and respecting the will thus expressed of the Comorian people, six months after the referendum of 22 December 1974, and more specifically on 3 July 1975, the French Parliament adopted law 75-560, the true objective of which was to organize and to set in motion the dism~'mbennentof the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comeros. This law, which was fundamentally at variance with all earlier decisions and which ren~ged on the commitments entered into by the highest French authorities, including the President of the Republic, was in fact a challenge to the international community, to African opinion, and to the people of the Comoros. Faced with such a reversal of policy, my country had to react. Thus, on 6 July 1975, drawing the logical consequences from the referendum of 22 December 1974 on r,elf-determinations the people ofthe Comoros proclaimed its independence. 23. Considering the peaceful relations that had existed between the French and the Comorian .; lmmunities for over 135 years of colonization, the Comorian people were stunned. by this attitude, which was unexpected and undeserved, to say the least. In fact, by acting as it did and by belieVing in the imminence of a political and. social collapse, France harped on the benefits of its colonial domination. The intention Wgg 'to sow among the Mrican nationalists a fear of chaos that the imperialists have stubbornly linked to the concept of national liberation. But to believe in that would be to ignore the true. values Qf the African people, and particularly those of the Comorian people, who were more determined than ever before to achieve their national unity and to safeguard the~( dignity. 24. Thus, the Head of the Comorian State, our brother All Soilih, said in a speech of 14 November 1975: . ''We shall shoulder our responsibilities and we shall do so because we never confuse friendship and humiliation because nature has endowed Comorians with certain qualities-simplicity, a sense of honour, endurance and resistance to privation-and because in .any case, ours is a just cause, ours is a worthy struggle, and we are convinced that the Comorian people will emerge from this test united, strong and enhanced." 25. In the light of the colonizing attitude adopted by France, the people of the Comoros set up the institutions and structures necessary to the consolidation of their independence. Despite their meagre resources, they embarked quite naturally on a vast campaign of information among friendly States and in international organizations. 26. Following 135 years of presence on ,our soil, France had nothing more valuable to leave the Comorian people than a legacy of destitution and want. To fulfIl its plans, French missions abroad and the French press itself embarked on a vast campaign designed to isolate the Comoros. However, we must ~y that the Comorian side more than once showed its willingness to negotiate, while France, on the other hand, continues to entrench itself in an attitude ofnon-co-operation. . 27. May I recall some of the specific actions of the Comorian leaders along these lines: in 1973, dUring the fmt discussions on the access to independence by the Comoros; in June 1974, when we had to decide how to organize the popular referendum held that year; and in October 1975, when the Comorian Government, on its own initiative, asked, three months after L"1dependence, for a resumption of the dialogue. 28. ThUS, the Comorian side always showed itselfready to seek ways and means conducive to a speedy solution ofthe problem of the Comorian island ef Mayotte, thus satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Comorian people. At the risk of seeing our attitude misinterpreted, we agreed to participate in allY conference of French-~peaking States, 30. On 26 October 1975, a statement by the French Government announced that a law was being placed before the French Parliacent calling for the ratification of the independence of the Comoros without Mayotte. On 28 November 1975, the French representative in the Comoros, in a communique to Radio-Comores, announced his Government's unilateral decision to repatriate it~ technical personnel and to withdraw all fmancial assistance to the Comoros. On 10 December 1975, the French Parliament ratified the independence ofthe Comoros without Mayotte. On 15 December, the last French technical adviser left the Comoros. It was then that the great game of referendums limited to Mayotte began. 31. Confronted by an international opinion which was intransigent on the question of respect for the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros, the French Government, in order to conceal its occupation of the Comorian territory of Mayotte, organized the referendums of 8 February and 11 Apri11976. We must point out that these referendums were organized in Mayotte 16 months after the over-all referendum of 22 December 1974, nine months after the proclamation of the independence of the Comoros on 6 July 1975, and six months after the admission of the Comoros to the United Nations on 12 November 1975 as a country composed of the islands of Anjouan, Grande-Comore, Mayotte and Moheli. 32. This travesty carried out by the supporters of the occupation of Mayotte was intended only to give a semblance of legality to what was carried out de facto, illegally and arbitrarily. During all this period, while the pace of the process of recolonization accelerated in Mayotte, the massive expulsion of the nationalists native to 33. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, seized of the situation, for strictly humanitarian reasonssince the Comorians were not refugees-tried to participate morally and materially in resettling these expelled people. I should like to pay a sincere tribute to the Secretary- General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, for the efforts that he has made and continues to make to alleviate the sufferings of our people by mobilizing the aid and assistance of the United Nations system for the Comoros. 34. The restrictive measures that were adopted in Mayotte so far as concerned both the movement of persons and assets oetween the three liberated islands and occupied Mayotte and the treatment of the nationalists living there show the disarray and bad conscience of the separatists in that island. Mayotte inevitably is a lost cause for these conquerors of another age and another era. 35. Resolution 31/4 is of capital importance because it states specifically and unequivocally the position adopted by the international community on the question of the Comorian island of Mayotte. It rejects the refert.ndums of 8 February and 11 Apri11976 held in Mayotte. It rejects in advance any other form of referendum or consultation that might be held in the Comorian territory of Mayotte. It also rejects in advance any possible law or regulation that may be adopted by uFrench governmental or legislative body to legalize any French colonial presence in the Comorian territory of Mayott~. 36. But, in spite of that resolution ...1d other pertinent resolutions adopted by this same Assembly on the matter, in spite ofthe political support given to the Comorian cause by the Organization of African Unity [OAUI, by the Islamic Conference, by the non-aligned movement, and by all the States members of the League of Arab States, and in spite of the individual representations ~ddressed by friendly States to Paris, the French Parliament, as though wishing to freeze the situation in Mayotte and to make it irreve!'Sible, adopted law 76-1212 ~f 24 December 1976, which proclaimed Mayotte to be an integral part of the French Republic. That law constitutes, on the one hand, a challenge hurled in the face of the international community and, on.the other, an act of deliberate violation of the principles ofour Charter and of the pertinent resolutions of our General Assembly. It constitutes, furthermore, plOofof the desire of the French Government to maintain in the Indian Ocean region an atmosphere of constant insecurity prejudicial to the consolidation of the fudependence ofthe fledgling African States bordering the Indian Ocean and to handicap and hinder their political, economic and social future. 37. Since the beginning of the 1960s, France has utldertaken a wide operation of decolO1Iization of its one-time colonies in Africa. The entire world welcomed with satisfaction and relief this process that had been so long awaited by the international community. Furthermore, the spirit that reigned over that partial decolonization, by making it possible to envisage a total decolonization of the French Empire, could not but lean to a resurgence ofhope ~8. The Comoros have existed for precisely 135 years under the French flag. In the course of that very lengthy period many of my Comorian brothers fought shoulder to shoulder with the French and fell on French battlefields. They paid with their blood to make France a free, united and prosperous nation. During all that time, in spite of the application of all the universally known colonial methods, no Frenchman in the Comoros was ever the object of harassment or of any act whatsoever that might today be brought up as justification for France's attitude with regard to the Comoros and the Comorians. 39. Those who have had the opportunity to visit my country have been able to assess the moral values and the fraternity characteristic of the Comorian people which flows from a deeply rooted Moslem faith. 40. Even today, my country is ready to resume relations wim France. What is taking place between the Comoros and Fnmce today is against nature and against the normal order or international political behaviour. It is all the more upsetting since the very nature of things would have dictated that between France and the Comoros there be nothing but friendship. 41. On 14 November 1975, two days after our admission to membership to the United Nations, the Head of the Comorian State, brother All Soilih, declared: "We, the Comorians, are not hostile to that great people to which we are historically linked; all that we ask ofit is that it take account of reality and not to prejudice the flowering of our people. Moreover, there are many Frenchmen in the Comoros and in France who have taken up this cause of our nation. Th~y share in our struggle and thus show a true desire for solidarity and friendship." In conclusion, the Comorian Head ofState added: "To that people, we offer the hand of friendship for frank co-operation in mutual respect for our sovereignty and in the interest, properly understood, of our respective populations". 42. What higher authority than the Comorian Head of State could set forth the position ofhis Government on the procedure for settling this question? 43. It is now clear, once and for all, tl.!at the Government and people of the Comoros seek a dialogue, but as I have often stated, and as the Comorian Head of State has just confmned, the territorial integrity of the Comoros fmds its justification not just in legal acts but more in its true national identity, which has its origin in the common history of its settlement, its heritage, its common cultural patrimony and the g~ographic and economic conditions that make the populations of,these four islands of necessity interdependent. respected, cannot bring true peace. 46. Mr. FALL (Senegal) {interpretation from French): The question on the General As~embly's agenda today is perhaps one of those with which our Organization is most familiar ever since its creation because it has to do with the problem of decolonization. I will certainly not be saying anything new if I mention that the struggle of colonial peoples to achi~ve the right to self-determination has never been easy or peaceful. It is well known that the colonial Powers, wherever they have not oppo:red with brutal repression the just aspirations of subjugated peoples, have always used subterfuge and dilatory tactics to protect their own economic or strategic interests. They have unanimously, wherever tbe situation permitted, applied the strategy of "divide and conqnet:". 47. The examples of decolonization which the colonial Powers deliberately mishandled with a view to pitting the former colonized peoples against one another are legion. I do not need to give examples as they are so familiar to all. These methods, however, could not really slow down the struggle of peoples for decolonization, nor could they lead to lasting benefits. Today as we see colonialism in its death throes, we were entitled to believe that the colonial Powers had understood that the best way of protecting their interests was to gain the friendship of their former colonies by establishing with them a just and mutually beneficial co-operation. Unfortunately the Mayotte affair dashed that hope. By deciding on 13 July 1975 to occupy part of an independent State which is, moreover, a Member of the United Nations, the French Government not only acted against international law and the decisions and recommendation of the Security Council and the General Assembly, but seems to have resumed practices which counteract the admirable work of decolonization which France carried out until fairly recently. 48. The concern to safeguard the principle of self-determination for a minority can certainly cause one to forget the right to Self-determination of the majority of the population. This is less a case of o!,posing the principle of territorial integrity to the principle of self-determination but, rather, an erroneous interpretation of the latter principle. 49. In fact, the representatives of the French Government, in seeking to justify the French presence in Mayotte, very often invoke the provisions ofresolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial peoples and countries. We feel that in the present case one should remember that while,underresolution 1514(XV)everypeople is entitled to self-determination, the resolution also contains provisions prohibiting "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country ...". 51. The international community, consisting in part of nations which were formerly colonies, has always expressed its sympa~y for, and 'given its support to, the Comorian people and their Government in their just struggle. On 21 October 1976 the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 31/4 declared: "... that the occupation by France of the Comorian island of Mayotte constitutes a ~lagrant encroachment on the national unity of the Comorian State, a Member of the United Nations.... "... that such an attitude on the part of France constitutes a violation ... of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which guarantees the national unity and territorial integrity of such countries". $2. The refusal of the French Government to implement United Nations decisions can only be prejudicial to the prestige of the United Nations, which more than ever before needs strengthening. In this connexion the charter Members should set a good example by respecting the decisions of an Organization, which they themselves set up. In so doing, they would contribute greatly to strengthening the trust of the smaller nations in our Organization and would also promote the peaceful settlement of disputes among States. 53. On the other hand, the occupation of the Comorian island of Mayotte by France can only diminis..'l the store of sympathy which France has built up in its relations with Mrica. It cannot help but create a split between France and the African States in a matter that my delegation really doubts is worth the candle. We feel, therefore, that it would be in the interests of both the Comoros and of France speedily to reach, through negotiation, a settlement providing for the return of the island of Mayotte to the Comorian State. -54. In this respect my delegation welcomes the attitude of moderation and of dialogue adopted by the Comorian Government on this thorny problem. It has carefully avoided heightening tensions in the archipelago by demonstrating on many occasions its willingness to have normal relations with France and to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the Mayotte problem. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Comoros, who preceded me at this rostrum, has spoken of facts which illustrate his country's attitude of dialogue and moderation. "The inhabitants of that island have opted by vote in favour of a future different from that of their neighbours. The status of the island does, however, leave them the possibility of stating their position about their future on another occasion. France will not stand in the way of any course of action, provided it is followed with mutual regard for the rights of the parties." [10th meeting, para. 188.} 56. This statement, whose sincerity we do not doubt and which expresses the willingness of the French Government not to rule out the possible return of Mayotte to the Comoro archipelago, should be followed forthwith by actions: In this regard we feel that France's role in the process leading to the return of Mayotte to the Comoros should not be viewed as a passive role. France has assumed responsibility by taking the initiative of detaching the island of Mayotte from the rest of the Comoros. Today it must also take IJleasures to help return Mayotte to the Comorian State. 57. Therefore, we feel that France should flISt try to reduce tensions in the archipelago and initiate a climate of peace and mutual understanding among the various segments of the population. France should, as a matter of priority, refrain from taking any measures likely to create or to strengthen the barrier between Mayotte 2Ild the rest ofthe Comoros. The restoration of the economic, trade and cultural relations, which formerly existed between Mayotte and the rest of the Comoros, would contribute greatly to the achievement of detente in the archipelago. 58. Similarly, the free circulation of persons between Mayotte and the greater part of the Republic of the Comoros should be re-established anda just solution should be found for the Comorians deprived of their possessions and expelled from Mayotte. 59. My delegation is convinced that only a return to normal conditions-that is the resumption without artificial restrictions of the human, economic, social, cultural and politicaI relations which have always existed between the various parts of the Comoros as a whole-can provide favourable conditions for a settlement of the Franco- Comorian dispute. 60. The normalization of relations among the various parts of the archipelago must be accompanied by the establish- ,ment of good relations between France and the Comoros. In this connexion the French Government must contemplate the resumption of its economic, fmancial and cultural assistance to the Republic of the Comoros. 61. France has accustomed us to greater generosity with regard to its former colonies. Furthermore, it is difficult for us to understand why the Republic of the Comoros should be penalized because it has had too much faith in the principles of liberty and democracy taught it by' France itself. 63. For its part, my country will continue to make every effort to assist in the restoration of normal relations between France and the Comoros and the opening of a positive dialogue with a view to the speedy restoration of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Comoros over the island ofMayotte. 64. In the view of my delegation, the normalization of Franco-Comorian relations and of relations within the Comoros as a whole is the necessary prerequisite for the beginning of fruitful negotiations aimed at a political solution of the problem of MayoUe. 65. The OAU, reflecting the profound concern of the whole of Africa at the occupation of the Comorian island of MayoUe, has taken a number of steps at the highest level in order to assist the search for a solution which would make possible the return ofMayotte to the Republic of the Comoros. The OAD has also established an Ad Hoc Committee of Seven, whose task it is to follow closely the Franco-Comorian dispute and to take all possible steps and propose any measures likely to promote a just settlement of the dispute. 66. The United Nations, whose action in the field of decolonization has been so remarkable, cannot remain inactive when it knows that a part of the territory of one of its Members, weak and defenceless, is occupied by another Member State. It is therefore necessary and desirable that the United Nations should play an active part in this matter and take measures to establish a dialogue between the two parties. 67. By putting an abrupt end to its aid to the Comoros after more than 130 years of colonial occupation the French Government obviously wished to destabilize the regime of the new independent State by casting it into inevitable economic and social chaos. Thus the economic development of the country has been jeopardized, its relations with the rest ofthe world impeded and its cu~tural activities blocked. 68. France has thus confronted the Comoros with considerable difficulties for which it bears a heavy moral responsibility. The Comorian Government, for its part, has faced this disagreeable situation with calm and dignity and has been able to survive it thanks to the faith and courage of its people and the moral and material solidarity shown by its many friends. That is why, in concluding my statement, I wish to reaffirm the strong SUppilrt ef the Senegalese people and Govemm~nt for the Comorian people and at the same time, to support the granting, both by the United Nations and Member States, of substantial

The questions to be discussed during the present session include that of the Comorian island of Mayotte, an item which my country, on behalf of the OAU, asked the General Assembly to keep on its agenda for the present session, thus complying with the relevant resolutions by which the Heads of State or Government of the States members of the OAU, meeting in Libreville last July, wished to show the solidarity of the whole of Mrica with the brother people of the Comoros in their just cause. 70. The General Assembly could well have done without discussing this vexed problem if France, the former administering Power, had been willing in the specific case of the Comoro archipelago to act in accordance with its traditional doctrine in the matter of decolonization which it framed and has applied since the time of General de Gaulle and which led to the independence of our African States and most recently of Djibouti. 71. Even more recently, the President of the French Republic, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, following this tradition in the matter ofdecolonization, declared on 24 October 1974, speaking about the Comoros: "The population [of the Comeros] is homogeneous, with practically no people of French origin, or only very few. . .•was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhabitants, should retain a different status? "I believe that one must accept contemporary realities. The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate, even if some ofthem ... may have wanted a different solution. "On the occasion ofthe attainment ofindependence by a Territory, it is not for us to propose to shatter the unity of what has always been the single (',. moro archipelago." 72. In fact, that statement by the President ofthe French Republic only reafflrmed the status of unity and of the territorial integrity of the Comoros recognized in French law since the annexation decree of 9 September 1889. 73. We might also recall, if necessary, the many resolutions on the subject adopted by the United Nations, particularly resolution 3385 (XXX) of 12 November 1975, which affmns, inter alia: Cl••• the necessity of respecting the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro Archipelago, composed of the islands of Anjouan, Grande-Comore, Mayotte and Moh6li ...". 74. More recently, resolution 31/4 sou81i.t to prevent the danger ef an explosion which would shatter the peace and the stability of the Comoros and, even more, ofAfrica as a whole. The Comorian people itself did not act in any way contrary to French tradition in the matter of decolonizatkm when it made its dear, unambiguous choice of 75. May I stress the surprise of all Mrica and of all nations which love peace and justice at the way the French authorities analysed the results ofthe voting, which was not at all consistent with France's position as I have just described. That analysis, based on the fact that a minority had declared itself against independence, caused France to organize two further referendums, on 8 February and 11 April 1976, in ,the Comorian Island of Mayotte and these referendums led to the present impasse. • 76. I should like to point out that the results ofthese last two referendums in no way affect with the clear conviction of the Republic of the Comoros, of Mrica and of all States loving peace ~d justice that Mayotte is an integral part of the Republic of the Comoros, for it would be futile to deny a head of State, elected by a majority of his citizens, the right to represent his people as a whole. I cannot envisage the electors of one or more provinces in a country, all or a vast majority of whom may have refused to vote in favour of the person elected, proceeding to elect a new head of State to represent their own specific and minority interests. 77. Everyone knows that this would be a situation unacceptable to any State jealous of its rights and prerogatives. 78. Africa, just like Franc1e, has nothing to gain by a futile confrontation. It is from tltis standpoint, we feel, that the mandate was given by the Heads of State and Government of the States members.ofthe OAU to the current chairman of the pan-African organization, the President of the Gabonese Republic, His Excellency El Hadj OJ!1ar Bongo, who is and has been a good friend of France at all times. 79. The African Heads of State and Government asked the President of the Gabonese Republic, together with his French counterpart, to fmd ways of solving this painful problem, which does no honour to France, which has always been held up as an example for its decolonization policy, and with which many countries, including my own, Gabon, maintain close relations of friendship and cooperation in every field. 80. This set'fch for a dialogue with France has led to the establishment" at the level of the OAU, of a committee called the Committee of Seven on the Comorian Island of Mayotte, composed of Algeria, the United Republic of Cameroon, ilie Comoras, Gabon, Madagascar, Mozambique and Senegal. That Cornmittee has been instructed to enter i"1to negotiationc: leading to a peaceful solution of the question of ,:eturning Mayotte to the Republic of the Comoros. The Committee met in Moroni, in the Comoros, from 5 to 6 September 1977 and adopted a recommendation which in fact is a programme of action that would allow the above-mentioned objective to be reached. The programme of action provides, inter alia, that: "... a 1i1ission consisting of Foreign Ministers of the Committee of Seven on the issue of the Comorian Island 81. As I said earlier, France, the Comoros and Africa as a whole have nothing to gain from a pointless confrontation. Therefore, with this in mind, I have no doubt that France, which, as it has always stated, is ready to hold a dialogue, will no longer merely issue statements of good intentions towards Mrica, but will demonstrate its willingness to engage in dialogue by specific action, by acting positively in response to the initiative of the current Chairman of the OAU Assembly, the President of Gabon, His Excellency, El Hadj Omar Bongo, and by responding favourably to the appeal. made by the Committee of Seven on behalf of independent Africa. 82. It is along these lines that all Africa hopes for a review of this case by the relevant French institutions, as permitted by the island's development statute.

My delegation wishes to speak on the question of the Comorian Island ofMayotte as Sri Lanka has an interest in this matter both as a Member State and in consequence ofits responsibilities as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Group. It seems to us that developments over the Comorian question will surely come to be regarded in the future as one ofthe most bizarre episodes in the history of decolonization, as what we have been witnessing is the unusual spectacle of a colonial Power engaging in the process of decolonization and thereafter resorting to recolonization, not decolonization. 84. It will be recalled that, at its twenty-ninth session in December 1974, the General Assembly adopted byacclamation resolution 3291 (XXIX), which, among other U"rlngs, reaffmned ''the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro Archipelago". During the same month a referendum was held covering all four islands of the Comoros, which resulted in 95.5 per cent of the Comorian people voting for independence and only 4.4 per cent voting against independence. In allowing the referendum, the French Go....ernment had proceeded towards decolonization on the basis of preserving the territorial integrity of the Comoros, but thereafter,in the course ofth.e followfugyear, the French Government's attitude suffered a transformation which we fmd difficult to underStand. 85. In july 1975, Mayotte refused to recognize the Government of the Comeros and the French Government responded by placing the island under its protection. In October 1975, the Security Council adopted resolution 376 (1975) recommending the admission of the Comoros as a Member State by a vote of 14 in favour with none against, while only France abstained. In November 1975, the General Assembly admitted the Comoros to the United Nations by consensus, with France not taking part, by resolution 3385 (XXX), which reaffmned: ''the necessity of .respecting the unity and territorial integrity of the 87. Such, briefly, are some of the more important developments over the question of the Comoros. The facts speak for themselves loud and clear, and I therefore do not . wish to go into further detail about the background of developments except to refer to the fact that several statements were made by the French Government itself, recognizing and even emphasizing the principle of the territorial integrity of the Comoros as constituted by its four islands. It should suffice to limit ourselves to just one quotation from a statement made by the French President on 24 October 1974. The quotation is now becoming famous and the previous speaker also quoted it, but I quote it for its effectiveness: "The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate, even if some of them ... may have wanted a different solution. On the occasion of the attainment of independence by a Territory, it is not for us to propose to shatter the unity of what has always been the single Comoro archipelago." 88. The Sri Lanka Government has fmn, categorical and emphatic views on the question of the Comorian island of Mayotte as it concerns the principle ofterritorial integrity. 89. In my Government's view nothing could have so primordial an importance for a State as its territorial integrity, and surely such importance should be given to this principle by every Member of the United Nations which is prepared to respect the United Nations Charter. The violation of this principle by the French Government over the Comoros seems to be particularly surprising, as France itself had to suffer centuries of turmoil before it could establish its own political unity and territorial integrity. It is even more surprising when one remembers that France itself lost part of its national territory in the last century, to regain it only after several decades had elapsed, and France should therefore be able to understand and appreciate the importance that we give to the principle ofterritorial integrity. 90. In the course of the General Assembly's consideration of this subject last year, the point was made that the Comorian question involved a conflict between two principles: the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of providing self-determination for a part of the people of Comoros in accordance with their supposed wishes, a conflict which was described as a "dilemma". In the view of the Sri Lanka delegation there is no conflict of principle involved, and there should be no dilemma whatever, as the principle of the territorial integrity of a State overrides other supposed principles which come into conflict with territorial integrity. 92: There are some aspects of the Comorian question which might be interpreted as possibly having a sinister significance. It is known that as many as 40 oil tankers pass every day between theComoros and the West African coast, in which connexion the question arises whether the French action in dismembering the Comoros has relevance to a strategy to safeguard the oil route to the Western countries. Sri Lanka, as a country having a special interest in the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace {resolution 2832 (XXYI)}, cannot help but wonder whether the Comoros imbroglio has to be understood in the context ofthe problems of the Indian Ocean and the supposed needs of naval strategy. It has to be emphasized that, whatever the perception of France and other countries about their -interests in the Indian Ocean, there is no justification or excuse at all for the dismemberment of a State. 93. Sri Lanka, as Chairman ofthe Non-Aligned Group, has a special interest in consequence of decisions taken at the Fifth Conference of -Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo in August 1976. One of the resolutions adopted by the Colombo Conference appealed to all members ofthe Non-Aligned Group "... to approach the French Government jointly and severally with a view to inducing it to abandon once and for all its plan to separate the Comorian Island of Mayotte from the Republic of the Comoros".5 And in accordance with a mandate given by the same resolutions, the Sri Lanka Government made representations to the French Government shortly after the Colombo Conference. I give these details to emphasize that the non-aligned countries have been intereated, not in rhetorical declamation about colonialism, but rather in promoting practical action to solve the Comorian problem. 94. At the present General Assembly session we are one of the sponsors of a draft resolution {A/32/L.12 and Add.l} which: "Calls upon the Government of the Comoros and the Government of France to work out a just and equitable settlement for the problelp ... which respects the political unity and territorial integrity-:Qfthe Comoras ...". 95. It has been said that a country that does not remember its past is doomed to repeat it. Bearing in mind the past travails of France over its own political unity and territorial integrity, we appeal to the French Government to respect the United Nations Charter, to respect the decisions of the General Assembly, to respect it own true interests, and to act in accordance with its own best traditions.

The question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte, consideration of which we are resuming today, is one of those vexing problems caused by mishandled decolonization that create a situation of uneasiness between former colonizers and their quondam colonies. This problem, that has lasted too long, still perpetuates a climate of tension that could easily have been avoided if the former administering Power of the Territory had complied with the spirit and the letter ofthe pertinent General Assembly resolutions. 97. Tunisia has always shown its solidarity with the struggle of the Comorian people to regain its legitimate right to self-determination and freedom. Indeed, after the Comoros' accession to independence, we. expressed our great joy and pride at welcoming the Comorian State among us as a free and sovereign nation. Unfortunately, the exercise of that sovereignty throughout the Territory was blocked by a decision whose usefulness we fail to' understand but whose consequences for Franco-Comorian relations in particular an~ for Franco-African relations in general give us cause for apprehension. 98. Indeed, interpreting along their own lines the results of a referendum which in the light of the statements of the French Government itself were to have led to the peaceful independence ofthe Comoros in full respect for its national unity and territorial integrity, the French authorities decided to go back on their previous commitments and to maintain their presence in Mayotte. 99. The matter before us today has repeatedly been considered in various United Nations bodies. Its elements are far too well known to all for me to have to rehearse them in all their detail. Some years ago, long before Comorian independence, the international community had expressed its conviction that the archipelago constituted an indivisible political entity composed of the islands of Anjouan, Gr~d Comore, Moheli and Mayotte. At that tim~ the French Government gave clear and unequivocal assurances regarding the policy it intended to follow in the process of decolonizing the Comoros-namely, that the referendum that was to precede the proclamation of independence would be organized at the archipelago level and that hence it could not result in the dismemberment of the Territory. 100. Unfortunately, the events that follo~d were far from being in conformity with those declarations. 102. At its July 1977 meeting in Libreville, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU reiterated its profound concern over the persistence of the French presence in Mayotte. .. J03. Recently, a committee composed of seven African Ministers, appointed by the OAU Council of Ministers, decided to approach the French Government with a view to prevailing upon it to fmd ajust solution in keeping with the principles and resolutions ofthe United Nations. 104. The Tunisian delegation attaches great importance to a speedy solution of the question ofthe Comorian island of Mayotte. Any delay in the implementation of the principles and resolutions adopted here without opposition would only increase tensions and they, in turn, would only make it more difficult to fmd a solution to the problem. We have no doubt whatever ofthe will of the French Government to meet favourably the aspirations of the Government and people of the Comoros. It is for that reason that today we make an urgent appeal to it to do everything possible to establish the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros. We are convinced that, within the framework of open and serious negotiations between France and the Comoros, the dispute can be solved along those line~, to the benefit of the true interests of both the Comorian and French peoples. 105. Thus my delegation has joined in sponsoring the draft resolution that has been submitted to the Assembly and which we trust will be unanimously approved by the entire Assembly, without any exception.

The position adopted bythe United Nations on the question of the Comorian island ofMayotte is clear and cannot be misinterpreted, no matter what legal, pseudo-historical or formalistic arguments may be put forward by the former administering Power. 107. It should be recalled that any action by the United Nations with regard to Mayotte is pased on two fundamental principles: the recognition of the political unity of the archipelago, which is composed of Anjouan, Grande- Comore, Moheli and Mayotte, and the need to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the;! Comoros. Those principles, which are already set out in the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV), have been reaffmned in all the resolutions on the Comoros and cannot be given a different meaning by legislation based on considerations that have nothing-to do with the honest implementation of the principle ofself-determination. 108. For those who feel that principles are more important than laws-especially when laws are merely nationaland for those who attach some value to the solemn commitments which were freely undertaken by the highest authority of the former administering Power, will fmd it 109. That is why the United Nations has condemned.the referendums of 8 February and 11 April 1976 that were organized by France in Mayotte. It is for that reason that the United Nations has rejected any legislation that woula legalize any French colonial pr~sence· in Mayotte. It is for that reason that the United Nations has requested the immediate withdrawal of the French Government from Mayotte, and has condemned the continuation of the French presence there. 110. Briefly, France's faits accomplis in Mayotte-the last being the establishment of Mayotte as a special unit of the French Republic in December 1976-while momentarily they may have met certain interes.ts that became more and more marginal, did not receive, cannot receive and will never receive any international sanction. Harsh as it may be, the reality is also simple, and it is the duty of this Organization to see to it that a permanent member of the Security CouncH reverts to a more correct concept of its mission and recognt:es honestly and loyally its obligations under the Charter. 111. Indeed, we have always maintained that the abnormal and unconstitutional situation which exists in Mayotte-unconstitutional if one sees it in the light of the Charte2."-can only have a negative impact on the maintenance of peace and security in our region of the Indian Ocean. 11:2. So long as Comorian sovereignty is usurped by France in Mayotte, the Comorian Government will certainly exert every effort to meet that challenge; the neighbouring coastal States of the zone cannot but lend their full support to the just cause of the Comonans; the peace and co-operation that we hava a right to expect will not be fully realized; and their consequent deterioration carries the risk ofits extending further. 113. That situation is even more disquieting because the Comoros are located in a strategic military, political and economic zone, because in this western part of the Indian Ocean there is unfortunately no lack of instances of defIance of the United Nations, and because the Powers' rivalry to establish their presence has not ceased to thwart all the efforts we have made to make of the Indian Ocean a zone ofpeace. 114. The withdrawal of the French administration from Mayotte would give a more positive significance to the protestations of peace and' co-operation that we hear from France when the Indian Ocean is being discussed. Otherwise it would be useless and even dangerous for us to harbour any nIusions since we would then be constrained to draw the inevitable conclusion that France prefers the interplay of partisan and chauvinist interests to its obligations under the Charter. But we know such are not the provisions of the Constitution of the French Republic with regard to its international commitments. t " ... to all Member States to intervene, individually and collectively, with the Government of France to persuade it to abandon once and for all its plan to detach the Comorian island of Mayotte from the Republic of the Comoros". 116. Voices more authoritative than ours have already informed the Assembly of the results of the representations that have been made to the French Government. But as a member of the Committee of Seven established by the OAU to work out and apply a strategy designed to ensure the return of Mayotte to the Republic of the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar can say that in Libreville, on 28 June 1977, and at Moroni on 6 September last, the OAU Committee'of Seven reaffrrmed the following points: fust, that the occupation of Mayotte by France is illegal-an opinion shared by the League of Arab States, the Islamic Conference and the movement of the non-aligned countries; secorldly, that the evacuation of Mayotte must be effected unconditionally and as speedily as possible; and, thirdly, that any initiative for the implementation of the second point must take place in conditions of strict respect for the political unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity ofthe Comoro archipelago. 117. It is in the light of these three points-on which no compromise can be envisaged-that the OAU Committee of Seven has recommended contacts with the former administering Power through the intermediary of ministers of foreign affairs and ambassadors, as well as direct United Nations action, at the level of the Secretary-General, to ensure the implementation of the provisions of resolution 31/4;and in particular ofits paragraphs 3 and 5. 118. Those who favour conciliation could say that, since initiatives at the highest level have already been taken and since the OAU, through the intermediary of the Committee of Seven, has already explored the possibility of a Franc,:>- Mrican dialogue on the question ofthe Comorian island of Mayotte, it would be appropriate in the circumstances to await the results of the various consultations, procrastination being a favourite tool of those who simply. refuse to face any problem.. 119. Here we can make two comments: IllSt, it is evident that the two requests made by the General Assembly to the French Government have not elicited any response. I am referring to immediate withdrawal from the Comorian island of Mayotte and the resumption of negotiations with the Comorian Government. Moreover, the provisions ofthe Charter with regard to regional co-operation certainly cannot absolve the Organization of its responsibilities. So long as a resolution has not been applied, action by the Organization must take its normal course. We believe that this is the price that has to he paid ifthe Organization is to regain its political authority, which some constantly impugn. In the second place, a period of reflection might have been envisaged if France had shown a consistent, if not positive, attitude with regard to the three points raised 120. In the circumstances, it is understandable that the. Republic of the Comoros has no recourse other than to come again before the General Assembly' and ask it to reaffmn the principles of the Charter, to maintain the position it has taken on the Comorian island of Mayotte, and to help the Comorians, whose desire for peace and willingness to negotiate with the French need no further proof, to recover their dignity, sovereignty and unity. 121. So far as the delegation of Madagascar is concerned, we can only repeat what we have already said so often in other forums with regard to similar Jituations, namely, that the United Nations cannot depart from the provisions which it laid down with respect to a given territory and cannot accept a situation where a Member State-even a permanent member of the Security Council-challenges those provisions by recourse to principles which are falsely universaIist, merely to accommodate interests of which the validity and lasting nature are most doubtful; that the territory of a State whose integrity has been recognized by the United Nations is inviolatle and can certainly not be placed under occupation, military or otherwise, by any other State; and that it is inadmissible that coercive measures should be used to infringe the unity of a State or a people, and that any attempt whatever to destroy, partially or totally, the territorial integrity or the national unity ofa country is inadmjssible. 122. We may be told that these are only principles and that certain policies c~m depart from those principles or that efforts will always be made to circumvent them in the name of other so-called "principles" whose primacy and validity can only be established after having violated one's conscience and after reneging on previous commitments. But if such be the fate of the question of Mayotte, we are sure that the United Nations, like my own delegation, will certainly be able to draw the proper conclusions.

On 12 November 1975 the Comoros were accepted and admitted as a Member of the United Nations in implementation of the principle of universality. The international community then cornmended this admission, since the people of the Comoros had suffered under the yoke of imperialism for a period excee4ing 130 years. 124. The delegation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expresses its deep regret at the fact that part of the territory of the Comoros is still under foreign domination as a result of the flagrant interference by France in the island of MayoUe, its disregard of the principle of selfdetermination for the Comorian people and its disrespect for the national unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros. 126. If we examine the historical development of the archipelago as a whole and since the French occupation of Mayotte by force in 1848, we fmd that in 1886-that is, 38 years after occupation-it was declared that the four islands wer~ considered a French protectorate, thus affirming the unity of the archipelago. We also find that since 1889 all laws and decrees have emphasized the political unity and territorial integrity of ~he Comoros, with their fout: island~. 127. When political parties emerged tn lead the political struggles and the demand for independence, they emphasized their desire to enter into negotiations with the French Government with a view to achieving independence in a ;pirit of friendship and co-operation. On 15 June 1973, a joint declaration of independence was signed; it stated that the territories were to be prepared fqr independence; secondly, it emphasized the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros; thirdly, it embodied an agreement to consult with the people of the Comoros about the future by means of a referendum. This was reaffirmed b~T the French President, Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, when, in a press conference on 24 October 1974, he stated: "[The Comoros] are an archipelago which constitutes a single unity... The population is homogeneous, with practically no people of French origin ... was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one i~land"-that is, Mayotte-"whatever one might have for its inhabitants, should retain a different status? "1 believe that one must accept contemporary realities. The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate ...~'. 128. Following the referendum of 22 December 1974, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, the French President, stated: "The dignity. which had characterized the voting showed the maturity of the Comorian people ...". 130. All this historic review indicates that the archipelago is an indivisible, integral unit. 131. The resolutions adopted by the OAU Assemblies have emphasized the principle of respect for the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros. At the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Mauritius in July 1976, the issue was raised; the Assembly referred to its resolution concerning the French occupation of the island of Mayotte, and set up a committee of seven to -contact the French Government and discuss the matter with it. 132. The Seventh Islamic Conference, held in Istanbul in 1976, condemned French intervention in the internal affairs of the Comoros; and the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo the same year, referred to the essential respect for the territorial integrity of the Comoros and condemned the French intervention. 133. In July 1977, the Council of Ministers of the OAU, at its twenty-ninth ordinary session, held in Libreville, entrusted El Hadj Omar Bongo, President of Gabon and Chairman of the OAU Assembly, with the task of contacting the head of the French Government to discuss, and seek to settle, the problem of the island of Mayotte {see A/32/310, annex 1, document CM/Res.555 (XXIXJ/. At his meeting with Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the President of the French Republic mentioned that France had taken note of the African position. 134. This problem has been the concern of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for several years, and in the fmt meeting between former French President, Mr. Pompidou and Colonel Al-Qadhafi, Colonel Al-Qadhafi raised the problem of the independence of the Comoros and the necessity of granting self-determination to the Comorian people. 135. In the Eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Tripoli from 16 to 22 May 1977, resolution 18/8-8 was adopted condemning the referendums conducted on 8 February and 11 April 197p and declaring them null and void and rejecting any form of referendum or consultation which might be conducted later concerning the Comorian island of Mayotte, and any legislation or statute that might b~ enacted by the legislative authorities or the French Government seeking to legitimize the French colonialist presence in the Comorian island of Mayotte. It further called upon France to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Comqrian State, and called upon the cummt Chairman ofthe Islamic Conference to exert his 136. Following this invitation, the Foreign Minister ofthe Libyan Arab Jamahiriya paid a visit to France, during which he met Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, the President of France, and conveyed to him the desire expressed by the Islamic Conference that France should take the necessary positive steps to safeguard the territorial integrity of' the Comoros. 137. The situation in the island of Mayotte necessitates immediate intervention and positive efforts by the United Nations. We still hope that France will seek to understand the desire of the Comorian people to safeguard iU own integrity. We still remember what the Foreign Minister said in his statement during this current session, when he said: "France feels and shows solidarity for countries it has teen closely associated with through history, and we are fully prepared to demonstrate the same solidarity in the Comoros." [10th meeting, para. 188./ 138. We are indeed hopeful that the expression of such solidarity by the French Government will take the form of putting an end to its illegal existence in the island of Mayotte, in order to grant the people of the Comoras real independence, territ9rial integrity and unity, to enable it to develop its own country and to overcome ita economic difficulties, particularly since the people of the Comoro! have expressed their ardent desire to co-operate'with France. 139. Mr. AL-MIHRY (United Arab Emirates) (interpretation from ArabicJ: The General Asselk.oly &t its last session considered the question of the Comorlan iisIand of Mayotte. It adopted resolution 31/4 affmning thlt the island of Mayotte was an indivisible and integral part ofthe Comoros. My country's delegation participated in the debate on this problem in the General Assembly at its 1ut session, affmning this fact and our Foreign Minister reaffIrmed it in his statement before the General Assembly on 4 October last. He said that; "... the continuation of the island of Mayotte outside the national sovereignty of the Comoros is a matter of concern for most States, especially Arab and African States, which maintain strong relations of friendship and co-operation with France. We still hope that the issue wi1l be resolved in a manner that will ensure the territorial integrity of the Comoro islands and will maintain the strong ties of friendship which exist between France and the Arab and Mrican States". [l~lh meeting, para. 132./ 140. We welcomed with great satisfaction the draft res0- lution submitted to the General Assembly at its current session [A/32/L.12/. This draft resolution constitutes, in our view, an acceptable and flexible formula for imding a suitable and peaceful solution of tilis problem, a solution based, naturally, on the necessity for respecting the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros in 142. We also welcome the fact that the draft resolution would give the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the mandate to make the ncessary efforts and undertake consultations to urge both Governments, the Government of the Comoros and the Government of Fr·"1.ce, to enter into serious negoti:ltions to solve the problem. 143. We should also like to commend the efforts exerted by the OAU te) find a peaceful solution of this problem that will safeguard thepoUtical unity and territorial integrity of the COMoros. 144. The United Arab Emirates, realizing the difficult economic situation in that young Republic, has assisted in th~ past and; has pledged financial and moral assistance for the future to support the Government of the Comoros in seeking development and progress as well as prosperity for its people. 145. Finally, we should like to expre~ the hope that the adoption of this draft resolution by the General Assembly will restore the island of Mayotte ~o its' motherland and that we may nnt have to raise this issue again at the forth,,;oming session.

At the 1st meeting of the G:aneral Committee, held on 22 Septembers my delegation voted against placing on the agenda of the Assembly a debate on Mayotte. In doing !{J we h"d a reason of fundamental principle, which already guided om: attitude during the _thirty-frrst session, nam,ely, iliiat tbe States Members of the United Nations must respel/;t the Charter that they themselves agreed to and whose artitle 2, paragraph 7, says that our Organization is not empowered to interfere in the domestic affairs of a State. 147. Ha~tflg made that reservation of principle, we none the less are participating in the debate because w~ hope that this f.!·~bate wnI be calmer and because truth compels us to t~pond to certain statements that have been made and to Cl}rtain questions that were posed, since it is important to offer darifications on certain points that wO"Jld otherwise be presente'1 inaccurately or incompletely. 148. ! shall not recall in detail all the reasons why the island c·f Mayotle has not chosen the 3ame d~stiny as the other three isiands of the Comora archipelago. Those reasons are well known, and it is ~~'So clearly established that tha\ cho~~e W2S entirely free ana was exercised without the Fren.;:h Government at any time either soliciting or trying to influence that choice. 149. Everyone l',nows that, far from Wishing to separate the islands which it had itself grouped under a unified administration, the French Government h~d at first en- 150. Uso happened that, wisping to maintain their identity and, also perhaps concerned because of the attitude adopted in the past in regard to them by certain elements in the other islands, the inhabitants of Mayotte clearly indicated by their vote that they did not wish to form part of the Republic of the Comoros when it acceded to independence. 151. The French Parliament, which was the only competent authority to defme the way in which the Territory should develop, then sovereignly judged that it was its duty to defer to the almost unanimous wish of the inhabitants of !t.~ayotte by giving them the chance to choose for them- ~elves their destiny. 152. France is governed by democratic institutions. One of the essential principles of those institutions is the duty of the Government to carry out the law adopted by the representatives of the people which is sovereign. This, we believe, is a principle that is widely recognized, even ifit is .not always applied. By virtue of this principle, and in application of the laws of the Republic, Mayotte was able to decide to remain within the French Republic as freely and as clearly as Moheli, Anjouan and the Grand-CoIpore chose independence. 153. The French Government could obviously not fail to apply the principles that govern its internal legislation and in so doing, it did not-no matter what allegations may be made-Violate the principles of international law. 154. Some say that, by letting Mayotte follow a different patli from that of the other islands, we have violated the principle of territorial integrity. Need I recall that in other regions of the world the procedure of a separate referendum has been applied in other archipelagos? Need 1 recall that for administrative reasons France, at the end of the last century, grouped Madagascar and the four islands of the archipelago under one and the same authority? 155. Everyone recognizes that the problem of the territorial defInition of archipelagos is a very specific problem. There are examples throughout the world of situations of this kind which are not unknown to this Assembly. The only sure criterion is the will of the populations. That is the criterion which France has applied in Mayotte, thus implementing the essential principle of our Organization: the right of peoples to self-determination. 156. The measures taken by the French Government and the French Parliament since the last session of the General Assembly show quite clearly-were it still necessary to do so-that my country in no way wanted to determine for ever the destiny of Mayotte. The inhabitants of that island will·be able freely to make another decision on their future. The representative of France said from this rostrum last 158. The inhabitants of Mayotte themselves will say at the proper time what is their fmal choice. They will say so freely and France will not exercise any pressure of any kind. It was in that spirit that Mr. de Guiringaud said here on 28 September last: "The status of the island does, however, leave them [the inhabitants of Mayotte] the possibility of stating their position about their future on another occasion. France will not stand in the way of any course of action, provided it is followed with mutual regard for the rights ofthe parties." [10th meeting, para. 188.} 159. We understand that the Comorian Government desires the political unity of the archipelago. But this unity cannot be achieved against the will of the population of one of the islands. The future of Mayotte is, as I have said, for the inhabitants of Mayotte themselves to decide. May I add that it will depend also to a certain degree on the attitude of the Comorians? 160. In that regard I recaU that, for its part, France never took the initiative of ceasing it~ co-operation with the Comoros. It is not because of France that that co-operation was interrupted. We are always ready to resume it. 161. Who can doubt that the final choice of the inhabitants of Mayotte will depend, in large part, on the attitude of mind and spirit of the neighbouring State and the ability of that State to dispel their wariness regarding it? 162. It is up to the Comorian Gove11L1l1ent to see to it that a dialogue is begun. with the inhabitants of Mayotte. France would never either reject a community which hadchosen to remain linked to it or oblige it to place itself under an authority that it objects to. But it is ready to try to make the dialogue between the Comorians and the inhabitants of Mayotte easier and more fruitful. France, I repeat, will accept any solution chosen by the inhabitants of Mayotte.

I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Comoros, who wishes to exercise his right 9f reply.

I do not intend to reiterate what I said earlier, nor do I intend to take up the time of the Assembly. 166. Personally, I felt that this year's debate was to be held under the aegis of reason, and that more than a century of living together with France could, whatever the difficulties and disputes betwen us, create at some point a reasonable situation that would enable us to contemplate the future with a certain optimism. All tbe representatives who have followed one another to. this rostrum to take part in the debate have confirmed the positions adopted by the OAU and other international organizations, particularly the General Assembly of the United Nations. 167. I think that from the time of the San Francisco Conference to the present the international community has adopted a certain way of interpreting the Charter and a way ofapproaching decolonization which in fact has constituted a kind ofinternational jurisprudence. 168. It is with real regret that we have just listened to the representative of the French Republic. As far as my Government is concerned, the international community knows its position. We know very well that, come what may, the cause of those who support France's presence in Mayotte is a lost cause because it is a situation that flies in the face of history. I would not want to recall certain facts at this time that demonstrate that for a people, regardless of its size at a given moment, the fact of national liberation overcomes any resistance. 169. having placed this debate' under the auspices of reason, I would have wanted a Power such as France, haVing had both the opportunity and the privilege of being a founder of this international Organization-which in fact is the only guarantee that the small countries such as my own can count on to safeguard their independence and sovereignty-to have given proofofgenerosity, at least this time. But I regret to see that that is not the case. 170. However, as far as my country is concerned, its position remains as I described it in my statement, and it will not change. We will continue to believe th~t, in any case, the situation demands a solution today-at the negotiating table. We continue to believe that this is the only way of arriving at a solution that will enable France to regain the place it has occupied since the decolonization of some of its Territories in Mrica began in 1960, and to enable the Comoros to count on the renewal of its relations with France in the best possible atmosphere. 171. I would simply add that in the course of this debate many in addition to myself have been able to speak for Africa and for my country, 2Ild I thank the Assembly for that. The meetingrose at 5.40 p.m.