A/PV.322 General Assembly

I request 8\ vote paragraph by paragraph. 6. The PRESIDENT (translalld from Ff"mch): We shall therefore vote on draft resolution I paragraph by paragraph. JPedne,day, 18 December 1950, at 10:45 a.m. •• . The first recital 'was adopted by 15 'Votes to 5, with 15 abstentions. . 7. The PRESIDENT (translated from. French): I call upon the representative of the Unite~ States on a point of order.

I rise on a.point of order or perhaps a point of inquiry. Before the General Assembly is draft resolution I, which was approved in the Fourth Committee. It was the under.. standing of several d~legations that the draft resolution which was the result of negotiations carried on yester.. day was offerf.d as a substitute for draft resolution I. It will also be remembered that several amendments were offered to the substitute upon which agreement was reac:hed. 9. I make the inquiry as to whether or not it would be proper first to vote upon the amendments to the substitute draft resolution and then to vote upon the $ub... stitute draft resolution as amended. 10. The PRESIDENT (translated from Fr,ncld: The Fourth Comtnittee has submitted two draft 1'esolu.. tions to the General Assembly. It is true that in the meantime some delegations have endeavoured t\)reach a compromise and have submitted a new draft resolution; but I must point out that that draft has not come to t18 from the Fourth Committee. I am obliged to put to the vot~ first the draft resolution submitted by the Committee. Delegatio.ns which wish the Genera! Assembly to adopt the compromise draft resolution might perhaps-I do not wish to influence them in any wayvote against the draft resolution stl,bmitted by the Fourth Committee; I think that is the best tbmg they can do. 11. In brief, I mUSt fitstput to the vote the draft res0- lution submitted by the Fourth Conuni,..tee; then, before putting to the vote t.he compromise draft reaolu... The third recital was rejected by 20 flot,s to 14, urith 13 abstentions. " . The fourth awl Jqtk 7'Bcitals were rejected by 18 votes tQ 1'$ with 18 abst\'ntions. .The si~th rl~c#;;E 'UJ(U rejected by 20 votes to 14, .'lmth 14 abstent'M'ns. The sevr?Ji!ih recital w«.s rejected by 18 voteJ to' 15, with 12 abstentions. .. Paragraph 1 oj the operative part was rejected by 22 vot~s to 18, with 9 ab.'ttentions. Paragraph 2 of the operative part was rejected by 22 'l.lotes tQ 18, wzth 8 abstentions. Ptlrauraph 3 aj the operative part was rejected by 23 v(jf(?$ to 19, with 5 ~Jbsttntiom

I request a separate vote 011 sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 4. . Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) oj paragraph 4 oj the operative part were rejected by 25 votes to 19, with 5 abstentions. SUb-paragraph (c) of paragraph 4 of the. operative part was rejected by 24 votes to 15, with 9 abstentions. Paragraph 5 of the operative part was rejected by 23 'Votes to 20, .with 5 abstentions. Paragraph 6 oj the operative part was rejected by 22 'Votes to 19, with 5 abstentions.

I do not intend to put draft resolution I to the vote as a whole, because only one of its paragraphs has been . adopted, and that paragraph is tIot in the operative part. 14. Pr1.,ce Wan WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): On behalf of the co-sponsors of the jo~nt c:1raft resolution [A/1681], I wish to announce that the amendments submitted by Cuba [A/1688] are a~cepted. 15. 1 should clso like to propose a slight change of wording in paragraph 4 of th\~ operative part of the joint draft resolution. No change of substance is involved, but only a change in.style. The beginning of that paragraph shofudbe reworded as follows : "Author.. izes the Committee, as an intE.'rim. measure, pending the completion of its task referred to in paragraph' 3, and as far as possible in ac~ordance with the procedure of the f()~mer Mandates SYElt~m, t4.' examine the report on the administration of tbe Territory of South West Afriea •• }11 "" •.

After that explanation, you wi11 all ha.~~ understoOd that the st>Onsors of the joint draft. r(~solution accept the amend.~ents submitted by b1e de~egation of Cuba; we can also consider that they accept the slight draftiJl1~ change suggested by the represei1tative of "rhailand. But before putting to the vote the draft resoluti()J1 thus amendea,· I shell call upon the representative of the" Union of South Africa on a point of order. 1.This amendment is complenlentary to tb" amendment sub· 18. There has been some talk of this being a com.. promise draft resolution, and I wish to say that that term may bf..~ susceptible of some misunderstanding. I rise merely to make it perfectly clear that the South African delegation is not a party to any co~promise in respect of this matter. The parties to the discussion lead.. lng up to the new draft resolution were, as far &S we are aware, some of the Member States which sponsored draft resolution I, as approved by the Fourth Commit.. tee, and some of the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and seven other nations. We did not take part in those discussions, and in fact only learned of· the terms of the new draft now before the General Assembly a short while before it wa~ of.. fidally cL ~ulated. It is a compromise,· therefor:e, between a more extreme and a"It.:ss extreme draft resolu.. tion, and a compromise to whic.'1. we are in no ~ense a party. I propose to give the reasons why my G"legation will vote against this new draft n~3t\lution after. the vat.. in~ is concluded, in acco,~dance w~th the President's ruling. '

I shall put to the vute the joint draft resolution [A/1681], together with the amendments submitted by the Cuban delegation [A/1688]. 20. I must remind you that following a discussion which took place yesterday [321st meeting] on paragraph 3 of the operative part of this draft resolutiona naragraph which deals with the setting up: of a corn.. mlttee of five - Denmark will replacl the United Kingdom. 21. Mt. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) ~ The delegation of the Union of South Africa requests that the operative part should be put to the "{ote paragraph by paragraph, and by show of hande, and that the draft resolution as a whole should be p.,~ to ttie vote by roll-call. 22. The PRESIDENT (translated from Frefich): We shall therefore proceen in the ttl1mnet sUltgested by the delegation of th\e Union of South Africa;. 23. First I shall put the preamble to ti~e ~raft r~solu­ tion to the vote.· I shall thell put the individual Data· graphs of the operative part to the vote." ' The preamble was adopted b~ 43 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions. , Pdragraph 1 of the. operative part W(iS adopted b, 4!3 votes to 6, with 7 abstentions. " Paragraph.2 of the operative part was adopted by 38 ,!'otes to 6, with 8 abstentions. Paragraph 3 of the operative pare WfJS adoPt8d b, 43 votes to 6, with 6 abstentictJs. . " Paragraph 4 of the operative POITt was adopted by 39 votes to 6" with 7abstentions. po~nts of ·agreeme~t .i~stc:ad of points .of difference,. to Untte ~~d not tO~lvlde, In the face of.the grave cn$IS at the moment facmgthe world. 26. Progressively, we must confess, Qurbopes have deteriorated and our e..1C:pectations have all but been . shattered. It seems asH there were a spirit preva1~t among. certain Member States, which unfortunately they have succeeded in indoctrinating in others, to eschew the way of com' f-:ltation and.agreement in order to teach an amicable s01ution, and to prefer teride rough~hod over the fundamentals of intemational co- operation and the sensibilities of a fellow Member. 27. Instead of creating t~e machinery to ..ensure the calm and objective consideration of theproblern of the international position of South West Africa in the light of the a<J.,iso.ryopinion of the International Court of Justice aDd otherreleva,nt factors, thiscomptonU8e re- solutiol'l plt\cdcally closes the door to this method o~ approach. Ins.teaJ of keeping the door invitingly open, it is only siilghtly ajar at.the moment, and the opening has narrow~.d as the debate has pr~essed. The present comprqxnise resplutiol1 is ~further .IUU$ttS.UQn of.this. 28. It is signifi<:ih't that there was no. attempt to in.. trod,t1ce a compromise text until it was clear, from the voting in the Fourth Committee, that draft resoluti~!!c I: which was based on teA:-s submitted by the deJegatif'tls of India and other6.. would nf,:>t commattd' a .two-thirds majority in t~e General Asseulbly. Then, and only then, .the attempt to combi:-:.e d-t'.utresolution I as a.pproved by· the Comttlittee with a jCliint draft resolution sub.., mitted tp the Committer: by the United States ano. seven other nations [A/C.4/1....124/Rev.l and Corr.1] 2 For the discussion on this subj1ect in the Fourth Committee. see Official Rlco,ds of· th, G",eral.A..tll1lWi;y, Pi/lh SII,rion, Pourth CotHfflitl,e, l00th to 199th meetings itle1usive. compl~te recapitulation of the Court's advisory opinion. 30. .In. the secondflace,. an ad!Unona.l ~ph [A/168l, para.gra/Jh 4 . was added to the cpera . tive. part. of the eight-Power diaft., providing for the establish- ment unilaterally of machinery for the examination of reports and petitions before the next session of the Gen- eral Assembly~. bya body established.for a different ·purpose q,nd entrusted with this extraneous task without ·consultation. with the,Union of South Africa. This provision can surely. not be rec.oncll.ed with the.. rec~.... tion, .in the immediately preceding paragraph [A/1681t paragraph 3] .0£ the pnnclple of conferring with the 'Union of .South Africaconcenting measures n~ to implement the advisory opinion of the Intemation.al ·Court of Jt.tstice. . . 31. In the third place, the principle that the members . of the s~ial committee should serve in an individual capacity wasdi.scarded in favour of the prin~ph; that they sbm,11dserve as representatives of S~tes. ~ 32. I need not discuss here the legal implications. and defects of this nf:W resolution. This, we say, is an il- lustration of how the development has been pro~ sively it:J. the direction of closing the door to a friendly solution, based on the full and free discussion of the prool~m in all its aspects. 33. The South African delegati'~n still stands by what _ was said by our leader in h,t$. opening intenention,' . namely, that the. South Africa:r(\ Government would:eive the most careful consideration to any resolution which might emanate from the General Assembly. But he atao dre;,w attention to the natural corollary to that sta:teJ.11etlt, nainely, that my government's d..edsion would be largd.y influenced by the nature of that resolution. 34. I have no desire to anticipate that decision~ but had I .been. permitted to declare our vote before the vote was taken, I should ha~e entreated the General As- sembly in all seriousness and sincerity to J??nder care- fully the draft resolution placed beforeIt, with ~cu1ar reference 7to, first, the new facts disCovered 'Since the d ·1· ... f tt. . ti· . _. 11 Lt-.. ftU!" " It . euvery 0 ...uea_Vlsery op:tt110n on '&''&'Jw.J'~..JV;--faeti· of"",hichthe International Court of. Justice had no kno.wledge at the time; secondly.·., the admitted datirer.. to South .. A..fri~, .which. is .adtnini.sterig.g S.outh West Africa· a,.q ·an integral portion' of the Union of SOuth Africa, of havicg itsownintema.l ~liciec·ttiticlled under the cloak of critici, .' of the adtniniatte.tion of Sou.th West Africa. and ~us in violation of Article 2, P(lr~ph 7 of th~ 9hartet, and, ~hirdly~ the genuiae deSIre .o.f South AfrIca to. have this long OUtstan.·dint: matter settled and to achieve this by way of unfettere(( consultation in a spirit of realism. ........ 38. The Belgian delegation abstained from voting be- cause, in the first place, the preamble to the resolution does not mention the chief question which was put to the International Court of Justice, namely, whether the Union of South Africa is or is not bound to place South West Africa under trusteeship. The General Assembly accepts the advisory opinion of the Inter- national Court of Justice. I take it, therefore, that all those who voted in favour of the resolution have ac- cepted the decision-the opinion of that Court in that respect also. 39. The other reason why the Belgian delegation ab~ stained from voting was that under this resolution the General Assembly decides unilaterally, and prior to the opening of the negotiations provided for in the same text, that a committee which it has established without consulting the Union of South Africa should examine the reports and petitions that may be submitted. 40. Mr. RAO (India) : In view of the several altera- tions made in the draft of the first resolution which has just been adopted by the General Assembly, my delega- tion considers it necessary to make a brief statement in explanation of India's vote. 41. The original draft resolution, as the text emerged from the Fourth Committee, was in the view of my delegation a reasonable, modest and wisely conceived proposal. Unfortunately it did not receive a measure of support sufficient to ensure its adoption by the Gen- eral Assembly. My delegation therefore supported the draft resolution in its revised form, although it would have preferred the text as it stood in the report of the Fourth Committee. My delegation accepted the amend- ments now incorporated in the resolution, in a spirit of compromise, and it did so, in the main, for two reasons. 42. In the first place, there is no real difference of opinion in the United Nations on the desirability of ac- cepting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, nor is there any difference of opinion on the .desirability of the Government of the Union of South Africa implementing that opinion without delay. 43. Secondly, my delegation has in mind, notwith- standing the statement just made by the representative of the Union of South Africa, the assurance which the representative of that government gave to the Fourth Committee that his govemment would give the most careful consideration to any resolutions that might be adopted by the General Assembly. ~erences ov~r. the most practical methods of implement- mg that 0plmon. 45. There have been several concessions in the amend- ments now incorporated in the resolution which we have just adopted. The authors of the alternative draft resolu- tion [A/1657] which was withdrawn yesterday in favour of the amended revised draft, were keen on the appointment of a negotiating committee. Many of us in the Fourth Committee were apprehensive that a ne- gotiating committee would mean an interval of another year, during which the inhabitants of South West Africa would continue to be denied the benefits of an arrange- ment whereby administration reports and petitions were examined by the United Nations, or some organ created by it. 46. The compromise now accepted meets our objection half way. The negotiating committee will, as an interim measure, perform these functions in addition to conduct- ing negotiations with the Union of South Africa on the procedural measures necessary for implementing the opinion of the International Court of Justice. 47. My delegation was impressed by the point of view of the representative of the United Kingdom, who said in the Fourth Committee, that it was envisaged that there should be negotiations with the Union Govern- ment, not on the substance of the Court's opinion but on the procedure for implementing it, not on whether re- ports or petitions should be submitted but on how they should be handled by the United Nations. 48. That is what the General Assembly expects the negotiating committee to do through the adoption of this resolution. The next session of the General As- sembly will, we hope, have the report of the negotiating committee before it on three main topics: on the ad- ministration reports of the Government of the Union of South Africa for the years 1947 to 1950; secondly, petitions from the territory of South West Africa, and, thirdly, the procedure to be followed in the future. 49. So far as the future is concerned, let me say a word. The second draft resolution, which is yet to be adopted, reiterates previous resolutions inviting the Government of the Union of South Africa to place South West Africa under the International Trusteeship System. It also stresses what has been pointed out by the International Court of Justice, namely, that the nonnal way of modifying the international status of South West Africa would be to place it under the Trusteeship System. My delegation is confident ~he General Assembly will adopt the second draft re~~lution as it has done the first, without any real opposItion or dissent. 50. The problem of South West Africa ~as been. before us ever since the United Nations came 1I1to exIstence, and for four years the General A~sembly.h~s sought a solution. Today we have the adVIsory op1l11On~f the International Court of Justice, endorsmg. practIcally everything contained in the various resolutIOns of the General Assembly on the subject. SI. Finally, let me say a word about the observati?ns made by the representative of the Unio~of South Afn~ w~rds the implementation 6f the Court's opinion, and for this purpose were arocious that.a negotiating COIn- mittee should be set up to work out, in consultation with the Govetnment of the Union of South Africa, the estab- lishment of a system of supervision' which would be as close as possible to that obtaining under the old Mandate. . 54. We supported<l. draft. resolution introduced in the Fourth Coti1..-nittee by Denmark and seven other States, which in our opinion provided the best'method of carry- ing out the Court's view. Unfortunately, we did not have an opportunity to vote on that draft resolution. We voted against the other draft resolutions which were proposed because we felt that they did not in fact im..· plement the Court's decision as we should have desired. 55. We have had before us today another draft resolu- tion, in the nature of a compromise between the framers of the various draft resolutions in the Fourth Commit- tee, )Yhk~has met with general agreement and which, although we are not in €ntire agreement with it, does, in our view, provide the b~st available basis tor the ir,'lpleOlentation of the Court's opinion. In these circum- stances we voted for the draft resolution as a whole. 56. I wish to place on record, however, that the United Kingdom Government considers the original draft re- solution introduced in the Committee by Denmark and the sevenco"sponsors as_preferable-to-the resolution on which we have just voted because the pre;visionscon.. tained in par3.b7faphs 2 and 4 of the latter text may be held to prejudge to some extent the procedure for the submission of reports and petitions. I do not say that it will so prejudge the procedure, but it may do so. We hope !t will not. Tbe original draft resolution also set out the full opinion of the Courtobjectively, whereas this resolution which we have. adopt~d selects a part of the opinion and does not record the w!lole opinion. We sbould therefore have preferred, for t'he reasons I have gi"en~ to' see the original draft resolution in- troduced, and it is for this reason, an~ this reaStln alone, that the United Kingdom delegation abstained from A vote was taket.~ by roll-call. ". in jlwour:.YugosJavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist R.~public, Czechoslovakia, Guatett'~la, Indonesia, Po.. land, Uk?ainian Soviet Socialist R~public, Uman of' Soviet Soci~llist Republics. . Against: . '1enezuela,. Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, ChI1~~, Costa'Rica, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Isrp;~l, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey~ Uf!.io~ .of South Africa, United: KinJdom' of. Great Br~tam and Northern Ireland, Untted States of America. Abstaining: Uruguay, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argen... tina, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India,. Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico; Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria. The amendment was rejected by 24 votes to 8" with 22 abstentions. . 60. The PRESIDENT (t,.~nslated from French): I shall now put draft resolution If. to the vote as a whole. A roll-call vote has been requested. . A vote was taken by roll-call. In fa;uour: Union of Soviet Socialist Reptiblics;- United States of America, Uruguay, Vene.zue1a, Yugo- slavia, Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, B:ve1orussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, CzeChoslovakia, Ecua.. dor, Egypt, Guatemala,. Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Ir~q, Lebanon,Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Para.. guay, Ph.Uip-pine~l, Poland, S~;udi Arabia, Syria, U1min.. ian Soviet Soeia~ist RepabUc. Against: Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, iJe1gium, . Canada, Ethiopia, Greece, ~etherJands; Peru, Sweden. Abstaining: Yemen, Argentina; Bolivia, Cbile, eo.. lornbia, Costa Riett, Denmark, France, Iceland, .lranl · TIuI .traft r4,~Gll;dion 'W(J,$' adopted by 30 'tmt'$ to 10, with la abst,fI(4m}flS. " . · 61. Mr. JOO~;TE'(Union of South Africa): The South' African delegation voted apinstthetext of the resolution' which has just been' adopted, both in the Fourth Committee and here. in the General Assembly. We have .aiready given ()ur reason~ for voting against it in the Committee,. and I ·wish to repeat tbem ·here. 62.· Tbtf effect of the resolt.\tion is to invite South · Africa to submit a trusteeship·agreement in regard to South West Africa. That invitation lwsbeen extended to us on· different occasions in the past at:.d we have at- waJs categorically declined it.· Nothing mls happened in the meantime to cause South Mrica to reconsider its attitude; on th~ contrary, much has happened to con- · oolidate and strengthen it. In any case,. .we accept prevIous resolutions on this matter as a standing inv:ta- tion until they are withdrawn, open ior acceptance at any time should we be so inclined. There thus seems to be no justification for any repetition, particularly when it is borne in mind that, apart from.any invitation, · the way is always open to the Union of South Africa , to enter into such an agreement if it so desires. 63. South Africa has consistently maintained that it is under no obligation, legal or moral, to enter into such an agreement. I need say nothing with ~espect.to ..the legal objection, but with regard' to any alleged moral · d"ojection, I may merely recall that from tlte very be- ginning, and on every possible occasion, We have specifi- cally reserved our position in regard to South.West Africa with the' express' object of avoiding even the sen:ablance ofa moral obligation. In those circumstances, it seemed to my delegation that no good purpose could be served by a resolution of this nature and we therefore voted against it. International control of atomic energy (~on. . tinued) [Agenda i~em 26] 64. Mr. LACOSTE (France) (translattd from French): France has jointed with Australia, Canada, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United King.. dom and the United States in submitting to the As- sembly the new draft resolution on the international control of atomic energy [A/1668 and Corr.l] which was distributed to the Assembly yesterday. .' 65. The French Government thought it advisable to suggest to the General Assembly, in concert with the Powers ~o which I have just referred, a new method oi approaching the problem because it felt,liketbe other goven'11uents which have sponsored this draft resolution, that where atopic of such capital importance was.con- ~n!~d, no. possibility must. be neglected, .no effort spared, no chance.st"orned of'reaching a solution which would be acceptable to all----or even of making a slight step forward, however small, towards an agreement: . among the principal States concerned. . i 66. To tell the truth, .strong faith and persevering . courage are needed to pursue such an effort, when for four years all attempts have failed, one after the ,other, because they have lieen met by obstinaey, by negation, 67~ .However, since. the Commission onConventicmal Armarnentsatld' the Atomic Energy Cotntnission·have both been reproached for failing to ·show ~·true under- standing of the sptcial subj~s with :which they are con... eerned because they have notdea1t With·them as a whole, with the result that their outlook has been distorted, and because that rlivisionof labour has hittdered the accomplishmei.it of their' task instead of facilitating it, wc.shall make yet another concession to our critics. We shall do so 'because wer10 not want it to be said that the failure of the efforts of the United' Nations to settle aquestioll which, from the point of view'of the imme- diate as well as of the more distant future, is certainly the most serious question now facing the international community, was caused by the refusal of the majority of the Members' to listen to the objections of s()me among t~em concerning.a matter ·of procedure. 68, HO\\l,eveJ;, it isquite obvious that we cannotex,p~ct that··this meJ;'~, alteration in our procedure will bring about. the succ~ss which .has escaped, us for so long. In fact, we believe that if our ~orts had been met by..a, goodwill equal to our own, the manner of dealing with , the problen:i-whether we'had taken it as a wh()~ or . piecemeal-would have b~en of small importance. We know only too well that we can expect nothing from any change in the organization of our work if there is not a change of another kind, a change of principle, a radical change of attitude on the part of certain of our colleagues with'regard to this formidable undertaking which now concerns tneir fate as well as ours, the destiny of this generation and of succeeding oneS. 69. We are .prepared.to meet ,our critics' objections and to give theIU this further proof of our devotion to the' cause ()f peace-a. peace deliv.ered from the most terrible of threats. And we appeal .to them, too, to demonstrate their sincerity by returning to the bodies engaged in the. study of'these'problem~~. They left;those bOdies, deliberately,·a year rago,e without any reason that could be considered valid, given the tremendous issues involved, and they hav~ been awaited there ever since. If the :Assembly accepts the suggestion of the sponsors of the pTesent draft,. the. two commissions will shortly be combined; that should satisfy the wishes of our in- defatigable opponents, who will find their long vacated places waiting for them. Once mote, we appeal to them to join us in a resolute stand ~o ove~come ~hat is cer.. tainly the. greatest of all the dlffi~~les··.whiCh. fa~e . us; we appe~ to them to show that their determtnatlon to succeed IS equal to our own. . 70. Mr•. HOFFMEISTER (C2:echoslovakia): The menace of war is, inseparably related to the menace of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb .hangs above· the heads of the peoples of the' world, suspended, unfortunately,. only by the thin. thread of the political incompetence of those who would. use it irre~ponsibly, ~nd firs~, in a fit of madness caused by their overwhelming deSire for conquest. 71.. One()f tlteprerequisites for peace ~ong the p.eo- pIes Of the worllfis the.knowledge that this menace,has I been eliminatfd. that there is no such bomb any more. : 73. There is still time today to change this programme and to prf~pare for peace instead of war. But the first condition is to give up investments amounting to many billions and to destroy the atomic bomb. This is a Faust- like problem. 74. At a Press conference on 30 November 1950, Pres- ident Truman said, according to a United Press report from Washington, that the United States had had under consideration the use of the atomic bomb against the Chinese ccmmrnists in connexion with the war in Korea. And going from bad to worse, he stat\..-d, during the Sa.n;le Press conference, that he would send a re- quest to the Congress for enormous new appropriations and for the expansion of the nation's atomic bomb pro- duction, and for large-scale expansion of the armed forces. 75. The following day, in the morning. issue of The New Y(),-k Times of 1 December,· we could read this: "His words in a news conference rang with challenge to communist China and Russia." 76. I'shall now quote one passage from this conference for the verbatim record because of the historical im- portance of this testimony: Question: "Mr. President, I wonder if we could retrace that reference to the atomic bomb?Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under active consideration?" Ans'wer: "It always had been, it was one of our weapons". This reported fact thu~ forms the most serious working paper for our discussions. . 77. May I now be allowed to bring in some additional quotations as relevantly as I can. Miss Anne O'Hare McCormick ·wrote in the New York Times of 2 De- cember 1950, under the headline HDetonations of a word out of season", as follows: "If the atomic bomb had been dropped, it could hardly have produced ~ greater sensation than the President's reference to it in his Press conf~rence.•. ~'The world-wide repercussions following the men" tion of this ultimate weapon proves not only how hor- rifying it is but how unwilling the war-sick nations of the West are to face the dreadful implications ..•". 78. Mr, Howard K. Smitll, in a cable of 4 December from London, published in The Natiott:· of 9 December, desc:--ibed .the dramatic scene in the British House of and Mr. Attlee came to Washington to tell the· Presi- dent that Europe opposed war with China •.. '"The unhappy aSsignment of Britain's. Prime Minister was to talk plainlyahout such ticklish mat- ters as General MacArthur's leadership,. Mr. Tru..... man's assertion that he alone can order the use of the atomic bOmb, American intervention in Formosa, the ,powers assumed by Syngman Rhee, the effect of re.. fusing Peking a seat in the United ,Nations.'Europe's feeling about these policies is as strong today as the ~ontrary emotions in .Washington." 80. Mr. Truman's statement -this was the British Peace Committee's reaction - moved the whole British people to anger; the committee emphasized the urgency of the need for the British people to insist that the United Kingdom Government should break from its subservience to United States policy. 81. 'The Times of London wrote that the question asked of the President and his reply touched upon the most sensitive fears and doubts of this age. " 82. The assembly may remember the day of the Pres- ident's annpun.c~ment and its impression on the minds of the representatives in the lounge of Lake Success. Most of the representatives were saying, to put it mildly, that it would be politically disastrous. 83. At last, the C011t11tUnique of the talks between Presi- dent 1'rUtnan and ?vIr. Attlee came. It dealt with the atomic menace at the very end, in 11 \7ery short paragra.ph: , "The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions. would never call for the use of the atomic bomb/' Still the impression in this Assembly remained that this 'Yas a rather poor retreat and this phrase could be added I infringe on·the sovereignty either of the -great or of the small. The Soviet Union realistically and logically con- sidered the question of peace from its very basis. It demanded and continues to demand with great consis- tence the prohibition of atomic weapons. " 92. In its draft declaration on the removalof the threat of a new war £,d the strengthening of peace and security among nations [279th meeting], the USSR, referring to the Stockholm Appeal an9 regarding the use of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruc~ tion of human beings as the most heinous international crime against humanity, and basing that attitude on the unanimously adopted General Assembly resolutions 1 (1) and 41 (1) of 1946 on the need for prohibiting the use of atomic-energy for military purposes, proposed that the General Assembly, recognizing that the use of the atomic weapons as a weapon of mass destruction of human beings is contradictory to international con- scienc(' and honour and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, should declare that the use of atomic weapons should be unconditionally prohibited and that a strict system of international control spould be instituted to ensure the exact and unconditional The bomb, 1J.e wrote, was the keystone of the security arch of the United States, whose foreign policy rested on it. -87. There was a phrase in The plew Yo-rk Times edi- torial of 2 December 1950 which struck me as a rather outspoken admission. It was : ((Moreover, it is within our power-alone among all the democratic countries- to precipitate or to"accept a world war." 88., It is clear that it is the United States which is the mafJl obstacle to the realization of the overwhelming <ks~re of the peoples of the world to see the atomic weapon lrohibited and the United States stockpiles desttoye . 89. The United States, with the bomb of atomic ag- gression hidden up its sleeve, has hypnotized the major- ity with the -might of dollars into. accepting and adopt- ing the resolution on united action for peace [302na meeting]. How many hypocrisies are _hidden in that resolution? Where does it speak of theprbhibition of the atomic bomb? Why, even this great Assembly did not prohibit the use of the atomic bomb under the flag of the United Nations! 90. The United States has convinced us that it does not desire peace. It is probably true that it does not want a war right now, this very day. But the moment will come when impatience will overcome premeditated action. Meanwhile the Americanized allies have had opportunities to convince -themselves of the fact that the great aid and assistance which was promised is not only not in the least altruistic, and that it is not even so great or so powerful as the United States wanted them to believe. ob~ervance of that prohibition. It further proposed that the General Assembly.' should declare that the first government to _use the atomic weapon, or any other means for the mass destruction of human beings, against any country, would thereby commit a crime against~ humanity and should be regarded as a war criminal. 93~ That proposal was truly worthy of the greatest Power in the world, but it was not aecepted. 94. The Soviet Union made use of every opportunity to put that basic demand for. the maintenance of peace- before the United Nations. It did so again [309th meetit~g] during the discussion on the twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations proposed by the Secretary-Gt;neral. The Soviet Union, in paragraph 2 (c) of i,ts draft resolution [A/1525 and CQrr.1} stressed the fact tbat in its view it was essential that in further developjng that pro- gramme, provision should be made therein for the unconditional- prohibition of atomic weapons.and other weapons for the mass extermination of people and the institution of control to ensure the observance of that prohibition. That proposal was also rejected. 95. How did the American majority react to all these proposals? The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vishinsky, expressed this clearly in his speech on 2 November 1950 in·the General Assembly [301st meeting] when he said: ((We must now have been seeking for some five years to ensure that a decision to outlaw the atomic bomb-the use of the atomic bomb-is taken simul- taneously with a decision to organize internationaf control which will ensure that this decision is carried out, but no· one agrees with us. They say 'no', and invent all k1nds of pettifogging formulre in order to- by-pass this straightforward proposal that the atomic' weapon should be unconditionally prohibited and that strict and effective international control O\1C; the execution of that prohibition should be- instituted not. want this. That is the basis of the dispu'te between us." 96. Instead of adopting a decision on which the world could build. up hope~ of peace, the General Assenlk11y adopted [308th meet~ng] an amorphous resolution en- titled "Peace through deeds" which, as Mr. SiroJ<y, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia and head of the Czechoslovak delegation said on 20 November [312th meeting], 4'virtually buries the question .of disarmament and the reduction of armed forces, as well as the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and at the same time establishes a further legal basis for armed interven- tion in the domestic affairs of States". '97. '".:'his summer, when I waS visiting the peace meetings in the villages in the Czechoslovak mountains, or in .the countryside close to Prague,.I heard a simple citizen, not a communist, not a writer, nor a politician, "just a man from the village, say something that, at that time, seemed over-simplified to me. He said: "The 'United States is opposed to the prohibition of the atomic bomb because ,it ~ants to use this weapon". 98. After President i Truman's statement, after the continual and consistent refusal of the United S~tes to agree to the prohibition of the atomic bomb and atomic weapons,· and after witnessing all the evasive tactics of the representative of the United States, I understand that every thinking person can describe the .policy of the American ruling circles only in this waY:l in those words. " . 99. Yes, the new conquerors, who today are proud of the hecatombs of the peaceful towns and villages, of the peaceful population of Korea, of the ruins left behind by the American airmen, no longer confine themselves to threats,. but are willing to use the atomic bomb at a given moment in order to speed up the" attainment of their objectives. 100. Today we no longer hear merely the empty words ~f blo~thi~sty senators; at a time when policy-making 1S passmg mto the hands of generals, the world must reali:Ge that the United States has entrusted the wa~ng of an aggressive war in the PaCific to the same man ~ho has on" 'e before made use of·the atowuc bomb in that very?' ea. .101. One of the characteristics of United States policy is a self-satisfied overestimation of the United States, .and a no less self-satisfied underestimation of the Soviet Union. In internal policy, the industrial and financial >Circles consider the notorious American slogan "bigger :and better" so effective and so essential that even those who determine the· United States foreign policy have succumbed to this propaganda. And we do not even mention certain military leaders who have succumbed to the mania forever bigger glory. 102. After the cold shower which this self-satisfied general attitude underwent when, on 23 September 1949, President Truman announced that the United States had lost its monopoly of the atomic bomb, the United States was left with only one consolation-that monstron~ sUpt:,irlrity, nor to have greater stocks of atomic weapons, for the Soviet Union continually proposes that all stocks should be destroyed immediately and that the production of atOlnic weapons should be prohibited everywhere. By these measures it desires to save the world from an eventual crisis of irresponsibility during which, in a· fit ·of overconfidence, the American owner of this stockp!1e might use it ter start a holocaust. 104~ This "question of superiority in the event of a qualitative change from the. cold war into a hot one is certainly also one of the characteristics of the American habit of overestimation. It is also characteristic of the overestimation of the value of the, atomic bomb in general, for we know today that the atomic bomb is not going to decide "the result of a ;war. ' 105. The old" trick of the promoters of the slogan . "control first, prohibition later" is in contradiraion with the common understanding of logic. Vve have first to prohibit the weapon, and tlun, or slimultaneously, to have control so that the prohibition ils carriedont. The immoral inverse conception cannot hide any other intention than to postpone the prohibition toa date when the mass production and the stockpil~ of bombs would. reach a point when an atomic war could be started without taking into account any opposition· to the use of the atomic bomb. We have te act now, because the day· may come when ·arms aceumulated in the arsenals will start to shoot and explode by themselves. The arms, as other goods, are destined for consumption. The businesslike American approach towards produc- tion is in natural contradiction with the manufacturing of bombs with the intention not to drop them. 10?}'he United States still counts on~tomic energy prImarIly as on a weapon only. Its attitude towards a peaceful development of atomic energy is negative, even though the United States Cotnmissionon Atomic Energy deClared on 23 November 1950 that it would at last publish the secrets of production of atomic energy so far as low power and nuclear reactors were coni. cerned. 107~ This stubborn demand for the control of atomic energy by a commission dominatedby the United States is, in our eyes, a necessary condition·ior the maintenance of the monopoly of American industry~".This further was a cir(:Uttlstance which put the eontrolof atomic energy into the hands of American trusts. Today this fact can in.no way help development, but on the contrary can only hinder development andeft'ect a dispen~..like distribution of an energy which, if it were fully utilized, would represent a direct threat to such sources of power of the. Ainericanruling circles.as coal and. petro1.1he Amencans do not wan..t a.nd willnot permit the use 'of atomic energy for peaceful pu~es. Could we; not lock the whole thing up, if security required it,! for a year or two years, without damaging our peace-time life in. any material re$pect ?UIS 109. It is clear that Blackett's warning voice w,s not listened to. The United Stat«~s·is not interested in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but exclusively for purposes of war. 110. Today,it is the monopolies that have been charged with the utilization of atomic energy for war p~ses. Billions of doll~rs are flowi!lg into the pockets of those who are producmg destruction. The Congress of the United States will certainly, in this· ease, adopt with a bi-partisan majority the poticy. of raising the pr~uction of atomic bombs and of greatly· ··extending theIr st<>cks. .. """ . 111. This. attitude is so clear that considerations about the control of atomic energy voiced by the United Nations are becoming entirely untimely and inappro- priate in American n~1ing circles. 112. The New Yorrk Herald Tribune magazine, This Week, of 13 Novemb~r 1949, describing the human qu~ll.ities of one cif.the top five atomic commissioners, .?1~ofeS$or Henry· de Wolf Smyth, author of the well blOwn StIf,yth· Repo't.t, wrote: HTheinformation he gave . . • made people everywhere realize that atomic energy.~s the. power ~o change the world." We agree that thiS IS true. AtomiC energy may change a booming capital into a h~p of bricks-or a dry sandy desert into a fertile farmland. It depends on who uses it and for what purpose it is used. . 113. In its issue of 21 November 1949, Mr. Henry Luce's Life· magazine quoted the speech of the Deputy Prime Minister of the. Soviet Umon, Mr. GeorJl M. Malenkov, delivered last year at the October Revmution celebration in the Bolshoi Theatre in lV!oscow. Mr. Malenkov' bad said that "in the hands of the Soviet people", atomic: energy "can be and must be a mighty Instrument .of technical progress on a scale never witnessed befo.re, an instrltment for the further rapid development of.'the;.productive forces of our country". 114. On 6 November 1950, on the eve of the thirty- third anniv,er,sary of the great October Revolution, the Deputy· Chairri1an·· of the Council of .Ministers of the ..*Quoted from the records of fue hearing" betore the S~l c:omuuttee on Atomic Energy of the United States Senate, 79th Comttess, 1st session, hearlrig of 14 December 1945. p1ans/~ , 115. Perhaps one day the self-satisfied supermen who believe in the self-sufficiency of the American civilization will1earn to understand that the Soviet Union is work- ing with atomic energy and considers it as a moving force of planned industrial production and as a fuel, as was stated here last year: and again yesterday by the Minister· for' Foreign' Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Vyshinsky. . 116. But in the Soviet Union the free development of atomic energy is not hindered by the obstructions and plots of n'lot1opolycapital and imperialism. Monopo!y capital naturally tries to prevent the utilization of atomic energy· for peat/eful purposes, for this would threatcrt the petrol, coal, ·oil, railroad, airline and shipping monop- olies. Imperialism is obstructing the peaceful utilization of atomic enel"¥y beca.u~e it·itself uses up this energy for the prOd\lctton of aggressive weapons. In order that monopoly capital should not suffer any losses in this, the imperialist managers have entrus~~d the tasks of war production to the mCl:Iopoiy trusts. 117. But peace is not in the hands of a few individuals who decide on the use of the atomic bomb. Nor is the atomic threat so terrible that it could frighten i:h~ great masses of the peoples who.desire peace, or to paralyse by fear the will of the pepples for peace. 118. The United States policy makes another fat~ful mistake. The United States has underestimated and still ttnderestimates the strength of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic o~ China, and in the same way it underestimates the strength and determination of the peoples ol the world. 119. How embarrassing did it seem when the repre- sentative of 'Sweden rejected [309th meeting] the honour conferred upon the capital of his country through' tlte. designaHon of the ~c~ ap~al as the Stockholm Appeal! Marshal Bulganm, m his November speech, said the following about this force of peace which is many times stronger than any atomic bomb: ~(rhe Soviet people stand for peace and resolutely uphold the caUSe of peace. Reflecting the will of the people, the Supreme·Soviet of the USSR, in June of this year, supported the Stockholm Appeal of the permanent committee of the World Congress of the Partisans of Peace. This appeal has been signed by 115 million Soviet dtizens-the entire adult popula- tion of our country. In this way th~ SQviet people clearly show that they desire peace and that they will fight for a "lasting peace. MUttons of peoples of other countries have taken up the fight for peace. The Stockholm Appeal .has obtained the support and signatures of over 204 millio~ people in China. In Poland, ~zechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Albania, over 50 million people have signed it. In 124. The peoples will enforce their will so that the atomic menace will be tom from the hands of those who are the greatest enemies of the people. 125. The question of who is holding the atomic bomb becomes ever more serious as United. States p«?licy deteriorates and slips along the shaky surface of an economy that has been and is going through many. crises on the road of fascism. Let us hide the painful fact that America, which once was ]efferson's and Lincoln's America, is today changing internally and using its influence for a general fascisation of the western world. But even in Latin America, United States policy stands like a bad Parca at the cradle of every reactionary coup. that, a criminal or a fascist who first drops an atomic bomb anywhere in the world at the command of a higher criminal or fascist general will be the one to bear the responsibility for the destruttion and ruin of the towns of even his own country. This is a terrible responsibility. and the world realizes once again tllat fascisation leads countries to irresponsibility. The United States has The meeting roslJ at 1.5 p.m , ,