S/PV.10086 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2025/850, which contains the text of a letter dated 26 December 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Mr. Ebo. Mr. Ebo: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with counterparts in the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). In addition, I held a meeting earlier this week with His Excellency Ambassador Ibrahim Olabi, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, which was also joined virtually by His Excellency Ambassador Mohammed Katoub, Syria’s newly appointed Permanent Representative to the OPCW. Since the Council’s previous meeting on this matter (see S/PV.9994), the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to engage on how to eliminate any remnants of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous Government. Given the significant challenges to overcome in these efforts, I welcome the continued progress that has been made since the Council’s previous meeting. As previously reported, since 2014, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been able to confirm that the declaration submitted by the previous Government was accurate and complete because of the insufficient and inaccurate information it contained. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has reported “serious concern” over the declaration’s issues, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. The new Syrian Government has been working with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the programme developed by the previous Government and ensure serious long-term compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In this month’s report, the OPCW Technical Secretariat reiterates that, in addition to the 26 declared chemical weapons-related sites, information made available to the OPCW suggests that there are more than 100 other sites that may have been involved in the previous Government’s chemical weapons-related activities. As part of its work on this matter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat plans to visit all these locations, taking into account security and other relevant considerations. With support and facilitation from the Syrian Government, OPCW teams deployed in March, April, June, August, September, October and November 2025. And the overall number of locations visited since March 2025 now stands at 19. Of these, four were locations previously declared, while 15 were suspected chemical weapons-related locations. The OPCW also conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts, collected six samples and collected more than 6,000 documents from the visited locations. Based on the information gathered through the OPCW’s deployment in 2025, at least two locations visited by the OPCW could be declarable under the CWC. The OPCW is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons-related activities conducted at these two facilities and their subsequent declarability. I am also encouraged to hear that further deployments are being prepared. In meetings held in October and November 2025, the Syrian Government and the OPCW Technical Secretariat discussed the possibility of visiting several high- priority chemical weapons-related locations in the coastal and northern areas close to Latakia. Subsequently, through two notes verbales dated 11 November 2025, the Syrian Government shared reports of the visits that the reconnaissance teams had conducted at two locations, suspected of containing remnants of undeclared chemical weapons. The OPCW Technical Secretariat is analysing these reports and will coordinate further activities, including possible visits to these locations with the Syrian Government. However, it must be emphasized that some of the sites to be visited are located in dangerous areas, involving significant risk to teams on the ground, including Syrian and OPCW personnel. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Government with a list of operational requirements to be completed before any site visits by the OPCW teams can take place. The Syrian Government has informed the OPCW that they will share these operational requirements with their national and international partners, coordinate necessary activities and provide feedback as soon as the necessary work is completed to ensure safe deployment to these locations. Additional concrete steps in the previous reporting period that should be highlighted include the fact that in November 2025, the newly appointed Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW presented his credentials to the OPCW Director General and the Syrian National Authority has been re- established. I also welcome the re-establishment of the continuous presence of the OPCW mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, as the OPCW Technical Secretariat secured accommodation and office space in October 2025 in an existing secure location that already meets United Nations safety and security requirements. As has been previously reported, there are significant challenges ahead and consistent support from the entire international community will be critical to efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons. The OPCW Director General has noted that the tasks ahead will likely be more complex than those carried out 11 years ago and involve the destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons programme. In November 2025, the OPCW Director General sent a letter to members of the Executive Council, along with a needs and gaps assessment prepared by the Technical Secretariat. This assessment shall inform those parties and other partners willing to support the Syrian Arab Republic as to what needs to be provided so that the activities in the Syrian Arab Republic may come to a successful end. I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has been supporting and advising the Syrian Arab Republic and other State parties with regard to the plans for the destruction of any identified chemical weapons and related remnants. Destruction might need to be carried out on site, where conditions require. The recent decision of the Executive Council on expedited on-site destruction, that is EC- 110/DEC.1, dated 8 October 2025, authorizes such a measure and constitutes a positive step forward. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains committed to delivering on its mandate to verify the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all declaration requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention, decisions by the OPCW policymaking organs and Security Council resolutions. I will also reiterate that the commitment of the new Government of Syria to fully and transparently cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is both welcome and commendable. I also commend the efforts of the Syrian teams on the ground whose work involves significant physical risk. As I have previously emphasized, there is currently a critical opportunity to obtain long overdue clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and to rid the country of all chemical weapons. I once again urge the members of the Council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort will require. The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do our part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time.

I thank Mr. Ebo for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

We would like to thank Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for his briefing. We have closely studied the latest report by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General, Fernando Arias (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure). We note the efforts undertaken by the Technical Secretariat in fostering cooperation with the Syrian transitional Government, geared towards normalizing the situation around Syria’s chemical dossier. We express our gratitude for the related work undertaken by Qatar, which was temporarily representing Damascus’ interests at the Organization. We welcome the appointment of Syria’s new Permanent Representative to the OPCW, as well as the establishment of the Syrian National Authority responsible for interaction with the OPCW. Russia has consistently advocated and continues to advocate for the prompt resolution of outstanding issues pertaining to Syria’s initial declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which would facilitate the closure of the Syrian chemical file. All this could have been done far sooner if the OPCW Technical Secretariat had acted in good faith, as stipulated in its mandate and the provisions of the Convention. Alas, over the course of more than 10 years, this body has politicized the matter and dragged out the process, keeping it afloat as a lever to exert pressure on the Syrian authorities. To that end, the Secretariat resorted to violations of the methodology for collecting evidence provided for by the Convention; the fabrication of evidence; conjecture that flies in the face of the basic laws of science and common human logic; and false testimony from phony eyewitnesses. All these facts, which have long been known to the international community, generate ever greater scepticism regarding the ill-conceived and rushed decision of the OPCW Executive Council to hastily detect and destroy certain Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles. Such measures do not have the slightest hint of respect for the provisions of the Convention and its annexes. We deem it unacceptable to set dangerous precedents that risk irrevocably encroaching upon the provisions of the Convention vis-à-vis the modalities for the destruction of chemical weapons. It is the inability of the OPCW to perform its tasks efficiently and the principled unwillingness of the Technical Secretariat’s leadership to correct its methodology of work that continue to be a key problem obstructing the implementation of the objectives of resolution 2118 (2013). As long as these problems remain unresolved, nothing will help — neither the willingness of the transitional Syrian Government to constructively engage with the OPCW nor the desire of the international community to turn this page of Syrian history as quickly as possible. The latest report by OPCW Director General, Mr. Arias, merely corroborates this conclusion. The report still has the following wording: “the transfer of power to new authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic […] presents an opportunity for the Organization to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme” (ibid., para. 11). This language is completely at odds with the real situation on the ground, let alone the fact that it goes beyond the purview of OPCW’s mandate, which is purely technical in nature. One should not disregard the objective reality that, over the years of conflict, a significant part of Syrian territory has repeatedly come under the control of various armed groups. Many military and industrially significant facilities have either been destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of large-scale air strikes carried out by both the Western coalition and Israel. Against this backdrop, certain statements by the Technical Secretariat seem to be completely divorced from reality, namely those about properly collecting new samples, discovering documents at sites or demanding that the Syrian authorities provide certain information and documents. What also appears dubious is the quality of “new” materials obtained under such circumstances. Clearly, in these conditions, there can be no talk of either the preservation of material evidence or its authenticity and the possibility of objective analysis thereof. Nor can anyone speak of the comprehensive picture that could be established during the inspections. Ignoring the aforementioned facts, the Technical Secretariat continues to assert that there is a need for inspections at another 100 sites. All this, alongside the decision regarding the expedited elimination of the discovered chemical weapons, leads us to the conclusion that such plans are merely attempts to pin the responsibility for the crimes on the former Syrian authorities, rather than a desire to establish the truth. We are convinced that the Security Council members must not condone such an approach. In this regard, we once again call on the OPCW Technical Secretariat to act impartially and professionally and to adhere to a depoliticized approach. In practice, this means that there should be no predetermined conclusions that are not underpinned by irrefutable evidence. The efforts to close the Syrian chemical file must be strictly in line with the provisions of the Convention. We also urge our Council colleagues to develop approaches to addressing this issue with due regard for the specificities of the domestic political situation in Syria, which is currently facing a host of existential problems, including the need to preserve the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for his briefing. The United States welcomes the establishment of a continuous presence in Syria of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We also welcome the re-establishment of the Syrian National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the appointment of Mr. Mohamad Katoub as the new Permanent Representative of Syria to the OPCW. As we mark the one-year anniversary of historic change in Syria, we are encouraged by the cooperation between the Syrian Government and the OPCW towards identifying and documenting the full scope and extent of the Al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons programme. This past year has opened the door, in an unprecedented way, to the OPCW in Syria. However, many challenges remain, particularly with respect to deploying under challenging security conditions. We urge all parties to do everything necessary to ensure the success of these deployments and minimize the proliferation threat to the region. As indicated by Director General Arias in his most recent report on the issue (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure), the OPCW will need extrabudgetary support to complete its mission in Syria. We therefore urge all OPCW member States, especially those from the region, to contribute to this effort if they have not already done so. Beyond ensuring the verifiable destruction of any remnant of the Al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons programme, I would like to reiterate that the Council must also ensure that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons be held to account, consistent with resolution 2118 (2013).

I would like to thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ebo, for his briefing. I welcome the presence of the Permanent Representative of Syria. The political transition that began 13 months ago in Syria with the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime generates tremendous hope. France is committed to supporting the Syrian authorities in conducting a peaceful and inclusive transition that respects the rights of all components of Syrian society, in the spirit of the principles enshrined in resolution 2254 (2015). This political transition offers a historic opportunity to achieve the chemical disarmament of Syria and ensure accountability for the use of these inhumane weapons, which the Al-Assad regime has used repeatedly against its own population. In 2025, a dynamic of cooperation began between Syria and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW teams have been able to carry out several deployments in Syria. One can note specifically the deployment of the team tasked with investigating and identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons, which is now incorporated into the OPCW’s Office of Special Missions. In November, in another notable development, Syria appointed a new ambassador to the OPCW at The Hague. We welcome the commitment undertaken by the Syrian transitional authorities to open a new chapter with the OPCW and to finally move forward, in accordance with their international obligations, towards the complete and verifiable elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme. There are still significant challenges in meeting the expectations of the international community. First, there are challenges related to the legacy of the Al-Assad regime. Owing to the Al-Assad regime’s numerous omissions, Syria’s national declaration on the status of its chemical programme still cannot be considered accurate and complete in the light of the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This was reiterated in the latest report by the Director-General of the OPCW (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure), which highlights that 19 issues relating to this declaration remain unresolved, potentially regarding significant stocks of military chemical agents. The OPCW also estimates that approximately 100 undeclared sites may have been involved in activities related to Syria’s chemical programme. Secondly, there are challenges related to the conditions under which the elimination of the remainder of the former regime’s chemical programme is being resumed. We are not in a situation in which the regime or the Governments that developed a programme are the ones deciding to dismantle it, since Bashar Al-Assad’s regime has always refused to do so. The knowledge is therefore incomplete, and the former expertise is no longer available, which complicates the tasks at hand. In this context, which is also marked by major economic and financial needs in Syria, France underscores the importance of two elements. First, the Syrian authorities must remain fully committed to full and complete cooperation with the OPCW. France will be vigilant in this regard. Secondly, the international community must provide resolute technical and financial support to help the Syrian authorities fulfill their obligations and address the very unique challenges I mentioned earlier. France reiterates its support for the OPCW teams, as demonstrated by its contribution to the special fund for Syria in 2025. At the most recent Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in November, France supported the decision to delegate to the OPCW Executive Council the power to restore Syria’s rights and privileges as a State party, which were suspended in 2021. The eventual restoration of these rights and privileges will be an important step in Syria’s reintegration into the international community. In order to achieve this goal, substantial progress must continue to be made in cooperation with the OPCW and in the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme.

I thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for this informative briefing, and I welcome the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to our meeting. Over the past year, Syria has made significant strides towards peace, security and development. As discussed, many times around this table, we should continue to support this positive trajectory across all tracks — political, economic and humanitarian — but also when it comes to destroying and disposing of the Al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons. Allow me to make two points today in line with Denmark’s objective to close this file effectively and comprehensively, while also securing accountability for the atrocious crimes committed against the Syrian people. First, we acknowledge the complexity of the task of destroying all remaining chemical weapons in Syria. We therefore urge Member States to extend all technical and financial assistance to Syria and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in sharing this burden. With the continued presence and threat of Da’esh and other terrorist groups in Syria, an expedient closure of this file is needed. We welcome last year’s OPCW destruction plan, the re-establishment of a continued presence of the OPCW mission in Syria in October and the appointment of a Permanent Representative of Syria to the OPCW. This close cooperation is important and commendable. At the same time, we urge the OPCW to take a more proactive approach in coordination with Syria, in order to increase momentum towards the closure of the file. Secondly, progress on this file must not come at the expense of accountability. Accountability remains a cornerstone of a successful political transition in Syria. This also means accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. All victims of the Al-Assad regime’s illegal and heinous chemical weapons attacks deserve justice. In closing, we reiterate our hope to make further progress towards concluding the chemical weapons file this year. We also reiterate our support and encouragement to the OPCW and the Syrian transitional Government to continue to work diligently towards these ends.

We thank Mr. Ebo for his comprehensive briefing. We welcome the presence of the representatives the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye in this meeting. Pakistan reaffirms its opposition to the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. We attach great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a pillar of the global disarmament regime. We support the Convention’s universal adherence and its full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation. Pakistan remains committed to advancing the objectives of the Convention and upholding the effectiveness and impartiality of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Over the past year, Syria has witnessed sustained movement both across internal and international tracks, creating a welcome opportunity to advance stability, recovery and reconciliation. The visit of the Security Council to Damascus last month conveyed an important message of solidarity and enabled Council members to witness first-hand the realities on the ground, reinforcing the importance of sustained engagement. We strongly support Syria’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are essential for durable peace and stability. Pakistan continues to back an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process. The security situation in Syria is seriously affected by Israel’s military occupation of parts of Syrian territory and its continuing strikes against Syrian sites and facilities. Regrettably, Israeli military strikes have also impeded the technical work of the OPCW in Syria. The risk of terrorism and the presence of foreign terrorist fighters also pose a challenge to the country’s security and affect the OPCW’s verification activities. Pakistan views positively the commitment of the Syrian authorities to fully implement the CWC, secure suspected chemical weapons sites and address outstanding issues. We appreciate the cooperation of the Syrian authorities with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and hope that this collaboration will continue unimpeded. The Technical Secretariat must be enabled to carry out its independent verification to eliminate suspected chemical weapons in Syria and any risk of proliferation, in compliance with the CWC. The re-establishment of a continuous presence of the OPCW mission in Syria in October 2025 will promote this objective. As highlighted by the Technical Secretariat, it is also important to bridge the gap between what the Syrian Arab Republic must provide and the capacity it has at its disposal. Continued international support to Syria and the Technical Secretariat therefore remains critically important. We welcome the adoption of the decision on the reinstatement of the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC in November 2025. We also appreciate the designation of points of contact and the appointment of the Permanent Representative of Syria to the OPCW. We hope that the engagement between the Technical Secretariat and the Syrian authorities will build on the positive momentum to resolve all outstanding issues. We look forward to their continued cooperation, in full compliance with the CWC and Security Council resolutions, to close the Syrian chemical weapons file as soon as possible.

Allow me to begin by thanking Somalia, in its capacity as President of the Security Council, for organizing this meeting. We also thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ebo, for his briefing. Colombia reaffirms its absolute rejection of the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual under any circumstance and for whatever purpose. In this regard, my country insists on the full and effective implementation of the relevant instruments and on the needs to ensure justice and accountability for any use of this type of weapon. Shedding light on the facts and identifying those responsible and bringing them to justice, in line with international law, is fundamental. The Colombian delegation takes note of the information presented by the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and expresses its concern over remaining challenges, including the 19 outstanding issues that involve large quantities of potentially undeclared and/or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. We therefore urge the Syrian authorities to step up their efforts to fully address in a timely manner the request for information and documentation made by the Technical Secretariat. At the same time, we acknowledge the commitment and efforts of the new Syrian Government to actively collaborate with the respective authorities on this issue. This is an opportunity to make progress in fully clarifying the scope of the programme and ensuring long-term compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. We appreciate the signs of cooperation we have seen, including the channelling of communications through its representation to the OPCW and the support provided for the conduct of field visits. We trust that this collaborative dynamic will continue and strengthen in the future. However, the report (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure) shows that operational limitations remain to be overcome, including working conditions that ensure the integrity and confidentiality of OPCW activities. In particular, we emphasize that preserving evidence and the integrity of declared sites and those that may have been involved in related activities is essential to the conduct of rigorous investigations and safeguarding the chain of custody. This would ensure the identification of the presence of possible undeclared chemical weapons or precursors of chemical warfare for the purpose of proceeding with their elimination, in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the same vein, we would like to highlight that the security situation continues to affect the Organization’s ability to carry out deployments. Visits and activities are subject to security requirements, and some sites are located in dangerous areas. We therefore urge all actors to exercise maximum restraint, contribute to de-escalation and avoid actions that could interfere with this important work. We express our concern that the military operations of other actors have affected OPCW deployments, causing delays in its work, hindering access to the areas that need to be inspected, preventing the collection of verifiable information concerning the presence of chemical weapons or chemical warfare precursors and, as a result, increasing the risk of worsening security and stability in Syria in particular and in the region in general. In conclusion, Colombia reiterates its support for the efforts of the Syrian Government and the work of the OPCW aimed at verifiably closing this file on the basis of full compliance with international obligations and respect for international law. This transition period offers an opportunity to make concrete progress towards a Syria free of chemical weapons and to consolidate security conditions that will enable a stable future for the country. It is incumbent upon the international community to support these efforts in a responsible and consistent manner.

I would like to thank the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ebo, for presenting the report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure) and for the latest update from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the situation in Syria. We acknowledge the presence of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye, who honour us with their participation today. The dossier on chemical weapons in Syria has entered a new phase, characterized by a sustained operational presence of the OPCW on the ground, significantly expanded investigations and the start of concrete preparations for the accelerated destruction of remnants of the chemical programme. In addition to the 26 officially declared sites, more than 100 additional locations may have been linked to chemical weapons-related activities. Panama values the establishment of the Office of Special Missions and the re- establishment of a continuous OPCW presence in Syria, which have enabled on-site visits, interviews, the collection of samples and documentation and strengthened verification. This structural change improves the Organization’s ability to fulfil its mandate effectively and credibly. We recognize that the interim authorities have opened an important window of opportunity for cooperation. We value steps such as the signing of the agreement on privileges and immunities, the appointment of a new National Authority and the facilitation of visits. However, the report clearly states that these commitments have not yet been fulfilled, particularly because issues remain pending regarding access to key documentation, difficulties or dangers in accessing sites, interviews with technical personnel and compliance with pending decisions of the Executive Council. It is particularly significant that the OPCW has initiated technical consultations for accelerated on-site destruction, in accordance with decision EC-110/DEC.1. This development reflects the fact that the process has entered a decisive stage aimed not only at verifying but also at safely and verifiably eliminating any remnants of the chemical programme, while preserving the evidence necessary for accountability. In this context, Panama stresses that accountability is a structural component of the Syrian chemical dossier and reiterates its support for the independent work of the Investigation and Identification Team and for cooperation with international justice mechanisms. The use of chemical weapons, under any circumstances, constitutes a serious violation of international law. While concrete progress has been made, the information contained in this report shows that the threat has not been fully eradicated. Panama urgently calls for this critical phase to be used to move forward resolutely towards full compliance with the Convention, ensuring effective cooperation with the OPCW and the political and financial support necessary for the success of its operations. We reiterate our full support for the OPCW in implementing its mandate and call on the Syrian authorities to translate the initial progress into a full, sustained and verifiable commitment, in line with their international obligations and the relevant Security Council resolutions. We are confident that this will be the case. For the progress outlined in the Director General’s report to be sustainable, it is essential that the disarmament process move forward in parallel with governance and security efforts in order to consolidate the conditions necessary for genuine and lasting peace. Following the Council’s historic visit to Damascus last December, it has been established that the consolidation of peace in Syria requires progress in an inclusive political process, led and owned by the Syrians themselves, in full compliance with resolution 2254 (2015), which guarantees the effective participation of all sectors of society, including women and young people, and which is based on full respect for human rights. We reaffirm our commitment to disarmament, justice for victims and the shared goal of a Syria free of chemical weapons for the sake of international peace and security.

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the African members of the Security Council (A3), namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and my own country, Liberia. We thank Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for his briefing, and we welcome the participation of all representatives. At the outset, the A3 reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone and under any circumstance. We underscore that accountability, cooperation and verification remain indispensable pillars of upholding the Convention’s integrity. We note the Secretary-General’s letter (S/2025/850), which reflects continued progress in implementing resolution 2118 (2013) and enhanced cooperation between Syria and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In this regard, we welcome the confidence-building developments referenced in the letter, including the OPCW Director General’s visit to Damascus, the reorganization of Secretariat activities through the Office of Special Missions and the agreement on privileges and immunities for OPCW personnel, which, together, have facilitated improved cooperation. These steps demonstrate the value of sustained engagement and pragmatic arrangements in advancing technical objectives. We also welcome the successful OPCW deployments noted by the Secretary- General, marked by unprecedented access, cooperation and the collection of new documents and samples. The A3 acknowledges the submission by the Syrian authorities of a concept plan for the destruction and verification of remaining chemical weapons, as referenced in the letter. We consider this plan a constructive basis for further technical engagement and urge sustained international support for its implementation. The A3 supports the ongoing work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, in close collaboration with the Syrian authorities, to address the outstanding issues identified by the Secretary-General, including those involving potentially undeclared chemical warfare agents and munitions. We also note, as reflected in the letter, reports indicating that additional locations may have been involved in chemical weapons-related activities and underline the importance of allowing the OPCW to pursue these matters through professional, impartial and technically grounded mechanisms, including the Office of Special Missions. The A3 is deeply concerned that recent security incidents, including those reported in July 2025, have disrupted OPCW activities, noting that such actions directly undermine international verification efforts and risk delaying the closure of this long-standing file. We call for restraint and the avoidance of actions that undermine the verification efforts or risk further escalation. Respect for territorial integrity remains essential to reducing tensions, preserving regional stability and protecting civilians. We also underscore the continued threat posed by Da’esh and stress the importance of preventing chemical weapons from falling into the hands of terrorist groups. In conclusion, the A3 emphasizes that sustainable progress towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons in Syria requires: the cessation of actions that undermine verification efforts; full and sustained cooperation between the Syrian authorities and the OPCW; adequate international funding and technical support; and strict adherence to international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. We therefore encourage continued dialogue and cooperation between Syria and the OPCW, with appropriate international support, to permanently close this file.

At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for his valuable briefing to the Security Council and to welcome all the delegations participating in today’s meeting. Since 8 December 2024, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has been taking serious steps to restore its role in its regional and international environment and to support the process of political reform in the country. These steps have also included numerous initiatives to meet Syria’s obligations to the OPCW and to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which aims to eliminate chemical weapons, ensure accountability and protect international peace and security. In this context, the Kingdom of Bahrain welcomes the pivotal role played by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in strengthening international security and protecting humanity from the dangers of these banned weapons. The Kingdom of Bahrain commends the close and constructive cooperation between the Syrian Government and the OPCW and welcomes the signing of the privileges and immunities agreement by the OPCW and its staff on the one hand and the Syrian Government on the other in June 2025 and the appointment of a team from the Office of Special Missions to coordinate all the activities of the OPCW Secretariat in the Syrian territories. That, in addition to the OPCW Technical Secretariat teams completing several field visits over the past year, is a clear example of the Syrian Government’s readiness to deal with this file in a transparent and credible manner. The Kingdom of Bahrain commends the comprehensive clarifications contained in the report of the Director General of the OPCW (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure), appreciating the efforts made by the OPCW in cooperation and coordination with the Syrian Government in this regard. The Kingdom of Bahrain calls on the international community to offer the necessary support to the Syrian Government and the Organization so that they can both perform their required duties so as to finally close this file. The Kingdom affirms the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the brotherly Syrian Arab Republic and rejects foreign interference in its internal affairs, considering that the security and stability of Syria constitute a fundamental pillar for the security and stability of the entire region. The Kingdom believes that the support of the international community for the Syrian Arab Republic in this transitional phase is an urgent necessity in order to achieve an orderly and smooth political transition, in accordance with the principles of resolution 2254 (2015). In conclusion, the Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms the importance of joint action to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction and the support of the international community for the Syrian Arab Republic in this pivotal phase.

I thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for his briefing, and I welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic with us today. It has now been a year since the fall of the Al-Assad regime in Syria. This new Syrian Government has provided hope that Al-Assad era chemical weapons will be verifiably identified and eliminated once and for all. The United Kingdom applauds the continued commitment of Syria’s leadership to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention and to meet its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013). We commend the continued professionalism and dedication of the staff of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who carry out their work in Syria under difficult conditions. In 2025, Syria and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons made important progress under challenging circumstances. First, multiple OPCW deployments to Syria have increased our understanding of the scale and scope of Al-Assad’s chemical weapons programme. The evidence found of an undeclared chemical weapons programme was a stark reminder of the threat that the Al-Assad regime posed to the Syrian people, first and foremost, and to the wider region. Secondly, a Syrian-led decision on expedited destruction was adopted by the OPCW Executive Council in October, allowing Syria and the OPCW to deal with dangerous elements of Al-Assad’s programme upon discovery. And thirdly, a Syrian led decision adopted at the Conference of the States Parties in November was an important step towards restoring Syria’s rights and privileges at the OPCW. The United Kingdom welcomes the establishment of a continuous OPCW presence in Syria and the appointment of a new Syrian Permanent Representative to the OPCW in The Hague. And we pay tribute to Qatar for representing Syria in this context since January 2025. These milestones provide a foundation for Syria and the OPCW Technical Secretariat to accelerate their work in 2026. However, there remain challenges to overcome. Significant and sustainable financial and in-kind support from the international community is key to eliminating the remnants of Al-Assad’s chemical weapons programme. The United Kingdom is proud to support Syria in this respect, having contributed more than $3.8 million since December 2024 to the OPCW’s Syria missions. We will continue to provide technical expertise to both Syria and the OPCW, and we urge Council members and the wider international community to also assist in this endeavor. The Council has spent more than a decade discussing this file. With clear commitment from Syria’s leadership to the eradication of chemical weapons and to seeking accountability for their use, we hope to see continued progress in 2026 to deliver these important outcomes for the Syrian people’s well-being.

Let me thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ebo, for his informative briefing and the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for his report (S/2025/850, annex, enclosure). I welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in this meeting. As this is our first statement on this important item, allow me to begin by reiterating Latvia’s commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. We support a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition process that enables the Government to foster stability domestically and in its relations with neighbours, combat terrorism, address the country’s socioeconomic recovery and ensure inclusive governance for all Syrians. The ongoing transition and reform process are also crucial to Syria’s full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. A stable, inclusive and cohesive Syria is key to ensuring full transparency in eliminating all remnants of chemical weapons and to guaranteeing full accountability for all those involved in the illegal chemical weapons programme and in the heinous attacks on civilians under the Al-Assad regime. It will not be easy or simple, but it must be done with the utmost zeal and urgency. We welcome the fruitful cooperation between the new Syrian authorities and the OPCW, and applaud the significant and ongoing efforts of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. This includes the establishment of the Office of Special Missions, tasked with implementing the mandates of the Declaration Assessment Team, the Fact-Finding Mission and the Investigation and Identification Team, as well as the re- establishment of a continuous presence in the country. We encourage the Syrian authorities to continue to provide full support to the Office of Special Missions in all possible ways and to comply with all information requests accordingly. Considering the scale of the challenge, with more than 100 additional locations potentially related to the programme, as well as the continuing threat posed by terrorist groups, regional and international support is key to assisting Syria in achieving full implementation of the Convention, including the verified elimination of all remnants of chemical weapons. The recent historic visit to Syria by the Security Council was a strong political signal, and this should be followed by further international efforts. While financial resources are the most obvious necessity, capacity-building and the sharing of technical expertise are equally urgent. Finally, allow me to reiterate that any use of chemical weapons is categorically unacceptable. It constitutes a breach of international law and causes immense suffering. It is crucial to maintain an unwavering commitment to strengthening the norm of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We cannot allow impunity to prevail. All cases of use of chemical weapons, in Syria and elsewhere, must be thoroughly investigated, and perpetrators must be held accountable for their crimes.

I would like to thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ebo, for his briefing. I would also like to welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Syria in this meeting. More than a year after the fall of the Al-Assad regime, the Syrian people have embarked on a new path marked by aspiration and hope. The Security Council’s recent visit to Syria sent an important signal of support for the country’s reintegration into the international community. This transition cannot be complete without the definitive resolution of the chemical weapons file, which remains a critical legacy of the prolonged conflict. We welcome the most recent monthly reports of the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and wish to highlight three points. First, Greece fully supports the principles and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons by any State or non-State actor, anywhere and under any circumstances. Such acts are unacceptable and must not go unpunished. Accountability is essential. In this regard, we express our full support for the OPCW in the impartial, professional and rigorous execution of its mandate. Secondly, we take note of the tangible progress reported by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. As we have heard from Mr. Ebo, since March 2025, OPCW teams have conducted visits to 19 locations in Syria, including suspected chemical weapons- related sites, collected samples and documentation, and re-established a continuous in-country presence as of October 2025. These steps are important for advancing verification and rebuilding confidence. At the same time, information indicating that more than 100 additional locations may be linked to past chemical weapons activities highlights the scale of the remaining task and the need for sustained cooperation and access. Thirdly, Greece welcomes the willingness demonstrated by the Syrian authorities and the progress achieved thus far, as reflected in the re-establishment of the Syrian National Authority, the resumption of progress reporting and the appointment of a new Permanent Representative to the OPCW. At the same time, significant challenges remain, and we urge the Syrian authorities to intensify their efforts to address them fully. In conclusion, Greece reaffirms the importance of upholding all relevant international agreements and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2118 (2013), and of preserving the international norm against any use of chemical weapons. In this regard, my country has decided to contribute financially to the trust fund for Syria missions of the OPCW and stands ready to provide further assistance, in particular training, to enhance the means and resources of Syria, in order to enable it to implement its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We reiterate our full support for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria as well as for a peaceful, inclusive and democratic political transition that ensures that all Syrians, without discrimination, feel safe and equal.

I thank the Deputy to the High Representative, Mr. Ebo, for his briefing. I welcome among us the Permanent Representatives of Syria and Türkiye. I wish to make the following four points. First, China notes the recent progress achieved regarding chemical weapons and Syria. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat has established an office in Damascus and has conducted five investigative field visits to Syria. The Syrian transitional Government has reconstituted its national implementation mechanism and submitted monthly reports on chemical weapons. China welcomes these developments and supports continued dialogue and cooperation between the transitional Government and the Technical Secretariat to bring about an early, thorough and comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues in relation to Syrian chemical weapons. Secondly, the 110th session of the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision authorizing the expedited on-site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in exceptional situations. This is a special arrangement made in response to Syria’s specific security situation and destruction capabilities. It does not constitute a precedent. As a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Syria has a responsibility to completely fulfil its obligations. Both the Technical Secretariat and Syria should act strictly in line with the Convention to ensure that the destruction of residual chemical weapons is verifiable and irreversible. Thirdly, when addressing the issue of Syrian chemical weapons, the most important lesson for the international community is that it must not be politicized. The OPCW must maintain its technical nature, perform its duties strictly in line with the Convention and proceed with its work in a just, transparent and secure manner, while providing State parties with timely and complete evidence of all progress. Furthermore, any investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons must follow proper procedures, rely on solid evidence and reach credible conclusions. Fourthly, Syria must steadfastly oppose all forms of terrorism and prevent terrorists from acquiring, manufacturing or using chemical weapons. To this end, we call upon the Syrian transitional Government to fulfil its international obligations and take all effective measures to firmly combat all international terrorist organizations, including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement. Finally, I wish to reiterate that China maintains a policy of friendship towards the entire Syrian population. We support the maintenance of Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, and we object to external intervention. China consistently and resolutely opposes the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual under any circumstances and for whatever purpose. The use of chemical weapons, whenever and wherever it occurs, is intolerable and cannot be countenanced.

At the outset, I congratulate you, Mr. President, and your brotherly country, Somalia, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month, and I wish you every success in managing its work. I would also like to thank Mr. Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for his briefing. I would like to particularly thank him for distinguishing between Syria and the chemical weapons programme and his recognition that this programme, alongside any incomplete declaration, date back to the Al-Assad era. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Latvia on their membership of the Council for the period 2026–2027 and wish them every success. On 8 December 2025, Syria celebrated one year since its liberation from the dark era of the Al-Assad regime, during which chemical weapons were widely used against civilians. I would like to address the chemical weapons issue from the perspective of Syria’s new policies, adopted over the past year. Our efforts in this regard, since the Director General’s visit 10 months ago, provide a realistic and concrete example of our overall approach. These efforts have succeeded in moving the issue from a stage of scepticism and manipulation to one of partnership with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). First, we are boldly confronting the legacy of the Al-Assad era. The Government’s approach this year has been to bravely confront any heavy legacy from the Al-Assad era. The chemical weapons file is a prime example of the issues inherited from this era, of which we were victims. We dealt with it effectively, despite the serious difficulties we faced. The most important of these difficulties were the secrecy of the Al-Assad era’s chemical programme, the lack of institutional memory, weak national capabilities and the dangers of landmines and remnants of war. The destructive role played by Israel in targeting suspected sites further complicated the situation. All of this makes the task of dealing with the issue extraordinarily difficult. However, we have been up to the challenge, and we have shouldered our responsibility. Secondly, concerning our approach to maintaining the security of Syrians and the world, this year the Government has sought to be a source of security, both locally and internationally. We have risked our lives to dispose of the remnants of chemical weapons in order to preserve the security of Syrians and safeguard the security of the region, while adhering to the highest possible safety standards, within the limits of available resources and capabilities and taking into account the risks this may pose to the lives of our national teams. Thirdly, as regards commitments to international conventions, from the outset, the Syrian Government has worked to move beyond the procrastination and manipulation that characterized the previous era with regard to the implementation of international conventions and legal obligations, and has been keen to return to fully fulfilling its obligations within the framework of those legal instruments, based on respect for its international commitments. With regard to the chemical file, Syria demonstrated its commitment by providing all necessary facilities to the Organization’s Technical Secretariat teams, including issuing entry permits to all members of the Organization’s teams and facilitating their unrestricted access to Syrian territories. It has also granted the necessary licences for the deployments of the Technical Secretariat teams, of which there have been eight, with a total of 23 sites visited. During these visits, unrestricted access and all logistical and security services have been provided, in addition to security and safety measures. We are currently witnessing the longest deployment of the Technical Secretariat teams, which began on 6 October and continues to this day, marking the beginning of the Organization’s long-term presence in Syria. In parallel, the new Syria has continued to submit its monthly national reports to the Organization. Fourthly, in terms of constructive cooperation, the new Syria believes in cooperation and partnership with the international community and in multilateralism as a way to overcome differences and achieve balanced relations based on mutual trust and respect. Guided by this belief, Syria has made a qualitative leap in its cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This was reflected in the decisions of the OPCW Executive Council, and we saw it in the shift in the positions of States, as we heard today, culminating in the recent adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in early December 2025 (General Assembly resolution 80/534), with the broad support of Member States. This sent an unambiguous political message about the international community’s support for the path of the new relationship between Syria and the OPCW. Given this positive climate, Syria has unreservedly opened its doors to international cooperation, and the efforts of the national teams have begun to yield results, as they have, in the course of their work, identified two suspicious sites containing empty cylinders previously used for toxic chemical substances. The Technical Secretariat was contacted immediately, and the national teams continue their work to explore and identify other suspicious sites for reporting. In the context of transparent interaction with the OPCW, Syria has also provided the Technical Secretariat with 6,000 documents related to the inherited chemical weapons programme, and we have also secured interviews with 14 witnesses, including people who were working on the chemical programme in the Al-Assad era. Fifthly, regarding accountability and justice for victims, the new Syria has placed the issue of transitional justice at the top of its priorities, believing in the need to hold accountable those involved in violations, provide redress for the victims and ensure that there is no recurrence, as a key pillar for consolidating civil peace and promoting societal stability. In this context, Syria is cooperating with the Investigation and Identification Team, which is operating for the first time from inside Syria, reviewing evidence and official documents regarding the attacks committed by the Al-Assad regime. The Syrian national committee has held meetings with victims and witnesses who have been affected by the chemical attacks carried out by the Al- Assad regime. These teams helped witnesses to testify before the OPCW. In the same vein, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs sponsored a conference for victims of chemical weapons for the first time from Damascus. Sixthly and finally, regarding capacity-building and strengthening national institutions, Syrian State institutions are enduring structural weakness and a lack of technical capacity and qualified personnel as a result of 14 years of war, which were preceded by decades of dictatorship, isolating Syria from the world. This poses a major challenge for the new Syrian Government, which is nonetheless working tirelessly to strengthen national institutions and provide them with qualified staff. In this context, Syria reactivated the work of its Permanent Mission to the OPCW by appointing a Permanent Representative to the OPCW at the beginning of October 2025, after the State of Qatar played a commendable role in representing it before the OPCW. Syria has also reconstituted the national committee for the supervision of cooperation with the OPCW and has formed a national working group with representatives from several ministries to facilitate the work of the Technical Secretariat teams and support investigations and accountability. In parallel, Syria is working on a plan to build the capacity of national teams. In conclusion, despite the importance of national efforts, Syria, after 14 years of war and inherited challenges, is in dire need of the support of the international community, especially in the areas of on-site destruction, demining and remnants of war. Urgent and effective response to existing challenges is insufficient without serious international support in the financial and technical fields and in the areas of accountability, the prosecution of criminals and capacity-building. As Syria looks forward to the support of the international community in overcoming this heavy legacy, it reaffirms its determination to continue working to turn this page, guided by its deep belief that chemical weapons have no place in the world today and its firm commitment to the maintenance and strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime as a fundamental pillar of regional and international peace and security.

I now give the floor to the representative of Türkiye.

I would also like to express my appreciation to Deputy High Representative, Mr. Ebo, for his briefing. Last month, the Syrian people marked the first anniversary of their liberation with a sense of hope and optimism. We recognize the steps, reforms and efforts carried out by the Syrian Government and welcome its commitment to stability, effective governance and the well-being of its people. Amid these encouraging developments, much remains to be accomplished. Foremost among the priorities is addressing the issue of chemical weapons, which continue to be a source of serious international concern. Following years of systematic obstruction and deliberate non-compliance by the former regime, political developments since 8 December 2024 have created a meaningful opportunity for renewed engagement with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and for establishing a more constructive and effective working relationship on the ground. We welcome the Syrian Government’s expressed readiness to address this critical matter. We also welcome the appointment of a new Syrian representative to the OPCW. Resolving the long-standing issues related to Syria’s chemical weapons programme and ensuring sustained compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention are of utmost importance. Recent findings from on-site deployments underscore both the gravity of the threat and the urgency of decisive action. Meanwhile, landmines, explosive ordnance and hazards linked to former chemical weapons activities continue to endanger civilians and hinder stabilization, reconstruction and the safe voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Eliminating the remaining chemical weapons capabilities in Syria is not only a legal obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention but also a critical imperative for regional security and a humanitarian priority. The Syrian Government cannot do this alone. The scope, complexity and technical requirements of these tasks exceed Syria’s current national capabilities, operational means and financial resources. The international community now has a historic opportunity to assist Syria in overcoming the immense challenges inherited from the past. Sustained long-term international support will be essential in the period ahead to ensure the success of the Syrian Government’s efforts to eliminate all remaining chemical weapons remnants in the country. Türkiye is ready to do its part, as it has done until now. We will continue to stand by Syria and the OPCW to achieve this shared objective. We will also maintain close consultations with the Syrian Government to strengthen its medical preparedness and the physical capacity of the field assessment teams. Israel’s continued air strikes and hybrid military activities in Syria hinder our joint efforts to this end. These irresponsible attacks have damaged former chemical weapons-related sites, increased the cost and risk of destruction planning, endangered local populations and jeopardized the safety and freedom of OPCW missions and staff. To achieve our shared objective of genuine stability in Syria and the wider region, the international community must ensure that such actions are restrained. In closing, we reiterate our support for Syrian-led and Syrian-owned initiatives to identify, secure, declare and destroy chemical weapons-related materials, in cooperation with the OPCW and the relevant stakeholders. We encourage all Member States to lend their full support in achieving a region free from chemical weapons.