S/PV.10120 Security Council

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor.

On a point of order, we are deeply disappointed by the attempt of our American colleagues to blatantly abuse the authority of the presidency of the Security Council and to convene a meeting devoted to the activities of the so-called Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The position of the Russian Federation and that of a number of other States regarding the alleged reactivation of the Council’s anti-Iranian resolutions, including resolution 1737 (2006) is well known to Council members and the wider international community. The mechanism for their reinstatement, as provided for in resolution 2231 (2015), has not been triggered. The assertions of Western States to the contrary do not withstand any scrutiny. The European trio participating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — from which the United States itself withdrew in 2018 — had no right to invoke that mechanism. My country, together with our Chinese and Iranian colleagues, has repeatedly brought to the attention of delegations the legal rational on this matter, providing detailed explanations as to why the United Kingdom, France and Germany could not invoke the snapback mechanism. Therefore, let me recall the following for those who are particularly forgetful. The Council’s anti-Iranian resolutions ceased to be in force in 2015 when resolution 2231 (2015) was adopted. Resolution 2231 (2015) itself expired on 18 October 2025, as stipulated in that resolution. The Council has taken no other decision on this matter. Resolution 1737 (2006) therefore ceased long ago to have any legal effect or relevance. Let us not once again repeat the hackneyed assertions that the snapback mechanism has allegedly been invoked. Against this backdrop, there are no grounds for the Security Council to hold a briefing by the 1737 Committee. Attempts by the United States and its allies to persuade us otherwise constitute a gross violation of the Council’s procedures and decisions. It is precisely for this reason that Russia, together with China, was compelled to block the adoption of the Council’s programme of work for March and to oppose the approval of the 1737 Committee’s report. Similarly, we cannot agree to the agenda for today’s meeting proposed by the United States presidency. We also note that the item “Non-proliferation” was removed from the Security Council’s agenda when resolution 2231 (2015) expired. We therefore request that the question of holding this meeting be put to a procedural vote. We call on our conscientious and sensible colleagues to vote against it and not allow the Council to be used to lend legitimacy to legal and procedural arbitrariness.

We fully reject the points made by the Russian Federation. Today’s meeting is fully in line with the decisions and procedure of the Council. The United Kingdom, alongside France and Germany, triggered the snapback mechanism procedure in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). We did so because of Iran’s significant non-performance of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As Russia and China know, the snapback process completed on 28 September 2025, and, as a result, six Security Council resolutions and United Nations sanctions have come back into force. We particularly recall that resolution 1737 (2006) requires the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work. The Council should not be prevented from discussing these important matters at hand. We therefore urge that we continue with today’s meeting, and the United Kingdom will therefore vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda.

I wish to react to what has been said by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation. I wish to begin by aligning myself word for word with what has just been said by the representative of the United Kingdom. I wish to share the following facts. The Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme were restored last September under the procedure for the restoration of sanctions, the socalled snapback mechanism. That procedure was conducted in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 2231 (2015). Among the resolutions restored was resolution 1737 (2006), which establishes a sanctions committee and tasks it with working under Council oversight. There is no legal doubt surrounding that point. The restoration of these resolutions and that of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) are objective realities rooted in compliance with resolution 2231 (2015). Moreover, the Secretariat has taken note of these realities in its official communications to the Council and to our Organization in general. The International Atomic Energy Agency has done so as well. The latter produced reports on the implementation by Iran of nuclear obligations provided for in the resolutions restored in September 2025. Henceforth, it is incumbent upon all States to implement these resolutions in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Incidentally, States from manifold regional groups have incidentally begun to once again apply these sanctions by conveying to the Committee requests for and notifications of exemptions. The law and the legal principle are in agreement in this case. The resolutions were legally restored. It is therefore entirely justified for the Security Council to meet today to discuss the work of the Committee, even if — and we regret this fact — two members did object to the adoption of the quarterly report of that Committee.

China supports the procedural motion put forward by Russia and calls on all members to vote against the convening of this meeting. China has repeatedly pointed out that the activation of the snapback mechanism by the E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — is procedurally and legally flawed. Resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025, and the Security Council has therefore concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. Against the backdrop of renewed hostilities in the Middle East and the increasing complex and grave situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue, the President's insistence on convening this meeting will only intensify divisions and confrontation among parties and undermine the prospect for a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. China expresses its grave concern in this regard. China calls on Council members to focus on safeguarding peace and stability in the Middle East, faithfully implement the arrangements related to the termination date of resolution 2231 (2015), uphold the authority of the Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy and create conditions for the Iranian nuclear issue to return to the track of political and diplomatic settlement.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States of America. The United States strongly rejects the assertions made by the representatives of Russia and China and fully supports the statements that have been made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France in support of moving forward with this meeting. Resolution 1737 (2006) and subsequent resolutions mandate quarterly reports from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) to the Council. Today the President of the Council, as acting Chair of the 1737 Committee, should be presenting the Committee’s 90-day report. We are disappointed that the obstruction from two Council members blocked the delivery of this mandated report to the Council, despite it being an entirely factual description of the Committee’s activities during the reporting period. Nevertheless, it is necessary to continue to move forward with this meeting, which provides an important opportunity to discuss the implementation of the sanctions measures reinstated by the Council. I would also note that on the first day of the United States presidency, all Council members except two confirmed their support for holding this mandated meeting. I urge everyone to join us in voting in favour of adopting the agenda, holding this meeting and allowing the Council to proceed with its work. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. As President, we believe it necessary to move forward with this meeting. In view of the request and the comments made by members of the Security Council, I intend to put the provisional agenda to the vote.

The provisional agenda received 11 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The provisional agenda has been adopted. Non-proliferation

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States of America. Today was meant to be a straightforward, mandated meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). Unfortunately, our Russian and Chinese colleagues continue to block this Committee’s important work as part of their collaboration with the Iranian regime. On 6 March, the Russian and Chinese delegations officially blocked and objected to the 90-day report of the 1737 Committee mandated in resolution 1737 (2006). By doing this, Russia and China have made clear that the 1737 Committee exists and is functional. It is a simple fact that on 19 September 2025, the Council decisively voted against a resolution submitted pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) to continue sanctions relief for Iran, thereby reinstating six previously suspended Security Council resolutions relating to Iran, including the resolution that established the Committee. What this means in plain language is that all States Members of the United Nations should be implementing an arms embargo against Iran, banning the transfer and trade of missile technology and freezing relevant financial assets, in line with the robust United Nations sanctions that had been in place before 2015 and have now been snapped back into place. The United Nations provisions to be reimposed are not arbitrary but instead are narrowly scoped to address the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear, missile and conventional arms programmes and Iran’s ongoing support for terrorism. Iran had ample opportunity to prevent this outcome. France, the United Kingdom and Germany offered to extend the so-called snapback mechanism if Iran accounted for its highly enriched uranium stockpile, if Iran complied with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations that were already mandatory under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and if Iran resumed direct diplomacy with the United States. All of those options were put on the table in good faith for Iran, and all of them were rejected. In that vein, Iran has remained defiant. Just last week, the report reiterated that Iran is the only State in the world without nuclear weapons to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60 per cent. The IAEA Director General’s report also confirmed that, for more than eight months now, Iran has been refusing to provide the IAEA with updated information on, or access to, this highly enriched uranium stockpile or other previously declared low-enriched uranium stocks at facilities affected by military strikes in June 2025. The Director General himself describes this as “a matter of nonproliferation concern and of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement”. Pursuant to the 19 September vote (see S/PV.10001) and the Council’s binding resolutions, we meet today with a Committee that is operational. The Committee has received exemption requests. The requests have been approved by this operational Committee. The Secretariat has called for applications to serve on the Panel of Experts. That selection process is now under way. We urge Council members to press our Russian and Chinese colleagues to allow the Council to appoint a Committee Chair. The obstructionism thus far on the matter of a 1737 Committee Chair is predicated on a bad-faith and baseless reinterpretation of events. The truth of the matter is that Russia and China do not want a functional Committee — not out of some type of legal objection but because they want to protect their partner Iran and continue to maintain defence cooperation that is, now once again, prohibited. Both countries have sustained military trade ties. In 2022, Russia began by buying Iranian drones in violation of resolution 2231 (2015), which imposed time-bound restrictions on Iran’s nuclear and conventional arms activity. Russia has also acquired close-range ballistic missiles from Iran and provided Iran with attack helicopters earlier this year in violation of resolution 1929 (2010), which imposed even more sanctions against the regime’s nuclear programme — all of this while Iran continues to evade sanctions, fire ballistic missiles and drones at civilians in the region, attack civilian shipping in the Gulf and wreak havoc in the Strait of Hormuz. Let us end this performative handwringing, supposedly over process. The reality is that Russia and China do not want this Committee because they want to continue to protect their partner Iran. In the light of that, the United States will continue to work to ensure Iran can no longer hold the world hostage with its missile, its drone and certainly not its nuclear programme. Let me close by reminding the Council that the United States pursued a diplomatic solution in good faith prior to the initiation of the snapback and thereafter. I outlined for Council members the activities of the United Kingdom, France and Germany along those same lines. Each time, we articulated clear time frames for meaningful dialogue — dialogue that could address the outstanding issues of concern to the international community, including the behaviours prohibited under the reinstated Security Council resolutions. Time and again, Iran chose not to take those opportunities. I resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

This year we will mark 20 years since the Council adopted resolution 1737 (2006) — 20 years during which Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes have been among the most pressing threats to international peace and security. The United Kingdom has been clear all that time that we favoured negotiation and diplomacy, but we have repeatedly seen Iran not act in good faith to address international concerns. So, I want to start by expressing solidarity with our partners in the Gulf and the wider region, who took no part in the military action launched on 28 February but who have been the target of waves of repeated and unprovoked Iranian missile and drone attacks over the past week. We strongly condemn these attacks. They are endangering civilians, destabilizing the region and threatening the global economy. They must stop. We pay tribute to the swift actions taken by those partners to protect civilians, including United Kingdom nationals; their efforts have saved lives. We have acted to defend the Gulf and will continue to stand by the region in the face of this threat. This is exactly why the United Kingdom co-sponsored, alongside 135 countries, and voted for, resolution 2817 (2026) yesterday (see S/PV.10119). Today’s crisis underlines the gravity of Iran’s approach to the nuclear and missile files. Our position is clear: we will not overlook actions that undermine international security or the global non-proliferation regime. Iran’s reckless and repeated use of ballistic missiles, including against its neighbours, without provocation has intensified regional insecurity and heightened the risk to civilians. Our concerns about its nuclear programme remain serious and long-standing. Iran has persistently failed to fulfil its safeguards obligations and fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. There is no credible civilian justification for more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. This is unacceptable and erodes confidence in the peaceful nature of its activities. It was this sustained nuclear escalation that led the E3 to trigger the snapback mechanism last year. We underline the importance of all United Nations Member States, including Iran, implementing the reinstated sanctions fully and without exception. Resolution 1737 (2006) imposes sanctions banning nuclear technology and materials, imposes asset freezes on key individuals and entities linked to Iran’s enrichment programme and establishes a sanctions committee. These restrictions play a critical role in curbing Iran’s destabilizing actions by narrowing its access to the capabilities to sustain its missile programme and by constraining Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities. Effective global compliance is essential for the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) to carry out its mandate. We encourage rigorous monitoring and reporting and call for the swift appointment of a Chair. The Panel of Experts must be established without delay to independently investigate alleged violations of sanctions. We call on those Member States that have sought to evade or undermine the United Nations sanctions reinstated under the snapback mechanism to cease doing so immediately. This approach only emboldens Iran. No Member State should, directly or indirectly, undertake or facilitate any action that breaches or circumvents sanctions, and all should press Iran to halt its destabilizing behaviour. All Member States have a clear responsibility to fulfil their United Nations obligations in full, particularly on an issue as grave and consequential as this. The United Kingdom remains unwavering in its commitment to finding a lasting and sustainable solution that ensures Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

We are disappointed by the fact that the majority of Security Council members did not summon the courage and wisdom to speak out against this flagrant violation of earlier Council decisions. The responsibility for the lawlessness unleashed in the Security Council lies squarely on the shoulders of the United States presidency and those delegations supporting it or condoning its one-sided decisions. We regret that some colleagues continue to follow the lead of Washington, which back in 2018 thwarted the correct implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by illegally and unilaterally withdrawing from the nuclear deal. Now, Washington continues to do everything possible to erase any prospects for reaching diplomatic agreements on Iran’s nuclear programme. The Russian Federation’s position vis-à-vis the supposed activation of the mechanism for reinstating anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions is unchanged, principled and consistent. As we have already noted today, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3) could not trigger this instrument. I will not delve into details. Our position on this matter is spelled out in detail in numerous letters addressed to the Security Council and the General Assembly, and all colleagues can reread them. I will just recall the main points. First, these countries have lost the right to trigger a snapback through their chronic violations of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). I am referring to the inability of the E3 to fulfil their obligations to ensure that Iran receives economic benefits from the lifting of the European Union sanctions that were in force up until 2015. I am also referring to their illegal decision to resume the pressure of unilateral sanctions after the JCPOA Transition Day on 18 October 2023. International law is fairly clear-cut on this issue. A party that fails to comply with its obligations under any treaty or agreement cannot invoke the instruments contained therein to its own advantage. This is also in line with the so-called clean hands doctrine and with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, not to mention advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. Secondly, the JCPOA, which was an integral part of resolution 2231 (2015), clearly sets out the procedure for resolving any disputes related to the implementation of said agreement. Before the issue of non-compliance with the JCPOA by any party can be referred to the Security Council for consideration, it must be thoroughly examined within the framework of the dispute resolution mechanism in Vienna. Paragraphs 36 and 37 of the JCPOA lay down a specific formula for this process. No matter how much the United Kingdom, France and Germany try to assure us that they presumably used the dispute resolution mechanism back in 2020, facts are facts. Not only was this mechanism not exhausted, it was not even launched owing to serious procedural gaps that were never addressed. Therefore, the so-called notification of the triggering of the snapback, which was sent by the Europeans to the Security Council on 28 August 2025, was legally null and void. For that reason, the outcome of the 19 September vote on the draft resolution (S/2025/561) to maintain the regime of revoking anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions could not have had any legal or procedural effects. In a nutshell, there was no snapback, and resolution 2231 (2015) expired on 18 October 2025. In this context, attempts by Western countries to justify their untenable claims by citing the United Nations Secretariat position do not hold water either. Our United Nations colleagues did take certain steps, namely they informed member States about the reinstatement of the resolutions and the recreation of the website of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its sanctions list. But these steps are nothing more than unlawful actions taken by the Secretariat in breach of resolution 2231 (2015) and Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the Secretary-General and United Nations staff from receiving instructions from any Government. Under such circumstances, the Russian Federation sees no grounds for the 1737 Sanctions Committee to be back up and running, let alone to have its work discussed at a Security Council meeting. It is deeply regrettable that Western delegations are stubbornly attempting to legitimize their claims, which is negatively affecting the work of the entire Security Council. The Europeans and their allies are simply hijacking the issue of seat distribution on United Nations Security Council subsidiary bodies, demanding that it be linked to the appointment of the Chair of the illegitimate 1737 Committee. We would like to stress yet again that any such attempts are doomed to fail. We strongly urge our Western colleagues to abandon such ill-founded and unconstructive political paradigms, as they are dealing a very serious blow to the effectiveness of our joint work. We must remind you that Russia, along with China, did everything in its power to prevent such a complex legal and procedural situation from occurring. At the height of disagreements over the snapback, we put forward a depoliticized and balanced draft resolution (S/2025/539) on a technical rollover of resolution 2231 (2015) for a period of six months. If that document had been adopted, it would have helped to freeze the situation for a little longer, thereby giving us a chance to resolve the controversy around Iran’s nuclear programme without creating a crisis within the Council. However, Western countries and the delegations supporting them did not seize that opportunity. Subsequent events, especially those we have had to witness over the past week and a half, have clearly demonstrated that a diplomatic settlement was not in the plans of the United States and its allies from the get-go. They deliberately raised the stakes and whipped up hysteria around Iran’s alleged plans to acquire nuclear weapons, which were never corroborated by International Atomic Energy Agency reports, although we heard the United States representative today asserting otherwise. This was done with the sole purpose of launching another military venture against Tehran and further escalating the situation in the Middle East and beyond. In this context, we would like to reiterate that the Russian Federation categorically condemns the armed aggression against Iran by the United States and Israel in violation of the United Nations Charter and fundamental norms of international law. There can be no justification for such actions whatsoever, and neither can unsubstantiated and fabricated insinuations regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme serve as a rationale for such actions. In relation to the topic of today’s meeting, we must stress the fact that our United States colleagues previously had no legal grounds to raise the issue of reinstating the anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions and resuming the work of the 1737 Sanctions Committee, but now they have no moral grounds to do so either. Our country will persist in making every effort to counter such moves, and we will facilitate any initiatives aimed at reverting the situation surrounding Iran to the realm of political and diplomatic settlement. Therefore, on 7 March, our delegation circulated a draft resolution (S/2026/159) among Council members calling for an immediate cessation of military actions by all parties. Our document was balanced, unbiased and depoliticized. As we said yesterday during the vote (see S/PV.10119), the Russian draft focused on condemning any attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as on the need to ensure security for all States in the Middle East and beyond. The draft also contained an urgent appeal to all parties concerned to immediately return to the negotiating table. We believe that it is precisely such initiatives, rather than attempts to exploit the Council to advance politicized and unlawful agendas, that will allow the Council to fulfil its direct responsibility to maintain international peace and security. We regret that certain Council members did not summon the courage to support the Russian draft.

China just stated its position regarding the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its opposition to the convening of this meeting and does not intend to comment on the work of the Committee itself. However, as a member of the Security Council, China wishes to emphasize the following points regarding the current situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue and the way forward. First, the use of force is not the right way to resolve international disputes. Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity must be respected. The United States and Israel must immediately stop their military operations, refrain from attacking Iranian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, avoid the further escalation of tensions and prevent the conflict from spreading across the entire Middle East region. All parties should remain calm and exercise restraint, fulfil their obligations under international law and effectively protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. The international community should send a clear and unequivocal message opposing any regression of the world to the law of the jungle. Secondly, the Iranian nuclear issue must ultimately return to the track of a political and diplomatic settlement. I want to emphasize that it was the United States unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that triggered the Iranian nuclear crisis. The United States has also disregarded its own credibility and, together with Israel, twice resorted to the blatant use of force against Iran during the negotiation process, causing diplomatic efforts to collapse. As the instigator of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the United States actions violate international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. China strongly opposes such conduct. We urge the United States to change its course of action immediately, return to diplomatic negotiations, make a clear commitment not to use force again, engage in sincere dialogue with Iran and reach a solution in line with the expectations of the international community. The relevant European countries should stop fuelling tensions and instead play a constructive role in easing the situation. China commends the mediation efforts of the countries of the region and the IAEA and supports their continued assistance in resuming negotiations to promote the peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. Thirdly, fairness and justice must be upheld, and Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, must be effectively protected. Iran has repeatedly affirmed that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. Even after its nuclear facilities were attacked, Iran has continued to cooperate with the IAEA and has engaged in multiple rounds of professional and pragmatic talks with the United States in a constructive spirit. Iran’s sincerity should be taken seriously. Both IAEA reports and statements by its Director General indicate that there is no evidence that Iran is planning to manufacture nuclear weapons. The experience with the JCPOA has shown that, through comprehensive and stringent safeguards and monitoring, it is entirely possible to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Fourthly, any action by the Security Council should be aimed at easing tensions and preserving long-term peace and stability in the Middle East. Such action must be fair and impartial and must not become a tool for sanctions, pressure or the political agendas of any individual State. The Council should help to build trust among parties, bridge differences and create favourable conditions for the resumption of negotiations, ensuring that the dialogue process can proceed smoothly and effectively in an environment free from the threat of force. A certain country should stop engaging in political manipulation in the Security Council. Ignoring differences among Council members and forcibly pushing for the re-imposition of sanctions will only intensify confrontation and damage the prospects for a political settlement. A proper resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue bears on the authority and effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime and is crucial to peace and stability in the Middle East. As a permanent member of the Council and a participant in the JCPOA, China will continue to uphold an objective and impartial position, strengthen communication and coordination with all parties, build synergy, uphold justice and play a constructive role in restoring peace in the Middle East and advancing the political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

In the current context of tension in the Middle East, the situation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme remains an increasingly urgent matter for the international community. The Republic of Panama still firmly believes that the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a priority for international security and global stability. In that regard, we reiterate our commitment to the — hopefully optimal — functioning of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), reinstated as per the decisions taken by the Security Council. This mechanism is a key tool to overseeing the implementation of the measures adopted in the area of nonproliferation and to promote compliance with the relevant resolutions and reinforce the credibility of the multilateral sanctions regime regarding the Iranian nuclear question. The Republic of Panama also believes that the Committee’s technical, appropriate and uninterrupted work, as well as that of other subsidiary bodies, is essential to guaranteeing the proper implementation of the measures agreed on respectively and to facilitating dialogue, the exchange of information and cooperation among States in addition to the verification work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On the issue of reinstating the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), we would like to make clear that we consider this valid and legitimate. All subsequent actions towards restarting the work of the Committee have our full support. This follows two votes in September 2025 (see S/PV.10001 and S/PV.10006), when the Security Council decided on this matter, including on the snapback mechanism on 19 September. Linked to this issue is the broader question of Iran’s nuclear programme. We have consistently expressed our strong concern regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. In this regard, full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and strict adherence to international obligations are needed, along with strong, permanent and verifiable oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme. Cooperation grounded in verification and transparency remains the only way forward. Continuing enrichment to unreasonably high levels with no credible civilian justification and refusing inspection by the IAEA must be immediately addressed by Iran in order to restore confidence. In this context, Greece yet again reiterates its unwavering commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as its essential institutional pillars. Safeguarding and reinforcing it remains vital for regional and global stability and for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I would like to thank the delegation of the United States of America for presiding over the Council’s proceedings this month. We also express our appreciation for the briefing organized pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) on the resumption of the activities of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) during the past period. The discussion of this report comes at an extremely sensitive time for the region. Following a series of missile attacks and strikes using ballistic missiles and drones launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran against my country, the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, these dangerous developments constitute an unprecedented escalation that threatens regional security and international stability. In this context, the Kingdom draws attention to resolution 2817 (2026), which was adopted by the Security Council yesterday. This resolution, a draft of which was submitted by the Kingdom of Bahrain on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was the culmination of a series of negotiations. It is grounded in documented facts regarding these brutal Iranian attacks, addressing the situation with complete transparency and without any equivocation. The resolution embodies the international community’s condemnation of these heinous missile and drone attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against our national territories. It calls for an immediate halt to these attacks and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States to be respected. Targeting and terrorizing civilians and turning their residential areas into military targets constitute a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and a dangerous escalation that threatens civilian life, The national economy and the safety of society are at stake. Anyone who justifies the killing of civilians or the targeting of civilian infrastructure is not defending a cause but rather participating in distorting the truth and covering up aggression, reflecting a profound moral and humanitarian failure. The international community has condemned these dangerous attacks. A significant number of States and international organizations have issued clear statements of position condemning this aggressive behaviour, thereby dispelling any notion that the approach of destructive missile attacks could create legitimacy or credibility. The sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was created by the Council to compel Iran to comply with its relevant international obligations. However, the reality on the ground indicates that Iran’s continued aggressive behaviour now poses a direct threat to the security and stability of the region and to the safety of its peoples. Consequently, we affirm that the continued operation of the Committee constitutes an essential mechanism for ensuring Iran’s compliance with its international obligations, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions regime and contributing to curbing activities that threaten regional security and stability. In conclusion, the Kingdom of Bahrain calls on the Security Council to assume its full responsibilities in confronting these serious violations and to take a firm stance to counter these hostile acts, thereby ensuring regional and international security and stability.

As we are facing the ongoing hostilities in the wider Middle East, Iran’s nuclear programme and non-compliance with its nuclear obligations are at the very centre. We express our regret that this is the first time that we are discussing the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) since the reimposition of Council sanctions on Iran in September 2025, despite the fact that we have been legally mandated to do so every 90 days. We also express our regret that an agreement was not reached on the 90-day report of the 1737 Committee. The sanctions against Iran have been reimposed and remain in force. They reflect binding international law, and all States Members of the United Nations, including the members of the Security Council, are obliged to respect and implement them. The sanctions were reimposed owing to the continued and systematic failure of Iran to live up to its international obligations, most notably under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its non-negotiable legal obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement. Let us be clear: the production of highly enriched uranium up to 60 per cent, as previously reported by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, cannot be reconciled with any peaceful purpose. As long as Iran chooses to pursue its destabilizing nuclear programme, to refrain from granting unhindered access to IAEA inspectors to all relevant sites and not to return to meaningful negotiations, the sanctions will remain in place. As we have seen, the 1737 Committee has also been re-established and is exercising its mandate, despite the continued delay in the appointment of Chairs of the Security Council’s subsidiary bodies for 2026. This is also reflected in its continued work on the relevant exemption procedures. It is deeply regrettable that some Council members continue to dispute reality and legal facts. It is even more regrettable that the work of all Security Council subsidiary bodies is being paralysed in order to do so. This disruptive approach is the latest in a series of attempts to create a fictional, parallel legal narrative, aimed at challenging the authority of this body and its decisions. This is unacceptable, and it undermines not only this Committee and the Council, but also international legal principles more broadly. Let me remind the Council that Iran has supplied Russia with drones and missiles for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine — weapons used to attack civilian targets, in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). We also condemn Iran’s unprovoked attacks against its neighbours using these same weapons, and we reiterate our solidarity with the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jordan and other affected countries. We call for an immediate cessation of these attacks and for urgent de-escalation. Finally, allow me to reaffirm our readiness to engage constructively in further work of the 1737 sanctions Committee and to express our hope that the subsidiary bodies will resume their full operation as soon as possible. I also reaffirm that we will also support all efforts to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. We regret that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) was unable to agree on the 90-day report owing to the unwillingness of some Council members to recognize the decisions that the Council took in September last year on the snapback mechanism (see S/PV.10001). Let me begin by expressing Denmark’s deep concern about the continued escalation of the situation in the Middle East. We are witnessing a further destabilization of the already volatile and tense situation, with grave consequences for people across the region and for international peace and security. We are deeply concerned about reports of increasing civilian casualties and displacement. We call for maximum restraint and respect for international law, including international humanitarian law. We call for diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and for negotiations to be resumed in good faith. Furthermore, Denmark strongly condemns Iran’s continued attacks on countries in the region and beyond. These attacks must stop. We express our full solidarity with all the countries concerned. This is also why Denmark co-sponsored and voted in favour of the resolution presented by Bahrain on behalf of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and Jordan yesterday (see S/PV.10119). We were pleased that resolution 2817 (2026) was adopted. When it comes to Iran’s nuclear aspirations, Denmark has always been clear: Iran must never be allowed to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. As we watch the current escalations unfold, we are reminded why this is so important. We are deeply concerned about Iran curtailing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has lost continuity of knowledge and, for almost nine months now, has been unable to provide information on the status or the whereabouts of the enriched uranium stockpiles in Iran. As the IAEA has stated, this is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA’s latest report, which predates the current escalation in the region, confirmed that Iran has continued to deny the Agency access to a number of nuclear facilities. This is not in line with Iran’s legally binding safeguards obligations under the NPT and is deeply alarming. We see no credible civilian justification for accumulating or for hiding highly enriched uranium stockpiles. Last year, the E3 legitimately activated a snapback mechanism, and following the vote in the Security Council (see S/PV.10001), all sanctions against Iran were reimposed. We call on Iran and all United Nations Member States to fully comply with the six reinstated Security Council resolutions. In conclusion, Denmark has engaged constructively in the work of the 1737 Committee and will continue to do so. We regret that the Council has not yet agreed on a Chair for the Committee. This is holding hostage the full operation of all subsidiary organs. This significantly hampers the ability of the Council to execute its mandate. We stand ready to engage with all Council members to reach a solution as soon as possible.

It is now all the more important and necessary for the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 to be able to meet in plenary and operate normally so as to ensure its continued specialized technical support. Qualms about Iran’s lack of compliance and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), combined with an active conflict setting that is heightening the risks to regional and global security, make the need for the Committee to scrupulously perform its task all the more apparent. Independent technical information and reliable monitoring mechanisms help to reduce the risk of escalation and to avert any misunderstanding of the situation on the ground that could exacerbate it. Colombia wishes to underscore the critical importance of the IAEA’s activities and its meaningful presence at the sites subject to its monitoring and verification. In this connection, my country encourages Iran to ensure conditions for the IAEA’s safe and timely access to the facilities in order to resolve outstanding safeguards issues under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to restore full traceability and verification. Colombia takes the view that it is likewise crucial to have a fully operational Panel of Experts in place forthwith that is capable of rigorously documenting implementation, detecting patterns of evasion and putting forward evidence-based recommendations. We trust that the selection process under way will culminate in the swift constitution of the Panel and ensure the technical support that the Committee requires. I wish also to point out that the Council’s sanctions are neither an end in themselves nor a punitive instrument. They are measures that are designed to prevent, deter and correct conduct that threatens peace, to support political solutions and to foster non-proliferation. Sanctions are most effective when they are part of a strategy that marries diplomacy and verification. Colombia will participate actively in the Committee’s deliberations in a constructive and results-oriented spirit. We will continue to advocate for diplomatic channels, restraint and the quest for political solutions that address the concerns about Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, ease tensions and create space for a de-escalation of the ongoing conflict. On that basis, my country reiterates its appeal for restraint, de-escalation and a return to diplomacy as the only sustainable path to averting further tensions and rebuilding trust. We reaffirm our belief that multilateralism, international cooperation and objective technical verification remain the optimal way of mitigating risk, bolstering collective security and fostering stability, not only in Iran but throughout the region.

I thank the presidency for convening this meeting on the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The war, which is engulfing the Middle East, must end forthwith. In conveying our solidarity with our partners in the region, which have been subjected to indiscriminate Iranian strikes, we underscore that only a diplomatic solution and adherence to international law will ensure lasting peace. Iran bears primary responsibility for this state of affairs, which is catastrophic for the region and the world. For years, it has played a destabilizing role vis-à-vis international peace and security. Iran is pursuing nuclear activities that violate its international obligations. For more than a year, the country has all but suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is no longer in a position to guarantee that the Iranian nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. As for the status of Iran’s stockpile of 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — a quantity capable of allowing a dozen nuclear explosive devices to be produced — opaqueness is the order of the day. What is more, Iran has developed a ballistic missile programme of colossal proportions. Thousands of ballistic missiles and tens of thousands of drones have been, and continue to be, manufactured and are being used at this very moment against the countries of the region. Iran’s strikes on its neighbours threaten the region and the world. Iran has not taken the opportunities offered to it to reach a diplomatic solution concerning these matters, notwithstanding the efforts of France and its E3 partners. In this regard, allow me to rehearse a number of facts and to step back in time somewhat. In October 2003, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and the United Kingdom travelled to Tehran after uncovering an Iranian clandestine nuclear programme in order to arrive at a peaceful and diplomatic solution. It was largely on the initiative of the E3, as well as the United States, China and Russia, that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was concluded in July 2015. And in 2019, it was the Iranians who rejected — I repeat, rejected — the mechanism put forward by the Europeans to compensate for the effects of the United States withdrawal from the agreement. The Europeans never violated their obligations; the Iranians rejected the system offered by the Europeans to continue to implement this agreement. Since then, Iran has massively violated its obligations, as demonstrated by these 450 kilograms of 60 per cent enriched uranium. Iran says that it does not want to develop a nuclear weapon. That is all well and good, but when actions contradict words, is it the words that count, or the actions? Today’s strikes on neighbouring countries in the region give us the answer. Iran says, and it said again yesterday, that it is not attacking its neighbours and is only targeting military facilities. The facts prove the opposite. However, France remains convinced of the relevance of the diplomatic track and demonstrated this fact during seven rounds of talks held in Geneva in 2024 and 2025, alongside its European partners. In this context, in autumn 2025, France and its E3 partners had no other option but to trigger the procedure to reinstate Security Council sanctions. The resolutions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programmes were reimposed on 28 September 2025. Among other measures, they stipulate that Iran must suspend its uranium enrichment activities, resume cooperation with the IAEA and cease its ballistic programmes. It is now incumbent on Member States to implement these resolutions, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. We call on Member States to support the work of the 1737 (2006) Committee, which has been re-established to monitor the implementation of these resolutions. We welcome the fact that the Committee has once again begun to implement its exemptions mechanisms. The reinstatement of sanctions is clearly not an end in itself; it is a peaceful tool aimed at ensuring the cessation of Iran’s destabilizing activities. The implementation of the reinstated resolutions must serve as leverage to encourage Iran to return to the path of serious negotiations. France and its partners stand willing to participate in efforts to find a robust, verifiable and lasting agreement that will allow for the settlement of issues related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programmes and to its role at the regional level.

It is evident that the Security Council remains divided on the issue of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). Unfortunately, this split is also preventing agreement on the appointment of Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, greatly affecting their work. We are of the view that matters related to the 1737 (2006) Committee must not be allowed to impede the routine work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. We also note the lack of agreement on the report on this matter, which should have formed the basis of today’s meeting. The developments since June 2025, as well as the ongoing situation, which started with the unprovoked and unwarranted attacks on Iran, have had a deep impact on the context of the Iranian nuclear file. Regrettably, the breakdown of diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue has further complicated an already complex matter that has been on a downward slide for the past few months. However, what has not changed is the continued validity of the fundamental principles and the multilateral spirit that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the consensus adoption of resolution 2231 (2015). More than ever, and even during the current conflict and heightened tensions, it is clear that an enduring solution lies in embracing those time-tested principles rather than abandoning them for short-sighted policies. The JCPOA was a unique instrument — the manifestation of an approach based on dialogue, diplomacy and pragmatism. It was the outcome of painstaking and arduous, yet constructive, negotiations. It charted a road map to comprehensively addressing the concerns of all parties based on reciprocal actions, thus embodying the peaceful resolution of disputes that is at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations. Pakistan lent its support to the negotiated settlement of the issue, and it remains our core position to this day. It was also in that vein that Pakistan supported the draft resolution that was presented in September 2025 to effect a six-month technical extension of resolution 2231 (2015) in order to provide time for diplomatic engagement (S/2025/539). We also supported the presidential draft resolution that provided for the continuation of the termination of sanctions in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/561). It is clear that dialogue, diplomacy and constructive engagement remain the only viable way forward. And yet, diplomacy has been forfeited in favour of military means. Pakistan has expressed its clear position on these developments in the Chamber and elsewhere. We have condemned all use of force, targeting of civilian infrastructure and strikes on nuclear sites under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Strikes against nuclear facilities carry huge environmental and safety risks for the population and people all around the region. The IAEA’s crucial verification mandate should not be disrupted. The IAEA is the institution responsible for verifying compliance with the respective nuclear safeguards obligations of Member States in an objective, impartial and credible manner and on technical grounds. The IAEA should be enabled to fulfil this statutory function, and its verification activities in Iran should resume unimpeded. We reaffirm our support for the resolution of the Iran nuclear issue through peaceful means. Diplomacy and dialogue should be the guiding principles for achieving a negotiated settlement of all contentious issues, in accordance with the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned. Only an objective, fair and rules-based discussion can advance that objective. We call for an immediate cessation of hostilities in the Middle East and urge all parties to show maximum restraint, avoid further escalation, institute a permanent ceasefire and resume dialogue. All of Pakistan’s efforts are aimed in that direction. In July 2025, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2788 (2025), which highlighted the primacy of resolving all disputes through peaceful means. We must urgently revive the spirit of the Charter and that resolution to overcome the current spiral of escalation and stop this deadly cycle, which has tragically visited the region so often in recent times.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is closely monitoring the situation regarding the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), responsible for overseeing sanctions relating to Iran’s nuclear programme. Above all other considerations, we would like to highlight the following three points. First, the Democratic Republic of the Congo reaffirms its commitment to the fundamental principles of the United Nations, in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for international law and the promotion of dialogue among States. In this regard, my delegation emphasizes the importance of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure transparency and confidence in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Secondly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that nuclear nonproliferation is an essential pillar of collective security. However, we also believe that any measure adopted by the Security Council should go hand in hand with sustained diplomatic efforts to promote a lasting and mutually acceptable negotiated solution. Thirdly, in this spirit, the Democratic Republic of the Congo encourages all parties concerned to continue engaging in a constructive dialogue and to fully comply with their international obligations. Diplomacy and international cooperation remain the most effective means to resolve tensions and prevent escalation. In conclusion, my delegation recalls that the Council’s responsibility for pursuing the many objectives of our Organization, in particular the maintenance of international peace and security, requires us to overcome our differences in order to facilitate the smooth conduct of the Council’s activities through its subsidiary organs.

Somalia reaffirms its commitment to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We take note of the divergent views among Council members regarding resolution 1737 (2006). My delegation believes that a balanced approach that addresses the concerns of all parties is essential to resolving the current challenges. We underscore the primacy of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and we encourage constructive engagement in good faith to preserve the Council’s unity. Regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, we urge a return to the negotiating table to resolve non-proliferation issues. We believe that the only viable path forward is a swift recommitment to the talks on non-proliferation in line with the relevant international resolutions. Somalia recognizes the indispensable role that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and monitoring activities play in ensuring nuclear safety and global stability. We further acknowledge the critical role that the IAEA plays in safeguarding Iran’s enriched uranium, including clarifying information about nuclear materials at several locations. We reiterate our call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and for all States in the region to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without exception. Turning to the work of the subsidiary organs, we express our deep concern regarding the Council’s continued inability to reach timely consensus on the appointment of Chairs and Vice-Chairs for the third consecutive month. The current deadlock follows the unprecedented delay in the appointment of Chairs in 2025 — the longest in the Council’s history. We urge all delegations to show flexibility and a spirit of compromise so that the vital work of these subsidiary bodies can proceed without delay. In conclusion, the challenges before us demand a collective and measured response rooted in dialogue, mutual respect and renewed commitment to multilateralism. Somalia stands ready to engage constructively with all Council members.

Today Liberia voted to adopt the agenda to discuss this issue because we believe that the Charter of the United Nations and the binding language of resolution 2231 (2015) require us to do so. Article 25 obligates all Member States to implement Security Council decisions as written. In August 2025, a formal notification of significant non-performance under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (S/2025/538) was submitted. The Council did not adopt a resolution within the 30-day period mandated by resolution 2231 (2015) to continue sanctions relief. Under its explicit terms, the previous resolutions, including resolution 1737 (2006), therefore resumed automatically. The International Atomic Energy Agency report has documented significant levels of enrichment and stockpiles far beyond the JCPOA limits, providing credible factual grounds for the notification that activated the snapback mechanism. Liberia’s vote reflects no political alignment. It reflects fidelity to the Charter, the Council’s own decisions and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime.