S/PV.10137 Security Council

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jean- Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations; Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha, Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. Lacroix.

It is once again this year my pleasure to open this Security Council meeting marking the Heads of Military Components Conference. I am pleased to be joined by two distinguished Force Commanders: Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha, Acting Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). This annual gathering provides an opportunity not only to reaffirm our shared commitment to peace and security through the vital work of United Nations peacekeeping but also to benefit from the extensive experience and valuable insights of the most senior military leaders of our missions. The theme of this year’s Conference is a forward-looking peacekeeping, based on agility, strengthened by robust partnerships and underpinned by enhanced operational readiness. This timely discussion builds on several years of intensive policy dialogue between Member States and the Secretariat, during which these matters have been carefully examined. Three years ago, the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace presented a comprehensive vision of a recalibrated collective security system, in which strengthened United Nations peace operations are a central tool. The Pact for the Future took up this idea and tasked the Secretary-General with conducting a review of the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations. This review, which will be published shortly, will make recommendations to Member States on how to adapt the full spectrum of operations, including peacekeeping, for the years ahead and beyond. Last year’s ministerial meeting on peacekeeping, hosted by the German Federal Government in Berlin, marked another important milestone, not only in reaffirming the essential political and material support needed to meet current requirements but also in examining emerging demands and possible models for future peacekeeping operations. Throughout these deliberations, a fundamental principle was reaffirmed: United Nations peacekeeping is and remains above all a political tool used by the international community to help the parties to bring armed conflicts to an end and move towards a lasting peace agreement. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) illustrates how military, civilian and political components work together in pursuit of a common political objective and towards a clearly defined end state. The Mission’s military posture, its support for the implementation of the ceasefire through the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism and its activities are all designed to create and strengthen an environment conducive to the ongoing political processes. Furthermore, the collective credibility of the United Nations depends on its ability and determination to act when civilians are at risk. The protection of civilians will remain a priority wherever mandated, and we will continue to adapt and innovate to carry out this work in a manner suited to various contexts. In South Sudan, for example, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has shifted from a priority focused on protecting static sites to a more mobile posture. In response to recent violence in Jonglei State, the Mission was able to rapidly reinforce its presence in the area and open additional temporary bases to protect civilians caught up in the crossfire of intensified clashes. (spoke in English) Our peacekeeping operations must continue to be flexible and adaptable. Several priorities must guide our efforts. First, peacekeeping must remain adaptable and accountable. Prioritized and focused mandates from the Council that are adequately resourced and can be recalibrated to evolving needs and situations should be the starting point. Troopand police-contributing countries are the backbone of our missions. Their perspectives must be regularly included in mandate design and implementation. Effective integrated planning at the strategic and operational levels will allow for responsiveness to rapidly changing dynamics, timely cooperation with related partners and actors on the ground and measures to guide exit strategies. Secondly, we will maintain a strong focus on performance. The new iteration of Action for Peacekeeping Plus, which we have entitled Action for Peacekeeping Impact and which will be distributed to Member States shortly, retains a strong focus on performance, including highlighting good performance and addressing underperformance. We continue to evaluate the performance of uniformed components, mission performance and the impact of peacekeeping as a whole to guide corrective action and continuous improvement. For example, we recently rolled out a new evaluation for infantry battalions. This provides missions, Member States and Headquarters with information about shortfalls and allows for taking remedial measures, as needed. At the same time, we are maintaining readiness through the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. Next, to be future-ready, peacekeeping must be equipped with capabilities and technologies that allow missions to anticipate threats, adapt quickly and operate safely in increasingly complex environments. Enhanced mobility and agile logistics remain essential, but digital transformation is equally critical. Data‑driven tools, integrated command and control and such technologies as drones, satellite imagery and artificial intelligence strengthen situational awareness, early warning and force protection. In MONUSCO, these advances are already shaping operations. Confronted with armed drones and GPS interference, the Mission has strengthened early warning and adopted a layered surveillance approach, drawing on unmanned systems and satellite imagery, to support ceasefire monitoring in a challenging environment. However, technology alone is not a solution. It must be accompanied by skilled personnel, sustained training and predictable resources. By investing in the right capabilities, we can reshape peacekeeping to remain nimble, resilient and, ultimately, more impactful for the communities we serve. Fourthly, peacekeeping is inherently a partnership‑driven enterprise. As we look to the future, we are deepening collaboration with troop‑ and police‑contributing countries, host States, civil society and regional and subregional organizations to fully leverage comparative advantages and ensure that operations are optimally configured to the needs on the ground. Our strategic partnership with the African Union is central to this vision. Implementing resolution 2719 (2023) remains a priority, enabling more coherent and predictable support to African‑led peace operations. We see the value of enhanced partnerships clearly on the ground. In South Sudan, UNMISS has enhanced trilateral coordination with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, allowing for unified political engagement and coordinated action in support of the peace process. As the Council is aware, our peacekeeping operations have faced significant financial challenges over the past year, necessitating the implementation of stringent contingency measures. Although it is too early to assess the full impact of these measures — as we expect that this impact will be felt over an extended period of time — we are already seeing major constraints on the ability of the missions to implement their political and protection of civilians mandates and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel. For instance, the closure of bases has reduced UNMISS’ situational awareness, early warning capabilities and community reassurance, creating blind spots and limiting proactive interventions and timely deployment to hotspots. In the case of MINURSO, responsiveness to casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) needs from the east of the berm may also be slightly lower, owing to the reduction in the number of aircraft. A similar situation is taking place in MONUSCO, in which reduced aviation hours have increased reliance on ground movements in high-risk areas, elevating exposure to security threats and affecting the timeliness of emergency responses, including CASEVAC and MEDEVAC. Enhancing the cost efficiency of peacekeeping operations will remain a critical imperative for the Secretariat, and missions are identifying efficiencies as part of the implementation of the contingency plans. However, Member States must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time to allow us to work effectively in implementation of the mandates that they give us. For instance, although the training capacity of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has been reduced, the Mission has adapted by prioritizing critical training, increasing the use of virtual platforms and integrating training into operational activities, resulting in some efficiencies and improved prioritization. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Council for its continued engagement in peacekeeping. However, allow me to underscore that the effectiveness of our operations ultimately hinges on the unity, consistency and strength of the Council’s political support. Without sustained and unequivocal backing from the Council, our missions cannot deliver on the mandates entrusted to them, nor can they fully support the political processes at the heart of lasting peace. Now more than ever, it is essential that the Council provide strong, coherent and consistent support, not only to peacekeeping operations themselves, but also to the political efforts that they are designed to enable and sustain. I also wish to express my deep gratitude to Member States for their invaluable contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, their continued investment in its future and their commitment to ensuring that peacekeeping remains fit for purpose. (spoke in French) I would like to pay tribute to the work carried out every day by all the men and women serving under the United Nations flag, in very difficult conditions, in the service of peace. Allow me also to pay tribute to the heroism of the Blue Helmets who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of peace. We honour the memory of the three Indonesian peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon who recently lost their lives and of the six Bangladeshi peacekeepers killed in Kadugli while serving with the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

I thank Mr. Lacroix for his briefing. I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Nyone. Lieutenant General Nyone: I am honoured to brief the Council today on the situation in the Central African Republic from the perspective of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). I would like to congratulate the Kingdom of Bahrain on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. Allow me at the outset to express my deep appreciation for the Council’s continued attention and support to the Mission and to the people of the Central African Republic. I will give an update on the security situation, including the risks of spillover effects from the conflict in the Sudan, followed by the operational activities of the MINUSCA force. Thereafter, I will highlight the strategic outlook, and finally, I will convey key messages to the Council. The Central African Republic has made significant strides towards stability, with MINUSCA playing a central role in this progress. Following the combined presidential, legislative, regional and local elections held on 28 December 2025, the country has entered a post-election consolidation phase. The elections were conducted in a relatively peaceful environment across most regions and resulted in the reelection of President Faustin Archange Touadera. Despite these positive developments, the overall security situation remains uneven and fragile. The MINUSCA force has continued to support the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) in expanding their disposition across large parts of the country. This cooperation has contributed to improved security at the national level, particularly in the Yade region in the north-west and Haut-Mbomou prefecture in the south-east. However, insecurity persists in two hotspot areas, especially in the north-east and south-east. In Haut-Mbomou prefecture, for example, the situation remains highly precarious, owing to the activities of the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia, which has committed serious human rights violations. The group has carried out targeted attacks against the MINUSCA force and the national security forces and abductions of local administration officials and civilians, including incidents that occurred on election day in Zemio and Bambouti. In the north-east, instability is further exacerbated by spillover from the conflict in the Sudan, as cross-border movements of armed elements and the rising displacement of civilians place additional strain on already fragile communities, particularly in Vakaga prefecture, thereby heightening the risk of further destabilization. More broadly, the Central African Republic’s stability remains closely linked to regional dynamics, including what I have already highlighted: instability in the Sudan, the porous border with South Sudan and the exploitation of corridors and transhumance routes by armed groups. Although MINUSCA has not faced direct drone attacks, the use of drones in the region has already caused significant United Nations casualties, particularly in our sister mission, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei. The threat to MINUSCA is indirect but growing, fuelled by regional instability, border incursions and the potential spread of drone technology to armed groups operating in the Central African Republic. On a positive note, however, the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic established the Chad–Central African Republic Mixed Border Mechanism on 26 September 2025 to address persistent insecurity and manage influxes of refugees. These efforts have been welcomed by MINUSCA, as they aim to restore State authority, formalize trade and stabilize the porous border, while forming part of the broader strategy to transform the border from a source of conflict into an area of secure trade. The MINUSCA force played a critical role in supporting the Central African Republic’s general elections on 28 December 2025 by working alongside national defence and security forces to maintain security, protect civilians and electoral staff and ensure safe polling conditions through joint patrols. Despite limited troop numbers and a challenging environment, most polling stations operated smoothly. The force is now preparing to provide similar support for the second round of local elections on 26 April. At the same time, MINUSCA has remained central to implementing the Government’s disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme, following the April 2025 peace agreement with the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique and the Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation armed groups. It has provided security, logistics and technical support for disarmament operations, including securing sites and escorting personnel. These efforts have led to the disarmament of more than 1,300 combatants from July 2025, bring the total number to more than 6,100 combatants demobilized since 2019, thereby contributing to increased stability and reduced armed group presence. After a pause during the elections, these operations have since resumed. Funding shortfalls are not only an administrative challenge for the Mission; they are also affecting operational movements of the force on the ground. The repatriation of 4,031 troops and reductions in patrols, air support and logistics have constrained the MINUSCA force’s reach, mobility and responsiveness. If they are sustained, these limitations risk undermining protection of civilians, weakening our deterrence capability and reducing the Mission’s ability to consolidate the gains. Looking ahead, the Mission assesses that the security situation will remain generally positive but fragile, with a continued risk of localized violence, particularly in areas in which residual armed groups compete for influence and resources. As a result, the protection of civilians will remain a central priority for our Mission, alongside efforts to consolidate gains and gradually restore State authority. Continued engagement and support for national defence and security forces, through partners such as the European Union Force in the Central African African Republic, will be essential to sustain this progress. Continued Security Council support will be essential for the Mission’s success and broader stabilization efforts in the Central African Republic. Adequate resources and operational capacity will enable peacekeepers to operate effectively. Ultimately, however, lasting peace will depend on strengthening the capacity of the Forces armées centrafricaines and internal security forces. The force remains committed to fulfilling its mandate and supporting the people of the Central African Republic in achieving lasting peace and stability. I thank the Council for its continued support in this regard and I therefore stand ready to answer any questions.

I thank Lieutenant General Nyone for his briefing. I now give the floor to Major General Shrestha. Major General Shrestha: At the outset, I would like to convey my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to brief the Council. It is my privilege to provide updates on the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which continues to carry out its mandate in an exceptionally challenging environment. Allow me to recall the five benchmarks set out in resolution 2802 (2025). These include: the withdrawal of all unauthorized armed forces and armed elements and the full demilitarization of the Abyei Area; the resumption of meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), with documented outcomes; the establishment of the Abyei police service and the implementation of temporary administrative and security arrangements by September 2026; the issuance of visas to enable the full deployment of 640 United Nations police personnel, including individual police officers and formed police units; and finally, support for the prompt appointment of a civilian Deputy Head of Mission. UNISFA is intensifying engagement with the parties and partners to advance progress across these benchmarks, as the rest of this briefing will show. To fulfil its mandate, UNISFA’s strategy is built around seven key priorities. These include protecting civilians; strengthening political engagement; adapting the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) concept; enhancing intercommunal mediation; improving rule-of-law support; safeguarding humanitarian access; and increasing operational efficiency. Together, these priorities create a clear framework for delivering the mandate effectively and maintaining stability in Abyei. The political environment in which UNISFA operates has improved since the mission’s inception. However, the ongoing conflict in the Sudan and continued instability in South Sudan still affect mission activities. Progress in the Abyei political process remains limited, as regular meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) have been disrupted. The suspension of the Sudan from the African Union has further limited engagement. Despite this, UNISFA, the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and the Department of Peace Operations in New York continue to sustain dialogue with both parties, emphasizing the urgency for the parties to maintain their discussions through the JPSM and the AJOC. On 7 April, I met with the Defence Minister of South Sudan, and we agreed that efforts to reconvene the JPSM would be enhanced. He appointed a focal point to work with us to that end. We have also intensified political outreach, including consultations with the African Union and other key stakeholders, focusing on important mandate‑related issues. Additionally, the mission, in coordination with the Department of Peace Operations in New York, is also directing its good offices efforts towards advancing other aspects of mandate implementation with the parties, including engagement in deploying the remaining police personnel and appointing a civilian Deputy Head of Mission. The security situation in Abyei is relatively stable but remains unpredictable. Although no large-scale clashes have been reported in quite some time, criminal activity, sporadic gunfire, low-level intercommunal tensions, cattle raiding and revenge-related incidents continue. The continued presence of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) inside Abyei remains a violation of the 2011 agreement and UNISFA’s mandate. UNISFA has maintained a proactive security posture through ongoing patrols, rapid quick reaction force deployments and cooperation with community-based mechanisms, preventing numerous high-risk incidents. The joint community peace committee continues to provide vital early-warning support and to mobilize communities in amplifying our messaging towards mandate implementation. In that context, on 2 April, leaders of the joint community peace committee signed a declaration of intent to strengthen the weapon-free status of Abyei and advocate for the withdrawal of unauthorized forces, in line with my initiative for the demilitarization of Abyei. In November 2025, UNISFA facilitated the annual premigration conference in Noong and is preparing follow-up dialogues with traditional leaders and youth stakeholders. In the same vein, the Abyei joint programme continues to provide basic services to vulnerable populations in an effort to address the root causes of the conflict. The human rights situation remains fragile. The absence of legitimate and functioning State institutions continues to pose a challenge to the rule of law and the delivery of justice. Violations of the right to physical integrity and other civil and political rights are frequently reported, and the overall situation results in breaches of economic, social and cultural rights. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to strengthen the rule of law and human rights institutions. Despite those structural challenges, UNISFA continues to fulfil its mandate through monitoring, documentation and capacity‑building initiatives. The humanitarian situation remains dire. Violent incidents, the presence of armed groups, the increasing presence of internally displaced persons and the arrival of returnees and refugees are straining already limited services. Critical gaps continue to exist in health, water, sanitation, education and protection, mainly owing to the withdrawal of most United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Within limited resources, UNISFA continues to support humanitarian access and maintain close coordination with humanitarian partners. Through the Abyei joint programme, the Mission seeks to ensure that local populations benefit from the dividends of peace and stability. Overall, Abyei remains relatively stable. However, this stability is not automatic or self‑sustaining; it is actively maintained through UNISFA’s continuous political engagement with, and support to, both communities. On the Force’s side, UNISFA’s deterrence posture, robust patrolling and measures to enforce the weapon‑free regime have also proved to be key. Population inflows from both the Sudan and South Sudan, combined with the continued presence of unauthorized armed actors, intercommunal tensions, humanitarian pressures and the absence of formal rule of law institutions continue to generate underlying risks that require constant attention. The situation we face today reflects a recent and clear evolution. In late 2025, increased conflict in the Sudan had a direct impact on the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. The use of drone warfare, especially around Kadugli, significantly increased risks to United Nations personnel and disrupted Mission logistics. At the same time, the RSF’s proximity to the Sudan-Abyei boundary and fragmented command structures reduced predictability and undermined security guarantees. In some areas, continued deployment became unsustainable. Following the drone attacks on the Kadugli United Nations logistics base on 13 December, UNISFA was forced to abandon the base. The evacuation was completed on 21 December 2025. Subsequently, two JBVMM team sites were closed — team site 21 at Tishwin on 8 February and team site 22 at Abu Qussa/Wunkur on 6 March 2026. This new reality has raised the question of how we can continue to support the parties in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, an area that must remain monitored. To ensure that the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan and the Security Council are provided with well-informed and realistic options, an integrated experts’ working group, led by United Nations Headquarters with UNISFA, is currently developing options that we hope will be presented in the near future. In the meantime, Bangladeshi battalion troops previously assigned to the JBVMM have been redeployed to UNISFA’s headquarters in Abyei under a new mobile force employment concept. The Bangladeshi battalion will temporarily take responsibility for temporary operating bases within the Abyei box. This setup will give UNISFA more flexibility in deploying troops as operational needs emerge. As a result, the personnel of the Indian battalion and the Pakistani battalion will be available for other prioritized tasks, such as static combat deployment at key migration corridors or locations and enhanced security at Amiet market. A reduction of 470 personnel, along with staff suspensions and freezes, has affected the mission. Also, a 50 per cent cut in the Abyei joint programme and the suspension of quick impact projects — compounded by the departure of most agencies, funds and programmes — have limited community support in 2025-2026. For example, the mission was forced to reduce the number of participants in peace conferences. Also, the World Food Programme’s direct food assistance was reduced by half between 2025 and 2026, as a result of funding constraints. The Mission is managing those challenges by consolidating functions, strengthening civil-military coordination and repurposing posts. While the liquidity contingency plan has introduced measured risk into mandate delivery, core mandate tasks remain achievable. The impact of the liquidity crisis on UNISFA is therefore significant. UNISFA’s proposed authorized military and police strength for the 2026- 2027 budget cycle remains unchanged as submitted. However, the actual number of deployed personnel has been affected by the implementation of the liquidity contingency plan. I conclude with a simple observation: Abyei today is not at war, but neither is it at peace. With the rapidly increasing presence of unauthorized armed actors exerting pressure on mandate implementation within the Abyei box and in JBVMM areas, continued political engagement by the parties, underpinned by the Council’s support for UNISFA, remains critical to preserving stability and advancing a durable solution.

I thank Major General Shrestha for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.

Liberia welcomes the convening of this annual briefing and thanks the presidency for organizing it at a moment when peacekeeping faces unprecedented strain. We appreciate the briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Force Commanders of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). We salute the men and women serving under the blue flag, and we honour those who made the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of peace. Liberia speaks today with the clarity of a country that has lived the full arc, from conflict to recovery. We often say back home — half in satire, but fully in truth — that when the United Nations saved Liberia, it also saved Liberians from themselves. The United Nations Mission in Liberia worked because mandates were clear and implementable, expectations were matched by resources, and political processes were given space to breathe. That experience anchors our conviction that peacekeeping, done right, remains one of multilateralism’s most effective tools. Yet today’s operating environments are harsher and more complex. Armed groups fragment only to reform. Asymmetric attacks, disinformation campaigns and restrictions on freedom of movement are no longer exceptions; they are the terrain. Peacekeepers are being asked to do more, with less margin for error and at unacceptable risk. As the Under-Secretary-General pointed out in his briefing, adaptation is therefore not optional; it is now existential. On MINUSCA, Liberia acknowledges the Mission’s indispensable role in protecting civilians and supporting the political process in the Central African Republic. Progress achieved, including successful elections with increased participation of women, is real, although fragile. At the same time, persistent insecurity in parts of the country, combined with disinformation and regional spillover, continues to undermine trust and endanger both civilians and peacekeepers. The protection of civilians must remain the Mission’s organizing principle, supported by discipline, a robust posture and sustained engagement with local communities. Adaptation will succeed only if it is grounded in legitimacy, locally and regionally. On UNISFA, Liberia recognizes the Mission’s unique responsibility in Abyei amid a stalled political process. We are deeply troubled by attacks against peacekeepers, including kidnapping incidents. Let us be clear: peacekeepers cannot become bargaining chips in political disputes. Accountability for such acts must be swift and unequivocal. As mission configurations adjust, the Council must ensure that early warning, verification and community confidence are not casualties of a reduced presence. Visibility matters. Credibility in the peace process depends on it. Liberia would like to highlight three cross-cutting priorities. First, capability must evolve, but humanity must anchor its evolution. Modern technologies — unmanned aerial vehicles, data analytics and enhanced situational awareness — can save lives and extend reach, but only if they reinforce, not replace, community trust. Secondly, accountability is not punitive; it is actually protective. When violations go unanswered, whether against peacekeepers or civilians, mandates erode and political processes stall. Commitments under status-of-forces and status-ofmission agreements must be upheld. Thirdly, peacekeeping cannot outpace politics. Rushed or under resourced drawdowns risk reversing hard-won gains. Transitions must be conditions-based and paired with sustained peacebuilding and development engagement, including through the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund. In conclusion, Liberia reaffirms its strong support for United Nations peacekeeping and for the principles of Action for Peacekeeping and Action for Peacekeeping Plus. The men and women deployed in the Central African Republic, Abyei and beyond deserve clear and implementable mandates, political backing and the tools required for them to succeed. Peacekeeping works, but only when political and resource commitments match the exemplary courage of the peacekeepers themselves.

Let me begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General Lacroix for his briefing and by expressing our deep appreciation to the Force Commanders of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for their service and leadership under exceptionally demanding conditions. For decades, United Nations peacekeeping has helped contain conflict, protect civilians, support political processes, monitor ceasefires and create space for peace to take root. We have no doubt that United Nations peacekeeping remains one of the most effective tools available to the Council, even if today’s peacekeeping missions are operating in environments that are more dangerous and more complex than ever before. Denmark pays tribute to all peacekeepers serving under the United Nations flag. To the military, police and civilian personnel serving under immense pressure and — frankly, too often — with scarce resources. We commend their dedication and courage. They deserve not only our gratitude but also our full political support. Last year, Denmark, together with Pakistan and the Republic of Korea, created the Trio initiative to highlight peace operations as a vital tool for the Security Council and to promote effective, credible peace operations that are adapted to the realities on the ground. Together with Pakistan, we intend to deepen that collaboration this year. Blue Helmets, together with civilian components, cannot carry peace processes on their own. They require political backing, realistic mandates, adequate resources and host States that deliver on their obligations. Without these conditions, even the best mission leadership and the bravest personnel will struggle to deliver. We have seen how restrictions and violations imposed by host authorities directly limit mobility, weaken implementation and put peacekeepers at unnecessary risk. Host States must create the necessary conditions for missions to succeed. Another important recognition is that missions, contexts and mandates differ. While peacekeeping must always remain context-specific, planning must become more integrated, coherent and systematic. Denmark, together with Austria, has therefore taken the initiative to promote stronger integrated mission-level planning across civilian, police and military components. We are encouraged that 40 Member States have joined this effort. We look forward to working with all relevant actors to translate this into practical results that improve performance, accountability and the safety and security of peacekeepers. Since we have with us today the Force Commanders of MINUSCA and UNISFA, allow me to highlight a few mission-specific points. MINUSCA remains a mission of great importance. Denmark congratulates the Central African Republic on the holding of elections in December 2025. That was a significant moment, and MINUSCA’s contribution was essential. Now MINUSCA must increasingly focus on the future, consolidating progress through a forwardlooking approach to transition, rooted in realistic conditions, institution-building and national ownership. The people of the Central African Republic must be able to trust State institutions and be meaningfully included in the path ahead. Like all peacekeeping missions, MINUSCA must continue to evolve to meet the demands on the ground, including the challenges presented by the spillover of the conflict in the north of the Sudan. UNISFA is another important peacekeeping operation. It is charged with safeguarding civilians in the territory of Abyei. This mission clearly illustrates the potential to make better use of technology in peacekeeping. In a context where border monitoring remains central, capabilities such as satellite imagery and drones could significantly enhance situational awareness, extend monitoring reach and improve force protection in remote and contested areas. This is particularly relevant to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. When such tools are not fully utilized, missions are left to do more with less, under greater risk and with lower effectiveness. In two different ways, MINUSCA and UNISFA show the clear value of peacekeeping operations as well as some of the dilemmas and challenges they may face. Finally, Denmark looks forward to receiving the Secretary-General’s review on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations. However, we must not only focus on what comes next. Peacekeeping is a promise — to the communities we are mandated to support, to those we send into harm’s way and to the maintenance of international peace and security. That promise must be matched by our resolve here in the Security Council.

I thank all our briefers today. The United States holds to a simple principle: when conditions change, peacekeeping missions need to adapt or close. The operations authorized by the Council, which risk lives and significant taxpayer funding from all of our countries, are meant to be a temporary tool. Their aim is simple: to help host Governments navigate peace and security crises when they cannot help themselves. Unfortunately, more times than those on the Council would like to admit, missions drift from temporary solutions into open-ended commitments, burning through billions of dollars and risking peacekeepers’ lives, while some host Governments game the system and never hold up their side of the bargain. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) exemplifies this problem. It is supposedly an interim force, which has consumed billions of dollars over its 15 years in place, with little to show for in a lasting political process. In fact, during UNISFA’s tenure, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan have made virtually no progress towards delineating the border between the Sudan and South Sudan, demilitarizing Abyei or deciding the area’s final status. Worse, both Governments are actively undermining its effectiveness through deliberate acts of obstruction disguised as bureaucratic delays. Most recently, they have resorted to blocking the appointment of a civilian deputy head of the mission and denied visas to the mission’s personnel and police. The Sudan and South Sudan must unequivocally demonstrate progress on the benchmarks outlined in the mandate if they want to see this mission renewed for another year. Their actions are speaking louder than their words. Peacekeeping missions have a clear job to do: fulfil their mandates. Our peacekeepers should always be working themselves out of a job. Appeasing host Governments to maintain ambiguous consent is not their job. Consent cannot become a shield for inaction and de facto renewal. Council members and regional partners must do more to encourage full cooperation by host Governments and parties to conflict, not only when mandate negotiations and press releases come due. None of us should be satisfied when missions adapt only in order to survive another year. Survival should not be our threshold for success. Adaptation must be innovative. It should actually advance a mission’s mandate and ultimately make forward progress towards transition, closure and peace. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is a rare example of a mission that has collectively moved towards a broader strategic goal. It is long past time for the United Nations to capture and codify this kind of integrated strategic planning across the entire peacekeeping enterprise. We welcome MINUSCA’s repositioning of forces following the successful elections last December. We encourage adjustments to MINUSCA’s force laydown to economize its footprint in more stable areas, including Bangui, and to transition responsibility to the Central African Republic police or national security forces. For too long, the Council has watched idly as host Governments are strangling mission operations, as peace processes stall or backslide and as mandates become impossible to fulfil. We have seen missions blocked, restricted and ignored. Yet, these missions are renewed anyway. Despite these glaring realities, the Council has time and time again renewed failing missions with only minimal changes to mandates. We simply cannot continue to call for adaptive peacekeeping while opting for the status quo out of sheer habit. If we are serious about peacekeeping and reform, renewals must be earned, never assumed.

I would like to thank the briefers: Under- Secretary-General Lacroix and the Force Commanders of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The safety of peacekeepers is critical. This year has seen unacceptable attacks on blue helmets. This includes the killing of peacekeepers in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), MINUSCA, UNISFA and most recently in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Our sympathies are with the families of those killed. The United Kingdom condemns violence against United Nations peacekeepers, who work tirelessly to protect international peace and security. We recall that attacks on peacekeepers may constitute war crimes. We urge accountability, strengthened protection measures and respect for the mandates given by the Council. The United Kingdom commends the courage and professionalism of personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations. We are grateful for the briefings today from the MINUSCA and UNISFA Force Commanders, and I would like to make a couple of points specific to those two missions. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA continues to play a critical role in a complex environment. We commend MINUSCA’s support to elections in December 2025 and encourage the Government of the Central African Republic, with MINUSCA’s support, to sustain progress on the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, in order to advance security sector reform and to strengthen accountability for human rights violations. UNISFA also plays a vital stabilizing role. Growing interference by the Rapid Support Forces and other armed actors and limited progress by the Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities on the benchmarks outlined in the 2025 mandate renewal leave UNISFA stretched. The drawdown of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism sites has weakened early warning and confidence-building mechanisms at a time of rising insecurity. We call on all parties to respect Abyei’s demilitarized status and on the Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities to support UNISFA to deliver its mandate. Finally, taking a broader view, the United Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that United Nations peacekeeping remains an effective tool in support of international peace and security. We note the importance of United Nations missions being grounded in robust political strategies and their mandates being clear, prioritized and matched with the right resources and capabilities. Restrictions on missions’ freedom of movement are unacceptable. We should also protect progress on performance, accountability, safeguarding and the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping. We look forward to the publication of the Secretary-General’s review on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations to advance this effort.

We thank Under- Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix for his views. We also thank Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha, Acting Head of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), for their informative briefings. We would also like, through them, to express our gratitude to all military personnel serving in peacekeeping missions for their steadfast commitment to fulfilling their duty under difficult and dangerous conditions, with daily risk to their lives. Over many decades, United Nations peacekeeping has come a long way and has garnered sufficient expertise and tools to assist States in need in dealing with the most difficult stages of conflict, creating conditions for the political settlement of crises, concluding peace agreements and maintaining a stable environment for their implementation. There is no doubt that each situation warrants its own unique solution, with an emphasis on political objectives, taking into account the objective conditions on the ground and successful past experience, while strictly adhering to the fundamentals of United Nations peacekeeping. This implies unconditional respect for the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereignty of host States and the basic principles of peacekeeping — namely, the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence and to protect the mandate. We must move away from the overburdened mandates of peacekeeping missions in which the list of secondary tasks relating to human rights, gender and climate issues is so long that peacekeepers simply lack the resources to carry them out. We see instances of conflicts reigniting, while the population loses hope for positive change and increasingly wonders what is preventing the Blue Helmets from fulfilling their mandate. Such a scenario can negatively impact the position of host countries. Furthermore, the interference of international players in government processes may mean that host governments may have completely legitimate concerns about the risks of interference in their domestic affairs. The flip side of the coin is the fear of losing power as a result of such support being withdrawn from the country. This gap between actual results and resources expended is becoming a significant complicating factor. For our part, we are convinced that without a thorough analysis of such issues, it will be difficult for us to make progress. Only by building on such an assessment can we find a political solution, not a merely technical one, to the problems that arise. A simple, across-the-board cut of a certain percentage is a recipe for even greater problems, not a path to success. The crisis situations in which United Nations peacekeeping missions are deployed are constantly changing, which can lead, among other things, to a further deterioration of the security situation. For missions that have a mandate to protect civilians, this task often becomes a priority. However, there is no doubt that ensuring the safety of civilians is, first and foremost, the responsibility of States, and no one apart from the State is better placed to bear this responsibility. This is particularly evident when it comes to remote areas outside the mission’s deployment zone or in the current situation of cuts to troop numbers on the ground. This is precisely why, when peacekeeping missions do have a mandate to protect civilians, this mandate must be fully implemented, in close cooperation with national authorities, local communities and the relevant humanitarian organizations. At the same time, peacekeeping missions must also make efforts to assist in security sector reform and to improve the training of the relevant national authorities. Without appropriate capacity-building, it is impossible to achieve sustainable results. We consider the activities of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to be a good example in this regard. Thanks in part to the support of United Nations peacekeepers, the Central African Republic has managed to make significant progress on the security front, which has paved the way for sustained progress towards a return to peaceful life in the country. Despite the necessary measures to optimize resource and staffing levels, peacekeepers continue to effectively fulfil their mandate. The key elements of this mandate are the protection of civilians and support for national security sector reform. We also commend the Mission’s work in assisting the authorities with the conduct of electoral activities at the end of last year. On a separate note, we would like to underscore that the gradual normalization of the security situation in the Central African Republic was made possible by the synergy between the efforts of the United Nations mission and Bangui’s bilateral partners, notably Russia. This joining of international efforts to eradicate threats to civilians has enabled MINUSCA to become a contemporary success story of United Nations peacekeeping in Africa. However, it is important to remember that the safety of civilians can be guaranteed only by addressing the root causes of conflicts, as the need to protect civilians is not, in and of itself, the aim of peacekeeping, but rather a consequence of conflicts. In this regard, we would like to point out that the main objective of peacekeeping operations is to create the conditions for a political settlement through high-quality, painstaking political and mediation efforts, without exerting pressure or imposing ideologies that are alien to the parties to the conflict. Otherwise, even after a temporary respite, crises risk flaring up again. Thus, progress towards a settlement in Abyei has remained limited since the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei in the area in November 2025 (resolution 2802 (2025)). The protracted conflict in the Sudan, on the one hand, and the stalled political process in South Sudan, on the other, are preventing the two countries from engaging seriously in determining the final status of this territory. Both States are also facing a shortfall in financial resources, in addition to humanitarian challenges. All this merely delays the start of substantive talks on Abyei. We agree that a clear signal must be sent to the parties regarding the resolution of contentious issues, including the revitalization of bilateral border mechanisms, the establishment of a police force and assurance of Abyei’s demilitarized status. However, Khartoum and Juba will only be able to tackle these issues in earnest once the domestic situation in each of these countries is normalized. In the current circumstances, it is hardly advisable to use the Abyei issue to put pressure on the Sudanese and South Sudanese. It is important to give them room for manoeuvre and to demonstrate that the United Nations stands ready to continue to provide proper oversight of the situation in Abyei until the necessary conditions for dialogue between the two capitals are in place. Today, against the backdrop of the deepening financial crisis within the United Nations, which has led, inter alia, to a reduction in the number of peacekeepers in field missions, this crisis raises the question of replacing a physical presence with the use of new technologies to ensure the safety and security of the peacekeepers themselves and of the civilian population. There is no doubt that the Blue Helmets must keep up with the times and rely on the latest technology in their day-to-day work. However, first and foremost, it is essential to secure the consent of the host State and to take into account the sensitive nature of this issue, so that the use of information and digital technologies by peacekeepers does not pose a threat to the host State’s sovereignty or infringe upon the privacy of its citizens. Furthermore, data handling must protect information from falling into the wrong hands and must focus on the need for careful verification of its accuracy without fail. Russia has consistently supported United Nations peacekeeping activities. Since 1992, personnel from the Russian Ministry of Defence have been participating in peacekeeping operations. Currently, through the Ministry of Defence, Russian military observers and commissioned officers are serving as part of the missions in the Central African Republic, Western Sahara, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Middle East, South Sudan and Cyprus. Our country also contributes to the training of military peacekeepers, including foreign nationals, through Secretariat-certified training courses for commissioned officers and military observers. Russia possesses unique expertise in the professional training of Blue Helmets, and we are ready to share that expertise.

I would like to start by thanking Under-Secretary- General Lacroix and the Force Commanders of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for their remarks. Greece pays tribute to the men and women who serve under the United Nations flag and honours the memory of those who have fallen in the line of duty. Attacks against peacekeepers, such as the latest against the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, are unacceptable and a serious violation of Security Council resolutions and international law. We reiterate our firm belief that those responsible for attacks against peacekeepers should be held accountable. I wish to highlight three points. First, in the Pact for the Future, we committed to adapting peace operations to better respond to existing challenges and new realities. We look forward to the completion of the review of the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations. In particular, we support that the review should prioritize increasing the efficiency and agility of peace operations under increasingly constrained budgetary conditions, ensuring the primacy of politics in all mandates and enhancing collaboration between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union. As a cross-cutting concern, adaptation should not affect the core functions of peace operations, including ceasefire monitoring and the protection of civilians, particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children. Secondly, Greece reiterates its steadfast support for UNISFA and MINUSCA, which continue to deliver their crucial missions amid substantial but unavoidable budgetary and personnel constraints. We stress the need that any adjustment should not be horizontal but tailor-made and based on the specific needs and conditions of each peace operation. In this context, Greece also wishes to underline that, in line with resolution 2764 (2024), child protection capacities developed within United Nations peace operations should be preserved during mission transitions and withdrawals, including through their smooth and responsible transfer to United Nations country teams where appropriate. In this regard, continued support by Member States to the relevant protection capacities after mission transition remains essential, particularly in fragile contexts in which risks for children often increase during institutional reconfiguration. We recognize MINUSCA’s crucial and multidimensional role in supporting political stabilization in the Central African Republic, particularly during the delicate post-electoral period. We commend the resumption of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, a pillar of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, as well as MINUSCA’s crossborder and intercommunal dialogue and stabilization initiatives. We also note the continuing threats posed by armed groups and cross-border destabilizing dynamics, which require an agile mission posture and strengthened regional coordination. Moreover, we commend UNISFA and the troop-contributing countries, whose peacekeepers risk their lives to provide peace and security in Abyei. We underscore the need for the host authorities to immediately and unconditionally support UNISFA operations. We also take note of the challenges arising from the withdrawal from Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites and stress the importance of preserving confidence-building, early warning and verification capacities in the Abyei area. The absence of meaningful progress towards a negotiated solution remains deeply troubling. Thirdly, Greece supports the integration of new technologies, including artificial intelligence capabilities, remote sensing tools and enhanced situational awareness, in the training and capacity-building of peacekeepers in both missions. However, we must guard against the misuse of such technologies to spread disinformation or undermine the credibility of peacekeepers. In conclusion, Greece remains committed to strengthening unity within the Council, aiming at supporting peace operations in delivering their mandates, especially in the current challenging operational and budgetary context.

I thank the Kingdom of Bahrain for convening this meeting. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix; Lieutenant General Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); and Major General Shrestha, Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), for their detailed briefings. This meeting is taking place against a particular backdrop, marked especially by the liquidity constraints that are affecting the effective implementation of the mandates entrusted to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Democratic Republic of the Congo pays heartfelt tribute to all blue helmets, without distinction, for their constant commitment and the sacrifices made in often hostile environments and serving causes that transcend their national interests. The ongoing discussion on the adaptation of peace operations, particularly as part of the Pact for the Future, responds to a need that has become unavoidable: that of aligning our tools with the profound transformation of security environments. Peace operations remain essential instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, their effectiveness depends on a delicate balance: they cannot replace political action but must create the conditions for it. Their success remains inextricably linked to the existence of credible political processes, the consent of host States and predictable, adequate and sustainable resources. In contexts marked by the fragmentation of armed groups, porous borders and increasingly intertwined national and regional dynamics, the issue is no longer merely that of the presence of missions but of their actual capacity to adapt, plan their action and produce tangible results on the ground. My delegation wishes to make three observations. First, regarding MINUSCA, the Democratic Republic of the Congo commends the efforts made by the Mission, in particular its support for ensuring the security of the elections of 28 December 2025 and for the preparations for those of 26 April 2026. During the 2025–2026 period, the military component of MINUSCA has significantly adjusted its posture by decentralizing its units to remote areas. This repositioning, combined with strengthened cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, demonstrates a commitment to an operational presence that is more closely aligned with local realities and essential in the fight against armed groups. The same applies to the support provided to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, which enabled the disarmament of more than 1,100 former combatants between July and December 2025. However, this progress must not obscure the structural challenges that persist, including the fragility of the political framework and the spillover effects of regional crises on the country’s stability. Secondly, regarding the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, my delegation notes with concern the difficulties encountered in implementing the UNISFA mandate, against a backdrop of the deteriorating political situation and the absence of sustained dialogue between the Sudan and South Sudan on the status of Abyei. The withdrawal from Mechanism sites raises serious questions regarding the mission’s ability to continue to carry out its essential monitoring, early warning and confidence-building functions. Thirdly, the ongoing review of the future of peace operations reflects a major doctrinal shift. The gradual shift from multidimensional missions to lighter, more agile and modular configurations responds to an operational necessity. However, this transition cannot be purely technical; it calls for strategic clarification regarding the objectives pursued and the conditions for the success of these new models. The increased integration of technological tools, the pursuit of greater mobility and the consideration of emerging threats such as disinformation or cyberrisks are all relevant developments. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO is already using technology for surveillance and stabilization, including the use of drones with infrared cameras to monitor armed groups. However, beyond these adjustments, the primacy of politics must remain the guiding principle. Peace operations can only be conceived as temporary instruments, serving negotiated political solutions. From this standpoint, strengthening partnerships with regional organizations, in particular the African Union, is crucial. For my delegation, the Africa’s experience on the ground shows that the relevance of peacekeeping operations cannot be measured on the sole basis of their capacity to deploy. It must also be measured by their ability to be part of a credible political dynamic, meet the population’s expectations and adapt to constantly changing environments. Provided that peacekeeping operations are able to continue doing so, they will remain a central pillar of our collective peace and security architecture.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Lacroix, Lieutenant General Nyone and Major General Shrestha for their briefings. I wish to take this opportunity to pay my highest tribute to all peacekeepers remaining steadfast at their posts across the 11 mission areas. Currently, the international landscape is undergoing profound changes, with conflict hotspots continuously flaring up and multilateralism facing headwinds. United Nations peacekeeping operations are moving forward under immense strain. Building upon the three core principles of peacekeeping, United Nations peacekeeping operations must keep pace with the times, drive innovation and strike a balance among resources, efficiency and effectiveness, while being more focused, adaptable and impactful, in order to create favourable conditions for the political settlement of relevant hotspot issues. I would like to make four points. First, there is a need to maintain a political approach and pursue peace through dialogue. The peaceful settlement of disputes through political means lies at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations. Peacekeeping operations must consistently serve a clearly defined political process and act as a catalyst for reconciliation and consensus-building. In recent years, the Central African Republic has made significant progress in its peace process, successfully holding combined presidential, legislative, regional and municipal elections late last year. This serves as a success story of a host-country-led political process supported by a peacekeeping mission, in a joint endeavour to achieve lasting peace. Only by keeping political settlement as the essential thread and integrating it into every aspect of peacekeeping operations can a peacekeeping mission truly deliver results on the ground, successfully conclude its mandate and withdraw accordingly. Secondly, mandates must be streamlined to deliver tangible results. With peacekeeping resources increasingly constrained, peacekeeping operations cannot be all-encompassing. Overly broad mandates and excessive tasks dilute resources, obscure priorities and undermine balanced effectiveness. The Council should strengthen overall planning, proceed from realities on the ground and make prudent decisions to ensure that the mandates are more focused, better prioritized and more closely aligned with field conditions and the priorities of host countries. At the same time, any major adjustments to mandates or mission drawdowns should be realistic and feasible, based on the situation on the ground, respectful of the host country’s views, absorbing stakeholders’ concerns and decided upon prudently following thorough deliberations in the Security Council. Thirdly, there is a need to ensure the safety of peacekeepers and enhance operational effectiveness through technology. Currently, the security risks facing peacekeepers are particularly acute. The consecutive attacks on the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon over the past four months, resulting in the tragic loss of nine peacekeepers and injuries to many others, are deeply heartbreaking. The Secretariat and missions should fully implement resolution 2518 (2020) and other relevant resolutions, taking concrete measures to strengthen early warning and risk mitigation to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The application of new technologies offers new tools to ramp up the mission’s security and improve the performance of peacekeeping operations. As co- Chair of the Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of United Nations Peacekeepers, China convened a meeting in February this year featuring in-depth discussions on leveraging new technologies to safeguard peacekeepers, reaching a broad consensus. We hope all parties will continue to contribute their wisdom and strengths in this regard. Fourthly, partnerships must be solidified, and synergy must be built through collaboration. A smooth and effective peacekeeping operation hinges on the coordination and cooperation of all stakeholders, including the Security Council, the Secretariat, troopand police-contributing countries, financial contributors, host countries and regional organizations. The emergency drawdown processes of certain peacekeeping missions have attested to the importance of respecting host countries, enhancing communication among all parties and accommodating each other’s legitimate concerns. We must further strengthen coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, support the use of regional approaches and regional strengths to resolve regional issues, assist the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations in building their independent peacekeeping capacities and support the implementation of resolution 2719 (2023) to provide funding for AU-led peace operations. As a permanent member of the Security Council and the second-largest contributor to United Nations peacekeeping assessments, China has consistently supported the peacekeeping cause through concrete actions. This was demonstrated by our participation in 26 peacekeeping operations and deployment of more than 50,000 peacekeepers — duty on our shoulders, peace in our hands. China stands ready to work with all parties to promote integrity, innovation, quality and efficiency in peacekeeping operations amid a changing landscape, making great contributions to international peace and security.

I thank the Under- Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, and the Commanders of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for their briefings. I also welcome the presence of the heads of the military components of various peace operations, and I pay tribute to the men and women who serve under the United Nations flag to fulfil the Council’s mandates. For Colombia, peacekeeping is a valuable tool at the Organization’s disposal to promote peace and protect people. In that regard, allow me to highlight four aspects. First, the complex current landscape reflects how peacekeeping cannot replace political solutions and, at the same time, how political decisions seriously affect peace missions. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an example of the fact that no mission is able to fulfil its mandate completely if one of the parties chooses to use force and to violate international law repeatedly. The mission has acted responsibly and within the parameters of its mandate, but its ability pales in comparison to an escalation that has displaced more than 1 million people, done serious damage to civilian infrastructure and led to ground raids that contravene the framework established by the Council. For its part, MINUSCA reflects how missions can contribute to improving security situations, supporting national processes and promoting dialogue with local communities, even in a situation of political fragility and difficult security conditions. Secondly, there is an urgent need to address the growing challenges to mission security. Colombia condemns the recent attacks against United Nations personnel. We express our condolences to the victims and their families and in particular to Indonesia, Ghana, France and Bangladesh. These acts must be duly investigated and punished. Also, we must strengthen the capabilities of missions to face new and changing threats, including the use of drones, explosive artefacts and disinformation campaigns. The use of systems for remote sensing and for countering unmanned aircraft systems contribute to guaranteeing the safety and protection of personnel and to fulfilling mandates, complementing the effective presence of personnel on the ground. Thirdly, the protection of civilians must remain at the heart of peacekeeping operations, including during transition and reconfiguration processes. This effort requires political leadership and the capacity of host States, as the bodies responsible for protecting civilians within their territories. Colombia reaffirms the value of inclusive dialogue with communities and emphasizes the importance of coordination between military, police and civilian elements for this purpose. Finally, it is essential to provide a coherent institutional response to these challenges, striking a balance between expectations, resources and mandates. The reduction in mission capabilities resulting from contingency plans is a cause for concern. What must inform decision-making regarding mandates and transitions are the conditions on the ground, including the need to protect civilians. It is also crucial that host States give their consent and fulfil their respective obligations. In Colombia, we have learned that no sustainable peace can be imposed by force of arms. The path to peace requires inclusive dialogue, involving women and the vital forces within the regions, which addresses the structural causes of conflict and paves the way for viable and sustainable political solutions. This is the only way to ensure that peace is not merely a temporary arrangement, but a credible political vision and a tangible reality for communities.

At the outset, let me begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Lacroix for his comprehensive briefing. I also extend my thanks to the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Lieutenant General Nyone, and the Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), Major General Shrestha, for their invaluable insights and dedicated leadership in these complex environments. I take this opportunity to honour the sacrifices of United Nations peacekeepers who have lost their lives in the line of duty and to recognize their legacy in the lives they touched and the peace they sought to build around the world. We gather at a time when the evolving security situations in the Central African Republic and Abyei underscore the continued importance of supporting political processes and protecting civilians. Somalia’s perspective is shaped by its direct experience as a host of missions and as part of a continent that understands the critical importance of effective peace operations intimately. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA faces significant challenges ranging from persistent insecurity and political fragility to the spillover effects of regional conflicts. To address these threats, the Mission must adapt its military posture to be more agile and robust while strengthening cooperation with regional actors to stabilize border regions and support inclusive dialogue. In the case of UNISFA, the withdrawal of Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites presents new questions regarding the future configuration of its monitoring mandate. As its physical presence is reduced, we must leverage technology such as remote sensing, unmanned aerial vehicles and enhanced situational awareness tools to maintain confidence-building and early warning. However, our experience demonstrates that technology alone cannot be our solution. Successful monitoring requires a delicate balance between innovative solutions and community trust. We must remain steadfast in upholding the core principles of peacekeeping, including the fundamental requirement of consent from host Governments and warring parties. The success of these operations depends on clear strategic planning and operational adaptability, ensuring each mission has well-defined objectives and clear exit strategies from the outset. Peacekeeping missions not only need to monitor ceasefires but also to support peace processes from the beginning. Future operations must be integrated with preventive diplomacy and mediation, as well as collaboration with regional organizations such as the African Union. We must also prioritize the development-security nexus, as it is impossible to achieve lasting peace without addressing the underlying root causes of conflict. Somalia strongly advocates for the increased nationalization of United Nations posts and the prioritization of local procurement to build sustainable capacity and strengthen a mission’s legitimacy on the ground. By investing in local economies, we move away from dependency and towards the resilience needed for self-sustained peace. To conclude, Somalia remains steadfast in its commitment to working with the Security Council to ensure that United Nations peacekeeping continues to serve as a beacon of hope. Through collective action and strategic innovation, we can ensure that when United Nations missions depart, they leave behind not dependency, but a legacy of opportunity and lasting stability.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Lacroix, Lieutenant General Nyone and Major General Shrestha for their informative briefings. Let me also pay tribute to all personnel serving in United Nations missions and honour the peacekeepers who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the line of duty. Military components are the backbone of United Nations peacekeeping. Military personnel provide protection and monitoring across the mission area of operation and serve as enablers of a wide range of mandated tasks. At the same time, military components can only reach their full potential through an integrated, whole-ofmission approach. Effective mandate delivery depends on close cooperation between civilian, military and police components, ensuring that political, security and rule‑of‑law efforts reinforce one another. This underscores the importance of recent initiatives aimed at advancing integrated planning across United Nations peace operations. Today’s exchange is particularly important as the United Nations and its peacekeeping toolbox undergo a review process to remain fit for purpose in a changing security environment. Each mission faces distinct challenges, demanding tailored approaches and predictable resources, used strategically and efficiently. As the electoral process in the Central African Republic nears completion, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic is optimizing its posture. The Mission’s effectiveness will increasingly depend on its ability to deploy rapidly where needed, particularly in the east. This highlights the necessity to provide the Mission with adequate mobility and force projection capabilities, including air assets and engineering support. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), while continuing to fulfil its important mandate, is facing a capability gap owing to the absence of formed police units, alongside delays in establishing key civilian leadership arrangements. Addressing these shortfalls is essential, as durable stabilization cannot rest on the military component alone. It requires law and order capacities to address criminal activity and civilian mechanisms to manage tensions before they escalate. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) team sites has reduced the visible, impartial presence that helped to reassure the parties, build trust and discourage incidents. We encourage both the Sudan and South Sudan to engage with UNISFA in good faith to facilitate continued implementation of the JBVMM mandate. Allow me to highlight three broader issues relevant to today’s discussion. First, the safety and security of United Nations peacekeeping personnel is nonnegotiable. Deliberate attacks against peacekeepers may constitute violations of international humanitarian law and, therefore, war crimes. We must be clear that actors, whether State or non-State, who harass, endanger, or kill United Nations personnel are not only targeting individual staff. They are attacking the core values and fundamental principles that the United Nations and the Council represent. Such actions must be condemned and investigated, and perpetrators held accountable. Ensuring the safety of peacekeepers is also essential for the credibility and effectiveness of United Nations operations. Secondly, technological adaptation is indispensable in modern peacekeeping. Providing peacekeeping operations with equipment that matches the capabilities of conflict actors is critical for missions to be able to fulfil their mandates and ensure the safety of personnel and the protection of civilians. The tragic drone strike against United Nations peacekeepers in Kadugli in December shows that this is not a theoretical concern, but an operational reality. United Nations peacekeeping cannot remain analogue in the digital age. Missions should benefit from enhanced remotesensing, situational awareness and data-analysis capabilities, including those enabled by artificial intelligence. At the same time, their use must remain responsible, transparent and respectful of the sovereignty and rights of host nations and local populations. Investing in modern capabilities is central to enabling missions to operate safely and effectively. Lastly, I would like to highlight the need for a strategic political approach to peacekeeping. Mission adaptation and transition must be based on realistic conditions, not arbitrary timelines. While no mission should be viewed as permanent, we need to aim for responsible transitions that require nationally owned political and institutional processes, supported by close cooperation between all mission components and host State authorities. Equally, mandates should be adequately and predictably resourced. No mission should be expected to do more with less. The recommendations recently agreed by all troop-contributing countries during the latest session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, echo many of those points and demonstrate the membership’s shared commitment to strengthening United Nations peacekeeping. The Council should match that commitment.

We thank the delegation of Bahrain for organizing this meeting. We extend our gratitude to Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, and to the Force Commanders — Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) — for their work and valuable contributions. I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to all the women and men who serve in peace operations and to offer our condolences to the families of those heroes, who lost their lives in the line of duty. We observe with concern the reports from recent months, which demonstrate how delays in the payment of assessed contributions hinder the fulfilment of the mandates conferred by the Council, in particular the protection of civilians. In that regard, we remain attentive to the status of the Department of Peace Operations contingency plan, a temporary measure implemented to address this critical challenge. We find cases like those of UNISFA, MINUSCA and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) worrisome, as attacks against peacekeeping personnel and hasty troop withdrawals continue to take place, despite their vital presence and work on the ground. In Abyei, UNISFA remains the primary guarantor for the protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel. We therefore reiterate the need to ensure its operational capacity by guaranteeing that it is adequately resourced, and we urge both parties to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army. In this context, Panama is closely monitoring the proper implementation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism so as to prevent further regional spillover effects from the conflict. At MINUSCA, the lack of predictable resources undermines operational capacity and continues to limit the Mission’s ability to consolidate its gains in the area of civilian protection. We believe that any future decision regarding the reduction of resources or Mission personnel must be informed by monitoring the situation on the ground. To achieve results, it is crucial to strengthen cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union, by leveraging their influence and deep knowledge of the continent, and to reinforce trust with local communities and authorities that work closely with the affected parties. Turning to Lebanon, the situation has become untenable following the withdrawal of UNIFIL troops, particularly in the light of the recent escalation of territorial violence and the completely unacceptable attacks against peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel. The withdrawal of United Nations troops must not be opportunistically exploited by any State to pursue private interests that undermine progress towards peace. Panama has consistently reiterated that it is the responsibility of Member States — under the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law — to prevent further violations of international law and to protect United Nations personnel. The processes of adaptability and restructuring within peace operations are commendable. To ensure their long-term monitoring and verification, peace efforts must be led by local actors and evaluated on a case-by-case basis, grounded in an understanding of the realities facing each community. We can look to the case of Haiti as a distinct model — one that holds the potential to function in conjunction with the United Nations Support Office in Haiti. While not a traditional peacekeeping operation, the current Gang Suppression Force is an initiative that Panama and the United States of America — acting as copenholders within the Security Council — have championed in an effort to adapt and move towards a potential resolution to the profound crisis facing the country. In conclusion, in this period of particular fragility for our Organization and for multilateralism, Panama reiterates its commitment to peacekeeping operations and to the United Nations. The personnel who safeguard the peace of the most vulnerable constitute an irreplaceable pillar in the construction of safer and more stable societies. Their work transcends borders and cultures, leaving a lasting imprint on communities that rely on their presence to rebuild trust and look towards the future.

Pakistan thanks Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha, Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), for their briefings. This meeting is particularly important, as it allows the Council to hear directly from the military leadership responsible for implementing mandates on the ground. The military component remains the backbone of United Nations peacekeeping. We must recall that peacekeepers continue to operate in increasingly complex environments, with expanding responsibilities but shrinking resources — a trend that risks affecting both mandate delivery and the safety and security of peacekeepers. For over six decades, Pakistan has been among the largest and longest-serving troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping. More than 250,000 Pakistani peacekeepers have served in 48 missions worldwide and have contributed to the success of the United Nations across many contexts, including Liberia, a “lived success”, in the words of the Ambassador of Liberia. A great deal of hard work, commitment and sacrifice underpins this success. As a troop-contributing country that has lost 182 personnel under the United Nations flag, Pakistan attaches the highest importance to the safety and security of peacekeepers. Emerging threats, including the use of drones and other asymmetric tactics, are increasing risks for peacekeepers in the field. Recent attacks against peacekeepers, including those against Indonesian peacekeepers in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and Bangladeshi peacekeepers in Kadugli in UNISFA, are part of a deeply concerning trend. Such attacks are unacceptable and must not be left unaddressed. Accountability for crimes against peacekeepers is essential not only for justice but also for deterring future attacks. Ending impunity remains critical to preserving the credibility and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations and the Council. We pay tribute to all peacekeepers who have sacrificed their lives under the United Nations flag in service of international peace and security. Recent adjustments to the posture of UNISFA, including the withdrawal from the team sites of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, further reflect the increasingly difficult operating environment. The changing threat landscape raises important questions regarding how monitoring, early warning and confidence-building functions along the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone can be sustained despite reduced physical presence. Pakistan believes that the mission’s strengthened cooperation with the Sudan and South Sudan, closer coordination with regional actors and the appropriate use of technology can help preserve verification functions and situational awareness. However, technology must complement, not replace, the stabilizing value of a credible physical presence on the ground. UNISFA demonstrates why sustained human presence remains indispensable, particularly for community engagement, dialogue on transhumance arrangements and confidenceand trust-building among local communities, all of which need a human element. Similarly, MINUSCA represents a successful example of how multidimensional peacekeeping can deliver sustained stabilization when supported by adequate resources, political backing and strong partnerships with national and regional authorities. Over the past decade, the Mission has contributed significantly to the protection of civilians, support for political processes, the extension of State authority and the implementation of disarmament and reintegration efforts. Its support to the recent successful conduct of elections in the Central African Republic further illustrates how military capabilities enable political progress and help consolidate gains on the ground. At the same time, persistent insecurity in the east and south-east underscores the continued importance of maintaining key operational capabilities to preserve those gains. Any future transition of MINUSCA should remain conditionsbased and guided by priorities and realities on the ground. Taken together, the experiences of UNISFA and MINUSCA illustrate both the continuing need for peacekeeping and its proven effectiveness as a central instrument of the Council. They also underline a simple but critical requirement that mandates must remain realistic, missions must be provided with the resources and political support necessary to succeed and peacekeepers must be protected. In this regard, Pakistan and Denmark continue our collaborative work, as the peacekeeping duo, to help maintain the focused and sustained attention of the Security Council to make peacekeeping stronger and even more effective. Let me also recall that, apart from its success, credibility and legitimacy, the cost-effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping is also something that has been confirmed and proven over time, as compared to other arrangements. We believe that strengthening the military component of peacekeeping remains essential to preserving stability in fragile environments and consolidating the gains. That is fundamental if peacekeeping is to serve as an effective instrument for maintaining international peace and security.

I would like first of all to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, and the two Force Commanders, Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha, Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), for their briefings. The testimonies of the briefers confirm that we are witnessing a transformation of the challenges of peacekeeping, which they face on the ground. We are observing a significant increase in the violence targeting not only the most vulnerable populations but also the Blue Helmets deployed for their protection. I wish to pay tribute again, on behalf of France, to those who have lost their lives and to honour the courage and commitment of the women and men serving daily for peace on the Council’s orders. I would like also to commend the adaptations implemented by their forces these past months. That is a concrete illustration of the capacity of the United Nations to meet significant challenges within tight timeframes — challenges that have been imposed on it from the outside. Obviously, we must continue to improve the adaptability of peace operations, consolidate our collective capacity to plan and conduct missions and protect civilians from indiscriminate violence. All of that must be done within the framework of political processes leading to the sustainable settlement of conflicts. It is also our responsibility to ensure that the missions have the necessary means for the full implementation of their mandates, but also for their own protection. Lastly, we must take very seriously all the risks to the Blue Helmets linked to disinformation and the manipulation of information. The realities that the briefers have described prompt a few comments on my part. With regard to MINUSCA, as Lieutenant General Nyone recalled, it has played an essential role in securing elections and will continue to do so for the elections planned for the end of April. Despite undeniable progress, important challenges remain to be addressed. The security situation remains fragile, in particular, but not exclusively, in the border zones, along the transhumance corridors and around the mining sites. The risks of destabilization due to the spillover of regional conflicts, in particular in the Sudan, are real and must not be underestimated. Substantial investments in security sector reform are still awaited to allow the Government of the Central African Republic and the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic to fully assume their security responsibilities. In that context, several questions seem relevant to us. First of all, how can MINUSCA best adapt its posture to face the persistent insecurity, including the threats posed by armed groups and transnational networks, without substituting itself for the Central African Armed Forces or risking leaving a security vacuum? How can the Mission, and notably its military component, contribute to supporting the stabilization of the border zones? Is there a shift in effort that needs to be made? From the point of view of the force, what priority lines of effort can be identified with a view to a future transition of MINUSCA? UNISFA must deal, for its part, with two weakened States in a very vulnerable space. The briefing of Major General Shrestha underscores the variety of their forms of engagement, but one can sense the weight of the operational constraints that he faces. Two other questions seem opportune to us, to complement the valuable points he made on the readjustment within the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. First of all, would technological improvements, such as remote sensing, drones or other means enable the mission to overcome difficulties relating to access or mobility and strengthen its surveillance capabilities? Secondly, it is evident that the effective implementation of the mandate depends on maintaining strong relations with both two Sudans and local communities. Does the mission have the necessary channels to maintain these relationships at the appropriate level, between the Sudan and South Sudan on the one hand, and with local communities on the other hand? Finally, for both missions, the role of female uniformed personnel is essential across all mandated tasks. The lessons learned from experience in leading these operations will be of great value to us.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Bahrain. (spoke in Arabic) At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary- General for Peace Operations; Lieutenant General Humphrey Nyone, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); and Major General Ganesh Kumar Shrestha, Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), for their valuable briefings. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all peacekeeping personnel, including military personnel, and to extend my sincere condolences to the loved ones of those who have lost their lives in the line of duty. Furthermore, I would like to thank all Member States contributing military personnel to peacekeeping missions. The military personnel of MINUSCA and UNISFA have long played a vital role in maintaining security and stability in the Central African Republic and Abyei. This includes their important role in the protection of civilians, through providing support in conflict zones and during post-conflict transitional phases, through implementing peace agreements and monitoring ceasefires. This underscores the need for concerted international efforts to enhance the adaptability of these forces to address emerging challenges, build confidence, ensure security, continue to protect civilians and critical infrastructure and to facilitate humanitarian access, in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to achieving the desired security and stability. In this regard, I would like to underscore the following points. First, in light of the emerging challenges facing peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic and Abyei, it is important to harness modern technology in field operations, such as artificial intelligence, sensing technologies, early warning systems and unmanned aerial vehicles in operations on the ground, so as to enhance the efficiency of monitoring and detecting ceasefire violations, as well as to mitigate, predict and pre-empt threats, alongside the rapid analysis of complex and new data. Secondly, the Kingdom of Bahrain believes that strengthening partnerships with the host State and regional actors constitutes a fundamental pillar for achieving security and stability. In this context, the Kingdom of Bahrain values the significant role undertaken by MINUSCA in organizing elections and implementing electoral security plans in the Central African Republic, alongside the national forces. The Kingdom of Bahrain also calls for building on these successes to achieve the desired objectives in this regard. Thirdly, the Kingdom of Bahrain has followed with concern the recent withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and national monitors from the sites of Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur, which were being used as part of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to monitor the demilitarized zone between the Sudan and South Sudan, owing to the worsening security situation. In this regard, the Kingdom of Bahrain calls for concerted efforts and enhanced regional and international cooperation to mitigate the consequences of this withdrawal, which affect not only monitoring arrangements but also overall stability, confidencebuilding and response effectiveness. In conclusion, the Kingdom of Bahrain will continue to support all efforts to strengthen collective international action in support of peacekeeping operations to promote security, stability and peace at the regional and international levels. (spoke in English) I now resume my function as President of the Council. I give the floor to Lieutenant General Nyone to respond to the comments and questions raised. Lieutenant General Nyone: Allow me to respond to the two questions posed by the representative of France. The first question concerns how the Mission can better adapt its posture to support broader stabilization, especially in border areas. With regard to the Mission’s activities from 2024 into 2025, we recognize that most of these enclaves, located along the borders, are where instability has been emanating from. With the full support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), we established a border post at Bembéré, located between Chad and the Central African Republic, It was officially opened by the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, together with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in January 2025. That border post serves as a gateway for both countries, facilitating trade between them, as the border had remained closed since 2018. To support this, we engaged with the Government of the Central African Republic to accelerate the above-mentioned Chad-Central African Republic mixed border mechanism, which went into effect in September 2025. This mechanism’s concept of operations is based on Chad deploying five battalions on its side, stretching from the west of its border to the tri-border area with the Sudan and the Central African Republic. I wish to report that Chad has fulfilled that requirement and deployed all five battalions. On the side of the Central African Republic, the agreement is to deploy three battalions in the following locations: one in Markounda, and two in Moyenne- Sido and Inda. So far, only two have been deployed — in Markounda and Inda. Deployment to Moyenne-Sido is still pending. All this has been with the material support of MINUSCA to enable the establishment of bases, although much more remains to be done. Secondly, regarding the border with South Sudan, one month ago MINUSCA supported the deployment of 110 troops to Bambouti, located at the border between the Central African Republic and South Sudan. All these measures are meant to ensure our support in the stabilization of those border areas. However, many more resources are needed, as these border areas are quite vast. There are already existing mechanisms in most of them, the full operationalization of those mechanisms is pending. The border with the Sudan is complex. There is a conflict raging in the Sudan. In October, there were multiple incursions by the Rapid Support Forces, which caused the displacement of approximately 11,000 civilians, who had to seek refuge at one of our bases near the border. I accompanied the Special Representative of the Secretary- General to visit Am Dafok. Since there is no Government-to-Government engagement, the Special Representative had to promote local mechanisms in those two areas, leveraging local authorities and traditional leaders to push for stabilization. Our force was key in ensuring the mitigation of most of those incursions from the Sudan, and we played a very important role in this regard. So far, of the 11,000 displaced civilians near our base, fewer than 200 remain; most have since returned to their communities. These are the issues that we are trying to address as a Mission to support stabilization, especially in border areas. Concerning the border with Cameroon, there is already an existing mechanism. The Government of the Central African Republic and Cameroon generally hold periodic meetings. This also applies to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We have seen a couple of meetings to do with the security of the border areas.

I thank Lieutenant General Nyone for the clarifications he has provided. I now give the floor to Major General Shrestha to respond to comments and questions raised. Major General Shrestha: Concerning the representative of France’s questions with regard to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), the possible use of technology, our relations with the Sudanese and South Sudanese and our recommendations, I would like to highlight that the major concern for us is the monitoring of the safe demilitarized border zone. Although we have evacuated from the team sites — Kadugli, Tishwin and Abu Qussa — the mandate is still there and we are in a position to fulfil those sorts of mandates. The evacuated troops are at the headquarters. Concerning the question about the use of technology, as regards hybrid mechanisms, we are still in the planning phase. We are working on monitoring using satellite imagery, analysing images and then monitoring the safe demilitarized border zone, especially the five disputed areas and 10 crossing points. After analysis, of course, verification needs to be done, which can be achieved with a helicopter flight. For these sorts of monitoring and verification, we engage with both the Sudanese and South Sudanese. In the case of the South Sudan Government, the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa has also been engaged, as has the Deputy Director of the East Africa Division. Under-Secretary-General Lacroix was also there in South Sudan. I have already engaged twice with the South Sudanese Government. At the end of this month, I am also planning to visit Khartoum in connection with fulfilling the JBVMM mandate and regarding our modus operandi. We do have good relations. Our recommendations concern the fact that the more we engage with both Governments, the more progress can be made, thereby facilitating the fulfilment of the mandate — more engagement, more communication, more meetings with both Governments.

I thank Major General Shrestha for the clarifications he has provided.