S/PV.1027 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of our provisional rules of procedure anù withthe c'onsent of the Oouncil, 1 propose to invite the representatives of Senegal and Portugal to parUcipate without vote in the discussion of the question before the Council. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ousmane Socé Diop (Senegal) and Mr. Vasco Vieira Garin (Portugal) rook seats at the Council table. 48. Ml'. DIOP (Senegal) (translated from French): In its letter of 10 April [S/5279 and Corr.1] the Senegalese Govel'nment requested the Security Council to discuss the serious incidents which have occurred on the frontier between our country and so-caUed portuguese Guinea, 49. This Is not the first time that such incidents have occurred. As long ago as 16 December 1961, motorized units of the Portuguese colonial army overran the Senegalese viUage of Bakakapatapa sowing terror and panic among the people. The second occasion was on 21 December 1961, when two jet pursuit planes of the portuguese colonial army flew at a very low altitude over the Senegalese village of Ouassou. The same day, motorized units of the Portuguese colonial army invaded our territory, allegedly in pursuit of deserters. 50. At that Ume, because of the gravity of these incidents, Senegal requested the Security Council to consider them. We were told, however, that the Security Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of peace, is too important a body to discuss minor disputes and that it would be better for us to try to come te a direct understandingwith Portugal. We adopted that procedure, in order to facilitate the gendarmerie~ got to Bouniak. There they found some fragments of rocket shells and machine-guncartridge cases, and also one wounded person who is at present being treated at the hospital at Ziguinchor. That was the first serious incident which caused Senegal to feel that it was time to bring these matters before the Security Council. 52. Moreover, at the present time 'i;here is very great tension between the peoples livingon either side of the frontier between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. This tension is the result of the systematic policy practised by the Portuguese Cl; dividing the frontier populations. The Portuguese are killing and terrorizing the Diolas, Portuguese nationals who live just on the other side of the border from Senegal. The Portuguese say to them: The nationalists are able to pass through the villages and attack the Portuguese army because you are t!J.eir accomplices, you give them asylum, you help thf,lm! The Portuguese are terrorizing them and killing them in order to induce them to resist possible future nationalist incursions. They even go so far as ta say, "If you want these incursions to stop and if you wantto avoid being; held responsible for them, you must attack the Senegalese people on the other side who are also sheltering the nationalists, helping them and giving them advance bases for their aggression:n 53. The Senegalese iIiliabitants of the frontier area are called Mandjakes. The tension to which 1 have referred now prevails between the Diolas, portuguese nationals, and the Mandjakes, Senegalese nationals, who live on either side of the frontier. To put it bluntly the Diolas are threatening to attack the Mandja.ltes in order to put an end ta portuguese terrorism. You cau see that a grave danger exists because obviously the day that foreign nationals cross our frontier to attack 8enegalese citizens, the Government of Senegal cannot sit idly by in the face of a foreign invasion. This is the second factor of tension which has impelled Senegal ta bring this matter before the Council. 54. A third element of tension is the arrest of two Senegalese drivers, several weeks after the bombing of Bouniak. Despite the present situation, there are still economic relations between Senegal and 55. In addition. the portuguese have establlshed an espionage network on our territory. The arrest of two spies. who have confessed to being agents of the PIDEP (police intelligence and defence servicefOl' the portugu~se State) is clear proof of this. To aH (;riese new accusations. in addition to those of 1961. Portugal has responded with the most absurd denial. brushing aside the aC)cusations by saying that Senegal is doing aU this because it has annexationist designs on portuguese Guinea. Portugal also è? lies that it has ever violated Senegalese air space. It challenges us to give the names of the spies whom we claim were arrested a:ld who confessed to being Portuguese agents. portugi:i.l has also stated that it will consider Senegal responsible for any further developments resultillg from the situation in Guinea. that area which it caUs a Portuguese province of Africa. To this we reply that the arrested spies are Ml'. Camara Cherif. a Portuguese national. and Ml'. Da Silva Virgilio Antonio. who have confessed to the Senegalese police that they were both agents of the PIDEP. 56. As for the charge that Senegal has annexationist designs on Portuguese Guinea. Senegal's consistent attitude in the United Nations and in aU its international political actions refutes this absl'rd acousation which is an anachronism. In questions of de- (,1:010nization. Senegal has always maintained the principles of self-determination and national independence for aH dependent peoples. If Senegal had any annexationist ambitions. they would certainly concern the territory of Gambia. an enclave implanted in the very heart of Senegal and populated by a genuinely Senegalese population speaking the Senegalese language. And what has been mycountry's attitude regarding Gambia. for which alone we might justifiably have annexationist ambitions? 57. We, have stated and we state again that where the frontiers of former colonies which have qecome independent States are concerned we believe in the kind of peàcetyl jurisprudence which has already been establishe.@ by the nations of Latin America; that is to say. wheila colony becomes an independent 59. In any case, as 1 have said, Senegal has brought this matter before the Security Council today, for three specUic l'easons. First of all, after the violations of its frontier in 1961, even more serious violations have just taken place, including the bombing of the village of Bouniak. The Portuguese have, as usual, attempted ta deny this facto However, with their successive assurances and their contradictory communiquês, they have in the end contradicted themselves, since the local GoVel'~dnent at Bissau has finally contradicted the metropolitan Government at Lisbon. Thus, in the first communiquê of 10 April, the Government at Lisbon said that no Portuguese aireraft were in the air on 9 April in that region and that the bombing of a village by Portuguese aireraft was therefore an impossibilitr. Unfortunately for the Portuguese Government, however, the local G'''7ernment at Bissau had to acknowledge twenty-four hours later that on 8 April there had indeed been combined air-ground manœuvres in the region 0f the village of Bouniak and that on the following day, 9 April, there had bean reconnaissance flights in the same region to ascertain the l'esults of the combined airground manœuvres of 8 April. This, therefore, is the most obvious proof that we can provide-and there are others which we shall give later-of the bombing of Bouniak, a proof which was given to us by the local GOvernment at Bissau. 60. The second point, as 1 have said, is the tension along the frontier as a result oÎ the policy of opposition and systematic division practised by the Portuguese in regard to the Portuguese natioHals iiving near 62. We alao request the Security Council to take an possible steps to induce portugal to desist from the explosive course along which it isnowbeinginevitably propelled by its criminal refusal to act in conformity with international law and to co~ply with United Nations resolution 1514 (XV) of the GeneralAssembly on deoolonization. . 63. Mr. GARIN (Portugal): Thankyou,Mr.President. for givintr me the opportunity of addressing the Council at Ws stage. 64. We have heard the representative of Senegal give, at considerable length. details of his country's alleged grievances which have brought us here today. BefiJre 1 take up the subject--mattel' of these allegaliions in order to refute and e21.lJOse the few and rather trivial charges which they contain, 1 shall request the Council's indulgence and ask that they accompany me as 1 dwell on certain important features of Ws action on the part of the Government of Senegal. 65. An important observation which the Council will permit me to malte attheoutsetis that Ws meeting is both irregular and premature. in terms of the Charter. This is not. however. to questionthe decision for convening it. which we accept ·in aIl good faith. My delegation would not indeed lay great emphasis on these irregularities. The fact that we are here to participate in this discussion should help convince everyone of the open-mindedness that underlies the Portuguese Government's approach to the problems raised here. 66. However. the repl'esen.tative of Senegal bas asked the President to c()nvene Ws meetingposthaste. as he stated in bis letter of 10 April [S/5279 and Corr.l] "in view of the repeated violations of Senegalese air space and territory that have taken place·. which. if true. would become the basis of a dispute between his .oountry and portugal. Obviously. therefore, his request was made under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter. which comes soon aiter the Chapter dealing with powers and functions of the security Councll and wbioh appl1es. as its title states. to the pacifie settlement of disputes. Injustice and fairness, my delegation must presume that the Government of Senegal desires nothing but a pacific "l. The parties to any dispute, the oontinuanof; of whioh is likely to endanger the maintenanoe o,f ~nternational peaoe andseourity, shaH,first of aH"-1 underline the expression: first of aH-"seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,oonoiliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own ohoice. "2. The Security Counoil shaU, when it deems necessary, caU upon the parties to settle their dispute by suoh means." 68. Here, then, at the very beginning of this Chapter, we have laid down for us by our Charter the first steps toward a pacifie settlement of aH disputes between sovereign States. It is only after aIl, or at least some, of these steps have been attempted and have proved to have failed that an approaoh can legitimately be made to the Security Council. 69. As against these express provisions of the Charter, what is the course that the Government of Senegal has chosen to adopt? 70. It has not caredevento make a show of attempting any one of these methods of settlement named in Article 33 of the' Charter, but has straightaway clamoured for the Security Council to be convened, as if the very heavens would fall if some time were taken in seeking a pacifie settl~ent of its rather artificial dispute with Portugal through one or more of these methods. And as a result, very strangely, we find ourselves around this table, where only serious and grave emergencies are as a rule discussed. My delegation presumes that this aspect of the question did not escape the members of the Council, which makes it all the more regrettable that their arguments along the Unes laid down in Article 33 of the Charter did not prevail with the Government of Senegal. '11. Apart from.these and other considerations, the undue haste with which this appeal has been made to this important organ of the United ,Nations, with the avowed purpose of placing my country in the wrong because of alleged acts against or violations of a neighbouring territory, cannot be said-even on the most generous of constructions-to be consistent with the basic aims of the United Nations for the fostering of goodwill and understanding among nations. 72. Even the normal ethics and practice followed in international relations would have required the Government of Senegalto have broughtits grievances however right or wrong they may be-to the notice of the portuguese Government by diplomatie means, and, if they were proved true, to claim redress, compensation, or other form of satisfaction for any damage or injury suffered, before arriving at the conclusion that Portugal would refuse to co-operate in any such attempt' at a pacifie settlementof disputes. 73. In any event, it is inescapable that, in terms of Article 33 of the Charter, such 8.'11 approach r.onstitutes the first and mandatory step IGowards arr;:ving at a pacific settlement oi disputer,; between States before approaching the Security CO\Ulcil. It is equalIy undeniable that no such approach was attempted. The portuguese Government in Lisbon, in fact, only learned of the alleged grounds of this dispute with the Government of Senegal when news agencies distrlbuted to the worId press the communiqué issued by the Senegalese Government at Dakar onthe evening of 9 April. There was both regret and surprise because of the very unusùal and precipitate stepwhich it had taken in requesting the Security Council to meet, in preference to taking any of the timehonoured and customary diplomatic methods in order to ObtlÙn a settlement of the dispute. This version of the incident alleged to have taken place on 9 April was repeated on the next day, when a copy of Security Council document S/5279 came into the hands of the permanent mission of portugal. 74. 1.'rue to its traditional policy of friendship, co-operation and understanding-a policy proper between neighbouring Governments-the portuguese Government has never refused to discuss or negotiate on any disputes arising from incidents that are perhaps unavoidable between contiguous territories, whenever any have been brought to its notice, and to give satisfaction orredress where any was due. Throughout its long history. Portugal has never balked at the use of any means for the pacific settlement of disputes such as are enumeratedin Article 33 of the Charter. Tt' mention only one such instance in the past-an instance relevant to our present discussionof Portuguese Guinea-the namè of one of the >more illustrious Presidents of the United states of America, UlyssesGrant,remains forever memorableby an act of justice in the recognition of Portugal's right in a dispute concerning that Province as farback as 1870. 75. With· the. present Government of Senegal itself, Portugal bas through.out endeavoured to maintain only the most correct and good"neighbourly relations, as is becoming. to states having common frontiers. That this is· so ls proved by the fact that even in the letter of·••·therepresentative ofSenègal.requesting a meeting of the Security Council, the Government of Senegal, whilereferring to "repeated violations ofSenegalese air spaee and territory". could· not cite, apart from thèalleged incident of9 Apri11963-to which Ishall presentlycome-anything more. récent than the year 1961. Those events, without any real signfficance and originating ID mistaken or unintentional acts, which are now recalled in order to revive oid and obsolete 76. 1 come now to the substance of the letter from the representative. of Senegal which has prompted the present meeting. The complaint against Portugal falls easily into two parts: first, the alleged incident of 9 April 1963 in the village of Bouniak, mentioned in the second paragraph; and secondly, the three incidents that were part of the old complaint of 22 December 1961Y and that were disposed of at the Ume but are now repeated in the third paragraph of the letter. 1 shall take them up in that order. 77. With regard to the first, in which it is stated that: "On 9 April, four portuguese ai:rcraft violated [Senegalese] airspace and dropped four grenades on the village of Bouniak", 1 wish to stress here that this allegation is absolutely devoid of truth. As is made amply clear in Press Release No. 6/63, issued by the Permanent Mission of portugal to the United Nations on 10 April 1963 [see S/5281, para. 1] and circulated to aIl Member nations and to the international Press, on 9 Apri11963noportuguesemilitary airerait based in our Province of Guinea took to the air, and therefore no such airerait could have overflown the village of Bouniak or any other area along the border with Senegal. These are, in fact, the findings of a most careful inquiry that was ordered by my Government as a result of the allegations of the Government of Senega!. 78. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that aIl Portuguese forces in the Province have the strictest orders serupulously to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity and the airspaee of the Republic of Senegal. That the allegation is untenable is obvious for more th8J1 one reason. We do not know, of course, for sure who is really responsible for this imbroglio. But why, for instance, should four aireraft going on a mission, the object of which eould not be any other than sheer provocation of a neighbouringGovernment, have been equipped with the most unusual ofweapons for airerait-hand grenades-rather than real bombs? And is it not surprising "that such a raid, in the course of whieh it is alleged that four grenades were thrown in a populated area, cause little or no destruction and, if we are to believe a statement attributed by news agencies to reliable sources inDakar, resulted only in a single individual being slightlyinjured and a single mudhut being demolished? 79. The letter of 10 April. of the representative of Senegal to the President of the Seeurity Council !J Official. Records of the security CounciI, 5eventeenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1962, document 5/5055. y Ibid., sixteenth Y~ar, Supplement for October, November and December 1961, document 5/5039. Really, this is the kind of damage that could be caused by a minor thu,nderstorm. And yet now, at the last moment, the representative of Senegal tells us that what really took place was something very different from what is stated in the complaint. The hand grenades wlùch these alleged Portuguese aireraft are supposed to have thrown have grown into bombs, rockets and machine-gun bullets in thecourse ofthese seven days. One becomes very puzzled, to say the least. 81. It really seems that the senegalese delegation cannot make up their mind what their complaint against Portugal is about. They are not certain of the date on wlùch it occurred. They are not even certain about the damage that is alleged to have been done. But it isreallytoavoida confused situation such as this that the founding fathers of the United Nations had laid down in Article 33 of the Charter that b~fore coming to the Security Council there shouldbe some attempt at negotiations, investigation and talks between the parties-ta the dispute. 82. 1 come now to a point on which 1 should like to say a few words. We really come to what seems to be the most serious feature of the whole story. It is being advanced by the delegation of Senegal, in document S/5279/Corr.1, circulated today, that the allegeq incident took place not on 9 April but on the previous day, that is 8 April 1963. And this poses certain questions which render the entire picture even more l;llurred and fictitious. 83~ If the supposed incident took place in the early hours of 8 April instead of 9 April, as the delegation of Senegal now contends, is it believable that in the official communiquê issued to the Press by the Government of Dakar on 9 April there could hlP:Te occurred an involuntary slip of the tongue on such an important point as the date of the occurrence? And this, especially when it was so recent and when it is presumed to have caused such a seemingly righteous indignation among the senegalese authorities? And is it credible that the same involuntary slip or error could have been repeated in the letter of complaint sent to the President of the Secui'ity Council on the same day? Are we then to have two errors in one and the same day? 84. If we are to accept this amended version of the Senegalese complaint thatthe alleged incident took place on 8 April and not on 9 April, then it becomes difficult to explain why the Government of senegal waited more than twenty-four hours to announce it to the world in their Press communiqué on the evening of 9 April when the complaint was also addressed to the President of the .Security Council. Andagain, ü this were so, what could the Press communiquê have intended to signüy when, according to the Reuters report published in The New York Times of 10 April,itstatedthat, "The President" 86. These are sorne of the questions whioh one may weU go on pondering over for any length of time without finding their correct answers so as to make them fit the picture. 87. Mr. President, out of courtesy to you and to the members of the Security Council, and also to the . representative of Senegal. 1 should like to state here on behalf of my Government the facts as they took place in the province of Guinea on the relevant dates. verified after careful investigation. 88. On 9 April no military planes took to the air in Portuguese Guinea. On 10 April, also, no miutary operational flights took place in that territory. On 8 April, however, there were sorne routine smallscale military exercises in which air and land forces participated. No bombs or grenades were used by the planes and an operations took place strictly within Portuguese territory. 89. The news of these military exercises was made public by the portuguese authorities in Bissau at a press conference on 13 April and a report on it was distributed by the news agency France Presse. 90. It now appears that information about these military exercises reached, in a more or less garbled fashion, the· Government of Senegal, which might unwittingly have been pushed into issuing the communiqué to the Press on the evening of 9 April and simultaneously to sending a letter of complaint to the President of the Security Council. Then fol!owed the denial issued in Press release No. 6/63 by the permanent mission of Portugalon 10April. On 13 April came the France Presse report about the news con.,. ference which the Portuguese authorities in Guinea had given. It was only theri that the Government of Senegal appears to have realized that the military exercises which now it is obvious had been used as background for their complaint really took place on 8 April and not on 9 April as stated by thel!l. And thus, realizing that a mistake had been made that destroyed the very basis of their complaint inasmuch as it concerned one of the most important elements of that complaint, namely the date of the occurrence, they have thought fit to alter the date from 9 April to 8 April, as statedin document 8/5279/ Corr.1, circulated here today. 91. It becomes quite clear that there is no ground for complaint. No overflights or bombings of any part of Senegalese territory took place. This 1 wish to emphasize. 92. As for the alleged pieces of rocket. as they are called today, that are supposed to have been found in Bouniak by the Senegalese authorities as having come 93. Pexhaps it would not be just to question the good faith of the Government of Senegal in the matter. Indeed, my db:::Jgation would he far from doing so. Everything about the affair creates the impression that we are in the presence of a hoax engineered by sorne individuals labouring under the passion of slogans aimed at raising difficulties in the relations between Senegal and Portugal. The technique of the "incident", eUher provoked or staged, in order t{) further the achievement of expansionist aims is not new. It was used with success during the thirties of the century by the Nazis in their campaigns for the annexation of neighbouring weaker nations, and only a bare sixteen months aga by a Member State of the United Nations to overrun and annex another Portuguese overseas province. 94. 1 shall now deal with the second part of the Senegalese complaint. The three incidents of 1961, mentioned in the document S/5279, are: first, that "On 16 December 1961, units of the Portuguese army based in so-called Portuguese Guinea penetrated into the frontier village of Bakakapatapa sowing panic among the Senegalese population." 95. The explanation of this occurrence is that on 16 pecember 1961 a Portuguese reconnaissance patrol spent the night at a place called Tabanca de Barraca Patata, in Portuguese territory, departing at dawn on 17 December. Due to an error in the route, they strayed into a place in Senegalese territory also bearing the name of Tabanca de Barraca Patata (referred to in the Senegalese cable as Bakakapatata). Nevertheless, when they arrived at the village, the patrol met an individual who indicated to them in Portuguese the correct route, and the patrel immediately took that route to withdraw te Portuguese territory. There was no question of a deliberate violation of territory or of any panic having been caused, as was verified by the enquiry held by the Portuguese authorities at the time. 96. Secondly, that "On 21 December 1961, two Portuguese jet fighters flew over the Senegalese region of Ouassou at low altitude." 97. The explanation of this occurrence. as revealed also by an enquiry held by the Portuguese authorities at the time. is that an error in navigation due te technical defects in the instruments led to an accidentaI and inveluntary overflight of Senegalese territory, which did nOt exceed thirty seconds. 98. For these occurrences, the Portuguese Government expressed its regrets at that time. The manner in which the explanationswere given, without hesitation to admit facts. placed beyond doubt the good faith and sincerity of the Portuguese Government. 99.. The fact must not be lost sight of that modern methods of movement and travel from place to place, and the extrel:ne velocity at which, for instance. jet planes operate, does not at any time exclude the possibility of such accidentaI and involuntary overflights ovel' territories of a neighbouring cmmtry. Indeed, when we have almcsteveryotherdayinsta...'1ces 10J. The third allegation is that on the same datethat is, on 21 December 1961--motorized columns of the Portuguese army pursuing deserters trespassed on Senegalese territory. This was formally and categorically denied at the time on behali of my Government, because like the story of the Bouniak incident of 9 April 1963, it lacked aIl foundation in truth. This denial is repeated here once again. 101, AlI these explanations were given in a spirit of utmost good faith in the letter addressed by the Portuguese representative to the President of the Security Council on 9 January 1962, and as they did not elicit any commentfrom the Government of Senegal at any time, it was thought that they had satisfied that Government. 102. SInee, however, the Government of Senegal has thought it proper to revive the same complaints after this long lapse of Ume, the explanations are repeated here in order to keep the over-all situation clarified for those who may not have known both sides of the question as weIl as for those who, having known it at the time, may have forgotten our side of it. The fact is that where good\Vill animates the actions ofGovernments, only the most favourable constructions are possible for such trivial and insignificant events. But once it is conceded that there is very little of such goodwill, it is not difficult to imagine how even the most insignificant of occurrences is magnified out of aIl proportion, in order to be invested with sinister motives, and how others can be produced as if by magic, out of nothing, in order to provide the much needed pretexts for hostile demonstrations against my country in this forum. 103. On the other hand, despite aIl these instances and others of ill-disguised hostility on the part of the Government of Senegal, under whose overtprotec.;. tion and patronage aggressive armed attacks, accompanied by subversive radio propaganda against Portuguese soverE:)gp.ty have been prepared and ,launched from Sen'",'~aleBe territory (not by Portuguese citizens but by Senegalese and even by other foreign elements) and despite the fact that Senegal has time and again violated the principles of neighbourly intercourse between nations as laid down in the Charter, the Portuguese Government has displayed only the utmost restraint and patience, hoping that this atmosphere of i1l will is but a temporary phase in the relations between two once friendly nations, that is bound to pass away with time. 104. For this very reason, my delegation refrains from detailing here the various instances in which unfriendly acts have been committed against the Portuguese Province of Guinea. 105. There was -even today a new allegation made by the representative of Senega!. It is the alleged 106. Something also has been said about .supposed agents of Portuguese police operating in Senegal. Thase allegations are entirelyfalse andthe Portuguese Embassy in Dakar at that time. after a very careful investigation. proved to the Senegalese Government that this was devoid of foundation and that the men in question were not agents of Portugal. 107. These are very genuine and positive grounds for my Government's belief that the roots of this hostility on the part of the Government of Senegal lie outside that country. The relations between our two countries have not .always been strained as they seem to be at the present moment. On the occasion when the Portuguese Chargé' d'Affaires went to present bis credentials to the Senegalese Government early ln 1961. the Foreign Minister of that country had the good grace to express hi~self in these words: "Portugal is a country with which we maintain excellent relations. We are neighbours and Portuguese Guinea is here at our doorstep. In Dakar. there is an important Portuguese community which is integrated in such a. fashion that we do not know if they are Portuguese or Senegalese. The circumstances in which you come to Dakar are particularly favourable. " lOS. On that occasion. the newspaper Paris-Dakar. published in the capital of Senegal. paid tribute to Portug'.lese-Senegalese relations in these words: "Portugal waSt as is well known. one of the first countries to accord formaI recognition to the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic of Senegal. supporting forthwith its admission to the United Nations Organization." The article went on to say: "It is \Vith this spirit of sympathy and cordiality that the Portuguese Nation and its Government assist the promising affirmation of the Senegalese nationality. desiring eagerly to collaborate with it in the measure of its possibilities. and to make a real contribution to the progress and well-being of its sons who are to found linked by' affection and work to so many of its Senegalese citizens. The Luso-Senegalese relations which go far beyond the purely diplomatie sphere. in order to integrate themselves in close andfriendlyintercourse between two neighbouring peoples. call manifestlyfor a largescale co-operation which will bring the two peoples c10ser and will redound to mutual advantage in the course of an harmonious development." 109. On our side. these spontaneous sentiments of warm and generous friendship towards Portugual. born of centuries of close and fruitful collaboration 111. Before concluding, 1 wish to state that the Portuguese Government considers the sovereignty of aIl nations as sacred as its own. The Portuguese Government is also determined not to be easily diverted from the impeccably correct course of conduct which it has traditionally followed towards aIl neighbouring Governments, including the Government of Senegal, to which it has extended in aIl sincerity its hand of co-operation. 112. Inspired by such feelings, and despite the fact that we are fully convinced that our presentation of the case is the only one which reflects the truth, the Portuguese Government will always be willing ta co-operate and discuss with the Government of Senegal matters of common interest in order to obtain acceptable solutions for both parties and guarantees of mutual respect, provided of course that the issues are not prejudiced beforehand. 113. Ml'. CISSE DIA (Senegal) (translated from French): 1 apologize for taking the floor now, because 1 had indicated my intention of replying to the representative of the Portuguese Government, if necessary, tomorrow. In view of the allegations made by the Portuguese representative, however, 1 am unwilling ta wait until tomorrow ta submit certain material evidence which 1 have here, because 1fear that that representative might then claim that 1 had picked up these abjects in the streets of New York and seized the opportunity of this debate ta submit them in arder ta advance my case. Permit me, then, ta lay this evidence before the Council now. 114. Here are fragments of the rockets which were fired by Portuguese aircraft, not during the day of 9 April 1963, but on 8 April 1963. If there has been an erraI' of fact that erraI' must be blamed on the Post Office and not on the Government of Senega!. 1 could also show you the machine-gun bullets which were collected at the same time and in the same circumstances as the other articles. 1d 115. 1 have also before me an expert report submitted by the Senegalese Government.Y and drawn up, inter alia, by the Chief of staff of the Senegalese Army. This report is dated 11 April 1963, weIl before the dispatch dated 13 April 1963 published by the agency France-Presse. 117. This is all 1 wish to say for the moment since 1 feared. 1 repeat. that if 1 did not the Portuguese representative might tell us that this evidence had been picked up in the streets of New York.

1 would just like to remind the COlmen that in the course of my speech 1 said that the pieces of shrapnelwhich the Senegalese authorities claimed to have found in the village of Bouniak as having come from alleged grenades. bombs or rockets that were thrown on the Senegalese village of Bouniak from what they saywere Portuguese planes-what is there to prove that these are indeed what the delegation of Senegal claims them to bel or that they were indeed thrownfrom Portuguese aircraft at the place and on the day in question? 1 am sorry. but they do not prove anything. 119. T,he PRESIDENT: We have heard statements from the representatives of Senegal and Portugal and 1 believe members of the COUDcil might like to have some time in which to consider those statements. If there is no objection. the Chair proposes that the next meeting be held tomorrow afternoon.

1 am not intervening to object ta your wise decision. 1 only want to suggest that perhaps the Minister from Senegal might want ta circulate the documents he was talking about tonight or early tomorrow morning so that aIl of us may be able to study them before we come here in the afternoon. This is just a suggestion.

My delegation will do its utmost to submit this document tomorrow morning so that the Council may have it before its afternoon meeting. 122. The PRESIDENT: Then in the absence of objection we shall meet tomorrow afternoon at 30'clock. The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.