S/PV.1098 Security Council

1 feel it necessary to mnke the followlng clarifioatlcn. Many representatives in the Security Cour1011 have tsken tare to distinguish the domestic law of Cyprue from international rules and law. The Bolivian delegation fears that, if the Council grante the request thnt it should give a hearlng to the sooalled representatlve of the Turkiah community in Cyprus, as that requeet 1s now worded, such action will inevltably constltute interference in the domestic law of Cyprns. 9, Although the Constitution of Cyprus is closely linked to the treaty, the Bolivian delegation has found that, according 10 that Constitution, forelgn ropresentation of the St& 1s clenrly the responslbility of the President of the Republic, which m8MS thnt the

Are there anyotheroomments? From the remarks that we have just heard,it appears that there is no oonsensus among the members of the Seourity Counoil with regard to the question raised by the letter of the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkey [S/66663, whioh 1 mentioned at the beginning of the meeting. It might therefore be appropriate to draw the Counoills attention to the rules of prooedure whioh seem to be relevant in this respeot. Aooording ta rule 39 of the provisional rules of prooedure of the Seourity Counoil: 11. Le PRESIDENT d’autres nous venons d’entendre, d’opinion sur sentant J’ai Il serait l’attention int6rieur ourrenoe. du SecrBtariat qualifit?e tions ou B lui donner leur assistanoe des questions relevant “The Seourity Colln.:il may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it coneiders oompetent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in oxamining matters within its oompetenoe.ll 12. Mr. FEDORENKC) (Union of Soviet Socialist Republios) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, you have just oited rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Seourity Council. Permit me topoint out, however, that rule 39 rends as follows: 12. listes vient d’invoquer provisoire d’appeler qui se lit comme suit: [The speaker read rule 39.1 [L’orateur donne leoture de Pattiole 39.1 13. However, we have before us a letter dated 19 February 1964, from the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Seourity Counoil, requestjng an opportunity for Mr. Denktas to address the Security Council “as the representative of the Turkish Cypriot oommunity, one of the interested parties in the Cyprus question”. In this oonnedon, Mr. President, the question arises of what we are now disoussing. What is the question before us? What request has been addressed to the Security Counoil? 13. Or, nous sommes saisis sentant permanent de l’Organisation 19 f6vrier et demandant devant le Conseil de la Communeut des parties A cet Bgard, suivante: question adress4e au Conseil de S&urit@? 14. The letter referred to is oonoerned with a state - ment by a person purporting to represent the Turkish Cypriot oommunity, as one of the interested parties in the Cyprus question. This 1s the only request addressed to the Counoil. The Counoil has reoeived no other request. Therefore, Mr. President, the Soviet delegation asks fo: some clarification of this mntter. 14. de l’audition la communaut6 intbress6e façon adressbe a ét6 soumise. tique vouloir 15. membre 15. The. PRESIDENT: 1s there any othor speaker? :?do18 attirer d6cision des provisoire. que le 16. 1 8ee that there are no more s[Jeakers, 1 huve to draw the Council’s attention to the fact thnt a decision 1~ to be taken strictly within the terms of rule 39. yhorefore, in order for the Council to take a decision on this question under rule 39, since there 1s no consensus, 1 need a forma1 proposa1 from the Council.

1 still have nc proposa1 from the Council, and, if no member of the Council submits a prcposal, 1 intend tc continue with our debate and cal1 upcn the speakers inscribed on my list. Once the list of speakers has been exhausted, the Council may wish to revort to that matter.

1 thcught the motion had been made by the representative of Morocco. If it has net, in order to faoilitate the question before us, 1 would mcve that the Council invite Mr. Denktas to present,his views before the Council in accordance wlth rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

1 thought that in my last statement 1 hdd dealt with the matter in terms of a specific proposal. What 1 said may therefore be taken to mean that my delegntion is msking a specifio proposa1 on tho basis of rule 39 of the prcvisional iules of procedure.

Mr. President, you were good enough to draw our attention to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, which reads as follows: [The speaker read rule 39J 22. 1 do not think there is anything in rule 39 which specifies the form in which this information may be supplied. 1 take it that if such information is corsidered necessary by the Council, it may be supplied in a form other than that of an oral statemant before the Council. There are many other possible forms, 1 think. My delegation would like to emphasize this, especially as lt has in its possession-like other membsre of the Council, 1 believe-a letter sent by Mr. Denktas. The letter sets forth hi8 views along with oertain information for the members of the Council. 23. SO far as 1 am concerned, 1 shall eay that our delegatlon considers this form of information a suffioient menns of aoquafnting us with the views of Mr. Denktns, nnd we sec no reascn why it should he nccessary for hlm to corne here to make an oral atotement to the Council.

1 should lilte to support the proposa1 which wne made hy the representntive of Morocco that a representative of the Turkish Cypriot community should be invited, in nccordnnce with rule 39 of our provisional rules of procedure, to make a statement here concernlng the matters whlch we are now examining and to hold him - self nvnilable thereafter to supply the Council wfth any 26. Perhaps 1 should draw attention to the faot not only that there are a numbor of provisions in the Constitution of Cyprus expressly recognielng the existence of a separate Turkish Cypriot oommunity, but also that, partioularly in tho fields of fore@ affairs, defenoe and seourity, the Vice-President of the Republio, representing the Turkish Cypriot community, has oertaln rights expressly recognieed by that Constitution, 1 should recall also that a representative of the Turklsh Cypriot community was present at negotlations leadingup to the various agreement8 of 1969 nnd 1960, and was present also at the more reoent London talks. This seems to me to be very relevant to the question which we are now considering. 26. le falt dispositions sent chynriote domaine la seourit6 reprbsentant oertains constitution. reprgsentant assiste aux ndgooiations de 19GS et 1960 et qu’il des entretiens parait nous 27. The present situation in Cyprus oan, indeed, only be resolved if full regard is had to the rights and responsibllitles of bolh communities in the Republic. It is for this reason that 1 believe it to be essential that this Counoil should invite a representative of the Turkish Cypriot oommunity to corne to this table, under rule 39 of our provisional rules of procedure, for the purpose of making a statement, and 1 am sure that in doing SO he would assist the Council. It would be in the interests of both communities in the Republic, and would assist the Counoil in the grave situation which we are now considerlng. 27. sd%e que ai l’on prend et responsabilit4s dans la RBpublique. est indispensable sentant ioi, ticle dbclaration Cette decision munautes Conseil lement g l%tude.

In my delegationts vlew, rule 39 gives the Security Counoil oomplete latitude to decide who may be invited to supply information during the consideration of questions within its competence; in hearing Mr. Denktas, the Counoil is within the terms of rule 39. The wording of t.hat rule clearly shows that legal or more precisely, constitutiona questions do not have to be examined. The Council makes its decision solely on the basio that the person invited is in a position to supply information llkely to enlighten il. 28. l’article liberte qui peut &re l’examen en entendant les limites article diques, n’ont pas h btre prises quement sur le fait que la personne invitée est susceptible de fournir le Conseil 29, That being the case here, my delegation 1s in favour of hearing Mr. Denktas. 29. en faveur de l’audition 30. sentant du Maroc a proposé que le Conseil de sbcurit6

The representative of Moroooo hus proposed that, under rule 39, the Security Council of the Turkish Cypriot oommunity, one of the interested parties in the Cyprus question. 32. If we oorreotly understand the present situation in the Counoil, it is rejeoting the request oontained in this letter. It is rejeoting the request, sinoe there oannot be any other party in the question of Cyprus than the Qovernment of Cyprus, represented here by the delegation headed by Mr. Kyprianou, the Minister for Foreign Affaira of Cyprus, 33. If our understanding is oorreot, the appropriate inferenoe must be drawn. Having taken a deoision on this matter, we oan go on to other oonsiderations, inoluding those mentioned here by various members of the Seourity Counoil and in partioular the proposa1 or oonsideration that someone should be invited in a different oapaoity (as an tndividualor the like). 1 repeat that before poing on to examine aiibther question, we must draw a line, take a deoisionon the first question, that is to say, on the single question oontained in the letter. 34. The Soviet delegation requests you, Mr. President, to oonffrm what we have said. 36. The PRESIDENT: As 1 understandit, theproposal put before the Seourity Counoil by the representative of Moroooo falls striotly within rule 39 of the provisional rules of rooedure. 1 quoted that rule in a previous interven ion, 1 think its langnage is quite P olear. 36. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of soviet Sooialist Republios) (trandated from Russian): Mr. President, we have listened attentively, as you have, to the statement of the distinguished representative of Moroooo. So far as one oan judge, we haveno disagreement with you regarding the interpretation of the proposa1 made by the distinguished representative of Moroooo. But that is not what we wish to disouss now. 37. The Soviet delegation at this time would like to have oonfirmation from the Counoil that it rejeots the request oontained in the aforementioned letter from the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkey, relating to che oapaoity or mandate by which he would llke Mr. Denktas to address the Council 0.6 the representative of one of the so-oallsd interested parties; the Seourity Counoil should make tbis completely olear. This is precisely what tue should lika to hear now. After that, we shall speak of further matters, in particular, of whnt we should do in accordance wlth rule 39 or some other procedure. We lntend to make a statement on thnt subject Inter.

1 participate in this procodural debate wlth reluctanoc

My delegation takes the view that a request was brought to our attention by the President. During the oonsideration of this request, a forma1 proposa1 was made by our oolleague, tha representative of Moroooo. In the opinion of mydelegation, this proposal, or motion, has priority and interrupts our oonsideratien of thc request brought to our attention by the President. 40. If we adopt the motion of our Moroooan oolleague, that means that we have taken a deoision and that the request in quci9tion was no longer examined. That 1s how my delegation interprets the vote about to % taken. 40. si nous Vot&a en faveur de la motion pr6sent6e par le repr6sentant du Maroo, oel? nous rivons pris une d6oision et que la demande en question n’a plus 6t4 examin6e. C’est dans oet esprit que ma d616gation oomprend le vote que nous allons 6mettratout A l’heure. 41. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): La seule propusition dont le Conseil soit saisi est celle de la d616gation du Maroot elle tend A oe que le Conseil de s6curit6 invite M. Rauf Denktas, en vertu de l’article 39, A faire une d6olaration. Si auoune objeotlon n’est formul6e, je oonolurai que le Conseil aooepte oatte proposition.

Tho only proposa1 before the Counoil is the one submitted by the representative of Moroooo that the Seourity Counoil invite Mr. Rauf Denktas, under rule 39, to make a statement before it. If X hear no objeotion, 1 shall tako it that the Counoll agreea with that proposal, 42. M. FEDORENKO (Union des RBpubliques listes sovi6tiquea) [traduit du russe]: Pour nous, la discussion de oette question, qui est devenue une disoussion de proo6dure, n’a pas un oaraotbre purement formel: elle a une valeur de principe. M, Stevenson, l’ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, alest d6olar6 m6oontent de ce genre de disoussion: il a soulign6 qu’il partioipait malgr6 lui A l’examen de oette question de proo4dure.

The disoussion of this question, whioh has taken on a prooedural oharaoter, is regarded by us not as a teohnioality but as a matter of prinoiple. The distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Stevenson, has expressed dissatisfaotion with suoh a disoussion and has emphasized that he is partioipating with reluotanoe in this proaedural debate. 43. Mais, permettez-moi de le dire, olest 18 envisager la question d’un point de vue affeotîf. En oe moment, noue ne nous oooupons pas de sentiments ou d’6motions, mais de l’examen d’une question de prlnoipe. Ce qui doit pr6valoir ici, oe ne sont pas des Bmotions ou un Btat d’esprit, mais le oalms et la raison. 43, However, this, if 1 may say SO, is the emotional side of the attitude of one of our Seourity Counoil membere towards the matter at hand. We are ooncerned now not with feelings or emotions but with the examiration of a matter of prinoiple. Calm andreason must prevail here, not emotlons and moods. 44. L’Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis a d6clar6 qu’il Btt.‘- d6plac6 de pas do cet avis. Le Conseil de s6curitB se compose de ropr6sentnnts de plusieurs pays, et c’est A lui qu’il appartient de d6terminer ca qui est d6plac6 et ce qui ne l’est pas. A notre nvls, voici commttnt se prosente la situation: puisque nous oxominons 44. Thé dlr”.nguishedAmbassadorof the UnitedStntes bas eaid that a disoussion of thie question is not approprlate here. Permit me to disagree with this. The Seourity Counoil ooneists of rapresentatives from more than ono oountry, and it will dsoide whnt is appropriate and what 1s not. Our view of the situatior 1s that slnca wo are now disousdng one question-tho lettor of the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkoy to the United Nations-thers must be some Conoluaion of thls discussion, some decision, before une pnr int6rim de la Turquie nuprAs de 1’ONU -, il faut que cette discussion se termine d’une mnnlbre ou 49. With regard lo the proposa1 itself, the renewed propoeal. SO to speak. to invite Mr. Denktas, this time & & individttal, in &der to obtain information from him, we should like to ask the Council members to give their most oareful attention to rule 39 of the rules of prooedure of the Security Counoil. In aotuality, rule 39 reads: ‘The Seourity Counoil may invite.. , persona, whom it considers oompetent for the purpose, to supply it with information . . . “. However. rule 39 does not in any way state that suoh persona n&st neoessarily be heard by the Counoil. Such a formulation of rule 39 is entireli sensible and logionl, beoause if we adopt the point of view that the Seourity Counoil will hear a11 persons who apply to it, that in itself may oreate a kind of precedent. SO. Furthermore, if we grant a hearing to the representative of the TurkAsh oommunity in Cyprus as an indivldual, we obviously must grant a hearing also to the representatives of Cypriots of Qreek origin and, say, to Armenian Cypriots and SO on. 61. Moreover. what Will be the oriterion bu which Inthe &sousËion of other questions, the .+eourIty Counoil Will be able in future to deoide that it should not hear as an individual, let us say, a partioular representative, officia1 or other person? This beoomes a matter of prinoiple, and the zhembers of the Council must realixe the responslbility thay are assuming in throwing open the door in advance to any person who might wish to address the Security Council. 62. There is finally, one more oonsiderntion we should !ike to mention in this connection. If those who now would like to invlte Mr. Denktas in a new incarnation CIE an individual, as a “wolf in sheep% clothlng”, BO to epeak, are justifying this on thu grounds of rule 39 of the rules of procedure; that 1s to say, if they conaider that he is able to supply some informntlon, it should net be forgotten that Mr. Denktas is simply 63. Thus, even if Mr. Denktas oould supply some new information, it would be information from abroad rather than from Cyprus itself. The value of suoh information, as et lryone knows, is more than dubious. 64, Mr. HAJEY (Czeohoslovakia) (translated from Frenoh): As the Ivory Coast representative has pointed out, this prooedural disoussion be n when the President put before us doauments S F 6666r/ and S/SSSS, oontaining a request by the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, Sinoa some members of the Counoil have questioned Mr. Denktas’ representative oharaoter and have even spoken of a oertain international subjeotivity, it seeme to me that this fs not a purely prooedural disoussion but a debate on substanoe. We must therefore oomplete ou oonsideration of these doouments one way or another. 66. There is no doubt at a11 in my mind that the request of the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkey was not submitted under rule 39 of the rules of prooedure. Conseouentlv. it would seem lonioal that‘ before dealing with thé proposa1 made &der rule 39 of the rules of prooedure, we should deoide that the xequest oontained in doouments Y/6666 and S/a666 oannot be oonsidered; in order words. that there axe no substantive or prooedural grounds for granting this petition and hearing Mr. Denktas as the representative of a party to a dispute. Then and only then-and 1 think we ars ail agreed on this-oan we take up the entirely different proposa1 to grant this gentleman a hearing under rule 39. But firet we must dispose of the two doouments in question.

Mr. President, if 1 may first say a word about the prooedural wrangle in whioh the Seourity Counoil has found itself beoause of the prooedural question before the Council, it is my view and understanding that you drew the attention of the members of the Council to a oommunioation whioh you had recaivad from the Aoting Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations and requested members of tha Council to give whatever comrnents thoy cared to offer in regard to that communication, 67. Mr. President, as a result of your request to the meml>ere of tha Counoil, the counoil is now faoed witl: a formal proposa1 submittad b:r the representative of 60. 1 do not think it very neoessary to force the Counoil into the position of havinn to tahe a deoision on a request by à Member State; What it should do, in a spirit of oonoillation and, as 1 said before, with a vlevr to getting round the difficulty, is to deoide this question under rule 39 of our provisional rules of procedure.

1 would repeat that the only aroaosal before the Counoil for deoision is the motion Ëubmltted by the representatlve of Morocco. If 1 hear no objeotion i shall assume that the Counoil adopts that proposai. rbe proposa1 was adopted. 82. The PRESIDENT: Followlng the deoision just taken by the Seourity Council, 1 should like to stnb that it is my intention to ask Mr. Denktas to mJe a statement at the beginning of our next meeting. 63. Now we shall oontinue our discussion of tbe item on our agenda, and 1 shall oall upon the representatives whose names appear on my list of speakers, The first name 1s that of the representative of the Ur.ited Kingdom. 64. Sir Pntriok DEAN (Uni& Kingdom): At the end of th0 meeting on Tuesday lnst the distlnguished Foreign Mini&er of Cyprus asked [1097th mee#ng, pnra. 1391 what ho desoribed as n simple question to which he oxpeoted an answer. 1 therefore propose to begin this afternoon bv denlinrr with this. But before doina 80 I am bound 6 sny, wiM~ no disrespect whatever int&ded to the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, but only, if he wlll allow me to eay so, ns a meml>er of Lincoln’13 Inn to a momber of Gray’s Inn, thnt the questlon ns put is not, in my vlew, central to the r.znl issue whicb we are nll here to discuss. 1 shall deal with it out of courtesy to the distlnguIshac1 Poreign Minister, but 1 do net 66. The first point 1 should like to make in answering the question put by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus is tc emphasiee that whether or not the use of foroe is permiesible under the existing rules of international law ami, in partioular, under the Unit& Nations Charter must always depend on the oiroumstances in whioh and the purpoËes for whioh it is used. It is undeniable that the Charter itself oontemplates the lawful UQB of foroe in aertain oiroumstan&. Artiole 61 is one olear example of this. 66. Seoondly, 1 should like to draw the attention of members of -the Counoil to the nature of the right provided for in Artiole IV, the second paragraph of the Treaty of Uuarantee and the limitations plaoed on the exeroise of that right by that Artiole, The right whioh 1s reserved to -the guarantor Powers under the seoond paragraph of Artiole IV is not, as it appears to have been oonsidered by some of the preceding speakers, an unlimited right of unilateral aotion, but-and here 1 quote-“the right to take aotion with the sole aim of re-establiehing the state of affairs oreated by the present Treaty8.3/ 61. The purposes of the Treaty are, I would emphasiee, entirely in aooordanoe with the Obl&ation containid in Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the Ünited Nations, Furthermore, the aotion provided for in Artiole IV (2) of the Treaty oan only be taken in the event of a breaoh of the provisions of the Treaty, that is, in oiroumstanoes in whioh there is a threat tc the independence, territorial integrity or seourity of the Republio of Cyprus as established by tbe Basio Articles of its Constitution; and, as 1 bave already said, ft must be limited to suoh action as is neoessary tc re-establish this state of affaira. A right of intervention for this nurnose. and for this nurnose alone. is provided for -in -the -Treaty, But the *question of military intervention under Artiole IV of the Treaty of Guarantee would never arise if a11 ooncernad played their part as they have undertaken to do. The Qovernment of Cyprus like any other Qovernment-and I am sure the Foreign Minister of Cyprus Will agree with what 1 am saying-1s under a dÜty to maintain seourity within its oountry and to observe the Conetitution under whioh it 1s oreated and whioh authorizes its represenhtives to apeak on behalf of the Republio. Furthermore, it has undertaken by treaty to oarry out these duties in the Treaty of Quarantee. SO long as it does SO, no question of an intervention oan arise. 68. Tho logal effeot of the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Guarnntee, a8 in the case of otlier legal provislcne, will depand on the fncts nnd circumstances of the situation in which they are invokod, and tbere is nothing in Article IV to suggest that aotlon taken under it would necessarily be contsary to the Unltcd Nations Charter. 68. du qu’auraient d’autres dispositions furidiquee, depondra de.8 fnlts et dos circonstance8 caract6risant la tlon dans l’article IV ne lsisse entendre que de8 me8ures prises en ex6cution salrement Btre contraire8 k la Charte des Nations Unies. 70. The urgent task of this Counoil is to lose no time in taking the aotion that most members desire. That would be the best way of ensuring that oooasion for interventions under Artiole IV would nover arise. ‘Il, SO far 1 ham dealt with what are essentially legal matter& and 1 have dealt with thon1 in an esseni tially lenal way. 1 would, however, urge the Counoil to sée tkese matters in &eir true p&s$otive. As we a11 know, legal arguments oan oontinue for a vory long time, and this Counoil is not, and WQS never intended to be, a legal forum, We are here for one main purpose only, and that is to deal with a diffioult and dangerous situation whioh, if allowed to oontinue, oould threaten the peaoe. 72. 1 therefore believe that we muet keep our eyes fixed on the realities of the situation whioh have brought this Counoil together. It seems to me that they are theoe. Ssrious incidents involving the loss of both life and property on a substantial soale have ooourred between the two oommunities in CyPrus ta suoh a degree that, as the Qovernment oftiyprus itself reoognieed, some outside assistanoe was necessary to briig the situationunder oontrol and to prevent firther deterioration whioh oould lead to very grave international oonsequenoes. 79. This, therefore, 1s what we have to deal with, and somehow we must find a wav. as 1 think mv Norwegian oolleague said, to redu& tension in thé Renublio of Cyprus itself and then to buildup the oonfi&noe amongthe two oommunities whioh iè SO sadly laoking at present. In trying to do this, we oan only operate within the framework of the situation as it exists today. And this framework, 1 submit, embraoes the whole series and oolleotion of agreements and undertakings whioh were negotiated at suoh great length between the four parties oonoerned: the Republio of Cyprus, Qreeoe, Turkey and the United Kingdom. At our last meeting there seemed to be a large measure of agreement that in the prseent oiroumstanoes the Counoil had no alternative but to aooept these treaties as they are, and that they oould be altered only by negotiatiot, and agreement of the parties and oould neither be abrogated unilaterally nor disposeci of in some way by this Counoil. 74. New, with regard to the problem ns a wholc ît seemed to me-agnin at our laot meeting-thnt there was a very wicle measure of agreement nbout hog we should proceed. Nearly a11 the speakers thought.that the rlght oollrse waa to nddress ourselves immedinbly to the proùlem of restoring pence, and thersafter to movo on, with the help of the Seoretary-Genernl, the United Nations or whntever mediatlon seemed appropriate, to solvlng the ‘politicnl problems. 76. The representative of the Soviet Union tried to argue that we were trying to exploit Article IV of the Treaty of Quarantee for the purpose of dire& military intervention in the domestio affairs of Cyprus, and in some way ta restore a colonial r6gime. That is simply not a faO6 and 1 bfjlievs it is 80 reoognieed by the majority of this Counoil. 76, Le repr&entant de l’Union sovi&ique a es.%@ de soutenir que nous oherohions B exPloiter l’a)pc tiole IV du Trait6 de garantie R des fins d’intervention mllitalre direote dans les affaires inttkieures de Chypre, et pour r&ablir en quelque sorte le rQ gime oolonial. Cela ne correspond absolument pas B la r6alit6, et je orois que la majorit4 des membres du Conseil le reoonnaisaent. 77. Comme je l’ai dit, ~QUE les int&ess&, y compris le Gouvernement de Chypre, ont admis que la lutte entre les oommunaut6s 6tait parvenue B un point tel qu’une assistanoe extbrieure Btait n&oeesairg Pour reprendre la situation en main, Le Gouvernement ponibles et il s’est montr8 dispos6 h fournir oe type d%ssistanoe, et je suis reconnaissant da I%ommage rendu aux foroes britanniques devant le Conseil Pour la manibre dont elles se sont oonduites. Je orois aussi que l’on reoonnaft dans l’ensemble que oes troupes ont r6ussi 3 oontrbler la situation et l’ont emp0oh0e de s’aggraver davantage, 17. As 1 bave said, it was aocepted by a11 oonoerned, inoluding the Government of Cyprua, that the lntercommunal strife had reaohed suoh a point that some assistanoe was required from outside to keep the situation under oontrol. The Unit4 Kingdom aovernment bad the troops available and proved willing to provide this assistance. and 1 am arateful for the tributes paid in this CcÜnoil about tiïe way in whioh British forces have oonduoted themselveo. Agnin 1 believe that it 1s generally aooepted that they have bsen suooessful in keeping the situation under oontrol and have prevented any further serious deterioration in it. 78. AS r 7 ards certain oold-war passages in the speeohee o the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 oan only repeat that our only interset is the keeping of peaoe, and 1 should like to remind the Co~ol1 of pait of the reply of the Prime Mini&er of the United Kingdom to Mr. Khrushohev’s meesage of 7 February. In hi8 reply, Sir Aleo Douglao-Home said: 78. S’agissant de oertaines remarques, inspir&es par la guerre froide, dans les interventions du repr& sentant de llUnioh eovi&ique, je ne puis que r&&ter que notre seul int0r& est le maintien de la paix. èl je voudrais rappeler au Conseil un pas&@ dé la r6ponse que le Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni a adresshe au message de M. Khrouohtohev du 7 fhvrier. Dans cette rbponse, sir Neo Douglae- Home disait notamment oe qui “Her MalesWs Qovernment have one obleot in CyprUS. Thés iË t0 help maintain paoe and sèourity in the island. This 1s why we aoceded ta the request of the Qovernment of Cyprus for the help of British trOoPs in maintainina order. Thle te why, in oonsultation with other Qovernmente whose interest in the peawful solution of the island’s problems is bsyond question, we have been seeking agreement of all ooncerned on further measures to aseist the Cypriote ln the task of preserving their seourity,n 70. du Trait6 du Royaume-Uni a envoy8 des troupes B Chypre. Noua avons envoy6 des troupes par00 qu’on ~OUI a deman& de le faim et paroe que, d’une msnibre g0n&ale, on pensait que leur pr4senoe (tait *essaire et utile pour empBoher le renouvellement de troubles graves. Je voudrais pr6oiser une fois de plue, oomme je l’ai dbJh fait, pns oontinuer h nous aoquitter de nos fonotions un jour de plus qu’il n’est n6oessaire. Le moins qu’on puisse dire de cette t11ohe, o’ost qu’elle n’est ni fnoile ni agrbable, et oomme nous ltnvons tndiqu6 nettement dbe le d&ut, de partager notre fardeau aveu d’autres. 79. It was not, therefore, under Artiole IV of the Treaty of Ouarantee that the United Kingdom Glovernment sent lts troops to Cyprus. We eent our trooPs beoauee they were asked for and beoaure thev were generally o&etdered to be neaeseary and heipful in Preventing further aerlous strife. And 1 should Iike to make it oïear onoe again, a8 I bave already done, that we do not want to oontinue to perform our present funotions for a day longer than is neoessary. It is, to Put it mildly, neither sasy nor pleasnnt, and we would gladly, as WB have made olenr from the beglnning, share our burden with others. 80. 11 y a doux jours, le SeorBtniro d%tat de mon pays, M. Butler, a pris In Parole g la Confkenoe 80. Two days ago my Seoretary of St&, Mr. Butler, spoke at the Conferenoe of the Eighteen Nation Com- 81. It is inevftable that any problem brought to thfs Counoll le oomplex and dlffloult. Nations in dispute qeek, as tbey are bound to do by the terms of the Charter, to deal wlth thelr dlffersnoes by peaoeful negotiation. i[t is only when this faîls, and when n Ptters have got to the pltoh where in other tlmes there would Rave been a resort to war to solve them, that reoourse le hsd to thts Counoil. There are times when wl dlsoussion here ha8 helped to point toward a solution, There are times when argument and oounterargument, drsft and oounter-draft, move andoountermove indeed begin to take on the aspeot of a game of ohess. But, in thfs matter, theye ls not one of my colleagues around thls table whd 1s not aware that lives are at stske at this very time, 82. When 1 spoke last week [1006thmeeting], 1 warned the Counoil that for any one natlon to oarry the main responslbility of peaca-keeping la, at the least, unwise. Events sinus then bave underlined the dangers of thls and the need for an international fora& My C?evernment le prepared to take suoh part as may be thought appropriate in an international foroe properly oonstituted, but 1 muet warn the Counoil that it ls neither helpful nor fitting for us to oontlnue alone ta oarry out this tbankless task if there is no prospeot of an international force or steps toward an agreed solution of the problems of the Republio. My aovernment is, as always, prepared to do a11 in lts pawer to asslst the Counoll to reaoh a spsedy oonolusion to these dlsoueslons. 83. We are most grateful to the Seoretary-General and to the Presldent of the Counoll and to other members for the efforts whloh thev have been mskin& to get agreement to the establiàhment of a peaoe-leeping foroe and to the means of appointment of a mediator. But the situation in the Republio grows in danger, in cur judgement-and we are very alose to the affalrwlth every passlng day, snd tlme le runnlng against US. 84. 1 beg of this Counoil snd of the members sitting with us at thls table that we should not, any of US, let oureelvss be dhwted by any oonsideratione, however important they may seem to one or other of the partles, however important indeed they may be in terme of international law and praotlce, lf to dl8oUss them here threatens to delay aotlon noeded to meet the demsnds of a vary perllous situation. 86, We a11 of us know that only by taklng notion to retkre peace and to reassure badly frlghtened people oan oondltlons bo ra-ostabllshed in whlch tho searoh for n solution of the Cyprus problem oan be faund. For the sake of these unhnppy poople, let nothing and no one hlnder us from completllti qulokly thls flrst arrd vital task. 87. The representatlve of Turkey avoided the issue and, in order not to give a direot reply to a direot question, told us that the situation in Cyprus waa %o tranio to use that kind of etratalem” 11097th meeting;para. 1681. The situat!on is iiïdeed &gIo, but the trarredu of the situation lies in the faot that Turkey, a iouitry wlth oonsiderable military powar oompared to Cyprus, has massed its foroes and has made a11 tb preparations In readiness for an invasion of Cyprus. That is why a direot, honest and olear answer is neoessary to be given tumy question. 88, It has not, of oourae, esoaped our attention that the representative of the United States in his speech [1096tb meeting] stated oategorioally that no one is threatening Cyprus. But we tlld not allege that it is the United States that ia threataning Cyprus, We bave, we believe, a right to reoeive in this Counoil an anawer to our question from the represantative of the oountry whioh is threatedng Cyprua. 89. The representative of Qreeoe has made olear .his Government’s position [1007th meeting1 with regard to military ‘intervention. He stated -ùnequivoonlly and oategorioally, that Greeoe has no suoh right under the trenty nor does it reoogniee, 1 take it, suoh a right to the so-oalled guarantor Powers. 90. The representative of the United Kingdom has just told us that this waa not the oentral issue. He told us that it was not our task to conaider hypothetioal situations. but ft is the oentral issue and it is not a hypothetioal situation, It is the real reason why the Républio of Cyprus has oome before you in the Seourity Counoil. 1 belîeve, with what 1 shall bave to say latei in my apeeoh, that the points whioh bave been touohed upon by the representative of the United Kingdom wfll be oovered, 91. From the oaloulated silenoe of the repreaentative of Turkey or from his inability to reply to our question, we muet assume that bis oountry does olaim suoh a right. 1 do not think that suoh an assumption on our part is an unreasonable one. We have to bear in mind when we speak of Turkish intentions the faot that Turkey has oonoentrated a oonslderable number of foroes, lnoluding warshlpa, on its ooast faoing Cyprus. We bave the faot that the Turkiah contingent stationed in Courus has violated the territorial fntecrrltr of the RepÜGlio by oooupying strategio positions ogmmanding the Jntry to Nioosia from the nortb. We hnve the fllght of Turkisb military airoraft over our territory, and we hnve the stntement made by the Fore@ Minister of Turkey at the plenary sessfon of the London Conferenco who, in attempting to justify the violation of the air spaoe of the Republio by Turkish mllltary aircrdt, atnted the following: 91. Du silenoe d6lib6r0 du repr&aentant de la Turquie ou de son inoapaoiti R r&ondre B notre question, noua devons oonolure que son paya slarroge le droit dont j’ai par& Je ne orois pas que cette hypothbse de notre part ne devons pas oublier, lorsque nous parlons des intentions des foroes marre, Ïl y a aussi lë tait que les oonfingents n6s B Chypre ont viol6 l’int4grit6 territoriale de la RBpublique en oooupant des positions stratbgiques oommandnnt l’ontr6e do Nioosia par le nord. Il y a le survol taires pl6nlbre de la ConfBrenoa de Londres pnr le Minle’ro des affaires 6trangbres de Turquie, qui, oherohant h justifier la violation de l’espaoe abrien de la R6publIque de Chypre par des appareils turoa, a d6clar6: vention unilat&ale, conform6ment h l’article IV du Trnlt6 de garantie, mais elle a llmlt6 son înter- “Turkey docidad to use her own rigl!t of unilateral intervention on the basis of Artiolo IV of the ‘I’reaty of Guarantee, but she conflnod lier intarvontion to a 93. 1 have put in a nutshell the Turktsh position with regard to Artiole IV of the TreatyofGuarantae, as we sec it, as stnted by no les8 an eminent personality than the Minister of F’oreign Affairs of the Republio of Turkey, Apparently at the London Conferenoe the Minister of Foreign Affafrs of Turkey felt no ombarrassment in making this statement, whereas ‘n the Seourity Counoil, the ropresentative of Turkey i’eels embarrassed to answer. B4. Permit me, in as brief a manneraspossible with a11 the olarity that 1 oan muster, andwith a11 oards OP the table, to state our position on Artiole IV of thlr Treaty of Quarantee. 1 believe that sinoe the Government of Cyprus is a signatory to tbe Treaty, and in faot we are the prinoipals while the others are supposed to be the guarantors, our view should hnve a certain bearing on the issue. Artiole IV of the Treaty of Quarantee should, 1 believe, be read publioly for everyone to hear. It is a short Artiole whioh for a long time has oaused a lot oo trouble. It reads as follows: “In the ovent of a breaoh of provisions of tk) present Treaty, Qreeoe, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to oonsult together with respect to the representations or measures neoeosary to ensure observance of those provisions. “In SO far aa oommon or oonoerted action may not prove possible, eaoh of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take aotion with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs oreated by the present Treaty.“o/ Members of the Counoil will have noted that the term “military intervention, uBe of for00 or threat of foroefl, nowhere appears in the text of the Artiole. Turkey. howevex; apuears to interpret this Article as gi&g to it rhé Kght of unilaterel military intervention, As 1 said the other day, and 1 feel 1 must repeat it, we firmly rejeot this interpretation. 96. It le quite olear that Artiole IV of the Treaty of Quarantee as interureted bv Turkev is oontraru to peremptory norms of interGationa1 ikw, jus oogeband 1 houe thnt I mnv be exousedby the representntive of the United Kingdom if 1 denl for a wi~ilo with the legnl aspect, because 1 do not ehare hi8 view thnt it is irrelevant-as well ns the basloprinciples contnined in Artfcle 2 (1) and Article 2 (4) of the Charter. DG. Under Article 2 (l), fiThe Orgunixntion ie bnsed on the prinoiple of the eoverolgn equnlity of a11 its Meml)ekn, while under Artiole-2 (4), it Ïs provlded thnt “Al1 Members shnll refrnln in their intarnntionnl 97. It follows quite olearly that if Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee is interpreted as permitting the right of unilateral military intervention, this is in direct contravention of the basio prinoiples of the United Nations Charter oited above, and is therefore void. 97. Il s’ensuit Trait6 de garantie 6tait interpr6ti une intervention unil&rale, direote entre oet artiole et la Charte des Nations Unies que je viens de oiter, et il serait par oons6quent nul. 98, It is our view, shared bymost othertfovernments, as the reoent debate in the Sixth Committee of the aeneral Assembly made abundantly olear, that under ArUole 2 (4), the prohibition of the use of force in international relations is absolute, The only possible exoeptiotis are provided by the Charter in Article 42, that is to say aotion deoided upon by the Seourity Counoil, and in Artiole 61, whioh the representative of the United Kingdom mentioned earlier, that is to say in self-defenoe. It is our firm opinion that under present-day international law, both of these oxoeptions should be interpreted strioto sensu, Neither of these exceptions has any relevanoe to the present issue. 98, Nous pensons, et olest bgalement l’opinion de la plupart des gouvernements, oomme l’a prouve le rt3oent debat h la Sixibme Commission de l’AssemblI3e generale, que, selon le paragraphe 4 de 1’Artiole 2 de la Charte, l’interdiction ou b la menace de la foroe dans les relations inter nationales est absolue, Les seules exoeptions possibles qui vise s0ourit6, et h 1’Artiole 61, que le repr8sentant Royaume-Uni a oit6 tout h l’heure et qui vise la legitime defense. Nous sommes fermement oonvainous que le droit international aotuel nous oblige h interpreter d’entre elles ne s’applique R la situation actuelle. 99. A l’appui de ce que j’affirme, Humphrey Waldook: 100. II serait faoile d’invoquer un nombre oonsid& rable d’arguments Ii l’appui de l’interpretation laquelle l’artiole d’intervenir Traits Hautes Parties tbt possible II l’enregistrement au Seoretariat des Nations Unies, oonform6ment h 1’Artiole fait, de mgme que les conditions dans lcsquellea le Traite a 6t6 conclu, montrent que les parties voulaient que le Traite soit interprete oomme ne oontenant que des obligations ou ne oonferant que des droits qui ne seraient pas contraires et aux restriction6 Nations Unies. Cette interpr&ation ment nvec la rbgle fondamentale de l’interpr&ntion 99. In support of the above, mayI quote Sir Humphrey Waldook: “The final result ia that Artiole 2 (4) prohibits entirely any threat or use of armed foroe between independent States exoept in individual or oolleotive self-defence under Artiole 61 or in exeoution of oolleotive measures under the Charter for maintaining or restoring peaoe. Armed reprisa18 to obtain satisfaotion for an injury or any armed intervention as an instrument of national polioy otherwise tban for self-defenoe is illegalunder the Charter.na 100, One oould easily adduoe a oonsiderable number of arguments in support of the interpretation that Article IV does not oonfer the right of military intervention. The Treaty of Quarantee itself oontains in its Article V an undsrtaking that the High Contraoting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to register it with the Seoretariat of the United Nations in aooordan08 with Artiole 102 of the Charter, This faot, as well ns the general baokground against whioh the Treaty was enterod into, show that the parties intended the Trenty to be oonstrued a5 oontaining only suoh obligntions and oonferring only suoh rights as would not oonflict with the obligations and restriotions imposed by the United Nations C!harter, Thie interpretation would also accord with the fundamental rulo of oonstruotion of doouments expressed in the maxim & ret3 magis vnloat quam pore& “A treaty is void if it oonfllots with a peremptory norm of general international law from whloh no derogation is permitted and whioh oan be mcdified only by a subsequent norm of general international law havlng the same oharaoter.“o/ 102, The debate whioh took plaoe in the Sixth Commlttee [of the General Assambly] is of partioular lnterest, and 1 shall quote from the Committee s report: “Many representatives pointed out that Artiole 103 of the Charter, by proolaiming that obligations under the Charter prevailed over obligations under any other international agreement, hadaidedgreatly in oreating that rule. Yet, as various representatives stated, its lcgioal oonsequenoes had not been reoognieed, and it was that gap whioh the International Law Commission had filled by stating thnt an international treaty was void if it oonflioted wlth a peremptory norm of international law.“I/ Among the most obvious and best settled rules of Jus oogens mentioned in the Commission’8 report of the fifteenth session aa furnishing examples of the soope of the rule oontained in the Artiole, is first and foremost “8 treaty oontemplating an unlawful use of force oontrary to the prinoiples of the Charter”. 103. Another example whioh might be oited 1s a provision purporting to oonfer upon one or more States the right to intervene in the interna1 affaira of another State. That intervention of this kind 1s legally inadmissible as a part of present-day international law is olenrly illustrated by the judgement of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel 0888, whioh in part reade as follows: RThe Ccurt oan only regard the alleged rlght of intervention as the manifestation of a polioy of foroe, suoh as has, in the past, given rise to most serioue abuses and suoh aa oannot, whatever be We present defeots in international organization, find a plaoe in international law.” 81, 104, This pronouncement of th e hlghest lnternntional judloial tribunal, oombined witb the waight of other international authorlties, would leave little soope for doubt that the rule against foroible intervention by n ..* rules of us CO ns are of SO fundamental a -%9-- charaoter that, w en parties oonclude a treaty which ocnflicts in sny of its clauses with an already e:isting rule of jus ccRen8, the treaty must be oonpcriered totally invalid,“Y 106. TO sum UP, our pcsltion regarding Artiole IV of the Treaty of Quarantee is that the obligations of Member States under tho Charter supersede their obligations under any other international agreement. This is olear and definite from Article 103 of the Charter. Consequently, the cbligatlons of Member States under Artlole 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, whioh forbids the thraat or uao of forrc against the territorial integrity or political indopendenoe of any State, are paramount and aannot be neutraliecd by any provision in any treaty under whioh a breaoh would permit the use of foroe. And this io only logioal, beoause otherwise war oould not be pravonted nor peaoe maintained, In cther words, an aot whioh is forbidden under the Charter oannct be legalised by agreement between the parties therecf, 106. The Treaty of Guarantee provides that in oase of a breach of its provisions, the guarantors-that 1s to say, ff reeoe, Turkey and the Untted Kingdom-shall oonsult together with regard tc Yho representations or measures necessary tc ensure observanoe of thcse provisions”. And that if conoerted action is not possible, separate notion by any one of them oould be taken. “Action” here obvicusly refers to “representatiens or necessary moasures”, as expressly stated in that very same artiole. The word “measures” could only mean the use of peaoePu1 means, partlcularly in regard to the provisions of the Charter whioh 1 menticned above. Any other interpretation invclving the use of foroe would be in direct conflict wlth the cardinal principle of the Charter ccntained in Article 2, paragraph 4. And in that respeot, 1 repeat, the treaty would be void by virtue of the afcrementicned Article 103 of the Charter. 107. Having stated at some longth cur position on Artlole IV of the Treaty of Guarantee whioh is relevant tc the issue before the Counoil-thcugh it was not the Cyprus delognticn whioh made it rolevnnt to the issue -may 1 be permittod tc state briofly OUI‘ position regarding the treaties of guarantee and alliance for the information of the members of the Ccuncll nncl in crdor net to be accused later of withholdlng nnything. 103. Bath of these trenties mny fnirly be described as having been arrived nt in circumstnnces precluding “At the Conferenoe at Lanoaater House on 6 February 1969, whloh 1 was invited to attend as leader of the Greek Cypriote, 1 raised a numb8r of objections and expressed strong mlsgivlngs regarding certain arovislons of the arrreement arrived at in Zurioh between the Greek aid the Turkish Governments and adonted bu tho Britiah Governtient, 1 tr’edvery hard to bring Ïtbout the ohange of at least some of those provisions. 1 failed, however, in that effort and1 was faoed with the dilemma either of signing the agreement as it stood or of rejeoting it with a11 the grave oonsequenoes whioh would have ensued. In the oiroumstanoes, 1 had no alternative but to sign the agreement.’ This was the oourse diotated to me by neoessity.n Furthermore, the point whioh was raised by some representatives earlier in the debate that at the Urne of the signing of the Agreements no objeotions were raised, has automattoally been answered in this passage whioh 1 have quoted. 109. The parties were in an unequal bargaining position and the Greek Cypriot aide did not gîve its consent freely. In this respeot, may 1 remind the members that when we speak of the Greek Cypriot aide it is 80 per oent of thépopulatlon. These treatles whioh oontained onerous provisions were thus imposed on the majority of the people of Cyprus making the dootrlne of unequal, inequitable and unjust treaties relevant. 110. Thus a Constitution was folsted on Cyprus. The Constitution of thc Republio, the basio terms of whioh were agreed in Zurioh, oreates many ditfioulties in the smootk. frürotioning of the State and impedes the development and the progress of the oountry. It oontains many su1 generis provisions oonflioting with internationaliy aooepted demooratio prfnoiples and oreates souroes of frlotionbetween the Greek majority and the Turkish minority. The oomblned effeot of the Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee 1s thnt a situation has been orented whereby the constitutional and politioal development of the Republîo has been arrested In its infanoy and the Republio as a soveraign State has been plaoed in a strait jaoket. 111, This, thon, is the inequltable result of the faot that when we were contractlng the Agreements we were placed in an unequal position tonogotiate. The Turkish Government, however, as though a11 1 hnve just mentioned were net bad ona gh, wishes to llmit the Rovereignty of Cypru~ further by interpretlng Article 113. In oonolusion on this subjeot of the Treatiea, 1 wlsh to inform the Counoil that it is the intention of my Government to take a11 appropriate atern in aooordanoe with international law and praotioe to reotify the intolerable nnd unaooeptable aituation oauaed by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. 114. Mny 1 now refer to aome other aapeots of the whole issue whioh have been touohed upon during the deliberationa in this Counoil. 1 bave very oarefully oonaidertid the varioua statements made in the Counoil. 1 aak the indulgenoe of members in order to reply to oertain pointa made by some of the repreaentatives who spoke earlier. 116, The repreaentative of the United Kingdom, in his first atatement, desoribed the oonfliot as “a matter whioh, on the sutiac8, appears to lie aolely between the two Cypriot oommunitietP [1006th meeting, para. 331, 1 would agree with him that the matter liea between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority, but onlv on the surfaoe as he riehtlv rx>inted out. But what thé representative of the Uzted i(ingdom did not state is that it is the polioy of the Turkisb Goverr.ment whioh is at the root of thé problem. This, 1 believe, 1 have made abundantly olear in my statement befors the Counoil on Tuesday, 18 February [1095thmeeting]. 116. The C<umoil haa been requeated by my Government to denl with the situation arisingfrom the threats of aggression and the violation of the territorial integrity pf Cyprus by Turkey, whose nim, to get a foothold in Cyprus in one form or anotber, should by now be more thnn obvious. The tragio events in Cyprus, tragic for both sideo-let me express onoe again my Government’s moat sincere regret for the 106s of llfa on both sldes, and 1 must stab in thls oonnexlon that the representatlve of Turkey, unfortunntely, has failed to make any referenoe to the Greek vlotlms-are but k sytnptom and a oonsequence of the real issue. The internnl situation In Cyprus is the direot result of the poiioy purouod by tho Turkich Govoz%ment, based on a well prapared plan whloh 1 elnborated upon in my *The Qovernment of Cyprus are against the wall, not by the will of the Turkish Cypriots, most of whom yearn for the peaoe and quiet and oo-existence that were always possible before, but by the Will of the Turkish Qovernment.” 117. Sir Patriok Dean expressed partioular oonoern at the deteriorntion of the situation. SO did otber speakers. Members may be glad to learn, however, thnt sinoe the day the Seourity Counoil took up the question there has in faot been, with the exoeption of a few minor inoidents, oonsiderable improvement in the situation within Cym’us. The renson, in my estimation is that in the -1ight of the Seourity CoÜnoil% deliberations, the possibility of aggression from the outside 1ookË morè remote; with the result that the interna1 situation bas started gradually to improve. This is evidenoed by the faot that in the town of Limassol, to whioh the representative of Turkey referred SO often in relntion to his totally unfounded aoousation of genooide, life is normal and Turkish Cypriots bave returned to their jobs, both in the harbour and in the Qovernment oustoms as well as in Qreek-owned. and managed faotories. They were weloomed baok to their jobs, muoh to the regret, 1 txwpose, of those who put forward the theory of the in@ossibility of ooexisienoe of Qreeks and firks in C~~rus. In vnrious other areas QreekR and Turks have foimed joint oommittees to work lor the restoration of normal conditions and oo-operation between them and the settlement of differenoes among them. 118. 1 have mentioned a11 these fnots with some reluotanoe. 1 only hope that by stating the developments 1 shall not make the Turkish Qovernment unhappy to the point that it may step up again the maohinery of provocation, through its armed agents in Cyprus, in order to destroy the relatively oalm and promising ntmosphere whioh is at present prevailing, 110. It is not, of oourse, unknown inhietoryfor a sooalled mother oountry to arm and use people of the same ethnio origin, who are oitieens of a neighbouring oountry, in the dangerous game of produoing unrest and oivil war for the purpose of territorial errpansion, 120. The Turkish representative has tried toprovide a emoke-soreen to oonoeal the real issue by exaggeratiens, distortions and the use of words suoh as “genooideR and “ma8saorsaR. The tragio 1056 of Iife in Cyprus, whether it bs Ureek or Turkish life, 1s not the oau~e of the situntion but the effeot. Let uot our nttention be defleoted for n moment from the root of tbe evll, whioh is the intention of Turkey to bring about tbe partItion of Cyprus, by forca if neceesary, Md eventunlly to nnnex it to Turkey. Tho Minlstor of Information 6f the Turkish Goveinment, answoring questions from reporter& said on 18 Fobrunry thnt tbe only long-term solution was the sepnration of the oommunities of Cyprus into R federal stnte. Ile went on to sav that it wns truc thnt auoh a fodaration would grow l& sttparute indepondent ~tates whioh would eventunlly opt for union with Qroece and Turkey. Tbis stntement, originating from a reeponsible high offioial 121. The representative of Turkey ha5 falsely alleged that the Qovërnment of Cyprus and the Crsskmajority of the island have embarked on a polioy of genooide or extermination of the Turks. What for? Whv should the Qreek population of Cyprus wish to exte&ninats Turks? On the oontrary, the Qovernment and the areek majority of the population of Cyprus are trying by every possible msans to nrove tbat ooexistenoe and living ‘together in friendly oo-operation in a unitary, single State by Creeks and Turks is possible and should be aohieved. They would not try to provs that by exterminating or killing tbe Turks. 122, Nevertheless, 1 shall not allow myself to lower tbe standards of this debate by replying to the repreeentative of Turkey Md quoting various examples of massaores and genooide oarried out by Turkey in the oourse of its past Md reoent history. It is not, may 1 stress, in the oharaoter and hietory of the Qmek people of Cyprus t.s oonosive Md plan suoh horrible orimes. Any mari, however limited hi8 intslleot may be, muet realiee how false the Turkish aoousation is. There are 100,000 Turkish Cypriote. Can anyone believe that in the twentieth oentury it would bs possible to oonceive .a plan under whioh we would exterminate or massaors 100,000 psople? 7% Covernment of Cyprus and the vast majority of the people of Cyprus do not intsnd to oopy the methods employed by Turkey. 128. Some of the inoidents whioh bave ooourred in Cyprus have been rsferred to in the oourse of the delibsrations, with the usual-or psrhaps in thia oase unusual-distortion. The inoident in Limassol, inpartioular, was referred to more than onoe, It waa laat rsferred to by the rsprssentative of Turkey in bis reply to the gallery on Tueaday last. May 1 thsrsfors take that as an example of how taots ars distorted, and fn tw give the true faote.. 124, Pendant trois jours oons&x&ifs, des groupes de terroristes vooation sur des oitoyens innooente dans les faubourgs et dans la dispensaires turoe ont servi de ma@& le eang-froid dont ont fait preuve les foroee de s6ourit6, les attaques tumdes et les oouus de feu n’ont pas oess6. L&e foroeË oontraintss de riposter; aprgs uuoi, les Turcs ont demnnd6 le mer&edi 12 ft3vrier h- 14 heures un oessez-le-feu qui a 6t6 aooept8. Deux heure5 plu5 tard, oepsndant, au oours desquelles les 124. For three oonseoutive days, some groupa of Turldeh terroriets had been firing indiaoriminately and without any provooation on innooent oitieene in adjoining suburbs and in the town of Limassol. Minaret& and Turkish olinios were uaed as firing posta, and, in spits of the self-restraint of polios seourity foross, tbe Turkish attaoks and firing nevsr ceaeed. The eeourity foroee wers obliged to return the fire, following wbioh on Wsdnesday, 12 yebruary, at 2p.m. the Turks nsked for a oense-fire; thie waa aooeptect Two bours. Inter, bowever, during whioh tbcy bad obviously aoquired new supplies, the Turks resum5d tbe firing nnd the nttaoks, with tbe objeot of onpturing the Llmnssol port and the aovernment building5 by foroe. Tbe notion of the seourity foroes WAS nt first restrioted to sporadioally returning the fire, mainly by way of warning and to prevent tbe Turks from onrrying out tbeir planned nll-out attnok. Tbnt stnte of affaira oontinued until tbe early bours of Tbursduy, when seourity forces w5re obliged to lnunoh an attaok avaient manifestement obtenu do nouveaux renforts, ils ont repris le tir et le5 rer pnr la foroe du port de Limassol et dos Bdifioes publios. L’nution des foroes do sbouriU3 atest d’abord limit6e II titre d’avertissement pour empboher les Turos do mener h bion leur plan d’nttaque. Cet Btat de oboses 8’est prolongd jusqu’aux premibres heures 127. 1 would be perfeotly prepared to agree with the thesis of the representative of the United Kingdom that it is essential to restore peaoe in C~~rus and that the long-term problem wouldbe to estabiish oonditione in C~~ru8 in whioh areeks 5nd Turks oould live peaoefullikogether, and that the Seourity Counoil ha8 the responsibility of preeerving international pence. Al1 those ooneiderations are quite pertinent-but, in my QovernmenVs opinion, they &Ould be taken in the reverse order if the Seourity Counoil is effeotively to perform its task and suooessfully to fulfil its high mission. It 1s our firm oonviotion that if tbe Seourit~ Counollaots to affirm the tarritorlal integrity 5nd politioal independenoe of Cyprus, thereby eliminoting the threat of aggre68ion, interna1 peace will be restored and the politioal problem will be muoh casier to salve, 126. May I state agaln thnt as long as the possibilîty of outside military intervention exista, inter& peaoe is at stake, for the simple reason-and one ha8 to go into the payohology of the situation-tbat the Qreek majority of the people of Cyprue will be prepallng to meet the aRpFesaor and therefore will arm, whereas the agents dthe Turklsh Qovernment in Cyprue among the Turkieh minority will be labouring to provoke inoidents and bloodehéd in order to justify aninvasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army. 1% From the vnrious statements of the representatire of Turkey, it was not made olear to u8 whether hie Government does in faot still mean to invade Cyprus or not. I sun~oae that 1s a military secret. This threat of nggreesiÔn a11 slow haa, in my estimation, been obvious, The statemdnta of the various Turkieh leaders to whioh 1 referred fn my intervention were suffioiant Qvidenoe to oorroborato this faot. Wa havo uot yet rooeivcd nny satlsfnotory explunntion of these statemente or of thouo movements of ‘l’urkish troops and warships. Ao regarde the violation oommitted by the Turkish oontingent atatIonQd in Cypru8, tho QXplnnntion given by the Turkish representatlve that General Young gava A written etntoment to ttle QffQOt that the Turklsh unit in question aotod ontiroly under bis orders is plalnly inadequat8. Even if truc, the original notion by the Turkish oontingent took place on 86 DecembQr, while the commantl of General Young b~oame effective on 20 December 1DGJ. If the 136. The polioy of inoibment of the Turkish minority in C.Vpr~s is further evldence Pointing in the 8ame direodon. May 1 quote aome passages fr%m etatements made by some emissariee from Ankara while visiting Cypruson various oooasions. On 26 January 1963, eleven monthsbefore the inoidents, a Turkish emissary from Ankara, Mr. Caglar, addressed a gathering of Turkish Cypriots and said: “The TurMsh Army, nation and vouth, as a whole. will stand bu your side , . . Cyp& v&l be Turkieh ior ever, and noévent will be able to ohanne thi8 sftuation~. The President of the TUrkieh Youth Organisation, Dr. Ismet Giritli, also while visiting CyprUs, saidt “The Turkishstruggle ha8 not yet ended. The Cypriot Turk and the motherland will know how to make the world realiee this”. Another emiesary from Ankara, Mr, Tuncer, while vieiting cyprus, said: “Those opposing and using all sorts of trioks in trying to separate the Island from the motherland will not 8UOOeed. If, one day, the need arises, the Turkish army and the Turkish youth will give them the final fatal blow , , . The TUrkish nation is suoh a nation that, when its potienoa 18 exhausted, it knoW8 how to eliminate its opponents from history for good,” Mr. Tunosr obviously had in mind the weapon of gsnooide. 136. 1 have ventured to explain to the members of the Co~noil the position of myC+overnment on the issue of the Treaties‘of Quaranteé and Allianoe, a8 ~811 as our intentions. Our intention to tsrminate the Treaties of Ouarsntee and Alliance by taking the appropriata steps in aooordanoe wlth intarnational law and praotire ehould not bs interpreted aa in any way a desire on our part to do harm to the Turkish minority, or indeed to any other minority. 137. The representative of the Ivory Coast, in hic luoid and oonstruotive etatement during our last meeting, smnmed up the position as follows: NWe should be justified inoonoludingthateveryone a P ses ta a pester or leeaer extent that the Trsaties o London and Zurioh and their annexes are reeponsible for the present dfffioultiee in Cyprus, and that oertain olausee in those Treatiee oomplioate tho administrative and politioal life of Cyprus and may at any time recraate a situation no 10~5 unhappy than that whioh we are at proeont exp&eiioir~g.~~ [1007th meeting, para. 66.1 133. Wo olotie ourselves before the Saourity Counoii to guara&e Eltriotly, in our oapaolty as a &voroign and indepondent State, the human rights of a11 tbe oitlzons of Cyprus, irrespeotive OP rollgion, race, mx or colcar. do 140. Rut, havlng glven thls soiomn pledgo for the minorities and a11 the oitisens of Cyprus, and their human rights, 1 must also giVe another pledge before the Seourlty Counoil: that we are determined to sec the Charter of the Unlted Nations fully observed and respeoted in the oase of my oountry, with regard to its oomplete independenoe, sovereignty andkrritorial integrity. May 1 quote from a statement made in bis time by a statesman of a oountry neighbouring Cyprus, HO said: 140, Cependant, ayant prls un engagement rtussl solennol en 08 qui oonoerne les minorit88 et tous les oitoyens de Chypre, et en oe qui oonoerne llexoroioe ment prendre un autre engagement de s6ourItb, de mon pays, le respoot absolu de son indBpendanoe, de sa souverainet et de son int8grit8 territoriale. Qu’il me soit permis do oiter une d8olaratlon faite jadis par un homme d’Etat d’un pays voisln do Chypre, qui disait1 “The basio goal is that the oountry should survive in dignity and honour, This goal oould only be aohieved by the possession of oomplete independence -1 repent, SO that 1 may notbe misunderstood-oomplete independenoe. A oountry deprived of its independenoe-however wealthy and prosperous it may be-is not entitled to be regarded, in the eyes of oivilized humanity, as anything better than a slave, TO aooept the proteotion and sovereignty of a fore@ State is tantamount to admitting one laok of a11 human qualities, one’ impobnoe and dejeotion,” In oase the representatlve of Turkey does not reoolleot thls quotation, may 1 refresh his memory. It fs from a statement made by Kemal Pasha Ataturk in connexion wlth the Treaty of F&res. This statement waa oontrasted with the Sulta@s deolaration that “8 weak existenoe fe preferable to total annihilationn, We fully endorse and adopt thts statement of Kemal Pasha Ataturk and not that of the Sultan, Pour reoonnnftrnit pas cette ottatfon, qu’il me permette de lui rafrnfuhir la m6moire. Il s’agit d’une d8olaratlon faite par Keman Pacha Atnturk h propos de SBvres. Cette dbolarntion oontrastnlt nveo oelle du faiblessq que d%tre totalement anaanti”. Nous approumn8 bïetiement oette d6olaration de Keman Ataturk et nous rejetons oelle du sultan. 141. We have oome to the Seourlty Counoil fully oonsolous of our duty to our oountry and to the world. We have oome before pu wlth a requeet. We request you ta oall upon all States to respeot the sovereignty, terrltorlal lntegrity and independence of the Republio of Cyprus, If you grant thls request, you will be serving not only my oountry, but also the very meaning of the United Nations. We are prepnred to oo-operate with the Seourity Counoll. We appeal to youfor peaoe, but peaoo with juatloe. 141. pleinement oonsoients de oe que nous devons R notre pays et au monde. Nous sommes venus devnnt vous porteurs d’une requ&e. Nous vous demandons de lnnoer tent la souverainete, l’fnt4grlt8 territoriale et l’ind&- pendanoe de la Rt5publlque de Chypre. 81 vous faftes droit mon pays, mais aussi l’esprit m8me qui inspire les Nations Uniau. Noua sommes dIspos6s h ooopbror avao le Consoil de s8ourit8. Nous vous adjurons do nous donner In paix, mals olest la pnix dans la juetloe que nous domandons. 142, MI’. SEYDOUX (Pranoe) (translntod from Fronoh): The grava disorclors that bava brought 80 muoh bloodehod to Cyprus in tho olnsh of two oomrnunlties whioh hud for 80 long coexlstod poaoefully havo hatl a profoun« effoot on 1~01~10 throughout tho world nnd partioularly in my oountry, whioh hns ulwnys hnd feellngs of sympathy now mlngled with aadness for both othnlo groupa, who hnva heonbrcught 142. M. SEYDOUX (Frnnoa): qui ont ensnnglnnt8 Chypre en opposant munnut0s dont la oooxistcnoe fut sl longtemps paisible susoltent une vive 8motion dans le monde ot partioulibroment duns mon puys, ot~ l’on une sympathlo, maIntenant nttristie, pour oas populations SI proohos de la nbtro pnr tant do llons hîstorlquss et tant d’afflnlt6s do oulturo. Cyprus and is not a party to the agreements whioh led up to it. 144. Nevertheless, it le on the groundof those agreement8 that the problem of Cyprus has been rnised here, whakver one may think of their provisions and however one may ohoose t0 interpret them. It is not for the Seaurity Counoil either to provide an interpretation of them-only the International Court of Justiae aould du that-or ta effeot the alteration of their oontents, whioh oould be brought about only through negotiations between the ,parties. 146. Raving sald that, we must determine what should and oan praotioally be done to remedy the vexing situation faoing Cyprus, Here again, opinions differ. For some, oonsoious mainly of the mounting suffering of reoent days, the essential thing is to restore internal order and proteot lives, For others, guided mainly by th8 oonsideration that the present diffioultics are deen rooted. it is eesential to review the Cypriot Consiitution in order to eliminate the oame of those diffioulties. Looked at olosely, these two viewpoints are not really oontradiotory-Ëinoe one is oonoerned with the present while the other ie oonoerned with the future, 146, As regards the Seourity Counoil, its duty, 88 we sec it, olearly is firet and foremost to help to deal with what is most urgent. There has been bloodshed in Cyprus, and in the state of tension now reigning no one oan say whether there will not be more bloodshed again tomorrow. Two oommunities oonfront eaoh other and the laudable efforts of the troops brought in to prevent olashes have no doubt in many oiroumstanoes limited the damage without however being able to seoure the restoration of pence, We must aphal first to those who are direotly involved beoause they are at onoe those responsible and those oonoerned. I refer, of oourse, to the two oommunities and the Government of Cyprus. 1 refer also to Greeoe and Turkey whioh the two oommunities turn to and whioh indisputably are also responsible and oonoerned. Al1 the partiesand eepeolally, of oourse, the oommunities in question-muet understand the folly of any resumption or, even worse, any spreading of the tragio inoidenta whioh have for the paat three months brought 80 muoh 5orrow to their oountry or, if .not theirs, the oountry in whloh 80 many of thoir brothore by blood, language and religion now live. 147. Thnt 1s tha most qplt task. But, of 00~813, its solution-ovan a favourablo 8olution-would not finally sottlo anything slnoe thore would slill be tho problems of substanoe undorlying tha clieturbancos whioh a11 of us together nre now trying to guurcl ngainst. In other word5, wo are oonoorned hero wlth tha vory fUutUP0 of Cyprus n11d wit11 tha 8oIutiolla ht must bo found in ortler to mako thnt fulure a poacoful one und to onsuro llfc ond dovolopment to a population which the racont differoncos between it8 two oom- 149, Ma d616gation souhaite que oe diligent effort soit poursuivi, gardent oonsoienoe de la gravit6 d’un problbme qui peut finir par mettre la paix en danger dans une r6gion partioulibrement du monde. Elle souhaite enoore une fois que les gouvernements int6ress6s de deux prinoipales oommunaut6s de Chypre entendent les appels B la mesure, au oalme, B la oonoiliation qu’ont exprim6s la plupart des interventions faites h la table du Conseil et que, dans lW6r8t mais d’abord dans le leur propre, le repI%sentant de la Franoe leur adresse B son tour. 160. de ltespagnol]: Depuis 1964, où la question de Chypre a 6t6 soumise pour la premibre sation des Nations Unies, le Gouvernement bolivien a appuya avec chaleur la demande en vue de l’applioation du principe d’autod&ermination qui Permettrait Les effusions de sang, les saorifioes et lesprivations que oe peuple a subis pour obtenir sa libert8 ont BmU le monde entier; olest pourquoi nous avons tous 06- 16br6 aveo une joie r6elle son aooession B l’ind6- pendanoe. 160. Mr, CASTRILLO JUSTINIANO (Bolivia) (translated from Spanish): Prom the time when the question of Cyprus was first raised in the United Nations in 1964, the Qovernment of Bolivia has strongly supported applioation of the prinoiple of self-determination, SO that the Cypriot people oould deoide its own future. The bloodshad, saorifioe and. privation suffered by the Cypriote in order to gain their freedom moved the whole world, and it was, therefore, with real joy that we greeted their independenoe. 161. Unfortunately, the bloody and grievous ii!c!idents whioh we had thought to be a thfng of the past are today being repeated, The martyrdom of the Cypriot people has not yet oome to an end, and the Seourity Counoil is faoed with the responsibillty of dealing with this request for the restoration of peace among the blood-bathed people of Cyprus. 162. In the opinion of the Bolivian delegatfon, the most important and most urgent requirement, taking preoedsnoe of anything else or any other problem is to proteot Greek and Turkish Cypriots from slaughter and to oreate an atmosphere of oalm to enable both oommunities to disouss their differenoes free from the pressures to whioh Cyprus is being subjeoted and whioh threaten to destroy its independenoe as a State. 163. My Government has given me olear instruotions to mnke spaoiul mention in the Council of the Unitsd Kingdomts efforts dirocted at reatoring pence to the Cypriote, and to support the request that measures ahould be takon toform aUnitedNutions military force to intorvona between the dissanting factions, a force whioh should ba aolooted by tho Saoretary-Genornl and should prooeed to Cyprus without. 108s of tirne. 161. Malheureusement, douloureux que nous oroyions h jamais r6volus se renouvellent obypriote n’est pas termin6, et le Conseil de s8ouriti a le devoir mettrait retrouver 162. De l’avis de la d616gation bolivienne, leprobl8me qui doit passer plus important et le plus urgent, c’est de pr6server du maesacre les Chypriotes grecs un climat de calme qui permette aux deux oommunautbs d’apniser pressions son indbpendance en tant quIEtat. 163. Mon gouvernement m’a donn6 des instruotions prboises tout Uni pour rendre la paix aux Chypriotes et pour que j’appuie la demande d’adoption h or6er viendrait s’interposer choisia par le Secrbtaire g6nbrn1, devrait se rendre h Chypre sans d6lni. 164. Le Conseil de sbourit6 problbme extr&mcment d6licat dont la gravit& sans aucun In position 164. The Socurity Council io fnQod with an extromely delioato problom, whioh undoubtadly owes its serious- 11888 in large part to the geogrnphioal position of Cyprus, sitnatod as it is, as v’e nll know, at a vory 166. Cyprus must not be a vlotim of the interplay of interests foreign to its own. The impression is being given that the basio issue is simply the Treaties of 1969 and 1960 between Cyprus and the guarantor Powers. In the Bolivlan delegation’s vlew, that is not SO. The basio issue is the independenae of Cyprus and the oonsolidation of its sovereignty. The Treaties are entirely seoondary. We have to ask ourselves whether Cgrus existe; as has sometimes been sugpested, bu virtue of the Treaties. or whether the ?‘reati& -exist beoause Cyprug isa Republio. The Treaties undoubtedly oonstituted a notable oontribution to the oreation of the independent Republlo of Cyprus, but in our opinion they were the oonsequenoe of a oombination of ohanoe faotoro-geographioal, politioal, eoonomio, eto,-all of them, 1 repeat, ohanoe faotors whioh presumably are not now of deoisive importance for the independénoe of Cyprus. The indepeidenoe of Cyprus, we believe, is the result of the struggle of the C$io& themselv&, to whioh the Uniter Nations oontrlbuted-partioularly through the ideologioal value of the prinoiple of self-determination oontained in the Charter, a pdnoiple that, sinoe the last war, has been applied or has had oonsiderable reperoussions in a11 parts of the world. Cyprus is tiay independentby the will of the Cypriot people, and we donot oonsider that its independenoe depends on any treaty. It derives from popular sovereignty. 166. We have heard oonfliotina views on this matter: but in our opinion the Seourity -&sunoil must adhere to the philosophy adopted by the United Nations. beoause the Ünited N&ions-is a ünique body with its &n prinoiples. 11. would therefore be inconsistent if, whereae at the last Assembly the central theme of the discussions whs revlsion of the treaties, we here in the Seourity Caunoil were to glve the impression-whioh 1 do not think fs aertain-that we were aoting in the opposite sense. 167. In the opinion of the Bolivian delegation, there are no sacred treaties. That 1s an anaohronistio oonsept, whioh history and legal thought have bypassed and left behind. International treaties, like any work of man, are liable to errer, beoause man is not infallible. TO maintain, thorefore, that a11 treaties are saorosanot amounts in many oases to seeldng the perpetuation of injustice. Just as there are bad laws, there are bad treaties; just as there are good laws, there are good treatiss; there are unjust laws, and unjust treatles. What muet be done ls to analyse them in ordor to overoome the dlfficultlee and nrrive at a formula whloh safeguards the lnteres!s and rlghts of tha parties involved. The revislon, negotiatlon, renegotiation or re-examination of treatlos is an aohievement of clvilization. It ls based on disouasion, on a 163. We agree that neither the seourity Counoil nor the General Assembly has the power to declare a treaty non-existent or invalid, or to abrogate it; but the Counoil bas an obligation to oreate oonditions for a treaty to be re-examinod, ro-negotiated or brought up to date by the ordinary d!plomatio methode. 169. Cyprus, like Bolivia, is a small oountry whioh oannot m8ke war on anyone. The only oourae open to a small oountry without military power is re-negotiation or revision of unjust treaties. 1 bave heard no statement to the effeot that Turkey, Greeoe or the United Kinndom does not want to or refuses to examine, review or disouss matters with a oountrylike Cyprus; whioh is infinitely weaker. Suoh a situation would be inadmissible. 160. With the permission of the united St8teS representative 1 should like, by way of olarifioationof theSe ideas. to draw attention to the examale whioh his great~oountry 1s givingus at this very moment. Aooording to reports in this morninfc% Press. the United St8tes is ready to disouss or agree to rë-negotiation of the 1903 Treaty with Panama, This is 8 magnifioent example, beoause here we have a powerful oountry, one of the most poworful in history, approaohing Panama, the small oountry, in ordër to-review 8 situaticn 8nd find 8 solution ta the problem that has arisen between them. 161, What, 1 ask myself, is the basisfor the existence of the United Nations? What is the element that unites its Members? chat is it that ltnks our nations together? 1s it r8oe, religion, language, politioal ideology or any other faotor of that kind? No. Wh8t unites and binds all States Members of the United Nations, we firmly believe, is the ooncept of independenoe 8nd the oonoept of sovereignty, whfoh are immutable and must prevail over 811 others. Internationalpeaoe, whioh it is the SeouritU Counoil% task to maintain. is oloselu bound up with the preservation of the independenae 8nd sovereianty of a11 States Members of the United Nations; International law applies omy between independent States. Whu has C~~rus corne before the Se-&rity Counoil? It lias oomé‘before us to request Proteotion of its independence 8nd sovereignty, being convinoed that on these two elements the peaoe 8nd territorial integrity of the Republio depend. BU tion et oheroher une solution entre aux. 161, Nations Unies? Quel est 1&6ment qui unit ses membres, qui lie nos Etats? Serait-oe la raoe. la religion, 18 :angue, l’id&ologte politique ou tout autre faoteur de oe genre? Non, oe qui unit, 08 qui lie tous les Etats Membres de l’Organisation Unies, 08 sont, nous en sommes oonvainous. les prinoipes dYnd8pendanoe ne peut altbrer et qui sont appel&3 h pr&valoir sur tous de sf3ourit8 a pour mission de prothger, est Btroitement 1iBe de la souverainet de 1 ‘Organisation. Le droit international ne vaut au’entre Etats ind@endants. Pourquoi Chypre a-bellé eu reoours ind&pendanoe oonvalnoue que la paix et l’int8nrit8 de la RBoubliaue en dbpendent, 162. Le Conseil il Le conseil affronte une ment doit-il se prononcer? ll ala d’autre posslbilite que de dbfenclre les principes de laCharte clos Nation8 Unies, IesnrrPls sont fond& sur l’ind6pendanoe et la souverru. -3 des pays ninsi que mination dos peuples, 163. Ces nous sommes pos8s passerait-11 sl les garauties Etablies dans les trait68 182. The Seouritv Counoil must do something; it muet take a deoision within the fiold of ils oompetenoe. The Counoil is faoed wlth a areat responsibility. What decision should it take? Itoan only be a deoision in defenoe of the prinoiples of the United Nations Charter, whioh are based on the independenoe and sOVereigntY Of States and the self-determination of peoples. 163. Dur@ tlle laot few dayrc, while followillg tlle debate, we bave asked ourselveo the following question: what would happon if the guarantees establishod 164. 1 should like this attitude of my oountry, on the validity of treaties, to bo olearly established and not to be misinterpreted, partioularly sinae Bolivia has a similar problem, beoause of its geagraphioally enolosed posirion. 106. Cyprus has virtually asked for % revision or re-examination of tho Treaties of 1969 und 1980, In this move, it has Bolivia’s firmest support. For a treaty to be open to Fe-examination, re-negotiation or revisiun, it 1s neoessary to know its origine and ta plaoe oneself in the oiroumstanoes in w!lioh it was oonoluded, T~US, for example, the treaties signed by Cyprus were a neoeeeity, as *be most effeotive means of avoiding further bloodshed nnd restoring to the Cypriots that peaoe whioh was their grentest need at that time. My oountry agreed to sipn a treaty whioh oondemned it to its preaent land-looked etate, beoause of i*.s urgent deoire to break out of the blookade whioh it had endured fw more than twenty yenrs, as the result of a war of usurpation tbat iv& never even deolared, and it le still paying the penalties of a defeatcd oountry and reoeiving the same treatment. In bath oases the trenfies were the result of purelv oiroumstantial faotors and pressures, the weaker oountry having no oourae but to acoept them, even at tbe priw of loss of sovereignty. 166. Togethrr with the oreation of an international United Nations foroe, we ooneider it eseential to appoint a mediator to help brhg abcut P final understandin whioh, while safeguarding the positions of the di d erent parties, wlll be another step forward towards consolidation of the independence and territorfa1 unity of cyprus. 187. A8 1 bave said, Bolivia supporte tbe Unit& Kingdom’e propoeal for the oreation, with no lorr of time, of an international foroe, itr oomporition to b0 iY eed upon by the parties, We oannot but applaud, 80, the georetary-Qeneral’s efforts to d’ ‘oover some muanu of oonoiliation ‘and to end tht aagic situntlon in whioh tbo laoplo of Cy-prue finde itcelf. X69. Mr. Preeident, 1 should like permission to forgo the interpretation of my statomont into Frenoh and Engll sh.

I ahall be oxtremely brief, ati 1 beg tho indulgenoo of the members of tbe Seourity Counoll in view of the lateness of the hour. 1 havo already anewered many of the points touohed upon by the represeatative Of the Greek 170. The first point is that my statement was questioned when 1 said that the Turkish brigade was aoting under the orders of the British Commander and that he had aocspted this position. Unless some misunderstanding was made in the inbrpretation, 1 undeerstood that lt was eaid that that was not 8% 1 have here the lettsr of Qeneral Young, dated 4 January 1364 and written to the Colonel of the Turkish brigade, 1 shall not take the Counoil’s time to read it out unless that 1s desired. The lettar la here. 171. Another point 1 want ta touoh on very briefly is this. My statement was questionsd when 1 said that Turkey has no territorial ambitions in Cyprus. As a matter of faot, Turkey ha8 no territorial ambitions in Cÿ~rus, and the faots bave been inverted. Until the pr&ent tragio events the only intsrsst of Turkey was to sec psaos and stability and prosperityinthis Island whioh -lies off our sh&es. -Turkey i-8 an eastern Meditsrranean aountry. Turkey has the longest shore on the Meditmranean sea. Any disturbanos, any intsrnational oonfliot, 1s bound t0 intsreet Turkey beoause we would be involved in it whether we like it or not. Therefora, we have a great stake in having pesos and stability in that region, and of oourse the bsst way to bave that peaoe and stability in Cyprus is to have ths two oommunities living side by aide peaaefully, eaoh master of its own affaire, with no bloodshed and no troubles of the kind we bave had. 173. It was onIy after the events had startsd that the attention of Turkey was divertsd, In what way? Towards trying to arrive at an immsdiats oesaation of the bloodshsd, 1 do not think 1 have to repsat that we have aooeptsd a11 positive formulae, and we et111 Will aoaspt them. We have aoseptsd the London Conferencei we have sooepted the sending of an observer on behalf of ths Seorstary-Ceneral~ we have aoosptsd the first ami ssaond formulae propoasd for an international foroe. This ehows the intentions cd Turkey. However, needles8 to say, we oannot remnin indifferent-espsoially beoauee of the obligations we have assumsdintrsatiee -if there is rsnewed violence and tragsdy in that ialand, We should like to sec peaoe established there. 173. Again, aome caaotations have been aiven. 1 hone we shal1 net follow thio lins. The two quotations made by Mr. Kyprianou were from the President and a répr. ..&ative of the Turklsh etudent organisation-1 repset, of a student organisation-Mr. Caglar nnd Mr. Tunoer. It is not from the words of teenagera that the Ssourity Counoll oan obtain information on what the situation is. There has beon no officia1 Turkish oommont-and 1 ohallonge anyme to prOdU@ suoh offlolal Turkieh oomment-in the senso of the quotations read by M r. Kyprinnou, 117. One laet point, We were told-and there wa8 a wry lengthy statement ta thla effeat-that the Con&!- tutlon and Treaties and 10 on were imposed in 1060 on unwilling Cypriot oommunities. Again, this is not 80. We bave the statement of 19 February, made in London by tho Brime Mhlsbre of the three Powera, Oreeoe, the Unit& Kingdom and Turkey, whlch 1 shouldlike to read out. xt eayer “The Prime Minioter of the United Kingdom of Qmat Britain and Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Oroeœ and the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, ~Taldng note of the Dsolaration by the Reprerentative of the Uflek-CMrio? Communitu and the Ileurersntative of Mie Turliiih-Cyprlot Conimunity that-ttmy aoodpt the dooumenk annexed to this Memorattdutn aa the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprur, Wsreby adopt, on behalf.of their rerpeotive Oovernmentr, the dooumenk annexed to thir Memorandum rnd lirted b8low, 81 the agreed foundation for tha final rsttlement of the pxtblem of Cyp~,” W Thir is an hirtorioal dooument. 176. Amin. at the conolusicn’after tho oignature, In whiih ii1 had agroed, wo bave thc etatetient, taken from the offioial reoords, of Iiis Exoollenoy the Fore@ Mi&ter of Oreew at that time, Mr. hv&ff, who 8aid: “Wo think that in this task of finding the solution we &ll nover rolatively the lnteroet of every party. And wo havc been euooeeuful, After lpng talke, aiter long negotintions, whioh many timua wore not vory And he oontinued: vWs aignsd thess Agreements beoause this le in tho oommon interest of our oountries in the middle of a world whioh is full CU dangers and dangers whioh do not allow us to ignore them, We signed these Agreement8 beonuse we felt that they oover mlatively and absolutsly satisfaotodly the intereste of the psople of Cyprus as A whole. We also signed these Agreemante bsoause the respeoted mana-and here he pointed to President Makarios-vat the head of the areek oommunity in Cyprue and whom ws oonsldsred in a11 our deliberations as representing the wlll of the C?reeka of Cyprue, having been informed by UE, said that he was in agreement with theas Agreemente. I do not think that WI signed only beosuse we hnd his agreement, We signsd 1 think beoause it WAS our uonviotion that we bave reached the relatively best possible eolution, aBut I want ta add that we took into oonelderation Ne opinion for the fundamsntal reason that we had deolued during our dirouseione that we Will not impose these deoleions by foroe or by other ways on the Oreok Cypriote,” This le also an hlatmioal dooument, 179, It wuuld bs possible to oontinue on this line. However, 1 am sure that all ofueagree that the sItua= tion in Cyprus ie very urgent ami very dangerdur. 1 think that the time has oome whtin we oould aooelsrate car wurk, andbeginningwitb the nsxt meeting we should rsally luavs aside long oitations and long speeohss and try ts get an international forae to Cyprus ta stop further blocdshed, 180, Those are our hopss at this lats heur. I thank the Counoil for listening to me. 131. Mr. KYPRIANOU (Cyprins)~ 1 shallbsvsrybrief. As regards the letter of General Young, 1 havs ths impression-at least 1 think 1 heard oorreotly-that lt was Bot signed on 33 Deosmber, whereas the violation by the Turkiuh contingent ooourred on that day. 1 suppose Mut the lotter signsd by Cienerhl Young bore a later date. 130. Tel est notre espoir b Je remsroie le Conseil de m’avoir COU~& UP. Js serai g6n6ral Young, j’ai 1Qtiprssslon - entoutou~eoroir avoir bien entsndu - quielle 26 dboembrs, dsts 8 lquelle lation imputable la lettre n’a uns dats 133. Tho roprosontativo of Turkey etatod that tho quotationo whiah I had givon of romarkc by some Turkish emissnrias from Ankara who aame to Cyprue WeFo thoso of tconagors and shuuld not be tnken into Ounsldsrntlon. I would ti prepared to aooept tbnt, if the reprosontative of Turkcy had not ndmittod, in tho i’emarks whioh ho hns juet modo, tho very samo ldon chat thosc tonnagers brought ta Cyprus. 183, Lo ropr8sentant do les dlhnknrn h Chypre, quo dVtdo1oeooni.s et ne devaient oonslddration. Jo serais dIspoe B aooepter oette intorprbtatIon si 10 ropr6oontant do la Turqulentavait pas ropris, dans son intervention, les m3mes Id6ea, pr0ois6mont, que oollos que 00s adolesoents Btaient venus prBoher h Chypre. 133, Tho ropresontatlvo of Turkoy aald that in Cyprus Turkey 1s lntsrcsted In lmnca, a p~noe in whldh oaoh aommunity wwld ~XI master of its own affaire. That 133. Lo ropnbeontant do la Turquie a intbreeoe paix dana laquolle ohnquo oommunaut4 aerait ms& 187. Mr, BITSI (Qreooo) tranalatetlfromFrenoh)~ b 100 titan bava diffioultier wi tlmrs Iiotsningd0vloor tldt oomotlmor, whon 1 hoar tho intorpr8tation of oortain rem+rl, I 0011 hardly belîove my oarphonos. Throughthom alittle whUeagoIhoardMr. dUlOU, whom we umuaUy addserr aa tha Wnirtor Foroign AJfr&moyuO tifo WI, addroesod by tho roprosontati~ proprfiientauvo of the cireak cyprîota. 1 wandsr wlbother that wau heoau8o 8ometbM waa wrotg with tha ep\ipment or whother tba ropreientati&ofTufTu~y mlly intoncbd to revoal ooinothing 4 OP 188, Tbs PRESIDENT; Thare are no other namea 011 tho llot of rnerksrr. Havlw lnformall~ oonmulted trie twlnbero ai ttle soourltg bamoil, 1 -&uld liko to mot that tha Counall raoonvena ta continua the dlrawcdon of tho prwmt item oaitr agenrhtomorrow, Frîday, 28 Febrwry, at 8.80 p.m. n wue 00 deofdsd. Tho motfng FOIO at 1.15 pm. ,OltAND,,,AND‘, ‘vMUN” i ‘OUA” H. r. Au,,ur,,,.tb I., “l”b)l”lb. ,WLANO ,“LANDII WA,ION I “Y 01110‘. UQANRA aQoWlHO?, r.o..o”, 14k,I(4rnD4II. UNIT10 AMI "lP,JILIII6WI Y LI,"A,",‘ "LA "INAIUANOI D' QUI A"MI UNI‘I OVCIt" WI WO”tD 10011 COMCANV. 110.