S/PV.1099 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
15
Speeches
3
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions
UN membership and Cold War
Cyprus–Turkey dispute
General debate rhetoric
Security Council deliberations
War and military aggression
The etatement made by the repreeentative of the Soviet Union is nota point of order, as 1 bave mistakenly stated, but a requeat for information. On that ground 1 will oall on the repreaentative of Turkey who has indioated hia deefre to reply.
In effeot, 1 do not aee how there oould be a point of order when the representative of Turkey has given an opinion and the ropresentative of Greece ha8 given an opin!on. Why it should be the representative of the Soviet Union who decides to raise a point of order would be difficult to understand. However, from the point of view of!2forming the Council, I !&st say tliat the situation is as 1 explained in the bagînning of my first statement. In other words, we, Turkey, continue to have an Embassy in Nioosia. We do not say that the Government as such fa an illegal entity, nnd 1 hnve not said that here.
5ur 13. Il est dono bien naturel que je daolare que oes opinions ne refl&ent que la pensae de oeux qui les ont exprlm8es. Puisque les Chypriotes turos n’ont pas Bti oonsult$s, oe qui a 6tB dit ioi ne peut 8videmment pas refl&er leur opinion. Enoutre, puisqueauxtarmes de la Constitution il faut tenir compte de l’opinion des deux communau%, il est donc Evident que le point de vue exposa ioi ne reprasente pas l’opinion du Qouvernement ohypriote proprement dit. Nous avons entendu certaines opinions qui, selon la Constitution, peuvent engager oeux qui le5 ont formul&es. Je ne Pr&ends pas qu’elles soient d0pourvues de valeur: au oontraire, nous souhaitons les oonnaftre. voulai5 simplement bien pr8oiser de quelles opinions il s’agit. Telle est dono la situation, et olest j’ai d6olar8 ici ne refletaient que le point de vue d’une de5 parties. Je pense que oette explioation auraBolairoi la situation. 14. M. FEDORENKO (Union de5 RBpubliques listes sovi&iques) [traduit du ruese]: La question qui a et6 souletie par le reptisantant permanent Qreoe rev&, comme nous l’avons d4jA dit, unegrande importance. 16. Il oonvient de souligner que les termes dont use le reprdsentant de la Turquie gation dament aoorbditee de la RBpublique de Chypre pr85entent non seulement un inter& &hique, mais, oomme nous pouvons le constater, une grande signlfioatlon politique, C’est pourquoi les membres du Conseil Btaient en droit d’attendre de5 explioatlons du repr&entant de la Turquie. C’est aveo attention que noua avons 8oout0 la d8olaratfon que vient de faire le repr0sentant. Elle 0claire le5 motifs dont il s’est inspir8 lorsqu’il s’est permis d’user, au Conseil de s0curit0, de termes qui n’y sont absolument pas admis A l%gnrd du ohef et de la d818gation d’un Etat souverain, Membre da 1’Organlsation de5 Nations Unies. Ces motifs n’ont rien que les Etats Membres assument en vertu de la Charte. 16. tenono tout d’abord A noter qu’ils sont en oontradiotion flagrante avec les appels qu’il a lances lui-m8me
13. Therefore, it is only natural for me to say that these opinions re@ ;,:t only the opinions of those who made them. As they did no\ oonsult the Turkish Cypriots, of oourse they do not refleot the opinions of the Turkish Cypriots. And sinoe aooording to the Constitution, bath opinions must oome together, of oourse it is not the opinion of the Cypriot Government as suoh. We have heard oertain opinions whioh, aooordingto the Constitution, oan bind those who made them. 1 do not say that they are valueless; on the oontrary, we want to know them. But 1 just wanted to oall them for what they are, This is the situation, This is the reason why 1 said that the opinions that we have heard here refleot those of one side. 1 believe now that the situation haa been olarified by the explanetion whioh 1 have given.
The question rai& by the Permanent Representative of Greeoe is, as we have already pointed out, of quite vital signifioanoe.
16. It should be emphasieed that the terminology used by thc representative of Turkey to desoribe the plenipotentiary delegation of the Republio of Cyprus has not only an ethioal but, as we sec, an important ~x>litioal aspect. It ie preoisely for this reason that the members of the Counoil were entftled to an explanation from the representative of ntrkey. We have listened oarefully to tbe statement just made by the representative of Turkey. This statement sheds light on the motives whioh led him to use, in the Security Counoil, unauthorized terminology to dasoribe the head of a delegation and the entlre delegation of a aoveroign State Member of the United Nations. The motives adduced by the representative of Turkey have nothing in common with the obligations whioh States Members of the United Nations a5sume under the Charter.
16. As to tha tone and purport of the etatamont by the representatlve of Turkey, we ehould first like to point out that they clearly conflict with the appenls which
“In the first plaoe, it is our hope that no member of tbe Counoil will render the Cyprus question insoluble and more inflammatory by injeotingextraneous matter@-and 1 emphasize “extraneous mattersn-“or by making a loold-war’ issue of this extremely unhappy situation.” [lOSSth meeting, para. 280.]
18. This thought. as oan be seen from the reoords of thë meetings, &a; SO muoh to the Iiking of the representative of Turkey that he repeated it in full at the 1097th meeting of the Counoil, on 25 February. 1 shall not repeat that text, as it is absolutely identioal with ane 1 have just quoted. 19, It would havebeen logiaalk expeot that the representative of Turkey, who has been advising others SO insistently-1 quote-net to %nder the Cyprus question more inflammatory by injeoting extraneous matters”, should himself bave remembered his own advioe and his appeal to those otiers. Unfortunately, he did net. On the oontraru. it was the representativa of Turkey who preferred 6 devota his en&gies preoisoly to o& struoting the work of the Seourity Counoil with luestions whioh not only are extraneous but also oonsiderably oomplioate the cnr.sideration of the problem.
20. It was the Turkish side whioh made the suggestion that Mr. Denktas should be invited to steak in the Seourity Counoil as the representative of “one of the interested parties” in the Cyprus question. As we know, this suggestion did not meet with support in the Beourity Counoil. Infaot, striotly speaking, what interestedparty oan there be in Cyprus apartfrom the Cypriot Covernment itself? In Cyprus there is one lawful Qovernment of the oountry, and the representatives of that Qovernment are reoognieed in international dealinga andin the United Nations as the only lawful mpresentatfves of the Republio of Cyprus.
21. Althougb Mr. Denktas nevertheless suooeeded in gaining entry to Seourity Counoil meetings as n private individual, it may be noted that his olaimto represent some sort of interested party in Cyprus oloarly did net, and oould not, suooeed.
22. On the other hand, the representative of Turkey, obviouely antloipating that his thesis about two parties in Cyprus would not find support in the Seourfty Counoil -whioh is in faot what happened in the oase of Mr. Denktas-thinks fit arbitrarily to advanoe, in bis statements, the idea of two parties in Cyprus, and evan openly attaoks the oompotenoc of tbe delegation of the Republic of Cyprus. In partioulnr, in hi3 statement to the Seourity Counoil yesbrday, the representative of Turkey ventured to refer to the Ministor for Foreign Affairs of the Republio of Cyprus as the representatfve of tbe Qreek Cypriote [1098th meeting pnra 1691. And today the represontntive of Turkey oontinued to stress the same iden. In his letter to the Seourity Counoil, ho referred to Mr. Denktae as the representativa of the Turkish Cyprlot communlty.
des d6fenseurs les
de pr6senter gré&, pour but de favorlser par les m6mes trait6s aÜxqueïs il se r6i6re. question n’est pas examin6e A l’heure aotuelle par la Conf6renoe de Londres, oomit6. IA d certains. ont pd’ se permettre d&er de pressions inadmissibles A 1’6gard d’un Etat souverain - la RBpublique de Chypre - et de ses repr6sentants dament aoor6dit6s. 28, La proo6dure A employer au Conseil de s6ourlt6 pour s’adresser on stadresse ou A tout autre repr6sentant des r6gles Btablies par le Conseil et obligatoires pour tous oeux qui partioipent A ses travaux. 29. Cette proo6dure pouvoirs des repr6sentants des Etats selon son oaprioe. Si oes r6gles s’appliquent aux membres du Conseil, elles s’appliquent A fortiori R 6tre autoris6s A partioiper 6 l’examen d’une question et qui ont 6t6 admis A le faire, comme olest le oas pour le repr6sentant permanent de la Turquie.
27. We should like to remind those whom it may oonoern that the question is not now before the London Conferenoe, behind the olosed doors of oiroumsoribed meetings at whioh some peo~le oould. as the facts show. resort 10 unaooeptable nïettiods of pr&sure etc. against the sovereign State of the ReDublio of Cvarus and its plenipotenti&y representativës. -. 28. The mode of address in the Seourity Counoil is quite well known. It requires that the Minister for Fore@ Affairs or any other plenipotentiary representative should be addressed aooording to the standards reoognized by the Counoil, whioh are binding upon a11 partioipating in ita work. 29. This prooedure prevents anybody from referring to the powers of the representatives of States in anv way hem likes. If these &les apply to the members of the Seourity Counoil themselves. they are still more binding upoh those who have asked permission to partioipate in the oonsideration of a question and who have been allowed to take a plaoe here, as le at present the case with the Permanent Representative of Turkey. 30. The Mlnister for Fore@ Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, has been invited by the Seourity Counoil to take part ln the Counoil’s work as tha plenipotentiary representative of the Cvariot Stnte. We ask the President to draw the atte&on of those oonoerned to the faot that the deoision of the Seourftv Council must be implemented. 31. The PRESIDENT: Having in mind the oriierly conduot of business, 1 should Iike to reoallthat at Its last meeting the Counoil took a decision on the question of extending an invitation to Mr. Rauf Denktas. At the presont meeting the representntive of the Soviet Union hos requested some clarifications: the representntive of Turkey has spoken; nnd 1 now have a request to speak from the representative of Cyprus. Since Ihear no objeotfon, 1 now cal1 on the representative of Cyprus.
30. de Chypré,- a 6t6 invit prendre part A ses travaux en qualit de repr6sentant aoor6dit6 de 1’Etat de Chypre. Nous vous demandons, Monsieur le PrBsident, de bien vouloir attirer l’attention de oeux que visent oes observations sur la n6cess:t6 de respeoter les dboisions du Conseil. 31. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): bonne marche de nos travaux, qu’il me soit permis de vous rappeler quIA sn dernlbre s6nnce le Conseil a pris une d6oision touchant l’invitation A M. Rauf Denktns. Aujourd’hui, l’Union sovi6tique a demand6 oertaines pr6clsfons. Le repr6eentant de la Turauie a Dar16 et le repr& sentait de Chypre demande- A aon’ tour A prendre la parole, S’il n’y a pas d’objection, je donnerai dono la parole nu reprf3sentant de Chypre.
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34. 1 have been aware throurrhout the Counoil’s deliberations of the manner ‘in which 1 have been described by the representative of Turkey. 1 have not made any complaint, because 1 have relied on the deoision taken by the Counoil. 1 have also felt that the insult is not only to me but also to the Seourity Counoil.
1 think thatmy statement olearly set forth my oase. 1 do not know what we are now disoussing. The representative of the Soviet Union, despite the olarity of my statement, has made a further statement, whioh had nothing to do with the explanations 1 gave. He has desoribed a prooedure whioh should be adherod to in addressing members. 1 take it that his delegation is going to adhere to that prooedure from now on, But his remarks had nothing to do with what 1 had said.
36. Furthermore, the representative of the Soviet Union made that statement as though he were defending one of the oountries involved against the other. That is not very nioe. If my statement was not suffioiently olear, 1 am sure that my goodfriend, the representative of Greeoe, would have said SO, It is not for any third oountries to oome between neighbours and allies. We might have differenoes, but we oertainly do not need the Soviet Union ooming between us and maldng speeches that tend to separate us,
37. In any case, 1 have made my positionclear. 1 have taken note of the observations that have been made by other representltives. 1 shall not take any further part in this kind of debate.
1 rmst once again draw attention to the mode of action and the terminology to which the representative of Turkey is still resorting, and note another new element in his behaviour, whioh is the.t he has assumed the very unfitting responsibility of leoturing the members of the Seourity Counoil about how they should oonduct themselves in the matter of Security Cr,uncil prooedure.
39. In this case, it is legitimate to recall that the representative of Turkey is here wlth the permission of the members of the Security Council and this alone lays upon him the obligation to comport himself within tbe bounds of courtesy and in accordance with the established procedure of the Counc,il.
40. Allow me once again to draw attention to the fact that the Turldsh representative’s conduct and manner of expressing himself here are, as the Miniter for Fore@ Affaira of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, rightly
At the !nvffatfon of tbe President, Mr. Uenktas fook a place at the Counoil table.
42. Mr. DENKTAS: Mr. President, 1 thank you and I thank a11 the representatives for having given me the opportunity to addreos you on the tragic events in Cyprus. My community, which haa suffered more than 800 dead or wounded in a matter of two months, will be most grateful. Twonty thousand of them have been rendered homeless or workless and look upon charity for their living, The whole Turkish oommunity has been living under virtual Greek siege sinoe 21 Deoember 1963. AIl these people have been following the deliberations of your Council with anxiety. The faot that you have consented to hear their side of the story will be a great relief to them, and 1 thank you onoe ngain on their behalf.
43. 1 bave followed the long deliberations here with some anguish beoause every hour whioh has pnssed in valuable argument has meant to my oommunity either another lost life or some more people rendered homeless. Eaohday for them has been another day under siege and under terror. But 1 was relieved to find that the oonseneus of opinion in this Counoil is to bring the bloodshed in Cyprus to an immediate end, t.~ find means of doing 80 quiokly and effeotively. On this point, may 1 say that the Guarantor Powers, under the treaty whioh hae been the subject of attaok in this Counoil, oould have done this oonjointly, quickly and effeotively, but the Greek Cypriots did not want it as this would be a disservice to their cause. They wanted to do away with the treaties and with the Constitution.
44. While innocent Turkish women and ohildren were being killed or wounded, Archbishop Makarios, in complete disregard of a11 that was goingonin Cyprus, refused to have an immediate peaoe-keeping force in Cyprus offered by the United States, by the United Kingdom and by Greeoe and Turkey to be dispatohed from European oountries. While a11 this was going on in Cyprus, the representative of ArohbishopMakarios in the United Nations tried twioe, under the smokesoreen of invasion by Turkey, to get a resolution from the Security Counoil in general terms on the inviolability of the integrity and independence of Cyprus. The intention was to get such a resolution hurriedly and then to interpret it in their own wny and be ablo to declaro thnt the trentios were dead and of no effect and thnt the Gunrnntor Powers could do nothing while the GreekP deatroyed the Constitution nnd annihilntecl the Turkis,l community.
46. MI‘. Kyprlnnou 11~s nskecl tho Council: Is it conceivnble, is it possible thnt the Creeks shoulcl contomplato the nnnihilntion of a hundred thousatld Turks? Well, it will tnke some time tocomplete the exterrninfl-
41. Mr. Kyprianou has said that if the shadow of the Treaiies wbioh brought about the Republio of Cyprus ~a8 removed, then tension would be ellminated in the island and a11 would be well. TO prove his point he mentioned that aince the day this matter bas been hefore the Council, the fear of Invasion by Turkey haa dlminiehed, and, therefore, the tension has been reduoed and there have been only isolated incidents in the lslund. 48. For persans who have absolute oontrol over the Qreek gunmen, be they oalled security foroes or not, suoh statements are easy to make. It shows that they have given orders to their gunmen to lie in wait while these proceedings go on, Under the guise of isolated incidents, Turkish villagers have, however, been under oonstant threat and isolation. Turks have oontinued to die and mystariouely vanish. Quns andammunition are etill rolling in. Turks are still stranded and under eiege.
49. We know the pattern of these machinations. We saw them in the years 1955 and 1958. Each time the Cyprua case oame before the United Nations, the Greek terrarists, under the same leaders they now enjoy, either pulled the trigger or waited, according to orders.
50. Mr. Kyprianou has said that if the resolution which he seeke is not forthcoming, then the root of evil will oc::tfnue to be there, meaningthattension will rise and bloodehed continue, 1 feel sure that this Council will not be blackmailed into an irresponsible aotion or onesided resolution. 1 have absoluts faith as to that.
61. It ie very significant that Arohbishop Makarios on 18 February 1964 had this to say to a correspondent of UPI: ‘1 do not think a largrr pence-keeping force on Cyprus is necessa ry. If the Greek Cypriot resolution demanding guarantees against aggression is adopted by the Unitcd Nations Security Council, the need for a pence-lteeping force witl be ellminated. The main question now is to abrogate the Cyprue Treatles that give Britain, Greece and Turkey tho right to intervene in Cyprus affaira.”
52. This statement by Archbishap Makarios and the manoeuvres by bis representatives here in this Council are sufficient proof of the fact that the Greok Cypriote
55. Titis attitude and these declarations are also abaolute proof of the already well knownfaot that the attaok on the Turka waa an organized one for politioal reasons, and that suoh murder and violenoe as we have witnesesd in the last few months 1s a tool in the hands of the Greek authorities forgettingtheir pclitioal ends. Had this not been BO, how oould the Arohbishop 80 foroefully and categorioally eay that “if the resolution I ask for is given, no peaoe-keeping foroe will be neoesaary”? He will get hia resolution: he will interpret it as havin abrogated the Treaties: he will defy the guaranteeing ‘owers: and then under the umbrella of ycur resolution, he will deal with the Turks the way he thinks best. If violenoe is neoesaary durina this prooaaa, he wrll iesort to violenoe and tel1 the Gorld, aa he did in Deoember last, that hia Qeourity for,cesn are denling with eome Turkish rebels.
63. Cette attitude et oes d8olnrations sont Bgalement la preuve absolue d’un fait d8j& bien connu, B savoir que l’attaque oontre les Turcs u Bt8 organis8e pour des raisons violence dont nota8 avons 8t8 t8moins au oours de oes derniers autorit8s greoques esperent arriver le plan polltlque. Si1 n’en avait pas 0t6 aine& comment l’arohev8que Makarios si que je demande est accord&, auoune foroe de maintien de la paix ne sera n8cessniren7 Il obtiendra sa r8aolutlon; trait&, la proteotion de votre r8solutlon, il traitera les Turcs somme 11 le jugera bon, Si la violence est alors n8cessnire, 11 reoourra A la violence et il dira au monde, oomme il l’a fait en d8oembre dernier, “foraes turcs. 64. Telle est la mentalit8 greoque. Je r8p&e que j’ai entiere oonfianoe on la aagease de votre Conseil, qui ne se laissera Permettez-moi mentaux du probli3me. Pour les oomprendre, il est n8oessaire de comprendre les bases sur lesquelles renose la RBaubliuue de Chvnre et les raisons des dispositions le oaraotere absolument n8oessaire des trait&! cui lui ont donna naissance.
54. This is the pattern of Greek mentality. 1 repeat my utmost faith in your Council’s wisdom not to fa11 in lvith such mentality. Permit me, therefore, to taokle the problem in its essenoe and essentials. TO understand theac, it is neoessary to understand thebasie of tho Republio of Cyprua and ttie reasons for the G generis provisions in its Constitution, as well as the absolufe neoeseity for the Treaties whioh brought it about.
56, Each oountry, each State, has its own peouliar and individual oharaoteristioa. That is why it la dangerous to apply general prlnclples in oomplete disregard of suoh peouliarities. Gn the prinoiple of eaoh oaae to be decided on its own merits, 1 am sure that you will decide the issue before you on the merlta, peculiarities and inherent charaoteristios of Cyprus, Otherwise, the result wlll be ohaotlc. Very briefly, these are the fac&
66. Chaque pays, ohaque Etat a ses oaraot8rietiques propres, des prinoipes g0n8raux sans tenir oompte de ces oaraot8ristiques. ohaque oaa doit 0tre examln8 compte tenu de fies qualit& lntrit&ques, de la question dont vous Btes saisi en vou8 attaohant aux oaraot0ristiques aboutirait sont les faits.
56. Turks and Greeks have llved in Cyprus together einoe 1671. They have BO llved always a8 Greekz or Turka. They have eaoh stuck to thelr separate oulture, religion, tradition and national herltage. They are in effect Turkey and Greeoe projeoted lnto Cyprus for the Turklsh and Greek populations respectively. Any attempts to make them anything but Greeka or Turka have met with strong oppoeitior from these groups in Cyprua. They eaoh llved a8 autonomous oommunities togemer, yet always sepnrnte. Down to the smnllest village there bave always been, and there is, Graek and Turklsh authorities looklng after the offairs of their communlties sepnrately. As long ns they enjoye? . equolity and justice, they Hved together hnppily. A8 80011 ns one Ride nttempted to dominato tho other politically, trouble brewed nnd their relntions were momentarily estrnngcd. Greeks stnrted this nttempt to dominnto the Turlts nfter the British rule. Petltions for unlon wlth Greece met with counter-patitiona from the Turks oppoaing it, Démonstrations for union with Grcece met wlth counter-demonstrotions by the ‘I’urks.
66. Les Turoo et les Greos vivent o6te B 08te B Chypre depuis 1671. Ils ont toujours v0ou en tant que Greos oonserv8 leur oulture, leur religion, leurs traditions et leur patrimoine national. Pour les populations turque et greoque respeotlvement, projeotlon soit de la Turquie, soit de la Gr8ce. Toute tentative de faire de oespopulations autre ohose que des Greos ou de8 Turcs s’est heurtes il une forte opposition de leur part. Ces deux groupes ont &OU en communnut8s autenomea, ensemble, mais toujours s8par6es. Dana les plus petits villages, ilya toujours
CXI grecques et turques qui sloocupent s6parBment des affaires de leur oommunnutb respective. Tant quWs ont oonnu l%gnlit6 et la justioe, 1113 ensemble. Des que l’une des oommunnutt3s a essaye de dominer l’autre ooinmeno8 et les rapports 88 sont momentnn8ment tendus. Le8 Grecs ont essny6 de dominer les ‘ILroe dbu la fin du r6glme brltanniqu?. Dea p<lons pour
57. Graek Cvariots tried to set a rosolution in oompl&e disregard of the Turkrsh Cypriot faotor. The United Nations refused to fa11 into this trao. and advised the parties, that is to say the Greec ‘nnd Turkish Cypriots who were warring against eaoh other for different political nims, and greeoe and Turkey, their reoognized and nvowed motherlands, to find a just and peaceful solution by negotiation. That is how the Zurioh Agreement was reaohed. Arohbishop Makarios and Dr. KUpUk, representing the two oommunities, were in oonstnnt touoh with their respeotive motherlands during this tlme. At a11 stages they oonsented to what was being,agreed to as a oompromise solution. There should be no viotors and no vanquished. Peaoeful settleqent neoessitated that tho two sfdes should make mutual saorifiaes.
68. The fight arose beoause Greeks wanted union and offered the Turkish Cypriots the position of a mlnority. The Turkish Cypriots refused this and demanded union with Turkey, or at least partition, We would never aooept to live at the meroy of the Greek Cypriots. We had good examples of what life would be under them. The EOKA gunmen had repeatedly deolared that onoe the fight against the Brltish was brought to a viotorious end, the fight against the Turks would be sharp and short, Our struggle on the Island was a oonstant danger to peaoe between Turkey and Greeoe,
59. SO the oompromise was reaohed fairly and responsibly. A Government of partnership was born. The two oommunities sat at a oonferenoe table and agreed upon the terms and oonditions of this partnership. An eminent jurlst of international law from Switzerland presided over our deliberations. Greece and Turkey- 1 repeat, the fwo motherlands-had their representatives there, and we, the two oommunities, hadours. It was a settlement botween oquals, not betwoon the majority and minority. The notion of majority and minority would have arisen hnd there beon n Cypriot nation. There waa not even thc slightest notion of such a nation, Out of thls pnrtnership this notion might arise by a process of evolution when, in time, mutual goodwill, trust and friendship became the rule rather than the exception, ,
80. Thls notion of unlty of Cypriotism could hnve arison if the largr community hnd wanted it and had
61. 1 would like to quote some statements repeatedly made by the Arohbishop asfrom 1 April1960. He said:
“These achievements are not, of oourse, absolute, but the present reality does not oompletely olose the oircle of our pursuits.n He oontinues as follows: “The realiaation of our hopes and aspirations is not oomplete under the Zurioh and London Agreement& We have aoquired a bastion and a starting point for peaoeful oampaigns. From these bastions we shall continue to struggle with a view to oonsummating viotory.” This was a publio statement from a responsible man who wns becoming the head of a newly born State.
Il poursuivait:
Il s’agit d’une dbolaration publique faite par un homme ayant le sens de ses responsabilit& devenir le chef d’un Etat nouveau, 62. Puis, le 20 d6oembre 1961, il a d6olar6: Il existait une oour oonstitutionnelle cr86e en vertu de la Constitution pour connaftre des abus et de oertaines infraotionË oommis B Chypre, Un aminent juriste allemand en$tait le prasident, et des Chypriotes greos et turos ypartioipaient. Cependant, ltaruhev6que Makarios ddolarait ouvertement qu’il ne tiendrait pas oompte des dispositions d6olaration 8manait du chef d’un Etat tout nouvellement or66. 63. Le 6 janvier 1962, il a d&olar&
82. Then, on 20 Deoember 1961, he said: “Taking into oonsideration the general interest of the people of Cyprus, 1 shall disregard any oonstitutional provision whioh, if abuse& may obstruct the rrgular funotioning of the State.” There was a oonstitutional oourt oreated under our Constitution for abuses and for other matters in Cyprus. An eminent German jurist was at the head of it, with Ureek and Turkish Cypriot partioipation, And in spite of that, this was an opsn deolaration that he would disregard any oonstitutional provisions, This is from the head of a State newly born.
63. On 6 January 1962, he said: “The noble struggles of the people never oome to an end. These struggles, although they undergo transformation, are never terminated. The struggle of the people of Cyprus, too, will go on. The Zurioh and London Agreemente form a landmark in tbe oourse of this struggle, but, at the same time, are a starting point and bastion for further struggles, with tbe objeot of oapitalizing on what has been aahieved for further oonquestsa 64. On 12 February 1963, he said the following: “Even if the Conetitutional Court says that what 1 am doing on munioipalities is unconstitutional, 1 will not respeot anything of these thingsa
64. Le 12 fbvrier 1963, il a d6olar6 ce qui suit: 66. Et le ler avril 1963: 66. Le 27 juillet 1963, il n dit:
66. 011 1 April 1963, ho said: “As we kneel before the graves of our martyrs, we hear them shout: IForward, beyond tha graves’. , .The nrmed struggle ended, but it is continuing in a dif- .foront form 80 that the present may be flppraised nnd the future oonquerecl.H
66. On 27 July 1963 he snid:
“Tho agrecmonte do not form the @al; they are the prosent but not the future. The Greelc Cypriot people
There are numerous other quotations, but 1 shall not delay the Council by reading them.
67. Will the United Nations endoree suoh conduot? Can a man, R party to a simple transaotion, take advantage of the positive elements and refuso to abide by the negative elements? Even in private life this is not allowed. How will the Seourity Council help Arohbishop Makarios, if, in his own words, Qreeks are going to work to take advantage of the positive elements and get rid of the negative ones by oompletely disregarding the Turks and their rights in Cyprus? What will the fate of other international treaties be if Clovernments whioh sign them freely are allowed to advanoe the exouses whioh the Qreek Cypriots are now odvancing for abrogating these trenties?
68. Archbishop Makarios having agreed to the independent Repubiio solely for the pur-$se of using this Reuublio as a sprinaboard for wEnosisn-union of Cybrus with Qrèeoeihis administration oould do nothing but serve his purpose. Al1 Turkish rights were denied or refusad under humiliating aoousations. Al1 government organs set about doingnothingbut tracking out a11 Turkish rights. In spite of the guarantees and the speoial rights worked into the Constitution, everything possible was done to reduoe us and treat us as a mere minority. Nothing was done to stop the rising tide towards the oondemnatlon of the Agreements by the Graeks. Churohes and sohools beoame a training ground for anti-Turkish, anti-Constitution upbringing of youth. A polioe state was olamped down upon us. Human rights and oonstitutional safeguards were oompletely disregarded. Turkish Cypriots, while neoessarily doing their utmost to keep up the morale of their people, bent a11 their energies to bringing the Ureek leadership to reason.
69. Dr. K11çUk~s message to Arohbishop Makarios gives a good pioture of the Turkish stand. It is dated 10 February 1964. This was an open letter addressed to Arohbishop Makarios. It says:
“Your broadcast lest night reminded me of the constant efforts whioh were made during the short life of the Hepublio in order to oreate oonditions in whioh the two communities could Iive to@thar in peace nnd proeperity and co-operate in a-spirit of friandship with goodwill nnd understanding. Lest you have forgotten my concrete appeals to you and the n&gative and evusive attitude whioh you nlways ehowed toward them, may 1 list below a few instances of thie and the rosponse with whI,ch they were met by you?
“You will no doubt recollect that 1 had to appenl to you many tirnos, both orally nnd in writing, that you nnd cartain Clreelc ministors ehould refrain from
‘1 had asked you repeatedly and nlso the Council of Mini&ers and the Attorney-General of the Repubho that, as in a11 other oountries, you should provide sanotions in our oriminal code for deterring aotivitles and propaganda aimed at undermining our Constitution and the order established thereunder. You refused to take neoussary steps for the enaotment of legislative provisions for suoh sanotions. 1 had requested you and the Attorney-Genernl of the Republio repeatedly to proseoute those who had been publishing stntements oaloulated to promote feelings of ill-will bet.veen different olasses, or oommunities, or persona of the Republio, in violation of seotion 61 of our oriminal oode. On your instruotions, the Attorney-General refused to proseoute suoh offenders, of whom the most notorious was Nikos Sampson, whom you always wonted to proteot for rensons lmown to you.
“1 had proposed to you that we should hold traquent press oonferenoue together and thereby try to influenoe journalists to refrain from publishing inflammatory material likely to oreate enmity, distrust, and oauses of friotion between the two oommunities. You refused to do SO.
“1 had suggested to you on many oooasions that we should visit mixed villages together and advise inhabitants to put aside their differenoes ond live together in a spirit of friendship and neighbourliness. You refused to do it. But, on my own initiative, 1 visited mixed villages and spoke to Greeks and Turks alike, advooating friendship between them. 1 had oalled upon you to show respeot for the Constitution and the deoisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court. You refused to do RO. On the oontrary, you made public deolarations to the effeot that you would disregard oonstitutional provisions and that you would not respeot deoisions of the Constitutional Court.
“1 had asked you and the Counoil of Ministers to stop the Cyprus Broadoasting Corporation from broadoasting material whioh was offensive and insulting to the Turkish oomrnunity and was of suoh a nature as to breed hatred toward Tu&s. You failed to take effeotive aotion and even allowed the broadoast of suoh objeotionable material as a sketoh in wbioh a six-year-old Greek boy 1s depioted as deolaring that he would repay his debts to his mother by bringlng to her the beads of six Turks.
“1 had to request you repeatedly to use your influence on the sc-oalled Mini&er of Interior toprevent him from turning the security forces of the State inlo a Goatopo-lilte terrorist organizotion. You refused to do 80, nnd the Minister wns left free to fi11 the foroes wlth Greok terrorists ünclor the guise of plainclothes specinl branoh men. I had to oomplain to you mnny timos thnt Yiorkatzis has been nrming the Greek membnre of the security forces nnd thousands of EOKA men with henvy nutomotio weapons.
“1 had ter mnke several approaohes toyouo-noerning the non-implementation of those provisions of the Constitution whioh gave tous oertain rights. 1 had represented that the Publio Servioe Commission was wflfully violating the Constitution and aoting arbitrarilp in an insultina mannor. In many instances in government departients, and espeoially in the Foreian Ministry. Turkish offioers were disoriminated agninst and were deliberately pushed aside and prevented from performing any duties oompatible with their stntus. You refuséd to tnko nooosenry aotion to romedy tho situation,
“Three major constitutional orlses ooourred during the life of the Republio: taxation legislation, munloipalities, and the Cyprus Army.”
70. He thon deals with these separately. 1 oan give thls letter to the Seoretayiat, to be inoorporated in my speech, beoause it is a long letter. It ends this way:
“1 oannot oonolude this letter without stresoingthe differenoe of attitude whioh you and 1 adopted in our approaoh to the problems whioh have oonfrontsd us sinoe the independenoe of Cyprus. As lllustrated above, while you did your best to maintain a world of hatred toward Turks and thus destroy ~11 hopes of ooexistenoe in peaoe and frlendship, 1, on the other hand, as you well know, toiled hard to keep alive our Constitution and to oreate oonditions in whioh the two oommunitles oould live and Prosper together.
“It is most fltting toquote here from a letter whioh 1 sent to you on 22 Auuust 1962 in an effort to bring you to thé path of reason and goodwill: ‘Your Beati; tude ie no doubt aware that the oampaign for the abrogation of the agreements and for the amendment of our Constitution by unilateral aotion has reoently assumed euoh proportions that it is no longer posslhl~ to aooept the rapfd spread of the feeling of uneasiness, inseourlty, distrust, and enmity. As a result, we have been drngged to the verge of a oonstitutional orisls, from whloh rune the rfsk of falling into an abyss of calamity nnd devastation’.
“In the oiroumstnnoes, 1 found myself oompelled to appeal again to Your Bentitude nnd to request you to end euoh a oampaign. In thot matter, 1 also said: ‘1 wish to express the vlow that, desplto what haa 80 far been done, reason will preveil and in the end it will be poeoible to snve Cyprus from plunglnghaadlong lnto a state of chaos, anarohy. and dlsnster. 1 sincerely hope that Your Beatltude wlll riae to the occasion and abandon such plnns nnd Intentions which
The letter is signed by Dr. Fazil KUçUk. 7 1. Thie was the Turkish stand. But the Qreek Cypriot propaganda maohine was direoted to oonvinoing the world that the ro0t of a11 the trouble waa the unworkabllity of the Constitution: that, if a11 Turkish rights were removed and the Turka reduoed to the position of n mere minority, aooepting the position of living at the meroy of the Qreeks, a11 would be well,
72. Arohbishop Makarios, who, on the one hand, told hla people that he would use the present r@imo for aohieving nEnosisw, the union of Cyprus with Oreeoe, told us, on tho other hand, to help him do 80 by gjving up a11 our rights. 73. We asked him to try ta apply the Constitution, and we told him: If we find out, after this attempt, thnt thore are unworkable parts, we shall oertainly sit down with you and oonsider them. But do not diotate to us-without making any nttempt to apply these provisions-that they are unworkable, beoause we oannot aooept that. We told him that he muet first prove his gond faith. But he had no good faith toprove. He had one intention: to ohange the Constitution, to abrogate the agreements, and thus to be free to move on to “Eno&“.
74. His Minister of Interior organieed the poll0e on the lines of an EOKA terrorist organieation. Oreek youth waa illegally armed and tralned under hia auspioes. ‘76. Hic own statement, dated 29 July 1963,the statement of the Minister of Interior, the person responsible for our safety and for law and order in Cyprus-ie this :
74. Son ministre de ltint8rieur a organis8 la polioe sur le modble d’une organisation terroriste EOKA. La jeunesse greoque Btait ill6galement arm8e et formae aveo son appui. 76, Voioi oe que d6olarait, le 29 juillet 1969, le Minietre de l’int&ieur, la personne responsable de notre s6ourit.6 et du maintien de l’ordre A Chypre: 76. Toutes oe6 ohoses-18, d0sormois disparu grlloe aux aooorde oonolus en vue de pnrvonir mises on pratique pnr les gene les plu8 ref~ponsables. Comment pouvions-nous n0u6 @entir en e&uriUB? Comment l~uvions-nous Btro hourem? 77. Aux envlrons du moiE de mars 1963,l’nrohovQque Mnknrloe d&olnrait ouvertement que 1964 sornit une
#With our eyes always turned toward Qreeoe, whioh ie the symbol of freedom, we exhibited our oiviliz~- tion and strength to those who maltreated ua. Keeping our Qreek oonsoienoe away from every possible influenoe, we always remained devoted to our ineradioable goal. Thie oountry ha8 alwaye been Qreek and will remain 80. Even though destiny onuse our annihilation, Cyprua will always remind ua of Oreeoe. Our anoient monuments Will be a proof of Qreeoe. Qreek spirit and heroism will gush out of thie earth, whioh ie watered with blood. “Realising our responeibilitiee towarde our people we ehall, depending on the strength of right, stride furward without hesitation and with determination for ttAG mntorinllenlion of our aspirations in oonformity with the national expeotntions nnd drenm of the Cypriot Greek peop1e.n
76. Al1 those thinga whioh we thought weredone uwny with under tho Agreemants In order to reaoh a oompromise agreement w8re thus cnrried out nnd onrried 011 by the most reeponeible people. How oould we feel Eecura? How oould w0 fael hnppy?
77. About March lDG3, Archbishop Maknrios openly deolnred thnt 1964 would bo n deoisivo year. In 1963
78. It is a result of this predeterminedpolioy that t11e polioe pressure on the TurksofCyprus inoreasedfrom day to day. Illegal searches beoame a rule of the day. Resentment*arose, naturally. In the last three years they had tried several times by deliberate provooation to make the Turks oom.o out with an sttaok on the Qreeks SO that they would fi1.d the exouse to bit ~8 baok with a11 their might. We dld not fa11 lnto that trap, and they knew we would not do SO. SO, on the nlght of 21 Deoember 1963, they found the exouse. A Turkish family golng to its house was stopped on the way by armed Greek youngters. They pretended to be polioemen. They never disolose their identlty. They said “We are the men of the Ministry of the 1nterior.a At gun point they tried to searoh the Turkish women and men. The women refused, They said! “You must take UB to the police station if we are to be searohed.* Then people, hearing this alteroatlon, gathered round, It le said that about fifteen peraons gathered round, and while the alteroation was going on, two Greek offioers, this time in uniform, oame to the soene, shooting their way in and Mlling a Turkish womanand man and wounding five other Turke. We did our best to keep this as a polloe affair, and we tried to looalize the matter, but again that was not good enough for the Government of Cypru~. When this event happened a11 Greek polioemen were oalled to the polloe stations and fully armed, No arma were lssued to the Turks, and the following day, when we issued the statsment by Dr, KUçUk oalling upon the people to remain quiet and oalm, the Cyprus Broadoasting Servi~e, whioh again WRS under the Same Mînlstry, refueed topublish lt. They said, ‘We shall publish onlypolioe bulletins”, and we soon began to sec what those bulletina were to be. By the evening tboy started telling the world tbat thnre waa rebellion going on in the Nioosia area and thnt the security foroes were denling wlth tho rebels. In fnot. we were a11 eurrounded by Greek polioomen, hold in by prlvnte Greek nrmlos of whose existence we did not know until then, and we were nttaoked witlr automatic rifles.
80. 1 shall not elaborate on the horror which we suffered. For five days we were tut off from the world. Our telephones, inoluding the telephone of the Vice- Prosident, were disoonneoted. The radio was in the hands of the Greeks, and they issued bulletins continuously sayiny that a rebellion was going onand that they were dealing with the rebels. The wireless telegraph servioe waa in their hands and no foreign oortespondent oould oome to OUT side of the world as we were oompletely .surrounded and tut off, It was after the fifth day, after a last appeal hnd been made by the Turks to a11 the Guarantor Powers oalling for help for the last Urne-previously they had not heeded OU~ appeal at all-telling them that we had reoeived an ultimatum from Mr. Pandelidis, the polioe offioer, who had started the whole thing and who had told his number t%vo on the Turkish side that if we did not a11 surrender they would smash us out from our homes with mortar bombs by next morning-it was after that that the Turkish oontingent moved out of its barraoks and took a position as the result of whioh the Greeks who were attaoking us had to leave unfinished a work whioh they were doing thoroughly. It was only after that that we were saved.
81. 1 understand the rssentment of Mr. Kyprianou as a result of the moving out of the Turldsh oontingsnt. It preventsd them from oompleting a very thorough job, and our inslstenoe on the Treaty of auarantee must be appreoiated beoause it has saved us. That is why 1 am here. That is why SO many thousands of Turks oan still look to this Counoil with hops.
82. A great deal of oomplaint has been centered around the moving of this contingent, whioh did not tire even one shot, but it is on reoord that at the time the Turkish oontingsnt moved out, the Qreek oontingsnt also moved out from the other stde, taking over oharge of the airfields and other parts of the Qreek town. These people were there to maintain law and order, and the! had done SO without firing a single shot. In the meantime the British foroes came and took over the oontrol and command of these two oontingsnts. They are doing nn ndmirnhle job. 1 think they deserve thanks. It 1s these Powers whioh hnve needed further help from their other allies in order to maintain peaoe in Cyprus and bring sanity nnd reasol. to a11 of us, 1 think that is the renson we nrè a11 here-not to change Treaties, not to insist on conditions which we shall Inter use for OUI’ own ends. Thnt is the urgent work before this CWIOII, and thnt fa why 011 Cypriots in Cyprus, Turks Or Oreeks, who want peaoe and who want a cessation Of bloodshed look to the Council for n decision on that particulnr issue.
“On the question of hostapes. IMr. Yorgadfisl said the Turkish leaders have bëen.i&ormedoffi&aily by the President of the Reaublio that aaaroximately 700 TUrkiFh oitizens have tieen evaouatèd frOm areas in whioh fieroe fighting was taking plaoe and have been removed and housed in Greek sohools in safe are88 . . . . n
84. New, the information oame to us offioially after the oease-fire that they had approximately 700people. When we demanded the release of these people, we were told that they had beentakenfor safety purposes. Only 634 were returned to us. We asked what had happe& to the others. The answer waa: we have no others: that is the number we had. But there were British eye-witndsses who saw some of these hostages lined up and shot. Later we saw several of them buried in mass graves. fully olothed, women and ohildren inoluded.As 1 bave said, the information oame to us offioially that the number was approximately 700. In any oase, 6 responsible seourity f&oe should have known the number of people they had removed; we should not have been given an approximate number. We have asked what happened to the missing. It is no use insisting that the total number was delivered to us, We want ta know what happened to the missing, the people who did not return to their homes, +o have not been found, who have vanished. Their fam TP are entitled, in the name of humanity, to know ul least where the graves of these people are.
85. Turks that were il1 have been removed from the hospitals. They have vanished. We want toknow where they are, or at least where their graves are. In a11 humanity, we are entitled to know.
86. Of course, this is not one of the Security Counoil’s tasks, but it is materlal to the issue before the Counoil. It helps the Counoil to understand why WR insist on these treaties, why we insist on these rights. Without them we shall just vanish.
87. .After the cease-fire and after Fore@ correeponde& ca. tnto our sector and the horror was disolosed, thel 18 no more fighting in Nicosia. But it is very significunt that the houses of the 700 people and of other persons who had fled from the Greek sectors were completely destroyed, eithor gutted by fire or pulled down by bulldozers. This happened a11 over Cyprus. Wherever the Turks had to leave theirbomes, those homes were gutted or pulled down.
89. Will the Seourity Counoil, thon, adopta resolutlon whioh will leave us oompletely at the meroy of these poople? It is hald that in order toaohieve a resolution whioh will be aooeptable to the Cyprus Government aomething must be said about the integrity and independenoe of Cyprus, ‘I%ey eay: in order to make the Turke feel seoure, let us have a United Nations foroe in Cyprus, but tha resolution muat state that the independenoe and integrity of Cyprug are to be maintained by the Security Counoil. 90. As we sec it, the triok in suoh a position i~1 the following. The United Nations foroe will go to Cyprus for a matter of three mont\%, But they bave made no eeoret of the faot that they will immediately interpret the resolution as rendering the Treaty of Guarantee invalid, and that resolution will be in their hands for good. Thus, for three montha they will tel1 their gunmen: do not shoot. Then the United Nations foroe will gu away, and, with the Seourity Counoil resolution in their hands, they will defy the guarantor Powere and argue that the Treaty of Gunrantee is invalid beoauae the Seourity Counoil has adopted this resolution. And on that basis they will deal with us AW they please.
91. On dira peut-6tre m6fiant. J’ai pu 6tre m6fiant avant les inoidents, mais maintenant les faits ont oonfirm6 viens de dire au Conseil.
91. It may be said that 1 am a very suspioiou~ Turk. 1 may have been suspioious before the inoidents, but now the faots have oonfirmed what 1 have just told the Counoil. 92. The other day Mr. Kyprianou said that there fs now little or no aotivity in Cyprus, that everything is normal, that in some parts Greeks and Turks have signed deolarations that they will keep the peaoe. Well, my information from Dr, KUçUk is that Turks oontinue to be under a state of siege. In some plaoes they are running short of food. In some plaoes they cannot get medicine, No one cari go to work. Life is at a standstill as far a8 the Turks are ooncerned. In 8omb small PlaceB, there may be Turka working. But that is not the question. The question is: are we entitled to live in human dignity as free people in a land where we have lived for 400 years, or are we to be put at the meroy of the Qreek Cypriots and to be treated as a mere minority when we have never had that statua in 400 yaars? Aye WC to be trlclretl out of our I’ight to burgain equally just because they have killed some of us? That is the main iesue before tha Socurity Council today.
92. M. Kyprianou nous a dit l’autre jour qu’il y avait peu ou pas d’aotivlt6s Chypre, parties de l’fle lee QreoP et les ‘ruros avaient sign6 des d6olarations selon 1c;quelles ils maintiendraient la paix. M. KUçUk indiquent que les Turos maintenus dans un Btat de si6ge. En oertains endroits, ils oommenoent h manquer de nourriture; end’autres, les m6dloaments font d6faut. Personne ne peut aller travailler. Turcs. vaillent peut-8tre encore, mais lh n’est pas la question. La questfon est celle-oi: avon8-nous le droit de vivre dans In dignit6, en tant que peuple libre, sur une terre 011 nous vivons depuis 400 nn8, ou va-t-on laisser trniter nt~von8 par la ruse, 6galit6 simplement paroe qu’on u tu6 certaine d’entre nous? C’est lh la principale qcleetion dont le Conseil de s6curltb est saisi aujourd’hui,
93, Il ne faut pas oublier que c’est Grecs craignaient le partage et quo les Turos avaient peur de In Iliscrlmination
93. It must not be forgotton that it wa6 becnuse Greeks feared partition and Tu& feured C;reelt discrimination and eventuol union wlth Greece that theee
94. In spite of thcse guarantees we have suffereddisorimination, we have suffered indignity, andfinnlly we have suffered the killings and the destruotion of property. They now want you to tel1 them, “Bravo for a11 this, you have done well”, and they want you to honour them by giving thsm a free licence to argue that the treaties are invalid and, under this illusion, continue to subjugate the mrks, take awny oui’ oonstitutional rights and, if neoaasary, resort to furt.her violenoe.
96. We a11 stand for the rule of law; there is a rule of law in Cynrus, that is the Constitution. If it is neoessary thii it ihould be ohanged it oan be ohanged only by nrgument and by maklng the otl.>r side seo your point of view, It cnnnot be changed by killing, by massacre: it cannot be ohnnged in this way.
96. Before 1 oonolude-and 1 apologize for having taken up SO muoh of your time: time is valuable for you, for me and for my oommunity-1 should like to deal with one or two points which Mr. Kyprianou dealt with. HO has shaken in his hand sinoe the London meoting some seoret and mysterious doouments stating that the Turklsh leadershlp has put its signature to oertain doouments whioh prove beyond any doubt that there was a plot between the Turkish leadership and the Turkish Government in order to partition the island and he has read parts of this dooument. In London 1 ohallenged him to produoe these doouments for the pub110 to read as a whole and to prove in whose oustody they were at the time they oame into their hands-who gave it to them, when they got them, who signed them. Allthesethings must be proved before documents oan be discussed. 1 challenged this; nothing was produoed. Now 1 ohallenge again. If they got these doouments before these inoidents, then they should have done their duty as a responsible Government and taken some action against these people. If they m>t them after the incidents-and 1 think that va; their oase in London-then they must tel1 us where and how they got them, They must produoe proof and then rest on it. But the faots disprove the document:.
97. If the Turkish leadership in Cyprus was involved in suoh a plot for partition in conjunction with the leaders in ‘I’urkey, the two months’ fjght in Cyprus would not have ended in the way it did; the faots in Cyprua would not be as they rire today: some Turks armed mostly with shotguns and a11 Greelts armed thoroughly: Turks shrieking for hclp from Turkey and Turkey, adamant to corne in without being sure thut n wholesale massacre is taking plncs nnd thon a11 it does le to give a warning nnd tiothing more: it 1s a cal1 to the Guarnntor Powors to take a hand.
99. Today no Constitution is in effect in Cyprua, None of the provisions of the Constitution are being complied with or applied. In the oiroumstanoes whioh have been oreated it oannot be applied. SO the two communities have fallen apart. It is not t’.a fault of Mr, Kyprianou that he hae not been able to get full instruotions from Dr. Kiiçtlk and the Turkish Mini&ers to have thie disoussed fully in the Ministerial Counoil. The Greek gunmen will not let the Turks gc to the other side and the ministerial function 1s finished. But with due respeot to him, 1 do not think he oan say or that he oan olaim in justioe and fairneas and humanity that he oan represent the Turkloh voioe, thnt he oan fully represent the Turklsh side in thls Counoil. Ho oannot.
99. AujourdQui, il n’y A pas de ocnstitution en vigueur & Chypre. Aucune des dispositions de la Constitution n’est respeot4e ni appliqu6e. Dan8 les oonditione qui ont 6t6 orf3$es, il n’est pas possible de l’appliquer. Aussi les deux oommunautes s6parbes. Ce n’est pas la faute de n’a pu recevoir ni la faute des ministres turos si oette question n’a pu &re ministres. Les Turos de penetrer dans l’autre oamp, et les fonotions minist$rielles sont r6duites il nbant. Mais, aveo tout le respeot que je lui dois, je ne pense pas quV1 puisse dire ou qu’il puisse affirmer en toute justice, en toute 6quit6 et en toute humairit& qu’il reprgsente la voix turque, qu’il reprgsente pleinement le point de vue turc en oe Conseil. Il ne le peut pas.
100, Mr. President, 1 thank you mOitt alnoerely for glving me this hearing. 1 have done my best to tel1 you our side of the story. 1 thank you for your patienoe and 1 thank you for your kindnees. It has been a great help to me and it will be a great help to my oommun’ty, aa 1 hope what 1 hnve justtold you may be a help to you in your dellberating and in reaohing your deoisione.
100. Je vous remeroie tri38 sin&ement, Monsieur le PrBsident, de m’avoir aooord6 cette audience. J’ai fait de mon mieux pour vous vue. Je VOUE remeroie de votre patience et bon& Cela m’a 6t4 fort utile et ce sera fort utile A ma oommunaut6, oar j’espBre que oe que je viens de vous dire voua aidera dans vos do6rations vos dgoisions.
1 wish to thank Mr. Denktas for the statement he has made. 1 am sure that the members of the Counoil will examine the information oontained in his statement with the attention it deaervea. Mr. Denktas withdrew.
101. La PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Je remeroie M. Denlctas de la dfiolaratîon qu’il vient de faire. Je suis sdr que les membres du Conseil examineront les renseignements oontenus dans 80 d6olaration aveo toute l’attention qu’ils ml3ritant.
At this stage of the debate lt is almost redundant to say that the orisis in Cyprue 1s fraught with dangeroua potentialitiee. It is a11 too olear that the ohain of events whioh started last Deoember, if allowed to go on unoheoked, oould threaten the peaoe of the sensitive Mediterranean area and with it the peaoe of the world.
102. M. LIU (Chine) [traduit de Panglais]: A oeetade des d6bats, il est presque superflu de dire que la orise de Chypre est lourde de dangers. Il n’est que trop Evident que la e6rie d%Wnements qui a oommeno en d6cembre dernier, si elle n%tait pas enrayBe, risquerait rbgion de la M&iterranBe, qui est particuH?irement sensible, et dans le reste du monde.
103. As the organ respcnsible for the maintenanoe of international peaoe, the Security Counoil is duty bound to bring its influenoe to bear on the Cyprua oriais and pave the way for an eventual settlement of the basio iseues that have turned the Greek and Turkish oommunities on that ialand into warring oamps. Admittedly, this is no easy taek. The disouseions that have taken place in the paat ten dnys, both inside and outaide the Council ohnmher, bave shown how widely apart ure the pceitions taken by tho parties ooncerned. We rire flll nware of the untiring efforts of the Saoretary-General in oxploring the pcs~ibilities of a Swift und penceful settlement. In bis statement beforo the Council on 26 February, he told w thnt there wa8 nn earnest desire on the pnrt of a11 concerned to seek a peaceful solution, nnd thnt there had been progress on 8ome issuert, whilo certain basic differences persieted.
103. En tant qVorgane responsable du malntien de la paix internationnle, le Conseil de s&ouriU n le devoir d’user de son influence dans la crise de Chypre et de pr6parer la voie gun rgglement Eventuel des queetione fondamentales qui ont divi.4 lee oommurmut& greoque et turque de cette fie en campe ennemis, Certes, oe n’est disousaions qui ont eu lieu jours, tant nu Conseil qu’en dehors, ont montr6 h quel point 108 positions respectives des parties interesoeeo Btaient 6loignBes l’une de l’autre. Nous sommes tous au oOUrant des efforts inlaosables dbploy6s par le SeorBtnlre g0nt3ral pour Btudier les posaibilit6s d’un reglement rapide et paoifique. Dana In d6olnration qu’il n faite AU Conseil le 26 fevrier, il noue le d68ir einobre de reoheroher une solution paoifique ot quo deo progrba nvniont 6t4 r0alis6s sur divers points, malgr6 la persistance de oertaines divergences fcndamentale8.
106. What has made the Cyprus criais SO dlffloult to resolve ls, 1 bslleve, the immense oomplexlty of the issues lnvolved. There is, in the first plnoe, the stubborn faot that there are in Cyprus two dlstlnot oommunltiee whose lntereats do not alwnys oolnclde. Tbere ! dlstlnotes dont les lntt3r9ts ne oonoordsnt pas toujours, are, in the seoond plaoe, the oomplex oonatltutlonal 1 Il y a, en deuxlbme lleu, les dispositions oonstltutlonarrangements deslgned to proteot tho lntarests of the , nelles complexes destin&8 A proteger les lnt8r&s de Turkish Cyprlot oommunlty, whlchooouples n mlnorlty position. There ls, in the thlrd place, the question of : 11 y IL, en troldBme lieu, la question des Aocords de the London and Zurloh Agreomenta and the Treuty of ! Londres et de Zurich et du TrnltB de garantie, Les Quarantee. The Agreements, if my understandlng ls 1 aooords, si j’ni bien compris, oorreot, laid the foundatlon of tho oonstltutlonnl struoture of the Republl0 of Cyprus; nnd the Tronty of I Chypre, et le Trait6 de garantie visait h sauvegnrder Quarantee was deslgned to safeguard the lndependenoe, ; ltlnd6pendan&e, lYntbgrlt6 territoriale territorial lntegrlty, nnd seourlty of the Republlo as j de lu RBpubllque telles qutelles avalelit 6td 6tablles establlshed by tho baslo artloles of the Constitution,
106. 1 heve listened with great nttentlon to a11 the atatements made round thls tnble. The causes thnt bave been attrlbuted to the present or1818 are wldely divergent. On the one hand, il ha8 been malntatned that the soeoinl uullotltutlonal arrangements lmposed on CyprG hy the London and Zurloh ngreemente, ns well na the Treaty of auarantee sofeguardlng the observanoe of th&e arrangements, o&stltuté nn abrldrrement of the soverelgnty and lndependenoe of CyprÜa and are responslbie -for the unsatlsfnotory state of affaire obtttlnlng in that young Republic, and that thelr oontlnuanoe o&stltuteË an obstacle to the malntenanoe of inter-oommunal peaoe and hnrmony. On the other hand, lt hns been argued that inasmuoh as the oonstltutlonnl arrangements nnd agreements and trentles are deslgned to meet the speolal oondltlons of the country, any proposa1 to modify them ls on attempt to deprlve the numerloally weaker oommunlty of lts hard-won oonstitutlonal rlghte. 107. It seems to my delegatlon chat the Seourity Counoll, as a politloal rather than a judlolal body, lB not in a position to paBB judgement on the merite of theee two oontradiotory vlews. Members of thie Counoll oannot, of oourse, fa11 to underatand the lmportante of the various legal issues lnvoIved in the 01188. Rut tha primavy pre-oocupntlon of the Counoil nt the preeent stage is how to restore peaoe nnd ordor in Cyprus. On this there la n lnrgemensure of ngroement omong Counoil membere. My delegntlon hns nn open mlnd as to the methods to be uoed to bring pcraoe nnd order about. It ha8 been suggested thnt an lnternutlonnl pence-keeplng force should be sent to Cyprus. The dlffloultles surrounding the edtnbllshment of such n force ore real but not lnsurmountable. My delegatlon l 1s ready to support nny proposnl that willbe acceptable to the parties concerned.
It ls thus seen that ihe Interna1 oonstltutlonal arrnngemente in Cyprus are lnsepnrnbly bound up wlth a number of international instruments. Both tho speolctl oonstitutional arrangements and the internationnl instruments bave one oommon purpose, nnmely, the malntenanoe of hnrmony between tlie oommunitles living on the islnnd and of the pêne and etnblllty in the nrea.
109. This 1s a time for oonstruotive statesmanship. I believe with the Seoretary-Qeneral that there is an earnest desire on the part of a11 concerned to seek a peaoeful solution. If the suggested measures should be put into effeot and rewarded with success through the oo-operatlon of the parties ooncerned, It would not be a victory for the Greek Cypriots or for the l’urkish Cypriots, nor a victory for Turkey or for areeoe, but a viotory for the future of the Republic of Cyprus. 110. Mr. BITSIOS (Greeoe) (translatedfrom Frenoh): 1 am anxious thls evenina to fulfil a duty that 1 have nogleoted, and to paying ‘R tri’.Jute to thé Secrctary- Qeneral and to you, Mr. President. for the untirlng efforts you bavé made to reooncile diverging viewi nnd tc work out prooedures whioh, with duo regard for the interests of ihe parties involved in the Cyprus questlon, mlght oope constructiveiy with the extreme gravity of the situation we are oonsidering. Thc Groek Qcvornment has instruoted me to express its gratitude for your patlenoe, your impartiallty andyourdevotion.
111. The Council has two requests before it. The first is that submitted by the Qovernment of Cyprus on 26 Deoember 1963 (S/5488)& it was followed by sucportina documents. It listed aota and threats arainst thè ‘indep&denoe, territorial integrity and sover&gnty of the State. It asked the Counoil to take urnent aotion tc remedy the situation and prevent any rëpetftion of suoh violations. In other words, what the Government of Cyprus was asking was that the Counoil should proteot the Republio from any unilateral military Intervention or threul of suoh intervention.
112. Before any aotion had been taken on thatappeal, another request was made to the Counoil by the United Kingdom on 16 February 1964 [S/6543].uInsubmitting hls request [1096th meeting], the representative of the Unlted Klngdom explained that the efforts of the pnrties direotly conoerned to establish an international polioe foroe and a mediation prooedure had not succpeded and that the Unlted Klngdom oould not oontinue to bear, alone, the military and politioal Waponelbility for the maintenanoe of order in Cyprus. 81r Patrick Dean therefore aeked the Counoil to indioate the way whloh would lead to a solution, aooeptable tc a11 parties, of the difficulties obstructing the creating cf an Internnticnnl force, and the wny towar& an aooeptnble and equltable solution of the probleme whioh had given rise to tha present situation. He refarred in thnt oonnexlon to the advantages of ooncerted mediat1on.
Supp&Ï%
1904.
114. The representative of Wrkey, for his part, oonfined himself to the jirave situation prevailing in Cyprus and the more general international oomplioations that are to be feared. No one denies these faots and the existenoe of these dangers, But it seems tous that we are here not to establish or evaluate them, but to oope with them. 116. As if further proof of what 1s already quite obvious were neoessary, the Counoil has this evening invited Mr, Denktas, who, under rule 39 of the Counoil’s provisional rules of prooedure, that is to say, in bis individual oapaoity-and 1 wiah to stress that-has oome to enlighten us on something we already knew about.
Mr. Eenktas, whose persona1 responsibtlity for the diffioulties Cyprus now faoes and in reoent years has had to faoe is, 1 regret to say, hea+y, has not failed to tnke the further oooasion of this evening to add fuel to the fire. But honestlv. if we refer to the exaot terms of the reqüests whioh & are disoussing and whioh oonstitute the sole Item on the agenda, 1 do not think Mr. Denktas has given to the Counoil any insight that it laoked before.
116. TO return then to the statementa of the representative of Turkay, whioh for their part are very important, what struok me most of a11 was what he failed to say-in other words, the faot that, oonfronted with speoifîo questions, he refrained from saying the only thing we expeoted to hear from him. He oonsistently avoided the key question in this situation, the question that was put to the three of us by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. Does not this serious omission make it essentiel that the Counoil should issue an appeal for the independenoe and territorial integrity of Cyprus to be raspeoted?
117. 1 have tried to go over the elements of the problem one by one, and 1 have noted the oontente of the first requeet. 1 must a160 note a general oonsensus of opinion to the effeot thpt a multi-national foroe should be set up under the auspioee of the United Nations to preserve peaoe in the area and restore order and oalm on the island. that nerrotiations on the basio problems
should be resumed witï~ the assistanoe of an independent mediator. and that the Seourity Counoil should be kept informed.of the situation. -
118. There havo boen rumours-and aftRr henring tir. Denktas, we know what their source is-to the effeot that the Cypriots’ aim was to extract a résolutfon from the SeCürlty Counofl 60 that theyoould Intel olalm that the Counoll had qbrogated the treutles. That 1s not the casa. The Cyt~loeb hava shown thelr intentlons by aocepting thti principle of mediation. 1 have no
making themselves responsibleforbringingmatters to le Conseil prenne position sur les trait& en question assument la responsabiliti de mener les ohoses lune a deadlook. For our part, we still hopa for a text whioh, oovering both the requests, will allay th0 Cypriots’ impasse. Pour notre part, nous estirons toujours
fears and at the same time open the way to paoifioation obtenir un texte qui, en faisant la synthbse des deux
and negotiation. r0oours, dissipera les ordntes ouvrira en m6me temps la voie a 121. Mr. KYPRIANCU (Cyprue): 1 do not intend to make a long statement tonight. 1 have listened very 121. M. KYPRIANOU (Chypre) (trnduit de l’anglais]:
oarefully to the information given by Mr. Denktas. 1 Je n’a1 pas l’intention do parler longuement ce soir.
shall study oarefully the oontents of his statament and J’ai 0ooutB Ws attentivement les renseignements
1 shall oonsider what is the best wayto put the reoord donnI3s par M. Denktas. J’6tudierai aveo soin le
straight in view of the distortians and lies that a sooontenu de sa deolaration et je r6fl6chiral & la
oalled oitieen of the Republio had the audaoity to make meilleure faqon de faire une mise aupoint Ataat don&
bafore the Seourity Counoil. 1 may, on bhalf of the les dI3formations des faits et les mensonges qu’un
Bovernment, have to olarify various pointa myself, soi-disant oitoyen de la Republique a eu l’audaoe
Inoludlng perhaps produoe dooumenta. 1 may have to de pr6senter au Conseil de s6ourit6, J’aurai peut4tre
request you, Mr. President, to allow oitlrens of the il clarifier moi-m6me, au nom de mon gouvernement,
Republio to oome before the Counoil and givs informadivers points, voire m6me ft produire des doouments. Peut-Btre devrais-je vous demander, Monsieur le tien on the vital issues, 1 may have to request a number of oitieens of the Republio, of various ethnio origins, PrBsident, de permettre hdes oitoyens de la Hflpublique
to oome before the Counoil. d’origines ethniques diverse6 de se pr6senter devant le Conseil et de fournir des renseignements questions B 1’6tude. 122. Reserving thus my position on the %formation” 122. AprBs avoir r6serv6 de la sorte ma position whioh has been given, may 1 revert to the main issue bafors the Counoil? May 1 be permitted to quote what sur les “renseignements” qui vous ont 6t43
1 said in the oontext of my last speeoh yesterday? 1 je reviens B la question prinoipale dont le Conseil est saisi. Qu’il me soit permis de alter ce que eaid that 1 waa mentioning a11 these faots with some je disais hier dans ma d6olaration Je disais donc reluotanoe, and 1 referrsd to the oalminpdown of the situation in Cyprus and to the oomparative restoraque ofest aveo quelques h+itations que jementionnais
tien of order and normality in oertaln areas of the tous oes faits, et je parlais de l’apaisement qui s’&ait manifesti B Chypre et du retour relatif B l’ordre et
0oUntry. 1 went on t0 say: B un Btat de ohoses normal dans certaines partie8 du pays, Je poursuivais en oes termesr “1 only hope that by statingthe developmants 1 shall
not make the Turklsh aovernment unhappy to the point
that it may step up again the maohinery of provooation, through ita armed agents in Cyprus, in order to destmy the relatively calm andpromisingatmosphere whioh is at present prevailing.a 11098th meeting, para. 118.1
123. The provooation perhaps did not oome lastnight from the armed agents of Turkey in Cyprus, but it has 123. La provooation n’a peut-Btre pae 6t4 le fait la nuit dernibre des agents arm6s turos B Chypre, mais Oome again in the usual marner. Aooording tovarlous elle a lwports, whioh have not bcen denied as fnr as 1 know, “n p0werful Turklsh fleet with troops aboard salled diverses souro0s qui, pour autant que je saohe, n’ont pas Bt4 dfSmentias, along the soutli Turkish oonst less than eighty miles ayant des troupus h b0rd, n long8 le littoral sud de from Cyprus today, while the Turkish Senato henrd la Turquie h moins de 80 milles de Chypre pondant c on11 for intervention to snfeguard the penoe on this troubled Mediterranean island”, The message ~00s qu’on demandait au S6nat turo d’intervenir pour sauvegarder la paix dans cette fie troubl&c de la M1 to sny tint “the mnnwuvrea were similar to those M6dîtarran6ett. Le message ajoutait que “10s ma- Of two weeks ag0, whioh raisod fears of an imminent nœuvros 6taient analoguas l’urkish invasion of this stratoglo islnndn. The rep0rt effeotubes deux semainec auparavant et qui avalent Ws on: “In the Turltish Senate, Senator Dnkri ICnpnlnn fait oraindro un0 invasion turque imminente aald lthe MaknrîoEl ~rlmlnIstration 1s oompletely illegnl Ile strat&ique*. On nous apprend aad the Cluarantor Powera should not IntarvenOt.W S0nat turo le abnateur Dakrl Kapalan a d6olnrb que
126. Muoh has been said today about the situation in Cyprus; muoh has been said a11 along during the deliberations in the Counoil. It has perhaps oorreot for the Cour1011 to learn about the situation in Cypru& to hoar tha faots-but the oorreot faots. We have tried through our various statements to put the reoord straight when it was distorted. We shall go on doing the samo. But while wo go on doingthat, it seems that some people have forgotten the reason that the Cypr~e Government has oome before the Seourity Counoil.
126. We have oome here beoause m oountry is threatened by aggrossion from outside, K rom Turkey. We have oome here beoause we believo not only that the Counoil should proteot Cyprus from aggression from outside, beoause it is its duty to do that, but aleo, unle you do chat, you oannot have petroe in Cyprus. You oannot have peaoe in Cypruswhilepeople are shouting and oalling upon Turkey to intervene. You oannot have peaoe in Cyprus while Turkey is asking people to start oalling dpon Turkey to start an aggression,
127. 1 am oonfident that, if the Seourity Counoil deoides to proteot the territorial lntegrity and tho independenoe of Cyprus, peaoe will be restored in the island. As we have said on various oooasions, in order to allay oertain foars-whioh wo believe have nobasis --wo do not objeot in prinoiple to having an international force under the United Nations. Some peuple bave tried to say that we have attempted by trioks t0 avoid having any foroe. We tee1 that, if Cyprus is proteotsd, a foroe is not nooeseary-but nevertheless WQ ars prepared to have it. Howover, having a foroe is not the goal, Having a foroe is one of the means toward the restoration of normal conditions and order. You oannot have a force there tu restore normal interna1 oondltlons for a neriod of three months-and yst have Turkey feel that it has the right to intorvéne whenever it likee. You will not thereby be serving any purpose,
128. In regard to the ldea advanoed that, having a foroe there for three monthe and having obtained the resolution we wanted, WQ might, after the foroo withdraws, onrry on with this alleged ides of mussaoring the Turks, 1’ may say that the Unitod Nations is Weloome to hnve observera in C~~rus to watoh the situation even nftar the three months.
128. I ehould like to oonolude by stating tho followfng: My Qovcrnment is doing its best to stop bloodsbed in Cyprue and to restore normal oondltions. But 110~ oan normal oonditions ba restored as long aa the oountry
1 want to say just a few Word8 at thie late hour. If what we bave heard is what is separating us, 1 think we should be able to find a way out of ths diffioulty. 1 have explained here, again and-ngain, that Turkei oertainly ‘has no territorial olaim on Cyprus, The ohildren who are brought to life by Turtiah mothers every year are twioe the population of. Cyprus-and our land is bfg and 1s large enough for ua. Wearoone of the founders of thie Republio. We want to sec it Prosper-and up ta now, 1 think, we have proved it. That is why we have oome here, to try to sec whether we oan get an inter national foroe. Does a oountm that has anv bad idens about a neighbour wish to haie an international for& there? But, as everybody knows, 1 have besndoing my best from the very beginning, under instruotionsfrom my Qovernment, to obtain suoh a foroe.
pour obtenir 139. Nous avons Bvoqu6 bien souvent les trait& que l’autre partie oonsid&re oomme allant A llenoontre de ses intAr&s. En r&allt& oes trait& oontiennent les garanties marnes qui ont I3t.0 demandbes par M. Kyprfanou, Que d!t en sffst l’artiole Il? Il eut ainsi libell6: 138. Mon gouvernement a sign6 os trait& nousavons donti nott’e parole et nous y sommes fidAlesr osla, je le dbolare solennellement devant le Conseil. 134. C’est pourquoi, si 08 d6bat s’est prolong A la suite d’un malentendu, je orois que le moment est venu de une foros internationale pour maintenir la paix in& rieure et de volloment de 00s traglquea 0v6nemonte. 136. Ln Turcluie n’a jamais dit qu’elle s’est jug8c libre d’envahir File ou d’intervenir semblerait, Il faudrait evlter, portent sur de graves questions, de oitor qui n’ont 6t6 tenus en fait par personne et en tout oas pas par moi, Quoi qu’il 8n soit, je vlens de oitor un nrtiole d’un trnit43 aux termes duquol nou8 nous
121. We have SO often talked about the Treaties, whioh the other side oonsiders ae being ag-inst them. In reality, those Treaties oontain the very guarantees whioh Mr. Kyprianou hae just aeked for, What does Artiole II say? It says:
Vreeoe, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republio of Cyprus set out in Article 1 of the present Treaty, reoogniee and guarantee the independenoe, territorial integrity and seourity of the Republio of Cyprus, , , .“a
133, My Qovernment has signed this Treaty. We have given our Word, and we stand by it-and 1 say it now solemnly before this Counoil. 134. Thsrefore, if this is a misunderstanding that has prolonged this debate, 1 think the time hae now oome to rsaoh a praotioal solution-t0 have an internntional foras in order to keep interna1 peaoe, inorder t0 stop any possibilities of the reourrenoe of nny trngio eventa.
13G. ‘I’urkey hne nevor snid that itfeols free to invnde or intervene whenever it sees fit. We should not talk in this serions debate nbout things whiohhave net been said by either side-nnd those partioular thiny should not be attributod to me. In any oase, I wiah to ropoat that 1 bave just rend an artiole of n trenty by whioh we bave pledged to guarantee exaotly what hne been nsked for. Ancl 1 wish to sny thnt tny delugation,
sommes engag& n Bt8 damand6. J’affirme quo mn d616gation. aglssant
wOl’kitlg ullder inotruotiona from the Turklsh aovarn-
Whnt 1 said ie on r0oord, and 1 think thot we oannot dieouss texts at this distanoe. 1 have rend A text very olearly, and it is on the reaord, and 1 aaaept responeibility for whatever 1 have said.
138, Mr. BITSIOS (Qreeoe)! 1 have thefeolingthatthe Preaident’s tusk is being made casier and casier, In view of tho deolaration by theruproeontative of Turkey, reading the relevant Artiole 2 of the Treaty of aunrantee-that Turkey, among other States, has undertaken tc guarantea the independenoe and territorial integrity of Cyprus-1 do not sec why anybody would objeot to a resolution oalling upcn a11 Stutes to raepoot that same independenoe and territorial integrity, Cenainly, the parties that have the apeoial reepcnsibilityof proteoting that independenoe and territorial integrity willnot objeot to having others reepeot it.
At suooessive meetings of the Seourity Counoil, we have heard a legltimate question being asked by the delegation of th0 Government of Cyprus and in partioular by the Mini&er for Foreign Affaira, Mr. Kyprianou, by the repreeentative of ar0eoe, and, finally, by the Soviet delegation. 140. Can we, the members of the Seourity Counoil, at last obtain here a direot and olear an6wer from the repreaentative of Turkey? Can we have an answer tc the‘question of whether <Le Turkioh Covernment ie prepared, in nooordanoe with the Charter of our Organisation, to deolare that it undertakee to respeot the eovereignty, independenoe andterritcrial integrity of Cyprus?
1 believe that 1 have answered that question before. However, 1 shall do my best-very briefly, beoawe it L late-to answer it again.
142. 1 think it has been explained thnt, after very bitter disouasione In an affort tn soc what would bo tbe bast solution for bringlng about a happy settlemont of the Cypriot question. the two oommunitian on th0 island ,nlld their two mother oountrios, Groeoe and l’urkey, AQ woll as the LJnUed Klngdom, hadall agreed on a oertnln solution-a solution whloh hae oertain agruements. Thoso agreomonts nro tied to the Cha&r in A mannor known to the members of W3 Counoil. Thoue Are tho oiroumstanoee underwhioh a oontraotuul agroemont ha8 takon plaoo by whioh thie nuw Republio wna given the ohanoe to Prosper and to build itself in
A bi-oommunal Stato, mnd lt ia by thie oettlemont that
144. As I said before, %mkey is a signatory and Turkey aooepts its rosponsibilities and oommitments under that Treaty. Of oourse, this is a very serious matter; whatever 1 bave said is on reoord ond is to be taken as a whole. 1 do not think we shnll advanoe our work if someone tries to take just one sentenoe of whrrt 1 hnve said out of oontext and to put it in a new way or use taotios of this sort, beoause, ns 1 say, the situation is a serious one. Anyone who wants to sec the reoord oan read what 1 hove snid and take It as a whole, nnd 1 stand by thnt.
Imust apologize for having to olnrify the nature of my question. It seems to us that we put the question suffloiently olearly and we are now waiting for an answer from the representative of Turkey. 146. What is involved is the Charter of our Organization and we want to sec the attitude of Turkey olarified towards the nrovlsions of the Charter. the attitude of Turkey as a’ Member of our Orga&atlon towards another Member of our Organieation-the Hepublio of CYPrue. 147, Our question did not even allude to tlle so-oalled Treaty of 19130. It is quits inoomprehonslble why the mpreaentative of Turkey oontinually harks baok to some private treaty. 140. We wîsh to know, not the views of the represenktive of Turkey about the treaty to whioh he la oonstnntly refsrring, but the position of Turkey in regard ta the Charter of the United Nations, The representative of Turkey says that the Seourity Counoil is not the place in which to disouss the question of the so- Oalled Treaty of 1960. Ilowever, we are net asking him nbout thie, We arefullyawnreof Turkey’s attitude towards this Trenty, Wo are waitlng for a reply to a very olenr and, it would seem, simple question. As 1s h~own, the Counoil hns alroady roceived n reply to 911s question from the Government of Greoce.
147. Notre allusion au Trait6 de 1960. Nous ne oomprenons pas du tout pourquoi le repr6sentant r8fAre sans oesse A un aooord partioulier. 148. Nous voulons oonnaftre les vues de la Turquie non pae sur oe trait& qu’il ne oesae d’invoouer. maie sur la Charte de ltOKU; Le repr8sentant de ia Turquie dit que le Conseil de s8ourit8 n’est pas le lieu oQ doit &re nous ne lui posons pas de question A oe sujet. Nous oonnsissons bien lluttitude de la Turquie A l%gard de oe traIt& question qui noua parnft olnire et simple. Comme
on oette question.
149. Nous sommes repr4senttuit de la Greoe a prbois6 dans les termes les l’attitude de son gouvernement A l%gard des dlspo-
140. We are glnd to note bat, at the laet meeting Of the Councll, tho roprosentativo of Greace spoke most a1*tioulntoly about the attitude of the Greek Governmont tewards the Chnrter of the United Nations as it relates
162. Shall we at last hear this, or must we oonvene the Security Council again and again in order to obtain a statement on a question whioh, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus rightly says, is important or cxtremely important?
The representative of Turkey spoke of the way in which the mothers and the stepmother had brought about the Agreements in 1960. But sinoe thsn a new State has emerged, the Republia of Cyprus, whioh is a full Memberof the United Nations. It is as suoh that my oountry is represented here.
164. 1 notioe a remark whioh the representative of Turkey made earlier. If 1 heard himoorreotly, he said that, in his view and in his Government’a view, the Treaties w8re in aooordance with the United Nations Ch&er. If it is his Government’s view thatthe Treaties are in aooordanoe with the United Nations Charter, why should there be any objeotion to a resolution stating that the territorial integrity and independenoe of Cyprus should be respected, in aocordanoe with Artiole 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter?
If you will forgive me, the Soviet delegation feels it necessary to note that no reply has been given by the Turkish representative to the question raised by our delegation or to the question raised by the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Cyprus and-1 venture to reoall-by the representative of Greeoe, 166. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey): The reoofrr?s of the deourity Councfl will show that 1 have already answered this question twioe.
There are no other names on the list of speakers. 1 have oonsulted members of the Counoil about the date of our next meeting, and J should like to suggest, in the light of those oonsultations, that the Co*unoil should continue its consideration of this question on Monday, 2 Maroh, at 3 p.m.
If was SO decided.
The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.
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UN Project. “S/PV.1099.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-1099/. Accessed .