S/PV.1136 Security Council

1 have received communications from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus [S/5771],1/ from the representative of Turkey [S/5772]1/ and from the representative of Greece [S/5775],1/ requestingpermission to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the item before the Council. In accordance with the practice of the Council, and if I hear no objection, 1 Will invite the representatives of these three countries to take places at the Council table. 1. Le PRESIDENT: &nanant étranggres de la Turquie Gréce participer, la question la pratique pas d’objection, sentants du Conseil. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Spyros A. KyPrianou (Cyprus), Mr. Orhan Eralp (Turkey), and Mr. Dimitri S. B&ios (Greece) took places at the cofmcil table. Sur l’invitation (Chypre), S. Bit&os 2. Le PRESIDENT: ma liste avant de lui donner la parole, sentant de l’Union soviétique 21 The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The first speaker on my list is the representative of Turkey, but before calling on him i shall give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, who Whes to raise a point of order. 3. M. FEDORENKO listes 31 Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 1iCS) (translated from Russian): We have just approved I/ Documents Supplément u Officia1 Records of rhe Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for APeI, May and June 1564. 4. In this connexion the question arises: by what logic and on the basis of what procedure are we to hear first, not the representative of Cyprus, who is here in the person of Mr. Kyprianou, the Minister for Foreiga Affairs, III~ the representative of Turkey? 5. According to our information, the headof the delegation of Cyprus approached the Security Council with a request that he should be allowed to speak on the substance of the question uncler discussion-the questiol& which is on the Security Council’s agenda, It therefore seems to us that the representative of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, that country’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, should be called upon to speak first on the substance of the question under discussion. 6. I feel it is hardly necessary to expatiate on the fact that it is precisely the representative of Cyprus who has every right ta speak in the Security Council and to explain the position of his Government, if we consider the nature of the question. There is even less need to mention the purely ethical principlewhich is respected in our Organization, including the Security Council-that because of the prestige and precedence which representatives of higher rank generally enjoy, those representatives are called upon to speak first. 7. In connexion with what 1 have said, Mr. President, 1 should like to know what information you have on this matter and what your opinion is.

1 should like to draw the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union to the fact that the samepoint was raised at the 1095th meeting of the Security Council and then, as now, there was only one rule on which the President could base bis decision, namely rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure, which states: “The President shall cal1 upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. II 9! It happens that the representative of Turkey was the first to ask to speak, and that is why the Chair thought it should cal1 upon him first. However, if the representative of the Soviet Union has a forma1 proposa.1 to make, 1 shall have to ask the Council to settle the matter.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind explanation and for your reference to rule 2’7. This rule, which states that “The President shall cal1 upon representatives in the order in which they signify their clesire to speak”, 2 Ibid., Eighteenth Y~~upplernenr for October, November and December 1963. 3 Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964. 12. If the representatives whosenames appear onyour list put their names down alter the Council’s approval of the agenda, then we would ask you, Mr. President, to take into account the views expressed by the Soviet delegation regarding both the nature of the question on the agenda and the ethical aspects of the elementary rules which apply to diplomats. 12. Si les représentants dont le nom figure sur Votre liste se sont fait inscrire aprbs l’adoption de l’ordre du jour, nous vous demanderons de tenir compte des considérations que la délégation soviétique a exposées, tant sur le fond de la question inscrite a l’ordre du jour que sur les règles 816mentaires d’éthique qui s’appliquent entre diplomates, 13. If however, the list was drawn up before the meeting of the Security Council, then 1 would ask: how cari one put one’s name on the list before the agenda has been adopted by the Security Council, when it is not known who, or whether infact anyone, Will be invited to take a place at the Council table? 13. Mais si la liste a Bté &ablie avant la séance du Conseil de sécurité, qu’il me soit permis de poser une question: comment est-il possible de s’inscrire à l’avance, avant que le Conseil n’ait adopté son ordre du jour, et alors qu’on ignore qui sera invité et qu’on ne sait meme pas si le Conseil invitera quelqu’un a prendre place B sa table? 14. It is a logical procedure to reserve tickets in advance for the theatre or a football match; but how cari one be guided by an advance list of speakers in the Security Council when it is not yet known who Will be admitted to the Council table at the meeting? 14. Il est logique de louer sa place au théâtre ou pour un match de football. Mais comment peut-on établir par avance une liste d’orateurs au Conseil de sécurité, sans savoir qui sera invit au débat?

The Chair believes that it is extremely difficult to determine the precise moment when the speakers should put their names on the list. There is a current Security Council practice which allows speakers sometimes to list their names before the agenda is adopted; in the present case, that is how thelist was drawn up. As no new list of names was put clown at the time the actual decision to adopt the agenda was taken, the Chair henceforth, cannot but consider that the order in which the speakers had placed their names on the list Will continue to be valid. 15. Le PRESIDENT: Le PrBsident pense qu’il est extremement difficile de déterminer le moment pré- cis auquel les orateurs doivent s’inscrire sur laliste. Une pratique courante du Conseil de sécurité permet aux orateurs de s ‘inscrire quelquefois avant 1 ‘adoption de l’ordre du jour; dans le cas précis qui nous inté- resse en ce moment, une liste a et6 ainsi dresshe. Au moment oh la décision d’adopter l’ordre du jour a été effectivement prise, aucune nouvelle liste n’étant dhposée, la présidence ne peut faire autrement que de considérer qu’a partir de ce moment la validité de l’ordre dans lequel les orateurs ont étb inscrits demeure, 16. Quant au probl&me soulev8 en ce qui concerne la qualité de représentants, telle qu’elle est conçue clans l’article 27 du rbglement intérieur provisoire, j’attire l’attention du représentant de l’Union sovi& tique sur l’article 14 de ce réglement qui donne la qualité de représentants aux délégu8s des gouvernements qui sont invités & siéger B la table du Conseil. A défaut d’une autre qualification plus expresse, la présidence ne peut pas penser que le terme de 9eprésentants )I au sens de l’article pas également aux représentants des pays membres du Conseil de &curité Etats invit& répète quIa 1’Bgard du débat qui vient de surgir elle n’a pas d’autre moyen de trancher que de se référer soire et que, parmi ces articles, c’est l’article qui permet de trancher la question. 16. As to the question which has been raised concerning the term 9epresentativesl’, as used in rule 27 of the proVisiona rules of procedure, 1 should like to draw the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union to rule 14, which designates as representatlves Persons appointed by Governments invited to takepart in meetings of the Security Counoil. In the absence of some other, express designation, the Chair cannot but assume that the term “representatives”, as used in rule 27, applies both to representatives of countries which are members of the Security Council and to representatives of States which have been invited to Participate in the meeting, The Chair repeats that it bas no recourse in settling the point under discussion other than reference to the provisions1 rules of pracedure, and of those rules it is rule 27 that is aPDlicable. 17. Le Président a agi ainsi tout en reconnaissant au Conseil le droit de prendre une décision modifiant la décision de la présidence, Si le Conseil l’estime necessaire et fait usage d’une certaine latitude qui lui permet de ne pas appliquer l’article 17. The Chair lias acted in this way whilerecognizing fhe right of the Council to change the Chair% de- CiSiOn if the Council considers it necessary to do SO and wishes to exercise its privilege in not applying rule 27. The Chair, however, does not have the powers

1 believe 1 must draw the attention of the representative of Czechoslovakia to the fact that the decision 1 asked the Council to take was expressed in the following terms : IfIn accordance with the psactice of the Coancil, and if 1 hear no objection, 1 Will invite the representatives of these three countries to take places at the Council table.” Hearing no objection, the Council decicled to invite the three countries simultaneously. 1 then called on ench of the countsies in alphabetical order to take a place at the Council table; but as there is no rule in the provisional rules of procedure which provides that speakers shall take the floor in alphabetical order, 1 felt 1 had to apply rule 27. 20. 1 think the representative of the Soviet U;lion, who raised this question, asked for my opinion; 1 gave it by saying that 1 could not do anything else, that 1 had no power to do anything else, but apply the provisions of rule 27. 1 think that if the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia accept my opinion, they must allow that opinion to constitute a ruling of the Chair and permit me to cal1 on the first speaker on the list, who is the representative of Turkey, unless, as 1 said, they propose to the Council that it change the ruling.

Mr. President, I should like to thank you once again for clarifying your position and for explaining the reasons on which YOU based your intentions with regard to giving the floor to speakers in the Security Council. However, the Security Council was convened-and I refer again to the agenda-in connexion with the letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the Presiclent of the Security CoWcil, and also in connexion with the report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus. 22. It is perfectly clear from the Security Council’s agenda that we are considering this question in con- 23, In actual fact, he is the only one who should be called upon to speak for the present: thereis no other question on the agenda, and consequently it does not seem that anyone cari a priori claim the floor. If it is a question of subsequent speakers, then we cari understand the logic underlying rule 27, but this should be applied only after we have heard the chief representative of the country which is the subject of the question on the agenda. 23. En fait, pour le moment, c’est à lui seul qu’on doit donner la parole: l’ordre du jour ne mentionne aucune autre question et rien nlindique B priori qu’il doive y avoir d’autres orateurs, debat, il peut être logique d’appliquer l’article du rbglement intérieur provisoire, une fois qu’on aura entendu le représentant principal du pays dont il s’agit dans l’ordre du jour, 24, Strictly speaking, the question should not even arise as to whom should be given the floor. It stands to reason that the floor should be given to the authorized representative of the Republic of Cyprus, and he is present here. As to who wishes to speak later on this question, that is another matter. In that case we should apply the relevant rules of procedure of the Council. But how cari we apply these forma1 rules of procedure before we have heard the chief speaker on this question? That is against a11 logic. 24. A strictement parler, la question de savoir B qui donner la parole ne devrait meme pas se poser, Il va de soi que la parole doit être accordée au repré- sentant plénipotentiaire de la République de Chypre, qui est ici présent. Quant B savoir qui jugera nécessaire d’intervenir A ce moment-l&, nous appliquerons les dispositions pertinentes du rbglement intérieur provisoire, Mais comment pourrions-nous appliquer ces régies formelles de procbdure avant d’avoir entendu l’orateur principal? Ce serait contraire à toute logique, 25. You mention precedents and forma1 considerations. But if we are to be rulecl by these, the representative of Cyprus shoulcl have appliecl three months ago, in order not to be caught unawares. If we take this point of view, Mr. President, 1 would draw your attention to the fact that such an application was made on 26 December 1963 [S/5488]. Why has this application not been effective? And why are you bouncl by other applications for the floor? 25. Vous invoquez des précbdents ou des considkrations de forme, Mais, s’il fallait partir de la, le représentant de Chypre aurait dQ pr@.enter sa demande - disons - trois mois B l’avance afin d’éviter tout imprévu. Si l’on adopte ce point de vue, je me permettrai alors de faire observer qu’une telle demande a été présentée dés le 26 décembre 1963 [S/5488], Pourquoi donc cette demande ne serait-elle tenir compte d’autres demandes ou inscriptions? 26. Monsieur le PrBsident, que le Ministre des affaires étrangbres de la R&~Ublique de Chypre compte bien être entendu lepremier par le Conseil de sécurité. d%claircir ce point ou de confirmer que nous interprétons correctement les intentions de la délégation de Chypre? Je ne voudrais pas repéter les choses les plus élementaires concernant l’aspect moral et éthique de la chose, Peut-il y avoir un doute, sur le plan considérons le rang élevé de ministre des affaires &trangéres qui, par lui-mhme, devrait nous engager, en tant que collègues et diplomates, à faire preuve de la plus Blémentaire courtoisie? 26. Mr. President, we understand that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus in fact expected that the Security Council would hear him first. Therefore 1 would ask you to explain this, or to confirm that we have correctly interpreted the expectations of the delegation of Cyprus. 1 do not want to reiterate the most elementary considerations concerning the moral and ethical aspects of this matter. Can we raise the question as a tactical one, or put it in the context of elementary diplomatie tact, considering the high position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a position which in itselî makes it incumbent on us as colleagues and fellow-cliplomats to show common courtesy and diplomatie consicleration? 27. En somme, le devoir du Conseil de sécurité et du Secrétariat était de veiller les motifs que je viens d’exposer, h ce que la parole soit donnée en premier lieu au Ministre des affaires étrangéres de Chypre, s’il y avait le moindre doute B cet égard. 27. Fiually, if the position was not entirely clear, it was the duty of the Security Council and the Secretariat to ensure in advance that, on the basis of these circumstances, the Minister for Foreign Affairs ofcyprus should be invited to speak Pirst. 28. Therefore, Mr. President, 1 ask you to give due attention to these considerations. 28. C’est pourquoi, Monsieur le Président, je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir tenir compte de ces considérations. 29. Le PRESIDENT: Je voudrais rectifier: dans lequel j’ai invité les reprgsentants & prendre place & la table du Conseil est l’ordre leurs demandes ont été reçues, Cet ordre n’influence 29, The PRESIDENT (translated from French): 1 should like to make a correction: the order in which I invited the representatives to take seats at the Security Council table is the order in which their 31. The remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union are relevant and logical, but 1 repeat that the Chair cari rely only on the rules of procedure and the usual practice of the Secuxity Council, which always confoxms to the rules of procedure. Consequently, no matter how logical the situation may appear to be, the Chair is not empowered to depart from the rules of procedure. It therefore intends to apply those rules and to cal1 on speakers in the order in which they put down their names, the first speaker thus being the xepresentative of Turkey. 32. In these circumstances, 1 ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether he has a forma1 proposa1 to make for submission to the Council.

Mr. President, we have listened carefully to your explanation. We paid particular attention to that part of it in which you mentioned the desire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, on fully legitimate grounds, to speak first on the question whioh is the subject of the Security Council’s agenda, 34. We therefore venture to note that, despite the logic and valiclity of the arguments put forward here, especially by the Soviet delegation, what is taken into account is not logic and common sense buut lifeless formality, and that, in the present case, the Security Counoil is not following the principles of morality and elementary ethics-although these principles should be upheld particularly in this body of high standing, as a mode1 of the relations which should exist among colleagues, especially in regard to high-ranking representatives from Governments of Member States.

The Chair believes that the provisional rules ofprocedure are entirely logical. Therefore, in the absence of a forma1 proposa1 and in accordance with rule 27,I cal1 on the representative of Turkey.

Thank you, Mr. Presiclent, for your judicial and fair ruling. Not being a member of the Council, I cari have nothing to say about your rules of procedure, but 1 find that your ruling was extremely logical as well as just, 37. 1 should like to mention only one pointwith which 1 cannot agree. It was the point brought up by the representative of the Soviet Union as to comity, or ethics, or order of priority, or the seniority of members of this Council. If it were a football matchor a theatrical performance, 1 would certainly, out of deference to rank, yield my place to a Foreign Minister; but 1 believe i?hat before this Council we are reprene;ltativcs of our countries and we have no right to yield. 38. First of all, Mr. President, 1 should like to express my thanks to you and to the members of the 40. But before doing that, 1 consider it a duty to give thanks where thanks are due. 1 must express our gratitude to the Secretary-General and to his close collaborators both here and iri Cyprus for their unceasing endeavours to implement the resolutions of the Security Council in good faith and with a determination to make the best of a difficult situation. I must also mention with gratefulness the name of the distinguished Finnish diplomat, the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus, Ambassador Sakari S. Tuomioja, who has undertaken a very delicate and difficult job in order to serve the interests of peace. My Government has full confidence in him ancl willcontinue to do a11 in its power to render his task less difficult. 41. Thanks are also due to the Governments of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, whioh have undertaken considerable sacrifices in contributing troops to UNFICYP in order to put an end to the slaughter of innocents in Cyprus. My Government is also grateful to the Government of Austria for having sent a hospital unit, and to the Governments of Australia, Austria, New Zealand and Sweden for their contributions to the United Nations peaoe force in Cyprus. Not only my Government, but a11 place-loving peoples in the world, owe a debt of gratitude to these public-spirited countries for heeding the cal1 of the United Nations, at considerable material expense to themselves and risk ta their sons, in order to maintain law and order on the tsoubled island. 42. After the .two previous meetings of the Council in March on the question of Cyprus, we had pinned our hopes on the United Nations. We had hoped that with a scruptilous observance of the resolutions of the Council by the Greek Cypriot leaders and through the efforts of the United Nations Force and organs in the island, gradually the hatreds would be dispelled and a spirit of conciliation would prevail which could create a suitable milieu for achieving a peaceful and reasonable settlemerit. This naturally presupposed a certain amount of goodwill on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership. Our hopes in that respect have been dashed. It is a tragic fact that, although more than three months have elapsed since the adoption of thefirst resolution, no such milieu has even begun to appear in the island. On the contrary, the situation has gone from bad to worse on account of the complete disregard of the resolution by the Greek Cypriot authorities and their behaviour which was oonsistently and utterly inoompatible with good faith. 43. Many instances cari be cited on this refusa1 to respect the recommendations of the Council and the lack of good faith on the part of the Greek Cypriot “Mr. Tuomioja said at a news conference that he regarded both the Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee as valid now, but that both could be changed with the consent of the four States concerned. II This declaration of the Mediator is entirely consistent with the United Nations Charter, with t.he resolutions of 4 and 13 March 1964 [S/5575 and S/5603J, and with the principles of international law, and reflects the opinion of an impartial Mediator. 44. If 1 may remind the Council of the terms of the resolution of 4 March, it stipulates that the Mediator “shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement “-1 repeat, “a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement tt-“of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the wellbcing of the people of Cyprus as a whole and preservation of international peace and security”. 45. In the face of these explicit terms in the Council resolution, the Archhishop, by an unlawful act, has attempted to set aside unilaterally a valid international engagement, thereby also attempting to leave not only the Mecliator but also the Security Council before a fait accompli. It is no more and no less than an attempt to influence the Mediator, to prejudice an agreed settlement, ancl to give the Mediator the impression that his views Will not carry weight in Cyprus unless they happen to coincide with the views of the Archbishop. 1 have termed this attempt as unlawful because it is not only contrary to the basic international law principles of pacta sunt servanda, but it is also in direct violation of the Constitution of the Republic. Article 181 of the Constitution of Cyprus, which constitutes one of its basic articles, says: “The Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and Constitution of the Republic concluded between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and theUnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 4/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplemefor January, February and March 1964. The picture is clear. It shows that the Archbishop does not feel the slightest compunction in overriding or violating the Constitution when it suits his purposes. Le tableau n’a aucune espi%e d’h&itation la Constitution 46. In resorting to this unlawful attempt at the unilateral denunciation of a treaty, the Archbishop relied on the excuse that the Turkish contingent in CyI)rus, which is stationed there as provided under the Treaty, refused to return to its barracks. 46. traité comme Chypre ses cantonnements, 47. In fact, when the action of Greek Cypriot terrorists rendered the situation in the island fraught with danger for a11 Turks, the Turkish,contingent considered it extremely dangerous for its own security to remain in its barracks which were situated in an area controlled by the Greek Cypriot terrorists, and was forced to move on to a new garrison in a more secure sector of the Nicosia area. Archbishop Makarios and his Government have tried to interpret this move as a violation of the Treaty of Alliance, Such an interpretation is entirely untenable. The position which Will be occupied by the Turkish and Greek contingents in C@rus under the Treaty of Alliance is determined by the so-called Application Agreement which was signed in Nicosia in August 1960. Nowhere in this Agreement is it stated that the Turkish and Greek contingents Will forever remain in their original barracks, Article 15 of the Application Agreement gives the right to the Turkish contingent to be garrisoned anywhere in the Nicosia area as near the Greek contingent aspossible withfn a radius of five miles, 47. tes pour dangereux ses cantonnements les terroristes de changer secteur Makarios ce mouvement liante. fendable. grec doivent d’alliance l’Accord ao& que les nellement L’article contingent oh dans la region de Nicosia, du contingent 48. The present garrison of the Turkish contingent complies with this requirement. The Turkish contingent is a highly disciplined unit which, even while it witnessed the tragic events of last Christmas, has never attempted to intervene and has never fired a single shot. The fact that such a unit has moved to a safer position is worthy of praise and not of criticism, inasmuch as it has probably avoided grave provocations to which it might have been subjected had it remained where it was. A change of garrisoncould by no means be used as a pretext to denounce the Treaty of Alliance, Had Archbishop Makarios been constitutionally empowered to make such a move, which he was not, he would, under the recognized principles of international law, have had to cal1 upon the signatories t0 negotiate for the abrogation of the Treaty. 48, cette disposition. plus aux Bv&nements tenté de feu. une position des critiques, graves soumise ment de prétexte Si la Constitution a agir comme principes auraient négocier 49, montre clairement rer Pacifique ment et par la force S’il n’en avait pas été ainsi, tenues ficile encore. 49, This move of the Greek Cypriot authorities is a clear indication of their reluctance to co-operate for an agreed settlement and a peaceful solution and of their determination ta effect brusque and forcible changes in the status quo. Had it been otherwise, they would have refrained from rendering the taskof the Mediator even more difficult. 50. Quant au contingent grec, le rapport du Secré- taire général [S/5764] indique brïevement, au Paragraphe 115: grecque demeure dans ses banlieue de Nicosia.” Si le personnel de l’organisation des Nations Unies b Chypre y avait regardé d’un Peu plus près, il aurait vu que lasituation était différente: 50. As for the Greek Army contingent, the Report of the Secretary-General [S/5764], in paragraph 115, briefly states that: “The Greek Army national contingent remains in its barracks on the outskirts of Nicosia”. If the United Nations staff in Cyprus had looked a little more carefully, they would have seen that the situation is different: The Greek regiment in 51. After the adoption of the Council resolution 4 March 1964 in which the Greek Cypriot leadership was asked as “the Government of Cyprus “, to take a11 additional measures to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus, we had a11 hoped that they would, out of a sense of responsibility toward the United Nations and to international public opinion, make a genuine effort to curb violence, The outcome has been just the opposite, Violence and bloodshed have continued to be perpetrated in a systematic and cynical manner, often by the very elements which were supposedto maintain law and order. 52. May 1 briefly mention some of the acts of merder, destruction, abduction, etc. which have been committed since the resolution of 4 March: On 5 March, a bomb exploded in the building of the Turkish Communal Chamber. As a result five Turkish Cypriots were injured. On 7 March, Greek Cypriots launched amass attack against the Turkish quaxter of Paphos. Fifteen Turkish Cypriots were killed, twenty-two were wounded and thirty-four were taken as hostages. On 13 March, Turkish Cypriot houses and shops in the village of Gozuguzel (Asamatos), Trakhoni and Kiedes, in the region of Limassol, were plundered by Greek Cypriots. On the same day Yenicami mosque inPaphos was set on fire. On 14 March, the Turkish Cypriot village of Teknecik, in the region of Kyrenia, was burned down. On 15 March, Turkish Cypriot shops in Paphos, after being plundered, were set on fire. On 19 March, Greek Cypriots attacked Kazaphani village with heavy armaments, demolished Turkish Cypriot houses of Panokoutrafas with bulldozers, Duringthese attacks, six Turkish Cypriots were killed and many were wounded. 1 have a long listbefore me: 21 March, 22 March, 1 Apxil, 6 April. 53. After G April, the list of similar murders outrages committed between that date and today contains some sixty similar items which 1 shall not enumerate. They corne right down to the abduction of a British majox in the United Nations Force and his driver on 7 June. 55. In connexion with the attacks of Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cy-priots inKtima, The Washington Post of 10 March 1964 said: 55. Relatant les attaques des Chypriotes les du 10 mars 1964 s’exprimait “Al1 British appeals for a cesse-fire have been rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The Greeks also have refused to allow any British troops to enter the town, a suburb of Paphos. The ban extended to Major General R. M. P. Carver, Commander of the 7,000 men British peace-keeping force, who flew there this afternoon and had to remain at British headquarters outside the town -. . . “Smoke rising from nine separate fires could be seen thirty miles away. From a helicopter circling overhead, it was possible to see men firing in the streets. “The Turkish position must be desperate and the Greeks have refused to allow evacuation of women and children. The British also were warned that British soldiers would be shot if they attempted to get in the way of operations. A helicopter managed ta land during a lu11 in the fighting to leave medical supplies for the Turks. Reported casualties were feared to be very high.” As it Will be seen from the report 1 have just quoted, Cireek Cypriots not only fired upon women and children, as they have done on other occasions, but they also refused to allow the evacuation of women and children from the scene of fighting. 1 submit this fact to the attention of the Council, as it clearly shows the attitude of Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriot population. Ainsi citer, sur des femmes et des enfants, comme ils,l’ont en d’autres de laisser lieu des combats. Conseil, grecs envers la population chypriote 56. The New York Times of 18 March 1964, describing the burning of the Turkish Cypriot houses in the village of Trapeza, said: 56. Le New York l’incendie de Trapeza: “A wisp of smoke curls from the charred end of a roof beam. The village pump still drips water and bees hover over a spilled bottle of syrup. Otherwise nothing moves; Trapeza is a ghost town . . 0 e “Last Thursday, for reasons of hatred too deepfor an outsider to appreciate, the deserted village of Trapeza was burned. Halil Salih, the 60-year-old mukhtar or appointed leader of Trapeza, lay ailing and feverish on a make shift bed in Kazaphani and asked about his village. He sighed when he heard that furniture, straw mats, clothing and such had been piled together in each house to make a bonfire. He wae pleased to hear that the schoolhouse had not burned, nor the mosque that is attached to one side of it. Both were wrecked. Window frames wese torn out, roof tiles knocked off and in the debris were prayer rugs, finger paintings and half-filled composition books. The ceilings were too high for flames to reach.” 57. The same correspondent in the 20 March 1964 issue of The New York Times reported the Greek Cypriot attack against the Turkish village of Ghaziveran as follows: Wy nightfall at least three Turkish Cypriots were dead and four were wounded. Five Greek Cypriot attackers were wounded and one died in the hospital. I’The siege of Ghaziveran, on Morphou Bay, has bgen uneven. Two cesse-fires during the day broke clown. British troops intervened but with the approach of darkness, they were pulled out of the village, As they left, rifle and machine-gu.n fire was exchanged again. About 200 women and children and a few old men huddled in a small schoolhouse in the tenter of the village. l!Bullets tore through the leaves in orange groves around the village, chipped the stucco walls of the school or lodged in the walls of other buildings.” Greek Cypriot attackers did not hesitate to fire upon the schoolhouse whese women, children and old persons took refilge. 58. Now 1 would like to mention some of the tragic inciclents which took place in Cyprus after the United Nations Peace-keeping Force becanze operative on 2’7 March 1964. Al1 these incidents were reported in the bulletins of the Information Service of the Force. 59. On 1 April 1964, in the region of Suleymaniye, a Turkish Cypriot was killed by Greek Cypriot fire while repairing an irrigation ditch. His brother, who was working with him, was saved by escaping. On 3 April 1964, a Turkish Cypriot was wounded by Greek Cypriots in the village of Ayios Marina. At Ayios Theodoros, Greek Cypriots fired upon United Nations soldiers who were transporting a Turkish Cypriot wounded by Greek Cypriots. On 11 Aprill964, a sixtyyear-old Turkish Cypriot at Omorphita was killed in his garden by Greek Cypriots and his daughter was wounded. On 23 April 1964, a nine-year-old Child in Nicosia was murdered, and at Ayios Theodoros a Turkish Cypriot was wounded by Greek Cypriots. On 24 April 1964, a Turkish Cypriot inNicosiawas killed by Greek Cypriots, and at Trakhonas, a Turkish Cypriot was wounded while repairing a water canal. On 25 April 1964, armed Greek Cypriots attacked a Turkish Cypriot refugee camp situateclwest ofKyrenia Road and destroyed it. Following an on-the-spot investigation by United Nations forces, it was asserted that many refugees were murdered and a number of them were abducted. 60. Those few excerpts from a lengthy crime-sheet Will be sufficient to illustrate the extent to which the Greek Cypriot Ieadership have consideredthemselves 61. Here is an editorial from the New York Herald Tribune of 29 April: “Archbishop Makarios insisted on carrying the Greek Cypriot cause to the United Nations, He accepted a United Nations Police Force and U. N. Mediator. But he has continued to behave as if the Cypriot dilemma could be solved by the Greek Cypriots unilaterally. The U. N. Force has been largely disregarded. The Archbishop has abrogated the Treaty of Alliance and has continued to ignore the Constitution. The Government of President Makarios has not acted in good faith. If there is to be an agreed solution of the problem under United Nations auspices, it cannot be one that the Greeks in the islancl impose hy force on the Turks.” 62. Here is another bit, from the Washington Post of 29 April: “In a significant change of policy the United Nations accused President Makarios of Cyprus today of sponsoring the armed offensive in the Kyrenia area Sunday and Monday.” 63. Again, the New York Herald Tribune reports on 29 April a statement made by the Commander of the UNFICYP: “The United Nations Commander said: ‘The United Nations feels that the Greek action against the eleventh-Century fortress is not strictly in line with the Security Council resolution setting up the peace force I, He cited article 2 of the resolution which asked the Cypriot Government to take a11 additional measures to stop violence and bloodshed in the island. ‘1 64. The Saint-Hilarion aggression proved beyond any doubt that the Greek Cypriots and their leadership had intended a11 along to ignore the recommendations of the Security Council, to impose their well-known aims by force and to use the United Nations Peacekeeping Force as an instrument of their nefarious PoliCY. In the words of the New York Herald Tribune of 2 May: ---- “It seems clear now, however, that the Greek Cypriots had no intention of merely preserving the status quo, which is implicit in any armistice, until long-range solutions could be worked aut by mediation. President Makarios pressed forward to alter, 65. It is distressing not to find a word of blame on the Saint-Hilarion aggression in the present report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. It seems as though the on-the-spot condemnation made by General P. S. Cyani had gone with the wind. 66. Operative paragraph 3 of the resolution of 4 March 1964 suffered the same fate in the hands of the Greek Cypriot leadership, namely that it was completely ignored, In that paragraph, you Will remember, the Council Y!alls uDon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint”. As with the other paragraphs this cal1 was interpreted as an invitation to throw a11 restraint to the winds. One has the right to expect that at least Archbishop Makarios, a religious leader, would exercise charity in seeking peaceful ways of attaining a solution, by using his influence to stop the acts of terrorism committed by his community, and by instilling afeeling of serenity and common sense in his followers, thereby facilitating the work of the United Nations Force and creating a suitable atmosphere for nîediation. Alas, on the contrary, the Archbishop, instead of preaching tolerance and understanding, urged his followers on to battle with provocative speeches delivered in the tone of a military leader, For instance, during his visits to Limassol and Ktima in May, Archbishop Makarios declared: “We shall continue with the heroism and selfsacrifice’ of the people of Cyprus, which have been proved by the four-year struggle of EOKA.“-Incidentally, the Council Will recall that the struggle of the EOKA was carried on with the aim of union with Greece- “With the same spirit now we shall continue our new struggle and, with unbended faith, glorywill crown the guns of the Greek Cypriot people. “1 am proud because I am the leader of such people. Heroism, nationalism and the way which the great struggle is expedited offer us, and specially to the people of Limassol because they always stood in the first phase in the noble fight, heroism and @de.” These are indeed fighting words, not calculated to bring about an atmosphere of peace and mediation. 67. After making a visit to the illegally and unconstitutionally established Grttek munitions factory in Limassol and after inspecting the heavy cannons at the Greek police station at Limassol, the Archbishop had this to say a few hours later in Ktima: “We declare once again that the goal of our road is the Parthenon, which constitutes the compass of 68. It is now common knowledge that the Greek Cypriots have recently enacted a so-called law instituting conscription in the island and have begun to cal1 25,000 men to arms. Furthermore, they have started negotiations with certain countries for the purchase of military aircraft, motor torpedo-boats and other heavy weapons. These moves, which are in direct conflict with the first operative paragraph of the resolution of 4 March, are also contrary to the basic articles 50 and 129 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. According to these articles, compulsory military service may not be instituted and war materials may not be imported except by oommon agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. Consequently, these measures which have now been taken without the consent of the Vice- President, are constitutionally unlawful. 69. Furthermore, there is no doubt that these moves constitute a grave danger for peace in the area and a severe blow to the authority of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, One leading newspaper, the New York Herald Tribune, on 28 May hadthis to say on the subject: “The Greek Cypriot Government has published a conscription act to draft 25,000 men intoitsnational guard. The m8ve was considered a blow to the United Nations, which has said such an act would legalize the status of thousands of armed Greek Cypriot irregulars.” 70. There is another comment, this time from the Globe and Mail of Toronto of 17 June: “The decision to conscript Young Greek Cypriots is a step whioh cari hardly fail to bring about serious deterioration in the Cyprus situation. It is a gesture of contempt towards the United Nations ancl towards the 7,000 man force it has sent to keep peace on the island. It is a provocative act introduced at a time when the delicate balance of tempers should not be upset. The action of the Cypriot Government was taken despite the veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, l?azil Kliçtik. It has brought protests from Britain and Turkey and its unconstitutional nature may simply provide Turkey with justification for military intervention, n 71. The Greek Cypriot authorities have aggravated the situation by completely disregarding the Constitution of the country. It is a well-known fact that the Constitution of Cyprus is an instrument dedicated to a careful balance between the rights and duties of the two communities. It is bicommunal in character. NOW, if one of the communities takes it upon itself to set aside the Constitution, drive out the other community from a11 organs of government, usurp the power to govern and turn upon the other community in mortal attack, the term %overnment of Cyprus” loses its meaning. 72. The world is by now familiar with the atrocities committed by the EOKA terrorists since last Christmas. The Greek Cypriot Government has dressed these terrorists in uniforms and calls them the security forces of Cyprus: The recent item of unconstitutional legislation purports to raise the number of these forces to 25,000 under the name of the National Guard. This is clearly an attempt to organize the EOKA terrorist bands SO that they may be better trained and better equipped for their avowed purpose of annihilating, enslaving or chasing out of their homeland the innocent Turks of Cyprus. Already the terms %ebellionfl and “rebels” are being freely used to designate these innocents by the Greek Cypriots who are sesponsible. 13. This must be a unique case in history, when in a bitter strife between two communities, one of them usurps the powers ancl resources of Government, turns the leaders of the other out of office, sets upon the massacre of the innocent and then labels them as rebels. It is to the credit of theunited Nations and its organs that this distortion of fact has not been entirely swallowed by anyone except by the Greek Cy-priot authorities themselves. 74. Here are some instances of how the “security II of the people of Cyprus is assured by the EOKA terrorists which are now being consolidated as the security forces or the “National Guard”. An item in The New York Times of 11 April reads as fol.lows: “A Turlrish Cypriot was killed ancl his daughter was wounded toclay by Greek Cypriot gunfiro on the truce line in a suburb of Nicosia D. D , “The incident, the first since Monday, when four Turkish Cypriots were shot by Greek Cypriots afew miles east of Nicosia, occurred just before Mr. Ralph J. Bunche, United Nations Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, toured the truce line. “The Turkish Cypriot, Mehmet Saffet, and his 16 year-old daughter were watering their garden when the Greek Cypriot ‘security forces’ opened fire on 75. 1 have already referred to negotiations whichare reported to be in process for the purchase of aircraft and other heavy armaments by the Greek Cypriot Government. The Secretary-General and the United Nations authorities in Cyprus are well aware that the clandestine importation of armaments into the is.land by the Greek Cypriots has been going on for months. The bazookas and machine-guns used on several occasions since last Christmas against the Turlrs of Cyprus, have been pouring in from abroad. The countries who have supplied the murderous EOKA gangs with these weapons of mass destruction must be perfectly well aware that they share the responsibility for the murders committed with these arms, and for the destruction of property and places of worship oarried out under their protection. 75. J’ai par16 déj& de négociations actuellement armements grec. l’Organisation parfaitement ments suit depuis leuses dernier masse bandes truction partagent avec ces Armes, et de lieux du culte exécutées 76. The Greek Cypriot Government now proposes not only to continue the clandestine importation of arms but also to proceed openly in their purchase, in flagrant violation of the Constitution of Cyprus as well as of the resolutions of the Security Council. 1 have already explained, by citing the relevant article, that such a measure is unconstitutional, There is no doubt that it is also against the resolution of 4 March, which calls u-pan a11 Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus or to endanger international peace. If asms are supplied to the Greek Cypriots, not only the Greek Cypriot Government but also those who supply them wollld be guilty of a violation of the Security Council resolution. 76. Le maintenant clandestinement ouvertement la Constitution du Conseil l’article constitutionnelle, également qui invite obligations Unies, nace d’action dans la Republique souveraine en danger des armes ment le Gouvernement aussi coupables de sécurité. ‘77, There has been some question as to whether the United Nations Peace-keeping F’orce in Cyprus has, under the existing resolutions of the Security Council, the authority to prevent the importation of arms into the island. My Government has always maintained that the United Nations Force is not only fully authorized to stop such deliveries but is duty bound to do SO. It is our understanding that if the United Nations Force is to use its “best efforts to pruvent a recurrence of fighting 11, one of the first things it must do is to see to it that the warring communities do not arm themselves to the teeth in order to resume the fighting. My delegation hopes that the statements that Will bemade at this meeting of the Council Will throw sufficient Iight on the interpretation of the existing resolutions to enipower the United Nations organs to $ct energetically in dealing with this matter which carries the seeds of an explosive situation. 77. On se demande si, en vertu adoptées jusqu% présent la Porte paix tation d’armes soutenu qu’elle litée tenue de le faire, la Force est en son pouvoir pour prévenir combats lt, l’un de ses premiers veiller s’arment bat. Ma clélégation espére que les déclarations seront teront assez de luu?i&re sur ltinterprétationcles lutions Nations sur cette question qui recéle tuation explosive. 78. De tous produits plus barbare, conscience otages 78. Of a11 the tragic events which have takenplace in Cyprus since last Christmas, none is more basbaric, more dastardly and more revolting to the human conscience than the practice of taking hostages and of Wietly slaughtering them like SO many sheep. The 79. The question which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General put to Archbishop Makarios as to the fate of the remainder of the hostages is answered by the Archbishop himself, who cannot hide the obvious. He says: “1 do not conceal the fact that the Turks have been abducted by irresponsible Greek elements and may have also been killed. I’ This is a sad state of affairs. It cari only mean one of two things: either that Archbishop Makarios is not effectively in control of his supporters or’ which is much worse, that he is condoning such acts. 80. A similar view has been expressed by the Manchester Guardian of 11 June, which 1 refrainfrom quoting here on account of the strong epithets used in the article. But one sentence 1 cari quote, and it says: “If President Makarios cannot explain what has happened to them, itwillbe legitimate to ask whether the Greek Cypriots are yet fit for self-government at ail.” The article. of the Manchester Guardian is in rela;ion to the recent disappearance of a British Major and his driver in Cy-prus, but it could apply just as well to a11 the missing hostages taken by the Greek Cypriots. 81. The excuse proffered by Archbishop Makarios for these abductions and killings is quite simple: they must have been killed by irresponsible Greek elements. But then, where were the responsible Greek elements who were supposed to stop them? Are the Archbishop and his “Government n entirely blameless in this shameful business? Many murders and other crimes on the list have been clearlyestablished.What sort of government is it uncler which not a single person has been punished for a single crime? Or has murder become an instrument of government? 82. Mr. Presiclent, an answer to these questions is owed to you, to the Secretary-General, to the members of this Council and to world public opinion. It is our hope that the Council Will dwell on this question with the attention that it deserves and, in view of the absence of responsible government in Cyprus, deal effectively with such atrocities. 83. Archbishop Makarios believes that by imputing these crimes to “irresponsible elements ” he cari wash his hands of the whole business. May 1 take a moment to point out what the Archbishop’s “responsible elements fl are doing in Cyprus: during the Greek Cypriot aggression on Saint-Hilarion, the bodies of “The Greek Cypriots fire on a mixed Swedish afid Austrian United Nations detail attempting to collect Turkish bodies that had lain on the field since the fighting at St. Hilarion Castle earlier thia month. n détachement de la Force des Nations Unies composé de Suedois et d’autrichiens qui tentait d’enlever les corps des Turcs restes sur le terrain depuis les combats livr& au debut du mois, l Those who could harbour such dark hatred, commit such inhuman acts and fire on United Nations soldiers were no “irresponsible elements”. These were elements of the so-called “security forces” or “National Guard” which, under the persona1 command of Mr. Polycarpos Yorgadjis, Minister of the Interior in the Makarios cabinet, had launched an assault on Saint- Hilarion. Ceux qui ont pu nourrir des haines aussi profondes, commettre des actes aussi inhumains et ouvrir le feu sur des soldats des Nations Unies n%taient pas des %léments irresponsables “. C ‘était des Bléments des prétendues “forces de sécurit8” ou de la “Garde nationale” qui, SOUS le commandement personnel de M, Polycarpos Yorgadjis, ministre de l’intérieur du cabinet Makarios, avaient lancé l’assaut contre Saint-Hilarion. 84, 1 believe 1 have given ample evidence to show that the Greek Cypriot Government has no desire or intention to abide by the principles of international law, by solemn international covenants or by the recommendations of the Security Council. The question arises as to the reason for such recalcitrance. In our view the answer is simple. In one Word, it is Enosis. Archbishop Makarios is not interested in any agreed settlement or a peaceful solution, for the simple reason that he has one-and only one-solution in mind, to which sacred mission he has dedicated his whole life and career, and that is to bring the island of Cyprus into the Hellenic fold through union with Greece. The rest is elaborate theatricals. 84. Je crois avoir donné des preuves largement suffisantes que le Gouvernement chypriote grec n’a ni le desir ni l’intention de. respecter les principes du droit international, les pactes internationaux solennels ou les recommandations du Conseil de sécurité. La question se pose de savoir quelle est la raison d’une telle récalcitrante. réponse es? simple et tient en un seul mot: wEnosfsn. L’archevêque Makarios ne s ‘intéresse a aucun réglement concerté ni a aucune solution pacifique, pour la simple raison qu’il a en vue une solution et une seule, une solution qui constitue la mission sacrée à laquelle il a voue toute sa vie et sa carrière, ramener Chypre dans le giron hellénique par l’union avec la Grbce. Tout le reste n’est que mise en s&ne. 85. En fait, nous avons Bté les spectateurs ou les acteurs involontaires d’une tragédie grecque en trois actes, Le premier acte a et& la lutte sanglante de l’EOKA, qui est all6e de pair avec une tentative visant B jeter de la poudre aux yeux de l’Assembl8e générale pour qu’elle accorde la “libre dbtermination a B Chypre, afin que 13e puisse s’unir immediatement B la GrBce. La tentative a Echoué parce que l’Assemblhe génbrale a refusé de se laisser amener B favoriser Le deuxième acte s’est joué en 1959, pendant la période des accords de Zurich et de Londres. Le protagoniste du drame attendait alors soigneusement le moment propice pour jeter par-dessus bord les accords qu’il avait signés avec une arribre-pensge en y voyant simplement un tremplin vers la dernibre étape. Le rideau s’est levé sur le troisibme acte, avec le point culminant de l’action et le commencement du d.$nouement, B l’époque de Noël de l’an dernier oh fut déchaîné le massacre des innocents. La représentation continue, mais maintenant, fort heureusement, IfOrganisation dés Nations Unies est intervenue une fois de plus pour emp&cher un dénouement imposé par la force et nous ne savons pas comment la p&ce s’achévera. 86. Tout comme le slogan de la “libre détermination” était employé au cours des années 1950 pour amener 1’ “Enosis”, d’autres slogans tout aussi frappants sont exploités aujourd’hui dans le même dessein. Les 85. We have, in fact, been either spectators or unwilling actors in a three-act Greek tragedy. The first act was the bloody EOKA struggle, which wenthand in hand with an attempt to hoodwink the United Nations General Assembly into givingcyprus “self-determination” SO that it could immediately accede to Greece. That failed because the General Assembly refused to be hoodwinked into helping the cause of Hellenic expansionism. The second act was Performed during 1959, the period of the Zurich and London Agreements. During this period the protagonist of the clrama was carefully biding his time, waiting for the propitious moment to throw overboard the Agreements which he had signed with a mental reserve to use it only as a stepping-stone to the final stage. The curtain went up on the third act with the climax and the beginning of the denouemant at Christmas time last year, whenthe massacre of the innocent was unleashed. The play is still going on. But now, happily, the UnitedNations has intervened once again to stop the forcible imposition of the ending, and we have yet ta see how it Will be terminated. 86. Just as the slogan of “self-determination” was used in the fifties to bring about Enosis, now other and equally potent slogans are being exploited for the Same purpose. The lofty principles of independence, 87. If there is any doubt as to the real ultimate goal of Archbishop Makarios, these few quotations may help to dispel it. In an exclusive interview with the permanent Athens correspondent of Cyprus dailies, Evriphidhis Akritas, on 28 May, the Archbishop says: “But I am of the opinion that if America favors Enosis and officially defines its attitude in this direction, then there Will be rapid developments leading to the final settlement of the Cyprus problem. ” No lengthy interpretation of this statement is necessary. It simply means that, the minute it becomes possible to achieve Enosis through a political shorttut, the pretence of independence, sovereignty, etc. Will be discarded as old garments which have outlived their usefulness. 88. In the course of the sameinterview, the journalist asked about certain rumourecl disagreements between the Greek and Cypriot Governments, The Archbishop answered: “These reports are entirely groundless and untrue. The present policy line on the Cyprusproblem was formulated during my recent visit to Athens. Since then the co-operntion betweeu Greece and Cyprus has been complete and absolute. During my talks on the Cyprus problem with Premier Papandreou 1 felt particular happiness and satisfaction from the warmth of his faith in the future of the Hellenic megalonisos; 1 was very touched when realized that the Cyprus problem constitutes for Papandreou the great national issue which occupies first place in his thoughts and in his heart.” 89. Certainly there is no divergence between these two Governments, both of which are anxious to bring about their union. IL Will be recalled that in the “decaloguef’ which had been worked out between the two leaders in Athens on 13 April 1964, the slogan of self-determination, which in their minds has never mesnt anything else but Enosis, was firmly ensconced. 90. In fact, Premier Papandreou of Greece, in a statement made to the German newspaper, Der Spiegel, quoted by The New York Times of 11 May, called union of Cyprus with Greece “the only right solution” for the island in the long run. 1 presume that “in the long run” means not immediately but after acollusive I’We declare once again that the Parthenon is the final goal of our struggle and we shall reach that goal irrespective of the obstacles which we might encounter. n "NOUS est le but final de notre lutteet que nous atteindrons ce but quels que soient les obstacles auxquels nous pourrons nous heurter.” Here is another quotation-from The Washintion Post of this moxning. This is an item with a Nicosia dateline, from Roy Maloney: Du Washington Post d’aujourd’hui, j’extrais encore la citation suivante. Il s’agit d’une dépêche dat8e de Nicosia et Sign&e de Roy Maloney: “L’archevêque et chef de la majorité grecque, a préconisé l’union avec la Gréce comme la meilleure solution au conflit entre les deux communautés de l’fle, ont déclaré aujourd’hui des sources bien informées. n tlArchbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus and the leader of its Gxeek majority, has called for union with Gxeece as the best solution to the island’s communal strife, informed sources said today.” 92. The patience and moderation exercised by my Government pending the achievement of a peaceful settlement in Cypxus has been exemplary. We have done everything possible to facilitate the difficult task of the United Nations in the island and we shall continue to do SO. The Turkish Government has refrained, even under the most severe and deliberate provocation, to exercise a right which it possesses under a solemn international Covenant, namely the Treaty of Guarantee, ‘Vo take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created . . 0 VI by the Constitution, That right is inalienable. But it need not be exercised SO long as the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cyprus cari be carried out unhindered. The Greek Cypriot Government has cried “wolffl on many occasions and has each time levelled sinister accusations against my Government. Yet the history of the Republic of Turkey shows that it has never sought territorial aggrandizement. The naked truth is that it is not Archbishop Makarios who desires independence for Cyprus, it is the Turkish Government-an independence which would guarantee that the lives and property of the Turks of Cypruswould never again be jeopardized, and that the devious route to Enosis would be barred. SO long as a11 parties do the same, we shall patiently co-operate with the United Nations, awaiting the restoration of constitutional law and order and the achievement of a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement through the efforts of the Mediator. 92. La patience et la modéxation dont mon gouvernement a fait preuve en attendant un réglement pacifique a Chypre ont éte exemplaires, Nous avons tout fait pour faciliter la tache délicate de l’organisation des Nations Unies dans l’lle et nous continuerons d’agir ainsi. Le Gouvernement turc s’est abstenu, même en présence des provocations delibérées les plus violentes, d’exercer le droit qu’il possbde en vertu de garantie conclu en 1960, “d’agir dans le but exclusif du rétablissement de l’ordre créé, D ,II par la Constitution. Ce droit est inalienable. Mais il n’a pas besoin d%tre exexc8 tant que les op8xations de maintien de la paix entreprises. par les Nations Unies a Chypre peuvent se derouler sans obstacles. Le Gouvernement chypriote grec a crie ‘au loup” en maintes occasions et il a porté chaque fois des accusations sinistrescontre mongouvernement. Pourtant, l’histoire de la RBpublique turque montre qu’elle n’a jamais visé une expansion territoriale. sans fard est que ce n’est pas l’archevêque Makarios qui désire l’independance de Chypre, mais que c’est le Gouvernement turc - une indépendance qui gaxantisse que la vie et les biens des Turcs de Chypre ne soient plus jamais menacés et que la route tortueuse de 1t”Enosis” soit barrée. Tant que toutes les parties agiront de même, nous coopérerons patiemment avec l’Organisation des Nations Unies, en attendant le rétablissement de l’ordre public, ainsi qu’une solution pacifique et un réglement concerté gr%ce aux efforts 93. The terms of reference of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus are set out in paragraph 5 oî the resolution of 4 March. May 1 refresh your memories as to what they are. The functions of the force are to be: “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, . . , to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”. It should be quite obvious that the words “law and order” cannot be taken in the abstract. Law and order must of necessity depend on and emanate fxom a Constitution, whether it may be written or unwritten. InCyprus too, the only source of law and order is the Constitution. Anything outside that is the law of the jungle or the rule of force. The Security Council, therefore, in envisaging the restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions in Cyprus could have nothing in mind other thnn the restoration of the law and order and the retuin to normal conditions which existed in Cyprus PxiOr to the events of last Christmas, undex the Con- 93. Le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix B Chypre est exposé au paragraphe 5 de la résolution du 4 mars. Je me permets de vous en rappeler les termes. La doit avoir pour fonctions “de faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour prévenir toute reprise des combats et. . . de contribuer au maintien et au rétablissement de l’ordre public ainsi qu’au retour & une situation normalet’. Il devrait btre évident que les mots “ordre public” ne peuvent être pris dans l’abstrait. dépendre et émaner d’une constitution, écrite au non. A Chypre aussi, la seule source de l’ordre public est la Constitution. En dehors d’elle, il n’y a que la loi de la jungle quent, en envisageant le rétablissement de l’ordre public et un retour à une situation normale a Chypre, le Conseil de &curite chose qu’au rbtablissement de l’ordre public et des conditions normales qui existaient à Chypre avant 94. Only three months have elapsed since the representative of Cyprus, in this very Council room and from the same Seat, declared: “And there has been no violation of the Constitution whatsoever, and I challenge anyone to say that there has been. n You have heard me tel1 at some length the sad story of one violation of the Constitution after another within the last few months. Even the President of the Republic confirmed in the newspaper TO Vima, published in Athens, that he regards the Constitution of Cyprus as no longer being in force. 95, It is a basic fact that a Governmentwhich usurps or maintains power in violation of a Constitutionis no more than a coup d’état r6gime. In the view of this delegation, the terms “Government of Cyprus” and Qovereign Republic of Cyprus” employed in the resolution cari only signify a government set up and functioning under the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. It is well known that that Constitution provides for a Government made up of a Greek wing and a Turkish wing. Atpresent the Greekwingof the Government has ousted the Turkish wing and presumes to rule alone as the Government of Cyprus. That anomalous state of affairs which results from the intercommunal strife raging in Cyprus, cannot go on forever. We are hoping that the Greek Cypriot authorities Will presently heed the cal1 of the United Nations and in the future will co-operate with the United Nations organs in Cyprus for the restoration of law and order and a Constitutional Government. 96. That has certainly not been their behaviour up to now. We are still a long way from a return to normal conditions in the island. This has not failed, on many occasions, to create a source of anguishfor the United Nations authorities there. Here is an instance of what happened on 16 May last, as reported in the New York Herald Tribune: “The United Nations Force Commander on Cypsus lest his temper yesterday while touring the Famagusta dockyards with President Makarios. “Surrounded by Irish United Nations troops and Greek Cypriot police, the General and the Archbishop walked along the quaysideyesterdaylistening to the cornplaints of the Greek Cypriot District Officer, Dimitrios Paralikes. “‘It is a11 right here’, the Archbishop said at one point, apparently looking up at the Irish soldiers atop the medieval wall around Famagusta’s Turkish quarter. The Greek officiais in the party murmured agreement , “‘It is net’, General Gyani snapped, turning toface them. ‘Do not always complain about the other side. No Turk is safe in the Greek quarter, and the incident at the Naafi demonstrates that. You know what is going on, SO don% complain to me about the other side’, General Gyan i barked at Mr. Paralikes.” “Though excesses have been committed by bath sides, it is only the Greek irregulars who have systematically looted and burned entire villages, razing forty-one and leaving thirty-five thousand Turkish civilians-a third of the whole communityhomeless.” In the same article, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, Minister of Labour in the Makarios Cabinet, is quoted as saying: “Let us be realistic”, said the Labour Minister, who was an active EOKA fighter himself. “Destruction of this sort is deplorable, but if these Turks should want to go back home now, what homes could they go back to?” These are the cynical words of a member of the Cabinet which brazenly employs the epithet of l’rebels” against the innocent Turks of Cyprus who have been the victims of attempted genocide. Rebellion has in fact taken place in Cyprus, but the rebels are the Greek Cypriots who have revolted against the Constitution, against the international agreements solemnly entered into and against the conscience of mankind. 98. 1 started this statement by expressing sincere thanks to the Secretary-General and his advisers and staff for their well-intentioned efforts to bring peace to the strife-torn island. Their task has been a difficult and thankless one in view of the ambiguity and the lack of clarity in the existing resolutions of the Council. It is our hope that the present session of the Council will throw light on the true intentions of this body and Will thus empower the Secretary-General to carry out his clifficult task with more effectiveness. 99. Nevertheless, 1 cannot refrain from saying that the report of the Secretary-General [S/5764] is bound to cause some disappoiatment and misgivings not only in my own country, but in a11 circles interested in arriving at a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement in Cyprus. 100. Before taking up specific points mentionedin the report, may 1 say at once that its whole tenure is discouraging inasmuch as it fails to give any indication as to what is understood by the terms “law and order” mentioned in the 4 March resolution. On many occasions 1 have brought to the attention of the Secretary- General the fact that law and order cari only emanate from the Constitution of Cyprus, an 1 that the first duty of the United Nations Force should be to establish, as fas as possible, the rule of lawunder the Constitution. For without a constitutional r6gime a legal vacuum is created in’the island which could bring about a11 sorts of dire consequences. The report makes no mention cf the Constitution whatsoever. Are we then to understand that the rule of law in Cyprus has been supplanted bY the rule of Archbishop Makarios and his unlawful Government? Are we to assume that the United Nations Force is to Cook on as the Greek Cypriot Government Systematically pursues its aim, as the Secretary- General mentions in paragraph 25 of his report, “to tionn& qu’il entendre par l’expression dans la résolution j’ai fait Constitution la Force mement d’un régime un vide juridique de cons6quences mention prendre par gouvernement Force 101. Here are some specific aspects of the report: paragsaph 58 of the report says: “It is hoped that the appointment of General Karayannis to command the National Guard Will result in bringing the extremists on the Greek Cypriot side under control. The introduction of conscription may also help to reduce the numbers of armed irregulars at present at large in the island and discipline thern. Little is known about any efforts that may be under way to restrain the extremist Turkish Cypriot organization (TMT) andto bring themunder control.l* Some merit is seen in this measure and that is what we fail to understand.Is it not obvious that this amounts to no less thangivingtheprestige of an army to hordes who are determined to wipe out a community? Will net this so-callecl National Guard, better trained by a Greek General and better equipped and disciplined, constitute a fortiidable weapon in the hands ofaclique which has proved itself utterly irresponsible and whichis determined to impose a solution by force? Have we forgotten that the mass assault on Saint-Hilarion last month was personally clirected by the Minister of the Interior of that Government? 1 note with dismay and regret, that 1 coulcl not find a single criticism in the Secretary-General% report of this infamous attack. 102. The report seems to regret that the Turkish community has SO far failed to constitute a regular, well-trained army, which woulcl suppress what it calls the irregulars. The fact that a11 armed Turks are doing nothing but defending their lives and property in the face of unprovoked and planned Greek attacks seems to have been overlooked. Nevertheless, would the cause of peace in Cyprus be better served if two well-trained armies faced each other? 103. This measure of conscription has caused considerable alarm, especially among the countries contributing troops to the United Nations Force, and rightly SO. For there is no cloubt that such a formidable army, four times the size oftheUnitedNations Force, armed with weapons superior to that Force, wo~~lcl also constitute a danger to the security of the l?orce itself under the unpreclictable conditions prevailing in Cyprus. Furthermore, one would have wishecl the report to dwell, at least in passing, onthe unconstitutional and unlawful nature of such a measure which has been formally vetoed by the Vice-Presiclent of the Republic, 104. It is true that, further on in therepost, in paragraph 118, referring again tothe measure of conscription, the Secretary-General says: II . . . it may be questioned whether such a decision at this time could be considered to be consistent with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964, with specific reference to its paragraph 1.” 105. Another portion of the report deals with the importation and manufacture of armaments by the Greek Cypriot Government. Here again the Secretary- General raises the question as to whether this is within the ietter and spirit of the 4 March resolution. 1 have no doubt that the Council at this session Will furnish a reply to that question. Tous it is quite clear that this measure is fraught with danger for a11 concerned. The Secretary-General in paragraph 120 of the report states that: “There is no question, of course, that the smuggling of arms + whether by Turkish or Greek Cypriots, is illegal and that UNFICYP is entitled to try to check it. w In our mind the question arises as to whether this is the only illegal act committed on the island which the UNFICYP is entitled to try to check. Of course a sovereign and legitimate Government is free to import or manufacture arms for its own defence. But cari one community which has usurped the powers of Government be allowed to arm itself to the teeth for the purpose of annihilating another community? The danger that this sepresents not only to the Turkish Cypriots but also to the United Nations Force and in general to the peace of the area is obvious. Even if such a measure had been constitutionally valid, which it certainly is not, it would still represent a danger to peace in the area since Turkey could not remain indifferent to an island forty miles from its shores, inhahited by a hostile element, being turned into an arsenal, You Will recall that even when the island of Rhodes and certain other islands were ceded to Greece, Turlcey’s friend and ally, stipulations were made to demilitarize them, as they are today. 106. In this connexion it is truly regrettable that it was deemecl appropriate to refer in the report to socalled threats of invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. 1 have explained earlier that Turkey has and maintains the right under the Treaty of Guarantee to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by that Treaty. This is no threat of invasion, This is the assertion of the existence and applioability of a right if a11 else fails. 107. There is no doubt that thepresenceofthe United Nations Force on the island has contributed in a certain measure to deter the Greek Cypriots from perpetrating their nefarious deeds. But it must also be admitted that the existence of the right of Turkey to take action as a guaranteeing Power has also proved to be an effective deterrent SO far, and Will continue to be SO. In that sense, 1 submit that the existenoe and assertion of Turkey’s right to action is helpful to the United Nations Force. If tensions rise at times, it should be blamed on the perilous game of hrinkmanship SO well played by Archbishop Makarios 109. It is also regrettable that it has been seen fit to refer in the report to the situation of the Turkish contingent on the island, about which 1 gave lengthy explanations earlier in the course of this statement. There may have been a misunderstanding. It has been carefully explained to the Secretary-General and bis advisers, ostensibly to their satisfaction, that the return of the Turkish contingent to its original barracks could not now be envisaged because of the fact that that site was now surrounded by Greek elements which would jeopardize the security of the contingent. 110. Even though it may be true that a contingent of some 600 men could not offer much security to the Turkish community if and when the Greek Cypriot hordes choose to attack, nevertheless it is an undeniable fact that the presence of this contingent in that area has contributed greatly to the cessation of large-scale attacks by Greek Cypriots on the Turks; it has the ps,yohological effect of giving a truc sense of security to the Turks and thereby helps in reducing the tension in that area. My country is ready to place its contingent under the orders of the United Nations Commander if it cari be assured that the contingent Will net be ordered to return to its former insecure position. 111. The insistence of Archbishop Makarios on the return of the Turkish contingent to its barracks is purely a political move calculated to prove to the worlcl that, irrespective of the international Agreements which created the State of Cyprus and its Constitution, he is master of the island. Acquiescence, to say nothing of support, by the UnitedNations Force to such an unreasonable request coulcl not fail to give the impression that the United Nations Force is aiding the Archbishop in his attempt to impose solution by force, 112. We were surprised to read in paragraph 113 of the report: “However, the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the olaim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation.” This is of course an erroneous imputation and when reacl in conjunction with the declaration of General P. 113. The Council Will recall that Mr. KUçffk, as the Vice-President of the Republic, by an officia1 invitation dated 3 June 1964, called upon Makarios, as the President of the Republic, to state publicly that he intended to respect the Constitution and asked him to convene a meeting of the Council of Ministers to consider certain highly important matters relating to the security and defence of the Republic in order to put an end to fighting and bloodshedin the island. This genuine attempt by the Turkish community was flatly rejected by Makarios without valid consideration, and he made it clear that he would not recognize even the position of the Vice-President, who had been elected by the Turkish community and is thelegitimate holder of his office under the Constitution. While the report at various instances tends to impute ulterior political motives to the Turkish community, it is truly regrettable that this genuine effort on the part of the Vice- President, Mr. KUçük is not even mentioned. 113. qualité de vice-président par à Makarios, blique, respecter Conseil des ministres tions rite et B la défense de la Republique, un terme dans 1 ‘Ile. Cette initiative turque valable par Makarios, ne reconnaîtrait President, et détenteur la Constitution. rapport arrïere-pensbes table M. Küçffk, ne soit même pas mentionné. 114. The Secretary-General knows very well that Archbishop Makarios unilaterally abrogated an international agreement and in this way has committed an act of utmost gravity, contrary to the Security Council resolutions. Again, we could not find the slightest criticism of this action in the Secretary-General’s report. I would like to hope that this silence Will not be interpreted by the Greek Cypriots as acquiescence. 114. vêque Makarios international mement grave contrevenant de S&urit& la plus Egére du Secrétaire ne sera pas interprétéparles un acquiescement, 115. Me are gratified to read in the report that the Secretary-General takes a serious view of the barbaric practice of taking hostages. It is significant that he points out in paragraph 117 that these acts: 115. le rapport, inquietude saisir graphe ces actes: tt . , , donnent au monde entier une id6e Hcheuse ” .a. create throughout the worlcl a bac1 image of the people and Government of Cyprus, indicating, as they seem to do, an inability on the part of Governmental authority to check and control the shocking excesses of this kind”. du comme ils semblent le faire, que les pouvoirs blics de tels ex&s In the same paragraph he points out: Au même paragraphe, vante : “lt is bad enough that such inhumanity cari occur in these times, it is far worse that in no instance has anyone suspected of guilt been fond, charged ancl tried. It “11 est puissent pire découvert, 116, g dépeindre renouvelle pour qu’il d&plOie afin d’amener la paix ?t Chypre; qu’il me parclonnera points intéressée passer comme Secrétaire eu l’occasion la meilleure l’île déchirée par la lutte. 116. These words alone of the Secretary-General woulcl be sufficient to depict the situation in Cypruq tOdaY. 1 renew my thanks to the Secretary-General for his well-meaning and arduous efforts to bring peace to C@rus and I hope that he Will bear with me for having had to point out certain aspects of his report which, as an interested party, we could not afford to OVerlOOk. Both in this statement and in my frequent COntaCts with the Secretary-General and his able advisers I have had occasion to explain how, in our VieW, Iaw and order could best be brought to this Stl’ife-km island. 118. A news item in this morning’s Press illustrates just how and to what extent the Greek Cypriots try and often succeed in swaying the United Nations organs in Cyprus. I am referring, of course, to the tragic abduction and probable cold-blooded murder of the British Major of UNFICYP and his adviser, which no one in the world doubts was committed by the Greek Cypriot forces of security. The United Nations authorities in Cyprus accused “edremist elements known to the Cyprus Government” of the abduction. Thereupon strong pressure was brought to bear upon the local United Nations authorities in the fosm of threats, of appeals to the Secretary-General, and scathing communiques, with the result that a clarification was secured, carefully dodging the issue of blame. One wonders how often suchpressures are exercisedby the Government of Cyprus to influence the declarations, findings and reports of the United Nations authorities in Cyprus. 119. Finally, in spite of everything, we hope that, in the light of this debate in the Council and with a new Commander to carry out the peace-keeping task in Cypsus, further strides cari be made in attaining the peaceful goal which we a11 cherish. The meeting was suspended at 6.5’0 p.m., and resumed at 7.20 p.m. 120, The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I cal1 now upon the representative of Cyprus.

Whilelisteningto the speech of the representative of Turkey with the utmost tare, 1 at times felt him to be talking about a different country, about another situation in another land, and net about Cyprus. This is perhaps the reason why he himself insisted SO much on speaking first before the Security Council, in order to give a distorted picture from the beginning. 122. 1 reserve my right to reply fully to the distortions and false allegations made by the representative of Turkey. 1 shall touch in the course of my speech on only one or two of the points which he has raised, but first of all, 1 wish to pay tribute to the Secretary- General and express my Government ‘s deep appreciation for his untiring and sincere effort to implement, in the name of the United Nations, the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964, in the interests of preserving international peace. In this connexion, our appreciation also goes to the Mediator in Cyprus, the distinguished Finnish diplomat, Mr. Sakari S. Tuomioja, as well as to a11 officia& of the United Nations who have been working hard in implementing the resolutions of the United Nations on Cyprus. 1 would also wish to express my Government’s appreciation 123, We deeply regret in Cyprus that General P. S. Gyani, the Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, has not agreed to the extension of his period of service. General Gyani Will leave behind him in Cyprus the memory of a distinguished soldier and a man dedicated to the UnitedNations and to peace. 124. The presence in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force has always been welcomed by my Government as a symbol of peace and as a symbol of tbe high principles which form the foundation of the United Nations, It is in this spirit that my Government has, a11 along, done its best to assist the United Nations in its mission with regard to Cyprus. It is in the same spirit that my Government is in agreement with the extension of UNFICYPls mission in Cyprus for a period of three months. pour lui un symbole de paix et un symbole principes vernement 125. In spite of the many difficulties and the many obstacles, some of them apparent to ail, 1 believe that we have been able to achieve a great degree of cooperation between the Government and the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, in a common effort to restore peace and normal life. 125, breux sonne, retablir realiser ment et la Force des Nations Unies pour le maintien de la paix dans notre Ile. 126. 1 have very carefully read the report of the Secretary-General submitted on 15 June 1964 to the Security Council [S/5764], containing his account of the situation for the period between 26 April and 8 June 1964. While reserving my right to make certain comments on some of the points contained in the report, 1 wish today, in the course of my speech, to make direct reference only to certain parts of the report. 126. général sécurite la période Tout en me reservant vations sur certains clans mon intervention ment certaines 1.27. Wowever, before touching upon any other issue, 1 request the Security Council to focus its attention on paragraph 119 of the report of the Secretary-General, which reads as follows: 127. je demanderai de porter rapport “The recurrent threats of a landing by Turkish military forces in Cyprus impede the efforts of the Unlted Nations to restore normal conditions and to prevent fighting in the island of Cyprus. Such threats serve as well to make the Turkish Cypriot leadership less amenable to the acceptance of arrangements designed to contribute to a return to normality in’the Island. The most recent threat of this kind, which occurred only a week or SO ago, touched off considerable excitement both within and outside of Cyprus. Such actions are certainly not consistent with the appeal made to a11 Member States by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution of 4 March.” This last phrase has not been mentioned by the Turkish representative in his speech. Cette dernière ne l’a pas citée dans le discours 130. Many people expressed surprise at the fact that Turkey thought fit to plan an invasionof Cyprus at this particular moment-not that aggression-and I underline this-not that aggression could under any circumstances be justifie& The mere fact, however, that these new threats of aggression came at this particular moment when there was a situation of comparative calm in Cyprus is further proof of the point which 1 believe we have established beyond any doubt in the course of the previous debates before the Security Council, namely that calm and normal conditions in Cyprus do not serve the partitionist and expansionist shims of the Turkish Government. It should again be stressed that whenever in Cyprus there seems to be an improvement in the situation, the Turkish Government and the leaders of the Turkish terrorists in the island are doing their best to renew the tension and jeopardize the efforts for the restoration of peace. 131, When 1 had the honour to address this Council on a previous occasion, 1 repeatedly underlined the fact that the danger to international peace in that area of the world does not lie within Cyprus itself, but that it was, and still is, a direct result of the provocative and expansionist policy pursued by the Turkish Government. 1 had endeavoured at that time to demonstrate to the members of the Security Councilthat so long as Turkey is allowed to pursue its polioy of threats, provocation and incitement, it would be unrealistic to expect the establishment of conditions of permanent peace in CyprUS itself. 1 quote from my speech before the Security Council on 18 February 1964: “If you have hanging over Cyprus this tension and these threats of outside aggression, you cari have a half-million troops in Cyprus-and yet you Will have no peace.” [1095th meeting, para. 144.1 Speaking again before the Security Council on 27 February 1964, having reportedvarious events indicative Of an improvement in the situation at that time, 1 stressed the following: “1 have mentioned a11 these facts with some reluctance. 1 only hope that by stating the developments 1 shall not make the Turkish Government unhappy to the point that it may step up again the machinery of PKWOCatiOn.” [1098th meeting, para. 118.1 132. It is therefore imperative for the Security Council to continue to keep in mind the true reasons and the facts which are behind the situation in Cyprus. It is most essential that the Security Council should never lose sight of the fact that Turkey, with its actions and threats is undermining internationalpeace, in violation of the Charter of the UnitedNations and in open defiance of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. 133. After a long discussion the Security Counoil had unanimously adopted on 4 March 1964 a resolution which, among other provisions, called upon: 11 4,s a11 Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace”. Al1 Members of the United Nations, 1 submit, should be well aware of their obligations under the Charter, which in this particular case, were Specifically referred to in the preamble to the same resolution, namely : “Al1 Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. n 134. In my estimation there was no room for misinterpretation, and there was no room for misunderstanding, It was clear beyond any doubt that Turkey was called upon to terminate its threats and its provocative actions in accordance with its duty to respect the territorial integrity and independence of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, an equal fellow Member of the United Nations. Such actions, the Secretary- General stressed in his report, are certainly notconsistent with the appeal made to a11 Member States by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution of 4 March. 135. Yet it was only a few days later, and at a time when in Cyprus there was again comparative calm, that Turkey once more decided to threaten and prepare itself for an invasion of the island. Thus, the Turkish Government, in the early hours of the morning of 13 March delivered an ultimatum to the Cyprus Government eontaining various unfounded allegations in its unsuccessful effort to justify the unjustifiable and provide an ill-conceived excuse for persistingwith its sinister designs. 136. TO most Greeks who had a close association with the struggle for freedom in the course of the last War, 137. The sole purpose for which the Security Council adopted that resolution on 13 March was to deter the projected invasion by Turkey and at the same time it brought out once more the essential meaning of paragraph 1 of the resolution of 4 March, which was to restrain any Member State, and specifically in this case Turkey, from invadingor threatening to invade Cyprus. Furthermore, this interpretation was accepted by the majority of the members of the Security Council who spoke before the adoption of the Security Council resolution. 138. The representative of Brazil made thefollowing statement in proposing the resolution on behalf of the sponsors, namely, Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway: “Without going into the merits of the Turkish Government’s intentions, my delegationfeels strongly that the parties concerned should . , . abstain from any action which might exacerbate the grave situation already in existence in Cyprus and threaten the peace and security in the region.” [1103rd meeting, para. 95.1 139. The two Security Council resolutions to which 1 have just referred, although fully interpretedas 1 have stated above, have been defied and ignored by the Turkish Government since their adoption. How is it possible for Turkey to be allowed to ignore the Security Council, when other countries in othes similar cases, far greater andmorepowerful than Turkey, bave shown respect-t0 their credit-to the verdicts of this Council? 140. In spite of the action taken b’y the Security Council, the threats and the preparations for the aggression continued. The violations of the airspace of Cyprus by Turkish military aircraftwere repeated. The support given to the Turkish terrorists on the island increased in the form of arms, training and even trained irregulars from Turkey. Theprovocative eXerCiSes of the Turkish Naval Units at Alexandretta, and off the shores of Cyprus oontinued. The threatening statements by the Turkish leaders were repeated. 141. On 13 March 1964, the Turkish newspaper Millyet wrote that a Minister of the Turkish Govern- ‘fAfter the meeting of the Cabinet”-that is to say, Turkish Cabinett~ a spokesman declared that if incidents occur on the island, Turkey Will intervene immediately . . . . Upon receipt of their orders, the jets of the Turkish Air Force Will be flying over Cyprus in twelve minutes in order to provide air caver for the fleet.” 143. On 16 March 1964, only three days after the emergency session of the Security Council, the Turkish Parliament, at a joint secret session, authorized the Turkish Government to land troops in Cyprus, if neoessary. 144. On 7 April 1964 the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Sounai, referring to rumours which said that the reports about Turkey’s decision to make alanding were nbluffsl’, said that they were not bluffs and that a decision to intervene in Cyprus militarily had in fact been reached, 145. On 18 April 1964, in a commentary broadcast over Ankara radio, an open threat of invasion was made against Cyprus, and Turkish Cypriots were told to regard the green line in Nicosia as the new border between Turkey and Greece. 146. On 20 April 1964 the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Inonlt, said in Ankara: “If the United Nations Force cannot restore peace in Cyprus, Turkey Will have no option but to intervene. )1 147. On 27 Aprill964 the Turkish newspaper Cumhurif& reported: “This evening the most extensive military exercises of the year Will begin in the Alexandretta area.” It was on the same clay that the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Inonll, told reporters: “Whether the road to Kyrenia falls or not, we Will not let the island f a11 out of our hands ~ ” 148. On 30 April 1964, the Turkishnewspaper Millyet reported: ‘“Military exercises began yesterday in the area of Alexandretta, with the participation of the 48th and 50th regiments of the 39th division, in whose force the Turkish contingent in Cyprus belongs. Guerilla war units were also participating.” 149. On 4 May 1964, the same Turkish newspapes reported that units of the second army and heavy tanks began to gather in Alexandretta in order toparticipate ia landing exercises. 150. On 7 May 1964, the D&ense Ministry in Ankara announcecl that the Turkish navy, land and air forces began exercises off Iskenderun, south east Turkey. 151. On 11 May 1964, the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Kemal Satir, and at that time Acting ]-Oreign Minister, declared: “Al1 our preparations to invade Cyprus are complete. We have the strength and 152. On the same day, 11 May 1964, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Erkin, told reporters at The Hague that the presence of the United Nations troops in Cyprus did not affect Turkey’s right to intervene. On the same day, again the Turkish Foreign Minister was asked to confirm the statement made by bis colleague, Mr. Satir. He replied laconieally: “Yes-we cari capture Cyprus in six heurs.” 153. On 13 May 1964, the Turkish newspaper Millyet wrote: 1% is reliably reported that the preparations for a landing, which up to now may have given the impression of bluff or blackmailing, have now assumed a serious form. Al1 the necessary measures have been completed. n 154. On 14 May 1964, Turkish military aircraft violated once more the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus. A strong protest was lodged by my Government with the Turkish Government, and the Security Council was duly informed. 155. On 15 May 1964 according to a statement made by the Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff, General Tagmac, Turkish units from a11 three services took part in an exercise to test their strength in relation to Cyprus. General Tagmac told reporters that various units in various parts of the country took part in the exercise, concerning Cyprus. 156. On 17 May 1964, the Turkish Foreign Minister, in an interview with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, said that Turkey had a legal right to intervene in Cyprus. Members of the Council may recall that the Turkish reprksentative in the Security Council, when challenged twice by the representative of Cyprus as to whether in his Government’s view Turkeypossessedsuch a right, completely avoided the issue, It is, of course, much easier to make statements of this nature outside the Security Council. The Turklsh representative has now’made a’ reference to this point, and 1 shall gladly raise it again and ask certain questions. 15’7. On the same day, the Turkish Prime Ministes said in an interviewpublished in the German newspaper Die Welt: “One day Greece Will agree to a peacefulpartition of Cyprus with the help of NATO. As long as the Greeks refuse, the battle Will go on. Turkey Will not recede. In any hopeless situation in Cyprus, Turkey Will use her right of intervention in the island.” Obviously the word nhopelessn in this particular text must have referred to a case in which Turkey’s plans for achieving partition through peaceful means would not materialize. 160, On 6 June 1964, the White House announced in Washington that there had been an exchange of letters between President Johnson and the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr, InonU. It was reported that the United States Government had expressed its concern to the Turkish Government over developments in C@rus. Later it was learned that Turkey was planning an invasion of Cyprus, but was deterred at the last moment by the intervention of the United States. 161. On 5 and 6 June 1964, rumeurs were spread a11 over ‘the world, and information was received from various sources that Turkey was again preparing to implement its decision for an invasion of Cyprus. On 6 June, Reuter reported from Ankara that Turkey was on the s of military intervention in Cy-prus. 162, We are now being told by some ofthose who are or may be in a position to know, that the United States intervention halted the invasion only for the time being. We are being warned that the danger has simply been postponed, and that it has not been definitely averted. ft is being impressed upon us that the invasion may take place at any time. It is, 1 believe, my rightindeed, my duty-to request the Security Council not to ignore this situation, for the consequences Will be grave, not only for international peace, but also for the very foundations of the United Nations 0 It is, therefore, imperative that the Council should give priority over any other relevant consideration, however important, to these new threats of aggression by Turkey, made in complete disregard of the previous resolutiens. It is against this background that the Council should consider a11 other aspects of the situation in Cyprus. 163. Besides the threats and the preparations for an invasion of Cyprus, the Turkish Government has, in the meantime, been actively assisting the rebellion of the extremist Turkish Cypriots. Having inspired, incited and instigated the rebellion, the Turkish Government has been providing the terrorists with a11 kinds of Support, arms, training and even trained irregulars from Turkey, who have been smuggled into the island. 164. My Government is in possession of reliable information and evidence regarding the smuggling of arms and irregulars into Cyprus. For the benefit of the members of the Council, 1 shall read out extracts of a letter.addressed to a Turkish terrorist leader in Nicosia, by a Turkish terrorist leader in Mansoura, a village on the north toast of Cyprus, one of the main points where smuggling of arms and men from Tlnkey is taking place. This letter has been found on a British serviceman Senior Aircraftsman Keith Marley, who was arrested by the Cyprus police while tranSPOrting, in his own car, arms from thevillage of Mansoura Eo the Turkish terrorists in the Nioosia area, Here are some extracts from the lettes: This terrorist leader writes further: “As 1 am writing now to you the gift (arms shipment) has appeared from the sea. SO excuse me. We are rushing to the toast. May God not deprive us of the continuous flow of gifts and becs.” This letter, 1 believe, speaks for itself. This constitutes incontrovertible evidence of the role of Turkey in promoting the rebellion and bloodshed in Cyprus in her desire to further her own expansionist aims through the clandestine dispatch of arms and trained irregulars. 165. The above is further confirmed by anadmission of a member of the Turkish Parliament in a dispatch from Ankara, published in the issue of 24April by the Stiddeutsche Zeitung of Stuttgart. Mr. Hans Kempski reveals that the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Assembly, Professor Nihat Erim, admitted to him that organizers andspecialists of guerrilla warfare have been smuggled fromTurkey to Cyprus, and that this operation involves expenses on the order of 200 million Turkish pounds. 166. Besides the smuggling of arms and men by sea, my Government is in possession of reliable information regarding Turkish plans for the smugglingof arms into Cyprus by air, 167. The training of Turkish Cypriots, enlisted in other countries, in military camps in Turkey, is another example of the active role that the Turkish Government has been performing at the expense of Cyprus, in its effort to undermine the State and disrupt its unity in order to promote its own policy of partition, 168. On 15 May 1964, nine Turkish Cypriots were arrested by the Cyprus police, who were informed of their arriva1 at the Nicosia Airport. In the testimony given by them to the authorities, which wasreiterated and confirmed publicly on 29 May 1964 in a television interview, as well as at apress conference, these nine persons gave revealing details of their recruitment in London which took place, they were told, “in order to go to Cyprus and fight “. From London they were taken 169. These are but a few examples of the active participation of Turkey in the rebellion in and subversion of Cyprus, not to mention the most active role performed by the Turkish contingent in Cyprus in the whole aff air. ticipation la subversion mement dans toute l’affaire. 170. The Turkish contingent has refused to move from the position it has been illegally, and 1 repeat illegally, occupying since Christmas Day, On 29 March 1964, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, in identical communications addressed to the Prime Mini&ers of Greece and Turkey, requested the two Governments to order their contingents back to their barracks. In response to this appcal the Greek Government immediately ordered the Greek contingent back to its barracks, whereas the Turkish contingent refused. In his reply to President Makarios, dated 31 March 1964, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Inunnü, stated that: qu’il menti’ - depuis Noël. Le 29 mars de la Rbpublique de Chypre, dans des communications identiques Gr&e nements leurs Gouvernement contingent tandis ponse 1964, le Premier “The Turkish contingent in Cyprus was compelled to move into its present safe position on 25th December 1963, after the bloody events broke out in Cyprus on 21st December 1963. Its security was being seriously endangered in its normal barracks. The present position of the Turkish contingent is an absolute necessity imposed by the threats directed against the security of the Turkish unit.” CIetait This in fact was the first time that the security of the contingent was mentioned as the alleged reason for the action taken on 25 December. We have heard the same explanation for the second time today. Earlier we had been told that the Turkish contingent moved out of its normal barracks to its present positionin order du contingent prise explication nous avait dit précédemment avait 3 Ibid., Nineceenth Year, Supcment for April, May and June 1964. 171. Mr. In&iii, has contradicted himself. But there is yet another contradiction. The Turkish representative told the Security Council on 18 February 1964, that: tt *.. General Young, Commander of the British- Turkish-Greek peace-keeping forces in Cyprus, given a written statement to the effect that the Turkish units have acted and continue to act entirely under his orders.l’ [1095th meeting, para. 161.1 172. The Turkish Prime Minister, on the otherhand, in his letter of 31 March addressed to the President of Cyprus, stated that there was no relationship tween the arrangement of 26 December, namely, the one referred to by the Turkish representative, the position that the Turkish contingent had occupied, and which it still occupies. 173. In my estimation, the real reason behind the original move of the Turkish contingent was the same as the one which is now behind the refusa1 of the Turkish Government to order its withdrawal from the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. It was, fromthe beginning, part of the plan, The Turkish contingent was ordered occupy its present strategic position for the purpose of facilitating, on the one hand, the plan for the invasion of the island from the outside while providing a caver-up from within, and, on the other hand, to be in a better position to fulfil more easily its second function, namely, that ofproviding of training and other support to the Turkish Cypriot rebels. 174. The refusa1 of the Turkish Government toorder the Turkish contingent back to its barracks left no alternative to my Government than to consider Treaty of Alliance as terminated, as it had been violated in its essence by Turkey, 175. The Turkish representative today made the point that the fact that the Turkish contingent originally moved out from its normal barracks to its present position, and the fact that the Turkish tingent still holds this position at thepresent moment, is not a violation of the Treaty. He even referred the Application Agreement. May 1 read, forhis benefit and for the benefit of the members of the Council, the relevant decision taken by the Committee of Ministers of the Treaty of Alliance which, as he should know, is the supreme political authority provided under the Treaty to deal with, the stationingof Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus. The decision, which was taken on 28 June 1961, is as follows: “The present camps of the Greek andTurkishcontingents should be considered as their permanent camps unless and until decided otherwise by the Committee of Ministers.” I repeat: Wnless and until decided otherwise by the Committee of Mini&ers”, and not unilaterally by the Turkish Government. The continued presence, therefore, in Cyprus of the Turkish contingent constitutes 177, In his report to the Security Council of 15 June 1964, the Secretary-General states: 17’7. Dans de sécuritf3, ces termes: “The Greek Army contingent would readily place itsélf under United Nations command, semain in its barracks and possibly withdraw from the island if a similar arrangement could be made with the Turkish Army contingent . . . . The continued deployment of Turkish troops cannot greatly add to the security of the Turkish Cypriots over and above the seourity ‘that UNFICYP could a,fford them. , ,II [S/ 5764, para. 1161. Et le SecrBtaire The Secretary-General, in his report, goes on to say: ‘1. l . 1 consider it reasonable to urge that the Turkish Army contingent should now either retire to its barracks voluntarily and remain there, or aocept my long-standing offer to take it under United Nations command, although not as a contingent in UNFICYP. This, of course, would certainly mean the return of the Turkish troops to their barracks. However, the condition advanced up to now by Turkish offioials for agreeing to place the Turkish con-, tingent under United Nations command is unacceptahle, since it would SO limit UNFICYP authority over the contingent as to render United Nations command meaningless.” [Ibid.] Au paragraphe genéral, et turc & Chypre, leur presence In paragraph 115 in his report, the Secretary-General, referring to the presence in Cyprus of the Greek and Turkish contingents states: “In any case, their presence on the island is a problem.. . Ott 178, Mon gouvernement les troupes qui ne sont pas sous le Commandement Unies estime Son maintien la paix. C’est en soi un acte d’agression. 1’78. It is my Government’s firm view that foreign troops in Cyprus which are not under the command of the United Nations should leave the country. It is my Government’s position that the Turkish contingent should leave Cyprus D Its continued presence in Cyprus constitutes a threat to peace. It is an act of aggression in itself. 179. Dans son trait6 of Force dehors des forces effectuées d’actes ne peut demeurer rain invitation ri&e un acte d’agression terme 179. In the book, International Law and the Use of Force$/ Ian Brownlie writes that apartfrom forces of occupation during wartime or war-like operations, no foreign forces are allowed or cari remain on the territory of a sovereign State, except with its consent or unsolicited invitation. Any other unauthorized interference with the territory of a sovereign State constitutes an act of aggression according to the accepted meaning of that expression in international law. The presence of foreign troops without the consent of the State repudiates the con- & Oxford University Press, 1963. 180. In the light of what 1 have stated, which, 1 believe, establishes beyond doubt the fact that theintegrity, independence, sovereignty and unity of the State of Cyprus are under a constant threat fromwithout as well as from within, Iwonder whether Ineed to explain the reasons which prompted my Government in taking additional measures to organize and reinforce its defence. 181. At the outset, 1 wish to make it quite clear that it 1s the inherent right of any sovereign Government to import arms or organize its armed forces, No one has the authority to deny this right to my Government. The only question, therefore, which remains to be answered is whether it was necessary for my Government to take additional measures at this moment to strengthen its defence, The answer to this question is to be found in the existing situation in Cyprus. No objective person would question the advisability of the measures taken by my Government, unless he believes in the theory that Cyprus is too small a country to resist any invasion. 182. We in Cyprus-and 1 believe that a11 freedom loving peoples of the world would agree withus-completely dismiss this theory. It is our duty and our right to defend our country and my Government Will never lose sight of its responsibilities in this respect. 183. The late President of the United States, President Kennedy, one of the greatest believers in peacein our time, said in a speech at Arlington in 1962: “The only was t0 keep the peace is to beready in the last resort to fight for our country.” 184. 1 entirely agree with the Secretary-General that the smuggling of arms, whether by Turkish or by Greek Cypriots, is illegal. In this connexion 1 wish to stress that my Government would be particularly pleased to co-operate with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in checking the smuggling of arms. On the other hand, the importation of arms on behalf of a Government cannot, under any circumstances, be made subject to the approval of anyone. Ican, however, state that it was not the intention of my Government to acquire heavy arms or take additional military measures if there was no threat of invasion from outside. 185. Much has also been said about the Government’s decision to institute conscription. 1 quote from paragraph 118 of the Secretary-General% report: “The decision by the Government of Cy-prus to institute conscription in connexion with the organization of the National Guard to assist the security forces of the State, is a governmental act.” 186. In his report, the Secretary-General deals in detail with various aspects of the situation in Cyprus. As 1 indicated earlier, 1 do not intend at this stage to make detailed comments on the report. 1 would, however, wish to touch upon one or two of the issues dealt with by the Secretary-General. 186. Dans son rapport, en détail de divers Comme propose detaillés aborder général a trait& 187, The Secretary-General made specific reference to the question of hostages. My Government’sposition on the practice of taking hostages is clear beyond any doubt. 1 wish to repeat in this context extracts from a statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, made on 6 March 1964: 187. la question nement le ce propos des extraits dent Makarios, “The Government of the Republic Will make every effort and Will take a11 necessary measures in order to suppress any unlawful acts and to enforce law and order. One side of this task is the easing of the existing tension. A first step towards that direction is the releasing of a11 persons held as hostages. “For this purpose we appoiht ‘that by noon tomorrow, Saturday 7th March, a11 Turks held as hostages by Greeks, shall be brought freely to Nicosia Police Headquarters, where it has been arranged that they Will be taken over by the representatives of the International Red Cross. Ihope that without any excuse or delay there Will be complete compliance. Failure, if any, to comply with the’above, Will be severely punished. This gesture on the part of the Greek Cypriot side Will not be made dependent on any conditions whatsoever to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. 1 express the hope, however, that there will be a reciprocal response and gesture.” The next day forty-nine Turks who had been detained by the Greeks were released in response to the appeal of the President. Le lendemain, 49 Turcs dktenus par les Grecs &aient mis 188, Or, un certain par leurs sort, ment simple: 188. A number of Greek hostages held by the Turks have never in fact been released, and in answer to various inquiries made by their relatives and the authorities, the reply of the Turkish leadership is cynically simple: “We don’t have any hostages.” 189. The fact remains, however, that a greatnumber of Greeks are known to have been abducted and taken as hostages by the Turks. Their fate has been unknown for some time now. But when the Turkish leaders stated that the Turks do not hold any hostages, the clear implication is that a11 those persons -bave been murclered. It is perhaps true that in some instances some irresponsible Greeks have taken thelaw into their own hands and, in retaliation, have taken Turkish Cypriots as hostages. This may have been the case, for example, following the incident of the coldblooded assassination of the two Greek army officers 189. Grecs, otages par les Turcs. un certain déclarent cela sous-entend nes &tre irresponsables par mesure turcs ce qui s’est grecque et un policier de sang-froid &néral irkciser condamne prise and a Cypriot policeman in Famagusta, an incident which the Secretary-General mentioned in his report. But I wish to make it clear once more that this prac- UCe Of taking hostages, from whichever side it is exercised, is most strongly condemned by my Government. The President of Cyprus, in a statement on 28 The President of the Republic of Cyprus was xeferring to the praotice of taking hostages in general, whether the perpetrators came from the Greek side or the Turkish side. 190, However, we have never read or heaxd of any condemnation of this practice from either the Turkish Government or the Turkish leaders in Cyprus in the cases where Greeks were taken as hostages by the Turks. On the contxary, by exaggerations and distortions, the Turkish leaders, both in Ankara and in Cyprus, have tried to capitalize on the question of hostages, fully aware that public opinion is most sensitive-and quite rightly so-on this subject. The Turkish leaders have tried to conceal the fact that Greeks have been abducted, and probably muxdered, by the Turks. On the other hand, Turkish propaganda has tried to fabrioate an exaggerated picture of Turks being abducted by the Greeks. In this effort long lists of missing persons have been prepared and handed over to the Red Cross by the Turkish leaders, But a great number of the persons who were listed by the Turkish leadershjp as missing, have been found in their homes, well and safe. 191. Following the disturbances at Paphos, Mr. KUçük informed the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross that a number of hostages were being held by the Greek Cypriots. This charge was also contained in the Turkishpropagandaleaflets. At the request of the Red Cross a list of the allegedly missing persons was submitted by Mr. Kliçiik. Acting on this complaint, Red Cross representatives visited Ktima, Paphos, and ascertained that none ol these pexsons had been missing and that they were a11 found perfectly safe in their homes. The name of an expolice constable, Kemil Mehmet, had appearedon every list of missing persons since January 1964. Yet in April the Red Cross representative was able to locate him living in good health at his home in the Turkish quarter. 192. The most blatant example, howevér, of the bad iaith of the extremist Turkish leadexship in this respect is the recent case of the thirty-two Turkish Cypriots, whose names had been included on the list of missing persons alleged to have been taken as hostages, and who, after inquiries, were found alive and well in their homes by the RedCross representatives, never having been abducted by anyone. Despite the fa& that the Red Cross had informed the Turkish leadership of this fact, and despite the request made to the Turkish leadexship to announce publicly that the thirty-two persons in question, previously alleged to have been missing, had been found safe in their homes, the Turkish leadership deliberately omitted to make any statement in a dishonest attempt to continue to make politioal capital out of their fabricated story of hostages. 194. A close look at the facts would show that the question of hostages has become a propaganda objective for the Turkish leadership. People who are safe in their homes are to be found on the missing persons list. People who are probably at the moment happily visiting other countries, such as Turkey, also may be found on the missing persons list, but, what is worse, my Government’s strong suspicion, not unwarranted and not without good reason, is that also a number of those persons on the missing list are indeed missing, for they have been assassinatedby the extremist members of their own community for failure to compIy with their orders, or because they were found guilty of wishing to see normal and friendly relations resume between Greeks and Turks on the island. 195. Before leaving this subject 1 wish to stress once more that my Government is determined to do its utmost to put an end altogether to the practice of taking hostages, whether exercised by Greeks or by Turks. My Government feels unable to acoept any suggestion that those Turkish Cypriots, including some of their terrorist leaders, who are responsible for the abduction and murder of Greeks, as well as of Turks, should not be liable to arrest and punishment. 196. As the Council has seen, it has not been my intention to set aside the fact that some Greek irresponsible elements may have been guilty of the practice of taking hostages. What 1 have attempted to do is simply to present the problem in its proper perspective and dispel the falsehoods which Turkish propaganda has found it necessary to resort to, in accordance with the Hitlerite principle that a lie, if told 100 times, becomes a truth. 197. The President of the Republic of Cyprus in his statement on 29 May 1964 to which the representative of Turkey made reference earlier, although he unfortunately and-1 cannot help feeling-purposely, failed to mention the whole statement, had said: “1 do not conceal the fact that Turks have been abducted by irresponsible Greek elements and have probably been killed. 1 have, however, ceased to believe that the lists of missing Turks submitted by the Turkish leaders are true. An example in point is the case of the thirty-two Turks who had never been abducted and whom the Red Cross discovered living in good health in their own homes.” 198. While the Turkish leaders are fabricating stories about hostages held by the Greeks, the intimidation of the Turkish peace-loving citizens by the Turkish rebels has assumed new dimensions. The Security Counoil should pay particular attention to this aspect. Terrorization and intimidation of the Turkish Cypriots by the Turkish terrorists is one of the methods employed by the Turkish leadership in its endeavour to resist the will of the people which desires to restore normal and friendly relations between the two com- “The harvesting has provided the opportunity fox the renewal of contacts between the two communities, and has demonstrated that the will and the ability to live and woxk together still exists. n 200. When, on the other hand, a United Nations officia1 in Cyprus made a similar statement to the effect that Greeks and Turks cari live together, the Turkish illegal radio station, in a commentary, declared: “We expect the Peace Porte Commander to issue an immediate statement refuting the views expressed by the United Nations officiai.” 201. The Turkish Cypriots are living in conditions of cruel suppression, intimidation and terrorismimposed by the Turkish rebels. Out of the numerous cases reported to the police, the following instances may be cited by way of examples: 202. On 20 March 1964, it was reported to the police that, in the Turkish village of Vretsia, Turkish extremists fatally shot a Turkish Cypriot, Ali Kachatti, of the same village, The victim is said to have been related to the modcrate Turkish leader, Mr. Ihsan Ali. 203. On 7 April 1964, a Turkish shepherd, Djemil Feyzoullah, while grazing his flock near the village of Asproyia, accompaniecl by his wife, who is of Greek origin, was fired at by two Turkish terrorists and was injured in the head. He was treated in a Government hospital. 204. Another Turkish Cypriot, Behaettin Niazi was arrested and tortured by Turkish terrorists of the village of Pano Yialia on the accusation that he was running a taxi service between his village and Nicosia, going through Greek villages, This amounted to a crime. 205. The case of Moustapha Houssein Kousha is particularly revealing. This unfortunate Turkish Cypriot, who had been induced to leave his house in the mixed village of Dhali in order to go, together with his family, tq the Turkish village of Louroujina, decided to return secretly to Dhali, where he found his house in Perfect order. He has requested that his family in Louroujina be allowed to return with him to Dhali, but the Turkish extremists in Louroujina refused to let them go, despite his efforts to this end through the Red Cross representatives. According to him, his family have been recently subjected to illtreatment at the hands of the Turkish rebels. 206. Mustapha Dervish, another Turkish Cypriot of Paphos, who was running a coffee shop in an area near the Greek quarter, was ordered to close his shop, or otherwise ke punished. The reason for this order was that Greek Cypriots were also frequenting the coffee shop and meeting their old Turkishfriends. 207. It is oharacteristic in this respect that paragraph 34 of the Seoretary-General’s report accepts the possibility that: 11 . . . in Ktima the leaders of the extremist Turkish Cypriot organization Turk Mudafaa Tesdati (Turkish 208. A Turkish Cypriot by the name of Kaimal Osman, of Omorphita village, was ill-treated by the Turks for net being unfriendly towards the Greeks. He managed to escape to the Greek sector of Nicosia. 208. du village d’omorphita, parce à se réfugier 209, Another Turkish Cypriot, Behri Yousouf of Lambriou, at Larns.ca, was ill-treated by the Turkish rebels in Larnaca. He was then abducted by the Turks and taken to Nicosia, whence he managed to escape to the Greek sector of the town. 209. Lambriou, turcs Turcs per et a gagner le secteur grec de la ville, 210. Faik Naim of Mallia, sixty years old, was illtreated by his Turkish compatriots because the Greeks had suppliecl him with bread. 210. maltraité Gre:;rl l’approvisionnaient 211. Houssein Behrich Arif Gokay of Kyrenia, nowof Famagusta, accompanied by his brother, went to a police station to complain that he was detained by Turkish terrorists and ill-treated because he refused to take arms against the State. 21.1. Houssein maintenant gnie de son frére d’avoir maltraitk contre l%tat. 212. On 20 March 1964, Salih Mounir of Lapithiou, another Turkish Cypriot, called at another village and reported to the Greeks of the village that extremist Turks had beaten him up because he had condemned their acts of violence against the Greeks. 212. autre Chypriote lage et a signalé aux Grecs du village que des extré- mistes les des Grecs, 213. I could go on for hours and hours citing examples of ill-treatment and intimidation imposed by the Turkish rebels on the peace-loving Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. The Cyprus police is in a position to report hundreds of incidents of ill-treatment of Turks at the hands of their fellow Turks, simply because they condemned violence or expressecl friendly feelings towards their Greek compatriots. Many such persons sought and received police protection. 213. citer des exemples de mauvais traitements dtintimidation sont victimes La police chypriote centaines des Turcs que les premiers maient triotes se trouvant protection 214. The great majority of the Turks in Cyprus have the desire to restore friendly relations with the Greeks. They are not allowed to do SO by the Turkish rebels, because friendship and co-operation wouldnot promote the Turkish plan for partition andseparation. 214. d&irent Grecs, pas parce seraient 215. A well-known Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr.Ihsan Ali, has described the sufferings of the Cypriot Turks at the hands of the Turkish extremists in letters and messages which he has addressed to various newspapers and personalities, including the Turkish Prime Minister. In a telegram addressed on 16 March 1964 to Mr. Intinü, Mr. Ihsan Ali spoke of those Turks who are trying to turn Cyprus into hell byputting forth the nonsensical allegation that Greeks and Turks cannot live together in Cyprus to world public opinion. Mr. Ali concluded his message to the Turkish Prime Minister as followsn v0 . . on behalf of the citizens who cannOt raise their voice owing to the prevailing threats and terrorism. )I 215. Un dirigeant Ali, turcs des messages verses Ministre 1964 a M. Inonü, M. Ihsan Ali parlait qui s’efforcent en soutenant cette allBgation ne peuvent terminait ces faire terrorisme 216. In a letter addressed to the Turkish newspaper Millyet, Mr. Ihsan Ali spoke of the actions of the Turkish terrorists to suppress those Turks incyprus who do no! follow their directions. He wrote: “Due to the terrorism and intimidation of Denktas, surpassing 216. Dans une lettre envoyee au journal M. Ihsan Ali a parlé des actes commis ristes pas leurs rorisme “Almost every day I receive complaints either in person, or by phone or letters, from my Turkish compatriots, to the effect that they are exposed to Turkish threats and intimidations in various ways. In particular, they are prevented from going to the Greek market or shopping even for their basic necessities of life. Also those who have deserted their homes and villages are now being prevented from going back to their homes, . .“, Hundreds of Turkish Cypriots want to go backto their villages and live peacefully together with their Greek compatriots, but they are not allowed to do SO. 218. In their effort to pursue the plan of partition, in certain areas the Turkish leaders are forcing the Turkish Cypriot population of Cyprus to live in a State of seige. In spite of the fact that the Turkish leaders are acting on the basis of a plan to destroy the State, the State, on the othes hand, although in a position to create difficulties for the Turkishpopulation, has done its utmost to assist the Turkish citizens in any way possible. 219. The Qovernment of Cyprus has, for example, shown great magnanimity on the subject of supplies from Turkey to the Turks, in spite of the fact that all the commodities imported are plentiful and easily obtainable in Cyprus andin spite of the obvious danger, supported by reliable information, that stocks are being built up in order to support afull-scale Turkish military operation. 220. Since the end of December 1963, the Government of the Republic has allowed entry into Cyprus of Red Crescent personnel who came to offer medical treatment to the wounded Turks in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, but who, in fact, have been working to build up complete medical units and hospitals, as part of the pre-arranged plan for the division of the country, and who have also been making preparations themselves in anticipation of an invasion by Turkey. 221. Since that time my Government has allowed entry into Cyprus of foodstuffs and animal fodder, clothing and footwear, medicine, blankets and tents, to the total value of f 282;230 sterling. The Government has allowed these supplies to be imported duty free. This meant a considerable loss to the economy of the country not only in the form of import duty, but also because of the fact that a11 of these supplies were easily obtainable in the Cy-prus market. 222. Likewise, even though it became apparent that the Turks were acting on a preconceived plan, the Government did not, as it might have done, proceed to apply measures such as cutting off electricity or water for which, by the way, the Turkish Cypriots do not even pay now. 223. Al1 international organizations in Cyprus have acknowledged the generosity of the Cyprus Govern- 225. The main obstacle to the return to normality is the laok of freedom of movement in certain parts of the island, where Turkish terrorists are in control of certain roads. This problem still exists, to a certain extent, due to the fact that the Turkish rebels wauld not consider it helpful to their plans of division and partition to allow freedom of movement through the areas which they control. 225. normale certaines oontralent subsiste les rebelles leurs mettre qu’ils 226. But the State of Cyprus is one and indivisible and the effective authority of the Government must be re-established over the whole territory. It is in this direction that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in C@rus cari, and should, render a more active assistance, because without complete freedom of movement, the term “return to normality”, contained in the resolution of 4 March 1964 of the Security Council, becomes meaningless. 226. sible, être dans ce sens que la Force des Nations Unies charg8e du maintien tance plus active parce que, sans une liberté vement tion normale”, de sécurité 0 ation. 227. In this connexion, and in order to facilitate a solution to this problem, the Government of Cyprus has repeatedly put forward various suggestions to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. But the Turkish leaders refused to act aocordingly. It is another example of the bad faith of the Turkish leaders, and it is another example of their endeavour to undermine the mission of the UnitedNations Force, 227. problème, plusieurs des a Chypre, suivre la mauvaise foi des dirigeants dont ils de la Force. 228. It is the view of my Government that if the resolution of the Security Council of 4 Marchl.964 is to be fully implemented, freedom of movement throughout the country must be completely ensured, and a11 dividing lines must be removed. Any tolerant attitude to the oontrary would, in my submission, be a contravention of the resolution of 4 March, which would result in the failure of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. 228. appliquer S&urit& mouvement entier Supprim&es. contraire lution du 4 mars et aboutirait de la Force des Nations Unies a Chypre. 229. complet cet esprit est prbt & poursuivre avec la Force des Nations Unies ohargee du maintien de la paix. 229, My Government wishes the United Nations Force to succeed fully. It is in this spirit ancï within this framework that my Government is ready to continue to co-operate, to the fullest extent urith the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. 230. tion a Chypre, tous les problèmes gituation sont par politiqw de menaces. Tous les probl&mes, ficultés et tous les obstacles que nous rencontrons a rebelles turcs sont, la encore, les sympt8mes d’une cause unique, a savoir le plan de partage du Gouvernement turc. Les souffrances et le drame de la population chypriote, qu’elle soit turque, grecque, armb 230. I have dealt with some of the aspects of the situation in Cyprus. But it is crystal-clear that a11 the problems and the issues involved in the situation within Cyprus are only symptoms; they are not the cause. The cause is the policy pursued by the Turkish Government-the policy of division, the policy of partition, the policy of provocation, the policy of threats. Al1 the problems, the difficulties and the obstacles that we are confronted with in Cyprus, due to the subversive activities of the Turkish rebels, are again symptoms of one cause, nsmely the partltionist plan of the Turkish Government. The hardships and the tragedy of the population of Cyprus, whether Greeks, Turks, Armenians or Maronites, are 231. The cause of the trouble in Cyprus has came from the outside. It is the Turkish Government has armed the Turkish Cypriot rebels. It is the Turkish Government which has inspired and instigated rebellion against the State of Cyprus for the purpose of destroying the State, as was SO often repeatedly explicitly stated by the Turkish leaders, namely that their aim is to partition the State. It is the Turkish Government that does not want peace in Cyprus. Tuskey who continuously threatens Cyprus with vasion and at the same time encourages and supports the Turkish rebels to undermine any effort either of the United Nations or of the Government of Cyprus for a return to normal life in the country. lt was the Turkish Foreign Minister who spoke of the failure of the Mediator in Cyprus before the Mediator himself had the chance even to make his report Secretary-General. Turkey continues to undermine peace in Cyprus, and, with her policy ancl actions, threatens international peace. 232, The Security Council Will not be serving purpose if it chooses to ignore the real facts of the situation. It is against this background of facts that the future role of the United Nations with regard Cyprus lies. 233. In conclusion, 1 wish to reiterate once more my Government’s position with regard to the problem Cyprus. We want peace and a return to normal ditions in Cyprus and we are ready to co-operate with the United Nations in a common effort to achieve this goal. We are not, on the other hand, prepared accept curtailment of any of the sovereign rights the legal Government in Cyprus. We shall nottolerate any effort, whether from within or without, aimed at destroying the unity and the territorial integrity the sovereign and independent State of Cyprus, 234. We expect protection from the United Nations in view of the new threats by Turkey directed against the independence and territorial integrity of our country. We expect peace and justice from the United Nations. We expect a United Nations political solution. 235. My Government is ready to guarantee the human rights of a11 its citizens irrespective of colour, or religion; but on the other hand, my Government not prepared to negotiate on the inherent rights majority to rule and to decide fseely upon the future political administration of their country. My Government, in short, is determined to see the resolutions of the Security Council and the Charter of the United Nations fully respected and applied in the case Cyprus. 236. 1 would like to apologize for having taken muoh of the Counoilts most valuable time. I have tried to give to you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council, a clear picture of the true situation in Cyprus.

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