S/PV.1142 Security Council

The provisional agenda for this evening’s meeting of the Security Council is contained in document S/Agenda/ll42. If 1 hear no objection, I shall consider it to be adopted. 1. Le PRESIDENT jour provisoire de ce soir S’il n’y a pas d’opposition, adopté.

Mr. President, the Soviet delegation does not abject to the adoption of the agenda; however, it waives its objection on the understanding that our adoption of the agenda shall net prejudge the order in which we take up the questions raised in sub-paragraphs (a) and (IJ), nor the procedure we may adopt in discussing them. 2. M. MOROZOV sovi&iques) tique n’a pas d’objection du jour entendu dans lequel seront aux alineas des débats sÜ!r ces questions. 3. On this understanding, and provided it is shared by a11 the others, we shall not abject to the adoption of the agenda. In regard to the question of the se- Wence and organization of the discussion on this matter, we shal1 venture to revert to this at the ap- FJroPriate time after the agenda has been adopted. 3. Si tous les membres interpretation, contre adoption, temps l’organisation The agenda was adopted. L’ordre Lettre, Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Président Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Counci I ($5488): permanent CJ) Lettre, (0) Letter dated 8 A ugust 1964 from the Permanent Président liepresentative of Turkey addressed to the Presisentant dent of the Security Council (S/5859); 5. Throughout the present crisis in the island of Cyprus and with particular regard to the fighting between Government forces and Turkish Cypriots, General K. S. Thimayya, the Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, has persistently been exerting every effort to avoid further bloodshed by bringing about a cesse-fire wherever fighting has occurred. Bis efforts are continuing and he is keeping in close and constant touch with the leaders of the Government and the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community for this purpose. These efforts have not yet met with success, however. 6. Measures have also been taken by the United Nations Force to assist the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants who have fled from the various localities in the Kokkina-Mansoura area involved in the fighting and have sought the protection of the contingent of the United Nations Force in Mansoura. Assistance to these refugees as well as to the wounded has been discussed by General Thimayya with the Government authorities and continues to be given to the refugees. 7. Communications under today’s date have been received from the Permanent Representatives of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus requesting participation on behalf of their respective Governments in the discussion of the questions just placed on the Council’s agenda. These communications have been circulated as documents S/5862, S/5863 and S/5864.g If there is no objection, 1 propose to invite them to take part in our discussion of the matter, in accordance with past practice. At the invitation of the President, MI-. Orhan Eralp (Turkey), Mr. Dimitri S. Bitsios (Greece) and Mr. Zenon Rossides (Cyprus) took places at the Council table.

1 cal1 on the representative of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on a point of order.

Mr. President, a moment ago the Soviet delegation reserved its right to submit for the Council’s consideration some observations concerning the organization of the Council’s work at the present meeting. A simple comparison of the letters mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the agenda just adopted by the Council shows that priority should be given to the question raised in the letter from the representative of Cyprus [5/5861]Y which concerns “the deliberate and unprovoked armed air attacks against the unarmed civilian population of Cyprus carried out by airplanes of the Turkish Air Force in the hours immediately .L/ Sec Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplemcnt for July, August and September 1964. 10. 1 believe that such an order of business would be consistent both with the responsibilities already assumed by the Council in the past in the question of Cyprus, and with the facts submitted in the letter to which 1 have just referred. 10. J’estime que cette façon de proc&ler correspond a la fois aux responsabilités que le Conseil a deja assumees antérieurement dans la question de Chypre et aux circonstances de fait qui sont évoquees dans la lettre susmentionnee. 11. I hope that those members of the Council who are concerned to ensure expeditious and objective consideration of this question Will support my proposa1 that we hear first the representative of Cyprus, who incidentally has just arrived from his homeland, and then give the floor to a11 the other representatives who wanted to take part and were invited to do SO, and, of course, to the members of the Council. 11. J’espere que ceux des membres du Conseil qui tiennent à ce que cette affaire soit examinee avec diligence et objectivite appuieront ma proposition, afin que nous puissions entendre d’abord le representant de Chypre, qui vient d’ailleurs d’arriver et que la parole soit ensuite donnee B tous les autres representants qui ont demandé a prendre part aux travaux que, bien entendu, aux membres du Conseil, 12. 1 foresèe that these remarks of mine may arouse technical objections to the effect that the order in which these documents were submitted is not the order which 1 should like and in which 1 should consider it expedient for the Council to hear the representatives who have raised this question-the representatives of Turkey and Cyprus. I think that, in the face of the grave deterioration of the situation in Cyprus, we should be guided by considerations not of form but of substance. 12. Je prevois que ces observations de ma part risquent de se heurter a des objections d’ordre technique, en ce sens que l’ordre dans lequel les documents ont été pr&entés est différent de celui dans lequel il me parait souhaitable et rationnel que le Conseil entende les représentants qui ont soulevé cette question, c’est-a-dire les représentants de la Turquie et de Chypre. Eu egard a l’aggravation serieuse de la situation à Chypre, il me semble que nous devons nous laisser guider, non pas par des considérations d’ordre technique, mais par des considerations qui portent sur le fond de la question, 13. For this reason 1 would ask my distinguished colleagues to support my proposa1 and allow the representative of Cyprus, if, as I understand, he has already put his name on the list of speakers, to address us first. This would of course not exclude but rather take it for granted that the representative of Turkey and a11 the other representatives wishing to take part in the discussion of this question Will have the opportunity to give their views and explanations here. 13. C’est pourquoi je voudrais demander a mes distingues collegues d’appuyer ma proposition et de donner en premier lieu la parole au représentant de Chypre, je crois être le cas, sur la liste des orateurs, Bien entendu, cela n’exclut pas, mais au contraire pré- suppose, que le representant de la Turquie, ainsi que tous les autres repr&sentants qui d&sirent prendre part au debat, auront aussi la possibilité d’exposer ici leurs vues et de donner leurs explications. 14. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): En ce qui concerne la proposition du representant de l’Union des Republiques socialistes soviétiques, je voudrais informer le Conseil de l’ordre dans lequel le Président a 6th saisi des demandes de réunion du Conseil de sécurité ainsi que des demandes d’inscription sur la liste des orateurs. Le bureau du Président a Bté d’abord informe ce matin par la dblégation de Chypre que son représentant faisait route vers New York, qu’il se rendrait chez le Président des son arrivée et demanderait probablement alors une reunion du Conseil de securitb afin d’examiner les évenements de Chypre.

In regard to the proposalmade by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 should like to inform the Council about the sequence of requests made to the President for a meeting of the Council and for inscription of speakers on his list. The President’s office was first informed this morning by the delegation of Cyprus that the Permanent Representative of Cyprus was on his way to New York and that he would cal1 on the President upon his arrival, and that he was likely then to request a meeting of the Security Council to consider the developments in Cyprus. 15. Peu apres, vers 11 h 15, j’ai reçu une communication du representant de la Turquie demandant que le Conseil de sécurite soit convoque d’urgence. Cette lettre figure dans le document S/5859a. 15. A short time thereafter, at approximately 11.15 a.m., 1 received a communication from the representative of Turkey requesting an urgent meeting of the Council. That letter is reproduced as document W5859.Y 16. At approximately two o’clock this afternoon, I received a communicationfrom the Charged’affaires 16. Cet aprss-midi, charge d’affaires de Chypre une communication qui 2/Ibid 4 18. The rule to be followed by the President ta me to be very clear: it is rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, and, with your permission, 1 shall read it: “The President shall cal1 upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.” 19. In the meantime, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has presented posa1 to the Security Council that a different procedure be followed, and that the representative of Cyprus called upon to speak first. 1 should like to know members of the Council would want to express Opinions on the proposa1 made by the representative of the Soviet Union. 20. May 1 further inform the Council that the representative of Turkey, as well as the representative Cyprus, when 1 contacted them in this regard, maintained the desire to speak first. 1 was informed by the representative of Cyprus that he considered his request, which was for an immediate meeting, the one that had to take precedence; whereas representative of Turkey made reference to the rules of procedure and the fact that he had inscribed name first. Moreover, it was mentioned that what the representative of Cyprus wanted to do was to speak first on his own item, which he considered his letter to set forth. A similar point of view expressed by the representative of Turkey. 21. 1 thought 1 should give that information membsrs of the Council before 1 hear any one of the members who might like to speak on the proposa1 made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Despite the procedural arguments raised here to the effect that the delegation of Turkey should be given the floor my delegation wishes to support tbe view that the matter presented in the letter from the representative of Cyprus be given priority in the Council meeting and that he consequently be given the floor first speaker, The reason for which my delegation takes this position is quite clear. Cyprus is a country which has been attacked and, as 1 understand situation is becoming even more serious at this very moment. 1 therefore think that, at auch a grave moment, the Council might apply a procedure would correspond to the seriousness of the situation. 23. Mr. CASTRILLO JUSTINIANO (Bolivia) lated from Spanish): 1 should like to explain my delegation’s position, The Bolivian delegation feels there are two aspects to this problem: that of substance and that of Eorm. In my delegation’s the procedure we adopt should be based on realities and not follow a purely routine course. 25. The Turkish representative has asked the Security Counoil to meet in order to “consider the serious situation created in Cyprus by the renewed and continuing attempts . . . “. In the note from the Charge d’affaires of Cyprus, Turkey is accused of “attacks” -which is not at a11 the same thing as “attempts”- against the unarmed people of Cyprus carried out by planes of the Turkish air force. 25. le examine efforts grecs de Chypre très lation 1’ armee 26. The note from the Turkish representative denounces the Greek Cypriot Community for its continuing attempts to perpetuate the usurpation of government, which is a political matter. On the other hand, the note from the Charge d’affaires of Cyprus calls upon the Security Council to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and for putting an end to armed aggression. 26, la efforts gouvernement tique. Au contraire, de Chypre de sécurite agressions 27. 1 hope that my interpretation of thematter,based on the text of the two notes, is quite clear. My delegation feels that the Council should first hear the representative of Cyprus, without, however, in any way prejudicing the Turkish delegation’s right to speak as often as necessary. 27. j’espere Ma délégation pense que, sans porter au droit la parole le Conseil & parler

May 1 inquire from the representative of the Soviet Union if he has made a forma1 proposal? 28. -Le PRESIDENT demander a fait une proposition 29. Mr, MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republies) (translated from Russian): Mr. President,before replying to your question 1 should like to offer some clarification of the proposa1 1 bave submitted and which I continue to support, with particular reference to the observations which you have just made on rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure. 29. soviétiques) a votre compte en vous reférant provisoire, de la proposition 30. It is not my intention, Mr. President, to contest what you quite correctly quoted: the wording of rule 27. 1 shall therefore venture not to repeat it. I would merely say that to this situation-that is, the question of the order of the statements to be made by the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey, invited to take part in this meeting of the Council under Article 32 of the Charter of the United Nations-rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council unfortunately does not apply in any way. The fact is that, before rule 27 cari be applied, there must be a list of speakers drawn up in accordance with that rule. Yet it is perfectly clear that at 2.15 o’clock this afternoon-1 believe that was when you said the representative of Turkey asked to be put on the list of speakers-it was not yet known what decision the Council would take concerning Turkey’s participation in this meeting, In any event, even if it were permissible to take it for granted that he would of course be invited to take part in the meeting, it could not be held that at that moment he was already one of the persons entitled to speak under Article 32 of the Charter; because we had not then reached our forma1 decision of a few minutes ago to invite him and other non-members of the Council to participate in the discussion of the question now before us. Consequently, the inscription on the list of speakers at 2.15 this afternoon had no legal significance if we are to approach the question from a purely legal 30. ce que vous avez cite tres l’article donc pas la teneur, Je me bornerai 27 n’a, malheureusement, tion lequel doivent intervenir et de la Turquie, debat du Conseil des Nations l’article Conseil, conformement 14 h 15 - ce qui est, je crois, mentionnée moment son savait quant B la participation 2 la présente admettre invite put, des ce moment-l& qui auraient en vertu qu’on n’avait pas encore tranché formellement, le Conseil la question d’autres 31. Nevertheless, 1 should like to Point 0ut to Y0ul Mr. President and to my distinguished 0olleagues that at this crucial moment when, ns we cari sec fr0m the reports coming through the news aknQ’3 situation in the Cyprus area is deteriorating bY the minute, the last thing we should do is embark on a legal discussion such as 1 am now compelled bY S0ur clarification to carry on with you. 32. 1 should therefore like once again to draw attention of the members of the Council, nOt t0 thfs aspect of the problem, that is, the pllrelY pr0Cedural aspect, which, by the way, is to saY the least controversial, but rather to the circumstnnces which alreaciy have been rightly stresseci by the representative of Bolivia in his statement. The question nOH before us is a procedural one, butitis also a questian of great moment and will show at once which members of the Council intend to support from the outset the most expedient organization of the Council’s work by giving the representative of Cyprus an opportunity to outline the views of his Government, which, as is stated in the letter submitted for our consideratian, is a victim of aggressive acts. 33. That is why, Mr. President, 1 wish to make my proposa1 formal.

There is a forma1 motionbefore the Council to hear the representative of Cyprus first. This proposa1 has been supported by the representatives of Czeohoslovakia and Bolivia. Do any other members of the Council wish to spenk on that proposai?

The Council has many times heard discussions of what deserves precedence in speaking. This is the third time that this issue has been discussed in this case alone. On 18 February this year it was deeicled, and again on 18 June it was decided, in both cases in compliance with rule 27 of the provisional rules 0f procedure of the Security Council, which is quite clear and which states that: “The President shtxll call upon rePreSentntiVeS in the order in which they signify their desire to speak,” 36. In this case, the Government of Turkey, which first initiated the request for this meeting, was inscribed first. There is no question about the facts or about the rule. In the opinion of mY delegation, Mr. President, YOU are correct in thnt there is no alternative except to follow rwle 27. This is holv it was decided on both previous occasions and how it should be decided tonight, 37. It seems to me, if 1 may add another ~10fi, that the COunCil, if it should follow the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union, may be creating a serious difficulty for itself in the future, If ,,,,e decide which Participant in our proceedings sp.n&s

What 1 propose to say in no way affects my delegation’s view on the substance of the prob- Iem. My delegation believes that this point of order lies within the competence of the Council’s President and shall therefore abide by his decision in the matter. de dire ne préjuge en rien l’opinion de ma delegation

As there are no further speakers on this point, 1 shall put to the vote the proposa1 submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union, namely that we hear the representative of Cyprus first. 39. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Puisque plus personne ne demande la parole sur ce point, je vais mettre aux voix la motion du repr&entant de l’Union soviétique tendant a entendre le repr8sentant de Chypre en premier. 40. The representative of the Ivory Coast, however, has asked for the floor, and-although we were on the point of voting-1 now cal1 on him. 40. Je me permets de faire remarquer au repreque nous en sommes ZI. prbsent au vote; je lui donne neanmoins la parole. 41. M. USHER (C8te-d’ivoire): Jem’excuse, Monsieur le Président, d’avoir pense que vous devriez préciser un point.

1 apologize for having asked for the floor, Mr. President, but 1 think that you ought to clarify one point. 42. Our Moroccan colleague rightly said that this matter fell within your competence. Rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure in fact states: 42. Notre collegue du Maroc a dit à juste titre que cette affaire releve de votre competence. En effet, d’aprés l’article 30 du reglementintérieur provisoire: “If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling ta the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled. n 43. En consequence, nous voulons savoir si vous avez sur ce point pris une dacision et, s’il y a contestation, est-ce la contestation de votre clécision que vous proposez a la sanction du Conseil de securit8? Nous voudrions que vous nous precisiez ce point. 43. We should therefore like to know whether you have taken a decision on this point of order, and, if there has been a challenge, whether it is this challenge to your decision that you are submitting to a vote of the Security Council. We would ask you to clarify this for us.

In reply to the question raised by the representative of the Ivory Coast, 1 should like to give the following explanation as to how 1 see the matter. 44. Le PRESIDENT repondre a la question posbe par le representant de la CBte-d’ivoire, sidere la situation, 45. The representative of the Soviet Union submitted a proposa1 which 1 have quoted and which 1 was about te put to the vote. The President has made no ruling. He has not been requested to make any ruling. But he has, in a statement for the informationof the Coun- Cil, indicated that if this proposa1 had not been made, he would bave, as a matter of course and in accordance with his duties, followed the rules of procedure, and he quoted the rule of procedure that he would have followed. 45. Le representant de l’Union soviétique a presente une motion que j’ai rappelee et que jletais sur le point de mettre aux voix, Le President n’a pas pris de dt%ision présidentielle. On ne le lui a pas demandé. Lorsqu’il a donné des renseignements sur la situation pour l’information Président a indique que, bien entendu, conformement a son devoir, si cette motion n’avaitpas Eté presentée il aurait suivi le reglement intérieur, l’article 46, Je reviens a la motion du repr8sentantdel’Union sovietique et je la mets aux voix. 46, I now revert to the proposa1 made by the representative of the Soviet Union and put it to the vote. Avote was taken by show of hands. Républiques socialistes soviétiques. 10 faveur: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The proposa1 was rejected by 4 votes to 3, with 4 abs tensions.

In explanation of the vote cast by the representative of NORWAY, it was cast in that way since that representative is at the same time the President of the Security Council. 48. 1 now cal1 on the representative of Turkey.

1 am glad that that phase of the debate is over.

Point of order. Before listening to an elaborate and long speech, I should like to make a statement on information which has been received from my Government.

Would the representative of Cyprus mind if 1 asked the members of the Council if they have any objection, Cyprus being a State Member of the United Nations but not a member of the Security Council, to his speaking on a point of order?

Mr. President, the delegation from Cyprus has suggested that 1 should ask you and the other members of the Council, to allow him to make a brief statement to inform us of a situation which, in that delegation’s opinion, is extremely serious and which Will affect the opinion of the Council when it hears the latest developments.

Does any other representative want to speak on the request made by the representative of Cyprus? There being no objection, 1 cal1 on the representative of Cyprus on a point of order.

According to a telephone message received a few moments ago, six warships îrom Turkey are heading for Cyprus for the purpose of invasion. They have been followed by another twenty-six warships and troopships for the purpose of aggression against Cyprus and invasion of the island, and within one hour they Will be landed there. In these circumstances, 1 thought it fit to let the Security Council know of this situation before we embark upon a discussion of a matter which is very minor in comparison with this threat of invasion of the island. In this respect, 1 would cal1 attention to the fact that the situation is grave, not only as regards Cyprus, but also for the United Nations itself and its Charter, if we return to the rule of the jungle through invasions in this form. Thus, having these oonsiderations in mind, the Security Council may now decide whether it Will not proceed with the consideration of this imminent danger with which my country is threatened, with its population being bombed from planes and invasion of the island, which may bring about a world war. That is a11 I wanted to say.

It appears that 1 was little premature when 1 said that that phase of the that every time the question as to who speaks first cames up, there are these procedural manœuvres aimed quite obviously at allowing Mr. Rossides to speak as though he were the plaintiff, whereas in fact he is the accused. He represents a faction of a government .which is the aggressor in Cyprus. The procedural manœuvres themselves were rather weak. Last time 1 believe 1 was asked to yield in deference to the rank of the representative of Cyprus who happened to be the F’oreign Minister. This time 1 am surprised that 1 was not asked to yield to the greater wisdom of Mr. Rossides. However, as 1 said, 1 am glad that that is over, and now, if you Will allow me, I shall proceed with my brief statement. 57. Mr. President, 1 wish to thank you and the members of the Security Council for having responded 57. du Conseil de sBcuritEt d’avoir a mon appel pressant Conseil Chypre. une inquiétude deroulés gouvernement dessus lance communauté SO promptly to my urgent appeal for a meeting to consider the deteriorating situation in Cyprus. I am sure you have a11 been following with mounting con- Cern the events of the last few weeks in Cyprus, where the Government of Archbishop Makarios has thrown a11 discretion and restraint to the winds and has embarked upon a series of crimes against the innocent Turkish community. 58. These crimes are too numerous to mention in detail. I shall merely refer in passing to some of them, namely, many mortal attacks on individuals, unlawful and unwarranted arrests and torture: unlawful searches of means of transport; blockades of Turkish-inhabited areas; the interception of necessary supplies, such as oil, building materials, etc.; the application of severe economic pressures on the Ttirkish community; the adoption of a number of measures such as the so-called Administration of Justice Law, 1964, the Territorial Waters Law and the Military Secrets Law-a11 in flagrant violation of the Constitution; the refusa1 to allow relief supplies from Turkey to be distributed among the needy Turkish community, thus in fact condemning these innocent refugees to starvation; even the cutting off Of the water supply in Ktima, thereby attempting murder by thirst, and the threat to fire on Swedish personnel of the United Nations Force who would attempt to carry water to the besieged. 58. &num&re en détail. Je me bornerai uns en passant: de nombreuses tortures des moyens de transport; par les Turcs; comme le pAtrole, les pressiotis la communau% turque; 1’ adoption de certaines comme la justice, secrets violation laisser a la communaut6 ainsi llarr&t qui revient et la menace d’ouvrir de la Force de l’eau aux assiEtgés. 59, Tous ces agissements vernement matiquement afin humblement pr&parati£s certains tions briser 59. Al1 these acts made it quite clear that the MakariOs ,Government was determined, with systematic turns of the screw, to annihilate the Turkish community or to bring it to its knees in meek submission. Quite recently, certain military preparations of the Greek Cypriot bands, certain deployments and statements by their leaders to the effect that they were prepared to crush the resistance, made it obvious that the Greek Cypriots were preparing to unleash a ôl. This information is confirmed by the United Nations Force, Press release No. 529/329, of 7 August 1964, states: “A Greek Cypriot patrol boat fired some rounds at the general area of Kokkina at 0450 hours this morning. At the very same time, 0450 hours, another Greek Cypriot patrol boat fired somo twenty rounds at the general area of Mansoura. There were no casualties at Kokkina and Mansoura.” A later bulletin, released the same day at 1700 hours, states : “Heavy fighting broke out at 1515 hours this afternoon in Kyrenia-Ayios Theodorous complex. a general exchange of fire from Greek Cypriot Turkish Cypriot positions. Greek Cypriot armoured cars are reported to be advancing towards the area from the village of Pakhy Ammos. Mortars being used from a hi11 position west of Mosphileri. No casualties have been reported. n Our own sources, however, indicate that T’urkish casualties, dead and wounded, are heavy. 62. In the face of this large-scale offensive, threatening to wipe out the inhabitants of the area, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force has been unable to act. General Thimayya has told the Turkish Chargé faires in Nicosia that the United Nations Force would be unable to stop this onslaught without risking heavy casualties itself. It is no doubt true that, as the Secretary-General has affirmed, General Thimayya making efforts to bring about a cesse fire, but as to the question of intervening between the elements are firing at each other, that has proved impossible, 63. 1 should like to quote from The Washington of this morning: of “Turkish Cypriote reportedly were seekingmeans evacuating women and children from Kokkina and Mansoura after bombardments this morning Greek Cypriot patrol boats, the Swedish colonel, “More than 1,000 heavily armed Greek Cypriot troops were reported strung out in an arc from Kato Pyrgos to Pornos, sealing off the Turkish area, The Turkish Cypriots are estimated to have 400 well-armed men. ‘Plus armes forme cernant turques bien armés. “Waern accused the Greek Cypriots of preparing a well-planned, all-out assault, using a11 the weapons they possibly cou1d.l’ ‘Waern parer faisant disposer.lt 1 repeat: “Waern accused the Greek Cypriots of preparing a well-planned, all-out assault, using a11 the weapons they possibly coulà.” That was the commander of the local United Nations contingent speaking. Je repete: préparer faisant disposer.” tingent de la Force 64. In the face of this brazen aggression and of the defiance of the United Nations my Government was compelled to order a warning flight over the battle zone by Turkish aircraft. In the statement which I made before this Council on 18 June 1964 1 said, with regard to the right to take action under the Treaty of Guarantee:?f 64. Devant cette agression attitude de defi envers vernement a la force vol d’avertissement Dans la declaration 1964, voici ce que j’avais dit a propos du droit d’agir vertu du Traité de garanties: “That right is inalienable. But it neednotbe exercised SO long as the United Nations peace-keeping operations in Cyprus cari be carried out unhindered.” [1136th meeting, para. 92.1 “Ce droit est inaliénable. dl@tre exercé tant que les operations la paix entreprises peuvent séance, par, 92.1 65. C’est precisément termes, des Nations de sorte droit de garantie encore que d’une façon prudemment impensable aide aux freres sacres, agression d’un matériel envoyés par la Grece. 66, Les Turcs garanties attaques et massacrés nique et illegal comme ou étaient Nations pouvaient Turquie time appel au secours. 65. That is precisely what has happened. In other words, the Greeks of Cyprus have denied the United Nations Force the right to exercise its mandate SO that the unquestionable right and even duty of Turkey to take action under the Treaty, even though carefully restrained, had to be brought into application. NO country, in duty bound to go to the aid of its massacred kin, could be expected to remain aloof in the face of such an organized and brutal aggression, perpetrated with the aid of military equipment and personnel sent from Greece. 66. The Turks of Cyprus, robbed of a11 their constitutional guarantees, turned upon and massacred by a fratricidal, tyrannical and illegitimate clique Of their compatriots, with the other guaranteeing Powers unwilling or unable to act, and withthe United Nations Force rendered impotent, had nowhere to turn for protection but to Turkey, and Turkey could nOt ignore such a humane and legitimate call. 67. The Turkish Government did not fail to approach the other guarantor Powers and the Commander of the United Nations Force in order to enlist their aid in stopping the onslaught. We have also requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council, which iS now being held upon our demand. Nevertheless, the criminal attacks have continued unabated, even 67. Le Gouvernement ser aux autres puissances de la Force de prêter attaques. d’urgence ment à notre demande, 3/ Signé è Nicosia, le 16 août 3Signed at Nicosia, 16 August 1960. 68. On behalf of my Government 1 am hereby informing the Security Council of the background, purpose and purport of such action, which is under its solemn rights emanating from existing international agreements. 1 am alsoformally requesting the Council to consider what urgent measures cari be taken to put a stop to the Greek Cypriot gression which is threatening peace in the area. 69. In supplying this information and making appeal to the Security Council, I should like to emphasize once again that my Government, which been constrained to act in legitimate self-defence, continues to pin its hopes on the United Nations, the effective operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, and on the patient efforts of the United Nations Mediator. 70. There cari be no question as to who bears the entire responsbility for the alarming turn of events in Cyprus: it is the Government of Archbishop Makarios. The reason for the recent Greek Cypriot gression is evident, and not even an attempt is made ta hide it. It cari be seen in this quotation from Christian Science Monitor of 3 August: “Archbishop Makarios has at least been frank about what he has been up to in Cyprus a11 these past months. In an interview with the Salonika newspaper, Macedonia, he is quoted as saying: ‘We are not prepared to accept any compromise or make any concession . . . . 1 do not believe in the possibility of any agreed solution. In spite of hopes voiced by different quarters, an agreed solution entails possible compromise.‘” The editorial goes on to ask: “But cari any attempted settlement of the Cyprus crisis be lasting without the concurrence of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority?” 71. The timing of this Greek Cypriot attack seems carefully chosen to further the aims of the Makarios Government. For some weeks now the United Nations Mediator has been patiently working in Geneva with representatives of the Greek Turkish Governments to find an agreed peaceful solution. The very fact that the efforts in Geneva are continuing is some indication that there may be a glimmer of hope. It is in order to put out that glimmer of hope that the Makarios Government have undoubtedly acted. It is not an agreed peaceful solution that they want, but their own unacceptable and unworkable solution which is to be imposed by force 72. Speaking about the re-entanglement of the situation, 1 cannot pass without a reference to one of the most aggravating influences which have corne into Ehe picture-perhaps the most aggravatingone. 1 refer, of course, to the arms build-up which is taking place on the island. 72. Puisque je parle du retour a une situation difficile, je ne peux passer sous silence unfait qui exerce sur la situation une influence tri% aggravante et sans doute la plus aggravante de toutes celles qui SI exercent. Je veux parler évidemment de 11 accumulation d’armes qui est en cours actuellement dans l’ile. 73. For the last few months 1 have, on innumerable occasions, taken up with the Secretary-General and his senior advisers the alarming situation created by the introduction into the island of military equipment and personnel from Greece. This build-up of Greek arms in Cyprus has reached such proportions that it oan now be fairly said that an invasion of the island by the Greek Government has taken place. 1 have often tried to explain at great length that the existing mandate of UNFICYP gives it sufficient authority to stop the inflow of arms. One of its tasks is to stop the recurrence of fighting, and it would seem that when one attempts to prevent a recurrence of fighting between two individuals or two communitics, the first thing one would be expected to do would be to see to it that neither of them acquires the means to fight with. We are still hoping that that logical interpretation Will prevail in the long run. 73, Depuis quelques mois, j’ai examiné en d’innombrables occasions avec le Secretaire général et ses conseillers principaux la situation alarmante créée par l’introduction dans l’fle de matériel et de personnel militaires accumulation d’armes grecques à Chypre a atteint des proportions telles qu’on peut dire à coup stlr qu’il y a eu invasion de l’fie par le Gouvernement grec. J’ai souvent essayé cl’expliquer en d&ail que le mandat donne a la Force des Nations Unies lui confere despouvoirs suffisants pour empecher l’entree des armes. Une de ses tâches est de prevenir toute reprise des combats. Or il semble que, si l’on veut provenir toute reprise des combats entre deux individus ou deux communautes, la Premiere chose a faire soit de veiller des moyens de combat. Nous esperons toujours que ce raisonnement finira par prevaloir à la longue. 74. In the meantime, the continuingbuild-up of armaments appears to have greatly alarmed the countries that have supplied troops to the United Nations Force and they have explained their concern to the Secretary-General. The appeal thereupon made by the Secretary-General was rejected offhand by the Makarios Government. The resolutions of the Security Council appear to carry no weight whatsoever with the Greed Cypriot Government when they do not suit its purposes, nor do any constitutional provisions, treaties or agreements. The provisions of the agreement concerning the status of theforce [see S/5634],q signed by the Greek Cypriot Government and the United Nations, were just as nonchalantly violated when that Government saw fit to hide from the eyes of the United Nations Force its large-scale illegal importation of armaments. However, when faced with renewed appeals from the Secretary-General and the possibility of an unfavourable report to the Security Council, or possibly a condemning session of the Council, the Makarios Government somewhat backed clown-1 say “somewhat” because, in the last analysis, the freedom of movement of the United Nations Force is still subjected to provisos. This is the well-known negotiating tactic of aggressors or potential aggressors: you take two unlawfdl steps forward and, under pressure, you retreat only one step; everyone says what an amiable fellow you are, and you have gained one unlawful step. ‘74. En attendant, cette accumulation dl armes continue parafi avoir alarmé beaucoup les pays qui ont fourni des contingents à la Force des Nations Unies et ils ont exposé leurs inquiétudes au Sec&taire Le Secretaire genéral a lancé alors un appel que le gouvernement Makarios a rejet8 cavalierement. Les résolutions du Conseil de sécurite semblent n’avoir absolument aucun poids aupres du Gouvernement chypriote grec lorsqu(elles ne &Pondent pas aux desseins de ce gouvernement, et il en est de même de toutes dispositions constitutionnelles ou conventionnelles, Les dispositions de l’Accord sur le statut de la Force [5/5634-/], chypriote grec et l’Organisation des Nations Unies, ont été violees avec tout autant de désinvolture lorsque ce gouvernement a juge bon de dissimuler a la Force des Nations Unies ses importations illegales d’armements. Neanmoins, lorsqu’il a reçu des appels renouvelés du Secrétaire entrevu le risque dl être l’objet d’un rapport défavorable au Conseil de securité ou même d’être condamné éventuellement Makarios derniere analyse, la liberté de mouvement cle la Force des Nations Unies est encore sujette a des restrictions. Nous avons là un exemple de la fameuse tactique que les agresseurs ou les agresseurs en puissance emploient dans les negociations: vous faites illégalement reculez, alors que vous êtes bien conciliants, et vous avez gagne illegalement un pas. 75. Even if the United Nations Force enjoyed full freedom of movement in the island, this would only 75. Mbme si la Force des Nations Unies jouissait d’une entiere liberté de mouvement dans lIEle, cela 41 Voir année, 4/.% Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Swplement for January, February and March 1964. 76. ~~ Government has at its disposa1 unass:Iil:lblc facts as t. the magnitude of the Greek arms build-ul> in Cyprus. ACCording to reliable nnd Confirmé formation, t,he strength of the Greek mllltary f0rces now in cyprus IS as follows: A Greek military c0ntingent Composed of 950 officers and men is station?! in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Alliancp:d’ on 13 Jme 1964 a Greek militnry unit eStim:~ted at 240 men arrived on the island: on 19 and 2O JUIN? larger unit, composed of four infnntry batMf0ns and two artillery battalions, together amounting to %75O men, arrived in Cyprus: on 22 June another militWX unit 0f 950 men arrived in the Island frOm GWWe. Thus 0n 22 June 1964, the Greek military fnrches in the island amounted to 5,890 men; during the first week 0f July, additional Greek fOrCeS having arrived kn Cyprus, the strength of these forces rose to f,*~~~f~ men. 77. The above-mentioned figures are nlso confirmed by information received from United Nations sources. In fa&, judging from the passenger capacity af the buses used, at least 4,900 men have been trsnsported on 122 buses from Limassol to the north of the island. Also, 369 truck-loads of militnry equipment were transported from Limassol to different points of thP island. Among these were thirty pieces OI artillPr) referred to as 25-pounders; thirty pieces of fieltl artillery of 40 mm. calibre, and nineteen pieces of â-pounders. 78. As is well known to the United Nations Comm& in Cyprus, the transportation of militnry personnel and equipment took place in the Limassol arsa uncler heauy security measures aimed at preventing 1Jnited Nations patrols from performing their duty of observation. 79. On 7 August, at 11.1.5 a.m., three GreekCypriots were apprehended while trying to infiltrate lnt0 the Turkish sector of Nicosia near Cnglnynn, Thess persons, who were members of the GroekNational GunIrl, carried guns and rifles. They were taken to the Turkish Cypriot police station in Nicoslu for interrogation and detention. It was found that they were carrying an assortment of identity cards, Two of them stated that they were Greeks and thnt they had arrived in Cyprus from Greece two weeks before, together with some 800 Greek soldiers, In the meantime, Greek Cypriots threatened to attack the ‘J).Irkish sect0r of Nicosia, unless these three Greek soldierR were released, and subsequently started to amass trooPs around the Turkish sector. General ~inl~~yya was informed about the incident and the eventual Prosecution of these Greek soldfers 0n charges 0f carrying arms and entering illegally into the nrkish sectorV and he was also told that he could sec them if he wished t0 do SO. At a press conference attended 3Treaty Of Alliance between the Kingdom of C;reece, Ihe ~~~,t,l,~ Of Turkey and tbe Rwbfic of Cyprus, sigmd st Nico&, on 16 Augusr 1960, 80. The figures 1 have quoted show that, if it is desired to avoid a full-scale conflict in the area, the United Nations Force must be fully empowered to stop any further importation of military equipment and personnel. But from our point of view, the scale of the build-up already reached is alarming in itself, and therefore an attempt should be made to reduce the existing supply of arms and personnel. 80, prevenir Force des Nations empêcher de personnel niveaux atteints et les effectifs faudrait donc s’efforcer 81. TO achieve both ends, my Government would like to suggest a number of measures which could be taken by common consent. These measures would be the following. 81, Pour parvenir ment voudrait raient Btre prises seraient 82. First, entry points to Cyprus, such as ports and airports, must be placed under the effective control of a committee composed of representatives of Turkey, Greece, and the countries contributing troops to the United Nations Force. 82. Premierement, ports, trôle de la Turquie, des contingents 83. Secondly, since the island has become an arsenal, through the importation of armaments, including heavy arms such as artillery, tanks and aircraft, the mere stoppage of future importations of armaments and military personnel Will not eliminate the danger. Furthermore, large, illegallyformed military forces, composed of Greek Cypriots andmercenaries, are now operating on the island. Therefore, it is vitally necessary to subject both sides to a gradua1 and controlled disarmament. The final level of this disarmament should be determined according to the size of the army, security, and “gendarmerie” forces, as well as to the amount and nature of the armaments required for the performance of the duties of such forces, as prescribed in the Constitution of Cyprus. 83. Deuxiemement, formée en arsenal y compris d’artillerie, d’empêcher sonnel militaire De plus, été constituses Chypriotes ment dans l’ire. Il est donc d’uno importance d’imposer et contr8le. fixe en définitive de l’importance securité la quantite et de la nature pour l’accomplissement forces, de Chypre. 84. Ce desarmement sous le contrôle exerces celui dont je viens 84. This gradua1 disarmament should be achieved under the control and supervision of the United Nations, by a committee set up in the same way as the committee 1 have just mentioned. 85. En plus de ces mesures, communautés respecter traites du Médiateur reglement 85. In addition to these measures, the leaders of the tio communities should announce their intention to abide by the Constitution and conform with the existing treaties, and also sustain the efforts of the United Nations Mediator until an agreed settlement is found. 86. Je remercie Conseil a cet epineux tardive etant doit le Conseil caces. 86. Mr. President, 1 thank you and the members of the Council for your forebearance in tackling the thorny problem of Cyprus once again at this late hour on a weekend. But the situation is explosive; therefore the Greek Cypriot aggression must be speedily checked, and 1 hope the Council Will envisage rapid and effective measures. 87, M. Comme tournant en presence 8’7. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): As 1 have already mentioned, we are at a very crucial turning-point, because there is a threat and, what is more, an actual fact now, of ships moving toward Cyprus. 1 understood I . 88. The representative of Turkey has entered upon discussion of matters that are of long standing, and proposals for further steps that could have beenmade at any time-ten days, fifteen days, or a month agobut, indeed, were net. His recourse to the Security Council was a counter-measure against our own recourse because of the aggression of Turkey. At 10.10 o’clock this morning, my deputy had informed the President of the Security Council that we were requesting a Security Council meeting because of the illegal over-flights of airplanes from Turkey over various parts of the island, machine-gunning the people of Cyprus. 89. One hour later, after the President of the Council had been asked to alert the members of the Security Council, when this circumstance had evidently, and quite naturally, transpired, it occurred to the representative of Turkey to make a tactical move, while 1 was on my way from Cyprus; he had recourse to inscribing his name on the list of speakers-which was indeed an urgent recourse-so that he might request the Council to consider the situation in Cyprus in regard to the Turkish minority. This is a matter which, as 1 said, he could have raised at any time before but did not raise until we had requested a Security Council meeting. 90. What is of particular concern to the Security Council is that, after Turkey had followed, ostensibly, the peaceful course of appealing to the Council, only a few hours thereafter, it started sending its airplanes into Cyprus, that is, between the time of Turkey’s application to the Security Council to meet to consider the situation in Cyprus and the hour fixed for that consideration, which was 7.30 p.m. Turkey, as I said, dispatched its planes to Cyprus, where they bombed the population, not military targets, but towns. The towns or villages that were bombed are: Pornos, Polis-Chrysohou, Pakhy Ammos, Kato Pyrgos, Goudi and the town and harbour of Xeros. Twentysix civilians, women and children, including infants, were killed, and over 200 were wounded. This action was taken by Turkey in the time between its request for a meeting of the Security Council and the meeting now being held. 91. 1s this the conduct of a Member of the United Nations conscious of its obligations under the Charter? 1s this a conduct that shows respect for the Charter Of the United Nations or for the ordinary decency of ordinary warfare, if warfare it is? 93. Before 1 go further in dealing with this matter, 1 would like to say just a few words to counter a11 that the representative of Turkey has said. For one thing, he stated that the Greek Government forces had started this attack. That is untrue, and 1 have here the officia1 documents. 93. Avant voudrais dire seulement quelques mots pour refuter tout ce que le représentant de la Turquie a dit. Il a declaré d’abord que l’attaque avait été engagée par les forces gouvernementales grecques. C’est faux, et j’ai ici des documents officiels sur ce point. 94. On 10 July, General Thimayya was informed by the security forces of Cyprus that the Turkish rebels who were holding certain positions in the area of Mansoura had moved forward from their positions and occupied an important height. 1 say “Turkish rebels” because there must be a distinction made between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish rebels: the Turkish rebels are the ones under attack, not the Turkish Cypriots or the Turkish community. On the same day the Greek security forces, through General Karayanis, by officia1 document NO. 901/ 281/11, informed General Thimayya of this move and asked the United Nations Force to take steps for the peaceful ,withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot rebels from that height in order to avoid a clash. 94. Le 10 juillet, ont informé le géneral Thimayya que les rebelles turcs qui tenaient certaines positions de Mansoura s’&aient avanc8s et avaient occupé une hauteur dl importance stratégique. Je parle de ‘Irebelles turcs”, car il faut distinguer entre les Chypriotes turcs et les rebelles turcs. Ce sont uniquement les rebelles turcs que nous attaquons, non les Chypriotes turcs ou la communaut& turque. Le même jour, le génkral Karayanis, porte-parole des forces de &!curité grecques, informait Thimayya par le document officiel No 90/281/21 et demandait B la Force des Nations Unies de prendre des mesures pour obtenir le retrait rebelles chypriotes d’éviter une confrontation violente. 95. le directeur adresse une deuxieme lettre au sujet de cette position - importante dans la situation prbsente -, paix et de la tranquillitb, Unies intervienne regagnent leur position précédente, auquel cas il n’y aurait aucun trouble ni accrochage. 96. Le 24 juillet, nie pas que les Turcs aient avance et aient la hauteur en question, mais il dit qu’il n’y a pas d’habitants aux alentours et que, par consequent, il n’y a pas de population en danger, Or il ne s’agissait pas la de population en clanger, mais de la prise par les rebelles d’un point stratégique leur permettant de progresser, cl’&tenclre et de poursuivre la r&ellion. Ici, je rappellerai lettre &j& citee [1136&me séance, par. 1641 et qui avait éte trouvbe sur un militaire damné depuis pour crime d’espionnage commis B Chypre et d’autres chefs d’accusation. La lettre dont il était porteur Mansoura awr rebelles de Nicosia et exposait leur plan. Partant de Mansoura, ils devaient peu % peu gagner du terrain liquidant tous les villages grecs qui s’y trouvaient - le terme employe est bien llliquider’l - pour gagner Lefka, puis, en liaison avec les forces d’invasion, provoquer le partage. Tous ces dbtails ont étgfournis au Conseil de sécurite. 97. C’est pour exécuter ce plan sinistre visant à étendre la rébellion 8 Chypre, h renverser le gouvernement, ;2 démembrer 1’Etat et B proc6de.r au partage de l’île par la force, qu’ils ont hauteur. C’était Ih une des mesures prises B cette fin, Or les forces de sBcurité chypriotes ont fait 95. On 22 July, as no reply was receivecl, the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior addressed a second letter to General Thimayya on the matter Of this height-an important height in the situationaslùng the Force, for the sake of peace and quiet, to intervene, SO that the rebels might withdraw to their previous position, in which case there would have been no trouble and no flare-up. 96. General Thimayya replied on 24 July. He did nOt deny the fact that the Turks had moved forward and occupied that height, but he said that there were no inhabitants around that height and therefore no danger to any population. The point was not that the population was in danger, however, but that the rebels had taken a strategic point from which to move out and. spread and continue the rebellion. And 1 would remind the Security Council of another letter, which has already been quoted [1136th meeting, para. 1641 and which had been found on a British military man WI~O lias since been convicted for espionage and other charges in Cyprus. He was carrying a letter from the rebels of Mansoura to the rebels in Nicosia, desoribing their plan. They would gradually spread out from Mansoura, occupy other parts, liquidate a11 Greek villages in the ares-that was the word used, “liquidate”-go on to Lefka, and then, supported by the invasion, bring about partition. That was related in detail before the Security Council. 97. In carrying îorward the sinister plan of spreading the rebellion in Cyprus, overturning the Government and disrupting the State and partitioning the islnnd by force, the rebels occupied that height. That was one of the steps taken for that purpose. The Cypriot security forces did everything possible to use the 98. After the Government’s security forces abandoned a11 hope that the United Nations Force would intervene to make the Turks withdraw-as pears from this document-they occupied another height, not attacking the Turkish rebels, not moving at a11 toward them, but they occupied another height. When the Turkish rebels saw that the Government forces were occupying another height, they attacked immediately: they started the fighting. That was three days ago. And, of course, the security forces had to counterattack. That it was the Turkish rebels attacked first cari be seen from the results. security forces were taken unawares; four Greeks among them were killed and one was wounded, whereas there were hardly any casualties on the other side. That shows who had the advantage of the initiative in the attack. 99. The representative of Turkey cornes here speak about the protection incumbent on the United Nations Force, although the Turks have disregarded whatever steps the Force has taken, for 1 am absolutely certain that, before General Thimayya replied on 24 July that the area after a11 was not populated, the command of the United Nations Force had tried hard to persuade the Turks to withdraw, and when that attempt was unsuccessful the Force, in the hope of avoiding further trouble, tried to placate the other side. But that does not matter. 100. 1 have no doubt that General Thimayya had done everything he could to persuade the Turkish rebels to withdraw. But they would not withdraw, because they were carrying out a plan, the plan that I have just set forth: to spread and intensify the rebellion in Cyprus, and resort to warfare and everything goes with warfare, and the action was part of that plan. SO the security forces had to be constrained, if the Government were not to abdicate and abandon the island to be partitioned and to be parceled up by those who want to parce1 it up, to move in a dynamic way: to do SO, they had to use force, and they used force to rectify the situation and restore law order. 102. No Greeks cari enter the areas that are under the control of the rebels, no Greeks cari enter the part of the city of Nicosia which is under the control of the Turkish extremist leadership. Whether it be a Child, a woman or a man, they would immediately be arrested, tortured, killed, or whatever mayhappen to them, and sometimes they are returned in a terrible state. And this is merely because they are Greeks entering that sector. turcs. 103. But is the same thing happening on the other side? Any Turk cari move into the Greek sector. And they do corne in. They go to the shops, buy things, leave, and return to their quarter. There is law and order in the part controlled by the Government. If any of the known rebels were to corne in there, however, they would be arrested, but nothing more. The other day a Child approached the Turkish sector and was taken and beaten, and he suffered 1 do not know what, because he was a Greek Child. But nothing like that happens on the Greek side, where Turks cari go about their business. There are SO many villages where Turks live peacefully under the protection of the Government. It is only the part of the Turkish population which is secluded in the rebel areas that is suffering, as 1 have just stated. quel Turc c’est ils rentrent dans le secteur ment. turaient autres enfant s’est battu parce que c%tait n’arrive vaquer librement les protection la population trôlées de le dire, 101. Therefore, it is absurd, to say the least, to speak about the Turkish population suffering from the actions of the Greek population or the Government. Their real suffering is from the terrorists, as we have seen from the letters sent to General Thimayya by Mr. Ihsan Ali [see S/5831]7/ and others, and from those who are suffering in the Turkish sector because of the terrorism of the Turkish rebels. 104. de parler turque vernement. subir les lettres Ali [voir qui sont les victimes dans le secteur 105. Therefore, in this situation what has the representative of Turkey pointed out? He speaks about the question of water, the water situation in Paphos. 105. Voyons quoi le représentant parle 6/See Officlal Records of the ,Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1964. -~61 Voir année, Supplément 7/Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1964 ---L 1964 d require that if no payment is made of the regular fees within a certain time the water is to be tut off. But I know that there was every intentionof arranging thls matter SO that nobody would suffer hardship in that respect unless found guilty of depriving the municipa1it.y of its fees for political reasons-not because they were unable to pay but because they wanted to deprive the municipality of the money and use it t0 further the cause of the rebellion. 106. Then the representative of Turkey spoke about communities. 1 .would point out to him that it is not a question of communities at all; it is a matter of the fighting between the Government forces and the forces of the rebellion. And 1 would humbly submit that, according to the Security Council resolution of 4 March it, is time for the rebellion to be ended in Cyprus. There is nothing in this resolution which says that the rebellion must be respected. The resolution states that “... the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and se,- curity, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting”-that is one duty of the United Nations Force-” and, as necessary, to contribute to themaintenante and restoration of law and order”-that is the second duty of the Force-“and a return to normal conditions “, 107. Therefore, the United Nations Force has to find a balance between those two objectives: toprevent a recurrence of fighting, and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. Now it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered that protection of the rebels, allowing them to hold fortifications and prevent normal communications in the island between Nicosia and Kyrenia and on the road to Xeros, is part of the maintenance of law and order. TO leave those communications in the hands of the rebels is not maintenance of law and order; the control over them has to be given to the Government, which has the responsibility for maintaining law and order. 108. But the United Nations Force did not want to Start any fighting and has been trying by peaceful means to persuade the Turks to allow a gradua1 return to normal communications under its control. AS another part of its effort to co-operate with the United Nations, the Government of Cyprus, and particularly the President, has offesed to hand over a11 fortifications to the United Nations Force. But the Turks refused because they had their own plans for the rebellion. SO, the situation whioh has developed iS nothing but the wish of the Turks to spread the rebellion on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the effort of the Government to contain it-not even to eliminate it. The Government has been SO restrained as to not trying to crush the rebellion, as it had a responsibility to do in the absence of a peacefui solution. It is still hoping that the United Nations will manage to achieve that. 110, That, 1 believe, answers the main points raised by the representative of Turkey, and 1 Will reserve my right to answer him in greater detail later on, Now we have a natter which transcends a11 these particulars of the conduct of the Government and the conduct of the rebels in Cyprus. We have ample time to deal with that and 1 am ready to produce a11 evidence to support every word that 1 have said tonight, and to counter by evidence every word that the representative of Turkey has said. 1 would request the representative of Turkey, when he wants to bring evidence, to bring documentary evidence and not to quote newspapers. Newspaper reports are not documents but present the views of the newspapers as influenced by various factors. We want officia1 documents, and 1 am going to produce a great deal of officia1 documents to prove everything that 1 have said. questions et je me reserve ment plus en detail. Nous sommes affaire particulieres celle des rebelles temps que j’ai dit ce soir et 3 réfuter chacune des paroles Je demanderai entendra ments de journaux l’opinion divers, et je presenterai a l’appui de tout ce que j’ai dit, 111. But 1 wish to stress now the situation that we are facing at this moment, And it was no use trying to evade it by asking the representative of Turkey to speak first, which made it necessary for me to spend a11 this time in order to answer what he said. The problem now is twofold. The first point is that the population of Cyprus is subjected to indiscriminate killing by the overflying planes in a manner unprecedented since the establishment of the United Nations, unprecedented in its ruthless destruction of human life carried out without war, without aiming at military targets, but merely in order to terrorize. This is the rule of the jungle and 1 say again that this matter is grave not only for Cyprus but for the whole world, because if peace and freedom is violated in one part of the world, no matter if it is a small part like Cyprus, it is violated everywhere. And it concerns a11 the small nations, a11 the small countries who may at this moment feel secure because it SO happens that they are secure. But they may at any time be exposed to the same dangers and the same aggression, though in different circumstances, as Cyprus is now suffering. Therefore, we would expect a11 the small countries to support Cyprus in its effort to survive the aggression andthe conspiracy of Turkey. 111. situation en ce moment. demandant le premier, temps pour repondre qui se pose point hasard fait sans precedent sation la destruction qu’il y ait guerre, soient terroriser et, je le répète, Chypre, et la liberte du monde, Me comme Chypre, ailleurs. tous croire en d’autres dangers Chypre. petits pour survivre la Turquie, 112. The attitude of Turkey-and 1 am still speaking about the question of the overflights and the bombing of the population-is directly contrary to the United Nations Charter, Article 2, paragraph 4. If Turkey had any oomplaints about the conduct of affairs in Cyprus, it should have corne to the United Nations. It has corne to the Security Counoil only today after we had said that we were going to present our case, and after they had started killing the population of ~Yprus. 112. de la question bardement traire de la Charte. plaindre aurait Elle n’en a saisi le Conseil de sécurité apres saisir mence B massacrer 114. The second aspect of the problem is thepresent threat of an invasion. The ships are moving toward Cyprus, and unless they stop and turn back, as they did on 2’7 December 1963, during the Security Council meeting, we shall have a full-soale invasion of the ‘sland, That would bring Greece into a war, which ould not be unlikely to escalate into a world war. 15. It is therefore for the Security Council to disus8 that aspect of the question against the very imortant consideration that it is a threat to world eace and not only to Cyprus. 1 appeal to the Security Uouncil, on behalf of my countrymen who are now in mortal danger, to protect them from the threat of invasion and from the airplane bombings. 116. 1 stated earlier that there was no precedent to the present situation, but I have been reminded that there has been a precedent since the establishment of the United Nations, namely the Suez affair. It is truc that the Suez affair constituted a precedent; but then let us follow that precedent in this cas.e and let us uphold the rule of law. Let us uphold the United Nations by adopting a resolution on the question of Cyprus similar to the resolution that was adopted in the Suez crisis, which saved the world. 117. After 1 have concluded my statement, 1 shall ask permission to submit a draft resolution which I have prepared with respect to the urgent matter of preventing an invasion, saving Cyprus from aggression and supporting the principles of the Charter.

Now the mask has fallen. Until yesterday, the Turkish Government was tellfng us that any military action on its part against Cyprus-action supposedly stemming from the Treaty of Guarantee-would be designed only to restore the state of affairs established in Cyprus by the treaties of 1959 and 1960. It is now for the Turkish representative to explain to members 120. At 1.30 this afternoon, my Government was informed by the Government of Turkey that the Turkish Air Force would be obliged to actif the Cypriot forces created victims among the civilian population. The Turkish Air Force acted three hours later-just three hours Iater-without there having been any victims among the civilian population and Turkish non-combatants; on the contrary, it was theTurkishAir Force that created victims among the population-especially to the north of Pakhy Ammos, where some 250 persons, mostly women and children, were killed or injured. Here, then, is the massacre of which the Turkish representative has spoken to us ad nauseam in the past, and which his country’s aircraft have just perpetrated in the space of a few minutes, 120, A 1 h 30 cet apr&s-midi, mon gouvernement @tait avisé par le Gouvernement turc que l’aviation turque serait forc6e d’agir dans le cas oh les forces chypriotes feraient des ‘victimes parmi la population civile. Trois heures apres - seulement trois heures après - combattants turcs aient eu des victimes, l’action de l’aviation turque: c’est elle qui a fait des victimes parmi la population, notamment au nord de Pachyamos, ohl’ond6plore environ 250 tues et blessés, femmes et enfants pour la plupart. massacre dont le representant de la Turquie nous a, dans le passé, parlé ad nauseum, et que les avions de son pays viennent de perpetrer quelques minutes, 121. Let no one try to tel1 us that the murderous attack by Turkish aircraft was decided upon as a sudden reaction to news from Cyprus regarding developments on the island, for previous statements by Turkish leaders of the highest standing belie that assertion. As early as 20 July, President Giirsel stated: 121. Que l’on ne vienne pas nous dire que l’attaque meurtriére r6action subite ades informations provenant de Chypre sur les BvBnements car des declarations anterieures des plus hautes personnalit& turques dementent cette assertion. Dej&, le 20 juillet, déclarait: “No one cari stop us from invading Cyprus. In any case, there is no need for a Turkish invasion of Cyprus; a bomb will settle the matter.” Chypre, D’ailleurs, nous n’avons pas méme besoin de cette invasion. Si besoin est, la question sera tranchée par nos bombes.” Des déclarations analogues ont, depuis lors, étefaites à maintes reprises dans la presse turque. Similar statements have since then appeared many times in the Turkish Press. 122. ‘IXe intention, therefore, already existed:strike by means allowing the victim no chance of defence. Always there is the same obsession: unilateral military action despite the Security Council reso- Iutions and despite, above ail, the fact of a United Nations presenoe on Cyprus. The Turkish representative has sought to present what has happened within the past twenty-four hours as if these events were a completely new story, as if we did not have to tope daily with a train of events emanating from the same muddy and poisoned source: the constantly renewed threat of a Turkish attack against Cyprus. 122. Par conséquent, l’intention par des moyens contre lesquels la victime n’a pas de possibilité de défense. Nous gravitons autour de la même idee fixe: action militaire unilaterale malgr6 les resolutions du Conseil de securité et maigre, surtout, le fait que les Nations Unies sont presentes ?i Chypre. Le représentant de la Turquie a voulu nous présenter les BvBnements qui se sont d6roules durant ces dernieres 24 heures comme s’il s’agissait d’une toute nouvelle histoire, comme si nous ne nous trouvions pas chaque jour devant une chal’ned’evbnements decoulant de la même source empoisonnée et trouble; la menace toujours renouvelle d’une attaque turque contre Chypre. 123. Mais a-t-il conseil, que les membres de notre organisation, que l’opinion publique qui suit nos debats et qui assiste aux phases de ce drame, n’auraient pas de mémoire? A-t-il qui a pré&dé, qu’ils oublieraient les causes pour ne se pencher que sur les effets, qu’ils ignoreraient là maladie pour ne se préoccuper que des symptbmes? C’est plut?& a ceux qui, aujourd’hui, Gouvernement de Chypre de faire appel a leurs souvenirs, d’interroger leur mémoire defaillante. Je me propose de les assister en reprenant le fil des évenements. 123. But had it been his hope that members of the Council, Members of our Organisation and public opinion which is following our discussions and witnessing the various stages of this drama, would have no memory? Had it been his hope that they would disregard everything that has happened previously, that they would forget the causes and concentrate only on the effects, that they would ignore the disease and concern themselves only with the symptoms? It is rather for those who today level accusations against the Government of Cyprus to consult their memory and investigate its disordered state. 1 propose to help them do this by following the thread of events. 126. On 13 March, howeves, came another threat imminent invasion, which impelled the Council adopt another resolution [5/5603]g and repeat its warning to Turkey by invoking its resolution 4 March. 127. In mid-June, the invasion ‘was on the point of being launched, and was stopped only at the eleventh houx, But in the Council the Turkish representative refused to answer the very clear question put to him by the representative of Cyprus at the meeting 19 June: @If Turkey is not preparing for an invasion, let the Turkish representative say SO.” 11137th meeting, para SS.] 128, Mr. Eralp did not reply. The reason for his silence appears today from the brutal attacks of the Turkish Air Force against the territory of Cyprus, from its machine-gun bullets and murderous rackets used aaainst a countrv which has no air force and oannot defend itself or, a fortiori, retaliate. What the Turkish Air Force has done todav is no deed of military valour, Y 129. For the fifth time Cyprus appeals to the Security Council, asking that if put a stop to the aggression of Turkey. This time we are net dealing with a threat. We are in the presence of an indisputable act of aggression. I am very much afraid that the Turkish Government has thus far failed to see what the texts designed ta spare its feelings were intended to indicate to it-namely, that any unilateral military action taken without the consent of the Security Council is condemned by the Charter, 130. SO long as the threat of invasion persists, is difficult to hope for the restoration of peace in Cyprus; SO long as the Turkish minority, with the aid of the Turkish contingent, continues to maintain a bridge-head to facilitate invasion, would there be any justification for believing that the Greek Cypriots Will cesse to take every possible step for the strengthening of their defences? Hope of invasion leads the Turkish Cypriots to arm themselves order to facilitate invasion if it cornes; threat invasion causes the Greek Cypriots to arm themselves in order to avert the danger, 131. Herein, then, lies the practical and urgent need to do away, once andfor ail, withthis curse of Turkish intentions, and now of Turkish actions, 132. At this critical moment for peaoe in theeastern Mediterranean, Greece has again done its duty. This afternoon, the Greek Cabinet issued at Athens communiqué in which it reaffirmed its right to defente against attack, but added: “Greece proclaims s/ Ibid L 133. This is the voice of Greece, true to its principles and loyal to the cause of peace. It is now for you to draw your conclusions from it. 133. Voila la voix de la Grece, et 8. la cause de la paix. Il vous appartient vos conclusions.

Today for the fifth time in the last few months the Security Council is once again compelled to take up the question of Cyprus, because, acoording to the evidence of the documents before us and the statements we have just heard, the threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus has again increased and the situation in the area has sharplydeteriorated. 134. sovietiques) la cinquieme fois en quelques curité tion de Chypre, les déclarations contre blique de Chypre la situation vée. 135. As the representative of Cyprus stated, the Turkish Air Force has bombed Cyprus. Thirty aircraft have attacked several inhabited areas in the northern part of the island with rocket and machinegun fire. In the Cyprus area there are again signs of a concentration of foreign armed forces. It is thus obvious that the forces of NATO are being brought into play, as they continue to impose on the Cypriots from outside a solution to problems that lie within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of cyprus. 135. Comme l’aviation attaque & la roquette localités une concentration la région de Chypre. tion tinuent a vouloir du dehors, exclusivement blique de Chypre. 136. We cannot fail to see that the latest of these acts of foreign military interference in the affairs of Cyprus are particularly dangerous. They are fraught with grave consequences that threaten the maintenance of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean region. 136. d’intervention les ticulierement sequences dans la region de la Mediterranée 137, An attack by the military aircraft of one country against the territory of another cannot be described otherwise than as an act of aggression. The invasion of another country’s air space-in other words, the use of armed force in order to impose one’s will on another sovereign State-is prohibited by the Charter of our Organization. That is why the efforts of the Turkish representative to justify that invasion by calling them, as he did here, “limited police action taken in legitimate self-defence” are unconvincing. 137. d’un pays peut action Etat, bombarder termes, sa volante interdit la vanité des tentatives Turquie qu’il t’action titre de la legitime defense”. 138. If we were actually to admit that one sovereign State may assume the right to undertake so-called police action against another sovereign State, it could only lead to the destruction of the United Nations Charter, to arbitrary acts in the international arena, and international complications whose perilous consequences for the cause of international peace and security cari hardly be calculated. 138. A vrai dire, si l’on admettait puisse dites de police ne pourrait Nations internationale, dont il serait quences internationales. 139. Il faut bien constater territoire comme on le sait, 139. We cannot fail to note that the bombing of the territory of Cyprus took place after a11 States, as you are aware, had been requested by previous decisions 141. We may legitimately ask why, despite a11 these deoisions, which were voted for by a11 the members of the Security Council, the threat to theindependence and territorial integrity of Cyprus is still not removed. 142. TO anyone who is at a11 familiar with the tense situation that has grown up around Cyprus in recent months, it is clear that the latest events are the result of continued interference in the affairs of Cyprus by aggressive imperialist forces, namely by NATO. If there were no such interference, if the differences between the two communities in Cyprus were not artificially inflamed from outside in the interest offorces alien to Cyprus, the deplorable bloodshed in Cyprus would have ceased and the Turkish and Greek communities, having long since settled questions which concern them alone, would now be living in harmony. 143. But the crux of the matter is that the enemies of the independence of the Republic of Cyprus trying to use the island’s domestio problems for their own special purposes. 144. In this connexion we deem it neoessaryto recall the statement made on 9 July 1964 by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev: “The imperialists, by inflaming the nationalistic contradictions between the two communities -TurMsh and Cseek-are aiming at imposing new occupation on Cyprus. “The imperialists are urging Turkey on in pursuit of their adventurist aims. We and Turkey neighbours and we want to live on friendly terms with her. We are doing our utmost to achieve that aim, Unfortunately there are forces in Turkey, which, without any legal justification, wish to dictate terms to the Cypriots and are threatening military invasion. This policy complicates still further situation in the area. “For a State whioh has the strength, it is very difficult to find a psetext for invasion. to violate the sovereignty of any country, even a small one, is something which today is fraught serious consequences. Such a violation couldprovoke a dangerous chain reaction. Turkey, too, should u/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and Jura 145, The Soviet delegation understands the deep anxiety of the people of Cyprus and their Government at the new and dangerous deterioration in the situation around Cyprus. 145. inquiétude gouvernement gereuse 146. We have said before, and we say again, that the Security Council should take the necessary steps to protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus from aggression and to stop a11 foreign interference in the affairs of this country, a Member of the United Nations. 146. demander mesures souveraine mettre de cet Etat, Membre 147. We deem it necessary to emphasize that it is the duty of the Security Council to demand the immediate cessation of military acts against Cyprus and respect for the sovereignty of Cyprus in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter and the deoisi.ons previously adopted by the Security Council. 14’7. Il nous paraft Conseil mis contre soit des antérieures 148. In order to gain time 1 will gladly waive the consecutive interpretation of my statement into English and French, on the understanding that this Will not constitute a precedent. 148. bien renoncer et en français cela ne constituera

Does any other representative wish to speak at this time? 149. un autre maintenant?

1 havefurtherinformation from Cyprus that the President of Turkey, Mr. Gtirsel, has announced that the bombings will continue tomorrow. But it will very soon be tomorrow there. It is now already 4.30 8.m. in Cyprus, which means that within a few hours we shall have continued bombings, and this is by announcement of the President of Turkey. 150. J’ai d’aprés annonce que les bombardement& Il ne reste demain a Chypre, les bombardements de la Turquie 151, We have corne to the stage when Turkey is no longer trying to conceal its aggressive purposes, but almost boasts of them. 1 therefore consider, and humbly submit to the Security Council, that measures must be taken by the Council immediately. Accordingly, 1 would make the suggestion that a small interruption of the meeting should take place SO that members may consult among themselves and with us for the purpose of considering a draft resolution. 151. n’essaie agressives, et je le dis trbs que le Conseil ment, une courte membres avec nous, 152. Je serai qui viennent quelles

1 shall not take long, but there are one or two points which have just been raised to which 1 shall reply very briefly. 153. The first was about this Turkish fleet, this armada, which was on its way to Cyprus. 1 presume that the hour has gone and that it must be in Cyprus by now, but we have not heard anything about it. 153. cette armada que, maintenant rien appris. 154. Also, it appears that the President of my country has said that the bombings will continue. Well, if Cyprus were invaded 1 do not suppose there would be any reason M continue those bombings. Perhaps 154. dit, paraît-il, Eh bien, aurait 156. From the lengthy explanations given by Mr. Rossides it would really appear as though the Turkish villagers of Kokkina and Mansoura, numbering a few hundred people, set out to conquer the glorious National Guard of the security forces of Cyprus. It is in fact they who are at the root of the trouble: they have set out to defeat the security forces, and that is why the Greek Cypriots had to defend themselves. 1s that the picture which they sought to Paint? I really fail to understand it. 157. It appears that the words of the Swedish colonel who was in command in the area do not carry much weight with Mr. Rossides. Perhaps 1 cari quote another source which would be more credible to him. This is from the bulletin of Tass, the Press agency of the Soviet Union. It says: “The situation is particularly tense in the area of Kokkina, a village where Greek Cypriots tried to crush the last stronghold of the Turkish Cypriots in that sector.” 158. Of course, Mr. Rossides does not set much store by newspaper and agency reports; we have to have officia1 documents, as he calls them. 1 do not happen to have any letters by General Karayannis in my pocket that 1 cari wave around, and 1 believe that under the circumstances they would be just as credible as any letters which are quotedby the representative of Cyprus on the subject of correspondence between authorities in his own Government and the United Nations. 159. Mr, Rossides has bandied about this word ?febelstc quite a lot, He seems to like that Word. More and more it has crept into the lengthy correspondence with the Secretary-General. But 1 wonder if that picture is accepted by all, the picture of the Turkish community as being the rebels and the Greek Cypriots as being the latiul Government of theisland, 160. He has spoken of law and order. From where in a oountry does law and order emanate? 1 believe it cornes from its Constitution, How then cari the representative of a sector of the Government that has on every occasion braeenly trampled on the Constitution claim to represent law and order? That is indeed very difficult for me to understand. Al1 that we seem to be left with now is that the members of the Greek Cypriot community, who are in fact themselves the rebels for having trampled on the Constitution, are beginning to feel their oats. They have armed themselves to the teeth and are now calling openly and brazenly upon the Security Council and upon the United Nations Peace-keeping Force to help them to quel1 what they cal1 a rebellion. 161. Mr. Rossides says there are no communities in Cyprus and that the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 does not refer to anything like that, that a11 it refers to, a11 that is even implied, is only 162. ‘I have very little to say about the remarks of my colleague the representative of Greece. He has asked me how 1 could explain the actionof the Turkish aircraft in Cyprus and he has said that we have pretended to have the right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus in order to re-establish the status which existed before. That is our right; we claim no more than that. But it is that right which, to begin with, confers on us, as a corollary, in the first place, the right to go to the aid of our kin who are being massacred in Cyprus. How else cari we begin to exercise that right? Shall we go to the Archbishop with flowers In our hands and send a delegation requesting him not to kil1 these people? We even tried that first, but it did not work. 162. observations G&oe. l’action nous P&endions ralement antérieur. à aucun autre droit, mencer, premier des nôtres manière que nous fleurs pour même resultat. 163. I have one short remark to make in reply to the representative of the Soviet Union. He has also spoken at some length on the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. 1 must say, as 1 have said once before in this Council, that it seems to me that the Turkish Government is the only one that sets any store by the independence of Cyprus. It now appears-and 1 have adduoed a great deal of evidence before on this point-that the Government of Cyprus is anxious to bring about “enosisfl. This has been proved by its public statements; it is merely a question of method, a question of procedure, a question of means. But beyond that there is no question at ail. “Enosis” and only flenosis” is its ultimate goal. 1 do wish that that point would be clearly understood by the representative of the Soviet Union, If it were, then 1 think his remarks would assume a different character. 163. répondre par16 assez de la souverainet Chypre. le Conseil, me semble-t-il, On constate, preuves, désireux declarations de ce gouvernement. pour eux est de savoir de procédé, bléme ne se pose en dehors de celui-l&. final est lfttEnosisn haiterais le observations

The representative of Turkey has seen fit, at this grave hour for Cyprus, to give a light turn to his speech and to try to speak with irony about what 1 had said concerning a strategic movement thnt consisted of taking a height and about the words of General Karayannis that 1 cluoted. 1 would point out to him that 1 quoted not only from the letters of General Karayannis but also from General Thimayya’s replies, which proved that a strategic point had been taken. It is peculiar, to say the least, to speak about the innocent inhabitants of Kokkina taking strategic points on heights. At least 500 Turkish soldiers who entered Cyprus surreptitiously are in Kokkina operating as a military force there against the established order in Cyprus which is recognized by the United Nations, the Government and the State of Cyprus. It is these 500 Turks from Turkey who are operating from Kokkîna and who have been attacking. It is they who have taken the height, with the assistance of Turkish Cypriot rebels, of course, and they who are ready to spread out over Cyprus, and it is they who have been attacked. And when Tass said that the last stronghold of the Turkish Cypriots had been attacked, it meant the Turkish Cypriot rebels, assisted by the military personnel from Turkey, and certainly not a stronghold occupied by 164. Le representant heure El son discours j’avais sistant le général je n’ai Knrayannis, Thimayya, d’un point stratégique. de parler hauteurs Au moins tinement opérations l’ordre Gouvernement soldats de Kokkina emparés chypriotes se déployer attaques. le dernier il s’agit 165. The representative of Turkey disputes the fact that they are rebels. What else cari they be called, when they are fortifying themselves and ready to fight against the State? 166. The next point, which 1 have not mentioned before, concerns the “Green Line”. This is an unfortunate line, and in any case it was deemed fit that the United Nations Force should hold it. The Force was holding the Green Line, but three days ago the Danes there who held the road to Paphos as part of that line, were dislodged by the Turkish forces, contrary to a11 arrangements for the peace-keeping in Cyprus, contrary not only to the normalization of law and order but also to the avoidance of any recurrence of the fighting. The Danes withdrew, and SO the Paphos road was occupied by the Turkish rebels-a move which they made without any provocation; in fact it was the rebels who were guilty of provocation, At the same time they opened fire in Nicosia. 1 was there and 1 hearcl the gunfire, which started the whole thing. There was continuous firing in Nicosia and continuous firing at Kokkina before the Greek forces took any action. 167, The representative of Turkey speaks about the right of Turkey to intervene by force40 invade Cyprus, as a matter of fact. This is a matter which he avoided saying before, but now he talks about it brazenly, saying Turkey is entitled to invade C@rus because of the Treaty of Guarantee. 168. Nothing could be more removed from the sense of the Charter of the United Nations than to speak in the Security Council of the right to invade Cyprus under a treaty. Article 103 of the Charter should make it abundantly clear that any such provision would be inoperative. But even SO, there is no provision in the Treaty of Guarantee that entitles Turkey to use force. 1 have dealt with this point, and 1 need no longer dwell upon it. However, what the representative of Turkey has deliberately avoided dealing with is the brutal bombing of the innocent population of Cyprus, whioh has been real massacres not attaoks upon strongholds. 169. TO the question of the bombardment of villages where people were murdered, where SO many children and women have been slaughtered, there has been no reply, and the representative of Turkey dismissed this as of no importance, This is a matter that has to be dealt with by the Security Counoil at this moment. We have plenty of time to deal with the other aspects at other times; they could have been dealt with before; they oan be dealt with later, But at this moment, the important questions are: first, the indiscriminate bombings in Cyprus, the over-Plights, the violation of the air-space of Cyprus for such sinister purposes as machine gunning and bombing; and, secondly, the threatened invasion. The fact that the ships bave net yet arrived does not necessarily mean they Will net arrive an. hour or more hence; we have had the experience before of ships from Turkey coming very near the toast of Cyprus and then returning. That does not mean that the ships now on their way there 171. With regard to his reference to the independence of cyprus, 1 think the representative of Turkey is trying-I will refrain from describing the character of his manner-to create misunderstanding where no misunderstanding lies. The Government of Cyprus has repeatedly claimed the country’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, to which it is entitled under the Charter. That territorial integrity will not be allowed to be threatened by Turkey through any subterfuge or in any other way. We declare and repeat that a11 Greek citizens of Cyprus Will fight for that independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the island, to the last man, and that we are a11 ready for it. But we want a peaceful solution, There must not be any use of force to make Cyprus submit to the Turkish Government’s desire for partition, or any of its other claims. 171. l’indépendance m’abstiendrai malentendu chypriote la souverainete auxquelles ne permettrons integrité autre les citoyens pendante, llfle, tous solution force Gouvernement prétentions. 172. Therefore, we now have to deal with thismatter within the scope of the Charter, andprotect a Member State from invasion and aggression. 172. qùestion et assurer l’invasion

My statement will be brief. The French Government has observed with great concern the latest events in Cyprus which have been the subject of the statements just made by the representatives of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. These statements may often have seemed contradictory. But my delegation wonders whether they may not be regarded as complementary-each tending, naturally, to emphasize one or another aspect of a situation as complex as it is alarming-until an impartial report from General Thimayya cari help us form a clearer idea of the origin and results of the situation. 1’73. brève. vive nements des la Gr6ce ont pu, ,?I maintes Ma délegation pas les considbrer mettant l’autre qu’alarmante, gén6ral plus nette de sa gen&se et de ses d6veloppements. 174. The news most recently reaching us spoke of some restoration of calm, although risks were still Pressent and the situation remained explosive, It is eSSentia1 that neither the fighting nor the outside intervention should be resumed tomorrow; and to thls end the representations made to the Governments concernbd, and local action by the United Nations Force and its Commander-in-Chief, should help. But the SeCUritY Council itself should add the weight of lts authority to these representations and this action, bY aPPealing to the parties involved to cesse taking action which has already created too many viotims, but instead to rely on the steps taken by the United Nations with a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem in v+%v, and to stop jeopardizing the Mediator’s 174. parvenues encore la situation ni le combat, reprennent; vernements Force chef devraient doit action, parties ont remettent Unies

For the moment 1 should merely like to obtain small explanation from the Turkîsh representative, if he will be SO good as to gîve it to me. At this juncturc, SO critical for Cyprus and SO fraught with menace to peace in the eastern Meditersanean, did he introcluce in his last statement the concept of “enosis” -which is not pertinent at this time-because it displeases his Government, or because he knew that it would displease the Soviet Government?

Since there are no further speakers at this moment, 1 would propose to the Security Council that we adjourn for twenty minutes for the purpose of consultation among the members of the Council, as well as with the interested parties, in regard to the further procedure to be followed in the resumed meeting. The meeting was suspended at 10.5’0 p. m. and resumed on Sunday, 9 August, at 1.1,s a,m.

First of all, 1 have to apologize for the fact that twenty minutes sometimes cari appear to be a very long time. Furthermose, 1 regret tc have to announoe tc the Council that it has not been possible to arrive at a consensus during the informa1 consultations that have taken place, One fact which has oontributed to this lack of result is of a technical charactes, 1 am glad to report; that is, that telephone communications with some oapitals have been very difficult to obtain, and when obtained, I have been told, the quality of the contact was very poor. 179. 1 assume that the Secretary-General Will, in the meantime, prepare and present to the Council an urgent report on the recent events in Cyprus SO that the Council, when it reconvenes, maydealrapidly and effeotively with this situation in the light of a11 available information. 180, May 1 request then that the members of the Counoil and the representatives of the parties concerned remain available for an early meeting of the Security Ccuncil, the time of whichis to be determined by the availabilîty of the Secretary-General’s report and the termination of the communication difficulties that some of the parties experienced.

The situation as described by you, Mr. Psesident, with regard to the delay In the resumption of this meeting is quite coxrect; it was very difficult, at least as far as I am conoerned, to ccmmunicate with Cyprus. Therefore I informed ycu that we shall have to wait until tomorrow morning to obtain the agreement of Cyprus to the proposed consensus, and that for this reason it was inevitable, owing to the lateness of the heur, that we wculd have to adjourn until tomorrow. But when 1 proposed that, I did not envisage at a11 that the time for the next meeting would depend on the appearance of a report which may be delayed. We wanted to get something effective done as soon as possible, and the soonest possible would have been 18 2. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): 1 have only two words to say and it is only to inject a note of relief into the proceedings, We cari a11 sleep in peace. The charge that the Turkish fleet was on its way for an imminent invasion of Cyprus is, as usual, false. 1 have been instructed by my Government to tel1 the Council that there is no such thing. Turkey has only a few destroyers patrolling offshore, and they have no intention of landing. 182. M. ERALP n’ai que deux mots a dire et uniquement pour apporter une note de soulagement tous dormir flotte nente de Chypre reçu au Conseil que quelques cotes debarquement.

The report that I had from Cyprus indicated that the number of ships was exactly the number 1 mentioned earlier. They came within fifteen miles of Cyprus and stopped there at 3.30 in the morning, Cyprus time. They remained for twenty-five to thirty minutes and then turned back and proceeded to a distance of thirty miles, where they were last located. SO it is not incorrect to say that they moved toward Cyprus, though they followed their previous practice of moving close and then moving away. Why not say things as they are, why try to distort them? This is how the situation really is, and there are radar reports and other information to prove it. 183. rapport de navires approchés a 3 h 30 du matin, sur place pendant 25 2 30 minutes, demi-tour milles, Il n’est donc pas inexact de dire qu’ils se sont diriges vers suivi s’éloigner comme elles sont? Pourquoi chercher C’est avons des relevbs ments pour le prouver.

1 want to say very briefly that 1 support the Cypriot representative’s proposa1 that we should cal1 a meeting for 3 p,m. 134. M. MOROZOV sovietiques) dire Chypre 15 heures.

1 support the suggestion of the President, that we meet upon his call. 185. duit de l’anglais] tendant a nous réunir 186. la proposition

I support the proposa1 made by the representative of Cyprus. 187. mettre aurait réunir Monsieur le désir.

May 1 make a proposa1 which is, perhaps, of a compromise nature, namely, that we meet later this morning, provided that you yourself, Mr. President, express a desire to this effect.

1 shall refrain from oommenting on the French representative’s proposal; 1 shall not consider it a compromise. 188. tiendrai du representant considerer 189. restera au differend prochaine 189. If there are no further comments, the President then remains available to the members of the Council, and the parties to the dispute, with regard to the convening of the next meeting of the Seourity Council,

If no other member of the Council wiahes to take the floor, the meeting is adj ousned, The meeting rose on Sunday, 9 Augus t, at 1.25 a.m. Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.50 (or equivalent