S/PV.1153 Security Council

In accordance with previous decisions of the Council, I propose to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to take places at the Council table and participate in the discussion of this question, without vote, 1. aux dt5cisions je propose de la Turquie table à l’examen Sur l’invitation quie), Bitsios At the invitation of the President, Mr. Orhan Eralp (Turkey), Mr. Spyros Kyprianou (Cyprus) and Mr. Dimitri S. Bitsios (Greeoe) took places at the Council table. 2. orateur Je lui donne la parole.

The first speaker on my list is the representative of Turkey, to whom 1 give the flcor. 3. comprends de faire lution Nations m’accorder &Pondre sations

1 fully realize that the Council is anxious to get on with its work of adopting a resolution for the extension of the mandate of the UNFICYP. But I shall have to ask for your indulgence SO that 1 may reply as briefly as possible to the scurrilous attacks made by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou against my Government. 5. It has been clearly established by neutral observers that the Turkish air action was scrupulously directed against military objectives. It is always regrettable but true that in large-scale military operations a certain number of civilians also perish. But the Secretary-General’s report [S/5950 andAdd.1 and Z]u indicates, in the number and nature of the casualties, that this action could not have been directed against civilian objectives. After the fighting stopped in Tylliria, the Greek Cypriot authorities took a group of international journalists to show them the, damage caused on civilian installations. They were shown a hospital which had been damaged. But right next to the hospital there were a number of tanks which had been destroyed by air action, Whichprompted one of the journalists to ask: “1s this a hospital for tanks?” 6. It is regrettable that some civilians should have perished in defensive action against a murderous attack planned and executed by the Greek Cypriots. But 1 ask the Council: is there any comparison between this and the cold-blooded butchering of women and children in their homes by the terrorists acting under the orders of the Makarios régime, as happened in December? Can this be compared to the coldblooded taking of hostages and of torturing and executing them, as happened in Famagusta on 11 May? -7. ‘The air action of Turkey was fully discussed by the Council on 8 and 9 hugust 1964 [1142nd and 1143rd meetings]. What cari be the purpose of Mr. Kyprianou in bringing this matter up before the Council once again? 1s he trying to blame the Council for not condernning the defensive air action? Not only the Council but, in spite of the large-scale propaganda efforts of the Makarios regime, also the whole world has understood the reason for that action, The Council neither condemned nor condoned the action in question. It took it for what it was and asked for a11 hoStilitieS in the area to be stopped, No one has said that Turkey., s’hould stand aside and observe the cold-blooded slaughter of her kinsmen when not even the United Nations Force was given a chance by the aggressors to remove the women and children from the area, 8. Mr. Kyprianoutookfully twenty minutes to describe in great detail the fighting that resulted from the L/ Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplemnl. 9, Mr. Kyprianou made a pointed allusion to the fact that the weapons used in the defensive air operations in Tylliria were of foseign manufacture. Of course they were, We have not as yet reached the level of production when we cari manufacture a11 the weapons we need for our own defence. We obtain them for defensive purposes, and for defensive purposes only, from our friends. In the Tylliria operations they were used for the legitimate purpose of the defence of Turks who were faced with the immediate prospect of annihilation. Itwas announced at the time that the air interventionwould stop as soon as the nttacks on Kokkina would stop. It did, and they did. But what about the heavy weapons which the Makarios régime solemnly declared to the United Nations it had obtained for defensive purposes? Why were they being used for the extermination of a beleaguered minority? From where were they obtained? 9. M. Kyprianou que les armes de d8fense .?l Tylliria Je n’entends core au point ofi nous pourrions armes Nous obtenons des fins Lors des operations dans le but 18gitime d’un anéantissement moment, que l’intervention les attaques qui s’est le rggime nelle qu’il a faite aux Nations Unies, s’etaitprocur8es à des fins exterminer venues? 10, Mr. Kyprianou took over two hours of the councilfs time for a long dissertation full of the usual slanders, distortions and double-talk. 1 shall 10. Pendant a tenu un long discours les deformations habituelles. tous les impartial une opinion sur la plupart nOt attempt to answer them all. On most of them the Council Will make its own judgement, guided bY the impartial report of the Secretary-General. 11. One of the distortions was his reference to a statement which was supposed to have been made bY General Sounay, the Turkish Chief of Staff, in which he was supposed to have said, after consultation with NATO officiais in Paris, that he had obtained the full consent of NATO headquarters for air attacks on Cyprus. There has never been such a statement. I believe a statement was made to the effect that Turkey had the right, whenever her national interests dictated it, to regain control of the forces which she had put at the disposa1 of NATO, The statement was distorted in that manner, and 1 now correct it. 11. L’une rendu coupable qu’aurait turc, fonctionnaires le plein assentiment pour des attaques dgclaration c’est, int&&ts traie de l’OTAN, formes, 12. Un exemple de M. Kyprianou a faite Il semble se seraient seraient Famagouste Makarios et a ensuite dites? 12. A typical example of the double-talk was his reference to what he called “self-restricted areas” in Cyprus. It would appear from his remarks that the Turks had merely shut themselves up in certain areas and would not corne out. What about the areas of Famagusta and Larnaca which were declared restricted areas by the Makarios Government ten days ago, and then, graciously deolared unrestricted once again? 13. M. Kyprianou du blocus debat que quelques je disserte rapport lations faites 12 septembre ment d’informations 13. It was said that my reference to the economic blocka’de did not add anything but a few adjectives to the issue. Was 1 expected to go into bargaining on calories and calorie values? Does not the report of the Secretary-General and the eloquent revelations of General Thimayya to the Press on 12 September 1964 contain sufficient information on that score? 15. Mr. Kyprianou promised the Council that when it met to consider Cyprus he would be in a mood to talk. He has talkecl a great deal, but he has displayed a rather grumpy mood. No one was spared from his barbs. He attacked the Council, he attacked its members, he attacked the Secretary-General and the United Nations authorities in Cyprus, but most of a11 he saved his slanders for my Government. He even went SO far as to imply that the Republic of Turkey had no right to make suggestions as to the procedure of the United Nations. He seems to have overlooked the fact that Turkey is a founder member of the United Nations and that it has always upheld the principles of the United Nations. If he caree to have a look in the Meditation Room, he Will find a memorial plaque which testifies to the human sacrifices of Turkey for the cause of the United Nations, As to his oblique reference to Turkey’s part in fighting for the principles of the United Nations, 1 advise him to read up on his contemporary political history in order to learn some more about the valuable contribution of Turkey to the United Nations cause. 16. After all, it was not a Turkish General, but General Grivas, the Commander of the Greek Cypriot Forces about whom General Thimayya said on 13 August 1964: “He thinks the United Nations is a bloody nuissance probing its nose into the thing.” 17. These slanders are a11 the more unpalatable as they corne from the representative of an artificial country which was created in a spirit of friendship between Greeee and Turkey in response to the cal1 of the General Assembly, a country whose membership in the United Nations was co-sponsored by Turkey, a country whose independence Archbishop Makarios has vowed to terminate by having it swallowed by Greece in a great wave of territorial expansionism. 18. Finally, the Fore@ Minister of the Greek Cypriot Government has corne to this session of the Council waving an olive branch which has turned out to be full of thorns. He has cited a telegram from Archbishop Makarios [S/5950/Add.2, annex] to the Secretary-General in which the Archbishop, among other tings, offers to lift th.e inhuman blockade and to resettle thousands of Tuukish Cypriots who have become refugees as a result of the terrorism 19. The telegram from Archbishop Makarios offers, among other things, to resettle the Turks of Cyprus if they bow to his Will. 1 cari hardly help but mention a statement which 1 have quoted before and which 1 would like to quote again. It is from the Labour Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Papadopoulos, who says: 19. tamment s’inclinent de rappeler l’on me permettra declaration dopoulos, ” Let us be realistic. Destruction of this sort is deplorable. But if these Turks should want to go back home now, what homes could they go back to?” This should be read in conjunction withthesecretary- General’s report where the destruction of Turkish homes is exposed. Il faut se souvenir g&&al 20. And, again, in The New York Herald Tribune of 17 September there is this item: 20. du 17 septembre, “Turkish Cypriots reported a 60-year-old woman and her 38-year-old son were wounded by Greek Cypriot gunfire as they picked grapes near the village of Vrecha.” Ce devaient une raison crime Makarios? priote avoir chasse 1’Me de Chypre. dans l’fle gime Makarios They must have been grapes of wrath. Do we have any reason to expect that the perpetrators of this neWeSt crime Will be brought to justice by the Makarios regime? Has any Greek Cypriot under the Government of Cyprus ever been brought to justice for killing, wounding, torturing a Turkish Cypriot? Or is it opan season for shooting Turks on the island of Cyprus? This is the rule of law, of the Makarios law which his régime offers to the Turks of Cyprus. 21. Une solution ne sera que Mgr qu’il ne croit a comprendre Nous esperons les qualités, clique croit triompher 21. The solution of the Cyprus problem Will not be imposed by force upon the Turkish minority. Archbishop Makarios, who has categorically stated that he does not believe in an agreed settlement, must be made to realize that no other settlement is possible, We hope and trust that the new and able mediator Will be successful in impressing this fact upon a clique that has made intransigence a virtue and intolerance a triumph. 22. l’anglais]: parce nement est 1Q.m de ceux qui sont directement ses a été saisi.

1 have asked to speak early in this debate because, as the Council is aware, my Government is one of those directly concerned in this situation and has been SO ever since the Council was first seized of it. 23. 1964, 23. The Secretary-General’s main report of 10 September on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, 24. The Secretary-General’s account of the operations of the Force and the problems which it has faced in Cyprus analyses fully and frankly the course of recent events on the island, and 1 do not think it needs further comment from me to lead the Council to uphold the Seoretary-General’ s conclusion that, if the Force were to be removed at this time, the results for the island of Cyprus would be disastrous, 25. There should be no doubt in the mind of any member of the Council, or indeed of any Member of this Organization, that the United Nations Force in Cyprus under its able Commander, General Thimayya, offers us the only hope of keeping the peace until, by way of mediation, a permanent political settlement is achieved. Without it the consequences for the island, and indeed for the cause of peace in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area, would, as we have often been reminded, be very grave. My delegation cari therefore see no alternative course but to support the extension of the Force’s mandate for a further three months. 26. 1 should also like to say here and now that my Government attaches the greatest importance to the principle that the finanoial burdens of maintaining the Force should be widely shared among Member States. The present situation, under which a very heavy burden-financial and material-has been borne for six months by a small minority of Member States, appears to my Government to be both inequitable and contrary to the spirit of our Organization. We therefore most earnestly trust that voluntary financial contributions are made by Member States promptly and in sufficient amount to enable the Secretary-General to ensure that the Force is fully maintained and that its operations are carried out efficiently, 27. It is not enough, however, for the Councilmerely to approve a further extension of the mandate, It is vital that we should do our best to ensure that the Force cari Count upon full co-operation in carrying out its mandate from the leaders of both communities in Cyprus. 28. In this connexion my delegation welcomes the decision to lift the economic restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community which is contained in the message from the President of the Republic of Cyprus to the Secretary-General, embodied in the latter’s most recent report to us [S/5950/Add.2]. 29. The most distressing aspect of the problems besetting the island of Cyprus has been the suffering and hardship which has been inflicted on SO many innocent people, whether by the result of open warfare or of economic blockade, or through other 30. My delegation remains convinced that a solution to the problem of Cyprus will only be found by way of peaceful negotiations between the parties concerned, and that a solution acceptable to both communities in Cyprus, which will be lasting, Will not be possible until present tensions are substantially lessened and until conditions are restored to the level where people cari pursue their normal lives without fear. 30. blème négociations et que l’on ne pourra table durable, éte atténuees oil la population normale. 31. En terminant, Secretaire de la tache a assignee a Chypre, 31. In conclusion, 1 should like to pay a tribute to the achievement of our Secretary-General in performing the complex and difficult task which this Council has bestowed upon him of maintaining peace in Cyprus. 32. It is unfortunately only too true that unwise policies and rash decisions have in the past led to the sudden outbreak of hostile action: and it is the strong hope of my delegation that those responsible for such policies and decisions will from now on heed the previous resolutions and appeals of this Council. Nevertheless, in spite of a11 these difficulties, the Commander of the Force has SO far heen able to deter and containthe spread of wide-scale hostilities. His energy and initiative appear to us to deserve the highest commendation. 32. le passe, sidérées d’actes que les responsables sions et des les difficult&, qu’% present des hostiliWs. méritent, 33. The Secretary-General’s special representative in Cyprus, Mr. Galo Plaza, has also done much t.0 lower the tensions and to further the restoration of normal conditions, We welcome the announcement that Mr. Gslo Plaza has been appointed Mediator in place of the late Mr. Tuomioja, and we wish him a11 success in his most important task. By his very success in his present task, however, he has demonstrated the vital importance of the continuedpresence in Cyprus of a person of his stature acting as the persona1 representative of the Secretary-General. 33. Chypre, pour rhduire situation Plaza M. dans cette tâche si importante, Par son SU~C&S dans ses dernieres fonctions, M. Galo Plaza a demontre l’importance capitale que revdt la prgsence continue a Chypre d’une personne de hautes qualit& pour agir en tant que representant du Secrétaire gen8ral. 34. Pour les raisons indiquees dans ces courtes observations, ma d818gation est prête à appuyer une decision du Conseil visant & proroger pour une nouvelle période le mandat de la Force des Nations Unies à Chypre. 34. In the light of these few comments my delegation Will be prepared to support action by the Council to renew the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period,

We are fortunate, in our consideration of the item on our agenda, to have the excellent report presented by the Secretary-General, It is a thorough and wellorganized presentation of the pertinent facts, in the opi- 35. M. STEVENSON (Etats-Unisd’Am8rique) [traduit de l’anglais]: du jour, nous avons l’avantage de disposer de l’excellent rapport prasenté par le Secretaire général, De l’avis de mon gouvernement, c’est là un expos8 complet et bien ordonne! des faits pertinents. rapport formules avec franchise sur les principaux aspects de la mission que le Conseil a confiBe, par sa résolution du 4 mars 1964 [S/55’753/], au Secrétaire gené- ral maintien de la paix, et il fournit d’excellentes raisons de poursuivre l’opération. nion of my Government. The reportoontains forthright judgements and conclusions on the major aspects of the taskwhichthe Council assigned to the Secretary- General and to the peace-keeping force in its resolution of 4 March 1964 [5/55’75],3/and it provides an excellent basis for continuing the operation. 3/ 1964. 3/ Ibid., Ninereenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1964. 37. This careful accounting to the Council Will be, we hope, kept current by the Secretary-General tothe greatest extent possible, and in this way the Council may be kept fully aware of the degree of co-operation the Force that this Council has created is receiving from the parties concerned. Aa a use-Eu1 example of this practice we note in particular the addendum to the Secretary-General’s report [S/5950/Add.Z]. This contains both an account of recent events and a very welcome statement by President Makarios that the regrettable practice of calculated restriction of essential supplies to certain areas of the island will henceforth cesse. W e see no place in the civilized behaviour of modern nations for Governments to institute interna1 economic blockades against minorities in their midst. The decision to lift the interna1 blockade in Cyprus is as necessary as it is timely, 38. The military situation as described in the Secretary-General’s report, however, remains particularly worrisome and precarious. The description in the report of the serious outbreak of fighting which occurred a month ago and the repeated efforts made to stop it are a vivid reminder of the very narrow margin between the tragic and senseless engagement and its extension into wider country. 39. Apropos of this engagement, we continue to oppose and to deplore, as I said here to the Council on 19 June 1964 [1138th meeting], the importation of arms into an island already stuffed with armaments. We most energetically deplore any use of force on the island by the parties to the Cyprus dispute, In particular we deplore the use of heavy arms, purportedly purchased for external defence, in violation of specific pledges made to the United Nations. In the presence of a lightly-armed United Nations Force, commissioned by this Council to prevent a recurrence of fighting and positioned between the forces of the two communities, the use of such weapons is indefensible. 40. We also most emphatically deplore any air attacks on the island launched from outside ofcyprus. In this connexion, the United States hasnever agreed to the use of arms furnishedunder military assistance agreements for any purpose not specified in those agreements-and this applies to a11 such weapons furnished to any signatory of such an agreement 41, TO say that actions of bath types aggravate the situation in terms of the resolution of 4 March would be oniy a gross understatement. They risk the broadening of hostilities, they are tragic in their consequences for combatants and non-combatants alike. We cari be thankful, 1 think, that the dedication and the discipline of the troops of the United Nations Force and the energetic efforts of the Force Commander in policing the cesse-fire which the Council voted on 9 August 1964 [S/5868Jg have helped to overcom,e this recent perilous situation. 41. situation, serait les hostilités les battants. que le devouement Force giques assurer Conseil surmonter 42. But it is clear that the danger remains great and that the Force needs and deserves the utmost co-operation from the governmental authorities and communities on Cyprus and from a11 Member Statesin particular those directly involved in the Cyprus question, For if it is successfully to carry out its principal mission of preventing a recurrence of the fighting, it Will have to have such co-operation. In addition, the Commander and his forces, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his memorandum of 22 July 1964, [S/5843],u must be able to move freely and to inform themselves of the island of Cyprus if they are to position themselves in a timely manner and to exercise the functions the Secretary- General has carefully defined for them in his report to the Council. 42. grand grande auprés nautés Membres, ress& sa mission des combats, sable. troupes, dans puissent la situation mesure les soigneusement 43. Limitations on the United Nations Force beyond those in the Agreement on the status of the Force [S/5634$ or disrespect for thc United Nations troops or for the authority which the Secretary-General has vested in their Commander, General Thimayya, cannot 1 believe be oountenanced by any Menibers of this Organization. Therefore, 1 wholly endorse what has already been said here about support for the Commanderts authority and commend the energy and the wisdom with which he has exercised it in bis most difficult task. 43. Unies, statut de la Force envexs rité mandant de la Force, être de l’organisation. t5té dit ici au sujet du soutien du commandant, gie et de la sagesse autorité 44. sans r8serve devant ressées, prorogg membres efforts de 1’ONU & Chypre normale. 44. Furthermore, 1 cari state that my Government fully supports the recommendation now accepted in the Council by the main parties concerned: that the mandate of the Force be extended for an additional three months. 1 believe the Council should a11 be grateful for the persevering efforts of the United Nations staff in Cyprus to re-establish normal conditions. The catalogue of their frustrations in these efforts is a monument to the complexity of this 9 Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1964. %w -/ Ibid., Supplement for January, February and March 1964. 46. I cannot concludethese remarks, however, without touching on a subject which is not only painful to my Governmeat but also, judging from his report, to the Secretary-General, And that is the subject of finances, We tried in the 4 March resolution to meet this problem without further complicating or prejudicing the more fundamental issue of financing United Nations peace-keeping across the board. 47. My Government has, 1 believe, participated generously in the financing of United Nations aotivities in Cyprus on the voluntary basis undertaken pursuant to the Council’s resolution. Of the estimated $12.5 million which the Force Will cost for the first six mont&, we have pledged up to $4.3 million, and in addition have provided, at no cost to the United Nations, airlift for some 4,700 troops, to the value of about $1 million. Contributions in line with their financial abilities by other members of this Council, as weli as by other United Nations Member States in the European and in the Mediterranean region, including especially those whose interest in apeaceful solution is enhanced by their proximity to Cyprus, would have solved the financing problem for the United Nations Force in Cyprus. 48. Lacking such contributions, the Seoretary- General is now in the awkward position of being asked to sustain a Force for which, despite the financial support of their troops undertaken by Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, pledged funds are inadequate. We earnestly urge that a11 members of the Council which have unanimously established this peace-keeping operation set an example by contributing the financial means, without which the operation cannot succeed. 49. If the Council decides to authorize the continuation of the Force, 1 Will promptly announce the extent to which my Government is willing to provide continued financial support for the operation. 1 earnestly hope that this pledge Will be quicklyfollowed by comparable pledges from a11 who have a sincere interest in the United Nations and in its peace-keepingrole. AndI am frank to say that 1 believe that those who have particularly insisted on the primacy, or even the exclusive authority, of the Security Council in the peacekeeping field might well assume aparticular responsibility to contribute to an operation duly authorized by the Security Council and financed by arrangements 51. terminée, une solution que le Conseil lution du 4 mars. tion ne peut &tre &tre négociée ont reconnu apposant ensemble Nicosia 51, The peace-keeping task in Cyprus Will end, Ifear, only with the achievement of a permanent agreed solution, a solution of the type that this Council in its 4 March resolution correctly called for. TO be applicable this cannot be a solution legislated in the abstract, It must be a solution negotiated between the parties whose representatives recognized each other’s interest in the island by jointly affixing their signature to the treaties at Nicosia in 1960. 52. Whatever may be the present position of tbese Governments regarding those treaties, this recognition of interest could not, snd cannot now, be scratched from history. It is for this reason, 1 believe, that the Couneil in its 4 March resolution clearly indicated the parties which would be involved in mediation and negotiation. These were the parties assiduously and patiently consulted by that accomplished Finnish statesman, the late Sakari Tuomioja. 52. nements dlinter&ts effacée de l’histoire. que le Conseil lution lesquelles Ce sont la les parties si accompli 53, This distinguished man, who in the lime given him gave SO generously of his talents, both to his country and to the world, spared no effort in his final task. He did not live to complete it and the most fitting tribute that we cari give to his memory is, 1 would suggest, to rededicate ourselves, with the aid of the new Mediator appointed by the Secretary- General to this task. 53. reusement donne, à la fois aucun effort assez hommage que nous puissions me semble-t-il, l’aide du nouveau mediateur, g&i&ral. 54. My Government, which had the utmost respect 54. Mon gouvernement, for Mr. Tuomioja and deeply regrets his untimely sideration passing, Will continue to be at the disposition of his sa mort prématuree, able successor, And we congratulate the Secretarydistingue General and tbe parties concerned for having agreed general to the choice of Mr. Galo Plaza for this task. We d’accord wish the new Mediator every success in his difficult ces fonctions. task. de reussir 55. I believe this Council cari be satisfied that the difficult chore it has given to the executive organ of the United Nations has been undertaken with diligence and dedication. But the task is not over. The need for continuing work on it is apparent and we must follow its execution closely. The Secretary-General, the Commander of the Forces and the Mediator Will need the full support and the co-operation of the Members of our Organization. The nations which have offered their troops, their police forces, their medical personnel, have given an example of co-operation and support which we hope no Members or friends of this Organization, and particularly no permanent members of this Council, Will hesitate to follow . 55. tâche difficile Nations dévouement. n6cessit8 en suivre rai, le mediateur la coopération Les nations contingents, dical, que, nous l’esp&ons, Organisation, Conseil 56. le plus debat sur le rapport 56, Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (translated from French): The most positive, most concrete and most constructive element in the debate on the Secretary-General’s 57. The Council, therefore, Will understand the reasons why at least my delegation was anxiously waiting for the Turkish delegation’s reaction. Yesterday and today, 1 followed the statements of the Turkish representative with great attention, With regard to past events, one might have expected polemics; but 1 was waiting to see his approach to this pacification plan. Before presenting my comme& on the method used in this connexion by the Turkish representative, 1 should like to stress the faot that even today, more than a month after the air raids on Cyprus, the Turkish representative attempted once againto justify that measure. He adduced two faotors: the Secretary- General’s report, in the first place, and, in the second place, the conditions under which defensive arms are provided to members of the Atlantic Alliance by our principal allies, 58. One might well ask, and I think the members of the Council Will ask, what the Turkish representative was able to find in the Secretary-General’s report that could possibly justify the air raids on Cyprus. If the Council Will permit, 1 shall read paragraph 225 of the report [S/5950] once again, as it seems to me to be to the point: “These raids on defenceless people killed and maimed many innocent civilians, destroyed much property and inevitably led to a hardening of the positions of the Cypriot Government, as might have been anticipated. 1 trust that they Will net be repeated, for whatever reasons.” However this paragraph may be read, no encouragement cari be drawn from the report either to justify the past or to portend the future. 59. On the other hand, 1 must express my satisfaction at the statements just made by the United States representative. Greece, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, expected these statements, namely that arms provided to members of the Alliance were exclusively for defence. It is in any case on this condition that Greece remains within the Atlantic Alliance, 60. 1 have said that, after the usual polemics, the most interesting part of the Turkish representative’s statement was the part in which he dealt with the pacification plan of the President of the Republic of Cyprus. 1 assure the members of the Council that it was with deep regret that Inoted the altogether negative way in which this plan was received by the Turkish delegation. 62. 1 cari only share the opinion of the speakers who preceded me, namely that pacification in the island is most urgent. Mediation cari make headway only in a less strained situation and then it might do SO quickly; but to bring about this situation, the goodwill of everyone is necessary; the aggressive, negative and ironie words of the Turkish representative may bave demonstrated that Mr. Eralp is a good fighter, but contributed nothing to our debate. l?or my part, in any ease, 1 was unable to draw any conclusions from them or anything permitting the hope that a new leaf might be turned over. 62. m’ont est une affaire un climat gresser, dement, de agressivesp Turquie batailleur, bution n’ai mettrait tournee. 63. It has not escaped my attention that the United States representative, speaking of the solution of the Cyprus problem, had in mind a solution which would be the result of an agreement between the parties concerned. This, of course, would be the ideal solution. But is it within the realm of possibility? May one even hope for it, when one of the parties solemnly stated here a short time ago that Cyprus is an artificial State? 63. sentant probléme le résultat Ce serait elle dans le domaine des possibilit&? rer, nellement artificiel? 64. Mr. Eralp told us that Cyprus was an artificial State created by the Will and the co-operative spirit of Turkey and Greece. Many States, in the diplomatie history of humanity, have indeed been founded by the agreement of certain Powers; but once they are born, once they are in existence, they are States. There is not the slightest notion of llartificial State” in international law or in history. It does not exist. Cyprus is a Member of the United Nations. Its international personality, its independence and its territorial integrity are not matters for discussion or for controversy, because they are recognized by the United Nations. And if there were any need in this crisis, the Security Council, the supreme organ of the United Nations has recognized them anew. 64. artificiel ration dans or& une fois En effet, dans l’histoire, Elle nisation nationale, toriale 2 controverse, Nations crise, de nouveau reconnues. 65. In any case, Greece would not have co-operated with Turkey in order to found an artificial State. The worst of it is thal; we cari never hope to reach a solution if, nine months after the crisis, we proceed from the idea that Cyprus is an artificial State. 65. ooop&$ Le pire, a une solution du concept 66. grec. donne pondu, accusation entre 66. Mr. Eralp has spoken over and over again about Greek expansionism. l?or what reason does he wish me to give him the same answes each time? I have already answered that accusation of expansionism at anothcr meeting of the Council. 1 Will tel1 him that there is an enormous difference between 67. We have committed ourselves to the principle of the independence of Cyprus, of its existence. We do not consider Cyprus an artificial State. We are ready to co-operate with everyone in the quest for a peaceful solution. But above all, we consider that what is important now, what is important in this Council, is to give the pacification plan of the President of Cyprus a11 the moral support possible; and, as 1 rnyself didyesterday, torequesttheSecretary-General to instruct his representatives in Cyprus to spare no effort day by day in following the execution of this plan. For the moment, it is our only hope. 68. The representatives of the United Kingdom and of the United States made an appeal earlier concerning the financial side of the question. During the first six months, Greece contributed the sumof $1,050,000. Greece Will continue to fulfil its duty when the Council decides to prolong the UNPICYP mandate.

Ihave no more speakers on my list at present and 1 will therefore take this opportunity to speak as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 70. It is almost nine months since the Security Council, doing its duty as the United Nations body with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, first placed the question of Cyprus on its agenda [1085th meeting]. 71. As you know, during this period the Council has discussed the situation in the Cyprus area on five occasions. It is no exaggeration to say that this question of the threat to international peace and security created by foreign interference in the interna1 affairs of Cyprus has been and remains a matter of serious concern to the Security Council, 72. The events which have taken place in the Cyprus region in the past nine months and in particular those of the beginning of last August, show quite clearly the real reasons for the dangerous increase in tension around Cyprus, this small State which is a Member of our Organization’These events confirm that the essence of the matter, as we have repeatedly pointed out, is that certain NATO Powers are seeking to exploit the differenoes between the two communities in Cyprus for their own selfish ends, 74. II is quite obvious that those who suffer most from this enmity between nationalities and this bloodshed are the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of Cyprus, to whatever community they may belong. 75. And if the situation in Cyprus today is still far from normal, as is indicated in the Secretary-General’ s report to the Council, this is mainly due to the fact that the difficulties on Cyprus continue to be artificially inflated by impcrialist forces, 76. The Soviet delegation has already said, in its statements at previous meetings of the Council, that the essence of the matter is that the NATO Powers want to shift the Republic of Cyprus from its position of neutrality and fetter it with new one-sided agreements, in order to turn the island into an armed base-a kind of l’unsinkable NATO aircraft carrier,” as they oall it, anchored in the eastern Mediterranean. That this is the case is also shown by events of the comparatively recent past, when the territory of Cyprus was used by the imperialists for the unleashing of aggression against Egypt in 1956. It is also shown by officia1 statements of representatives of thewestern Powers. We need only refer, for example, to the statement by the United Kingdom Minister ofDefence, Mr. Thorneycroft, in the House of Commons on 19 February 1964. In this statement the Minister said, with extreme candeur: “Cyprus remains the main base for our air strike forces in support of CENTO.” May 1 remind you now of the not unfamiliar Acheson plan, which represents a new stage in theprocess of turning Cyprus into a NATO base? 77, As reported in the Western Press, NATO is at present discussing various different ways of making the fullest possible use of the territory of Cyprus in its own interests. It is known from these reports that the Acheson plan, to which 1 have already referred, is to dispossess Cyprus of an area of 200 square miles in the eastern part of the island and give it to Turkey for a military base. Other alternatives worked out in NATO involve turning two United Kingclom bases on Cyprus into collective bases, if one cari cal1 them that, for the aggressive blocs of the Western Powers. The United Kingdom newspaper The Financial Times of 18 August 1964 said: “One base could be made over to NATO, SO that Greek and Turkish troops could join the British forces there; the other to CENT0 . . . and in this case Turkish troops alone would join the British.” 78. The list of these ideas and plans could be extended; but what has already been said suffices to justify the conclusion that a11 these plans and the manceuvres connected with them are persuasive evidence that certain NATO Pow ers are openly plotting behind the backs of the Cypriot people, to carve up the territory of Cyprus afresh. In this they are behaving as if Cyprus were still a United Kingdom colony and not a sovereign State which is a Member of the United Nations. 79. One of the means still used to put pressure on Cyprus is the threat of a new invasion by Turkey. At the beginning of August, as everyone knows, Turkey mounted aggressive operations against Cyprus, bombing its towns and villages. As we a11 remember, a special meeting of the Security Council was held in that connexion, The operations in question not only did not meet with any support but were, on the contrary, condemned by a majority of members of the Council. 80. This attack on Cyprus is essentially part and parce1 of NATO policy, which is a direct threat to the freedom and independence of the Cypriot State. 81. We should like, in this connexion, to draw attention to the fact that the many photographs handed by the delegation of Cyprus to members of the Security Council at the 1151st meeting, which were rejected in such a magnificently casual manner and with such a great show of indignation by a recent speaker in the Council, included photographs of the remains of napalm bombs and rackets used by Turkey during its air attack on Cyprus in August of this year. 82. Anyone who took the trouble to look at these photographs could see with his own eyes what marking these was on the deadly devices showered on the peaceful population of Cyprus. That marking was, 1 am quoting from a record based on a study of those photographs: “Government Order No . . . , Property of the United States Air Force”. Among these photographs there is one of the remains of a Turkish military plane which took part in the raid on Cyprus and was brought down over Cypriot territory. Thés aircraft belonged to the 112th NATO squadron. On what was left of this aerial pirate on Cypriot territory there Can be seen the following marking: “Property of the United States of America”, or “Property of the United States Air Force”. 83. That is why Mr. Kyprianou, Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Cyprus, rightly pointed out: “The aircraft and the bombs which hit Cyprus are not of Turkish make , . . these aircraft, rackets and bombs have been given to Turkey as a member of the NATO Alliance and for the purposes of the NATO Alliance.” [1151st meeting, para, 87.1 85. We would remind the Council of a statoment by the Chairman of the Council of Mini&ers of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who on 16 August 1964 said thefollowing: 85. Le 16 acat 1964, Nikita Sergueievitch Khrouchtchev, president du Conseil des ministres de l’Union sovigtique a déclare a ce sujet: “Of course, every right-thinking man Will understand that without somebody’s blessing Turkey would never have embarked upon this dangerous military adventure. Turkey is a member of NATO and is in practice completely under the influence of those forces which determine the policy of that aggressive bloc. There is no getting away from the fact that the Turkish armed forces whichcarried out the attack on Cyprus are a constituent part of the armed forces of NATO, and that the bombs dropped on the peaceful Cypriots bear NATO markings. prendra que, sans la bénédiction de l’OTAN, la Turquie ne se serait pas lan&e dans cette dangereuse aventure militaire. de 1’OTAN et se trouve en fait enti&rement sous la coupe des forces qui définissent la politique de ce bloc agressif. Il est indéniable que les forces armées de la Turquie qui ont attaque Chypre font partie les bombes lâchées sur les Chypriotes pacifiques portaient d’ailleurs la marque de 1’OTAN. rieuse du complot impgrialiste contre Chypre et de l’attaque contre l’fle Londres. Lorsque nous entendons dire que l’attaque armée de la Turquie contre Chypre a été commise parce que le Gouvernement chypriote n’assure pas aux Chypriotes turcs des conditions de vie satisfaisantes, cela ne cadre nullement avec les faits. Il s’agit de tout autre chose.” “Everything therefore indicates that the secret threads of the imperialist conspiracy against Cyprus, and the attack on Cyprus, lead to Washington ancl London. Arguments to the effect that the armed attack by Turkey on Cyprus was carried out because the Government of Cyprus does not provide the Turkish Cypriots with good enough living conditions do not fit the facts, Something else is involved here, ‘1 And Mr. Khrushchev explained what that was. He said: Et voici l’explication “The people of Cyprus rose up against the United Kingdom colonizers and were successful. The imperialists, aggravating the nationalistic contradictions between the two communities, the Greeks and the Turks, are now seeking to impose a new occupation on Cyprus and are urging Turkey on in support of their imperialist aims.” contre les colonialistes britanniques, et ses efforts ont abouti. En attisant les dissensions nationalistes entre la communauté grecque et la communauté turque, les impêrialistes soumettre 1Yle à une nouvelle occupation et, dans ce dessein, ils incitent la Turquie 3 agir.” 86. It is impossible not to see that continuingoutside pressure on Cyprus, and attempts ta intimidate the Cypriot people by the use of force, are a growing obstacle to the normalization of life in Cyprus and make the settlement of its interna1 problems, which are the concern of the Cypriots alone, more and more complicated. 86. De toute évidence, la pression qui continue à s’exercer tentatives par l’emploi de la force entravent de plus en plus le r&ablissement 1Yle et compliquent encore le rbglement deproblémes intérieurs 87. Il ressort sine qua non pour faire disparaître la tension qui r&gne dans la région de Chypre consiste avant tout a Bliminer toute pression extérieure sur l’île, a mettre un terme a l’ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de la Rgpublique, à empbcher les impérialistes de continuer 3 jouer avec le destin des Chypriotes, 87. From what I have said it is obvious that the essential condition, the prime prerequisite for relieving tension in the Cyprus area is for outside pressure on Cyprus and interference in its interna1 affairs to cesse and for the imperialists to stopplaying about with the fate of the Cypriot people. 88. The Soviet Union, governed by a desire to strengthen peace, has steadily supported and continues to support the just cause of the Republic of Cyprus, which is defending the right of a11 Cypriots, both Greeks and Turks, to work in peace and con- 88. L’Union soviétique, soucieuse de voir consolider la paix, a toujours soutenu et continue de soutenir la cause iégitime défend le droit qu’ont tous les Chypriotes - grecs ou turcs - de travailler 90. The Soviet Government, as everyone knows, stated that in the event of aggression against Republic of Cyprus the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the threat of a military conflict which might blaze up near the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union and affect the security of our country and of States that are our friends and allies. 91, We may recall that in its statement of 16 August 1964 the Soviet Government said: “The Soviet Union Will continue to devote efforts to ensuring that a peaceful solution found to the Cyprus problem one which meets the interests of both the Greek’and the Turkish community and the need to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of C@rus. If, however, events develop in a different direction, if the situation becomes more strained and if it cornes ta an invasion of Cypriot territory, thesoviet Union Will not remain on the side-lines. In answer to the request of the Government of Cyprus and the persona1 request of President Makarios, the Soviet Government hereby states that if there is an armed foreign invasion of Cypriot territory, the Soviet Union Will help the Republic of Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence against foreign intervention.i1 92, The situation in the Cyprus area canbenormalized and the Cyprus question cari be settled through servance of the decisions of the Security Council and strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. 93. It should be borne inmind that the most important element, common to a11 the Security Council’s decisions on the Cyprus problem, is confirmation of the principle of non-intervention in the interna1 affairs of Cyprus and the need to respect its sovereignty, 94. This has been reflected in the repeated appeale of the Security Council to a11 States to refrain, conformity with their obligations under the Charter, from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus or to endanger international peace. As we know, this appeal is contained in the Security Council resolutions of 4 March, 13 Marcb and 9 August [S/5575, S/5603 and S/5868]. 95. With regard to the Soviet Union?s position on the dispatch of United Nations forces to C@rus, it should be noted, first of all, that this position has been set forth repeatedly by the Soviet delegation at previous meetings of the Council, including the meetings 97. Our position on the question of the use of United Nations forces in genoral to prevent or put an end ta acts of aggression or to protect the sovereignty of a State victim of aggression was also set forth later in the well-known memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 10 July 1964 concerning “certain nieasures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security” [S/5811].3 97. Notre Position sur la question génerale de llem- Ploi de forces armées de 1’ONU pour prévenir ou faire cesser des actes d’agression, ou SOUVerainet a aussi eté définie dans notre mémoire du 10 juillet dernier, intitulé “MBmoire du Gouvernement de 1 VJRSS CmmmNnt l’efficacitg de la paix et de la &?curit8 internationales” [S/58117/]. 98. An essential condition for recousse to such an extreme measure as the dispatch of United Nations forces must, in a11 circumstances, be strict observance of a11 provisions of the Charter relating to the use of force for the maintenance or restoration of international peace. 98. La condition nécessaire du recours àune mesure aUSSi l’Organisation des Nations Unies doit être en toute circonstance le strict respect de toutes les dispositions de la Charte relatives B l’emploi de la force en vue du maintien ou du retablissement de la paix internationale, 99. However, as we pointed out in detail in the Security Council on 4 March [1102nd meeting], in the case of the operations of United Nations forces on Cyprus not a11 provisions of the Charter were respected when the relevant decision was taken. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not oppose the adoption by the Security Council of the resolution of 4 March. It is also well known that we adopted this position in order to meet the wishes of the Republic of Cyprus, which considered that this resolution, despite its inadequacies, would help to forestall aggression against Cyprus and to protect the country’s legitimate rights and interests. 99. Or, en ce qui concerne 1’0pération de la Porte des Nations Unies Xl Chypre, les dispositions de la Charte - comme nous l’avons indiqué en détail au Conseil le 4 mars [Il028me sbance] - n’ont pas toutes étB respectées lorsqu’a étB adoptée la résolution pertinente. NBanmoins, l’Union soviétique nes’estpas Oppos&e & ce que le Conseil adopte la r&olution du 4 mars, On sait aussi que nous avons agi de la sorte pour répondre aux voeux de la République de Chypre, qui estimait que cette résolution, malgr8 tous ses dbfauts, aiderait à empgcher l’agression contre Chypre et 2 proteger les droits et intérêts Xgitimes de ce pays. 100. Le Gouvernement chypriote jugeant cette mesure indispensable pour assurer la si%urité et l’intégrith territoriale Plus fait obstacle, par la suite, B la reconduction du mandat de la Force jusqu’au 26 septembre 1964 [S/5776y], conformité de la r&olution du Conseil en date du 4 mars. 100, Inasrnuch as the Government of Cyprus deemed this necessary for the protection of its country’s security and territorial integrity, the Soviet Union subsequently raised no objection to an extension of the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations forces for asecondperiod, until26September 1964 [S/577$, on the same conditions and in strict conformity with the Council resolution of 4 March. 101. Il y a lieu de souligner tout particuliérement que, en agissant de la sorte, l’Union soviétique Partait aussi du principe que les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité n’imposaient aucune obligation financibre aux membres de IQNU qui n’avaient pas envoyé de contingent & la Force des Nations Unies à Chypre. 101. It should be emphasized that, in following this course of action, the Soviet Union was also motivated by the fact that the Security Council resolution imposed no financial obligation on Members of the United Nations not supplying contingents to the United Nations forces on Cyprus. 102, pour ce qui est de la Prolongation de laPré& sente de la Force des Nations Unies a Chypre, le Conseil de sécurité doit egalement se faut respecter la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi que les int&?+ts du pays dont le gouvernement a accepté de recevoir ces troupes sur son territoire et qui a ensuite consenti à. prolonger leur Présence dans des conditions bien determinées. 102. In considering the present question of a further extension of the stationing of United Nations fOrCeS on Cyprus, the Security Council should bear in mind the need to respect the United Nations Charter and the interests of the country whose Government agreed to acoept these forces on its territory and later agreed to an extension of their statloningon the island subject to specific conditions. a Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1964. 3 Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1964. WIy Government has already indicated to the Secretary-General that we are prepared to accept the extension of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mandate for an additional three months’ period on the basis of the terms of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964.” [lL5lst meeting, para. 14.1 With regard to the functions of the United Nations force on Cyprus, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs made the following statement, in equally clear-tut ternis: ,t . . . the functions of UNFICYP, as we have a11 along understood them under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, would be exercised in such a way as to respect at a11 times the sovereign rights and the authority of the Cyprus Government.” [Ibid., para. 15.1 104, On the whole, then, the position of the Republic of Cyprus concerning the extension of the stationing of the United Nations Force on Cyprus for another three-month period rests on the premise that such an extension cari be based only on observance of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. 105. That is absolutely correct. There cari certainly be no extension of the stationing of the United Nations force on Cyprus save on the express condition that the arrangement envisaged in the Security Council resolution of 4 March Will be fully respected, particularly with regard to the financing of UnitedNations operations in Cyprus and the functions of the United Nations Force. 106. In this connexion we wish to stress that we firmly oppose any broadening of the function of the United Nations Force as set out in the Council resolution of 4 March 1964. 10’7. It is quite obvious to us that this could not fail to lead to intervention in the interna1 affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. It is important to bear in mind that in the Security Council resolution of 4 March it is stated that it is the Government of Cyprus which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order in its country. From this it clearly follows that the provisions of the Security Council resolution concerning the function of the United Nations force-in the words of the resolution, “to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order”-mean that the United Nations armed forces cari act only in support of measures adopted for this purpose by the Government of Cyprus which, as the Government of a sovereign State, bears full responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order in Cyprus. 108. It is equally clear that this co-operation must in no circumstances lead to demands by the United Nations armed forces that the Cyprus Government 109. In this connexion it should not be forgotten that 109. Il ne faut pas oublier que les fonctions de la the functions of the United Nations forces must Force des Nations Unies doivent consister avant tout consist, first of all, in protecting Cyprus from any B proteger la s&zurité de Chypre contre les menaces foreign threat. Indeed, it is obvious to any impartial de l’extérieur. observer that if there were no threat of Poreign constatera que s’il n’y avait pas euclemenace d’interintervention or aggression against Cyprus the question vention et d’agression étrangbres contre Chypre il of sending United Nations forces to Cyprus would not n’aurait m8me pas Bté question d’envoyer une Force laave arisen at all. des Nations Unies dans ce pays. 110. The duty of the Security Council, as the principal organ of the United Nations vested withresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has been and is to prote& the national independence and the territorial inviolability and integrity of Cyprus and respect for the sovereignty of Cyprus, a Member of the United Nations with full rights as such. 110. Le Conseil de sécurité, principal organe des Nations Unies chargé du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, devoir d’assurer l’indépendance nationale, l’int6grité territoriale le respect de la souveraineté de cet Etat Membre &. part entière de l’organisation des Nations Unies, 111. The Soviet Union has advocated and continues to advocate resolutely that the Security Council should prote& the Republic of Cyprus from aggression and prevent and put a stop to any fore@ intervention in the affairs of that small State. 111. L’Union soviétique insiste, comme par lepassé, pour que le Conseil de sécurité protège la RBpublique de Chypre contre l’agression, pour qu’il empêche et arrete toute inghrence étrangbre dans les affaires de ce petit pays. 112. These are the observations whioh the Soviet delegation has deemed it necessary to make at the present stage in the consideration of the Secretary- General’ s report, 112. tique jugeait nécessaire de formuler au stade actuel de l’examen du rapport du Secrétaire genéral. 113. In order to save time, if there is no objection I am prepared, without establishing any precedent, t0 forgo consecutive interpretation into English and French. 113. Je suis prbt, pour gagner du temps, et s’il nIy a pas d’objection, B renoncer à l’interprétation cutive de mon intervention en anglais et en français, sans que cela crée un pr6cédent. 114. In my capacity as PRESIDENT, 1 give the floor to the next speaker who, according to my list is the representative of Cyprus. 114. En tant que PRESIDENT, je donne maintenant la parole à l’orateur suivant, qui est le représentant de Chypre.

In the course of the debate in the Security Council on 11 September 1964 [ 1146th meeting], 1 undertook not to follow in the footsteps of the representative of Turkey and lower the standards of this debate. 1 intend to follow the same course now. 115. M. KYPRIANOU (Chypre) [traduit de l’anglais]: Au cours du débat au Conseil de sécurit8, le 11 septembre [1146&me seance], Je me suis engagé à ne pas suivre l’exemple du représentant de la Turquie et B ne pas rabaisser le niveau du débat. J’entends bien, aujouxd’hui, tenir cet engagement, 116. Le reprgsentant de la Turquie s’est départi de son calme, bien qu’il ait eu toute la nuit et toute la matinCTe pour se rasseréner. en ouvrant le debat, comme il l’a fait aujourd’hui, c’est parce qu’on est B court d’arguments. Il a eu recours à des attaclues personnelles, mais je ne lui ferai pas l’honneur de lui répliquer delameme façon. Je me bornerai B parler de certaines des questions qu’il a soulevées. 116. The representative of Turkey lest his temper, although he had a11 last night and this morning at Ns disposa1 to calm down. One loses his temper, especially in opening the debate, as he did today, only when one finds no arguments to use. He has resorted to persona1 attack, but 1 shall not do him khe compliment of returning any persona1 attack. 1 shall deal only with certain of the matters that he raised. 117, Tout le discours du représentant de la Turquie a 6% non seulement peu constructif, mais extremement provoquant. Le reprgsentant de la Turquie s’est ing6ni8 & reprendre toute une série d’expressions, déj& utilisées par lui-même et sonpréd&cesseur dans un certain nombre de discours depuis décembre 1963, pour diffamer le Gouvernement chypriote. Il a attaclué le Gouvernement de Chypre sur un ton et d’une manière des plus répréhensibles, sans pouvoir avancer, natu- 117. Not only was his whole speech today not constructive, but it also proved to be very provocative. He tried to collect expressions which he and his predecessor had used in various speeches in the past in order to defame the Government of Cyprus since December 1963. He used anobjectionable tone and manner to attack the Government of Cyprus, without, of course, beingin a position to offer anything constructive. He further tried to attack me personally. He 118. Then he tried again to present an excuse the bombings. Although in his original statement, made in the effort to present an excuse, he used terms such as “limited police action”, today he used another term, and saicl that it was of course natural that civilian populations would suffer when there are large-scale operations. Therefore, today he admits that their attacks on Cyprus were large-soale operations. 119. The representative of Turkey said that it,was not true that the Turkish aircraft did not aim at military targets. Yesterday 1 gave the picture of what happened. 1 myself am not in a position to say whether or not they aimed at military targets. 1 simply cirew certain conclusions, as any logical man would have done when he saw the results of those bombings. The faot that in the course of those bombings armoured car and a boat were hit does not mean that the Turkish aircsaft were aiming at military targets, because they also hit hospitals, churches and houses, they killed civilians, they bombed towns-women children were maimed and killed. 120. What 1 endeavoured to point out yesterday waa that the Turkish air force, with its reputed ability and having the time at its disposa1 to choose unprotected targets , could not logically have hit a11 those civilian targets and innocent people unlesq it aimed at them. ,121. The representative of Turkey saidinhis attempt to excuse the bombings, that they were aimed at military targets. But even if that were SO, it still is no excuse. Who gave Turkey the right to bomb military targets in Cyprus? Did the Security Council give that right to Turkey? Has the Security Council ever appointed Turkey the policeman over Cyprus and in Cyprus? Cyprus is net an artificial State, as the representative of Turkey tried to point out. Cyprus became an independent State, perhaps under certain treaties, but since then Cyprus has become aMember of the United Nations, and Cyprus exists as an independent State by virtue of being a Member of the United Nations on an equalbasis, the same as any other State. Many countries, as the representative Greece pointed out earlier, have become independent as a resuft of certain arrangements, and many countries have taken shape as a result of various arrangements, including Turkey. Yetw e accept Turkey as an equal Member of the United Nations. It is on exactly the same basis that we should be accepted. 122. It is not agreements that gave Cyprus right to be an independent country, it is the demand of our Century that gave Cyprus that right, it is the demand of its people that gave Cyprus that right; it is the demand of world conscience that gave ,124. The representative of Turkey yesterday tried again to speak of the Treaty of Alliance of 1960, and he tried to say that the existence in Cyprus of the Turkish contingent was legitimate because in his Government’s view the Treaty of Alliance still exists as a valid document. 124. Le representant de la Turquie a cherche de nouveau, hier, & parler du Traite d’alliance de 1960 et il s’est efforcé de soutenir que la présence a Chypre du contingent turc était legitime parce que le Traité conserve sa validité. 125. I have often dealt with this question of the Treaty of Alliance, But what is amazing is this: that even for argument’s sake, even if we suppose that the Turkish Government’s position were correct, that the Treaty of Alliance is valid, thenwhat is the excuse for the Turkish Government in not acting in aocordance with that Treaty? The Turkish Government on the one hand says: “The Treaty of Alliance is valid but we do not act in aocordance with that Treaty; we refuse to order our troops into barracks’l-as is very clearly stated in the agreements entered into inimplementing that Treaty. And on the other hand they say that the Treaty is valid. The Turkish Government says: “We have the right to deploy our forces wherever we like, contrary to that Treaty. If And yet the Cyprus Government does not have the right to nullify that Treaty. They say that the Treaty of Alliance is valid, and yet they have never obeyed any orders of the Tripartite Headquarters under the Treaty of Alliance. 125.. J’ai souvent parle de cette question du Traité d’alliance. Mais voici ce qui est stupbfiant: & supposer que, comme le prétend le Gouvernement turc, Trait8 d’alliance soit valable, quelleest alors l’excuse dont le Gouvernement turo peut se servir pour ne pas se conformer a ce traité? Le Gouvernement turc dit: “Le Traité d’alliance est valable, mais nous ne voulons pas nous y conformer et nous refusons de renvoyer nos troupes dans leurs casernes.” C’est 18 ce qulimposent les accords qui ont éte conclus pour l’application du traite. Tout en soutenant que le traité est valable, le Gouvernement turc dit qu’il a le droit de deployer ses forces oh bon lui semble, contrairement aux dispositions du traité, mais le Gouvernement chypriote n’aurait pas le droit de dénoncer ce traité. Les Turcs affirment queleTraitéd’alliance est valable et cependant, en décembre, ils n’ont ob&i a aucun des ordres donnés par le quartier géneral tripartite 126. J’ai dit, hier, que toutes ces violations duTrait& d’alliance ont amene mon gouvernement a sa decision irrevocable Gouvernement turc continue de se référer, comme je l’ai dit hier, au Traité dlalliance, apres les attaques aeriennes contre Chypre du début du mois dIaoC& reduit à. une absurdité - si jepuis dire - toute notion d’alliance. 126. 1 said yesterday that a11 those violations of the Treaty of Alliance resulted in my Government’s irrevooable decision to declare this Treaty as terminated. But for the Turkish Government to continue to talk, as I stated yesterday, of a Treaty of Alliance after the air attacks on Cyprus in early August makes, if 1 may use the phrase, sheer nonsense of any concept Of alliance. 127, Dans sa diatribe d’aujourd’hui, le représentant de la Turquie a de nouveau fait allusion au prétendu blocus economique. J’ai suffisamment pris du temps précieux séance, pour expliquer quelque peu longuement ce qu’il en etait. eu par le passé quant a la fourniture de certains genres de denrees alimentaires et d’autres articles en ce qui ooncerneuniquement certaines zones turques volontairement bien que j’aie pris beaucoup de temps pour expliquer tout celaen detail, en citant des déclarations de repsésentants des Nations Unies et en tous les renseignements dont nous disposons, le 127. In his polemics today the representative of Turkey referred again to the so-called economic blockade. I took enough of the Council’s valuable time to explain at quite some length at the 1151st meeting what the whole story w as, and 1 proved to the Council, in my submission, that although there have been difficulties in the past with regard to the supply. of certain types of foodstuffs and materials only to certain self-restricted Turkish areas-three in number-and although 1 took the Council’s time to explain a11 these things in detail, quoting statements from United Nations representatives and giving as much information as we have at our disposal, yet the Turkish representative, after the proposa1 made 128. 1 would ask the representative of Turkey to read my speech of yesterday on this question carefully and he Will find a11 the answers. 1 wish only to inform the Council that a ship from Turkey arrived at Famagusta today, bringing supplies from Turkey, and that my Government has allowed these supplies to go in to the island for the Kokkina area free of import duty. The amount involved was E12,OOO. 129. The representative of Turkey tried to present the Tylliria fighting again in a different context, and he spoke of the area as if it was a Turkish area. He said that it was after the fighting in the Tylliria area that the Turkish Government decided to go into action in self-defence. 130. 1 am not aware of any laws, internationally accepted, that would justify such an action, In short, as 1 pointed out yesterday, the Tylliria fighting was started by the Turkish terrorists in the effort to extend the area under their control for the purpose of pursuing the policy of the partition of Cyprus. That this policy of partition of Cyprus is still the policy of the Turkish Government was clearly seen yesterday from the speech of the representative of Turkey in trying to misinterpret the terms of reference of the United Nations Force in Cypxus as laid down by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. 131. The distinguished representative of Turkeyalthough it may sound rather odd to continue to refer to him in that way, considering the names he chose to cal1 me and after a11 the attacks he tried to make on me today, 1 shall still continue to do so-referred again to the question of the strengthening. of the defence of Cyprus and the increase of the armed forces. Other speakers also made reference to that subject. 132. By what logic could anyone, and in particular Turkey, ask Cyprus to give up the effort of strengthening its defences in the light of what happened in August and in the light of the continued threats of aggression and invasion of Cyprus? We are small, but 1 think we have the same rights as everybody else. The least right we have is that we are entitled to defend ourselves. 133. There has been much talk of the so-called danger to the Turkish community in Cyprus, in the light of the fact that the defences of the Cyprus Government have been strengthened. In fa&, the Turkish sepresentative tried to make a comparison earlier on by saying what happened in Cyprus as a result of the bombings could not be compared-and may 1 use his expression-“with the genocidal crime perpetrated against the villages of the Tylliria region.” 134. I am net aware of any casualties in villages in that area. 1 think there have been none; no villages 135. The Turkish representative yesterday, in rejecting the magnanimous-1 think it is the correct Word-plan for the pacification of the country submitted to the Security Council by the President of Cyprus, said, among other things, that the Turks do not require any protection from the Greeks, in fact, that they want protection from the Greeks, that the Turks are in danger from the Greeks, That is why he said that they are not prepared to demolish what he called “thefr defensive fortifications”. 1 could furnish the representative with very long lists of Turks who bave already sought the protection of the Cyprus police, and 1 say the Cyprus police although 1 know that he dislikes the term very much. 135.. Hier, le representant de la Turquie a dit, entre autres choses, en rejetant le plan de pacification génereux - j’emploie ce terme parce que je le crois juste - President de Chypre, que les Turcs n’ont pas besoin de la protection c’est Btse protégés contre les Grecs, et queles Turcs sont en danger devant les Grecs. C’est pourquoi, a-t-il qu’il a appelé “leurs fortifications de défense”. Je pourrais une tres longue liste de Turcs qui ont déjà demande la protection police de Chypre” tout en sachant qu’il aime fort peu cette expression. 136. Les Turcs de Chypre ont besoin de protection, et ce que nous avons proposé c’est de les protéger sous une surveillance des Nations Unies, Serions-nous disposes a faire une pareille proposition si nous avions, comme l’a dit le représentant de la Turquie, de sinistres prendre le monde entier $ témoin: securité, le Secrétaire géneral et les Nations Unies. 136. The Turks in Cyprus need protection, and what we offered to do is to prote& them under the observation of the United Nations. Would we be prepared to make su& an offer if we had any sinister plans, as the representative of Turkey said, at their expense and against them? We wish to have the whole world as witnesses: the Security Council, the Seoretary-General and the United Nations. 137. We offered to rehabilitate the Turks andfinance them in that effort, The Turkish representative tried to quote a statement which a Minister of the Cyprus Government was supposed to have made, to the effect that some Turks would not find their houses if they went back, in case thc houses had been destroyed in their own villages. But this is precisely the meaning of economic assistance in that respect-t0 help them rebuild their homes, The Turkish representative did not see fit to welcome the suggestion. He did not think it fit to say: “Let the Turks go back to their villages”, because the Turkish Governmment’s policy iS to have the Turks in certain areas. They do not want them to live in peace where they have been used to living for years and years. 137. et de les assister financiérement à cet effet, Le representant de la Turquie a tenu a citer une declaration qu’aurait Chypre, selon laquelle certains Turcs ne trouveraient plus de maisons s’ils rentraient chez eux, dansle cas oh les maisons auraient Bte détruites dans leurs villages. Mais c’est la précisément la raison d%tre d’une assistance financiere - les aider B reconstruire leurs foyers, juge bon d’accueillir favorablement cette suggestion. Il n’a pas juge bon de dire: “Les Turcs doivent rentrer Gouvernement turc est de concentrer les Turcs dans certaines régions. Il ne veut pas les voir vivre paisiblement là od ils ont vécu tant d’années. 138. The Turks in Cyprus need protection, those Turks who would like to go back to their villages and be liberated from the concentration oamps erected by Turkish diplomacy and Turkish policy. We are ready to give that protection under the observation of the United Nations. We are ready to help them to go back to their peaceful lives. 138. Les Turcs tourner dans leurs villages et &re libérés des camps de concentration dressés par la diplomatie et la politique turques ont besoin de protection. NGUS sommes prêts à leur offrir cette protection sous la surveillance des Nations Unies, Nous sommes pr&ts a les aider à reprendre leur vie paisible. 139. Lorsque financibre, le repressntant de la Turquie a juge bon de dire: t%onnez-leur répondrai leur est clO. Il a dit que le Gouvernement chypriote ne versait mais je peux lui repondre que 560 Chypriotes turcs, pensionnés de l’Eta& reçoivent toujours régulierement 139. When we spoke of financial assistance, the Turkish representative thought it fit to say: “give them what they already are entitled to”. Weil, we have been giving to many people what they have been entitled to. He said that the Cypriot Government does not pay Turkish Cypriot pensioners, but I cari tel1 him that 560 Turkish Cypriot government pensioners, irrespective of their residence, regularly 140. It is not hard for me to admit that there are difficulties inthepresent situation in Cyprus. Naturally there are difficulties. When the United Nations or when the Cyprus police or when Government officiais try to go into a certain area to perform their duties and they are obstructed by the Turkish terrorists-in fact some United Nations offioials were obstructed from going into Kokkina to deliver food supplies the other day-there are bound to be difficulties. It is in the interests of peace and for the purpose of removing a11 these difficulties and of restoring normal conditions that the President made his proposals. 141. Then the question of the amnesty again was not accepted by the Turkish representative. Nothing in fact was accepted. The whole world has commented favourably upon those proposals. The Turkish representative, however, felt that they are not worth-while considering, It might be too much for me to say that the Turkish Government wishes the Turka in Cyprus to suffer. It might have been too much for me to say that, but what 1 cari, in a11 sincerity and in a11 objectivity, say is that the Turkish Government would not mind seeing those people suffer it that serves its own polioy and if it is in pursuance of its own purposes. 142. When the Turkish representative yesterday commented upon the assumptions contained in paragraph 232 of the report of Ehe Secretary-General [S/5950], he said that in connexionwithsub-paragraph (bb, the question of the removal of fortifications and armed forces, that should not happen because that would not allow the Turks to have the possibility of effective resistance. Our offer is the removal of a11 the fortified positions, both those of the Government and those of the terrorists, throughout the country for the purpose of the return to normal conditions, and of ensuring and seouring freedom of communication and movement throughout the island. 1 wonder whether the Turkish representative considered as defensive arrangements for the Turkish minority the positions held by the Turkish contingent on the Kyrenia Road or on the St. Hilarion mountain. 143. The Turkish representative tried to distort once more the picture with regard to our intentions towards the United Nations, and he referred to a statement allegedly made by General Thimayya, according to which General Grivas is supposed to have saicl that the United Nations presence in Cyprus is a nuisance. 1 cari inform the Turkish representative that General Thimayya has denied that he ever made such a statement, but that is simply for the record. 144. May 1 again remind members of the Security Council that it is we, the Cyprus Government, who have sought to corne to the United Nations, It is Cyprus that struggled hard, very hard indeed, to corne to the Security Council. We were continuously under pressure, under intimidation, and under blackmail not to corne to the United Nations, but we dîd corne to the United Nations because we trust the 146. Then the Turkish representative saîd that I even attacked the Securîty Councîl. Where dîd he find that? It îs true that 1 expressed the indignation and bîtterness that the people of Cyprus felt at the stand taken by certain members of the Securîty Councîl. That is not an attack on thesecurity Council. 146. Le reprbsentant j’avais a-t-il tion et l’amertume l’attitude rît&; lui-même. 147. Then, what îs worse, he found an opportunity 147. Ensuite, de dire condamnk Je le prie r&olutîon ment de lire t0 say that the Securîty Councîl had never condemned the air attacks on Cyprus. 1 would request hîm to read paragraph L of the resolution of 9 August 1964 [S/5868]. 1 would request him to read the speeches made by the representatîves around thîs table in the course of these debates. But ît îs obvious that he saîd that, bot because he does not know of these things, but beoause of the intentions of the Turkîsh Government. It is perhaps for the same reason that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Erkîn, before the National Asscmbly in Ankara, stated that “we arranged COUTS &Unis a dît cela, non parce passe, turc. Ministre a déclarB tlN~~~ avons diplomatique” dements A mon avis, mets damné par le Conseil pour ces actes, des actes brutalement Charte Conseil si j’étais je n’aurais vous pour deformer vrer ensuite a des attaques personnelles. SO well the question on the dîplomatic levelff-the question, that îs, of the bombings-t’that we dîd not draw any censure”. In my juclgement, and in my submissîon, the Turkish Government stands oondemned in this Council for those acts, which have been brutally perpetrated agaînst Cyprus in violation of the Charter and in violation of a11 the resolutîons of the Security Councîl. If 1 were in the position of the Turkîsh representatîve, quîte honestly and quîte sincerely, I would not have the iaudacity to corne before you today and try to distort the picture to such an cxtent and, after having done that, to resort to persona1 attacks. 148. de contribuer la paix et de conditions solu de prendre & l’exception décisions. 15 septembre 148. We are at the moment at such a stage that my Government has resolved, in its effort to contribute to the maximum possible to the restoration of peace and normal conditions in the country, to take certain decîsions. The whole world, except Turkey, bas welcomed those decîsîons. The Secretary-General, in the addendum dated 15 September to his report stated: “1 welcome Presîdent Makarîos’ suggestions aS an important step toward reducing current tensions and enablîng UNFICYP, wîth the co-operation of the Cyprus Government” -may I stress that agaîn, “wîth the co-operatîon of the Cyprus Government” because there is a Cyprus Government whîch is PartiCiPatiW wîth your permission in thîs debate today-“to carry out effectively its mandate of endeavouring to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contrîbuting to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and to a return to normal conditions on the island. I have asked my Speoial Representative and the Force Commander to take up îmmedîately wîth the C~~rus Government the implementation of these ProPosals.” 149. In the interests of peace, in the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole, 1 trust, and 1 am confident, that the United Nations Will go ahead in coopexation with the Cyprus Government in implementing these proposals, in spite of the negative attitude the Turkish Government, which reveals nothing but the sinister plans which continue to exist, directed against the very being of the Cyprus State and its people, and the real intentions of the TurkishGovernment not to see peace or normal conditions restored in Cyprus because that would kil1 the Turkishplan partition. 150. TO conclude, I would like to say that Cyprus has been accepted as a fully sovereign and equal Member State of the United Nations. It has not been accepted as such because of certain treaties which have ceased ta exist due to the policy and the actions of the Turkish. Government. Cyprus exists as an inclependent State by virtue of being independent, by virtue of being a Member of the Unitcd Nations. For Cyprus the Charter of the United Nations is the basis of its existence. And it is under that Charter andin accordance with its principles-which the representative of the United Kingdom described as far more important than any other document in the world-that we intend to proceed to solve the problem of Cyprus.

The situation is as follows: I have another speaker on my list. The Turkish representative has asked to speak a second time at this meeting of the Security Council. It is now 7 p.m. If at least one member the Council advocates our hearing the representative of Turkey now, and Will be good enough to tel1 me SO, I shall cal1 upon the Turkish representative. Othexwise, 1 should prefer that we continue the discussion at our next meeting, when other members of the Council Will be heard. 1 am at the disposa1 of the Council’s members.

1 think it would be only courteous, if one of our invited guests has asked to speak, that ha be given the opportunity to do 60. 1 would certainly hope that he would be very brief in view of the late heur.

said that 1 was prepared to comply if any member of the Council SO suggested. 1 therefore cal1 upon the representative of Turkey.

1 am glad to see that there is at least one member of the Security Council who is interested in hearing what 1 have to say. 1 am never very lengthy, as you know, and we are a11 suffering from a certain amount of tedium from having heaxd from the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot Government the same falsifications and the same distortions over and over again. If length of statements and repetition of distortions ever won 156. Of course, I regret that he did not find my statement constructive, for the simple reason that at the end of the statement 1 said that there is only one road open for a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement, and that is to co-operate with the Mediator. That could not have been considered constructive by the representative of a Government which has openly declared that it is not interested in a negotiated settlement. 156. Bien entendu, je regrette affaires COnStrUOtiVe, déclaration conduisant concert& le Médiateur. comme constructif nement ressait 157. There are a number of things that require a reply, but 1 shall not take a lot of your time. But one thing 1 must say with regard to a statement which was repeated here again today about constitutions and agreements being made not to be serve& butto serve. I was surprised that the Foreign Minister did not include the Charter of the United Nations in that list, beoause that is precisely what is being done. The Charter of the United Nations is being made to serve the interests of the Greek Cypriot Government until such time as their independence shall be divested of a11 the guarantees SO that they cari bring about l’enosis II, 157. raient votre mots au sujet d’une dbclaration qui a éte encore ré- pétée aujourd’hui, et les traités mais pour servir. affaires Nations ce que l’on est en train de faire: le Gouvernement chypriote en attendant que plus rien ne garantisse dance de Chypre 158. de nos forces employé, mais je parlerais de nos troupes, a dit que nos troupes n’avaient pas le droit de se trouver la 0h elles sont actuellement. NOUS avons discuté interminablement que nos troupes trouver des traités. 158. Another reference was made to the deployment of our forces-“deploymenttt as he called it, “position” as 1 cal1 it. He said that they had no right to be where they are now. We have argued this point endlessly and 1 have proved to the Council that they have every right to be where they are, under the relevant article of the treaties. 159. Il a été dit que la communauté turque était utilisee par le Gouvernement turc a Ses Propres fins. Monsieur un seul: ramener la médiation à un règlement 159. It was said that the Turkish community was being used by the Government of Turkey to serve its purposes. Mr. President, we have only one purpoae, and one purpose alone in Cyprus: t0 see peace and tranquillity there SO that mediation cari be effective, and that a negotiated settlement mn be worked out. 160. Le représentant proché l’offre Il a dit qu’une crains vieille offre cela sera mis a exécution, parce que, comme vous avez tous pu le constater Secretaire duplicit8, à manquer a la parole donnee et aux accords conclus. Nous attendons donc anxieusement de Voir Si cette mesure sera mise ?I exécution. 160. The representative of Greeoe also chided me for not shouting with joy at this magnanimous Offer of the Greek Cypriot Government. He said that a new leaf had, been turned. 1 am afraid it is the same old leaf, There is one thing constructive in it, and that is the lifting of the blockade. We have yet to Sec whether it Will go into effect, because, as YOU bave a11 seen in the report of the Secretary-General, there is a tendency for duplicity, for breaking words and agreements. We are waiting anxiously to sec if this measure will go into effect. 162. Yesterday, Mr. Kyprianou asked by what right 1 was expressing opinions on the magnanimous offer which was addressed not to me, not to my delegation, not to my Government, but to the Turkish community Ln Cyprus. In doing that, 1 am afraid he was ruling out the Turkish Government as one of the interested parties in this problem. There again there was an apparent divergence with the Seourity Counoil which, in its resolutions, has always considered Turkey as a very much interested party in the question of Cyprus. 1 was not speaking for Dr. KUçiik, the leader of the Greek-Turkish community yesterday. He has spoken his words. He has sent a longtelegram today to the Secretary-General S/5977],s/ which has been delivered to him this afternoon. You Will see his views in that telegram. 363, May 1 corne back, finally, to the words of my colleague from Greece, where he was very vehement in his defence of the independence and territorial integrity and the unchallengeable sovereignty of Cyprus. 1 shall merely quote from a statement dated 5 September that 1 have in front of me, coming from the Athens national information service, and 1 think it will throw light on the sincerity of these statements. Addressing the Salonika Officers’ Club Mr. Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece said: “New 1 corne to the great national issue, Cyprus “- not the great Cypriot national issue; thegreatGreek national issue -‘!NO~ 1 corne to the great national issue, Cyprus [ applause]. It has become common conscience that the only solution to the Cybrus issue is lenosisl [prolonged applause], because ‘enosis’ is both a commandment of justice and a guarantee of peace. This is the proof. Theuniversal conscience is the enlightening work which has been carried out by our own Governmerit. This is our work. The only existing question is the way in which ‘enosis’ is to be carried out.” Well, 1 think that is quite revealing. l.64. Among the accusations which were levelled at me by Mr. Kyprianou was the charge that my Government had sinister designs against the independence of Cyprus. I shall let the Security Council be the judges of that, as to who has sinister designs on the independence of Cyprus.

1 was sure that at some time during the debate the Turkish representative would pull some statement or other by the Greek Prime Minister out of his file, 1 cari place at his disposa1 dozens of similar state- 166. 1 do not have to be ashamed in these circum- 166. Je n’ai pas B rougir dans ces conditions, je l’ai stances, as 1 have already said, topronounce the word dit deja, de prononcer le mot “Enosis”, et je déclare “enosistl, and 1 state again that have for you dozens, de nouveau que j’ai 5. votre disposition des dizaines, indeed hundreds of similar statements made by the des centaines de declarations semblables faites par le Greek Government. Gouvernement grec. The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier, OU adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones .de las Naciones casas ‘distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccion Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies)