S/PV.1180 Security Council

The Council has before it the Sècretary-General’s report Of 12 December on the United Nations Operation in CYPrus [S/6102].1/ 1 should also like to inform the members of the Council that the President has received a draft resolution sponsored by Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway [ S/6115] .u 3, Mr. KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): I wish once again to express my Government’s gratitude to the SecretarY- General and his assistants in the Secretariat for their 3. M. KYPRIANOU Je désire exprimer a nouveau la gouvernement pour les efforts continus que font le u Sec Officia1 Records of the ~ecurity Council, Nineteenth Year, lJ Voir année, Supplément ~PPlment for October, November and December 1964. 4, 1 y,$& &O to express our deep appreciation to General Thimayya, the Commander of the Unit& Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), as well as to Or. Carlos Bernardes, the SPe0ial Representative of the Secretary-General, for their untiring efforts to implement the Secretary-General’s directives within the framework of the mandate Provided for by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964 [S/5575].v 5. I should like further to renew my Government’s appreciation to a11 countries whose contribution either in the form of military contingents and police units or in the form of financial assistance has made it possible for UNFICYP to continue to fUnCtiOn. 6. In its resolution of 4 March 1964, the Security Council provided that Il. , , the function of the Force should be, in the interests of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”. 7. During the period under review, there have been no major incidents in Cyprus. The present meeting of the Security Council, therefore, is being held in circumstances of comparative calmness, which has corne about as a result of UNFICYP’s presence and the patient, restrained and constructive policy of the Cyprus Government. 1 must emphasize this especially in the light of the fa& that the rebels, acting on the directives of the Turkish Government, have made it more than abundantly clear, by their attitude and actions, that law and order and a return to normal conditions are not for them a useful proposition, since by law and order and a return to normality the plans of division and partition would not be advanced. 8. TO anyone who has had the opportunity to study c.arefully the lengthy report submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General on 12 December 1964 (S/- 61021 it must have been obvious that the Government of Cy~rus has been endeavouring through sincere oo-operation withUNFICYP to taokle, in a spirit of go0d will, magnanimity and constructiveness, the various problems which have arisen as a result of the rebellion; it should be equally obvious that the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot rebels, on the other hand, has ail along been employing a policy of obstruction and complete negation in its desire t0 preserve, to the greatest degree possible, the anomaly of the situation, and in its efforts to promote segregation ad division among the people SO as to further the PolitiCal aims of the Turkish Government for partition, or what it prefers to cal1 ‘lfederationll, which is nothing omer Tan a disguised form of partition, Al1 the efforts of the Turkish rebels, based upon the 3 Ibid., SuPPh+%It for January, February and Ma)--b 1964. COU~S de la periode considérée, la Force a et6 mieux a m&me de s’employer à s’acquitter du mandat qui lui a etté confié par le Conseil de securit8 en ce qui concerne le retour % une situation normale.” The Government of Cyprus has done its utmost in this direction, in a spirit of sincere co-operation with the UNFICYP. My Government has gone a long way to meet various requests and proposals submitted by UNFICYP and has sometimes done more than that. In certain cases, security requirements and other important considerations, pertaining to the economy of the country, have been overlooked in my Government’s desire to contribute as much as possible to a return to normal conditions. Le Gouvernement de Chypre a fait tout son possible dans ce sens, dans un esprit de cooperation sincere avec la Force des Nations Unies. Mon gouvernement a fait encore, poux répondre propositions pr8sentées par la Force, En certains cas, dans son desir de favoriser retour à la normale, il a accepte de passer outre B certaines considérations importantes relatives B l’Économie du pays, 10. Les chefs des rebelles, toutefois, se sont servi de divers pretextes et excuses pour essayer d’entraver et de boycotter l’effort reel fait par le gouvernement et par la Force pour rétablir conditions normales. Les rebelles chypriotes turcs, par exemple, ont soutenuqu’onne devait rienfaire tant que la Constitution de 1960 - Constitution imposée et impossible ?I, mettre enœuvre - qu’ils ont eux-mêmes completement detruite par leur revolte et par leurs actes, ne serait position insoutenable, le Sec&taire géneral, au paragraphe 31 du rapport, affirme ce qui suit: 10. The rebel leaders, however, by using various pretetis and excuses, have been trying to obstruct and boycott the genuine efforts, both of the Government and of UNFICYP, to restore confidence, trust and normality. The Turkish Cypriot rebels, for example, have been maintaining that nothing should be done unless the unworkable and imposed Constitution of 1960, which they themselves by their rebellion and their actions have completely destroyed, is reinstated. In connexion with this untenable position, the Secretary-General, in paragraph 31 of his report, states: “However, UNFICYP had been proceeding on the assumption that this would not prevent Turkish Cypriots from agreeing to, and co-operating in the implementation of, measures designed to improve the situation in the island and to relieve the plight of the Turkish Cypriot population in particular without affecting the constitutional position either way. The proposals in the UNFICYP aide-memoire of 23 November concerning freedom of movement for civilians, restoration of economic activity, resettlement of refugees and the like were put forward on this basis. It now appears, however, that, in the view of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, even these measures would, if implemented, prejudice the Turkish Cypriot case with regard to a final settlement , . . II “Cependant, la Force Btait partie de l’hypothese que cet état de choses n’empêcherait pas les Chypriotes leur application - des mesures visant a améliorer la situation dans l’ile population chypriote turque en particulier cela influe, dans un sens ou dans un autre, sur la situation constitutionnelle. Les propositions contenues dans l’aide-memoire 23 novembre, concernant la liberte de deplacement des civils, la reprise de l’activité réinstallation dans cet esprit, Toutefois, il apparait maintenant que, de l’avis des dirigeants chypriotes turcs, m@me’ ces mesures, si elles étaient appliquées, desserviraient la cause des Chypriotes turcs en ce qui concerne le règlement definitif . . .” 11. It is, thesefore, crystal-clear that the retuxn t0 normal conditions as called for by the resolution of 4 March 1964 and reiterated by subsequent resolutions of the Security Council, is being obstructed, as a matter of polioy, by the leadership of the rebels, acting under instructions from Ankara. The difficulties and the plight-to use the Seoretary-General’s expression-of a section of the Turkish Cypriot minority are being perpetuated, as a matter of policy, by the leaders of the Turkish rebels. 11. Il est par conséquent évident que la politique des dirigeants de ces rebelles,.qui agissent sur instructions d’Ankara, est de faire obstacle au retour à une situation normale prévu d’abord par la résolution du 4 mars 1964, puis à nouveau par des resolutions ulterieures et - général - la situation déplorable d’une partie de la minorité ciellement par les chefs des rebelles turcs. 12, a rapporté le 16 décembre: “L’hiver jusqu’ici aet& rude a Chypre, la pluie tombe a torrents et de nombreux &fugiés chypriotes turcs se trouvent 12. The Nicosia correspondent of The New York Times reported, on 16 December: f$So far this has been a hard winter for Cyprus, with torrents of rain, and many Turkish Cypriot refugees are in amiserable policy of division and strife pursued in the Service of the political aims of Tuxkey. 13. IL est rapport incapable, plir tion de son mandat, une situation cax la Force efficacement securité Il ne s’agit pas d’empécher nir action efficace, des combats de la situation conditions que des continuent patible lignes de separation. 13, It is indeeddishearteningtoreadinthe%cxetaxY- Genexal’S report that UNFICYP fuels unable, undex t.he present circumstances, to achieve any major progress witb regard to its mandate to contxibute to a xetuxn to normal conditions. This Should not be SO, beoause UNFICYP has the xesponsibility fox implementing the entire mandate entrusted to it by the Seouxity Cour& fully and effectively, andnotonly Paxt of it. Its task is not, bypreventingfighting, to presexve the anomaly through lack of effective action. Its task is to prevent a recurrence of fighting but also to contxibute to the restoration of normal conditions. A return to peace and normality is incompatible with the oontinued existence of pockets of armed rebellion against the State, Normality is inconsistent with the existence of a “Green Line” and other dividing lines, 14. There is great merit in the policy which has hitherto been followed by UNFICYP in its approach to the various problems by endeavouring to salve them through persuasion and talk, inits understandable desire to avoid conflicts with the rebels; but it is not proper, in my consideredopinion, for this approach to have been made a principle for UNFICYP. It would be a great achievement indeed, if UNFICYP wexe to succeed, through discussions, in obtaining the undexstanding of the rebel leaders and pexsuading them not to obstruct the efforts towaxds a retuxn ta normality. But it is not correct nor consistent with UNFICYP’s mandate even to imply that measuxes towaxds normality cannot be taken without theconsent Of a handful of rebels. 1 sincerely hope that we have net reached the stage where any action by UNFICYP and the Government towards a return to normality would depend on the willingness or unwillingness of the Turkish rebels to co-operate. 14. La Force s’est efforcee de résoudre les divers problemes qui se posent par la persuasion et la discussion, dans un désir comprahensible d’éviter les conflits avec les rebelles, et cette politique est digne de louanges; mais cette politique n’aurait pas dQ, B mon avis, Btre Brigee en principe par la Force. Ce serait 6videmment un tri?s grand succès Si la Force pouvait, par la discussion, persuader les chefs des rebelles de ne pas entraver les efforts faits pour favoriser juste ni conforme au mandat de la Force de suggexex que les mesures destinbes a assurer le retour ti la normale ne peuvent &re prises sans le consentement d’une poignée de rebelles. J’espBxe sincérement que nous n’en sommes pas au point oh toute action prise par la Porte ou le gouvernement vers un retour a la situation normale dependrait de la volonté de coopPrer des rebelles turcs. 15. 1 wish t0 stress again that there is a lot to be said fox endeavouringto persuade the rebels to abandon their taCtiCS of obstruction; but this cannot, under anY cixcumstances, be interpreted as giving a right of veto to the rebels with regard to the implementation of measuxes thought proper by the Government a.nd UNPICYP. If we were to suppose for a moment that the actions of UNFICYP towards a xeturn t. noxmaliiy depended upon the willingness or the lack of willingness of the rebels to co-operate, such an approach would not only amount to a violation of the resolutione of the Security Council, but would abs0 constiWe a Policy prejudicial to the principles of territorial integrity and unity of the State and the eovereign rights of the Government. 15. Je tiens à souligner a nouveauquedenombreuses consideratipns militent persuasion pour obtenir des rebelles qu’ils renoncent à leur tactique d’obstruction. aucun cas être interpxeté comme leur donnant un droit de veto Bl’Bgard de la mise en application des mesures que le gouvernement et la Force estiment appropriees. Si nous devions un seul instant supposer que les activités de la Force tendant a rétablir la situation normale devaient dependre de la volonté ou du refus de coopérer des rebelles, cette attitude reviendrait non seulement a violer les r6solutions du Conseil de Secmité, mais aussi & appliquer une politique contraire aux principes de l’int6grit6 de 1’Etat ainsi qu’aux droits Souverains du gouvernement. 16. I thought it advisable to underline theSe points So that thexe may be no misconception as t. our 16. Il m’a semble n&ceSsaixe de souligner ces points de façon a Eviter tout malentendu au sujet du r8le de 17, With your permission, 1 would like to explain briefly the policy of my Government and its efforts towards a return to normality. 17. que de mon gouvernement la situation 18, In a message addressed to the Secretary-General on 15 September 1964 [S/5950/Add.2, annex]v the President of Cyprus eriumerated a number of measures of the Government of Cyprus aiming at a return to normality, It may be recalled that when these measures were announced they became the subject of unanimous praise in this Council. In a statement before the Council the Secretary-General himself on 25 September 1964 said: 18. Dans un message g&n&ral le 15 septembre le Président de mesures de rétablir que ces mesures unanime a déclare devant le Conseil le 25 septembre Il ,.. 1 wish once again to state that 1 welcome President Makarios’ suggestions as an important step towards reducing tensions in Cyprus and enabling UNFICYP to carry out its mandate effectively” [1159th meeting, para. 301. avec Makarios, réduction permettre de son mandat” 19. The Psesident of Cyprus, in his message of 15 September, informed the Secretary-General of the decision of the Cyprus Government to remove a11 economic restrictions and to permit the delivery of any quantity of food-stuffs supplied to or purchased by the Turkish Cypriots in areas kept in compulsory segregation by the rebels; there was no problem of supplies in the other areas inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. This decision of the Government was immediately implemented, and today there are no res trictions whatsoever on food-stuffs, in spite of the fa& that the reasons which originally prompted the imposition of partial restrictions with regard to the areas SO segregated have not been eliminated, In addition to this, a11 other articles and materials have also been derestricted with the exception of only a few items. 19. 15 septembre, décision les Chypriotes leur imposaient ou d’acheter n’y avait pas de problbme les autres Cette dgcision appliquée en ce qui concerne ayant entra@ dans ces zones oh est pratiquée pas encore Bté supprimees. ont Bté levees sur tous les autres articles B l’exception 20. In a letter dated 12 November 1964, addressed to Mr. Bernardes, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, President Makarios states: 20. adressbe Secrétaire déclare : des certains sur les principes aux exigences l’inobservation de llfle.” “It is not the policy of the Government to impose economic restrictions, The prohibition of certain articles or materials is based on the following principles: (a) security .requirements should not be prejudiced; (b) evasion of the law should not be encouraged; and (c) the eoonomy of the island should not be undermined.” [S/SlOZ, annex III, para. 11.1 21. Anime d’un esprit ment a accepte faites gén&al, liste dhja courte 21. In a spirit of goodwill the Government has accepted certain suggestions made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, thus eliminating a number of items from the short list of restricted materials. -- 3/ Ibid., 3/ Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1964. 23. In this connexion 1 should perhaps say a few words about the importation of food supplies, clothing, footwear and other items by the Turkish Red Crescent. Several such shipments have been allowed to be imported without any restrictions, and free from duty, although this practice has had an adverse effect on the economy of the country. Despite the fact that a11 the items imported are easily obtainable in the Cyprus market and the commercial world is thus being deprived of what would normally be part of its proceeds, inspite ofthefact that some of these supplies never reach the needy people for whom they are intended but are diverted to those engaged in military activities, the Government accepted a suggestion UNFICYP to allow yet another such shipment imported without restrictions and free from duty. This new shipment was unloaded on 4 December 1964. The Government, in agreeing to provide a11 these facilities, was prompted by a spirit of good- Will but it must be appreciated that this practice cannot be established on a permanent basis. 24, It should further be mentioned that the Government has been providing electricity, water and telephone facilities to a number of Turkish Cypriots, in spite of the fact they have been refusing to pay the appropriate fees, 25. In his message to the Secretary-General 15 September 1964, President Makarios seiterated his readiness to order the removal and dismantling of a11 Government armed posts throughout Cyprusexcept of course fortifications connected with external defence-provided the rebels could be convinced the same. He further declared the Cyprus Government’s readiness to assist financially those Turkish Cypriots who had been compelled by their leaders to abandon their homes and wished to be resettled, and to afford them a11 the protection, fox which they are in such need, not from the Greek Cypriots from their terrorist Turkish Cypriot compatsiots. The President also stated the Cyprus. Government’s decision’ to grant a general amnesty SO that any rebel who might be under criminal charges for offences committed in connexion with the rebellion might be relieved from any fear of arrest and punishment. 26. Although this declared policy of my Government SO far has not met with theproper response, it nevertheless still stands. This was categorioally stated by the President of Cyprus in his letter of 12 November 19 64 to the Special Representative of the Secretary- 28. As is. reflectedinthesecretary-General’s report, the Government has done its utmost to facilitate freedom of movement. Certain proposals to this effect by IvIr. Bernardes have also been accepted andimplemented by my Government. The Government, for exaiple, agreed that police road-blocks should be restricted to a minimum, with a view to their progressive elimination and that measures should be taken to ensure that no Cypriot citizens travelling in the island should be arbitrarily arrested or detained on charges relating to offences oonnected with the disturbances following the events of December 1963. The Government also agreed that Turkish Cypriots should be free to move in and out of the rebelcontrolled pocket in a sector of Nicosia. 28. général, faciliter cet égard nardes par exemple, les barrages Blimination prises dans Illle arbitraires commises les évenements a également libres contr818es 29. TO illustrate the untenable situation existing because of the attitude of the rebels, 1 should perhaps mentien that only this week when a sixteen-year-old Greek Cypriot, Michael Koupepides, lost his way into the so-called Turkish sector of Nicosia, he was arrested by the rebels and severely ill-treated. His life was fortunately saved, thanks to the timely intervention of certain Danish members of UNFICYP, who managed to free him. In the rebel-controlled sector of Nicosia, Cypriots who are not of Turkish origin are forbidden to enter freely. Some of those who do enter lose their lives or are ill-treated and detained. 29. de l’attitude cette ans, secteur rebelles l’intervention membres le secteur Chypriotes la permission tentent, incarcerés. 30. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 36 of his report, states: 30. rapport, en pratique complètement r6gions ‘I. l . access by Greek Cypriots to areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots has continued to be barred almost completely, both in practice and as a matter of policy “, Il est Secrétaire cette interdiction les Chypriotes mouvement ou l’armée, par principe. What is important to point out in this respect is the conclusion of the Secretary-General that this prohibition by the ‘I’urkish rebels is being psactised as a matter of policy. Turkish Cypriots in certain areas are deprived of their freedom of movement not by the Government police or the Army, but by their own sa-called leaders, again as a matter of policy. 31. b&timents particuliers les rebelles - leur valeur a été estimée B plusieurs 31. Properties and installations and other establishments belonging to the Government and to citizens and located in the rebel-controlled areas-valued at several million pounds-are inaccessible to the Gov- 33. There cari be no return to normality unlessfreedom of movement is completely ensuredto ail citizens -Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Maronites-and unless a11 these people are able once more to oommunioate freely and co-operate and live together in peace and harmony, Dividing lines, or green lines, and a11 other basriers, must be completely removed. 34. Another question to which my Government attaches primary significance is that of the resettlement of displaced persons. It is the policy of my Government to do everything possible to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their homes. Accordingly, my Government has welcomed discussions with UNFICYP for the purpose of implementing this humanitarian measure, the heavy financial burden of which Will be borne by my Government. It has, in this respect, accepted the suggestion of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the assistance of UNFICYP by the stationing of UNFICYP elements in the resettled villages, for measures of protection against arbitrary arrest or detention on charges relating to alleged past offences connected with the disturbances following the events of December 1963, for finanoial assistance to Turkish Cypriots desirous of beïng resettled, and for their protection, 35. Wbile my Government is more than anxious to facilitate in any way possible the return of the displaced persons to their villages, we are inpossession of ample evidence that the so-called Turkish leadership does not wish them to return to their villages, and it is a well-known fact that terrorism is being used to prevent Turkish Cypriots wishing to do SO from returning to their homes. 36. 1 do not believe that it i’s necessary to take more of your valuable time in order to give you further examples and details of the positive, humanitarian and constructive policy of my Government in its earnest desire to secure permanent peace in the country and a return to normal conditions. In spite of the measures taken in this directionby my Government, however, and in spite of the many and most valuable efforts of UNFICYP, its Commander and those 38. In paragraph 32 of his report, the Secretary- General states : 38. Au paragraphe 32 de son rapport, le Sec&taire genbral dit ce qui suit: “The situation is further complicated by evidence made available to UNFICYP that certain non-normal conditions are being maintainedby measures applied by one community to its own members. If fait que, d’après des renseignements communiqu6s a la Force, certaines conditions anormales sont maintenues au moyen de mesures appliquees par une communaute B ses propres membres.” 39. The intimidation of Turkish Cy-priots by their own so-called leaders is a feature in the situation in Cyprus which has recently reached new dimensions and which cannot and should not be ignored by UNFICYP, if it is to succeed in the task entrusted to it by the Security Council. Turkish Cypriots, as I have already stated, are deprived of their freedom of movement, not by the Greek Cypriots or by the Government, but by their own so-called leaders. In many cases, as, for instance, in Nicosia, the Turks are not allowed out of the so-called Turkish sector, except on certain conditions and with the special permission of their leaders. Turkish displacedpersons are not allowed by their own leaders to return to their homes and to their peaceful lives near their Greek neighbours and friends. The Turkish rebels are imposing upon a section of the Turkish Cypriot population, which is under their control, conditions Of terrorism and misery in furtherance of their political aims, whereas those Turkish Cypriots could live in peace and prosperity if they were only allowed to do as they themselves would w-ish. 39. L’intimidation soi-disant chefs est un aspect de la situation a Chypre, qui a atteint récemment de nouvelles dimensions, et que la Force des Nations Unies ne peut pas et ne doit pas ignorer, si elle veut mener h bien la tbhe qui lui a Bté confiée par le Conseil de securité. Comme je l’ai déja dit, les Chypriotes turcs sont prives de leur liberté de mouvement non pas par les Chypriotes grecs ou par le gouvernement, mais par leurs soi-disant chefs. En de nombreux cas, a Nicosia par exemple, les Turcs ne sortir du pretendu secteur turc, sauf dans certaines conditions et avec la permission expresse de leurs chefs. Les personnes deplacées turques se voient refuser par leurs propres chefs l’autorisation de retourner dans leurs foyers et de reprendre une existence paisible près de leurs voisins et amis grecs, Pour servir leurs objectifs politiques, les rebelles turcs imposent à une partie de la population chypriote turque, qui se trouve sous leur contr8le, une vie de terrorisme et de misere, alors que Cette population pourrait vivre dans la paix et laprosperite si elle etait autorisee B faire ce qu’elle souhaite. 40, On trouve une preuve flagrante dans l’ordre par les chefs terroristes a l’intention des Chypriotes turcs de Limassol, oti les conditions avaient été, depuis longtemps, tout à fait normales. Cet ordre, qui 5. été porté à la connaissance de la Force, est ainsi libellé: 40. Glaring evidence of these facts is the following order which has been recently issued by the terrorist leaders to the T’urkish Cypriots in Limassol where conditions, in faot, for a long time have been completely normal, The order which has been brought to the notice of the UNFICYP reads as follows: “B. A fine . , , will be imposed on: (1) those who converse or enter into negotiations with Greek Cnriots ox who accompany any stranger into Our sector; (2) those who corne in contact with Greek Cypriots for any officia1 work; (3) those who appear before Greek Cypriot courts; (4) those who visit the Greek Cypriot Hospital for the purpose of having an examination or obtaining pharmaceutical needs. II~, A fine of E20 Will be imposed on those who have dealings v& Greek Cypriots or buy from Greek Cypriots goods that they cari get from the Turkish Cypriot sector, and on those who buy from Greek Cypriots their supply of goods that we cari manufacture, Those who allow the importation of such goods into our seotor Will be similarly fined. “D. A fine of f25 or other severe punishment and one month’s imprisonment or whipping will be imposed on those who enter the Greek Cypriot sector: (1) for promenade; (2) for friendly association with Greek Cypriots; (3) for amusement; (4) for conveyance of information to Greek Cypriots. II [S/ 6102, annex III, para. 44.1 41. Hassan Kemal, a former assistant district officer of Limassol, and now referred to as the representative of the Turkish minority in that City, admitted that he was the author of the above leaflet. It must be noted that even whipping has been introduced as a punishment of Turkish Cypriots who have friendly associations with Greeks, However, there are muoh worse examples than this. The régime of terror operated by the so-called leaders of the Turkish minoxiiy has brought death by execution and torture to a number of Turkish Cypriots whose only crime was an intention to return to their villages and their peaceful lives near their Greek Cypriot fellowcitizens, 42. On 31 October, Hussein Hassan was publicly executed by terrorists in the square of Mora village, in the Presence of his wife and five children, because he and bis family wanted to go back to their village. 43. Anot.her Turk, by name of Moulla Salib Hemin, from Mallia, a village in Limassol District, was t&ured by Turkish rebels because he daredto employ a Greek Cypriot lawyer in a court case. 44. Ali Karfa of Episkopi was murdered because bis relations with the Greeks was good. In Limmaso, Ali Jalal was murdered for the same reason, and in 46. Halite Mustafa, a married woman, who spent more than three months in a so-called Turkish Cypriot prison inthe Turkish sector of Nicosia because of her friendly feelings towards the Greek Cypriots and who finally managed to escape and seek the protection of the police, described to the authorities the terrible methods employed by the rebels against Turkish Cypriots who wish to have friendly association and co-operation withtheir Greekfellow-citizens. 46. passe chypriote en raison tes grecs, et à se décrit par veulent ration 47. We are in possession of ample evidence that many Turkish Cypriots, living under the control of their terrorist compatriots, wish to be rid of this yoke. 47. tes qui confirment vivant ristes, 48. Many Turks, in spite of the danger to their lives, have attempted to escape and return to their homes, and some of them bave succeeded in doing SO. They have been able to describe the terrible life they were forced to live under the régime of terror and intimidation of their so-called leaders. A significant number of Turks who have been persuaded or compelled to leave their homes in osder to serve the policy of division and partition have now managed to return to theis villages. 48. cela s’enfuir d’entre mesure de mener de leurs de Turcs, pour maintenant 49. In the village of Pitargou, in the Paphos area, Turkish terrorists opened fire against a number of Turks who had returned, in order to compel them to leave their homes once again and move into terroristcontrolled concentration camps. The Turks of Pitargou sought the protection of the Government police, which was granted them. A similar incident occurred in the village of Mallia. 49. des terroristes nombre vil1 ages , en vue abandonner de concentration Turcs police Un incident Mallia. 56. I am in a position to report to you about a great number of cases of innocent Turkish Cypriots, who bave either been murdered hy the rebels or who bave been ül-treated and tortured because oftheir tIcrime” to disagree with the policy of division; and 1 am also in a Position to refer to a great number of cases of Turkish Cypriots who have, in spite of the great dangers involved, escaped from the concentration camps that bave been imposed upon them by the Turkishpolicy of partition and strife. If it becomes necessary, 1 am quite Prepared and ready to cite them all. 50. de cas relatifs -5th ou bien maltrait& consistait pourrais cas dangers de concentration politique a fait 51. The imposed segxegation upon a section of the Turkish population has yet another serious consequenoe, apart from a11 the other evils thst it has brought uPon them. 1 quote againfrom the Secretary-General’s report: II s.1 Turkish Cypriots who commit serious crimes against other Turkish Cypriots now do SO with 51. lation turque en plus de tous les autres qués. général : infractions This paragraph from the Secretary-General’s report is cloquent enough and requires no further elucidation or comment. 52. Another example of the policy of the rebels to undermine the effort for a return t0 normality is their attitude with regard to Government and private property situated in the so-called Turkish sectors. Not only do the rebels refuse to allow the operation of industries and factories, but they do not even allow the removal of machinery and goods by their owners. Further striking evidence is their refusal not only t0 return the records of the Land Registry Office to the Government, but even to allow access to them. As a result of this, dealings with immovable property, mortgages etc. are at a standstill, causinggreat hardship to thousands of people and a great detriment to the economic activity of the country. The records and the library of the Nicosia law courts are treated in the same way as a11 other records of Government offices situated in the so-called Turkish sector of Nicosia. 53. The Turkish rebels bave nothing to gain, politically or otherwise, by keeping those records and nothing to lose by returning them, nor cari they possibly evoke any justification whatsoever. It is simply part of the efforts directed against the restoration of normality. 54. There have been attempts by the Turkish terrorist leaders to undermine the smooth functioning of the courts and the administration of justice. Their attempt was mainly concentrated in Nicosia. This is clearly reflected in the Secretary-General’s report and in the aide-memoire dated 23 November 1964 from UNFICYF to Vice-President Kffçük, dealing with the efforts of the so-called leaders of the Turkish minority t0 stall the recent favourable developments regarding the functioning of the Nicosia District Court, reads as follows: “Unfortunately, during the past two weeks this favourable trend has been reversed without sound reason-to the best of UNFICYPs knowledge. .UNFICYP deplores this trend. The Turkish Cypriot staff members, with one exception, have ceased to corne to the courtpremisesinWolseley Barracks, and judges and court offioials have been denied court records and books from the library in the lawcourts building.’ [Ibid., annex V, para. 16.1 55. The Secretary-General, in his report, has this to saY in connexion with the same subject: “The PraCtical results which were being gradually acueved, through the good offices of UNFICYP in a retwmto the normal functioning of the law-courts 56. In ibis connexion I wouldpoint out to the members of the Council that the Supreme Court of Cyprus is funotioning properly and smoothly under the presidency of a Turkish Cypriot judge, its other members being tv,~o Greek Cypriots, one Maronite Cypriot and another Turkish Qpriot. Also other courts throughout the eountry function properly and smoothly. As far as the integrity of the Cypriot courts is concerned, members of the Council are referred to the relevant parts of the Secretary-General’s report. 56. A ce PXOPOS, je voudrais souligner devant Ies membres du Conseil le fait que la Cour suprême de Chypre fonctionne de maniére tout à fait normale SOUS la présidence d’un juge chypriote turc, ses autres membres etant deux Chypriotes grecs, un Chypriote maronite et un autre Chypriote turc. 11 en est de même pour d’autres tribunaux dans le pays, qui fonctionnent de façon tout àfait satisfaisante. Pour ce qui est de 1’intAgrité des tribunaux chypriotes, les membres du Conseil sont pri8s de lire les parties pertinentes du rapport du Secrétaire g&&raL. 57, Those ‘who have carefully read the report must also have noticed that the rebels have flatly rejected almost ail UNFICYP proposals aiming at restoring normal conditions, For example, a programme prepared by UNFICYP for the defortification of the island has been turned down completely. 57. Tous ceux qui ont pris soigneusement connaissance de ce rapport ont remarque que les rebelles rejettent carrément presque toutes les propositions de la Force des Nations Unies destinees à assurer le retour a des conditions normales. C’est ainsi qu’un programme de la Force destine & demanteler les fortifications de l’ile a Bte completement rejet&. 58. TO sum up, in regard to the interna1 situation in Cyprus there has been, on the one hand, an absence of major incidents and therefore comparative calmness, during the period under review. The efforts of the Government and of UNFICYP for a return to normality, on the other hand, are oonstantly being obstructed and undermined by the rebels, who apply the Turkish Government’s policy of division and strife, for its sinister political aims which are not secret: partition or its disguised form, federation. We feel that, while everything should be done to avoid a .recurrence of fighting-and we are ready to do our utmost in this direction-the United Nations Force in Cyprus, for its part, should contribute more effectively towards achieving the goal of a return to normality. 58. Pour resumer la situation intérieure a Chypre, je dirai que nous avons, d’un 08tB, constaté l’absence d’incidents majeurs pendant la periode examinée et, de la sorte, enregistre un calme relatif. Les efforts du gouvernement et ceux de la Force des Nations Unies, d’autre part, en vue d’assurer le retour ZX des conditions normales, sont constamment gênés et sapes par les rebelles qui appliquent la politique de division et de lutte du Gouvernement turc, en vue de realiser leurs sinistres secrets: le partage, ou sa forme déguisée, la federation. &tre fait pour eviter une reprise des combats - et nous sommes pr&s a faire le maximun d’efforts dans ce sens -, la Force des Nations Unies & Chypre devrait efficace à r&ablir 59. La politique du Gouvernement turc, telle qu’elle a 6th également dbfinie par les Chypriotes turcs, a pour but de prouver au monde, en creant des conflits, des tensions, la ségregation et la division, que les Chypriotes grecs et turcs ne peuvent vivre en harmonie sous un m&me gouvernement. Cela n’&chappe maintenant à personne. La Force des Nations Unies à Chypre a une t%che à accomplir, celle que le Conseil de securité lui a assignee dans sa résolution du 4 mars 1964 [S/5575] et qu’il a confirmbe dans les résolutions ult&rieures qu’il a adoptees B ce sujet. La Force des Nations Unies à Chypre a déjà obtenu des résultats sin&rement sa t%che pour que l’operation des Nations Unies a Chypre rAussisse. 59. The policy of the Turkish Government, as also expressed by the Turkish Cypriot leaders, is to try t0 prove to the world, through oonflict, strife, segregation and division, that Greek and Turkish Cypriots Catwt live together in harmony under one Government. This is by now clear to ail. The United Nations Force in Cyprus has a task to perform: the task which the Security Council laid down in its resolution of 4 Mach 1964 [S/5575] and reiteratedby subsequent resolutions. The United Nations Force in Cyprus has already achieved agreat deil, andwe are sincerely erateful for that. but its mission should be completed if the United Nations operation in cyprus is to result in success, 60. Mon gouvernement est fermement convaincu que le retour à des conditions normales serait possible si la Force des Nations Unies acceptait d’assurer l’application des mesures Enumérées dans les derniers paragraphes de la lettre adressée le 12 novembre 1964 au représentant spécialpar lepr&ident Makarios [S/SlOZ, annexe III], Pour ce qui est de notre position, 60. In my Governmentfs firm view, a return to normality could be achieved if UNFICYP would agree to ensure implementation of the measures enumerated in the concluding paragraphs of the letter dated 12 November 1964 from President Makarios to the SPecial Representative [S/SlOZ, annex III]. As far as our position is concerned, 1 wish to reiterate 61. A year has elapsed since the outbreak in C@rus of the rebellion of the extremist section of the Turkish minority. In the course of the past year Cyprus has been the subject of continuous threats by Turkey, thseats of invasion, threats of attack and aggression, which culminated in the brutal bombings of early August 1964. The cause of the sufferings of the people of Cyprus-Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and others-has been the expansionist and neo-colonialist policy of Turkey. It is olear to a11 that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could live harmoniously together if they were only left alone, but théy are not left alone. Peace and normality in Cyprus cari easily be ensured, if the subversion instigated by Turkey is terminated and if an end is put to thc aggressive actions and thseats of Turkey, In this connexion 1 must stress once again that the continued illegal presence in Cyprus of the Turkish military contingent constitutes a constant danger to the peace andsecurityof Cyprus. 62. It is not my intention to take up your time by enumerating again the various subversive and aggsessive actions, the innumerable threats and the violations of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, perpetrated by Turkey in the course of the year that has elapsed. The Council is quite familiar with a11 these. It is very pertinent, however, to refer to a very recent and most characteristic statement made by the President of the Republic of Turkey, General Cemal Gtirsel, which was published on 14 December 1964. .63.- In that statement President Gffrsel reiterated what he had earlier said, to which reference was made in previous debates in this Council. General Gtfrsel stated at that time: “If the need arises the question Of C~PXUS Will be settled by bombs. 11 General Gffrsel went on to make it quite clear that, if the Cyprus question is not soon settled, the bombingof Cyprus Will be repeated. He seëms to ‘be under the false impression that killing and burning with napalm incendiary bombs Will make it possible for Turkey to subdue the heroic people of Cyprus, whose only demand, a legitimate demand, is complete freedom. General Gtisel seems also to be under the illusion that Turkey cari be allowed to endanger international peace and chat Turkey is in a position to dictate to the United Nations and to the world its own terms of peace and war, ad a time, in particular, when even the great Powers axe being gradually qeprived of this power. 64. That statement by the President of Turkey has corne at a moment when the situation in Cyprus is marked with relative calmness, when progress has been made. That statement alone, out of the very many similar statements expressing the intentions and attitude of Turkey, togethes with the obstructionist behaviour of the Turkish rebels to undermine all efforts for a return to normality, based again on 65. The policy of division, expansion and neo-colonialism followed by Turkey, in violation of the United Nations Charter, not only has been and continues to be the cause of the whole trouble in the area but is solely responsible for rendering an agreed settlement as provided for in the Securiiy Council’s resolution of 4 March 1964 virtually impossible, in spite of the continued efforts of the United Nations Mediator. 66, Turkey has been refusing to accept the very basis of the solution as it was quite clearly laid down in the resolution of 4 March 1964. This resolution, in providing for the appointment of the mediator, called for such a solution to be-and I underline this-“in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole Il. 67. Those few words provide quite clearly and unmistakably the basic principles for a solution. The resolution of 4 March 1964 speaks of the Charter of the United Nations and therefore of its principles. It speaks of the people of Cy-prus as a whole, and not of different groups or separate entities. It speaks of the well-being of the people of Cy-prus as a whole, and not of any interests of other countries. Those basic elements which have been provided for in that resolution cannot be ignored, negotiated or compromised. Therefore, an agreed settlement is not possible and Will not be possible as long as Turkey refuses to accept the basis of such a settlement as laid down by the Security Council. In this connexion 1 wish to stress that, in my Government’s view, the solution of the Cyprus question under the United Nations Charter cannot under any circumstances be subject to the veto of Turkey or of any other foreign Power. 68. Our goal remains the same. It cannot and Will not be abandoned. Neither the continua1 threats, nor the subversion, nor the bombs of General Gffrsel Will be able to change our objectives, which are the objectives of the United Nations, We are striving for a peaceful and lasting solution, which cari only be achieved through the freely expressed Will of the people of Cyprus in accordance with the principles of democracy and justice, a solution based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. That is why my Government has welcomed the resolutions of the Securiiy Council. That is why my Gcvernment has welcomed the stationing of UNFICYP in our country, and it is in this same spirit that my Government has requested the General Assembly of the United Nations to deal with the question of Cyprus in the course of its nineteenth session. 69. My Government has accepted the extension for another period of three months of the stationing of

1 should like to begin my brief statement with the expression of a wish. My Government, my delegation and myself have been utterly dismayed by the illness of ehe Secretary- General. We are gratified to hear that he is makîng rapid progress on the way to complete recovery and we hope that he will soon be well enough to bring, with renewed energy, his wisdom and experience to the aid of the United Nations at this critical moment in its history. 71. 1 should like, furthermore, to express to the Secretary-General, as well as to his immediate collaborators here, to the Commander of UNFICYP, General Thimayya, and to the Special Representative, General Thimayya, and to the Special Representative of the Secretaxy-General, Mr. Bernardes,our sincere thanks for their diligent and patient humanitarian efforts to bring some measure of relief to the harassed Turkish community. 72. Thanks are also due to those Member States which have served the cause of peace on the troubled island by contributing troops and police contingents to UNFICYP, and to those countries which, by voluntary financial contributions, have made it possible for UNFICYP to exist and to operate. 73. Before turning to the Secretary-General’s report whîch we have before us and which Will be the basis of the Council’s deliberations 1 should like to explain in a few words our view of ehe situation in Cyprus today. 74. 1 reserve my right, at a future stage in this debate, to reply to some of the allegations and distortions which have just been expressed before this Council by the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot regime in Cyprus. But before 1 do that, 1 should like to refer briefly to an allegation that he made with regard to a statement which is supposed to have been made by the President of Turkey. The Foreign Minister, Ms. Kyprianou, said that the President of the Turkish Republic was alleged to have declared that Cyprus would be bombed again if necessary. 1 haveno officiai knowledge of such a statement. 1 have heard of it in press reports. If it is in fact true, if such a statement has been made, it cari only reflect the persistence of the determination of Turkey not to allow its kinsmen to be slaughtered in cold blood as they have been in the past. But, of course, the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot r6gime saw fit to ignore the second 75. In the course of the first eight months of 1964, the world has witnessed an all-out effort on the part of the Greek leadership in Cyprus to bring the Turkish Community to its knees through unspeakable means of violence and economic persecution which 1 need not expose again here. The Council is familiar with ail the gruesorne details. 76. After the final desperate assault in the Tylliria region last August, the Greek Cypriot leadership seems finally to have realized that violence does not pay. The Turkisli Community, even at the door of death, has refused to submit to unlawful domination. On the other hand, world public opinion did not fail to apportion blame where blame was due. The Greek Cypriot rtlgime, with one eye on the present session of the General Assembly, appears to have decided on a change of tactics. This time it came as an ange1 of peace proffering an ostensibly magnanimous hand of forgiveness. During the last meeting of the Council on the question of Cyprus [1159th meeting], 1 took pains to expose to the Council the true intention behind this new approach; and the events of the last three months have borne me out. There has obviously been no change in the ultimate goal of the Greek Cypriot leadership, namely, to impose their own solution. If it cannot be imposed by force, it must be imposed by other less blatant but more insidious means. 77. We axe now faced with this new approach. The insurgent Greek Cypriot régime has not relented in’ referring to its Turkish victims as “rebëls” and to their attempt to defend their lives, their rights and their property as Vebellionl’. These words are used again in the letter of 12 November from Archbishop Makarios to the Special Representative [S/6102, annex III]. They were repeated again here “umpteen” times ad nauseam by the Greek Cypriot Fore@ Minister, with the same fantastic innuendo concerning my country. It is, of course, possible that bydint of repetition they may have corne to believe in this fantasy of a rebellion themselves. But it is too much to ask the world to believe it. 78. The studied course of the greek Cypriot regime seems to be to try to bring the Turks of Cyprus to their knees by aprocess of gradually and relentlessly extending their unlawful authority over the areas where the Turks have taken refuge in defenoe of their rights and their lives. In doing this, they obviously intend to enlist the unwilling or unwitting aid of the Unlted Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. 79. In the past few months we have allwitnessed how the Greek Cypriot Government has relentlessly followed its course of deliberately destroying eVerY 80. In the last of a long series of letters to the Seoretary-General, the representative of the Greek Cypriot Government has this to say about myself, and 1 quote: “Mr. Eralp is unable to conceal his disappointment that for over two months now complete calm prevails in Cyprus. II This slanderous insinuation is not even worthy of a reply. The whole world knows that my Government has always made it its prime objective to stop violence and bloodshed in the island. It cari only give us deep satisfaction that, however insidious the motives may be, the Greek Cypriots bave, finally chosen to desist from at least open violence. May 1 semind the Council that at its 1151st meeting the Greek Cypriot delegation quoted a letter from Archbishop Makarios declaring his Government’s intention to stop the inhuman economic persecution of the Turkish community. That was a declaration of intent to desist from further violence, The fact that ever since then comparative calm has returned to the island indicates beyond any doubt that violence was being used by the Greek Cypriots as an instrument of their policy. At any rate, the point was clearly confirmed by the Secretary-General’s report of 10 September to the Council [S/5950 and Add.1 and 2]!/. This, 1 believe, is sufficient to dismiss the preposterous assertion of the Greek Cypriot delegation that the Turks of C@rus were being provoked into making trouble on the island for ulterior motives, 81, In spite of the factthat the GreekCypriot Government seems to have, in its wisdom, abandoned the policy of the stick for the lure of the carrot, still, ail does net seem to be a bed of roses in the troubled island. The Secretary-General’s report is eloquent in its account of the severe hardships to which the Turkish community is still being subjected. Thousands of Turks are still living in caves or tents under conditions unfit for animals. Of course the Greek 82. 1 shall not go into a tale of woe. If the members of the Council would take a few minutes to read the aide-mémoire of 6 December and the letter of 10 December from Vice-President KUçUk to the Special Representative [ibid., annex VI], they Will have a clear picture of the situation. 83. The Secretary-General’s report contains a detailed account of the efforts of UNFICYP to bring about a gradua1 return to normal conditions in Cyprus. My Government cannot but be grateful for this endeavour, carried out under extremely delicate and trying circumstances. We are also grateful to the Secretary-General for his mention of our co-operation in taking certain steps in the right direction, such as the opening of the Kyrenia Road. Furthermore, the patient mediation of the Secretary-General and of his collaborators in bringing about the rotation of the Turkish contingent without a hitch Will not be forgotten. 84. 1 must, nevertheless, note that certain steps which have been envisaged by UNFICYP to promote a return to normal conditions have proved impossible ta achieve. Bpr instance, at the time of the implementation of the agresment concerning the reopening of the KYrenia Road [ibid., annex 11, the United Nations authorities had promised to do what they could in order to bring about freedom of movement on all the roads of the island by establishing a regime on them similar to the one now being applied on the Kyrenia Road. It would appear that their efforts in this direction met with the determined resistance of the Greek Cypriot authorities. In his reply of 12 November to the Special Representative [ibid., annex III], Archbishop Makarios states that at all events Turkish Cypriots travelling by road would still be subject in a11 areas to checking for security reasons. It is hard to appreciate the necessity of such checks once a11 roads were placed under exclusive UNFICYP control, as in the case of the Kyrenia Road. No progress seems likely to be scored in that direction SO long as the Greek Cypriot authorities maintain the fiction that they are the legitimate Government and that the Turks are the rebels. 86. 1 shall not go into those reasons for they are given in the report, But I would like to ask how the Turkish community could be expected, at this stage, to tear down their meager defensive structures and place themselves at the mercy of their aggressive Greek Cypriot compatriots. Even if we assume that the transitory presence of UNFICYP might give them some measure of confidence-and even tbat is hard to assume in view of the experience of the Tylliria assault-we must not forget that the Secretary-General deems it unlikely that UNFICYP would remain in Cyprus after the end of March. What would happen then, if an agreed settlement and a peaceful solution had not been brought about? Could the Tnrks of Cyprus be expected to be caught unawares as they were last December? We must net lose sight of the fact that at present the Turkish community in C@rus relies mainly on its own courage and resources in holding out against the Greek Cypriot secession. The Turkish community cannot be left to the mercy of those who have attempted to annihilate them. They are now in more or less effective control of 1.5 per cent of the total area of the island. It is interesting to note that, according to the figures given in the report of the Secretary-General, a simple calculation shows that that area alone, to which access is deniedto UNFICYP by the Greek Cy-priot authorities, amounts to 1.6 per cent of the total area of the country. 87. 1 do not wish to go into a detailed commentary of the Secretary-General% report. 1 feel, however, that 1 must make a few remarks with regard to the general purport and tenor of it. 88. The report reflects the policy of UNFICYP to refrain from any words or deeds which might be likely to affect the ultimate political solution. This is highly commendable and entirely in keeping with its mandate. For instance, in connexion with the request of the Turkish community for the invalidation of the new Administration of Justice Law, the report states in paragraph 103: “Any attempt by UNFICYP . . , to influence the Government on such lines would be tantamount to action affecting a final political solution. This is beyond the mandate given to the Force by the Security Council . ” 89. My Government would hope that the same circumspect view would prevail in any approach to the Turkish community as well. It is obvious, for instance, that any suggestion that might be made to the Turkish oommunity to comply with such legislation which it oonsiders incompatible with its views of the Zurich and London agreements of 1959 would be equally unwelcome, as being liable to affect the solution. 91. The mandate of UNFICYP requires it to promote a return to normal conditions. 1 believe the concept of normal conditions should be clearly defined. Where there is no constitutional law and order there is anarchy. Where there is anarchy there oan be no normal conditions. Evefi if UNFICYP does not consider it part of its mandate to re-establish constitutional law and order in Cyprus, 1 believe that it cari only contribute to a return to normal conditions by helping the two sides in the civil war to get together, In that direction, it would have been extremely helpful if UNFICYP could have rallied support to the cal1 solemnly issued 13y the Vice-President on two occasions to bring about a meeting of the truc and lawful Government of the Republic comprising members of bath communities. That should have been the first and the most constructive step towards a return to normal conditions, 92. 1 .consider it my duty to put the Council and UNFICYP on guard against placing too much relianoe on the moves of the Greek Cypriot authorities to bring about what they cal1 a l’pacifioation” of the island. The Greek Cypriot authorities are not even trying to conceal their attempt to perpetuate their usurpation of power. That was the gist of the lengthy statement made by Foreign Minister Kyprianou this morning. Even with t.he best of intentions, a peacekeeping force should be wary of lending itself to the establishment of a “fait accomplitt incompatible with the democratic principles of the Charter. It should, 1 believe, avoid any action liable to encourage the perpetuation of a tyranny, even if the tyrant cornes bearing gifts. 93. Finally, my Government has consented to the continued presence in Cyprus of the United- Nations Peace-keeping Force on the clear understanding that it Will effectively carry out its avowed intention of avoiding any action liable to affect a final political solution. We fully agree with the Secretary-General when he says in the conclusion of his report that when UNFICYP has done a11 it cari, a stalemate might ensue which mighc beconîe a pretext for failure to find a solution, Yet I must point out that the fear of a stalemate must not be allowed to let the Situation drift into a solution imposedby oneparty upon another.

My delegation is very glad to hear the good news about the Secretary-General’s health. We earnestly hope to see him back among us as soon as possible. 95. Tbree months have elapsed since the Security Council decided, on 25 September, to extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force Cyprus [S/5987].% During this period the major event was, of -course, the restoration of calm Cyprus. This enabled the Secretary-General and his assistants to negotiate successfully the reopening of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road and the rotation of the Turkish contingent. At the same time, the Mediator was able to take advantage of the “détente” in ordes to intensify his efforts. The result is that today, after many months of anxiely and turmoil, general attention is concentrated not SO much on the internal situation in Cyprus as on the finding of a political solution to the problem. 96. This development, which we welcome and to which Greece is proud to have contributed, is partly due to the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. As a factor of pacification and a symbol of active United Nations interest in the restoration of order and peace, the International Force, its Commander and the countries participating in it deserve a11 our gratitude. 97. At the same time, it must be acknowledged a decisive factor in this turn of events was the determination of the Government of Cyprus to restore maintain order and calm. 98. 1 would hope that those who greeted with scepticism the message of peace addressed by President Makarios to the Secretary-General on 15 tember 1964 [S/5950/Add.2, annex] Will now admit that the measures described in that message were not designed, as they had claimed, ta impress members of the Council at its brief September session. The facts prove that this message of peace reflected the genuine intentions of the Government of Cyprus, which wanted nothing bettes than to be able to extend the protection of the State and of the law to the whole population of the island, without discrimination. it be allowed to do SO? That is the question. It is a question which interests primarily Cyprus and its inhabitants; but it interests a11 of us here as well. 99. We have before us a new report by the Secretary- General. Like aI1 his previous reports, it is admirably clear and gives us a complete picture of what bas been happening in Cyprus since 15 September 1964. The contribution of the Government of Cyprus to the .Y Ibid. Force and the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the latters’ rejection of a11 suggestions made by the Force. I quote the relevant paragraph in the aide-mémoire it submitted to Mr. Küçiik: IIMoreover, a number of measures have been adopted by the Government, with UNFICYP assistance and good offices, which will help to alleviate the hardships to which many Turkish Cypriots, especially displacedpersons, are exposed. UNFICYP considers that further measures should be undertaken urgently by a11 concerned to bring about a return to normal conditions as envisaged by the Security Counoil in its resolution of 4 March 1964, and to create a more peaceful atmosphere in Cyprus ,” [S/SlOZ, annex V, para. 1.1 That was the UNFICYP appeal concerning, in particular, the fate of the Turkish Cypriots, especially displaced persons. Here is Mr. Ktiçllk’s reply: “The suggestions made in the aide-mémoire envisage retusn to a normality which [is] far from being within the framework and spirit of the Constitution, of the laws of the country and of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964.. .” [fi&, annex VI, para 2 0.1 101, 1 pass over Mr. Kffçtik’s insinuation that the United Nations Force is incapable of interpreting the Security Council resolution correctly. But 1 cannot refrain from dwelling on the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leaders place legalistic considerations, even when these axe not challenged, above the vital needs and the well-being of their own nationals. In this connexion 1 quote the Secretary-General’s comments in his report: “However, UNFICYP had been proceeding on the assumption that this would not prevent Turkish Cypriots from agreeing to, and oo-operating in the implementation of, measures designed to improve the situation on the island and to relieve the plight of the Turkish Cypriotpopulation inparticular without affeoting the constitutional position . . . The PSOposals in the UNFICYP aide-m8moire of 23November ooncerning freedom of movement for civilians, restoration of economic activity,resettlement of refugees and the like were put forward on tbis basis.” W6102, para. 31.1 102. But the explanation for Ms. KUçWs negative attitude is supplied by the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Yeni Gazete which, on 6 December, stated: “Makarios, for tactical reasons, wants the Turkish Cypriot refugees to return to their homes, because he would then be able to assert inthe United Nations that peaceful coexistence between the Turks and the Greeks is possible and to request that the United 103. 1 now pass ta a far more delicate but, for the United Nations, an equally important aspect of the matter. On 24 November the representative of Cyprus sent to the Secretary-General a letter the contents of which are sufficiently disquieting to cal1 for the Council’s full attention. This letter, which was circulated by the Secretariat to Members of the United Nations on 2’7 November under file number P0210CYPR(l), informs .us that thousands of innocent Turkish Cypriots are still deliberately kept by the Turkish extremists “in conditions of segregated oaptivity, and every pressure is exercised to force them into hostility to the Greek majority”. Documents and statements in support of this charge-documents and statements which the Cypriot Minister fox Foreign Affairs mentioned this morning-axe quoted in this letter, which also mentions executions of Turkish Cypriots and shots fired at them while they were trying to return to their villages on escaping from the camps of the armed terrorists. 104. The representative of Turkey on 4 Decembex promptly refuted the contents of the letter and cited inter alia the testimony of two UNFICYP officers who have been convicted, under the laws oftheir own countxy, of dereliction of duty. 105. The United Nations is of course in a position to verify, more fully than is done in paragraph 32 of the report, to what extent the information of the Government of Cyprus is correct. If that information is correct, it would be wise to give us confirmation of the fact and to take steps to put an end to that situation. Indeed, it would be unthinkable that an international crisis on this scale, started by a Turkish outcry that “the minorily is being massacred”, should be pexpetuated by the action of a band of fanatics terrorizing people of their own ethnie group. 106. The Turkish Cypriots-and hexe 1 refer net to the political leaders who are workingfor foreign interests in the island, nor to the armed terrorists who are living in luxury and even-it is said-in debauchexy, but to the poor people who have topay the cost: these, 1 say, should be able to choose infreedom. They should be able to decide for themselves, without fear and without pressure, whether they prefer to continue living as refugees in the camps whexe they are kept as hostages by those who state that partition of the island Will alone satisfy them, or whether they wish to return to their homes and benefit from measures fortheir resettlement whioh the Government of Cyprus has pledged itself to take with United Nations assistance. 108. Ba&ng up this paragraph of the resolution of 4 March 1964, the Secretary-General, in annex 1 to his report of 29 April 1964 [S/5671],9 defined the functions of UNFICYP as follows: I . 4 “cd) Achievement of freedom of movement for a11 communities within the whole town of Nicosia and other cities under conditions of security; ’ Il(cj Progressive ,evacuation and removal of a11 fortified positions , , . “a . . “0 The control of extremists on both sides; l’(g) The formulation of appropriate general amnesty arrangements; “(hJ The arrangement of security measures and other necessary conditions to facilitate return to normal conditions and partioularly of economic activity. II That is what the Secretary-General stated on 29 April, and that is the promise given by the United Nations in reply to the proposais of Cyprus as a whole. 109. From the standpoint of the Government of Cyprus, these measures, far from encounteringobjections, were the very reason for President Makarios’ message of 15 September, to which 1 have already referred. 110. We are aware of the negative reaction of the Turkish Cypriot leaders and extremists. What needs to be brought out is the extent to which they exert pressure on and terrorize their own ethnie group which desires to resume a normal life. The United Nations should, 1 think, give us more detailed information on this pc%. 111. In the meantime, we wlsh to incriminate noone, but we cannot pass over the fact that those of the minority who raise their voices against the extremists and urge reconciliation are described as misguided persona or turncoats-these are the terms used hy Mr. Eralp in his letter of 4 December 1964 [S/6083].y The Council Will judge whether or not such expressions constitute moral pressure on the members of the minority in C@rus. One is therefore entitled to ask oneself what effect they may have on the work Of mediation, considering that the starting-point for any solution lies in a spirit of moderation and conciliation on both sides. TO label as turncoats members Of the minority who are moved by such a spirit is 6/ Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1964. z/ Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1964. 113.. On the instructions of my Government, I wish to inform the Council that Greece agrees to the prolongation of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, as proposed by the Secretary-General, delegation hopes that due account Will be taken of the suggestions we have just made regardingthefunctions of the Force, and especially regarding imperative need to help members of the minority sesume a normal life in their homes with the financial support of the Government. 114. We hope, too, that a greater numbesof Members of the United Nations Will be willingto share in defraying the cost of maintaining the Force, in a spirit international solidarity and of approval for what UNPICYP has been able to achieve.

This Council was convened to examine the report submitted the Secretary-General on the operations in Cyprus during the period from 10 September to 12 December 1964. The report inclioates that the situationincyprus during the last few months has much improved that significant progress is undoubtedly being made, It refers to the easing of economic restrictions, well as restrictions on the freedom of movement of sectors of the population, resulting in a certain relaxation of tensions. 116. Notwithstanding this, the report clearly demonstrates that the basic factors underlying the Cypriot crisis remain unchanged despite the efforts made by the United Nations Mediator , l.17. The Secretary-General also iniormedthe Council that he considers it indispensable to maintain the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP] for some time to corne. After consultations with the, Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey andtheunited Kingdom within the termb of Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 the Secretary-General recommends the prolongationof UNFICYP’s mandate. Having in mind the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the delegations of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Norway and Brazil, on behalf of which I have now the honour to address this Council, wish to present the draft resolution contained in document S/6115. 119. The operative part of the draft resolution reaffirms the previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the matter, calls upon a11 Member States to comply with them, takes note of the report of the Secretary-General, and extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force to 26 March 1965. 120. We hope that the draft resolution now before the Council Will merit the unanimous support of its members. 121, Lord CARADON (UnitedKingdom) : We have today a single and a simple purpose. It is to consider the full and thorough report which the Secretary-General has presented to us and, in the light of that report, tc decide whether the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cy-prus should continue. We ail well reoognize how strongly held are the views which have been here expressed, but 1 trust that we shall be able today to concentrate our attention on the limited question which must now be decided, and not become involved in discussion of wider issues. 122. 1 am sure that we are ail gratefulfor the report which the Secretary-General has presented and that we would a11 wish to thank the UnitedNations authorities which have contributed to the United Nations effort in Cyprus. TO General Thimayya and Mr. Bernardes, and to ail those who have worked withthem and show-n such firmness, ski11 and persistence, we pay our tribute, and we a11 join, I am sure, in welcoming the fact that Cyprus has on the whole been peaceful in recent weeks and that efforts continue to achieve a return to more normal conditions, 123. The Secretary-General has made it clear in the conclusions of his report that he considers it indispensable that, for the time being, the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force should be renewed, and if the Council SO decides, and if continued British participation in the Force in the same mariner as at present is desired by a11 the Governments concerned, my Government is prepared to continue its participation and support. We are, con- 125. Perhaps you will permit me to add a persona1 Word, for 1 have had some association with the island of Cyprus since 1 first worked there morethan twenty years ago. When 1 finally sailed away from Famagusta four and a half years ago, 1 was rash enough to say: ‘II believe that the forces of moderation and tolerance and compassion and an overwhelming wish for peace Will prevail”. 1 have sometimes sadly remembered those words since violence again exploded in Nicosia neaxly a year ago. Now, as we pray for the success of the valiant and tireless efforts of the United Nations Mediator, perhaps we may again express the hope that the overwhelming wish for peace Will at last prevail . 126. And as we fesvently wish the Mediator well, perhaps 1 may quote Shakespeare% words. When one of my predecessors as Governor of Cyprus, Othello, sailed into Famagusta harbour, the people of Cyprus cried: “Bring renewed fire to our extincted spirits and give ail Cyprus comfort. 1’ 127. We cari a11 join today inhopingthat where Othello and 1, for various reasons, failed, the United Nations Mediator will succeed.

Mr. President, once again we have the question of Cyprus on the agenda of the Security Council. We are to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus for the period 10 September to 12 December 1964, and to take the necessary decision in that connexion. 129. It is noted in the Secretary-General’s report that recently the situation in Cyprus has markedly improved. This is an encouraging sign, 130. The position of the Soviet Union on this question is well known to members of the Security Council. It has often been explained by the Soviet Government and its representatives. The position of the Soviet Government was also set forth by the Chairman the Soviet Delegation, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, inhis statement on 7 December 1964 in the General Assembly 11292nd plenary meeting], 131. We deem it necessary to stress that the Soviet Union has supported and continues to support independence and territorial integrity of Cy-prus. Normalization of the situation in Cyprus requires compliance with the previous decisions of the Securiiy .133. As regards the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, the position of the Soviet Union in this regard, too, has been set forth in detail in the Security Council. We were and are of the opinion that the sine qua non for the use of United Nations armed forces must always and in all circumstances be strict complianoe with a11 the existing provisions of the United Nations Charter, This position of the Soviet Union received forma1 expression in .the well-known memorandum of the Government of the USSR; 1 refer to the memorandum dated 10 July 1964 regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security [S/SSll].y 134. However, since the Government of Cyprus considered it necessary for ensuring the security of its country, the Soviet Union did not oppose the dispatch of United Nations troops to Cyprus or the extension of their stay there. 135. The Soviet Union also based its position on the fact that the decisions of the Security Council imposed no financial obligations on States Members of the United Nations which were not supplying contingents to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. 136. We have also repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Union opposes any extension of the functions of the United Nations Force as outlined in the resolutions of the Security Council. Thus, the only possible basis for a further extension of the stay of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is strict adherence to the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. 137. In the Secretary-General’s report whioh is now before us, it is stated that a11 theparties immediately concerned, including the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, have expressed the wish that the stay of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be extended. In this connexion, the report contains a recommendation for the extension of the stay ofthe United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period ofthree months, beginning 26 December 1964 and ending 26 March 1965. 138. The Soviet delegation does not oppose this recommendation, given the fact that the stay of the United Nations Force in Cyprus Will be extended for another three months in conformity with the conditions laid down in the Security Council resolutionof 4 March 1964. 139. TO conclude, allow me to make an announcement which, although it has no direct connexion with the question now on the Council’s agenda, none the 1esS disectly cencerns the Security Council as a whole. 8/ Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1904. 141. We are convinced that the enlargement of the membership of the Security Counoil and wider representation in this, the United Nations organ primarily responsible for the maintenance ofinternationalpeace and security, for countries which have taken theis stand on the strengthening of peace, Will help the Security Council to perform more effectively important functions of maintaining world peace, halting aggression and protecting peoples and States which seek to uphold their freedom and independence. 142. With the President’s permission, 1 shall not insist on the consecutive interpretation of my statement, subject to the usual understanding.

1 have reserved my right to say a few words in reply to the statements made earlier this morning by the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot Government. He touched upon several fundamental substantial aspects of the question Cyprus; but in deference to the very reasonable gestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom and successor of Othello 1 shall refrain from going into a lengthy discussion of those issues; after all, we shall have a chance to discuss them later in the General Assembly. But there are one or two things which I feel that 1 must mention here for the record. 144. One of them was the words of the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot Government to the effect that federation was tantamount to partition. 1 must admit that 1 fail to understand his equation. In our view fedesation is a form of Government whioh we find in many parts of the world and which does not subsequently “slide” into partition. Such a view of the equation cari only be understood if we assume that in case there is a federation, then the Greek Cypriot element in that federation would hasten to be annexed by Greece; then, partition would corne about. But if there is no such intention, if there is the intention to live in a federation as one country, that would in no conceivable manner be tantamount to partition. 145, There has been a long list of alleged murders andunspeakable crimes committed by Turkish Cypriots against other Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by the Turks. 1 must admit that our intelligence does not give us any such aocounts. 1 am inclined to think that they may have been fabricated by certain services of the Greek Cypriot rggime. However, 146. Mention was also made of Turkey’s attitude as being a policy of neo-colonialism and expansionism. This again is very difficult to explain according to the record. We have said again and again, and we have proved by our deeds, that Turkey has no expansionist ambitions, no territorial ambitions on Cyprus. Al1 we want to see is that the two communities should live in peace in a federation without any influence from either Greece or Turkey. Taking account of those deeds and declarations, 1 really fail to see how Turkey cari be accused of following a neocolonialist policy. If there is a neo-colonialist or openly colonialist and imperialist policy being followed with regard to Cyprus, it is the Greek expansionist policy of ttenosislf. The statements that have been macle in the course of the last three months show that that intention is now out in the open. No secret is being made of the fact that once, as they cal1 it, Vnhindered independence” is given to the island, the next step will be “enosis”; and that in itself is an application of the expansionistic imperialisticpolicy of Greece. 146. s’inspirait dl expansionnisme, des avons actes, sionnistes, Chypre. deux communautes dégagee de l’influence la Turquie. dit, peut néo-colonialisme, neo-colonialiste et impérialiste la Grèce avec sa politique Les déclarations qu’elle politique. ft l’independance sera et cela expansionniste 147. As for the role of the Peace-keeping Force on the island, a very careful estimate was made by Foreign Minister Kyprianou as to how the Peacekeeping Force should operate. That statement olearly indioates that the misgivings which 1 mentioned in my statement were well founded. In other words, it does appear that under the aegis of the resolution asking for a return to normal conditions UNFICYP would be called upon to co-operate with the Greek Cypriot community to put down what they cal1 a rebellion; in other words, to bring the Turkish community to its knees by tearing down their barricades, by dispelling the conglomerations of Turks; in other words, establishing the authority of one community over the other. 1 have said in my statement, and 1 repeat again, that that is not a return to normal conditions, A return to normal conditions cari only be brought about by a return to constitutional law and order. 147. de étra.ng&res, la maniere montre mentionnees En d’autres de la resolution normales, Unies grecque rebellion, turque en dispersant ltautorite dit dans ma declaration, à des conditions retour peut permettre -148. graphe securité Mediateur peuple tres une tendance Bcartant probl&me. phrase je ne la comprends interprétation ils 148. Another mention was made of a phrase in operative paragraph 7 of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 where the Mediator is called upon to bear in mind Vhe well-being of the people of Cyprus as a wholet’. Al1 sorts of interpretations have been put on that. A tendency seems to appear to interpret that statement as discarding any possibility of a federal solution to the problem. In other words, an intention to work towards a unitary solution is imputed to this phrase. 1 do not understand it in that sense at all. In my view, the only interpretation of the words, “as a whole”, is that the interests of one . Community should not be given preponderance over

Mr. President, 1 had felt that the original statement of the representative of Turkey was satisfactorily answered by my opening statement, and 1 did not have the intention to ask for the floor again to take up more of your valuable time; but in view of the fact that he has chosen to reply to my statement by making some points in addition to the ones which he had made in his original speech, 1 feel it necessary, with your permission, to say one word or two of comments upon them. 150. It is quite clear to all, both from the first speech of the representative of Turkey and from his reply, that Turkey’s intention-which he did not conceal-is to thinkin terms of a dividedpeople of Cyprus. He used the phrase just now of not giving preponderance to one community over the other. That implies, 1 am sure, that the democratic principles of majority and minority, and the democratic principles of majority rule, should not be applied in Cyprus; this is obvious from his speech, 151. 1 just want to remind members of the Council that the Turkish minority in Cyprus is 18 per cent of the total population. TO try to put across the point that 18 per cent should be put on the same level as the 82 per cent of the population is not only contrary to a11 norms of democratic government, not only contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of majority rule that applies a11 over the world, but it is also contrary to the very interest of the people of Cyprus as a whole, and it is contrary to the Council’s resolution of 4 March 1964. 152. The representative of Turkeypresented the concept of federation as some kind of innocent concept. He tried to say that federation is not partition, and that it has been applied in many other countries of the world. Yes, federation came about in the case of many countries of the world where separate States decided to federate, but in the particular case of Cyprus, which has been one single entity from time immemorial and even during fore@ ocoupation and foreign rule, he is now asking that it be divided into different States and federated. Furthermore, he is asking that Cyprus be federated on the basis of ethnie groups. 1s that not division? 1s that not partition? The only difference perhaps is that it will be a partitioning of Cyprus into many pieces instead of three, as was the original demand: pne Greek, one Turkish and the British Sovereign Base Areas. 1 want to make it quite clear that federation or partition under no circumstances will be accepted by the people of Cyprus, neither by the Government nor by the vast majority of the people of Cyprus. Cyprus, whioh has been united and has been one single entity through the centuries and while under colonial domination, cannot now be divided when it has attained independence. 154. The Turkish representative also spoke of the 1960 Constitution and tried to emphasize that my Government was attempting to repoal it. That Constitution has been repealed by itself. It has been repealed through its inoperativeness. It has been repealed through the actions of the Turkish rebels and the actions of the Turkish Government. My Government, like the Government of any country, has to provide for law and order and cannot base law and order on documents simply because they were signed, some time ago, and were imposed, some tfme ago, on the people of Cyprus, although today they are inoperative. 155. The Turkish representative tried to indicate that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus should take into account the fact that a return to normality means a return to the 1960 Constitution, He further said that nothing could be done, in his view-and, 1 suppose, in bis Government’s view-as long a8 the present Government of Cyprus, which he considers illegal, functions in accordance with its decisions. The Secretary-General quite clearly and categorically stated that he could not accept that interpretation, and 1 should like to quote his report of 10 September 1964, in which he stated: “1 have not, of course, accepted these positions and have pointed out to those who hold them”-that is to say, the leaders of the Turkish rebels and the Turkish Government-“that the Security Council did not indicate such intentions in adopting its resolutions on this question.l’ [S/5950, para. 219.1 156. The Turkish Government representative tried to say that UNFICYP should ignore the Cyprus Government, if a return to normality was to be accomplished in accordance with the views of the Turkish Government. That cannot be done. The United Nations Force in Cyprus is stationed there because of the consent of the Cyprus Government and it is in Cyprus in order to act in co-operation with the Government. In accordance with the resolution of 4 March 1964, these two authorities, the United Nations and the Government of Cyprus, whose legitimacy has been reiterated by that resolution, are to act together in a joint effort. The Secretary-General in his report of September 1964, again, said that UNFICYP in its functioning in Cyprus, ?+espects at a11 times the sovereignty and the independence of Cyprus and the authority of the GovernmenV [ibid., para. 2201. 158. The representative of Tuxkey had the kindness to try to correct a quotation which 1 had given earlier from a statement made by the President of Turkey, General Giirsel. Although he first said that he was net officially aware of such a statement, he nevertheless tried to correct it, He said that General Gtirsel had said not only what 1 quoted but also that it was his earnest desire to see the problem of Cyprus solved in the United Nations. If he said that, we welcorne it, naturally. But was it necessary to connect this with the other statement which General GHrsel made and which has not been denied, to the effect that if the need arises the Cyprus problem Will be solved by bombs? What is the relationship between bombing Cyprus and a solution in the United Nations? With a11 due respect, 1 must say that 1 cannot see it. 159. 1 particularly welcome the remark of the representative of Turkey according to which we shall have ample opportnnity to discuss the wider aspects of the issue in the General Assembly of the United Nations. At least that is one point on which we agree. We shall be glad to do SO. 160. But there is one other point which 1 should also like to touch upon, and that is the reference to the fa& that the United Nations Force in Cyprus should try to employ the arrangement adopted conoerning the Kyrenia Road in the rest of the country; that is to say, to put a11 the roads of the Island of Cyprus under the control of UNFICYP. That is asking UNFICYP to take over the authority and the sovereign rights of the Government, the legality of which the Security Council, the Secretary-General and UNFICYP have fully accepted and fully respected. 161. The representative of Turkey said that it would not be advisable to remove the fortifications and armed posts because once UNFICYP is withdrawn from 162. 1 thank you for your indulgence, Mr. President, and 1 do not wish to take up more of the Council’s time. 1 should merely like to reiterate the following points. 163. First of all, the Government of Cyprus is the legal Government of the country, and the vast majority of the population of Cyprus Will not accept any thought of partition, division or federation. In this connection 1 should like to ask why, then, the Turkish Government did not consider it profitable to envisage that sort of system for the Armenian, Latin and Maronite communities in Cyprus. 1 repeat, the Government and the vast majority of the people of Cyprus Will never accept any solution that implies partition, Cyprus is aunitary state in which a11 the people must be equal before the law and the rights of a11 respected and guaranteed. It is the firm view of my Government that it is for the majority of the people of Cyprus to decide on the form of government by whioh theywish to be ruled and the form of administration under which they wish to be governed. It is not for anyone else. 164. An agreed settlement as provided for by the resolution of 4 March 1964-some phrases of which have been stressed by the representative of the Turkish Government-does not imply a right of veto for other countries upon the future of Cyprus. In parentheses I should like to point out that although he placed the emphasis on the words “an agreed settlement”, he refrained from saying that such a settlement should be in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 166. We are determined to have peace and to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem of Cyprus through the United Nations and in accordance with the principles of its Charter, The people of Cyprus Will not yield to any threats or to any aggression from outside designed at imposing upon them solutions which they cannot accept.

Before calling on the representative of Greece, who has just asked for the floor, 1 feel obliged to make the following statement. 1 have no intention of being SO discourteous as to curtail the right of speech of the representatives invited to the Council table this 167. The Security Council has, moreover, other very serious matters before it. 1 must, therefore, very respecffully urge representatives present at the Council table to do their utmost to keep to the agenda for this meeting.

The suggestion just made by the President rather embarrasses me. 1 am in the position of having to answer certain charges made against my country, and if the charges went beyond the soope of the agenda my reply will do the same. 169. Perhaps it was the unfortunate Othello who started a11 this business and brought upon Cyprus the bad fortune that has pursued it for SO many years. i70. But there is also theproblem of General GUrsel+s bombs, which Mr. Eralp wrapped up in his act of faith in regard to the United Nations. If the representative of Turkey Will allow, 1 will, in a11 courtesy, point out that, if he had not wrapped those bombs up in the Charter but had had them before his eyes, he would, 1 think, share my view that charges of expansionism and imperialism, valid three or four thousand years ago, do not square with facts, nor with the definition of those terms in my dictionary. Of course, a dictionary’s terminology depends in large measure on each country’s tradition and history, and on how much it has adapted itself to the concepts of international law and the ideals of the United Nations Charter. 171. In any case, we have been accused of expansionism because, in Mr. Eralp+s dictionary, ++enosis” means ++annexation++. But in our dictionary “enosis++ means the result of an eventual plebiscite-and inevitably the day Will corne when the Cypriot people, like every other people, will have to decide its future by means of a plebiscite. 172. Allow me to read an extract from a statement made by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in an interview which he gave to a Greek newspaper last summer. 1 shall read the passage in English: “A radical solution that would end once and for a11 the Greek-Turkish dispute and re-establish the friendship of the two countries on a solid and lasting basis would be the ceding of a part of Cyprus to Greece, and of the other part, which is close to Turkey+s Asiatic toast, to Turkey.++ 173. This is the wedding-cake which the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs offered us in suggesting that the island should be divided in two and shared between US. It therefore seems that Turkey has no objection to the return of part of Cyprus to Greece 174. In conclusion, 1 must mention the encouraging message brought by the Turkish representative to a11 Members here present and to every Member of the Organization, when he stated that the existence of a minority of 18 per cent in a country justified the establishment of a federation. My goodness, when 1 studied history and geography 1 observed that most States have minorities. If we are now to begin destroying the unity of States owing to the existence of a minority, 1 do not think that the representatives of countries which have minorities Will go home much reassured by the Turkish representative’s words. l.74. encourageant apporté les Membres que l’existence un pays lorsque remarqué Si on commence cause de Ilexistence que les reprgsentants rentreront du représentant 175. At a11 events, a clear answer was given today, and 1 am happy to have heard it from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. Referring to this federation plan, the representative of Cyprus replie& “No”. And 1 cari assure him that Greece stands with him and will add its negative reply when the time cornes. 175. aujourd’hui la part Chypre. sentant donner l’assurance ajouter

1 have no further speakers on my list and since no one else wishes to take the floor, 1 shall now put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway [S/6115]. 176. plus personne aux voix le projet le Bresil, A vote was taken by show of hands. The draft resolution was unanimously adopted.

1 shall be very brief. My delegation is especially gratified at the action just taken by the Council today in extending the mandate of UNFICYP. This decision, made in response to the desire of the Government of Cyprus and the recommendation of the Secretary- General, is clearly in the interests of the search for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question. 177. l’anglais]: specialement vient de prendre du mandat decision, Chypre est manifestement solution 178. Fortunately, we have once again had the benefit of an outstanding report to the Council, prepared and submitted by the Secretary-General, which summarizes the actions taken by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, the Commander of the Force, and the communities on the island to move toward resumption of normal activities. Tt also clearly outlines the attitudes of the parties on the island and notes the limitations within which a11 must work. 178. encore de 1’ excellent a prepare mesures taire Force reprise trés et prend s’effectuer. 179. par precbdentes. reconnaissant M. espérer favorable de mener lui a confibe. 179. The past three-month period has been marked by more real progress than the previous periods combined. My delegation notes that, although he recognizes the political limitations on his task, Mr. Carlos Bernardes has indicated that further progress cari be made in the effort to establish an improved climate within which the distinguished Mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, cari carry out the very dffficult task which this Council has given to him, The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m. Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.50 (or equhalent