S/PV.1186 Security Council

Before the Council continues its discussion of the itembefore it, 1 would draw attention to the draft resolution [S/6123/Rev.l] which has been submitted by the delegations of the Ivory Coast and Morocco.

It had not been our intention to speak again at this stage of the present debate. Kowever, the statement made by the United States representative on 24 December, Christmas Eve, has compelled us to do SO. 4. The United States representative referred to my delegation for the sole purpose of misquoting us, and afterwards he attempted to disprove his own misquotation. In fact, this is what he said: “The representative of Czechoslovakia claimed that NATO, which exists for the defence of Western Europe, had intervened in the Congo. He was quite mistaken, Two members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have taken certain steps, at the request of the Government of the Congo.” [1185th meeting, para. 32.1 5. The fact is that my delegation stated, inits speech of 21 December: “In trying to justify the attack on Stanleyville, its authors referred to its approval by NATO. This is in no way a recommendation, and 1 do not think that i.t impressed .anybody since we know that this military alliance always seems to be very efficient when defending the old colonialism or some forms of neo-colonialism, much more efficient than in other respects.” [1181st meeting, para. 20.1 In SO stating, my delegation based itself on fa&. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, speaking on the Stanleyville operation in the Belgian Parliament, said, according to the United States Press on 25 November, that the action taken by Belgium had been approved by the Council of NATO in Paris, A communication from Reuters, dated inParis on 24 November, was published in the world Press, stating that NATOIS Permmellt Council unanimously expressed its “understanding and approval” of the combined United States and Belgian military operation in the Congo. This was also commented on in the Western Press. Iwould just recall an editorial in The New York Times of 25 November 1964, where this fact is mentioned in the following way: “According to Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, the NATO Council knew and approved of the rescue ‘. 6. It is evident that it was not my delegation that introduced the problem of NATO into the debate on the Belgian-American adventure in the Congo. It was chat organization itSd.f, with its leaders andthosewho had planned and executed the Stanleyville operation. That fact, communicated by NATO circles, prompted my delegation to ask what decision a NATO organ should take in the case of an event which takes place in a country lying outside’the area of jurisdiction as defined by the basic legal documents of thatorganizatien. When we asked that question, we left entirely aside the fact that according to the North Atlantic Treaty such possible action should be purely defensive, whereas in the present case, the securi@ of the countries responsible for the Stanleyville attack was not endangered and hence that action, undertaken with the approval of the NATO Council, constituted GI aggressive military action. 7. TO that question the United States delegation gave no answer. There was no answer either to our statement of the fact that NATO seems to be used promptly against the liberation struggle of African peoples. Instead the United States representative spoke at some len@h about communists being behind the various troubles and spoke with a tone of indignation in the way the United States delegation often does when it has no facts to support its position. Perhaps in this way the representative of the United States wastrying to give a live example of the Socratic sentence he recallcd in his speech concerning a partisan engaged in a dispute who cared nothing about the rights or the merits of the question, This seems, particularly in the present debate, to be the attitude of the United States delegation. Faced with the position taken by the representatives of African States, as well as that of the delegations of the Socialist countries, the United States delegation perhaps becomes SO excited that it does not pay much attention to the facts or t0 what the other side is really saying. pour &tayer dans une discussion, Etats-Unis particulier. pays socialistes, Btre pr8occuper adverse I consequences Unis, mer la suprématie de style néo-colonialiste, replique Nous ne nous étendrons indiqu8 et les représentants ces accusations, & celles gées contre vention. 8. When our African colleagues point to facts resulting from white racism in the United States or when they accuse it of neo-colonialist actions bearing marks of white supremacy, the United States delegation replies by accusing them of an alleged black racism. We do not wish to dwell on this. We stated our position on this on 21 December, and the African representatives themselves have refutedsuch accusations. What we felt compelled to mswer was that part of the United States representative’s speech where he applied the same method to my delegation. 9. M. USHER nom du Maroc projet Rev.1 et qui se lit comme suit: 9. MT. USHER (IVO~Y Coast) (translatedfrom Frenoh): It is my privilege, on behalf of Morocco a.nd the IvoQ’ Coast, to introduce the joint draftresolutioncont~ned in document S/6123/Rev.l, which reads as follows: ‘fConvinced that the solution of the Congolese problem depends on national reconciliation and the restoration of public order, “Recalling the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, “Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “Taking into consideration the resolution of the ’ Organization of African Unity dated 10 September 1964, in particular paragraph 1 relating to the mercenaries, Wonvinced that the Organization of African Uni@ should be able, in the context of Article 52 of the < Charter of the United Nations, to help find a peaceful solution to a11 the problems and disputes affecting peace and security in the continent of Africa, Waving in mind the efforts of the Organization of African Unitv to help the Government of the Democratic Repu& of the Congo and the other political factions in the Congo to find a peaceful solution to their dispute, “1. Requests a11 States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo; “2. Appelais for a cesse-fire in the Congo in accordathe Organization of African Unity’s resolution dated 10 September l.964; “3. Considers, in accordance with that same reso- Iution, that the mercenaries should as a matter of urgency be withdrawn from the Congo; “4. Encourages the Osganization of African Unity to pursue its efforts to help the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve national reconciliation in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution of the Organization of African Unity; “5 . Requests a11 States to assist the Organization of African Unity in the attainment of this objective; “6. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to watch over the implementation of the present resolution, to follow the situation in the Congo, and to report to the Security Council at the appropriate time. Ir* 10. This draft resolution was the subject of difficult negotiations between the participants in the debate in which we have been engaged since 9 December 1964, and also with the other African States which have not taken part in this debate. It is therefore the result of a compromise which does not satisfy any of the parties *The Dnglish text of operative paragraph 6 was subsequently corrected ta read: “Requests the Secrerary-General of the UnitedNations to follow the implementation . . .* Sec paragraph 66 below. Il. That objective is to stop the slaughter in the Congo. The recent events we have been living through are but the consequence of the plethora of troubles suffered by our sister African nation for more than four years. That objective stems from our conviction that the solution of the Cbngolese problem must be political rather than military, and that it depends not only on national reconciliation but also on the restoration of law and order, for nothing lasting cari be built in a nation where law and order do not prevail. It is clear, however, that the Council has not considered this debate in the light of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Consequently, despite our deep conviction, that objective could be formulated only as an appeal, with the hope that this appeal Will be heeded. 11. recents que la conséquence nation sceur d’Afrique avons, blème tique, ciliation l’ordre dans une nation clair, débat dans le cadre du Chapitre Nations profonde, la forme entendu, 12. toute tentative le Congo est un Etat souverain Membre oblige, souveraineté devoir Etats tervenir affaires du Congo. 12. In the opinion of the Ivory Coast delegation, any approach to a solution must take into account that the Congo is a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations which compels us, in conformity with the Charter, to protect its sovereignty and its territorial integrity. This is a duty of which the Council must remind ail the States by enjoining them to refrain or desist from intervening in the domest affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 13. doit pour les organisations vus par l’organisation par bleme congolais, 1’ OUA a continuer exprimé 00 nous avons repris des adoptée a Addis-Abgba tenant plement qui prend securite ral, en œuvre le probleme menacer la paix dans le monde entier, 13. What is equally certain is that the Council must use a11 the means provided by the Charter to secure a peaceful settlement of this problem; regional agencies are one of the means provided for in Article 52 of the Charter. TO the extent that the parties concerned have already laid this matter before the Organization of African Unity, the Security Council should encourage the OAU to continue its efforts within a framework accepted by the parties mainly concerned. This is what we have expressed in paragraph 4 of our draft resolution in which we have chosen the same language used by the Council of Ministers of the OAU in the resolution it adopted at the Addis Ababa meeting of September 1964. Bearing in mind, however, that in the Congo there is not merely a threat to peace but a hot war which is assuming alarming proportions, the Security Council must, through the Secretary-General, the executive organ, follow the situation in the Congo, the implementation of this resolution, and be ready to take up the matter again should the situation continue to endanger peace in Africa and, consequently, peace throughout the world. 14. tous est engagee; aussi tous les Etats doivent-ils L’OUA democratique nisation ment s’isoler 14. Al1 States clearly have a responsibility in this matter and therefore they must a11 help the OAU to succeed. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must also help the Organization of African Unity by honestly lending it its indispensable support. It cannot isolate itself in Africa without becoming a target both for the Africans and for the 15. Finally, the OAU must itself help by rebuilding confidence between it and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, It is COmmonlY said that passion cari inspire the best things as well as the worst. The survival of a continent and of the generations living in it forbid such indulgence games of poker. Let us, therefore, without passion, perform a whole succession of small things. This is infinitely better and muoh surer. 16. That is the value of the objective we wish to attain by this resolution; we hope that the Council Will approve it, if not unanimously at least by a large majority and with no opposition, for the solidarity a11 is essential if the Congo, ancl with it Africa, is to be saved.

My delegation has very little left to say alter the particularly complete and cloquent statement which my colleague, the representative of the Ivory Coast, presented our draft resolution [S/6123/Rev.l]. 18; 1 should simply like to add that this draft resolution is the result of lengthy and arduous discussions which we have had with the African delegations that have been allowed to participate in the debate and with the other members of the Council. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to pay a tribute to the spisit of co-operation and understanding we met with in koth groups. 19. Indeed, the Council is not unaware that this is a problem of particular gravity for Africa and perhaps also for the world, and that after thislong discussion, the preparation of a draft resolution which, to a certain extent, embodies everything that has been said here, was not an easy task, However, we decided to undertake it because we are deeply conscious of the responsibility that rests on our shoulders. Morocco, in particular, is one of the African countries which, since the Congo’s achievement of independence, has taken an exceptional interest in that country, whoae existence and whose national and territorial unity are threatened by the manifold manoeuvres of colonialism being attempted today as in the past in Africa. 20. It was our wish that this draft resolution ahould reflect African Opinion as faithfully as possible, That is why it was necessary for us to prepare, 1 think, a gcod half dozen versions before we could bring this draft resolution before the Council, even after the original draft was submitted, we were obliged once again to moclify it in order to present it in ita final, that is to say, revised form. 21. We have noted with concern the aggravation the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; least we could do in the face of a situation which has du préambule, dangerously affected the stability and tranquillity of le moins qui a dangereusement an African country. quillit8 22. We were also in agreement in expressing our conviction that the solution of the Congolese problem depends on national reconciliation and the restoration of law and order. You Will note that we bave placed national reconciliation before the restoration of law and order; for national reconciliation is indispensable to the restoration of law and order, especially in a country which has been torn apart and is confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties. 22. ment congolais la restauration que nous avons place la réconciliation la restauration nationale l’ordre prises 23, We have also recalled the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. As the Council is aware, during the years 1960, 1961 and 1962, the United Nations, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, was especially concerned with the situation in the Congo, and the major endeavour of the Organization at that time was to sdeguard the independence and territorial unity of the Congo, which were then seriously threatened by a secessionist action in the Province of Katanga. 23. nentes sécurité. 1960, 1961, 1962, lesNationsUnies, g&n&ale librement souci sauvegarder territoriale, menacées province 24. la souveraineté blique démocratique 24. In the same spirit, we have retifirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 25. qui devrait congolais africaine etait nécessaire lution particulier 25. We wanted, moreover, to state what action should be taken to solve the Congolese problem within the framework of the Organization of African Unity, and that is why we thought it was necessary to take into consideration the resolution of the OAU dated 10 September, and in particular paragraph 1 relating to the mercenaries. 26. certainement dignité et a l’honneur ticulier. plus congolais Nations une attention tant plus recrutés ments pensons tique un pays mercenaires ment au Congo, de la façon la plus incompatible les r&gles africain, 26. The problem of the mercenaries in the Congo is surely the one which constitutes by far the greatest affront to the dignity and honour of Africa and of the Congo in particular. The mercenaries are the most odious manifestation of the disease which is at present eating away the body of the Congo, and we believe that the United Nations and the Security Council should devote particular attention to this situation, especially since it is common knowledge that these mercenaries are either recruitedin dubious circles or among the most embittered racist and colonialist elements. We believe that the greatest political and moral harm that cari be inflicted uponan African country is to allow these ban& of mercenaries to run rampant, as they are now doing in the Congo, in a mariner totally incompatible with the rules of the dignity and the independence of an African State. 27. avons l’esprit caine pour dbmocratique tiques 27. In the last paragraph of the preamble, we have stated that we had in mind the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to help the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other political factions in the Congo to find a peaceful solution to their dispute, We know, of course, that 29. In the ligbt of ail these preambular paragraphs, we feel that the operative paragraphs of our draft resolution acourately reflect the AMcan point of view. In paragraph 1 we have requested a11 States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo. The aggravation of the situation, the civil war, the return of the mercenaries to the country after having been driven out by the United Nations, a11 this is the result of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo and we believe that a11 these things must stop as soon as possible. 30. In operative paragraph 2 we have appealed for a cesse-fire in the Congo in accordance with the resolution of the Organization of African Unity dated 10 September 1964. We know that the OAU appealed for a cesse-fire in the Congo; that appeal is still valid, especially since it was made by the OAU in a resolution adopted unanimously by a11 delegations, including the delegation which represent;ed the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the Addis Ababa Conference. It was our view, after lengthy discussion, and after having re-drafted this paragraph several times, that the present wording is the most appropriate in the circumstances. 31. In operative paragraph 3, we state that the Secusif;y Council considers, in accordance with the Organization of African Unityls resolution of 10 September, that the mercenaries should as a matter of urgency be withdrawn from the Congo. We believe that the Council should exercise a11 its influence and a11 its authority to ensure this. 32. We know, moreover, that the Organization of African Unity has already heard several statements by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning its intention to withdraw the mercenaries. We believe that this point, althoughnot mentioned in the draft resolution, also deserves to be taken into consideration, if for no other reason than to give even greater force to the position the Security Council must take when voting on operative paragraph 3. 33. In operative paragraph 4, we state that the Security Council encourages the Organization of African Unity to pursue the efforts which it has al- 34. In this connexion 1 must say that if national reconciliation is to be effective, it must embraye a11 political factions, and in particular those which oppose the Leopoldville Government by armedresistance or by peaceful means. These two factions do, in fact, exist in the Congo: one manifesting its opposition by military action, and the other by political action, The aim of both is to achieve national reconciliation in conformity with the aspirations of the Congqlese people in regard to both the national unity and to the territorial integrity of the country. 34. Je dois dire a ce sujet que, pour être effective, la rÏ%zonciliation nationale doit s’étendre & toutes les factions politiques, s’opposent, soit les armes à la main, soit par des moyens pacifiques, au gouvernement de LBopoldville. Ces deux tendances existent en effet au Congo: il y a les opposants qui manifestent leur opposition par une action militaire, festent par une action politique. L’objectif des uns et des autres est de réaliser une réconciliationnationale conforme aux aspirations du peuple congolais, tant sur le plan de l’unité nationale que sur le plan de l’intégrité 35, In operative paragraph 5, we ask that the Socurity Council requests a11 Statcs without exception-we say “a11 States”, not “a11 Member States Il, and we have not specified whether these are African States or other States-to assist the Organization of African Unity in the attainment of national reconciliation. 35. Au paragraphe 5, le Conseil de S&urit8 prie tous les Etats sans exception - nous disons “tous les Etats”, Membres”, s’agissait des Etats africains ou d’autres Etats - d’aider l’Organisation de l’unité africaine & realiser la réconciliation 36. In operative paragraph 6, we request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to follow the implementation of the present resolution, to follow the situation in the Congo, and to report to the Security Council at the appropriate time. We feel that a situation as serious as that which now prevails in the Congo and which materially affects international peace and tranquillity, must be kept under review by the Secretary-General in SO far as the implementation of the resolution-if, as 1 believe we a11 hope, it is adopted-and the general situation in the Congo are concerned. We also feel that it would be advisable for the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council when ho deems it necessary. 36. Au paragraphe 6, nous demandons au SecrBtaire @n&ral de 1’ Organisation des Nations Unies de suivre la mise en œuvre de la &Solution, de suivre la situation au Congo et de faire rapport au Conseil de S&Urit.8 au moment approprié. En effet, nous pensons qu’une situation aussi grave que celle qui prévaut actuellement au Congo et quj, affecte sensiblement la paix et la tranquillite internationales, doit Btre suivie par le Secrétaire mise en œuvre de la résolution si, comme nous l’espérons tous, je crois, elle est adopt&, qu’en ce qui concerne la situation au Congo de façon générale. Nous estimons aussi qu’il serait bon que leSecr&aire g&éral il le jugera nécessaire. 37. C’est tout ce que ma délégation avait & dire. En son nom, je tiens h saluer la p&sence ici du Sec&taire absence dont nous avons tous ressenti les effets, tant dans la conduite de nos travaux que sur le plan de nos relations avec le SecrBtariat. marocaine se felicite retour du Sec&taire r&ablissement affaires tr& international. 37. That is a11 that my delegation wanted to say. On its behalf, 1 should like to welcome the Secretary- General who has returned to us after a long absence that was deeply felt by us all, bath in the conduct of our work and in our relations with the Secretariat. The Moroccan delegation is particularly gratified at the Secretary-General’s return and wishes him a complete recovery and every success in the very difficult problems that cal1 for his attention on the international scene. 38. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’espagnol) :Avant que le Conseil ne poursuive l’examen de la question dont nous sommes saisis, je tiens, en ma qualité de Président du Conseil de sécurité, h. exprimer au Secrétaire général toute la joie que nous éprouvons 2 le voir suffisamment r&abli pour pouvoirparticiper 11 nos travaux et nous apporter le précieux réconfort de son autorité et de son expgrience.

Before continuing with the discussion of the item before us, 1 should like, in my capacily as President of the Security Council, to express to thesecretary-General the pleasure we a11 feel at seeing him restored to health and again able to take part in our work and give us the benefit of his invaluable authority and experience. 39. M. ACHKAR Monsieur le Président, de commencer par exprimer la gratitude

1 should like, Mr. President, to begin by express% the appreciation of my delegation for the opportunity 40. Rule 38 of the provisiona rules of proceclure the Security Council reads as follows: “Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding Rule or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate the discussions of the Security Council may SU~- mit proposals and draft resolutions, Theseproposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council. II 41. The countries which have brought the complaint before the Security Council have, in a spirit of conciliation and as an expression of solidarity with the efforts made by our African brothers on the Council and the other members of the Council, refrained from taking advantage of this rule to submit a draft resolution which would have placed on record their position with respect to the extremely important problem raised by the Belgian-American intervention at Stanleyville. Friendly discussions have been carried on in this same spirit with a view to arriving at a result which, while it cannot, of course, be expected to satisfy everyone, might at least place the problem in its proper perspective and make it possible to work solutions which seem to us best suited to remedy the very grave situation prevailing in the Congo. 42. It was in these circumstances that the first draft resolution [S/6123] submitted by our brothers Morocco and the Ivory Coast was ciroulated as an officiai document of the Security Council. It took into account a number of comments and suggestions made by the countries I have the honour to represent. unfortunately appears that our friends of Morocco and the Ivory Coast were unable to convince the members of the Security Council of the merit ofthe suggestions we hacl made with regard, in particular, to operative paragraphs 2 and 3. 43. First of all, may 1 say that we would like-and take great pleasure in doing SO here-to express publicly our satisfaction at the efforts made by OUI’ African brothers in the Security Council, Consequently, far be it for us to engage in polemics before the Council at this stage; our only concern is to find an area of agreement that cari serve as the basis for a decision capable of winning the support of all, or at least of the great majority, of the Council members. 44. We had, then, in this spirit of compromise, thought that we could accept the omission, in the preamble of the draft resolution, of any explicit reference to the Belgian-American intervention, sinoe, as has y Officia1 Records of the Security Councll, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964. 45. What, then, were the reasons for our insistence that paragraph 2 should be modified? It will be recallted that this paragraph stated: 45. En effet, pourquoi insistions-nous pour que le paragraphe 2 soit changé? On se souviendra que ce paragraphe 2 disait: “Appeals for animmediate cesse-fire andrequests thewzation of African Unity and the Secretary- General of the United Nations, acting in concert, to take the necessary steps without delay to ensure observance of the cesse-fire and report to the Security Council as soon as possible”. délai les mesures nécessaires pour assurer lerespeot du cessez-le-feu, et de faise rapport auconseil de sécurité le plus tôt possiblett. 46. 1 should like to clispel a11 doubt in the minds of the members of the Security Council and assure them that the countries which have brought this complaint before the Council have full confidence in Secretary- General U Thant. We nevertheless felt that inasmuch as a11 those who have spoken in the Council bave emphasized the special, if net exclusive, competence at this stage of the Organization of African Unity in SO far as the efforts to find a solution to this difficult problem are concerned, it might perhaps not be absolutely necessary to bring the United Nations into the picture again, particularly as we know that the United Nations had to withdraw from the Congo as a result of the various difficulties it encountered. What is more, it w& recognized that the Organization of African Unity had the Congolese problem under advisement at the time of the intervention and that it had established an ad commission whose task is to create conditions for a national reconciliation in the Congo. We therefore considered that if the efforts of the OAU were placed outside the spectiied framework of Articles 52 and 54 of the United Nations Charter, its competence, if not its effectiveness, would to some extent be called into question, For that reason, we suggested that operative paragraph 2 should be amended to read as follows: 46. Je voudrais qu’il ne subsiste aucun doute dans l’esprit des membres du Conseil de sécurité quant au fait que les pays qui ont porté la plainte devant ce Conseil ont ‘une confiance entiére et totale en notre Secrétaire général, U Thant. Néanmoins, tous les orateurs qui sont intervenus devant le Conseil ayant fait ressortir a ce stade, de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine pour ce qui est de trouver une solution & ce difficile problsme, nous avons pensé qu’il n’était peut-être pas indispensable d’introduire encore dans le tableau l’Organisation des Nations Unies qui, on le sait, a dû se retirer difficultés qu’elle a rencontrées. Mieux encore, on sait que l’Organisation de l’unité africaine connaissait du probl&me congolais au moment oh l’intervention a eu lieu et qu’elle a établi une commissionad hoc chargée de créer les conditions d’une réconciliation nationale au Congo. Nous avons estimé, par conséquent, que placer les efforts de l’OUA en dehors du cadre strict des Articles était mettre en doute, dans une certaine mesure, sa compétence, sinon son efficacith. C’est pourquoi avions suggéré d’amendes le paragraphe 2 du dispositif pour qu’il revête la forme suivante: diat et demande à l’Organisation de l’unité africaine de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour le du cessez-le-feu, et de tenir le Conseil de sécurité informé conformément a 1’Article 54 de la Charte des Nations Unies”. “Appeals for an immediate cesse-fire and requests the Organization of African Unity to take the necessary steps to ensure observance of the oease-fire and to keep the Security Council Informed in accordance with Article 54 of the United Nations Charter”. Cela nous semblait tout & fait conforme a l’esprit et & la lettre de la Charte,et de nature aussi B eneourager les efforts trés sérieux entrepris par l’OUA. That seemed to us to be fully inaccord with the spirit and letter of the Charter and likely to encourage the very serious efforts undertaken by OAU. 47. Qu’il me soit permis de rappeler Egalement que 1fOUA pacifiques a des différends aussi sgrieux que celui dont nous connaissons actuellement. Je exemple les efforts entrepris par l’OUA dans le Conflit algéro-marocain, ou dans le conflit somalo-éthiopien, efforts qui ontété couronnés d’un incontestable Nous faire confiance à l’OUA et la laisser poursuivre ses 47. 1 should also like to recall that OAU has already had occasion to bring about the peaceiùl settlement of disputes as serious as the one we are now considering, 1 mention, by way of example, the action taken by OAU in the Algerian-Moroccan and the Somali- Ethiopian disputes, which in both cases met with unquestionable success. We therefore thought that here too we could rely on theOAU andallow it to pursue itS efforts without thereby placing its activities under 48. With regard to operative paragraph 3, which has drawn objections from the countries on whose behalf I am now speaking, 1 should like to point out that in prevîous UnitcdNations resolutions, ‘coththose adopted by tic Security Council and those aclopted by the General Assembly, a direct appeal was made for the withdrawal of the mercenaries. Paragraph 3 merely provides, however, that the mercenaries should as a matter of urgency be withdrawn from the Congo in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Organization of African Unity on 10 September 1964. We would bave preferred to have the paragraph state: “Appeals for the immediate withdrawal of the mercenaries from the Congo”. We considered that the Security Council should express a clear opinion on the presence of the mercenaries in the Congo and not take refuge behind OAU resolutions, or that it could simply express a hope or a wish. 49. Those were the differences of opinion that existed when the revised text was circulated, at theopening of this meeting of the Council. We note that this revised draft resolution contains new elements andthat certain parts to which we had basic objections have been revised and other parts which we fully endorsed have also been amended. That being SO, andsinceup to now we have been in close consultation with one another and have worked in a spirit of solidarity, harmony and fraternity, the African countries on whose behalf 1 am speaking would request the Council, through its President, to grant them a further opportunity to state their position on the revised text. They would thus have an opportunity to continue their consultations the meantime. 50. We are dI anxious, as you know, to reach an agreement which is compatible with our prinoiples. For the time being, this requirement has not been wholly met, but we have not given up hope that it will be. We would ask for an opportunity to try to achieve that objective, ancl perhaps by tomorrow we may be able to reach some kind of unanimous agreement which, 1 feel sure, would satisfy not only the Members of the United Nations, but-and this is fie main objective-the Congolese people, whose interests we a11 at heart want to protect. 51. 1 shall make a further comment on the revised text of the draft resolution. We may be surprised for example to note that the reference to other factions has now been omitted in the operative part. If efforts axe to be made to bring about a reconciliation, obviously the parties concerned are the ones to be reconciled. It is impossible to speak of reconciliation with only one of the parties in mind because that would mean that only the position of that party is to be considered. 52. On the other hand, it cari be said that operative paragraph 2, as we see it, has been substantially raiSOnS n’avons les consultations quels j ‘ai demandé la parole voudraient leur demain définitive 54. Before ending my statement, 1 should like to as- 54. sociate myself with previous speakers in expressing orateurs our gratification at having the Secretary-General sommes with US again and to convey to him our wishes for bis nous notre complete recovery. un complet

Whon 1 introduced the draft resolution, 1 explained the drafting procedure that we had adopted. We explained that we were aware that the draft reso- Iution has encountered many obstacles, that it is a compromise which does not satisfy anyone, and which, consequently, is not expected to command the full support of a11 those who havetakenpart in this debate. We have borne in mind the essential thing that has to be protected-and here we agree with our colleague who has just spoken-namely, the primary interest of the Congolese people. Views may perhaps differ as to what this is, but we believe that a man has no higher interest than to safeguard his life and that, consequently, the primary interest of the Congolese people ii that they should not kil1 each other. Everything else, we felt, was a matter of detail, and we thought that if we agreed on the essential point, we should submit our draft resolution. 55. M. USHER (Côte-d’Ivoire): jet de résolution, j’ai expliqué la procédure que nous avions adoptée pour le rédiger. Nous avons précisé que nous étions conscients du fait que le projet de résolution il constitue un compromis qui ne satisfait personne et qui, en conséquence, ne prétend pas avoir l’adhé- sion complète des parties qui ont participé Lce ‘débat. Nous avons tenu compte de l’essentiel B sauvegarder - notre coll&gue qui vient de prendre la parole -, à savoir l’intérêt prenons-nous différemment cet intérêt; estimons qu’il n’y a pas pour l’homme d’intérêt plus sacré que 1s sauvegarde de sa vie, et qu’en consé- quence l’intérêt qu’il ne s’entre-tue pas. Tout, hors de cela, nous est apparu comme secondaire, et nous avons pensé que, si nous étions d’accord sur l’essentiel, nous devions présenter notre projet de résolution. 56. Je crois qu’il ne vient 2 l’esprit d’aucun Africain, ici, organisme commun, l’Organisation de l’unité africaine, Aussi, dénions-nous & qui que ce soit le droit de parler pensons que tous, membres intégrés de cette organisation, nous devons la sauver et affirmer partout sa capacité et son efficacité. Nous avons tenu compte de cela. C’est pourquoi nous sommes parvenus a un texte revisé qui, au paragraphe 2, lance un appel en vue d’un cessez-le-feu lution de l’OUA. Cette derni&re résOlUtiOn Contient un tel appel, mais il s’agissait d’unappelpour que les combats cessent. Vous constaterez que nous Sommes allks un peu plus loin, en l’occurrence, puisque nous parlons d’un appel en vue d’uncessez-le-feu, un mécà- nisme étant prévu, dans la r8solution de l’OUA, qui permet de suivre la mise en application de ladite résolution. 56. 1 do not believe that any African here present would think of questioning the effectiveness of our joint agency, the Organization of African Unity. Foï that reason, we cannot allow any single individual to speak on its behalf. We believe that a11 of us who are members and constituent parts of that organization must safeguard it and everywhere proclaim its competence and effectiveness. We have kept this in mind. That is why we finally succeeded in drafting a revised text which, in paragraph 2, appeals for a ceasefire in accordance with the OAU’s resolution. You Will note that the OAUls resolution contains a similar appeal, but in our text, we have gonea little farther, for the OAU resolution calls onlyfor a cessation of hostilitics. You Will note that we have appealed for a ceasefire and that the OAU resolution provides for machinery to keep the implementation of the OAU resolutionunder review. 57. Nous ne pensons pas que le paragraphe 2 fasse obstacle & l’exécution & la Commission ad hoo dans le cadre de la résolution de l’OUA. C’est pourquoi je crois que nos camarades sauront apprécier à sa juste valeur l’effort que nous avons fait, mon collègue du Maroc et moi, en tentant de concilier leur point de vue avec l’expé- rience que nous avons de ce qui est susceptible d’être 57. We do not think that there is anythingin paragraph 2 to prevent the ad hoc Commission which was set up under the resolution of the OAU, from properly carrying out its mandate. That is why 1 believe that our colleagues Will be able to fully appreciate the SffOrtS which 1 and my colleague from Morocco have made to reconcile their points of view with the experience we have with the Council and what it would he apt to 58. In paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, as 1 said before, we bave adopted the wording used by the Council of Mini&ers of the OAU to the effect that OAU should help the Government of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo to achieve reconciliation, or, to put it another way, that it should act as an intermediary to facilitate the reconciliation in the Congo of a11 the parties, We do not think it admissible to distort in any way the language adopted almost unanimously by the Council of Ministers of the OAU. If it is to be changed, the Council of Mini&ers of OAU will have to be reconvened and asked to decide, 59. As to the wordingof paragraph 6, this is obviouely a customary formula. We have decided that everyone should refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo; we have decided that there should be a cesse-fire; we have decided that the mercenaries should be withdrawn. Apart from paragraph 4, which encourages the OAU to pursue its efforts, the Security Council has already taken decisions on certain principles and we think that it is normal therefore, for the Council to request the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution-that is to say, to observe that no one intervenes in the domestic affairs of the Congo-and to report to the Security Council. 60. We feel that our draft resolution does not oontain anything unusual and that the Council should be able to adopt it. We have not been able to satisfy everyone, but it is an accepted principle that when sponsors who are aware of their responsibilities wish to submit a draft resolution to the Security Council, they consult their colleagues on the Council, take their opinions into account and eventually succeed in drawing up a text which cari at least engage the responsibility of the entire Council. That is the objective we had in mind, and that is why we have submittedthis draft resolution. 61. Our African colleagues have askedfor more time. We are quite willing to agree to this but we propose to provide further explanations if they make reservations or criticize other parts of our draft resolution,

1 should like first of a11 to express my gratification that in the statement he has just made on behalf of the eighteen African States, the representative of Guinea has made it clear that he does not intend to engage in polemics about this matter. The work that my colleague of the Ivory Coast and 1 have done in preparing this draft resolution was part of a, concerted action carried out in conjunction with our African colleagues and with the other members of the Council. Our desire was to have the Security Council adopt a resolution that would to the fullest possible 63. Our desire is not to submit justanydraft resolutien for the Council to adopt or reject. Our desire is to submit a draft which reflects the point of view of the African States, both as expressed in the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU on 10 September 1964 and as expressed by the many delegations which have taken part in this debate. We think that we have in this way accomplished something that, while not very easy to do, is nevertheless a proof of goodwill on the part of the African delegations in the Security Council who wished to enable the Council to adopt a resolution that would be satisfactory to the Africans. 63. Notre souci n’est pas de presenter un projet de résolution quelconque susceptible d’être adopt8ou non par le Conseil. Notre souci est de pr&senterun projet qui puisse à la fois reproduire le point de vue des Etats d’Afrique, lution votée 3 l’unanimité le 10 septembre dernier par le Conseil des ministres de l’OUA et tel qu’il a été exprimé délégations qui ont participé & ce débat, Nous pensons que nous avons fait là un effort qui n’est pas tr&s facile Ei. réaliser, preuve de bonne volonté, de la part des délégations africaines au Conseil de s&urité, pour que leconseil puisse adopter une résolution satisfaisante pour les Africains. 64. Operative paragraph 2, which was the biggest obstacle for our African brothers, was finally worded SO as to correspond to African requirements; namely, to specify that the cesse-fire in the Congo should be respected in accordance with the resolution of the OAU. 64. Le paragraphe 2 du dispositif, qui a Bté le point le plus difficile ment rgdigé pour répondre aux exigences africaines, c’est-à-dire observé en conformité de la résolution de l’OUA. 65. 1 do not propose at this stage to dwell at length on the development of the conversations that have taken place since the beginning of this debate and which finally led to this text; but 1 think 1 cari say that our major concern was to submit to the Council a draft resolutioa which, especially as regards the essential points, would be acceptable to the African delegations and at the same time meet the expectations of the Congolese people. 1 feel that if this draft resolution, as it is now presented, does not command the support of a11 the participants in this debate, the reason will certainly not be that it has not been sufficiently studied in the light of the considerations put forward by both sides. We have a11 been in agreement that the Security Council must adopt a resolution. Acting upon this premise, our main concern has been to produce a text which the Security Council would adopt and which would at the same time meet the legitimate preoccupations of the OAU. 65. Ce n’est pas & ce stade que je vais me livrer & de longs développements sur llkvolution conversations, pour aboutir ?i ce texte; mais je crois que notre souci majeur a étg de présenter au Conseil un projet de résolution essentielles, aux préoccupations des délégations africaines et, en même temps, & l’attente du peuple du Congo, Je crois que si ce projet de résolution, tel qu’il est présenté, ne rencontre pas l’adh&sion complate de toutes les parties intéressees a ce débat, ce n’est certainement pas faute d’avoir Bté suffisamment gtudi8, compte tenu des préoccupations exprimées par les uns et par les autres, Nous avons et6 tous d’accord pour juger que le Conseil de sécuritk devait adopter une résolution, Partant de ce principe, notre souci essentiel a été d’aboutir à un texte qui puisse être adopt8 par le Conseil et qui, en même temps, l’OUA. 66. M. USHER (Côte-d’Ivoire) : Je voudrais demander simplement qu’une modification soit apportée auparagraphe 6 du texte anglais, Nous avions employé, dans le texte français, mande au Sec&taire Nations Unies de suivre la mise en œuvre de la pré- sente résolution. n Il apparaît que dans le texte anglais il a été employé une expression qui, en français, pourrait lution” ce qui n’est pas ce que dit le texte français. Il faut trouver

1 only want to ask that a change be made in paragraph 6 of the English text. In the French text, the original, we used the wording: “Demande au Secrgtaire géneral de 1’organisationdesNations Unies de suivre la mise enœuvrede laprésente r&olution”, It seems that in the English text aword has been used which in French could mean “veiller a l’application de la r&olution”, in other words, to “watch over” the implementation of the resolution, which is not what the French text says. A word should be used in 68. 1 have no further speakers on mylist, and for the purpose of granting members of the Council time for an exchsnge of views on the document we are discussing, unless I hear any other suggestion 1 would propose that we meet again tomorrow at 3 p.m. It was SO decided. The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)