S/PV.1234 Security Council

As this is the first meeting of the Security Council since 1 assumed the presidency, 1 should like, speaking as President and on behalf of the members of the Security Council, to express our gratitude to the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Morozov, who was President during the month of July. During his term of office Mr. Morozov presided over debates concerned with problems affecting the responsibilities of the Conncil andof great importance to Council members. Re won our admiration, net only for the mariner in which he. as Fresident, conducted the business of the Council in this chamber. but also for the assistance he rendered to us a11 in discussions outside the chamber to reach an acceptable conclusion to the Council’s debate. 2. In short, In the discharge of his responsibilities as President he showed the qualities of judgement and the mastery of procedures which a11 of us who bave known him in the Council, Qoth as President and as representative of the Soviet Union, bave corne to expect of him. 1 know the Council will wish me to offer him our thanks and apbreciation.

May 1 thank you, Mr. Fresident, for the kind words which you bave just addressed to me, which 1 accept as a tribute ta the country which 1 represent here. May 1 wish you every success in the work before ~OU. Representotive of Cyprus oddressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6581)~

In connexion with the question which has just been inscribed on the agenda, 1 should like to draw attention to requests to participate in our debate which bave been received from the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, dated 2 August and circulated in documents S/6578,2/ 5/6579,1/ and S/65822/ respectively. 5. Pursuant to the practice previously followed by the Security Counci; when this item was discussed, 1 propose, with tbe consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to take seats at the Council table and to participate, without the right to vote. in the discussion of this problem. At the invitation of the Presidenf. Mr. S. Kyprfanou (Cyprus), Mr. 0. Eralp (Turkey) aad Mr. A. S. Liafis (Greece) took places at the Couacil table.

Before the Council begins its discussion of the question on the agenda, 1 should Iike to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the two reports of the Secretary-General on recent developments in Cyprus, dated 29 July1965[S/6569j.U and 2 August 1965 [S/6586].2/ 7. The Security Council Uri11 now begin consideration of the question before it. The first speaker inscribed in my 1% this afternoon is the representative of Turkey. to whom 1 now give the floor.

The Council Will recall that during the last meeting of the Council on Cyprus, in June 1965 11224th meeting), 1 reiterated my Government’s ardent desire and hope that an agreed settlement would soon be found to the problem of Cyprus and its intention to work whole-heartedly for the early attainment of such a solution. Nevertheless, 1 also found it necessary to express certain apprehensions about the good-Will of the Greek Cypriot régime in Cyprus. 1 pointed out that there was strong evidence indicating an intention on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership unilaterally to attempt to alter the constitutional structure of the State of Cyprus by enacting an electoral law which would disregard the basic prinoiple of partnership between the Greek and Turkish communities of the islandupon which the independence of the Republic of Cyprus was built and without which it could net survive. by now. bave beeome abundantly Clear to eveIYbodY through recent unequivocal statements of Archbishop Mskarios and other Greek Cypriot officiais in authority, calling for enosis. or annexation by Greece. In fact it is not dtfficult to observe from successive reports submitted by the Secretary-General to this Council that the Greek Cypriots bave endeavoured to arrive at their objective througb a succession of faits accomplis which. taken individually, did net. at the -- time, seem of sufficient consequence to prompt the Council to take appropriate action. Tbts series of well-caloulated faits accomplis started soon after the adoption of the 4 March resolution 186 (1964). when on 22 March 1964 the Greek Cypriots usurped the executive power partly vested in the Turktsh community under the Constitution of Cyprus by the appointment of Greek ministers to the Cabinet posts actually held by Turldsh Cypriots. This was followed by the formation of an illegal Greek Cypriot army, by an indiscriminate importation of arms. bydeliberately bringing about the illegal occupation of the island by the armed forces of Greece. by numerous military actions against tbe Turkish Cypriot communityforthepurpose of extending this usurped, unconstitutional and illegal Greek Cypriot authority by force, by countless despicable economic restrictions and pressures applied agatnst the Turkish community in conjunction with brute military power, in order .to force that community to surrender its constitutional and treaty rights and submit to Greek Cypriot domination. 10. Among the last but not least of these acts was an tnhuman measure preventing Turkish Cypriot children studying in Turkey from returning to their families in Cyprus-again, of course, in flagrant violation of the Constitution, to say notbiig of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Al1 these acts were undoubtedly contrary to resolution 186 (1964) which, as we a11 know, calls upon the parties to the dispute and specifically upon the two communities of the island to refrain from actions that would be likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus. The fatts accomplis of the Greek Cypriots have been exposed and their perpetrators stngled out in no uncertain terms in the Secretary-General% reports wbtch the Council has taken note of in meetings held previously on tbe SU~- ject of Cyprus. 11. However, the reports now before the Councildeal with developments which are far more explosive in thsir implications and infinftely graver in their pctenthil consequences than any previous Greek Cypriot action. It is the considered opinion of my Govermnent chat if the Situation is to be saved. the Security Council must take fiRn action to make clear to the Greek CyPrtot régime chat its attempt to salve the dispute by faits accomplis is unacceptable and must cesse fortbwitb. The Greek Cypriots, by purporting to adopt the +~JO bills on tbe extension of tbe terms of office 12. The Turkish Cypriot community and the Government of Turkey bave always strictly and faithfully observed the cal1 of the Security Council for the peaceful solution of the dispute and bave exercised restraint in the face of repeated and brazen provocations. But it is only fair to keep in mind that there is a limit beyond which illegality cannot he allowed to go unchecked, a limit where encroachment on rights must be stopped if justice is to prevail, a limit where the Security Council should assert itsauthority if it is intended that it should play an effective role in the equitable and just solution of this particular dispute. And 1 want to stress with a11 the emphasis at my command that that limit has now heen reached. 13. The Secretsry-General% report [S/6569j clearly indicates that the action of the Greek Cypriots in adopting the two hills purporting to extend the term of office of the Greek part of the executive and legislative organs of the Republic and to amcnd the electoral system of the country in a unilateral mariner is contrary to the Constitution of the island. It is also evident from the contents and the tenor of the report that the Greek Cypriots intend, contraryto the Secwity Council’s resolution 186 (1964). to impose on the other parties a forcible solution to the dispute rather than a peaceful and agreed one. This, incidentally, brings down the mask camouflaging the Greek Cypriot designs behind the so-called moves of .pacification proposed to WNFICYP with loud fanfare. 14. Before proceeding forther with the analysis of the latest Greek Cypriot attempt of faits accomplis, 1 find it appropriate to repeat here a clarification about the use of the term “the Government of Cyprus”. This is necessary. as the report of the Secretary- General simply and objectively relates the incidents as they occurred without any comment, and. therefore, the context within which this term has beenused might lead to misunderstanding and inaccurate conclusions. For example. while citing the arbitrary conditions set forth by the Greek Cy-priots for the participation of the Turkish Cypriot members of Parliament in the deliberations of the House, it is stated: “The Turkish Cypriot members would accept that the laws enacted by the House of Representatives ivould be applied to the whole of Cyprus. including the Turkish areas. by the Government using the normal authorized administrative organs.” [S/6569, para. 8 @).l 15. This should be read in the light of the following facts: In reality. the Turkish parts of the executive and legislative organs of the Republic bave repeatedly proposed, both officiallyandunofficially, theconvening of the ConstitutionalGovernment and the ConstitutionaI Parliament for the express purpose of applying and 16. In the case of the Hwse of Representatives, its Turkish Cypriot members bave been prevented from performing their legislative duties. first. by physical threats to their lives, and now, asweunderstand from the Secretary-General% report, hy debarrlng them from participating in the fnnctions of the House. Consequently, it is evident tbat the laws which, under the Constitution of the Republic, require the participation of Turkish Cypriot members of the House and their positive votes (under certain proportions set out in the Constitution, suoh as the electoral law) cannot bave any legal validity if adopted by a Greek Cypriot majorily plane. 17. The prea2nt report of the Secretary-General [S/6569) contains a clear analysis of the unconstitutional nature of the enactments under discussion. 1 shall therefore briefly refer totheirnnconstltutional aspects. 18. The law purporting to extend the term of office of only the Greek President nms contrary to the very first article of the Constitution, whïch stipulates that there shall be a Greek President and a Turkish Vice- President of the Republic of Cyprns. The case is the same with the extension of the term of the Greek members of the House of Representatives. whicb shall bave 35 Greek and 15 Turkish members. As for the law purporting to amend the electoral law. according to article 78, section 2 of the Constitution, any such modification cari only be passed by the concurrent majority votes of both theGreekandTurkishmembers of the House of Representatives. Furthermore. this SO-called law purports to establish a common electoral roll and abolishes the separate Greek and Turkish rolls. whereas articles 1 and 62 of the Constitution requIre that the President of the Republic and the Greek members of the House shall be elected by the Greek Community, and the Vice-President of the 19. These unlawful attempts at legislation bave compelled the Turkish Community to take the necessary measures to maintain the constitutional situation. As the Secretary-General% report indicates. theTurkish members of the House of Representatives proceeded to prolong their own ternis of office as well as that of the Vice-President of the Republic. They also passed an electoral law based on the Constitution. This Turkish leglslation was promulgated by its publication in the Officia1 Gazette of Cyprus, issued in a Turklsh edition for the first time since the Greek Cypriot assault in December 1963. Incidentally, the publication of the Gazette in the officiai languages of the Republic is a constitutional requirement. 29. The Turkish Government hasprotested the illegal measures of the Greek Cypriot Administration in a note delivered by the Turkish Embassyto the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nicosia. The Greek Cypriot authorities bave at the sanie time been reminded that their actions not only violate the Constitution and international treaties but also contravene the Security Council resolution 186 (1964). 21. It would be superfluous to elaborate the reasons why these latest acts of the Greek Cypriot régime are in flagrant violation of the 4 March resolution. May 1 therefore simply point out the basic violations: 22. First, paragraph 1 of the report of the Secretary- General on the present developments carries the most obvious indictment. It says that these “developmsnts. . . bave increased tension in the islandv. How cari such measures, therefore, be reconciled with the solemn cal1 of the Security Council upon Member States to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus? The passing of such a provocative electorsl law, if it is not qualified as “action” in itself, is obviously a threat of forcible action liable to endanger the peace of the island. 23. Secondly, these purported laws are obviously intended as a means of imposing by force a solution to the problem of Cyprus, but the Security Council resolution 186 (1964) calls for a peaceful solution and agreed settlement to that problem. 24. Thirdly, these latest measures are blatant attempts to eliminate the lawful rights of one of the communities in the island, to which the resolution of 4 March 1964 refers specifically in its operative paragraph 3. 25. Finally, the attitude of the Greek Cypriot régime in denying to the Turkish members of the House of Representatives their right of sitting in the House is a clear defiance of the recommendation of resolution 186 (1964) concerning the return to normal conditions. 32. faits, de fa&3 division-as is elearly seen from tbe report by the seeretary-&nemB ~S/66SSl whicll was tirwaatea taday-in ptu-suante of the wind dream of Turkey for the final partition of Cypxxs. 34. My GovemmenF bas wmked consistently a& faübhUy for the im@.3nentation of the resolution 186 (1964) and ail subsecpent UnPFed NaFions resolueions. A few miMes ago, Fhe Turkisb representative woted that resoluFïon an& mt to my surprise, if 1 may say so, b-2 mitted one uery vital wÿord. 1 shoüld bave FImogbO thaF, in qwting a dacumenF, he might at Ieast do bis bat Fo be precise. l-le just forgot to quote the wohd n~w@ïeigo” whkh appears in the Security Gouncil resdution 186 (3.964). W%enbeattempted topreseot Fhe aeFions of my Govermnent and of tbe Hoose of RepresenFatives of Cyprus as being in cooflict with that r@SQlution, he Said that, mder that resolution, no me is to do anything to worsen the situation in Cypms. 1 think it may be usefol to remind members of the Council that that resolution states quite clear~y Chat nothing shouk3 be done by any State Member of Fhe Unit& Nations ?‘to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyp~sw. and tbat ail Memhers Were IwGxied of th@ir obligations under tbe Charter of the Gniéed Nations ad, in particular, Article 2, Fam‘a@FaPh 4, whicb WaS SpeCificaUY referred to in the preamble to the resolution. I mention this simply for th@ record. It is for tbe record-but althe same time, if 1 may SaY SO, it reveals the intentions of the Turkish representative. 36. We bave corne before thIs Council, as 1 said, because of the threats dlrectedagatnst the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and because of the lnterference in the internai affairs of Cyprus by Turkey. These interferences, these interventions and xeats, are the subject wlth which the Security Coucil has the responsibility and obligation to deal. 37. Turkey, on tI?? other hand, has corne before the Council wlth a complaint. Turkey has corne to the Security Council for what? TO try and talkthe Security Council into accepting the vlew that Turkey caninterfere in the inter& affairs of Cyprus. And if such interference is not tolerated-and 1 cari be very categoric in thIs respect, that it shall not be tolerated by Cyprus-then Turkey may go a step further and intervene by force. 1s that the implication of the Turkish complaint before the Council? Cari the Security Council, directly or lndirectly, or implicitly, accept such an idea? 1 am confident that it Will not, for otherwise a most dangerous precedent would be createdthat might tend to destroy the very foundation upon which the Security Council is based. Could the Security Council tolerate this behaviour of Turkey, whlch has the audacity, if 1 may say SO, to appear before the Council as a plaintiff, when in the conscience of the world it has heen repeatedly condemned as a habituai criminaI? Cari the Security Council set aside the fact that Turkey has repeatedly ignored the UnltedNations Securily Council resolutions concerning Cyprus? We heard, not with surprise, but with shock, the statement of the representative of Turkey to the effect that Turkey has continuously respectedthe Security Council resolutions. 38. Was the bombing of Cyprus in pursuance of the United Nations Security Council resolutions? Was the infiltration of Turkish armed men from Turkey In s asked tbe Security Council to consider grave situation asising fmm certain cted in eyprus a>v the House of Repre- I stated a few 2llinutes a@, tPaere is no as a res~tof~e~~~eugaf 5ny 15-N. may lx2 a grave situation as a result of the s t5 Werfere iatbe ck3mestic affaim ofCyprus, a restit of &Ine éhreat t0 intervas in Cypms. Tarkey, ié seems, bas clecidec? once agaia to create tension. An& if 1 may s5y so, it is mt khe fi& time, when there was cm and quiet in Cyprus-and I had axasion before t0 put to tbe Council otber examples of a simik sature-chat artificiel tension has been of creatïmg the necessary atm~spk~ for e action by Turkey or of seming as 5 smokeproviding the necessary caver for the activis of Twkisb agents in cypms in pta”suance of ue 41. A few miautes ago the TuFurkish representative said tlxit it is a& a secret any more-1 thi&I am using lais ovm wcrds-that the Greeks in Cyprus are na; for the union of Cyprus with Greece. And said tbat this is wbnt they are trymg to briag about by force. 1 think that Turkey’s ideas aboutwhat should bd3 dane in Cypms are clear. They are net against the ides of the union of Cyprus witb Greece-they are 42. 1 will now attempt to submit some information witb regard to the leglslation recently enacted in Cyprus. Pirst, however, 1 wlsh to state that it is the firm view of my Government tbat the legislation In question, wbich was made the subject of the Turkish complaint, relates solely to the normal functioning of the country, and, as such, is a matter falllng exclusively within the domestlc jurisdlction of the Republic of Cyprus. 43. We have had the occasion in the past few days to make it plain bath to Turkey and to the United Kingdom that Cyprus, an independent State, aMember of the United Nations entitled under tbe Charter to sovereigu equality with all other States, does not recognise the right of any foreign State to dictate the method of regulating its inter& aiTairs. 1 am confident that the Security Council will take the same view; for, otherwise, a most dangerous precedent would be created. 44. It is our view that the Republic of Cyprus, like any other State in the exercise of its sovereignty, is fully entitled to amend its electoral legislation and to extend the term of office of its President or Parliament. No foreign interference or interventionas is the accepted rule among all other sovereign and independent States-tan be tolerated: nor, likewise, would me Republic of Cyprus presume to lnterfere in the internal affairs of other States when measures of the same nature are being decided upon. 45. We ourselves cannot accept the view that any other State cari arrogate to itself the right to have a say in such measures, which are interna1 par excels, or indeed in anything which would directly or indirectly constitute an interference In the internal affairs of another State. Tbis is the position from which my Government cannot depart, uuder any circumstances; for, otherwise, it would mean that we would not reserve to ourselves tbe rights conferred upon OUI country by vlrtue of its being a Member of the Unlted Nations and by virtue of the Charter. 46. Having stated this, 1 should llke to apprise the Council of certain facts. Due to circumstances well lmown to this Council, it became necessary to make provision, by law, for extension of the terms of office of the President .of the State and the members of the House of Representatives for a designated period of twelve months-or, to be more precise, for a period not exceeding twelve months. 1 must remindmembers of the Councll that the terms of office of the Presideat and members of the House of Representatives were due to expire very shortly. It was imperative that this matter be acted upon in order to ensure the normal functioning of the State. Similar measures have, 1 think, been resorted to in other countries, for the same purpose, in similar circumstances. 47. Likewlse, it became neoessary to make provision for legislation amending in certain respects the existing electoral law. These amendments or modlfive creted a situation and p&tically impos- Constihtion.’ [S/6253, more, 3. subrait tbat it cxxtd net havebeen tbe intention of this Council tbat Cyprus shouldreturn b tic old system of division, sànonce, in its own wsolution 186 (1964). it alIed for a new solution Cyprus probkm, fn accordance witbthe Charter akhg into accourt tbe wellrus as a whole, rather than particular point bas heen ted Nations Medlator in his n tbese circumstances, the electoral law could in ao way foUow the clivisive Une of the previous law and thereby contribute to tbe pre-exïsting constitnticmal provisions, Which, by their abnormality and proven unworkabiity, were one of the main causes of the crisis in Cyprus. 51. 1 would submit t the legislation that was enacted was in full conformity with tbe spirit of the oonstitutional resolutions-I do wt say %couformity witb tbe lette@ because the Security Cou&l did net deal specifioally with the interna) arrangementsin Cyprus-wbich was included in the resolution 196 (1964) and which formeà the basis of the report of the United Nations Mediator. 52. What we bave done in Cyprus, 1 submit, bas been in full conformity with the spirît of tbe United Nations, anci it may be pertinent to refer to the bistoric n, adopted by tbe General Assembly at its session on 20 November 196$, ontbe Elimination of all Porms of Racial Discrimination in every Country [reSOlUtiOn 1994 (XVIII)]. Under Article 10 of tbe Deolaration: “The United Nations, the specialised agencies, States and non-governmental organizations sball do s,R iu tbeir power to promoteeuergetic actionwhich, bu combining legal and other practical measures, Will make possible the abolition of ail forms of racial discrimination. . .n Resolution 1905 (XVIII), for its part, in its first operative paragraph: “Requests tbat aJ.l States shall “No discrimination by reason of race, colour or ethnlc origln shall be admltted in the enjoyment by any person of political and citfzensblp rights in his country, in particular the right to participate in elections through universal and equal suffrage sd to take part in the government. Everyone bas tbe right of equal access to public service inhis country. ” 54. May 1 ask wbether, in view of these very clear and unambiguous lnjunctions bytbeGeneral AssembIy, in addition to the realities of the Cyprus situation itself, it was inappropriate in the circumstances to Write off”, as the Secretary-General put it, the communal distinctions inorder to apply the universally accepted prlnciples of democratic representation, namely. on the basis of equal rights of suffrage for ail citizens, witbout the discriminatory and divisive provisions which previously existed with regard to ethnie origlns. 55. AR must be equal before tbe Iaw. This is the tbeory wbich we are now applying in Cyprus. Any Citizen cari be elected as a Citizen of the oountry. Yet I bave to say this: we said that we were ready-and 1 would ?sk members of tbe Council to take particular note of thls fact-in spite of the principles wbich we are upholdlng, to continue our discussions with the Unlted Nations Mediator for the purposeof considering tbe best way for ethnlc mlnorities to be represented in tbe Cyprus Parliament. 56. The Turkish Government says there must be no extension of the terni of office of the President and of the House of Representatives, otherwise it wlll interfere; no new electoral law, otherwise it will intervene; no new elections, otherwise it Will attack us; snd no talks with the United Nations Mediator on the question of Turkish representation in the Cyprus Parliament. 57. The Turkish representative in his speech said that the Turkish members of the House of Representatives were barred from the House, and that they were not allowed to participate in the proceedings of the House. Similarly, he said, and 1 thhik1 understood tbis correctly, that the Vice-President of Cyprus and tbe Turkish ministers were ousted forcibly from the Government. How did that happen? 1 do net know. The only thing 1 know is that in December 1963 both the ex- Vice-President and the ex-Turkish Cypriot minfsters withdrew from the Government because at that particular mornent they thought. on the oasis ofpromises from Turkey, that tbe dream of partition was nearing reality. They withdrew, snd the Vice-President at that time said, “1 consider myself no longer the Vice- President of Cyprusv. They wlthdrewfrom the Government and the Turkish members withdrew from Parliament for eighteen months, and they bave beenworking agalnst the State, undermining the State. pursuing a policy of division, followlng and implementlng the policies of tbe Turkish Government. fa& of t&2 situation less alPegations. Hn tbis connexion, 1 may add se~+ral atber measums wem tien before, and, rding to the view of tbe ‘hrkish Gommment, th@y wre net in accardance witll tlle 1960 constitution h ami akxxlon Agreements. Why was h Oovernmneat did mt at tbat tirne &e Sewrity Ccuncil? This, iumy sur position that at this particular idar moment, a smake-sereen is ing ePse which is in the minds Turkàsh GQvwm@nlt. 6P. AaQtlaer reasan why 1 wxdd bave tbougbt tllat it was net necessary to take up your valuable tirne wss tic fzkct that tbe Secretary-GeneraI himself statès in his report ht, on tbe basis of certain information, be was concerned about tbe developments in Cypms, abat tke possibilityof division sud the possibiiity of an aggravatton of the situation: he made an appeal to my Gwemment, and, as I understand it from tbe report, to the leaders of the Turkish minority. Acg to tbe report, the replies lie received to that were very favaurabIe. But ose important argument for the necessity of holdingtbeseSecurity Council meetings to deal once again witb tbe violation of the Charter of tbe Uaited Nations by Turkey sud witb tbe threats of Turkey against Cyprus is that Turkey seems b feel at liberty to consider-indeed, it has SO stated-that, notwitbstandlng the basic principles of international law regarding the sovereignty and equality of States, nohvithstanding tbe Charter of tbe United Nations, notwithstanding the resolutions of the Sectity Coumil, it may still presumptuously interfere in tbe internai tiairs of Cyprus anclattempt to & SO as it dld in the past, with the threat of or the use of force. 92. It is tbis aspect of the situation wbich, in my submission, merits the most serious consideration 01 ‘Ais bady. The Security Council, the body entrusted @mder the Charter witb tbe primary responsibility for tbe maintenance of peace sud security in the world, CaLmot, in the nature of tbings, be concerned with the nassmg of electoral legislation in a Member State, since tbis is, by definition, a matter of domestic concem. But the Security Council cari be concerne6 when adter Member State by using various pretetis-as in this particular case the enactment of ths 64. In February and March 1964 we had occasion to debate at some length before this Council the merits and a11 the elements connected with that famous SO-cal; ;d Treaty of Guarantee. 1 do net wish to repeat what 1 stated then, and indeed 1 do net wish at this stage to repeat what other members said at that time. But 1 would simply like to state the followlng in connexion with this Treaty of Guarantee. 65. The Treaty of Guarantee, which was from the beginning in direct contlict with the basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and which was imposed upon the people of Cyprus in circumstances of duress and blackmail, could net under any circumstances overrule the basic principles of the Charter. This is made clear in Article 103 of the Charter. But since then, due to the attitude and policy of the Turkish Government-supposedly one of the guarantors of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, because in that so-called Treaty the basic declared objective or purpose was the protection of the territorial integrity of Cyprus-cne cannot have corne to any other conclusion than that even if there had been the slightest doubts with regard to the non-validity of the Treaty of Guarantee, those slightest doubts must have been removed when Cyprus hecame the victim of the bombings and of the aggression of Turkey, and when Turkey and its agents in Cyprus tried, through various methods, to pursue the &a of division and partitlon. Partition, naturally. is contrary t0 the concept of territorial integrity. Bombiig of Cyprus is defigtely a violation of territorial integrity. 66. A very, if 1 may say SO, peculiar situation arises wlth regard to tbe Treaty of Guarantee. We are told tbat we must respect the Treaty of Guarantee because of the sanctity of treaties-irrespective of the merits of the Treaty and irrespective of the provisionsof the Treaty. We are being asked to consider tit Treaty as valid, irrespective of the fact that tbat Treaty is in direct conflict with the Charter of the United Nations. We are being asked to respect that Treaty irrespective of the fact that it was imposed upon the people of Cyprus, while Cyprus wa8 still a colony, in circumstances of duress and blackmail. s. In otber words, : Treaty is valid. ou. being the 5mIler about it. Yoo bave to ked. You bave to suffer ~XX% you bave to continue to respect tbat Treaty.” 68. m~msr stil and wes.k we may be, we oan never accept that cmoept. We cari never accept tbat e cm never accept tbs idea that beoause 69. The Treaty of Guarantee does not exlst in 50 far as the Cypus Government is concerned. Even if st doubt, I repeat, a5 to its doubt was removed when of bombing5 inAugu5t 1964. em is a treaty whic respect and continue to respect; reaty is the titted Nations. nclude, tbe Turkish complalnt fore you was bm hereforotherpurposes. 1 eauwt be a pmphet and say wbat is tbe purposa tbat tbis mcmrse is goiug to serve; but it is certain tbat it is meant to serve anotber purpose. The Turkish comnt reveals the continuous policy of interferenceby key in Une interna1 affairs of Cypru5. ent tbat the Security Cou&l will do indirectly or implicitly to tolerate ation wbicb was enacted in Cyprus was necessary under the circmnstances. 72. 1 repeat, tbougb, tbat 1 would be happy if, In the course of tbis debate, theTurkishrepresentativewere t0 Sgree witl? me to bave the Wnited Nation5 Mediator continue his ta&, to go to Cyprus anddiscuss with the Governmeut and the representatives of the Turkid minority the question5 connected with tbe representation of the Turkish minority. 73. We are completely for resolution 166 (1964) ir r me-+ng and with its proper interpretation. s bez :iven time and time again by tht Semstary-General bïmself in his reports. 74. The Turkish representative spoke on a few othel wbich, witb tbe permission of tbe President deal witb later on in tbe debate. ents in Cyprus. bowewr ion around it. The tension by tbe threats of aggres. the threat of intervention abs at removine: and Upsetting tbe quiet wbich bal 76. Furthermore, as far as the final political solution to the problem is concerned, we bave been accused of trying to force a solution upon others. We are net the ones who bave thrown away the reports of the Mediator who was appointed under that Security Council resolution. We are not the ones who refuse to co-operate with the Mediator. We are ready to resume our co-operation with the United Nations Mediator in pursuance of that resolution. If Turkey wants a peaceful solution and if Turkey is ready to respect the resolutions of the Security Council, the Turkish representative must make a similar statement: that Turkey is ready ta support the mediation work of the United Nations Mediator who has been appointed by the Secretary-General by virtue of resolution 186 (1964). 1 shall say more about this later on.

One might conceivably have some misglvings as to the timingof tbe two legislative measures recently enacted in Cyprus, and especially the law containing certain transitory provisions amending the island’s electoral system. 78. Without questioning the authority of theexecutive and the legislative branches of the Cyprus Government to tske, as they have actually done a11 along during the past year and a half, such steps as are indicated in order to regulate public matters that need regulating, one could still wish mat anything which might in the present circumstances, justlfiably or not, lead to any untoward reaction would be carefully avoided. 79. 1 cari understand this overcautious view which seems to be shared by not a few colleagues in the United Nations, anxious to see the Cyprus problem settled as soon as possible in a most peaceful and amicable and equitable and just way. 80. 1 am at a 106s. however, to grasp the purport and purpose of the Turkish recourse to the Security Council on that matter. 1 fail to see the “incalculable gravity” and the “imminent danger” allegedly created as a result of the two laws in question, as stated in Ambassador Eralp’s letter to you, Mr. President [S/6571], nor any of the other alarming signs brandished in literary profusion by my Turklsh colleague. 81. We bave before us a highlyenlighteningdocument on this subject. It is documentS/6569of29 July 196% one day before the Turkish forma1 request for the convening of the Security Council-which contains a factual and objective, and, 1 shouldadd, as trustworthy as cari be, report by the Secretary-General on recent developments in Cyprus. There is nothing alarming or disturbing or even disquieting in this report. Truc, an increase of. tension is noted in the introductory Tbeir factitio extraa~us cause are qmy reflect t SQ much m ths island as abmad”. 85. Wbere abrcad, outside Cyprus, s%uId one Iwk for elements and factors of a harassing and troublesome nature conduoive to tension and trouble in the island? They cari ooly be found in Turkey, 1 subinitnamely, in same Turkish newspapers whicb on 27 July mmotmced tbat tbe Turkish Air Force had beenplaced in a state of alert and whlch also published the frantic appeals of the extremist Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf &mktash, calling for outright secession by tbe Turkish Cypriots and the setting up. of a separate Turkish Cypriot Republic, andfor immedlate tiitary intervention by Turkey in Cyprus. 86. What is more signlficant is that on the same day, 27 July, the Tnrkish Embassy in Nicosia delivered a forma1 note of protest to ths Cyprus Government whlch concluded with the omlnous warnlng tbat, in case the new electoral law were put into effect, “the Turkish Government Will not fall to take whatever action is necessary within its responsibility under the Treaty of GuaranteeW.6/ 87. .%Ch kmguage in SO recent an officia1 Turkish ckmment bas indeed a most ominous tone, and 1 need net elaborate on it since the Security Council is well aware of the so-called Treaty of Guarantee, whose purpose was the safeguarding of Cyprus’independence and territorial integrity, bot whlch was actually invoked by Turkey in Docember 1963 to claim a right of militaiy intervention in the island and. less than 88. What are we really up against? 1 am afraid we are faced with a situation in which the Government of a respected Member nf the United Nations sounds the alarm-apparently several alarm bells at the same time-for dangers Of its own making or else implied by its own tbreats against another country, threats which admittedly are of a nature to create unrest in that country. 89. 1 deeply regret that, intbe absence of any evidence to the contrary or any other reasonable explanation of tbis strange situation, 1 am compelledtomake such a grave assumption against a country with which my Government has only recently initiated and is still pursuing tslks aimed, among other objectives, at clearing the ground anù promoting a peaceful and amicable settlement of the Cyprus problem. 90. 1 am far from havlng any desire or inclination to indulge in unwarranted and useless recriminations wbich might also be harmful to our sincere effort to contribute our best to a settlement in which we earnestly wish and expert the full agreement and support of Turkey. 91. In all candeur, though-my Government having always been guided by a sense of complete frankness and sincere co-operation in its dealings with the United Nations-I believe that whatever 1 may say here, in trying tv analyse and understand the Turkish policy on Cyprus, could hardly cause one-tenth of the harm already infIicted on our Organisation’s efforts to help towards the solution of the ill which is at the root of the present abnormal conditions obtaining in tbe island. 92. The Turkish policy on Cyprus has been from the start a negative, unco-operative and obstructive one. This cari easily be detected in Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots turn down every peaceful overture made to them and stand pat in the face of any effort to restore normal conditions of life; oI,xt to everything except what appears to be to their exclusive advantage; refuse to 9ay taxes while claiming equaI financial advantages from the State budget: insist on freedom of movement a11 over the island while remaining stubbornly self-segregated in their ovm enclaves: where tbeir representatives boycott the Parliament for eighteen consecutive montbs and tben, a11 of a sudden, decide to resume their duties on theà own terms, etc. 93. I am net blaming the simple Turkish folk on the island, whom 1 know personally quite well. 1 am convlnced that this situation is hardly of their choosing or making, or to their liking. But that is how things are now, and there certainly cari be no remedy for that deplorable situation other than from the Turkish Cypriots themselves or their leaders. 96. Almost a year and a half hss elapsed since tien md a0 solution is yet in sigbt. The resolution recommeaded the designation of a Mediator wbo wcmld ù.dp alP the parties concerned to reach an agreed settiement in eonf0rmity with the Charter of the Unikd. Natitms, etc. 07. Of a11 tic features envisngeed by the Council for a settlemant. Turkey seems to bave concentrated on only WC, nnmely. tint a settlement sbould be agreed upon by all concerned. Furtbermore. tbrough a narrow .and self-centered interpretation, it has arrogated to itself 4 virtual right of veto of any arrangement‘tbat might net be to its pleasing for wbatsoever reason, am0ng whieh rmks first nnd foremost its overinflated sense of nstioaal prestige. 98. It was in exercise of su& a preposterous ri& of veto that Turkey reje6ted the Mediator’s report and eTen went SO far ns to rebuff tbat distinguished gentleman sud internnti0nnlly known and esteemed statesman and kwyer, in whose selectioa Turkey itself freely cencurred. it tbus chose to throw overboard a wlmle year of strenuous efforts at sortiig ont the fnndamenkd elements and determining tbe basic guidelines for a possible agreement. A serious setback was tbus infticted on the work of tbe United Nations, of tke Security Council snd the Secretariat, inparticular, whicb xny Govermnent is now trying its best to remedy tbrough its bilateral talks witb the Turkish Government in Athens and Ankara. 99. As to the subject matter now under discussion, that is, the two legislative acts recently passer3 by the Cypus Parliament, Turkey presses in effect for the resurrection of the legal validity of a formof government which 81% proved totally unworkable and which, in effect, lies nt the mot of a11 present difficulties ‘&guing that unfortunate ishmd. Inst.ead of looking constructively forward and building for the Wure, L regret to say that my Turkish friends stilï seem to be WICentrating on digging the past andprolongingthe sufferings of thousaads of people, mostly kinsmen of theirS, whose welfare and future progress and hanpiness they claim to cherish and protect. 101. Under the 1960 Cyprus Constitution, less than 5 per cent-1 repeat, less than 5 per cent-of the population of Cyprus could block the will of the rest; tbat is, more tban 95 per cent of the people of the island. The calculation is quite simple. The members of the Council will find it on a sheet of paper 1 am taking the liberty to circulate. As will be seen, only 4.81 per cent, which is less than 5 per cent, could block tbe Will of 95.19 per cent ofthe people-and thIs supposing that all Deputies were present in the House of Representatives. If only someofthemwerepresent, the same calculation would lead to even more outrageous conclusions. 102. This is a strikingexample indeedof the workings of the 1960 constitutional concoction. Suoh grave fallacies of the past have to be corrected if we are to build, as we all, 1 am sure, earnestly wish, something better for the future. Such action on the part of all conoerned is oalled for not only by the principles OÎ the United Nations Charter andthe pertinent recommendations of the Security Council, but it is also a requirement of morality and common sense, which are the surest guarantees of lasting arrangements. 103. It is high time, it seems to me, that we a11 concentrate on a solution of the Cyprus problem. This is the conclusion that emerges fmm a11 past and present developments in the island, as well as, 1 believe, from what has been said up to now here. Let us not be distracted from this main issue and our principal task by diversionary and coniùsing moves like the one whioh, for no valid reason, 1 regret to say, has brougbt us here again today.

The representative of Turkey bas asked to spea’c in exercise of hIs right of reply and 1 give him the floor.

1 must begin by saying bow taken aback 1 am by the statement wbich we bave just heard from the representative of Greece. After having pointed out the untimeliness of the two enactments which are the subject of the legislation, in regard to the intentions of Turkey and t?.,~ exposb Turkey made, he used such expressions as “gross exaggerations if not sheer fabrications” and ‘dangers of its own making”. as well as a series of other epithets, to prove that there was really no danger at all but that Turkey was fabricating a danger, creating an atmosphere of false alarm. 106. Notbing could be further from the truth. The danger is there; it is very much alive. It is no use le solution to is statementension in tbe Will aee, is not of the Secretaryis the basis for tbis tbe Greek Cypriot in the face of interbave macle to the effeottlmt tinte and again PnsinuatiQns wew made tothe effeotthat Turkey, enosis, was negotiating for tbe purwlth one of tlle emedalsotobe forcible soluparties will corne around to it. Ill. Tbe following question was also asked. It was 0th~ times braaenly violated tbe did Turkey rot bring up the matter d cornes befcme tbe Council mw lation, just a simple violation, has answer is very simple. Each tinte place, we seised the Council of it. Council bappened to be taking place rolongation of tbe mandate of tbe UNl?KXP or for otber reasons, and we bave never failed to bring before tbe Council such brasen violations of tbe Constitution of the island. 112. once again wearefaced witb the well e of the Greek Cypriot Administration-the aggressors and generators of tension, 113. What is adduced as evidence and as grounds for this entirely groundless and purely tactical complaint at present is the note of protrst delivered by the Turkish embassy in Nicosia against the unlawful and provocative RctS of the Greek Cypriot régime. The note in question, the text of which is available to ail, alter setting out the unlawful, unconstitutional and perilous nature of the purported legislative action of the Greek Cypriot Administration, says, in its last two paragraphs-and 1 shall quote again, and 1 shall quote correctly, as distinct from the quotations that bave been made by the representative of Greece and Foreign Minister Kyprianou: “The Turkish Government, as aguaranteeingstate Of the Constitution of Cyprus, would like todraw the attention of the Greek Cypriot authorities on the most serious consequences which might ensuefrom any attempt to put into effect the unconstitutional decision amending the Electoral Law. “The Turkish Government Will not fail to take whatever action is necessary within its responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee in order to ensure the observance of the constitutional order in Cyprus . C/ This was the crucial phrase which was omitted from both quotations: “in order to ensure the observance of the constitutional order in Cyprus”. 114. The Council Will notice that the TurkishGovernment is in fact issuing a caution against the implementation of this nefarious legislation. The so-called Electoral Law is in fact nothing more and nothing less than the declaration of a conspiracy to commit aggression against the Turkish community of Cyprus in order to deprive it of its constitutional rights and guarantees. The Turkish note does no more than serve notice that any attempt to proceed to such aggression would immediately bring into play the responsibilities that Turkey bears under valid international treaties. This is not a threat against the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. On the contrary, this is a warning that any action against that same territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus, of which Turkey is a solemn guarantor, shall not go unchecked. 115. My Government, as a loyal Member of the United Nations, has promptly brought the dangerous situation arising from the provocative legislation of the Greek Cypriot rbgime before this Council in order that the peace may be safeguarded in accordance with Greek Cypriot case-tbe clm-ua 117. Tbe fact tbat some of tbose treaties bave been c?mtrll, wbere tiae party that violates the agreet claims it is no longes valid because Ire bimself violated it. Shan~ dootriae, indeed. BEL By tbe same token. tbe Greek Cypriot ségirne ccdd very well assert tbat tbe C%arter of the Unïted Nations and the UniversaI Declaratton of Ehnnan Rigbts &o are invalid because tbey, too. bave been violated by tb@ Greek Cypriot Sgime. 119. A pie bave hem& for the umpteeuth time, the pre erous assertion that tbe treaties in question weie imposed upon the reluctant Greek leaders of Cyprus. The bubble was effectively burst by the statement made by the Foreigu Minister of Turkey before tbe nineteenth General Assembly on 25 January of this year, from whicb 7 shall nov+ quote: wArchbishop Makarios at tbat time was entirely free to accent or reject negotiations based on these agreem@nts. ntil then be had net besitated to reject outri several otber propos& submitted to bim. Eut in the case of the agreements in question, after cOnstiting at Ieugtb with otber Greek Cypriot leaders, he had deoided to accept tbe agreements as the groundwork for the future status Of CIWWL If proof is required, 1 need only refer bu the statement of Mr. Tenekides. professor of international law: “‘Qn that occasion, Archbisbop Makarios had called togetber in London some tbirty eminent Greek Cypriots. AU of tbem, witb tbe exception of “JWe signed these agreements also because that revered mari, Archbishop Makarios, who heads tbe Greek community in Cyprus, and whom we regarded during our deliberations as representing the wishes of tbe Greeks in Cyprus, told us when we informed him of the matter that he accepted these agreement% 1 do net say that we signed solely because we had his consent. We signed because we were convlnced that we had reached the best solution, relatively speaking. But 1 must add tbat we took account of his opinion for the basic reason-which we had stated during our discussion-tbat we wonld net impose these decisions on the Greeks of Cyprus, either by force or by any other means.’ v “Similarly, the present Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou himself, then head of the opposition, bad stated in the Greek Parliament on 27 February 1959: ” ‘Since these agreements havebeen acceptedby the Greek Cypriots and their leader, the GreekGovernment cannot possibly oppose them.’ I’ “Thus it was with full knowledge of the facts and in a11 freedom that a11 the interested parties, including the leaders of the Greek community, accepted the London Agreements. “The Zurich and London Agreements constituted only a general framework defining the fundamental principles of the future status of Cyprus. The Constitution and the final text of the treaties were drawn up by two committees meeting separately in London and Nicosia, with the full participation of tbe representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities. During these negotiations, which lasted fourteen months, representatives of the Greek community were completely free to present tbeir views in full. At the end of these negotiations, five treaties and instruments were concluded at Nicosia, to which Archbishop’ Makarios tiixed his signature, net, as was claimed here the other day, as the Greek representative of a British colony, but in his capaciiy as President of the Republic of Cyprus, having been elevated to tbat high office by the Greek community in accordance with the Constitution.“8/ 120. Again 1 would like to quote from a statement made by Archbishop Makarios at the time of the signing of the Agreements: “A new era, 1 firmIy believe, opens today for the people of Cyprus, an era of peace, freedom and Prosper@. The two communities working closely caus &~OS %-espect for tbe obligations treaties ami otber sources of inter- Cbaxter, wbicb states: in tbeir international use of force.. .A.. But t point is tbat tbis section must be rein its dole context. It bms Une tbreat or use of force-aud I quote witb emphasis: 8.. . agaiost the territorial integrity or political independence of te, or in any other manner inconsistent witb tbe es of tbe United Nationsv. 3.26. 1 slmuld lilœ ~CI draw the a ion of tbe Council unilateral action r article 1V of the Tre uarantee is Rfor sde aim of re-establis state of affairs treaty”. Tbe fact is tbat tbe state of affairs created by the treaty in question is a state Of affairs wbicb specifically provides for the territorial int@@y and political independence of Cyprus. In otber vmrds, any action taken under the Treaty of Guarantee is certainly not in conflict witb tbe terms =@aP of Article 2 of tbe Charter, since it natbe inst the territorial integrity or political décadence of any Skate or in any otber matmer 127. What 1 bave said about the continued validity of the treaties in question is in itself sufficient to dispose of the spurious argument of the Greek Cypriot delegation to the effect that the so-called legislation ~hich is the subject of this debate is solely an inter& affair of the Republic of Cyprus. 1 bave shownthat any matter which touches upon the basic articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is a matter of primary concern to the guaranteeing countries under the treaties in question. But there is more to it than that. 128. Cyprus is in a state of civil strife. Tbere are two factions on the island who are armed and vigilant and betweon them a tenuous truce is being maintained through the efforts of the UnitedNations Peacekeeping Force. The aggression and the many crimes of the Greeks of Cyprus against the Turkish community have brought the people of Cyprus into the goldfish bowl of international public attention and United Nations preoccupation. Under such circumstances, what kind of sense does it make for one of tbe factions in the civil strife to declare by legislation its intention to subdue the other and expect the other parties and the United Nations to remain indifferent because that faction maintains that its actions are matter of internai concern? Can it be said that any acts by one side or the other which affect the precarious situation in Cyprus today is a matter of domestic jurisdiction? 129. Such an attitude would be a negation of the peace-keeping interests of the United Nations in the strife-torn island. The Greek Cypriot r&ime cannot be allowed to hide behind such slogans as “internai affairsw, “domestic jurisdiction” or “act of government” SO as to defeat the very purpose for which the United Nations has sent a peace-keeping force to the island-namely to bring about peaceful conditions SO tbat an agreed settlement may be reached. 130. Finally, 1 must make a brief reference to the report of Mr. Galo Plaza [S/6253], parts of which bave been used in arguments bere this afternoon and also in the letter of Mr. Rossides to the President of the Security Council, dated 30 July [S/6573].9/ 131. The views of my Government with regard to tbe Mediator and his report are wellknown, andI need not go inb them here. Tbese views bave not and cannot be cbanged. The.report is a document which is binding on no one. In its own words, it sets fortb no precise recommendations or even suggestions, and its autbor WI aolely responsible for it”-again tbey are bis own 133. A similar slur on the Constitution of the island and its provisions bas been cast in tbe letter of Mr. Rossides to theSsmrity Council[S/6573], inwhich 8x2 states: w... eonstitutional pmvisions, wbich by tbeir ab~rm~ty and tbeir prown unworkability. had been the origin and the main cause of tbe trouble and tùe cri& in tk ïsbmd”. 134. In order to refnte this unfounded and tendentfous e fmm no less a person Heidelberg Universily, the first President of the Constitutional Court of the RepubHc of Cyprus. He declared, on 27 Uecember 1963: “The crisis in Cyprus is the result of President MaIcarias’ anti-Turkisb policy. 1 myself am oonvinced that if the Government of Cyprus bad been able to stick to tbe Constitution for fiveyears, most of the proklems would bave been mastered.s 135. Here is a quotation from Professor Heinse. assistant to Professor Forsthoff, and tbe Council Will t tkse two eminent, upright aad impartial w no interests at heart other tban the independence and prosperity of Cyprus. Professor Heinse said: *Separate collection of taxes for Greeks andTurks, however, remained possible to a large extent botb practice, SO that the lack of au overon taxation could in part be comfaihwe to acbieve a joint legidation was ME due to the incompetency of thoseconcerued, but to the faot tbat the mling gmup of Greek Cypriots macle no serious effort to co-operate or arrive at a compmmise, butinsistedwithgrowingdetermination OR igwring and abolisbing the existing Constitution.” ?y 136. I sbould Hke to return to tbat part of the ediator’s report wbich says: “. . . the very act of appointiug a Mediator . . . cari be said to indicate tbe convicticn of the Security Coumil that some new sohdion would bave to be found in order to bring an end to th@ existfng crisis” [S/6253. para. 1291. 137. The same tbeme hss been played today in the siatement of Foreign Minister Kyprianou. Tbis na tQ inion on wbich the Greek Cypriots bave sou se their flimsy case on the invalidity of etisting treaties concerning tbe Hepublic of Cyprus. But is such a conclusion justified? The very resolution 166 (1964), wbich sets up tbe institution of mediation, wbicb states in tbe second paragraph of the premble: “Considering the positions taken by tbe parties in relation to tbe Treaties signed at Nicosia 138. Here is a statement made by the late Ambassador Stevenson: “This Treaty or any international treaty cannot be abrogated, cannot be nullified, cannot be modified either in fact or in effect by the Security Council of the United Nations. The Treaty cari be abrogated or altered only by agreement of allof the signatories themselves or in accordance wlth its ternis.” [1096th meeting, para. 74.1 139. 1 bave another brief quotation from the representative of the Ivory Coast, Ambassador Usher: “But we must acknowledge that we bave no power to interpret or annul international treaties.“[l097th meeting, para. 85.1 140. 1 have yet another quotation from the representative of Bolivia, Ambassador Castrillo Justiniano: “We agree that neither the Security Cou&l nor the General Assembly has the power to declare a treaty non-existent or invalid, or to abrogate it.’ 11098th meeting, para. 158.1 141. There are otber statements, and perhaps the Fore@ Minister would take the trouble to study the records in whlch these statements appear. These are merely a few of the concurring views expressed on the subject, but they are sufficient to show that the Security Council certainly had no intentionofbrushing aside the treaties, thereby reducing the island of Cyprus to a geographical expression-as tbat is lndeed what would happen if we were to assume that the Treaties of Nicosia andtheConstitutionoftheRepublic were to be ignored. 142. 1 believe my remarks should make it clear to the Council that there is no basis whatsoever to the spurious Greek Cypriot charge whlchbns beenbrought before the Council to dlvert the attention of this body from the provocative action of the Greek Cypriots, to which attention has been drawn by the Secretary- General himself. 1 hope that the Councll may now proceed to tope wlth the dangerous situation whlch has arisen from such action.

The Foreign Minlster of Cyprus has asked to speak and 1 glve him the floor.

In his right of reply, or perhaps it was his main speech, the representative of Turkey analysed in detail two aspects of the question. One related to how the famous Treaties of Zurich and London came into being. In regard to tbe second aspect, he argued tbat the Security Council never had the’ intention-because it does net bave the ‘“At the Conference at Lancaster Xouse on 5 Febment6 and adopted by the Britisb Covernment. 1 tri& very hard to bring about the change of at ht to sign tbe agreement. Tbis was the course dictated to me by neoessity.” jlO98tb meeting, para. lQ8.j 1 do II& tbink that tht statement reveals wbat tbe Turkhh representative said, namely, that tbe hesident of Cypms signed those agreements %eely”. referred to the ted by two com- Nicosia, for tbe impression to the CO Xe tried to give tbose negotialions tiations and tbat anyone could abject anted want Shdl were for a long tirne; but thsy workecl witbin tbe framework laid cbwn at Zurich. The basis of tbe agreement and the bssis of the Constitution were agreed upon at Zurich ater in London by tbe British Covernment. ?Vbat committee clicl was to do their best to try and out tbs àe(atis and to try and put on paper those ideas wbich were agreed upon at Zurichsndin London in 1959. were net at Iiberty to change d been agreed upon at Zurich and the points which were agreed ad in London, 1 repeat, were imposed of Cyprus. Whenapeopleis struggling for freedom and self-determinatlon under colonial rele md m faced whb the diIemma of eitber acoeptlng 149. 1 do net want to go into the detalls of that famous Conference in London, but 1 cari say that when on the last day the President, Archhishop Makarios, wanted to express certain reservations and to try to effect some changes in tbose Agreements, the reply he received from the Chairman of that Conference was, ~F~OU bave a quarter of an heur to decide”; when lac had to decide between a wrong agreement and hloodshed, he chose the wrong agreement. 149. As far as the validity of those Agreements is concerned, 1 think that it is an accepted norm in international law and international relations in our Century chat an agreement which is imposed upon a people is net a validagreement. 1 donot wish to stress the point again that when an agxement contains provisiens which are contrary to the United Nations Charter, such an agreement is not valid. 150. The representative of Turkey said tbatthisbody is net a juridical body, but thenthegreater part of his second speech dealt wlth legal aspects. He also referred to the municipal law. 1 think that there is another parallel in municipal law which one could refer to. 1 am sure that the Turkish representative wouldagree with me that a contract between two parties is not valid in law if the subject matter of the contract is net valid and is illegal. 1 do net think that he cari go to a court and ask for implementation of a contract which provides for killing, for stealing or for depriving somebody of his freedom. It is the same thing in international law. He cannot corne to the United Nations and ask for support from that body for the curtailment of the independence or the sovereignty of a Member of the United Nations bezause the subject matter-if that was the subject natter-of that international contract is net valid in the light of the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 151. The representative of Turkey quoted resolution 166 (1964)-I do not bave his exact words, but 1 tbink he added something at the end; 1 do not know whether it was another part or whether it was an explanation of his own. As regards the treaties, he said something to the effect that the becurity Council had confirmed the validity of the treaties. 1 do not remember such a thing. 1 thiok thatwhat resolution 166 (1964) did was simply to takenoteofthe position taken by the parties in connexion with the treaties. If the argument of the Turkish representative is that the Security Council or the General Assembly lias no authority to invalidate treaties, 1 think he must agree at the same time that that body cari have no authority to sanction treaties. Either a body has authority to deal witb treaties or it does net have the authority to denounce treaties, and in tbe latter case tben it 156. The Turkàsb representative spoIce of tbe territorid integsity of Cyprus. and he said mat it s reasm tbat Turkey reserves to itself the ri àntavene Eo protect the territorial mtegrity of 1 eannat unaerstana bw one cm pmtect the territorial integriv of Cypms by bombing it. Ht Es Bot by *e of L&cm treaties tbat came an independent State. Those treaties were forcecI upon Cypms before Cyprus became iaclependent. àt is tme. but Cypm beeame independent LT an Act of tbe Brâtish Parliament, and I worald bate to thânk tbat the British Parliament would net bave voted for tbe indepencience of Cyprus unless thosetwo treaties were signed. Cyprus became independent because it Co&l net reemain a colony in 0~1‘ cenkmy. Cyprus was entitled to become independent. Thepeople of C~;~rus was entitled to determine àts ovm futare, as ideed it stiPI is, and it was only tbe force and tbe tbreats that created tbe situation in wbich the free wïnl of the peuple of Cyprus was blocked andfrustrated. It is the tbreats and the outside intervention tbat bave created a situatàon in whàch the peuple of Cypms are mt allowed freely ta express what tbey want for their oum comtry ancI the future ofthetr eountry amI bow they wish to be governed. 158. I c~uldalsoquotemanystatements~mpre~ous debates in tbàs Councàl, and 1 may do SO on auother occasion. 1 refrain from dzing SO novd net because 1 bave rat studied the records-i bave studied tbem, 160. 1 am net going to refer to what the Turkish reuresentative said about the mediation and the Mediator. 1 think tbe mere expression heused-Ithink 1 heard it correctly: the “mediational ockiitya-is enough to show the feelings of the Turkish Government about the job done by a distinguished servant Of the United Nations, who was. appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations by virtue Of tbe Security Cou&l resolution 186 (1964). As far as we are concerned, Mr. Galo Plaza is still the United Nations Mediator. We have co-operated with him closely. We have done our best. We were in consultation with him about a political solution to the Cyprus problem. We earnestly hope that he will be allowed to continue with his task. In the meantime, in spite of certain reservations which we also have concerning his report, I must state that the criteria which he laid down in his report (5/6253] for a solution to the Cyprus problem will serve for us as a guide, hecause they are the United Nations criteria, they are the criteria of the Charter of the United Nations, they are the criteria provided for in the Seourity Council resolution of 4 March 1964. 161. We have been calledthe aggressors. Aggressors against whom? Aggressors against the Turkish minority in Cyprus. But how? We are the aggressors because we are giving all sorts of services to the unfortunate Turkish people living in enclaves on the basis of the policy of Turkey. We are the aggressors because we provide food freely to a11 tbose people in tbose areas in spiteofthefactthatthey bave conspired and are still conspiring against the State. We give them electricity and water free. They do net pay taxes. We subsidize their crops. We facilitate their freedom of movement. Only today, 1 think, some women and children were helped to return to Kokkina, which they had left during the fighting. We try to be impartial towarda a11 the citisens, irrespective of their race. We help them with their harvest, with their grapes, with their economy, with their freedom of movement. But we are the “aggressors”. It is a vely easy word to use. Well, tbe aggressor in this case a certain area of a certain area of teci? Are tbe TurIe in one W~Q live in tbose It oan pxotect them. We ments. But let tbem 1st tbe essors and yet we bebave ix yet we treat tlae and yet we WE ntatives of the I65. If tic& cannot he done-ami 1 hope it cari-we hall pursue it ourselws. This is anotber sign of our faith in the United Nations aud of our faith in what this Organisation stands for. We shall pursue the problem of Cyprus ourselves at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. There it cari be discussed in detail, and we are confident that the world body Will decide what is right. 166. In conclusion, 1 wish to emphasiae oaly three points. First tbe tension which has been created in Cyprus is a result of the policy of Turkey, wketber it is threats or whether it is actions, whether it is direct actions or whether it is indirect actions through the agents of Ankara in Cyprus. The Turkish representative found that the threat in the concluding paragraph of the Turkish Government’s protest addressed to my Gowrament was net enough. 167. Secondly, we do not recognime tke ri ofw State to interfere in the internalaffairs of Cyprus, sud we do not remgnize the right of anyone to intervene in Cyprus. Interference and intervention are net only contrary to international morality and justice, but are aIso contrai-y to tbe very Charter of tlte United Nations, to the resolutions of the Securi’cy Couucil, and to the spirit ohtaiuing in our times. 166. ThirdIy, the Treaty of Guarantee-1 wish to repeat this snd to have it on record-does net exist for Cyprus. Cyprus does net need or require auy guarantors. Cyprus has as a guarantee the Charter of the Uaited Nations. It is on the basis Of chat Charter that we shall resolutely and without any deviation try to get a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, iu the interest of peace, in the interest of justice and in the interest of democracy. TbeOnlg way to secure that is by allowiug the people of Cyprus ta be free to deoide their own destiny, to decide how they wish to be wverned, and to liane tbeir wishes respected by a& 169. Mr. AKA (Ivory Coast) (trauslatedfromFreach) I apologiae for speaking at this Iate heur, but 1 shoulc like to make a brief explanatory statement. 170. The Permanent Representative of Turkey, exercising his right of reply and referring to the conclu. siens of the Rlediator~s report, quoted a statemenl made here by the representative of the Ivory Coasi to the effect that we bave no power to annul international treaties. 171. For the record, 1 should Iike to quote exactly in its conte& the statement made by Mr. Usher OI 25 February 1964. IIis words were: r to interpret or annul t~e5tiSs.~ pO97tk meeting, para. SS.] g tkat statement, my delegation wisked 173. ‘T~E PRRSXDENT: Tkere are no furtker speakers on my Est for tbis afternoon’s meeting. We tkerefore ve to casicler the date and tke time of our next meeting. I understand tkere are two members who woubl be ready to speak if a meeting were called tomomm sfternoon. On tke other hand, certain delegations believe tkat it would be more convenient if éhe next meeting were keld on Tiaursday. R is. of course, for tke Council to consider the question of its next meetiog; 1 would be inclined to suggest to the Counoil tkat we should meet tomorrow afternoon to kear tke speakers presently inscribedand, perhaps, additional speakers, even tbough tke meetii t be brie& 1 am, of course, ready to kear tke views of any member of tke Council on tkis point.

In SO far as my delegation is concerned, we wouId of course be happy to meet at any time tkat would suit the convenience of any other persons wko kave given their naines to speak tomorrow afternoon. Atthe same time, kowever, some of us, tke non-permanent members, kave kad certain discussions in connexion witk this debate, 2nd it would facilitate matiers if we could leave tomorrow free and kave tke meeting on Tkursday-of course, if it accords witk tke convenience of tke other representatives wko kave indicated a desire to speak tomorrow. 1 am entirely in yourkands, MT. President. 175. Tke PRESIDENT: Tke Council kas keard tke suggestion made by the representative of Malaysia; and in tkese circumstances, since ke suggests that it mfgkt be more convenient to tke Council if it were to defer its next meeting until Tkursday, if no otker member of the Council wiskes to comment on this proposal, 1 skall take it to bethewisk of the members tkat we skould adjourn until Thursday, 5 August, at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 6.16p.m. United Notions publications moy be obtained dishibutcn thrcughcut the world. Write toz Unitsd Nations, Sales agencer &positoires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous 6: Nations Unies, Section rter ci6n