S/PV.1261 Security Council

In accordance with decisions previously taken by the Council. 1 propose to invite the representatives of A@ria. India, Pakistan, Ghana, Zambia. Sierra Leone, Sensgril. Mali. the United Republic of Tanzania, Nigeria, Guinea and Ethiopia +o participate, without vote. in the Council’s discussions. At the iavitatlon of the President, Mr. T. Bouattoura (-%?e*ia). Mr.. G. Parthamrathi (I~&I)~ Mr. Amjad Al1 fpS.kiStd, Mr. A. $Wison-Sackey (Ghaca), Mr. F.M. Mulikita @ambia). Mr. G. B. 0. Collier (Sierra Leone). Mr. A. Ch @enegal). Mr. M. L. Keita (Mali)). Mr. E. P. M~aluko (Utited Republic cf Tmzacia), Mr. D. 0. Ibekwe INigeria), Mr. Achkar Marof(Guicea) acd Mr. T. B. Gebre-Egv (Ethiopia) took the places reserved for them in front of the Comcil table. 2. ‘i’he PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 wish to inform the members of the Council that 1 bave received communications from the representative of Mauritania [S/6932] and the Minister of State for External Affairs of the Gambia [S/6933] requesting that they be allowed to participate. without vote, in the discussion of this item. 1 bave also just heen handed a letter from the representatïve of Jamaica [S/6934], who asked that he be allowed to participate in the debate. If thare are no objections, 1 shall invite the representatives of these countries to part&. 2, withwt vote, in the Council’s discussions. At tfze inVitablOa of the President, Mr. A. B. Miske @fauritmia). Mr. A. B. N’aie (Gambia) and Mr. E. R. Richardson (Janmica) took the places reserved I%X them in front of the Coumil table.

The Council Will continue its consideration of the item appearing on the agenda. 1 give the floor to the representative of Mauritania.

1 should like to thank the members of the Council for havlng kindly allowed us to speak this morning. 5. In any other circumstances. the Mauritanian delegation would bave refrained from speaking. Many higbly authoritative voices bave already made known to the Council Africa’s indignation, its revulsion and its demands. However, the problem under discussion is one of such gravity for us a11 that the Mauritanian Government has deemed it essential to explain to you its own point of view on the subject. 6. The Mauritanian Government is particularly concerned at the situation in Southern Rhodesia and regards it as a serious threat to the peace and security of the African continent. My Government’s 7. 1 must say, witb regret. that notbing bas SO far happened to allay this justifiable concern. Welistened most attentively to tbe statement which tbe representative of tbe United Kingdom has made in the Council. Our first reactions. after hearing him, were disappointment, followed by astonishment, and then revulsion. 8. How cari the Secretary of State for Fore+ AfIalrs of the United Kimzdom bave corne 60 far and!mve kept not ooly Afric; but the whole world in suspense. for SO little? How cari the measures which the whole of Africa has awaited SO impatiently and sometimes SO hopefully. and which bave receivcd 60 much advance publicity. those terrible tbunderbolts with which the criminals in Salisbury bave been tbreatened. how cari they consist merely of a refusai, and a conditional refusaI at that, to buy a few poonds of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar? Did the Secretary of State corne SO far to tel1 us simply: Be calm and patient. What is happening is indeed inexcusable, but time wlll salve everythhg; iu the end (aftertwo. tbree or thlrty yearsit matters little how long) we sball succeed in maklng Ian Smith understand the enormity of tbe bhmder whlch he has committed and he Will return ta the fold quietly. ml almost of hls own free will. 60 *ht the United Kingdom cari set Southern Rhodesia on the road to an acceptable Constitution. 8. That-more or less-is what these most important statements in fact amount to. Let us examine them more closely. Those who bave epoken before me bave smply demonstrated tbe ineffectiveness of the economic measufes announced by London. 1 should simply like to add the followlng observations. 10. Tbere was nothing startling about those measures acd Mr. Smith and bis powerful political acd fimmcial protectors in London and elsewhere were givenplenty of notice to evade the restrictions announced or to pr@pare alternative chsnnels for use in the event of gentie application of some of those restrictions. After a% this is a family matrer. a matter between gentlemen. 11. The representative of the United Kingdom ha6 himself stated chat embargo measures, tobe effective. moSt h@ applied fully and universally-in other words eey must be applied also by such countries as South Afrlca and Portugal-and that, even in these optimum Conditions. WY would affect only one third of Southern Rhades~a~s experts. No me ca0 be made to believe ut Ian Smith wiIl yîeld for SO little. Sauth Africa and P**E=I -MI obvhsly lend Ian Smith ail tbe economic eeistaw3 necessary to nullify th@ eftects of tic P*OPOsed Satdions. What. for exemple. Will prevent South Africa from buylcg Bhodesian cropsandàispos- %X of them later on the world market, chamglng a few PodUgJIeSe colonies were undertaken. which is something that the UnitedKingdom could, but certainlywould net wlsh to do? Eve” if we assume, then, that the United Kingdom has decided to apply serious economic Sanctions, it seems that their effectiveness is largely compromised in advance by the mere fact of the presence of South Africa and of the Portuguese colonies. Nor do 1 think that the Unitrd Kingdom Gwernment expects any legal measures to bave a Salotary effect. It is therefore clear-and nobody has ever been in any doubt on that score-that no measures which do not involve direct compulsion cari put an end to the rebellion in Salisbury. 12. The representative of the United Kingdom has expressed astonishment at theparallelsdrawnbetween the action taken by his Government in British Guiana and Aden and the behaviour of that same Government in Rhodesla. Indeed, there is reason to he astonished, Since the situation in each case is quitedifferent. The only offence committed by MT. Mackawee’s Government was that it sought to satisfy the aspirations of the people, and refused to caver up repressive measures taken against the inhabitants of South Arabia. It did net. however, rebel, and remained withln the framework of colonial legality. although the Will of the PeoPle, eloquently expresse& gave it a much more valid legality. lt was therefore a Government which enjoyed the support of the people, a Government which could not even be criticized for having committed an act of rebellion; yet London didnothesitate to dismiss it, relying on brute force to administer directly what it considers to be a Territory under United Kingdom sovereignty. 13. On the other hand. we bave a régime, the Smith r&ime, that is forcing itself upon a population to which it is entirely alien. a régime whicb. forthermore. is in open rebellion against the authority of the administering Powei; yet the latter is not even planning to restore its flouted authority. to ensure that its law is respected or to prote& the threatened popoiation. The representative of the United Kingdom nevertheless rejects any idea of armed intervention as belng likely, on the‘one hand, to cause incalculable suffering. and, on the other, to delay achievement of tbe desired purpose. We Will later consider the first argument and seek to determine whether the innocent inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia would suffer more from London’s passivity or from energetic intervention which would put an end to their slavery. vention part, plus si raient vention 14. Let us consider the second argument first. We are compelled to state, in the first place, that we are sot in agreement on the purpose which, as was told us, is “to bring home to Mr. Smith . . . the gravity of what they bave done and to cause Southern Rbodesia to return to its allegiance to the British Crown SO tbat Britaio cari then carry out its task . . .fl. 14. nous ne sommes est, M. Rhodésie rieure Royaume-Uni 16. Ivloreover. to cause Southern Rhodes& to retirn “to its allegiance’ in sncb conditions cari only mean a return to the 1961 Constitution. However.wedenounce tbe r&rime established bv tbe United Binedom in %uthe& Rhodes& since -1961 just as mucb as we denounce tbe régime proclaimed at Salisbury a few days ago. As 1 explained to the General Assembly, on 5 November 1965. the r6gime proclaimed by the Salisbury usurpers is a direct andlogicalconsequence of tbe r6gime tnstitutedby the Untted Kingdom Government itself in December 1961. 17. We bave. in fact. reason to beastonished, as may Ian Smith. on bearkz from the lins of allnited Kingdom koreign Sec~etary such remarhs as the followingz “Tlùs illegal act bas been performed in the bope and with tbe intention of establishing a form of Government which would easure that the power to control the future of Southern Rhodesia remains in the hands of a wbite minority comprising only one twentieth of the population. But the Parliament of Britain, to whom alone the rfght togrant independence to Southern Rbodesia belongs. would grant it onlyon terms acceptable to the people of SouthernRhodesia as a who1e.s [S/PV.1257, para. 15.) 18. Astonishment ou our part is justified. for was it not the United Kingdom itself which established that form ofGovenrmentwhicb itnowappeared todenounce? Perbaps there is a nuance in the oonditional tense implied by tbe use of the Word vremainsv; but then who is at fat&? Ian Smith, who bas merely carried tbrwgh to its Iogtcal conclusion a system in which. moreover, he bas cbanged almost nothing except that he bas substitnted the word “independences for the W0l-d %elf-governmentA? or the United Kingdom Government wbich establisbed that system? 19. Aliow me to put s question to tbe disttnguished representatives of the Untted Ktngdom Governmenk do they sincerely believe that the self-government granted to Southern Rbodesia under tbe 1961 Constitution was granted “on terms acceptable tothepeople of Sdhem Rhodesia as a wholev? R the reply 1s in the tiimative. tben 1 do net understand wby the United K@&m Gcwernment should be very harsb towarda Mr. Smith. After all. self-government is merely eue stage on the road to independence and iftbe former is Grand On ~2tiaf2ctm-y terms. why should the latter net foRow on tbe same basis? If the reply ia in the negatfve-as we think is obviously the case-then the 20. Concerning the suffering of millions of innocent people. about whichthe distinguished Foreign Secretary is sheddingratherbelatedtears, 1 shouldlike to remind him that such suffering has alreadi been the fate of these people for years. Without going back to the begiming of the dark days of colonialism. which we would all like to forget. we merely wish to point out that. since 1961, under the racist rfigime established in full legality by the United Kingdom, the Rhodesians bave been the victims of a veritable r&ime of apartheid and terrer in whioh they bave no rights at all and in *vbioh concentration campa, arrests and even summary executions are their daily lot. If we add to tbose physical sufferings the loss of all human digrdty. wbat do tbe people still bave to lose? For a long time now they bave been waging the war that we seek now to spare tbem at tbe cost of the only hope ~~maining to them, the hope of a speedy liberation. 21. That would naturally be a fool’s bargain. The Zimbabwe people now bave nothing to lose; in fact, tbey now bave everything to gain. That is why. oddly enougb, tbe present situation rspresents some degree of progress in comparison witb the previous state of affairs. It has the advantage of laying bare what the scrsen of legltimacy snd British sovereigaty has hithbrta concealed from the world It has the merit of revealing what the real state of &fairs was and still is, namely a r&ime of outright apartheid, hidden until now under the mantle of British respectability. 22. Only the British settlers of Southern Rhode& wwld bave sometbing to lose in a war, if they ever dared to provoke one. Moreover, we csn scarcely be made to bellève tbat these few thoussnd British families which bave settled in a fore@ land and are surrounded by hostile peoples and countriee would for one moment bave oonsidered taking up arms against their motherland and against the powerful Brltish anny. The glorlous army of Iier Britamdc Majm was not afraid to tackle Hitler’s formidable legions, and tbat was. of course, an undeniably glorious page in its history. to which a11 enemies of Nazi racism pay tribute. It has also not feared an occasion to fight hundreds of millionsof subjectpeople in legitimats revoit. The United Kingdom Govermnent bas sometimes not hesitated-thers was the case tbat occurred only two yesrs agotu send its army far afield to crush a rebellion in a country where it bas no le@1 authority, at tbe mere request of the Government concerned. It is dlfficult for us to understand why tlmt Government hesitates to use that ssme army to maintain its legal position in a territory wbich it considers to be under its exclusive sovereignty and in wbich it itselt recognizes tbat it 1s responsible for tbe maintenance of law and order and *As protectien of ail the peuple. Witb such a striklng comparison. and SO flagrant a difference in treatment. 24. But the United Kingdom Government net only dld not threater: the use of force, it also took oare to mn-ce uneq.tivocally that it would net use force. How ch we reeard this otherwise than as a direct. encouragement 61 Ian Smith. sn encouragement whose meaning, we feel, is perfectly ciear. It meant: “Pmatever we say. don? worry; go ahead and declare indepeudence. The United Kingdom has sole responsibility for Rbodesia. Not only Will WL: not intervene nailitarily, we sbaS also net permit anyone else to intervene. Thers will natursllv be cries of indhmatian _~ .~~ and there may perbaps be some sligbt desire for intevention. The United Kingdom itself will bave to ndemn you and to aunounoe certain tneasures to be taken agamst you as a concession to woàd public opinion àna especially in order to salve the conscience of those members of the Commonwealth who would otherwise be tempted to review their relations with the British Commonwealth. But don% worry: no decisive intervention against you will be to1erated.a Such is the meaning of the United JSingdom’s refusa1 ta use force. The United Kingdom Government did net, of course, use tbose words to the rebele, but tbey were clearly imblied by its actions. and tbe rebels understood tbem perfectly just as we did. 25. The United Kingdom Government is pointing to the risk of an interminable war, as an argument against the use of force in 3outhern Rhodesia. However, there cari he such a risk only in the event of a POPU~RS’ uprising having deep mots in tbe indigenous population. Such was thé case-if tbere is any need ta cite exsmplea-in Kenya sech 1s the case in 3outb Arabia at the present t f thia kind ie there, 4 in gouthern Rh re is neitb apow mmy t?@.pa3le of g the Briti army in the open field, nor is tbere anygenuine popdar movement in faveur of the rebelllnn.

“Al1 the conditions for the outbreak of a racial war in the centre of Africa havebeen created.’ This was the view. based on sound reasoning, which was expressed by the representative of the Ivory Ciast 11259th meetinel. and his oninion has heen shared’ and emphasis~d~ by representatives of many African States and States in other parts of the world. The facts which give rise to this danger are the following. 33. First, in aterritoryunderanadministeringPower a white, privileged, racist group, which is clearly a minority-220,000 in a total population of almost 4.5 million-is seeking to proclaim independence. assuming the reins of government and imposing a system having the semblance of legality but which is discriminatory and political in its purpose. 34. Seoondly. more than 4 million human beings, constituting the indigenous African population, bave been left at the mercy of a racist, partisan, powerful and armed minority. 35. Thirdly, the adn?inistering Power condemns the rebellion and denounces it to the United NatiOnS but, not being in a position to impose and m-assume its own authority, immediately decides to apply economic sanctions and asks the Security Council to bave this programme of action applied hy all. 36. In the light of these three facts-now that they bave been put before the Security Council-there are three voices in particular which the Council itself and the world at large wish to hear and to which they must listen. 37. The first is that of the African States which are taking upon themselves the legitimate representation of a sister nonulation forciblv silenced and immobilized. It bas already spoken, and with understandable vehemence, for those States bave heen warning us here in the United Nations for years of vfhat has become today a deplorable reality. Their attitude is expressed in the draft resolution which the representative of the Ivory Coast submitted for OUI consideration. That resolution calls upon the adniinistering Power to use a11 possible means, including force, to crush the rebellion, to suspend tbe 1961 Constitution and to set up immediately a 44. Fourtbly, Uruguay hopes tbat the African States Will reach agreement witb tbe Unit& Kiagdom oonceraing the immediate action to be taken. In tbat eveti. my delegation will unbesitatiagly give its support to tbe draft wbicb may be aubm%,ted. Meanwhile. as far as tbe draft resolution of the United Kingdom is conoerned [S/~IX~],-we have communicated to tbat country% representative sur commenta aad the additions that we propose, wbich take into acoount certain views expreasedinthedraft sponsoreci by tbe African States. 45. Fiftbly. it is our underetaading tbat tbe situation which we are considering calls for tbe application of Chauter VII of the United Nations Charter. However. we must state frankly that we would net be in a position to support a draft call,@g for the use of armed force at this time in order to implement tbe reaolutions of tbe Council. The Charter does net require tbe application of such an extreme measure; what it does. in Article 41, is to create an option. Tbe use of force reouires tbe affirmative vote of tbe five permanent memhers of tbe Couacil and to show tbat tbere is no such unanimity today would be to Weaken tbe position taken against those responsible for tbe provocation. Moreover. we StiH bave faitb in tbe rule of law; my people are dedicated to peace aad recent history haa given us some sad and painful leseons in the matter of sots of armed repression. 46. On the otber baad, we tbisk tbat a genuine and uaiversal economic and fimmcial blockade would str MG Smith’8 eystem sed OU rity rule and eustai ital which Will be compelbd to ds.2 folly in wbich it bad become fnvo . Furthermore. such an economic blockade would not impose bungeer and want on the millions of Africaa inbabitants, for they are accustomed to an austere and sober way of life and they could endure a blockade wbich would strangle tbe privi&!ged minorities. In blockade would prevent the Africaa inbabitants from becoming %annon fcdderw in an armed action. “The Members of tbe United Nations shall foin in affordhg mutuel assistance h-4 carryhg out the measures decided upon by the Security CouuciL’ 48. Slxthly. the Rhodesian rebels bave fhmg the gauntlet of war and defiance in the face of Her Britamdc Majesty-which can hardly be oalled a gentlemmly gesture-aod they bave challenged tbe preseut Labour Govemment of the United Klngdom. That Government has taken up the challenge and thus continues to bear responsibility as the administering Power. It is askiug the United Nations to lend unanimous Support to its repudiation of the rebellion and its resort to economic sanctions. This is loglcal. for the United Klngdom itself cannot require the other states tu apply sanctions agalnst the rebels. 49. The United Kingdom, which could, in the circumstances. bave relieved itself of its obligations, relinquished its mandate or worked outwlththeUnlted Nations au agreement for placing the Territory under the Trusteeship System in accordauce with tbe provisions of Article 77 c of the Charter. is, on the contrary. prepared to honour its obligations. B sou 50. Thls being the case, the United Klngdom does not nef4 any express authorization from either the Council or the Assembly to do what it has to do. It bas had ample experience over the centuries in ensuring respect for its flag. We trust that today it will do SO without delay and without relaxation of effort, for a Population of 4 million has placed itself and is living under the guarantee and honour of the glorious flag Of the United Kiugdom, 4 million human beingS. defenceless and unarmed, threatened by a mluority which has not yet learued the lessons of hlstory and ha8 not opened its eyes to the realities of the contemporaiy world. 50. lement de sécurité sions effet façon qu’il vérance, défense la menace les 51. We trust. then. that the Government of theunited Kingdom-on which the anxious gaze of millions and millions of human belngs 18 aow flxed-knows what it must do to prevent a whlte minority tbat does no honour ta its klld from Sullying an lnsignia and traditions which we bave all respected, whlch we respect now and wlsh always to respect. 52. In c~n~ludiug my statement, I should like tn =seme the rlght to speak again on this question if more than on@ Tesolution is dlsoussed or 1 deem lt appropriate to do so. “NO~ that Mr. Ian Smith, in defiance of the whole world, has illegally seized independence in Rbodesia. 1 wish to inform you that the Government of the Gambia Will not recognize Mr. Smith’s régime sud Will bave no dealings with the rebel Government in Salisbury. “In the oircumstances, the Government of the Gambia endorses the action SO far takeu hy Her Majesty’s Government and hooes that a11 neoessam meàsures Will be taken to restore the rule of law in Rhode& and protect the basio human rights of the African majority. As Mr. Smith’s illegal seisure of power is treasonable and in view of bis racial policies, the Government of the Gambia urges Her Majesty’s Government to apprehend Mr. Smith and bis accomplices, to stop them committing the inhuman crime of racial oppression agalnst the African people of Rhodesia. “The Government of the Gambia reiterates its firm adherence to theprinciple of self-determination sud has no doubt that the British Government Will do a11 in its power to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia as soon as possible.” 55. 1 should liks? to point out that it is the view of my delegation that history has show that sanctions alone bave never proved effective, The position today is that Great Britain has taken immedlate action in imposing sanctions; but what is exercising the mlnds of everybody in the world is how far and how soon these sanctions Will he effective. It is knowa that in Southern Rhodesia, before the outbreak of this illegal seizure of power, the African leaders wera imprisoned, and that a state of emergency was introduced before the declaration. The longer this problem is left unresolved, the more dangerous and desperate willbe the position in which the African major@ there will be placed. 56. The record of the United Kingdom in granting independence to millions of people has been applauded from time to tlme in this very Council. Now that the end of colonlalism is approaching, that reputation is seriously at stske. It is seriously at stake for two reasons: the first is that here in t!ds Council, and in other organs, the United Kingdom Government has opposed any resolution in relation to Southern Rhode& on the grounds thal the United Kingdom Government is the sole administering Power. That being 80. it 1s quite clear that today, whatever the position may be, the 57. 1 shah keep my promise and 1 shaII not prolong this statement. but in conclusion 1 would say this. If for the sake of awhiteminorityof200.000 as agalnst 4 millim Africms the United KIngdom Government faIls to take effective and immediat@ measures to end this crisis. 1 venture to say that it Will not only lose its reputation but lose almost a& if not aII, its friends In the world. As 1 bave said. this is avery serIou@ matter. and everybody has the right to @XpmSB very stmng feelings with regard to thls matter. But there is one thim 1 wouId Iumlore of ihe membsrs of the Cou&l: chat this debat@ should be bmught to a close as scm 88 possible. While the debate is golng on. things are happerhg in Rhodesia. 1 would implore members of the Coumil to endeavour to brlng thls càebate to the earliest possible conclusion with an effective resolution. so that immediate action Will be taken. 58. 1 wiII only say one more word. wInterventionwmilitary interventiou. or armed intervention-is au explosive word. But it should not be ruled out. for sanctions bave proved to be lueffective. and if it is held back until other factors are bmught Into play the position will be more serious thm if military action is taken earlier.

There are no more speakers on my list for this meeting and, with the Council’s permission, 1 propos@ to adjourn the meeting. Before doing 60. however, 1 wish to inform the members of the Couucil that the election of a member of the International Court of Justice. to fil1 the vacancy created by the death of Judge Abdel Hamid Badawl. Will take place, wlth your approval, tomorrow morning at simuItsneous meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council. In accordance with the provisions of the Charter. This -election will take place in accordance with the decisiou adopted hy thq Couacil In its resolution 208 (1965) of 10 August 1965, providlng that the election to fIII the vacsnoy to whioh 1 bave referred should take place during the twentieth session of the General Assembly. 60. With regard to the item b@fore us. 1 understand that informal talks are still actively proceedingamong members of the Comm11 with a view to producing as effectively and speedily as possible a document which we ca” discuss.

The USSR delegation bas no objection, Mr. President, to your proposa1 to consider at OUI: next meeting the matters to which you referred. Before we adjourn, however, 1 should like some clarification on the followingpoint. 63. At the 125lthmeetingof the Council, the Jordanian representative proposed that the Council should hear the representatives of Portugal and the Republic of South Africa in connexion with the question before us. In the light of the special relationship in which those countries stand to this question, an understandingwas reached and you, Mr. President, toldusthatyou would take the necessary steps to follow it up. May 1 ask, Mr. President. whether you oan tel1 us what position Portugal and the Republic of South Africa bave tsken coacerning the Security Council’s invitation to them?

In reply to the USSR representative, 1 am in a position to say that. immediately following the meeting to which he referred, the Secretary-General sent by telegram an invitation to the representatives of South Africa and Portugal asking them to attend this discussion. A few minutes ago, a reply was received from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations [S/6935]. stating in substance that South Africa could not see its way to accepting the invitation to attend the discussions in the Security Council. With regard to Portugal, 1 am informed by the Secretariat that no reply has been received to date. 1 do not hnow whether tbis answers the USSR representative’s question.

Thank you. Mr. President. In oui view, your reply shows how justified is the deep concern expressed here by many representatives of African States that the position of the Republic of South Africa on this matter is only msking it more diffioult to take the action envisaged by the Seourity Council and that the Republic of South Africa, situated as it is in direct proximity to the scene of the tragic events and acttng in criminal collusion wlth the racist r6glme of Southern Rhodesia, can only complicate and aggravate the situation; 66. We should be grateful. Mr. President. ifyouwould in due course also inform the Security Council of the other countrVs position on this matter. Inviewof that

1 th& tlte represeatative of the Soviet Union for bis statement. I shall bear his request very muchin miad aad iaform the Couocil immediately upon receipt of smy reply from the other Govermnent.

My delegation sbares the views that bave just been expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union. We had hoped that the Government of South Africa would participate in our cieliberations SO that it could co-operate with the Semrity Council aad play its part in folfilling its obligations under the Charter. Tbishas nottakenplace, sd it PS mcst unfortunate tbat it bas net.

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