S/PV.1270 Security Council

Next Tuesday, that is. on 21 December 1965. it Will be exactlytwc years since the Cyprus question flared up. and as a result of that event the United Nations bas become again more deeply lnvclved in it. The Security Council. as we kncw, has succeeded in puttll an end tc the fighticg. aad by its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. established the United Nations Force in Cypras. On 26 December next, this Force will bave been In cperaticn for twenty-one months, aad Che Co~ncil is ncw faced with the question whether the Force shculd be once agaic extended. 10. Darlng the pericd which 1 menticned. the Force% presence has undcubtedly had the salutary effect of stcpping the fighting, of preventlng the outbreak of new hostilities, and of brlnglng a large measure of quiet tc the Island. Al1 this is vividly described in the latest report cf the Secretary-General of 10 December 1965. In this sense, one cari say that the United Nations operation in Cyprus has been snccessfu1. 11. Hcwever, in this case. as in similar cases, thcugh the cessation and preventicn of hostillties is a very important success. it is 0nIy ncgative. It is but an essential first step to render possible the solution of the underlying conflict which gave rise to the hostilities. The United Nations task wlIl be fully done only when it has helped to bring about a solution of the underlylng political problem. That is what one might cadi the positive aspect of cur respcnsibility. 12. With regard to this aspect, my delegation is extremely disappclnted to note that in the two years which bave elapsed no prcgress whatsoever has been made tcwards a political solution. There bave been elaborate informa1 negotiations between te parties directly concerned; one UnitedNationsMediater has succeeded another; but a solution is as far away over the horizon as it has ever been. 13. In t& respect, the Secretary-General states the follcwing: “AIl of the causes of the conflict that broke oct in Deoember 1963 persist aad are little, if at ail. diminished . ..” And in parsgraph 211 he 15. There are several such situations in the world, as we a11 know, and my delegation believes that the United Nations should pay more attention than heretofore to solving the underlying problems. Unless we do SO, the United Nations could become a recep taCle for unexploded time bombs, in which we spend a lot of time and energy on keeping the fuses wet, to prevent them from exploding, instead of dismantling the time bombs. 16. Therefore. my delegation believes that the time has corne to make a new and concerted effort to break the politioal deadlock over the Island. The efforts, bath of the General Assembly and of the Security Council should therefore be concentrated on giving new impetus to negotiations between the parties. The First Committee has already approved a resolution~ which recommends that negotiations be contlnued wlth United Nations mediation. 17. We belleve that the Security Council should build on this basis, now that it has to decide as to whether to entend UNFICYP again. My delegation. 1 am bound to admit-and 1 have to say so on behalf of my Government-is in two mlnds about this. On the one hand. it is obvious, from tbe Secretaly- G@neral’s report that if the United Nations Force were to be withdrawn now. that would create a serious danger of a flare-up of fighting in the Island, and perhaps even beyond that. On the other hand, my Government also fears that. if the Force were simply to be continued, no progress at a11 wonld b@ made towards a political solution. My Government flnds it increasingly difficult to justify to Parliament and public opinion its continued voluntary contributions to this operation if no progress is made towards a solution. tions in which they become involved qttlte often require them to lx prolonged, more or less mdefmitely. “The Cyprus operation now tends to conform t0 this pattern.. . . T~US, the questtcn of the United Natiaos peaee-keeplng efforts in Cyprus heglns to assume tbe dimensions of a dilemma for the Organization-indeed, several dilemma~.~ And agaln, in paragraph 214 the fiecretary-General Says: ” . . . The Force has been supp0rted up to nom by the generosity of a relatively small number of Governments. This generosity fmm the same sources cannot be expectecl to continue indefmitely. Some of the donors bave already begun to manlfest reluctance and some bave warned that their contributions in the future may depend upon evldence of an earnest attack on the causes of conflict snd progress towards a solution.* 19. My country would like to rank itself among those mentioned in this last sentence, and there is evidence that a considerable number of the countries maklng military or financial contributions to UNFICYP feel the same way. 20. As far as my Government is concerned, 1 must point out that its contribution in the future Will at any rate bave to be smaller than it bas beea up to now, anù that a decision upon the contribution and ainomit of our future contribution Will depend, to use the Secretary-General% words. upon nevidence of an eamest attack on the causes of the conflmt and progress towards a solutiona. Also. my Government is of the opinion that any future extension of UNFICYP should lx made dependent upon the same CO*dttiO*S. 21. The first. and main, responsiblllty for progress toWards a solution rests on the parties most directly concsrned. They bear a heavy responsibility towards the whoie world, but. in particular. towards those nS.tiOl~S which bave contributed either militsry contingents Or financlal contributions to keep the peace on the Island and render a solution possible. 22. The Members of the Cnited Nations are entitled to ask of the parties that they start negotiations WHhout further delay, that they should with determinatlon strive for a solution rather than imme- &atelY reject evay compromise which does net completely suit their wlshes and tùrthermore that they should refrain from any action that would render a SOlutlOn more difficult. Finally, they should SU~- StSntlally increase their flnancial contributions for 23. My delegation fully realizes tbe financial limitatations and eîonomic difficulties with whlch some of the parties directly concerned are confronted. We should. however. like to point out that their contributions. even if they were considerably lncreased. would still be small oompared to the tremendous sums they are hound to spend at the moment on keeping their military forces in a high state of readiness. 24. My delegation also realizes that the countries concerned are bearing some additional costs. Yet we cannot fail to notice, for instance, that. according to Anncx II of the Secretary-General’s report [S/6954] of 19 November 1965, UNFICYP has, in the twenty-one months of its presence in Cy-prus, spsnt no Iess than $700,000 for Venta1 of premises”. Since the Force is thore at tbe request of the Cyprus Government and in the interests of Cyprus. my delegation wonders whether it is right that the United Nations Force should bave to bear the cost of rental of premises on the Island. 25. In connexion with the sharing of costs, my delegation strongly supports what the Secretary-General has to say in paragraph 215 of his report of 10 December 1965 [5/7001]. wblch reads as follows: *Obviously, the ranks of the contributors should he considerably broadened. There is. to be sure. no legal obligation ou any Member Government to make a voluntary contribution, but since the action was taken by unanimous vote of the Security Council there is a moral obligation on a11 members. particularly on the members of the Security Council itse& and more espeoially on the parties directly concerned.” 26. On the basis of thls very valuable report and the observations contained therein, and the remarks that 1 bave made, 1 shwld like to summarize, as follows. what, in the opinion of my delegation. should be done to achieve the twofold aim of putting UNIFICYP on a sounder financial basis and achieving some progress. at last. towards the solution of the problem. 27. In the first place, we think that the cost of the Unit& Nations Force in Cyprus if possible ought to be reduced. We are happy to note that the Secretary-General, in parigraph 199 of bis report. announced a reductlon of 566 men since July 1965 and a further reduction of approximately 740 officers and men in latter half of January 1966. 28. In the second place, we wish to appeal to the parties directly concerned to make a higher contribution to the cost of maintaining UNFICYP. 30. In the fcurth place, we believe tbat the Seocrity Ccunoil shccld urge the parties directly concerned forthwith tc enter into negotiations with UnitedNaticns mediation with the purpose of finding a rapidsolution. 31. In the Afth place, we shccld like it to be clear that. if tbe Securitv Ccuncil decides to extend tbe statIonicg of tbe United Nations Force in Cyprus for a pericd of three months. it should do SO in te bope tbat dcring that period scfficient progress Will be achieved to justlfy the beginning of a phased withdrawal of UNFICYP. 32. My delegation wculd bave :iked a11 these elements to be incorporhted in a draft rescluticn. We think that several cther members of the Ccuncil wculd also bave liked that tc be done. Hcwever. 1 realize that we are cnd-r pressure of thne, that there has been a lone debate ip the Flrst Committee. and tbat the ne; debate which this might bring ‘abo;t in ibis Cocncil wculd take much time. 33. For these reasons. my dele,@ion has refrained from insisting tbst ail these elements shcud be embcdied in a dratt resolution. and we are therefcre prepared to support a short resolutioit wbich wculd limit itself tc the continuation of UNFICYP. At the same tlme. hcweper. my delegation wishes to make it clear tbat we-and, we bave reason tc believe. several other nations contributing to UNFICYPhcld these views and that ae Will be guided by tbem in fidcre. We believe that if thesr suggestions are carried cv! wholeheartedly by a11 concerned. this wilI provide the best hope that prcgress Will be made tcwards a .clution for the Cyprus question, tcwards an end sf the United Nations operation in Cyprus and towards the re-establishment of peace in the Island of Cyprvs.

1 give the flccr to the re.xesentative of Cyprcs.

ln the first place, 1 wish to thank the Secretary-General for his statement and also take this opportunity to tbank him for the constructive work which is carried on in Cyprcs by UNFICYP. 36. It is really very important to note that, in tbe case of Cyprus. as in other cases. although the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations bave prcved very usefbl and constructive, its peacemaking effort has lagged behind. But there are particular circumstances in Cy-prus which shculd be examined in co.mexion witb this delay in the solution of the prcblem. 37. 1 do net want what 1 am gcing to say to be taken as criticism of any one side. But if one wishes to appraise the situation and 888 what can be dcne. SO that there may be a mcve tcwards a solution of the problem, certain facts must be taken into acccwlt. 40. consiàé~ées ce de médiation de que B son mandat. 41. tionné arorrrès . Communautés~, la probkne pas chypriotes “Turkish Cypriots not in possession of a permit are forbidden to enter the Greek Cypriot sector. “(a) Those who disobey the order with a view to having trade connexions with the Greek Cypriots should pay a E25 fine or should be punlshedwlth imprisonment. u(b) A fine of El Will be imposed on: u(i) Those who converse or enter into any negotiations wlth Greek Cypriots or accompany any stranger into our sector; “(ii) Those who corne in contact with Greek Cypriots for any officia1 work; “(iii) Those who appear before the Greek Cypriot courts.” Whnt they refer to here as Greek Cypriot courts are the courts of the Republic; the Chief Justice is a Turkish Cypriot. The most important court in the capital of Cyprus is presided over by a Turkish Cypriot judge. These are the courts of the Republic. Yet the Turklsh Cypriots are enjoined not to appear. not to obey the courts: and if they do appenr. the legal authorities under which they live Will fine them. “(iv) Those who visit theGre@k Cypriot hospitals.* The Greek Cypriots hospitals are the hospitals of the Republic. Theyare not allowed tovisit the hospitals for an examination or for pharmaceutical supplies. It is this spirit hat is preventing a solution of the prohlem. u(c) A fine of E20 Will be imposed on those who bave any dealings with Greek Cypriots or on those who buy from Greek Cypriots goods whlch they car get from the Turkish Cypriot sector, or even on those who get from Greek Cypriots their supplies of goods which we cari manufacture”-the idea of division. “Similarly should be fined those who allow the importation of such goods into our sector. *(b> A fine of E25 or a severe punishment and on@ month’s imprisonment-illegal imprisonment, of course. but still. imprisonmznt carried out by the Turkish Cypriot leadership-“or whipping should be imposed on those who enter the Greek Cypriot sector for the following purposes: l’(i) For a promenade”-even if they enter for a walk; “(ii) For friendly association withGreek cypriots; “(iii) For amusement; and 45. This terrorist orgsnization bclds sway ia the enclaves. Alld tbose -nlurkïSh 6ypricts who are in the enclaves are in the power af these Twkish terrcrist cr~~izaticns. But theti netvmrk entends @“@PI beyamd tic er&ves into ail parts of cypms SO âs to prevent them maintaining norrd relatims witb the Greek Cypriots. a’he document from wlùch 1 read applles to the enclaves but is also intended to apply outside the enclaves to thcse wbc condu& amy dealings or miGntain s.ny friendly relations. 46. In tbese eircumstmce~. how cm vfe evct any impmiement in tbe relations between Greek and Turkcish Cypriots? They are fcrhidden to bave any gccd relations with tbeir Greek compatriots. This is crie ss~ect. 47. The other aspect, a very imPortaut cne, is the military separalion by enclaves. This requirrs a certain amout of exp&nation. I am Sony 1 bave to take up a little of your time, but 1 think it is very important tc deal witb tbis point in order to help the Greek and Turkish elements in Cyprus to get togetber. I sayagaintbisisnot intendedas a criticism. but ratber tc improve the sihmticn, if we really want a solution to tbe problem. The solution of the pmblem will start in Cyprus witb tbe peaple getting twther. understamhg that W-y bave comxncm intereste which are more important thon the differences wbich are wh~~~upand~tificiallycreated. 48. Thus 1 bave to refer to the matter of enclaves. In tbese enclaves. apart frcm tbe figbters-1 sball cat taueh upcn tbat aspect. but leave it as it isthere is the population fcund in these enclaves. They are called refugees, and amcng the refugees there are, of course. a number who are real refu- @es; tbey Ieft tbeir homes which were in the area where tbe figbting was going on. Those refugees bave gcne into the enclaves. But there are thcusands of Cther sc-called “refuoeesn wbo bave been fcrciblv removed from their villages where they lived in peace and hsrmcny with the Greeks, where there was no trcuble whatsoever: they were remcved for other reascns, to promcte the concept of partition by getting them together against their Will. That this is truc cari be seen from the fact that ahnost daily they escape and try to go back to their villages and they are fcllcwed aod killed or kidnapped. In spite of this Wey are SO dissatisfied with this fcrced separation imposed upon them tbat they risk their lives and flee from the enclaves. It is estimated that the number whc bave already escaped in this way exceeds 500. 50. There are many such examples, but 1 quote this because it is the most recent case. It is intended to show net only the conditions that prevail in the Turkish enclaves, where terrorism is rife, but also hcw we oan cveroome this prcblem of fcrced Separatien and lmposed hatred, when the people do not hate but they are fcrced to hate and to be separate. 51. 1 do not want tc elaborate on these matters, but it is a prcblem for the Security Council and for the UNFICYP to consider. Thousands of Turkish- Cypriots who are ncw under the threat of violence and torture from their masters, the terrorists. want to cc-cperate and find a solution to their problem, but they realize that they bave beccme the pawns of cutside politics and cannct find any peace Or safety. Hcw cari we get them tc work tcgether SO that we can find a solution? We do not want them ta find the solution themselves. We want them to live normal lives. We want them to return to ncrmality. net tc be frightened of buying in a Greek shcp Or of talking in a friendly way. They are cunished if thev talk in a friendlv wav. if thev Akk at a11 it musi be in an angry way, or nef at all. - 52. ’ It is therefcre understandable why the Secretary- General. in his previous report, said that it was S matter of policy for the Turkish-Cypriot leadership net to allow for imprcvements in the relations between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus. But, of course. it is not stated in tho report that they go to the extremes of terrorism and killing to attain that purpose. 53. There is anotber aspect, that is the aspect of the human rights of the Turkish-Cypricts who are threatened by the Turkish terrorists. There can be no dcubt that these facts are truc and they CBX be verlfied by GNFICYP, which is well informed abcut these matters. 54. 1 think consideration will bave to be given tc what should be done to help prote& the human rightS of the Turkish-Cypricts who are not willing to go on fighting, or to be the tools of cutside policies but who want to resume normal lives and go back to their villages and live as normal pecple. Thcugh many are killed, many still escape Snd that shows hcw much they do want to esoape. In the circumstances, On this occasion. 1 must emphasize the 55. That is tbe crux of the question. That is the trouble which does not present a solution to the Cyprus problem. If we get over this difficulty, if Tnrkey really abandons the concept of partition, as an objective or goal, then there will be no problem and Cyprus Will iimction witb a11 possible safeguards and guarantees to the Turkish minority. 56. 1 do not say that any side is Perfect. but I say that the Govemment of Cyprus has done a great deal toxvards understanding and co-operation. 57. First. they hwe dismantled unilaterally. It was a proposai made by UNFICYP that both sides should dismantle. at least in certain areas. andthengradually continue to dismantle in others. The appeal was made to both the Government and the Turkish rebel sides. The Turkish rebel side refused. or, to use another terni-to avoid offense to the representative of Turkey by using the word “rebela-the Turkish Cypriot leadership refused. Yet the Government did dismantle unilateially. at first. Of course they could not proceed because the dismantlingwas opposed. It was opposed because it was a step toward understanding: it was a step toward reconciliation. 56. Th@ second step was the offer to rebuild the houses of the Turkish Cypriots. to rehabilitate them and help them. This was started, and in certain Cases it was completed. but again there was opposition to those steps from the Turkish Cypriot leadership and from the Turkish Government. They argued that although they inight help the Turkish Cypriots t0 reconStrtict their lives, such steps would militate against the very concept of partition, which fostered batred and enmity and suited the purposes of the leaders. The rehuilding could therefore not continu@ because everyone became frightened of the terrorists, 60. That was the third important move towards reconciliation. agreement and co-operation which would assist in reaching a solution. Again the reactio” of the Turkish Government was vehemently opposed. There was no intention of imposing the provisions of that Declaration; it was intended as a, demonstration of goodwill and good faith, as a reassurance to a11 citisens. Of course, the other side could bave opposed this move on any reasonable grounds it could find, but its unreasoning opposition clearly showed a” unco-operative attitude toward the solution of the problem. If, on the other hand, the opposition was meant as a refusa1 to accept anything other tha” the rights existing under the so-called Zurich and London Agreements, it was most unrealistic. 61. Those conditions bave led to the trouble and the fighting. Those were unbalanced. unjust, discriminatory and divisive. They bave led to the trouble in cyprus. and if we were to revert to them we would complete the vicious circle and go back again to that trouble. Therefore, a solution must be fou:& 62. The Foreign Minister of Turkey said in the First Committee3/ that they do not say for a moment that they are not ope” to a revlsion or alteration of the agreements. Eve” if they say, whatever the position of the Government may be, that they intend to give this advlce to the Turks in Cyprus it is a constructive step towards the solution of the problem. A”d tbis was opposed. 63. This is the position in Cyprus. In the First Committee we adopted a draft resolution which we hope Will prove of great assistance in the solution of the problem, because it is intended to eliminate the ten- 65. If tkse trieks continue, tension Will be bullt up in Cyprus. The terrwists are encouraged in violence, and otbers are frightened-fear is net a good ccunsellor-and tberefore we bave trouble in Cyprus. Tbat is why we insisted on a resolution which would csll upon ail States to refrain fmm the use of force or intervention in Cyprus. Such a resolution wuld help towards a solution of the problem in a calm ntmosp4ere, in which there would b@ no threats of outside intervention, full protection of the rigbts of mloorities and at the same time good relations behveen the tw sides. If we cari achieve these conditions, 1 think we shall move towards a solution of tbe pmblem. And it is tirne tbat we do mov@+ towards a solution. UNFICYP cannot stay forever. 66. I agree witb wbat the representative of the Netherlands said yesterday. We cannot constantly bave ao artificial situation in Cyprus; w@ bave to adopt a more constructive attitud@. Bath sides must find a w*y to salve tbeir differences, and consultations between the two sides in Cyprus is necessary in orde to reach agreement on the position and the rigbts of the Turkish minority. surely all this is impDrtant and neeessary. But consultations cannot lx beld if the Turkish Cypriot side ls forbidden even to qek to a Greek, ifthe ordlnary’rurkon the streets is forbidden, whipped, punished, f&d and terroriaed if he merely speaks to a Greek. Tels is net th@ spirit in whlch we cari find a SO~Ulion. That is why 1 hope tbat the Turlclsh Goipernment arill net fall t0 understand chat this attitude, which is wrhaps due to wrong counsel fmm tb@ Turklsh Cmriots. is obvlously wrcng. That is fundamental to tbe solution of the pmblem. I ao net mention tbls as a criticism, but only as a way of contrib&lag towards a solution, and 1 hope it Will be understood in this sense.

1 call on the representatipe of Turkey.

In the first place, 1 slvxld like to express, on my own behalf, and that of my delegation and Government, oui sincere thanks to the -%m@tary-G@neral, and ta hls immedlate collahorabrs. for their usud constructive work and patient endeavour In OMer to maintain the fruitfuI work of 69. We bave had five long days of debate, in the First Committee, where the substance of the question of Cyprus has been discussed in minute detail. 1 would bave thought, therefore, that the Cou&l would bave been spared a long harangue, agnin, on the subject of the views of one of the parties with regard to the possible solution and to what is going on in Cyprus today, and what should be changed, and how we should go about changing it. Nevertheless, we bave had it; but 1 shall not follow that example. I sball be as brief as 1 cari. 1 shall merely try to answer some of the usual insinuations and aIlegations sud falsifications which Ambassador Rossides has indulged in. 70. Mr. Rossides has tried to place the cause for the continuation of We unsettled conditions in Cyprus on the lack of will on the part of the Turkish community to improve relations. Weil, this ca” be parapbrased as a lack of Will on the part of the Turkish community to submit to the unlawful authority of the Greek-Cypriot administration. 1 am afraid that it would be too much to exnect that the Turkish neoole L . of Cyprus should, at this stage-when they bave been fighting for nearly two years to maintain tbeir constitutional rights-now, gradually, give up what they bave been fiibting for, ami fall under the authority of the illegal Greek-Cypriot administration. They bave been characterised by Ambassador Rossides as terrorist organisations. Weil, 1 submit tbat there is only on@ terrorist organisation in Cyprus. and that is the IeadershipoftheGreek-Cypriot community. 71. The Turks are, as 1 bave said, fighting for their rights. There is civil war going on in Cyprus. Ambassador Rossides read from a document which purported to levy fines on people who consorted with the Greek Cypriots, or on those who traded with them. Well, naturally, Cyprus is not a b@d of roses: there is a civil war poing on there. Perbaps there is no actual fighting today, but it is liable to erupt at any time. Under civil war conditions-as under conditions of international war-there are such things as penalties for trading with tbe enemy. In everv communitv which is fhrhtine: for its existence, theré are tbose weaklings who Qomeîimes choose te cours@ of co-operating witb tbe enemy. There are measures taken against them; there must b@ measures taken against them in Cyprus-but 1 do not know of such measures. We bave to rely On 72. I shall net go into a discussion of the final solution whicb the Greek-Cypriot delegation envisages for Cyprus. Once again, imputations bave been made about intentions to partition the Island. Nothing could b-e furtber fmm our intentions. We are sincerely devoted to tbe independence of Cyprus. And yet there is one major obstacle to a peaceful solution of tbe Cypms problxn, and tbat is the continued insistace of the Greek-Cypriot régime in Cyprx on enosis. 73. Those members who were present during the debate in the First Commit&@ must bave noticed that a question was pointedly asked by my Foreign Minister, addressed to the Foreign Minister of Cyprus. He snid: “Watld tbe Foreign Minister of Cyprus solernnlg declrre that they bave giv@n up their ambition for enosis? If he does SO, 1 azn willing to declare solernnly that we bave forever given up partition.“!/ The absence of a reply to that question-although it was repeated several times-is elcquent. SO long as they persist in this ambition, in this nefarious scheme, in this fraudulent endeavour to get the hacking of the Gewxal Assembly of the United Nations and of the Security Council to help them bring about this nnnexation, there cari be no solution. AH of us who are interested in cutting the work and the time of the peace-keeping force in Cyprus to a minimum should try to bring oui Greek- Cypriot friends @round to a realistic understanding of tbis position. They must give up the idea of territorial expansionism. They must realize that the only way that a solution cari be found for Cyprus is through mediation, as the Secretary-General SO aptly observed. 74. Mention VAS made once again of the fairous Declaration of Intent and Memorandum. Our views on that declaration bave also been made !mown. 1 sball net go into them. As far as the Turkish community in Cyprus is concerned, and as far as my Government is concerned. it bas as much literarv value as a piece of poetry written by a member of the Greek-Cypriot administration. How canon@ declare one’s intention to give certain rights to people who are net under one’s authority? They do net wnt such rights: they want their own rights-the ones they bave now, tbe ones they bave been fighting for for two years. and for which thev intend to continue to fight. &isting on these -rights merely aggravates the question, and insisting that the United Nations should do something about pmclaiming these rights merely puts a solution farther and farther off. ‘76. We bave declared, time and time again, that we respect tbe institution of mediation as enunciated in resolution 186 (1964) of the Security Council, It is OUI only hope. The mediation effort should be reactivated, reanimated. We should get to work. 1 fullv understand the imnatience of the reoresentative of the Netherlands &d his Government, and of those Governments which are contrihlting in maripower and money to the maintenance of the force. But we must be realistic. We bave declared our position with regard to the present mediation effort. 1 need not elaborate on that subject. Our views cannot be changed. They will net be changed. Tberefore, we must proceed to tbe next step. We must prooeed to te next step as soon as possible. Any insistence on maintaining the present status of the mediation effort is unrealistic-not only is it unrealistic, but it is harmful, also, because, in effect, it shuts the door on mediation. 77. SO, 1 plead with the Security Councll and wlth the Secretary-General to proceed with the mediation effort in thls realistic light.

1 cal1 upon the representative of Greece.

Mr. President, the Government of Greece Nly appreciates the considerations which bave prompted the Secretary- General to recommend to the Security Council an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-lieeping Force in Cyprus. UNFICYP is doing a Splendid on-the-spot job. Its continued presence is obviously still necessary. even indispensable, in the light of the Secretary-General% report. 80. We wish to reiterate our gratitude to the countries which bave sogenerouslycontributedcontingents and financial and logistic support to the FOrCe; to the Secretary-General and his assistants, who direct and sustain the peace-heeping operation; to the able commander of the Force; to the Secretary-General% Persona1 Representative ln Cyprus, Mr. Bernardes; to the officers and men of the various national contingents. 91. We join the Secretary-General in his appeal that a11 the Members of the United Nations join the ranks of the contributors to this operation, whloh has been unanirnously approved by the Security Council. We feel entitled to make such an appeal since we have consistently cocrributed to UNFICYP at a11 stages to the limit of our resources. Tbe figures contained in the Secretazy-General’s report of 19 November [S/6954] provlde full evidence of 82. ffowever. 1 must sincerely deplore the terms just used by Eralp. wben he callsd tbe Greeks and Turks in prus enemies wbo must figbt eaob other and refrain from any normal huma” cantacts. Such statements are certainly net intended to help towards a solution in Cyprus. In fact, tbey refleot the attitude of the Turkish Government wblch goes 0”t of its way to stimulate the bostility of tbe Turks against the caeeks. 83. ?Jr. RAMANI (M&aysia): 1 believe tbat the draft resolutio&/ wbich bas been intmduced by tbe six “on-permanent members of the Council is already before nxmbers. It does net require a great deal of explanatior:. As far as passible, its 1ang”age and expressions were takeo, Yi’Ord for word, from earlier resolutions. It keeps clear of “nnecessary controversies and it faces “r to the urgent and immediate task of bavlng to extend the Unlted Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. and tbat is sll that it proposes to dQ. 84. 1 fînd tbat, by an unfortunate en-or of mine, we bad omitted mention in operative peragrapb 1 of one of tbe other resolutioas that sbould bave found a place tbere. Tbe la& line cf tbat parngraph should read O.. . and tbe further resolutions of arch, 15 June and 10 August 1964”. 1 apologlze for the omission. 85. Witb regard to operative paragraph 2, it is in the standard form except for tbe dates, but it contains a significant addition in tbe phrase following tbe word ‘extends”: “Extends once again tbe stationinp in Cyprw of tbe United Nations Peafe-keeplng Force.. .n. 66. Mr. President, it was felt by nearly a~ of us tbat lt was time Rie called to tbe attention of the Parties concerned the fact tbat tbey sbwld net COI~- tinue t0 feel tbat tbe Security Council Will protide them tith the necessary for00 t0 ieab-2 +he arene Cl@a~- for them to go on pursuing their co”flicts 87. One other point witb regardto that. The Secretary- General, in the concluding words of his report, had in mind tbat he would orefer a neriad of six months rather than a shorter period, but after consultation it was felt tbat, in the prevailing context of events in Cyprus as reflected in the Secretary- Ceneral’s report, anevenlongerperiodwouldprobably give rise to more complacency, and a sense of urgenoy that they should get together and settle tbe problem with whatever meaos may be available to them could onlv be emnhasized bv maktnz tbe period shorter than six months. Tbai is wbi the period referred to is now three months. 88. Operative paragraph 3 is new, and was taken word for word from the statement that WRS just made at the opening of the meeting this afternoon by te Secretary-General. It is intended ta impress upon the parties concerned the necessity and urgency that they should make an earnest, persistent and intensified effort. The concluding chapter of the latest report makes it plain that it is the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus that renders it more difficult, rather than casier, for the parties to get together, and this is what the Secretary- General states in his report. “The Force is needed in Cyprus. It may be no exaggeration to say that it has become almost indispensable for the time being. On the other hand, it would seem clear that it cannot be kept there indefinitely; possibly not even for very much lonwr. Financial strinaencies alone would nrobablv dictate this, althoughthere are other consideratiens whioh would make such a prolongation undesirable . . .I* [S/7001, para. 2071. 89. This is a passage to which 1 would like to cal1 the attention of members of the Council, one of the latter considerations being that over-reliance on the United Nations to prevent recourse to armed force, and even to help maintain the status quo, could be a factor in reducing the sense of urgency of the contending parties about seeklng solutions to the underlying differences which caused the esuption of violence in the first nlace. It is entirely that sentiment that motivated nearly a11 of those whom I consulted to make the period shorter rather than longer. 90. 1 do not wish to say anything further, except that, as 1 indicated, one of the purposes of a11 of us who co-sponsored the draft resolution was to keep the matter clear of controversy and not indulge in further polemics at this stage. It is notorious that we bave had sixteen days, including some nights, of debating thls problem of Cyprus in the Pirsl 98. At this stage, 1 wish to make the following statement. We note and welcome the clear report of the Secretary-General, and we bave also taken note of the serious and impressive statement which the Secretary-General made to us at the begfnning of this meeting. We share with other members of this Council the bishest admiration for themaenificent work which has -E@@n dom?, with such admirable persistence and patience and skill, by the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. We recognize the clear need for the continuation of this Force. We accept that a reduction in the sise of the Force cari be made, as suggested by the Secretary-General. We consider that the mandate should be renewed for a period of three months-if that is the pericd generally agreed by the parties chiefly concerned. 1 might add that we would bave been prepared to accept a periad of six months, if that wns the general wish, and, indeed. we se@ some arguments for the longer period, arguments it is not necessary to elaborate now. We shall certainly accept the wish of the majority in this respect. We are willing to continue to provide our contingent at its prenent strength, on the same conditions, if that is desired. We Will maintain our voluntary contribution to the expenses of the Force at $1 million for three months. We stronelv believe that the Secretarv-General should be relievëd of the burden of havfngto a”ppea1 repeatedly for further voluntary contributions and that the financing of the United Nations Force should be placed on an assured basis. SS. We express the urgent hop@ that those closely concerned, and the membership of the United Nations -particularly those that have not SO far borne a reasonable share of the casts-will join together to wipe out the existing deficit and put the future financing of the Force on a firm footing. 100. Finaliy. it is perhaps unnecessary to add to the wishes of a11 the other members of this Council an appeal that the extension of the mandate should be on the understanding that strenuous efforts Will be continued to achieve a political settlement and that these efforts Will be pursued with increased urgency. We agree with what has been said, particularly by the representative of Malaysia and the representative of the Netherlands. We agree that we must a11 bave an overwhelming sense of urgency. That sens@ of urgency cari only be increased by the statements that we bave heard this evening. 101. We attach the greatest importance tothe recommendations which the Secretary-General hds made to us, and we shall be glad to support the draft resolution which has been put forward by the representative of Malaysia this evening. Commission ce d&at, de Famagouste. lmbilet& cents la cette fait probKme.e en detail Permettes-moi, ce la Commission Ualted Nations Members. Serious as the iinancial ~roblem is. 1 do net tkink that we wculd be wise to deIay a decisim cnafurtk@rerdensionof tbe Force. deficit, provided su& contributions are also received frcm a substantial ncmber of other States. The Unit& States Will alsa continue its financiai support of tbe United Nations operation in Cyprus if the “The world comnmnity is entitled to expect that wben a dispute is brought before the United Nations and the United Nations acts to keep that dispute witbln bounds”-and to oromote a climate oonducive to negotiations-“the parties involved Will feel an obligation to bring the dispute promptly to a close”.!/ 105. It was almost a year ago that our representative said tbat the time for sterile recrimination and for clinglng to rigid positions has passed. Theparties owe it to the world community and to tbose who bave actively supported the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations to be about the work of solving the dispute. I repeat that advice here today with the Jtmost seriousness. An accommodation does not require compromise of principle. What is requlred, and what appears to date to bave been lacking, is a sense of urgency and a Will to conciliation. 106. The Secretary-General’s report underscores the absence of such a Will. It is the dutv of this Council to carry home to tbe parties the message tbat the United Nations expects them to move forwards a resolution of their differences and to do SO with a11 dispatch. 10’7. In this connexion, my delegation looks with faveur on the constructive appeal to the parties, made by our colleagues the representative of the Netherlands and the representative of Malaysia, to enter into negotiations looking to an early solution of the dispute, and requests the Secretary- General to give every assistance in f:xiitating such negotiations and to reactivate the mediation effort which has been in abeyance these past several months. 108. We recogniae that the role of the third man in a dispute as complex and deeply rooted as that witb which we are dealing is an unenviable one, and we pay tribute to the dedication with which the late Ambassador Tuomioja and his successor Mr. Gala Plaza pursued their efforts. 109. A resumption of the mediation effort need net, in our view. exclude direct diplomatie contact among the parties concerned. What is needed, as 1 emphasiaed earlier, is a breaking of the ice, the stimulation of a disposition by the parties to look for arees on which agreement may be possible, and progressively to narrow the differences until tbe shape of a settlement becomes apparent. 110. My delegation has an open mind on the question of whether the United Nations force should be extended for three montbs. as stated in the draft resolution just circulated, or for six months, as suggested in the Secretary-General’s report. We understand and 111. We note that the Secretary-General, in his report, refers ta the danger that an over-reliance by the parties on the United Nations to prevent resort to armed force and to maintain the status quo may reduce tbe sense of urgency felt by the parties in coming realistically to grips with the Unaerlylng political issues and endeavourlng to resolve them. i12: Xy delegation weLcomes the intention of the Seemtmy-General to make a further tut of 740 men in the stm of WNFICYP. We Welcome this annouacernent, particularly in tiew of the acute deficit in UNFICYP financing. We note tbat. in the judgement of tbe Force Commander. such a reduction cari safeIy be made witbout impsiring the effectivemess of tbe Force or changing its mandate. 1 hope that the Secretary-General Ml1 continue to keep the question of UNFICYP’s strength under review. with a tiew to furtber reductions as they may become possible. 113. TO conclude, tbe United States supports the extension of tbe Wnited Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus ami appeals tc ail States Members to contribute to the maintenance of that force. \?‘e MI1 also support a clear call upon the parties concerned ta wcogaize their responsibility to bring thls dispute to a peaceful end. In the light of thls commitment of our Government, we shall support the draft resolution. Totbis end we urge the Secretary- General. in consultation with the parties. to reaotiwte the efforts. For all too long Cyprus has been au Island of crisis. The issues in contention eau be resolved peacefully; they must be resolvedpeacefully. 114. liIr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): 1 do not intend to speak on tbe subject at this late heur. 1 merely want to make one observation with reference to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution sponsored by my delegation and five others. We are trying to arrive at a non-coutroversial te& one that is acceptable to a11 members around this table. 115. In operative paragraph 3 we bave used a certain phrase which might be made clearer if taken from tbe text of the Secruity Council resolution 186 (1964). 1 am referring to the words “a peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus”. Operative paragraph 7 of Security Couucil resolution 186 (1964) refers to “a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement”. To awid ûny misinterpretation in the future and P~O~UCE a non-controversial draft resolution in this Coumil, I would suggest-and 1 bave consulted many Of my colleagues though 1 did not bave time to consuit them all-that if at all Possible we use the same Pbaso in cperative paragraph 3 of the draft resolutien before us. It would then read: “Calls upon the parties directly concerned to make an earnest, persistent and intenslfied effort I hope thls Will be acceptable to a11 my colleagues around this table.

1 should like to begln by thanking the Secretary-General and his colleagues, hoth on the Island and at Headquarters, for the dewted. dedicated and excellent work whlch they are doing. and for the recent report which enables us to evaluate the present situation. 117. The fact that Bolivla is a sponsor of the draft resolution whlch we bave before us and which refers exclusively to the need to eutend-in accordance with the Secretary-General% suggestion-the &y of the United Nations Force in Cyprus shows that we are in complete agreement wlth its worùing. 118. I should also llke to refer to the suggestion made a moment agc by the representative of Jordan to the effect that we might amend operative paragraph 3 to include some words from the original text of resolution 186 (1964). 1 agree with thls amendment. 119. At the beglnning of this meeting, the Secretary- General said a few words whioh shed licht onthis problem. Two worda bave patiicularly impressed me-the words he used to describe the truc nature of peace-keeping operations. He said they were emergency actions. This means that they are measures and operations adopted by the United Nations through its competent organs to maintain world peace when that aeace is threatened bv excentional circumstances at any glven moment. ” _ 120. This clarification is very important because the fact that the Security Council has pericdically to extend the mandate of the Force in Cyprus is turning this peace-keeping operation into a kind of lona-terni situation which is neither acceotahle ta the-Security Cou&l nor consistent vdth the spirit of the United Nations Charter. 121. The reply to threats of war or of conflict cannot be a permanent armed peace which is very ccstly for those countries which contribute men and money and costly too, in time and money, for the Unlted Nations whlch has been spending endless heurs of discussion on this matter in various organs for years. 12.2. None of these circumstances cari be tolerated in whatever form indefinitely. Obvlcusly a11 the parties involved in this lamentable conflict must resolutelv face un once and for a11 to their dutv to negotcate seriously and urgentiy SO tbat a fi& solution may be found to this problem of Cyprus, thus preventing it from becoming a heavy continuing burden on the Unlted Nations. 123. On prevlous occasions we expressedour Government% views on the details cf the problem. Wbat is l24. menticamer causee la Force paix la sonune loyers accueillera pas qu’ii 125. Mr. FEDQRENKO (Union of Soviet Sccialist Republics) ~~~~a6~ from Rnsslan): The Security Cmmcll is today again considering tbe question of C~FINS in cmmexica-s with tbe report by theSecretsry- General cm 6he Wnlted Na6Cm.s Operation in Cyprus for tbe period 11 June to 6 December 1965 [S/7001]. ruaà 6he appmac of tbe earlier mandate for this operatio in resdution 206 (1965) of 15 June 1965. 125. listes sécurité Chypre l’Gp&ation du 11 juin et parce définie va bientôt 126. Tbus. 3s tbe mnndste of I’nited Nations Force is coming to an end. 6be Securi& Council bas to take a aetv decisian. 126. 2 Chypre appel? 127. et oonfirmer question croyons demeure les de correspondant numéro 127. Altbougb tbe Soviet delega6ion considers it necessary 60 recall ami reaffirm 6he well-knom position of tbe Soviet Union on tbe Cyprus question; w-e see no mc?d to set out oui attitude in detatl. siwe it remains uuchanged. The position of 6beSoviet Union on 6his question bas been expressed, in particuhr, in th@ replies of the klinister for Foreign Affairs of tbe USSR, Mr. Gromyko, to questions put 60 bim by tbe correspondent of the newspaper Izvestia on 21 Js.nuary 1965. 128. Tbe Soviet Union bas consistently advocated a peaceful solu6ton of the Cyprus question based on respect for tbe sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the safeguarding of Es iudepeudenoe sud security, an indispensable condition for such a solution being tbs Wlxirawal of all foreign troops from its territory and the elimination of foreigu militsry bases on the Island. 128. ment respect de Chypre, sdcurité les liquidation 129. As is well known, the Soviet Union was able 60 agrae 6c 6be dispatch of the United Nations Force 60 Cypnrs caly because the Government of Cyp~s bad given its consent sud because tbe functions of tbs Force in Cyprus and the conditions for financing it viere clearly defined in the Seourity Council resolution 186 (1964). 129. accepter ment son assentiment et son financement la résolution 130. The Soviet Union was guided by the same oonsiderations whenever the question of extending the United Nations Force arose. chaque 131. The report by tbe Secretary-General contnins a recommendation that the Uuited Nations Force in 132. It is a matter of scme interest that at the present meeting of the Council a number of members, and in partioular the representative of Bolivia, bave laid great emphasis on the widely-felt concern that the decision, dictated by an emergency situation, to send a United Nations Force to Cvnrus has taken on a chronic and almost permanent ch%acter. 133. In this connexion, we should like to draw attention to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution submitted jointly by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan. Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. That paragraph cslls upon the parties directly concerned to. make an earnest, persistent and intensified effort to achieve a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem of Cyprus, in accordance with resolution 166 (1964) and the United Nations Charter.

1 do net wlsh to speak on the substance of the question. For several days now we bave done nothing but discuss thls problem. We bave spoken of it at Ienath and. as far as 1 am concerned. 1 bave expressed my peint of vlew 60 many times on the substance of tbe problem in the First Committee that 1 hâve nothing more to say and nothingmore to add. 1 would merely like to make one comment. 135. We bave introduced a draft resolution which is co-sponsored by six non-permanent members. I believe that, in principle, since we are CO-sponsors of tbis draft resolution. we do net bave the rlght to submit an ameadmeut to our own draft. BÜt 1 bave noted that an amendment bas been submitted to operative paragraph 3 and tbe concern that bas been expressed is very honourable. Our colleague from Jordan has said that this amendment was being submitted in order to reproduce the wording of operative paragraph ‘7 of resolution 136 (1964) in the interest of avoiding controversy. However. Mr. President. if you had allowed your attention to wander, you would bave noticed that there was a slight reaction arouud the table which showed that the oontroversy which it is hoped to avoid may well not be avoided. I believe that we should nip any controversy in the bud by reprcduoing the wording of operative paragraph 7 of tbe resolution mentioned by ouf: colleague from Jordan. That paragraph reads as follows: I(. . . promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus. in accordsnce with the Charter of the United Nattons.. .“. YoU Will reoall. that this phrase was inclucied in that resolution at the time in order tc end a con- TalIs won the parties concerned to make an earnest, persistent and intensified effort to achieoe a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confrontmg Cyprus, in accordarme vi& the Chuter of the United Nations”. If you consider tlmi th@ controversy migbt continue. 1 sec TIC reasan why we sbouId net add the followiug words to the sentence: “Having in mind the wellbeing of the people of Cyprus as a whole and tbe preservation of international p@ac@ and security.” 136. 1 8x11 suie. as P just said. that the sentence and eaeh of the wcrds which were used ber@ at the time were used deliberately. We must use them again since that wording led to tbe adoption of tlm resalution of 4 Ma~ch 1964; 1 am certain that they will again pave the way for the adoption wlthout any difficultg of the draft resolution. 137. The PRESIDEW Before we deal with the draft resolution before us. I ,Iive the floor to the representstbe of Cyppus. wlm wishes to speak in exercise of tlle rigl& of rep1y. 138. Mr. RO%%DES (Cypius): Before 1 speak on the draft resolution which is before the Council. and on certain matters related ta it and to UNFICYP in Cyprus. 1 should like to say a few words in reply to tbe comment which 1 heard made by the represenkative of Turkey-to one or more members of the Council-to the effect that tbis matter bas been d@alt wlth in tbe First Committee and that. therefore. it is ummcessary to say anything fnrther here. 139. Wth all due respect, 1 wlsh to point out that the matters which 1 brought ont here. in my statement. were net brought ont in the First Committee because they had notbing to do with what was said in that Committee. Aere we must deal with the necessity for finding a solution to the problem. so that there shall net b@ an indefinite continuation of UNFICYP in Cyprus. XVe bave heard from all sides that there must be a solution. We bave heard from aII sides that it is so sad tbat there bas been no progress towards solution. 140. However, it is one tldng to deplore a situation. It is quite anotlxx thlng-a very important thingto look at the causes of a situation. It is necessary to sec what the causes of the stalemate in Cyprns are. Otherwlse. nothing we do cari b@ constructive. It wonld b@ Iike calling in a doctor who says: “Oh, well. thls patient has been sick for two years or more, and 1 cannot understand why this illness continues for such a long tirne.” 1 thought it was my duty to bring to the notice of this Council the causes for the lack of improvement in the relations. 1 am very grateful to the representative of Turkey for h@lping me, and supporting me. when he pointed out that in hls Government’s view. it is proper that 141. Then the representative of Turkey refused to admit that there is a terrorist organization. That there bas been a terrorist organlzatian in Cyprus for the last ten years, under the name of “FMT”, is 60 notorious that no denial cari dispelits existence. It is well known to the UNFICYP, and they could report on it if requested to do SO. 142. Also, it was attempted to cast doubt on the fa& whlch 1 mention-d in my table about Ali Zihni being tortured and murdered because he wanted to go back to his village. This againis afact which UNFICYP knows very well and cari confirm. 1 mentioned these facts merely to show the causes of the delay in finding a solution to the problem, and how they should be remedied. 143. Mention was made of the question of enosis. That was folly discussed of course, in the First Committee, SO it has no place here, particularly since this question had nothlng ta do with the troubles whlch started in Cyprus in December 1963. It was freely admitted, published abroad, and discussed in tbls Council at the time. They were caused by the efforts of the President of the Republic to overcome certain divisive provisions of the Constitution aad the excessive, unbalanced degree of power glven to the minority overruling the right of the majority. Those were the reasons for those troubles, and the fighting which took place turned on that issue, and not on the question of enosis. The question of enosis came up much later and therefore has nothing to do with what is &oing on in this Council. 144. The representative of Turkey, Ambassador Eralp, expressed his amazement that the Turkish Government should be sccused of wanting partition in Cyprus. Yet. in almost the same breath, a little while afterwards, he referred to what his Foreign Minister had said in the First Committee, to th? effect that if the other side would abandon enosis, then they would glve up their claim for partition. Therefore that is an admission that they do bave a claim for partition, which earlier they had denied. That is the whole trouble ln Cyprus: these divisive conditions are a result of this claim for partition. 145. Now 1 should like to say a few words concernfng the reference made by the representative of Malaysia to the contribution of Cyprus. Cyprus contributes facilities, camps and other accommodations belonging to the Government. which are giV%n without payment. Wbat he msntioned about the paYment8 made, referred to private property belongresowces of cyprus-particular1y under presentconditims-w it is orovidine: is net so sm3.U. We this comil. 146. with regard to th@ Ieaewa1-w are in 0omplete ement with a renewal 0f the F0ice for tlwee 6. OP coupse if. ta the meanwhi8e. it is fouw? it is net necessary, tben it can be terminated atitGy monlmt. Tbe reaem is made with tlle conset of Be rus Gave ent. Tbe Force romains tbere as 10 as it bas consent of the Govemment. That clear md therefore we do net tbink there is any barm in renewlng it for three monihs. a we bope tbat tbere Will be tbe same constructive ea-operation between tbe Government of Cypras awl WNFICYP SS in tbe past. 1 bave already said tbat we eaasider the work of UNFICYP most impurtmt. It bas done excellent wxk under the guidance of the SecretarpGeneral and bfs staff and tbe representative of *&e Secretary-General in Cyprus. and under the command of General Thlmayyn. Tberefore. we are quite willing to bave it renewed for amther tbree moatbs. 147. In coaoedon wlth tbe draft resolution. Ifollowed wbat bas been said by the representative of the Ivory Coast. Of course tbe moment we toucb upon tbis. we go beyond tbe statement of tbe Secretary-GetLeral. I believe tbat tbis phrase, in operative paragraph 3 of tbe draft rssolution, was taken from tbe statement of tbe Secretary-General to this Council, when he said “the parties direetly concernod Will make 911 eamest. persistent and iotenslfied efforttoacbieve a peacefbl settlement of the prohlem of Cyprus”. Once we depart from that and go to the text of the resolutton of 4 Marcb 1964, then of course we must bave the whole text. as the representative of the Ivory Coast bas just pointed out. 148. One other thing 1 should like to say is that the reference to tbe consensus expressed by the President on 11 August 1964 bas been included in previous resolutions of the Seeurity Council. and pa.fiicularly in resolution 206 (1965) of 16 June 1965 and in subsequent ones. Tberefore. we do eot tbink that the word *tben” is necessary. Certainly it refers to tbe President of tbe Council on 11 August 1964; the wording *Tbe then President” seems ratber cumbersome. Of course it is net the now President. it is tbe then President. 149. Tberefore we are in agreement with the draft resolution and wlth the additions proposed by the representative of tbe Ivory Coast, andwlththe renewal of tbe Force.

1 should like topropose, wlth all deference. tbat we might suspend the meet-

In regard to the proposa1 just made by the representative of Malaysia-if there is no objection-the meeting Will be suspended until 7.30 p.m. The meeting was suspendedat 7.1dp.m. andresumed ,af 7.30 p.m.

This is the first time in my experience that we bave taken a fifteen-minute suspension and punctually reassembled after that. 153. We have discussed this matter hefore. As I originally indicated, the immediate purpose of this draft resolution is to reaffirm the previous resolutions and to extend the Force. Those are the immediate and the only relevant purpose of this debate. 154. We thought that operative paragraph 3 might usefully be worded “Furthcr urge@ the people to try and settle the problem. But far from letting them settle it, we bave started waging a war with regard to the 1anguag.e of this peace-i.czping paragraph in the draft resolution. We bave ail agreed that the best way probably of ouring this headache would be to tut off the head, and we bave a11 agreed that paragraph 3 should be dropped from the draft resolution. 1 bave consulted with my other colleagues and they have a11 agreed that operative paragrnph 3 could be drooned. it Will not make the draft resolutien incompleie in any way. lt Will probably make it more complete.

We are novi going to vote on the draft resolution which we co-sponsored. and we welcome the precedent established by oui agreement to delete a paragraph, in this case operative paragraph 3. It is my hope that thls Will become established practice SO that many coufused and perhaps useless discussions may be avoided. 156. We shall vote for this draft resolution for the reasons SO objectively and fairly stated by the Secretary-General and because of the information that the Mediator. Mr. Gala Plaza, was good encugb to give to the Latin American group. 157. Secondly, 1 wish to announce that I shall vote for this draft resolutionwlthgreatpersonalreluctance since it imposes the obligation of making financial and other contributions on third parties and hecause my country cannot help to pay for the measures taken by virtue of thc draft resolution for wbich A vote was taken by show ofhands. The draft resolufion was adopted UnanimOUsïy.~

There nowremaintwo speakers on my list. 1 glve the floor to the representative of Greece in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. President, I bave waived my right of reply.

1 cal1 on the representative of Turkey. in exercise of his right of reply. 166. MI. ERALP (Turkey): I had a number of points that 1 wanted to make under the right of reply but, noting that the resolution has been adopted and the heur is late. 1 shall also forgo my right of reply.

May I “ow ask if ths representative of Cyprus also wishes to do thls.

Mr. Presidcnt, 1 was not exercislng the right of reply. 1 wanted to express a few words of thanks to the Council for the unanlmous resolution it lias just adopted for the renewal of the force and particularly 1 wish to address warm thanks to the representative of Uruguay for bis words. which are couched in the best traditions of the spirit of justice and freedom that bave always guided the Uruguayan people in their national affairs and in their international relations. lt is very encouraging to hear such words from a friendly country of the Latin American continent, and we are very grateful for them. The meeting rose at ‘1.45 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications moy be obtained distributors throughout the world. write to: United Notions, Sales C~~ENT SE PROCURER tEs PUBLICATIONS Les publicctionr des Notions Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous OU adressez-vous ù: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Los publicocioner de 10s Nociones Uiidos cosos distribuidoros en todas porter dirijore o: Nociones Unidos, Sec&% Litho in U.N. Pri~e: $US. 1.00 (or equivalent in other