S/PV.1302 Security Council

Before we take up the questions before us at this meeting, permit me to express to the distinguished representative of Uganda, Mr. Kironde, my sincere gratitude and that of my colleagues in the Council for his outstanding work during the month of August, when with his characteristic ability and dedication he discharged the functions of President of the Security Council. 2. I should like now, on behalf of all the members of the Security Council, to take the opportunity of welcoming to this gathering Mr. Samuel Ngude Odaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, and of expressing our pleasure in having him with us today in this Chamber, I call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda. 3. M. ODAKA (Ouganda) [traduit de l’anglais]: Monsieur le PrBsident, je d&ire vous remercier t&s vivement des paroles extremement aimables que vous avez prononcees a l’dgard de M. Kixonde, concernant la contribution apportee par le repr6sentant de lWuganda aux tsavaux du Conseil de &curit& Au nom de ma d816gation, je desire remercier les membres du Conseil pour l’esprit de collaboration, les encouragements et l’aide active qu’ils ont accord& &la d818gation de 1’Cuganda lors de la deliberation concernant le grave probleme qui s’est p&en% le moisdernier.

Mr. President, I should like to thank you ever so much for the extremely gracious remarks you have made about Mr. Kironde, in connexion with the contribution of Uganda’s representatives to the work of the Security Council. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to thank the members of the Security Council for the co-operation, encouragement and active assistance which they afforded the delegation of Uganda in the deliberation of the grave issue which came up last month. 4. Monsieur le PrBsident, votre experience et vos qualit& personnelles sont trop connues pour que je 4. Mr. President, your experience and your personal qualities are too well known to require any elaboration Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/l302) 1. Adoption de l’ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 21 septembre 1966, adressee au Prgsident du Conseil de sdcuritd par le rep&- sentant permanent par interim de la Republique democratique du Congo aupres de l’organisation des Nations Unies (S/7503). Remerciements au PrBsident sortant et souhaits de bienvenue au Ministre des affoires ktrangeres de I’Ouganda 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Avant de passer a l’examen de la question inscrite a l’ordre du jour, permettez-moi tout dlabord d’exprimer ?i notre cbl- , l&gue M. Kironde, representant de l’ouganda, toute la sincere reconnaissance des membres du Conseil et la mienne pour la faGon remarquable dont, au mois cl’aofit, il s’est aoquittk des fonctions de President du Conseil de s&?urit8, avec sa comp&ence et son d&ouement habituels. 2. Qu’il me soit permis Bgalement, au nom de tous les membres du Conseil de securit6, de saisir oette occasion pour saluer ici le Mini&e des affaires &rang&es de l’ouganda, M. Samuel Ngude Odaka, et pour lui exprimer toute notre satisfaction de le voir siBger aujourd’hui 31 nos c&&s. Je donne la parole au Ministre des affaires Btrangeres de 1Wuganda. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Letter dated 21 September 1966 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7503)

The Chair has received requests from States which are not members of the Council to be permitted to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The first request is contained in a telegram dated 25 September 1966 [S/7512] from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal. The second request is contained in a letter dated 28 September 1966 [S/7514] from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations. If I hear no objections, I shall invite the repsesentatives of the aforementioned Member States to take places at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. J.-M. Bomboko (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Mr. F. 23. de Miranda (Portugal) took plaoes at the Council table.

A further request to take part in the Council’s discussion of the item has also been received. I refer to a letter dated 29 September 1966 [S/7517] from the Chairman of the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania. If there are no objections, I shall likewise invite the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. C. Y. Mgonja (United Republic of Tanzania) took a place at the Council table.

A request has also been received today from Mr. Antoine Guimali, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, to be permitted to appear before the Council in connexion with the item under discussion, If there are no objections, I intend to call upon the representative of the Central African Republic when he wished to speak. It was so decided.

The representative of Burundi has just requested that he be given an opportunity to take part in the proceedings of the Council without the right to vote, If there is no objection on the part of any member of the Council, I shall invite the representative of Burundi to take a place at the Council table, At the invitation of the President, Mr. P. Niyongabo (Burundi) took a place at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin consideration of the Adoption de l’ordre du iour L ‘ordre du jour est adopt&. Lettre, en date du 21 septembre 1966, adressee au President du Conseil de skcurite par le reprtsentant permanent par intbrim de la Rbpublique dgmacratique du Congo aupres de I’Organisation des Nations Unies (S/7503) 5. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): J’ai 8tB saisi, par des Etats qui ne sont pas membres du Conseil, de demandes de participation sans droit de vote aux discussions du Conseil. La premiere de ces demandes figure dans le telegramme du Ministre des affaires Btrangeres du Portugal; en date du 25 septembre 1966 [S/7512]. La deuxieme figure dans la lettre, en date du 28 septembre 1966 [S/7514], du representant permanent par interim de la RBpublique democratique du Congo aupr&s de 1’Organisation des Nations Unies. En l’absence d’objection, j’invite les repr&entantsde ces deux Etats Membres a prendre place B la table du Conseil, Sur l’invitation du President, M. J.-M. Bomboko (Republique d6mooratique du Congo) et M. F. B. de Miranda (Portugal) prennent place a la table du Conseil. 6. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): J’ai aussirec;u une lettre du chef de la delegation de la RBpublique- Unie de Tanzanie, en date du 29 septembre 1966 [S/7517] demandant de participer aux discussions du Conseil sur cette question, En l’absence d’objection, j’invite le representant de la RBpublique-Unie de Tanzanie 9 prendre place a la table du Conseil. Sur l’invitation du President, M. C. Y. Mgonja (Republique-Unie de Tanzanie) prend place ai la table du Conseil. 7. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le Ministre des affaires Btrangeres de la RBpublique centrafri- Caine, M. Antoine Guimali, a demand6 qu9il lui soit permis de prendre part au debat sur la question examinee, S’il n’y a pas dlobjection, je donnerai la parole au representant de la RBpublique centrafricaine lorsqu’il la demandera. I1 en est ainsi decide. 8. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le repre sentant du Burundi vient de demander de prendre part aux travaux du Conseil sans droit de vote. Sauf objection de la part des membres du Conseil, j’invite le representant du Burundi a prendre place a la table du Conseil. Sur l’invitation du President, M. P. Niyongabo (Burundi) prend pIace a’ la table du Conseil. 9. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le Conseil de &curite va maintenant passer Zi l’examen de la ques- 10. The first name on the list is that of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, upon whom I now call. 10. Le premier OrateUr inscrit sur ma liste est le representant de la R&ubliC@e democratique du Congo auquel je donne la parole.

In the letter of 21 September 1966, which has been circulated as document S/7503, I informed you, Mr. President, of a complaint brought by my Government against Portugal, In that letter, my Government complained of the serious and unwarranted acts of interference carried out by the Lisbon Government against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, At the same time, I promised to set forth the grounds for these charges at greater length before the Security Council, I shall therefore acquit myself of that duty, but I should like first to thank you, Mr. President, for having made it possible for my country’s case to be heard in this forum. 11. M. BOMBOKO (R&publique democratique duGongo): Par lettre du 21 septembre 1966, distribuge sous la tote S/7503, je vous ai informe, Monsieur le President, d’une plainte adres&e par mon gouvernement centre le Portugal. Dans oette lettre, man gouvernement se plaignait des ing&renCeS caract8risees et graves du gouvernement de Lisbonne Centre la RBPublique democratique du Congo. Par la m&‘ne Occasion, j’avais promis dl&ayer davantage mOn RWUSatiOn en tours de &ance. Je vais done m’acquitter de ce devoir en ~0~s remercisnt, Monsieur le President, d’avoir bien voulu faire en sorte We la cause de mon pays puisse Btre entendue devant Ce pretoire. 12. Before entering into the substance of the matter, allow me to set forth briefly the general principles on which my statement is based. My country’s first concern is to respect the principles of the Charter which call for the settlement of disputes between States by peaceful means, for the problems which I am bringing before the Council endanger peace in Africa and seriously threaten the independence and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12. Permettez-moi, avant n-&me d’entrer dans le vif du sujet, de vous dire briEvement les principes gbneraux sur lesquels se fonde mon intervention. Monpays veut d’abord se conformer? au respect des principes de la Charte qui recommandent la solution des diffkends entre Etats par des moyens PaCifiqUeS, car les problemes que je vais exposer mettent en danger la paix en Afrique de m6me qu’ils menacent &rieusement l’ind6pendance et la souveraine@ de la RBpublique democratique du Congo. 13. In the second place, I come before you because of the faith and hope which my country places in this Organization, despite the viscissitudes inherent in any human undertaking, for the Congo owes a mighty tribute to the United Nations. My country can never, indeed, forget the dark hours which followed its independence and the paramount role which the United Nations played in resolving that crisis, 13. C’est en deuxieme lieu la foi et l(espoir que mon pays fonde en cette organisation, en dtSpit des vicissitudes inhErentes a toute entreprise bumaine, car le Congo se doit de s’acquitter d’un lourd tribut & l%gard de cette organisation. Mon pays ne peut, en effet, oublier les heures sombres gui suivirent son ind& pendance et le r&e de premier plan joue par les Nations Unies dans le denouement de cette Wise. 14. La RBpublique dtSmocratique du Congo voudrait ensuite donner le plus de cr&iit et le plus de consistance possible aux r&solutions de l’organisationqui, a maintes reprises, ont pr6conisG la non-ingerence dans les affaires intErieures des autres Etatsind6pendants. Parallelement a cette attitude, mon pays veut se conformer aux regles de droit et des relations internationales d’apres lesquelles aucun pays ne peut servir de base op6rationnelle quelconque pour lancer des attaques COntre un autre pays. Ceci est d’ailleurs une autre manifestation du principe de non-immixtion dans les affaires interieures des autres Btats, 14. The Democratic Republic of the Congo would like also to give as much weight andforce as possible to the resolutions of the United Nations, which have repeatedly advocated non-interference in the domestic affairs of other independent States, In line with this attitude, my country wishes to conform with the rules of law and of international relations according to which no country may serve asa base of operations of any kind for the launching of attacks against another country, This is, moreover, yet another way of expressing the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. 15. Au sortir de la nuit coloniale, les peuples africains s’efforcent de creer des conditions devant garantir leur stabilite, leur independance politique et Bconomique. Ce Processus se trouve h6las: devant des difficult& et des douleurs qui seraient toutefois surmontables Si elles n’etaient pas d&upleeS par deux phenomenes bien Connus de l’organisation et de ce conseil. 15. As they emerge from the colonial darkness, the African peoples are endeavouring to create conditions that will guarantee their stability and their political and economic independence. Unfortunately, many difficulties and troubles arise to impede this process, but these could be surmounted if they were not increased tenfold by two phenomena very familiar to the United Nations and this Council. 16. Le premier de ces phenom&nes est le maintien en Afrique de territoires soumis au regime colonial 16. The first of these is the presence of territories still subject to colonial or semi-colonial rule, The fact 17. In so doing, these States are, moreover, merely complying with General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), which, in partioular: “Appeals to all States, in co-operation with the Orgwon of African Unity, to render the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights”. 18. I am not speaking here of the frank, normal and highly desirable relationship of co-operation between industrialized countries and developing countries, Afxica is by nature open and brotherly, and it has managed, in spite of the tribulations of colonialism, to retain that character. One of our greatest African poets has written: “These peoples made of fire, once their hands were fxeed, wrote the word ‘brotherhood’ on the first page of their monuments.” 19. What I wish to speak about is the intesference that is intended to re-establish some kind of domination over liberated peoples in an indirect way. Such interference is criminal because it threatens the independence of peoples who have a recognized right to be independent, because it endangers the kind of world order that the United Nations is trying to build, and because it is a blow aimed directly at international peace and security, Interference of that kind willingly avails itself of the services of men who are slaves to ambition and greed and so corrupt as to fight against their own country and participate in the enslavement of their own brothers, men whose skin is black but who no longer have a right to the noble title of “African” because they have made themselves outlaws of the African community, and even of the international community, and who evoke nothing but contempt, even in those who use them, That is the kind of interference about which I wish to speak to the Council today, 20. The name of Morse TshombB is not unknown to this Organization. That name came to its attention almost at the very hour when the independent Congo took its place in the United Nations, for that man-1 shall not call him a Congolese-did not hesitate to plunge a dagger into the very heart of his country on the very morrow of its independence, Having returned to his country, which had generously forgiven himand had believed in his repentance and his promises and wanted to associate all its sons in the task of national reconstruction, Moi’se Tshombe eventually became its Prime Minister. After he had relinquished that office and gone into voluntary exile, he went to Europe and there, surrounded by unscrupulous men, adventurers and rogues, he began first to think about, and then to oxganize, a new assault against his country. sur tous les citoyens de I’Afrique et oblige lee pays deja independants a consacrer une partie impcxtante de leur attention, de leurs ressources et de leuxs forces pour aider B la delivrance de leurs fxexes encore asservis. 17. Ce faisant, ces Etats ne font d’ailleuxs que se conformer & la ri%olution 2107 (XX) de 1’Assemhl~e g&&ale adopt6e au couxs de sa vingtieme session et dans laquelle il eSt nOtamment: “Fait appel a tOUS les RtatS pour qu’ils accoxdent aux populations des territoixes administxes pax le Poxtugal, en COOpbXatiOn aVeC l’organisation de l’unit6 africaine, l’aide morale et mat&ielle n&essaire au x&ablissement de leurs droits inali8nahles”, 18. Je ne parle pas ici des relations franches, noxmales et hautement souhaitables de cooptSration entxe pays industrialis& et pays en voie de d&eloppement, L’Afxique eSt par essence OUVerte et fxaternelle et elle a su, en depit des misBres de la colonisation, conserver ce caraotere. Un de nos plus gxandspo&tes africains n’a-t-i1 pas Bcrit: “Ces peuples de feu, lorsqutils ont lib&?5 leuxs mains, ont Boxit la fraternit6 sur la premiere page de leurs monuments.n 19. Ce dont je veux parlex c’est de cette ingerence dont l’objectif est de xetablir de facon indixecte une domination quelconque sur des peuples libbr6s. Cette ing&rence-1% est criminelle, car elle menace l’ind& pendance des peuples qui y ont droit et auxquels oe clxoit a Bt6 reconnu, car elle met en danger l’organisation du monde telle que les Nations Unies s’efforcent de la charpentex. Car enfin, elle est un coup direct port6 & la paix et a la s6cuxite internationales. Cette ingerence-18 utilise volontiers les services d’hommes perdus dtambitfon et avides d’argent, pexvextis pour lutter contxe leux propre patrie et pour participex ?i l’asservissement de leurs propres frBxes, d’hommes dont la peau est noire mais qui n’ont plus droit au beau nom d’Africain, car ils se sont mis eux-m&mes hors la loi de la communaut6 afrioaine et meme de la communaut6 mondiale en nlinspirant partout que le mepxis, jusque chez ceux-la memes qui les emploient. C’est d’une telle ingerence que je veux aujourd’hui entretenir le Conseil. 20. Le nom de Mol’se Tshomb6 n’est pas inconnu de cette organisation. Elle a appris B le connadre presque au moment m$me oa le Congo indgpendant a Pxis sa place au sein des Nations Unies. Car cet homme - je ne dirai pas oe Congolais - nla pas h&it6 a plongex un poignard dans le coaur m9me de sa patxie, an lendemain m&me de son independanoe. Revenu dans sa patrie qui lui avait gbn6reusement pardonnt?, qui avait cxu en son repentir et en se8 promesses et qni voulait associex tous ses fils & la t&he de la xeconstxuotion nationale, Moi’se Tshomb6 devait devenix Premier Ministre, Loxsque par la suite il qUitta le Pouvoix, s’exilant volontairement, il gagna lrEuxoPeet la, entour d’hommes Sans scxupules, aventuxiexs ou esorocs, il se mit dlabord 51 r&es puiS a Organiser un nouvel attentat oontxe son pays. 22. Mol’se Tshombd had already used such men at the time of his first secession. In addition, throwing money and promises around lavishly, Moi’se Tshombe tried to create a fifth column in the Congo itself. As one who would murder his own fatherland, he flattered the tribal aspirations of some of his former gendarmes who had been pardoned by the Congo and incorporated in the National Army, A skilled corrupter, he lured with extravagant promises politicians who had been rejected by the people. Spending freely, he endeavoured to win over to his cause the foreign volunteers of the Congolese National Army. 23. There is abundant evidence of this, and it is common knowledge, Some mercenaries, with commendable sincerity, reported to the central Government the offers that had been made to them. The rebellion of the Katangese gendarmes at Kisangani which has just been crushed by the central Government demonstrated only too strikingly the work of demoralization undertaken by Moi’se Tshombe. The proofs are there, they are obvious, they are written in blood, But a fifth column was not enough, mercenaries were not enough, 24. A base was needed for launching the mercenaries’ attack and giving support to those-fortunately few in number-whom Tshombd had been able to win over inside the country. That base was ready at hand- Angola, one of the last strongholds of colonialism, which, as this Organization knows only too well, has been clamouring for independence for years. Situated next to the Congo, Angola has a long common frontier with it, and in particular with the province of Katanga. 25. Mais ce sont 19 sans doute des considerations d’ordre g&era1 dont je voudrais vous faire grace. 25. These, however, are obviously considerations of a general order, and I shall not enlarge upon them further. Let us now get down to the facts, Venons-en maintenant plus promptement aux faits. 26. In July of this year, information gathered by our 26. Au mois de juillet de cette annee, les informavarious security services revealed that former Prime tions reoueillies par nos differents services de sd- Minister Tshombe was recruiting mercenaries for curit faisaient Btat d’un reorutement de mercenaires the purpose of repeating, with more effective and par l’ancien Premier Ministre,Tshombt?; ces mercemore powerful means, the classic coup of Katangese naires Btaient de&r&s a r&diter, avec des moyens secession already attempted in 1960. Those reports plus efficaces et plus puissants, le coup classique de from different sources-chief among them certain la &cession katangaise deja tentBe en 1960. Ces noufriends from the Western European countries-were velles provenant de differentes sources, dont prinoiall in agreement; they also indicated that consultations palement celles de certains amis des pays d’Europe and intense activity were underway in connexion with occidentale, Btaient concordantes; elles nous indithe execution of those plans, quaient Bgalement que des consultations etune activite intense Btaient en coura pour llex6cution de ces plans. 27. Two persons were entrusted with the operation. 27. Deux personnages gtaient charges de l’Opf?ratiOn. These were Mr. Clemens, professor of sociology at the I1 s’agit de M. Clemens, professeur de sociologic a University of Liege in the Kingdom of Belgium, and lluniversittl de Liege dans le royaume de Belgique et Mr, Mario Spandre, a former legal adviser of former M, Mario Spandre, ancien conseiller juridique de Prime Minister TshombB, both of whom had become l’ancien Premier Ministre M. Tshombe, devenus tous his ready servants. These unsavoury characters had les deux ses hommes de main, Ces sinistres individus gone to South Africa in order to get in touch with s’&aient rendus en Afrique du Sud, ofi ils devaient Colonel Mike Hoare, a retired leader of the merprendre contact avec le colonel Mike Hoa,re, ancien 22. Mol’se TshombB avait deja eu recours & eux lors de sa premiere &cession. ‘D’un autre c8t6, semant a profusion l’argent et les promesses, Moi’se Tshombe stefforpait de creer au Congo meme une cimquieme colonne. Parricide de sa propre patrie, il flattait les aspirations tribales de certains de ses ex-gendarmes auxquels le Congo avait pardon& et qutil avait in& gres dans son armee nationale. Corrupteur avid, il promettait monk et merveilles B des politiciens rejet& par la population, DBpensant k pleines mains, il s’efforcait de gagner % sa cause les volontaires &rangers de l’armee nationale congolaise. 23. Les preuves sont abondantes et de notori& publique. Quelques mercenaires dont il faut saluer ici la sinc6ritG ant rapport6 au Gouvernement central les offres qui leur Btaient faites. La rtSbellion des gendarmes katangais a Kisangani qui vient d’btre 6crasee par le Gouvernement central, a d6montr6 de facon helas trop Bclatante, le travail de demoralisation entrepris par Mofse Tshombe. Les preuves sont la, Bvidentes, et elles sont &rites avec du sang. Mais il ne suffisait pas d’avoir une cinqui&me colonne, il ne suffisait pas d’avoir des mercenaires. 24. 11 fallait aussi une base pour lancer cesderniers 3 l’assaut et pour donner la main a ceux, rare8 heureusement, que Tshombe avait su gagner & l%nt& rieur; cette base dtait toute trouvee; clest l’Angola, l’un des derniers bastions du colonialisme, 1’Angola qui, votre organisation ne le sait que trop bien, r&lame depuis des an&es son inddpendance. Voisin du Congo, 1fAngola a, notamment avec la province du Katanga, une longue fronti&e commune. 28. Before going into the details of the operation proposed to them,. I must first describe the military Situation in the eastern Congo at that time. I might have had a map placed here in order to make my Statenlent clearer. Such a map is, however, available to the members of the Security Council, and I can locate on it the places that I am going to mention, 29. The Kisnngani region-the former Eastern Pro- VhCe-Was occupied by the Fourteenth Battalion, known as the Fourteenth Commandos, which was stationed at Watsa and was composed of former Katangese gendarmes. Also stationed in the Kisangani region was the BAKA Regiment, comprising two battalions made up of remnants of the former Katangese gendarmerie. Another battalion, likewise composed of former Katangese gendarmes, was stationed at Isangi. Mention must also be made of Colonel Schramme, of whom I shall speak later, who was in the Kindu region. Only two battalions of the Congolese National Army were not part of the forces of the former Katangese gendarmerie; these-the First and Third Battalionshad just been formed at the Kitona base. 30. The Kivu region was oacupied by a few companie s of Katangese origin, against several battalions of the Congolese National Army, plus a number of mercenaries commanded by Colonel Peters. A battalion of former Kntangese gendarmes, under the command of Colonel Schramme, controlled the Kindu region. 31. Most of the Katanga region was held by the forces of the Congolese National Army, which had been relieved in many places by Colonel Peters’ volunteers. 32. ‘l’he projected plan was simple; it consisted of provoking disturbances at Kisangani with the help of the former Katangese gendarme% who would, if necessary, be reinforced by several mercenary units operating in that region. In conjunction with that operation, the troops stationed at Kivu Consisting of former Katangese gendarmes would provoke incidents that would be exploited by Colonel Peters’ men, who were expected to defect and support the movement of the insurgents. Amid the general climate of instability which would thus be created throughout the eastern part of the country, Colonel Peters, whose men, as I have said, were centred in Katanga, would OCCUPY all the area controlled by him as he moved southwards to join up with a group Of marcenuies stationed in Angola. These mercenaries stationed in Angola were to take over the airfield at Lubumbashi-for those who are not familar with its new name, Lubumbashi is the former city Of ElisabethkS OffreS qUi lui 6taient faites, mit xapidement son ancien adjoint, le colonel Peters, lequel etait encore en operation en RBpublique &mocratiqne ducongo, au courant de Ce qui se tramait en le priant de ne Pas accepter, toutefois, les offres qu’on lui ferait. B 28. Avant de d&sire l’op&ationquton leur proposait, il faut d’abord faire etat de la situation militaire telle qu’elle se pr6sentait & cette epcque dansltest du Congo. J’aurais pu, pour mieux illustrer mon expos6, faire placer ici une carte; neanmoins, cette carte est ?l la disposition des membres du Conseil de securite et je pourrais situer sur la carte les localit6s que je vais titer. 29. La region de Kisangani (ex-Province orientale) 6tait oOcup6e par le 148me bataillon, appel6 le l.Ci?me commando, canton& a Watsa et compose des anoiens gendarmes katangais; Btait Bgalement en cantonnement dans la region du Kisangani le regiment Baka, lequel comprenait deux bataillons, vestiges de l’ancienne gendarmerie katangaise. Enfin, un autre bataillon, compos6 Bgalement d’anciens gendarmes katangais, Btait stationne B Isangi.Ilfaut titer Bgalement le colonel Schramme, dont je parlerai plus tard qui, lui, se trouvait dans la r6gion de Kindu. Seuls ne faisaient pas partie de l’effectif de l’ancienne gendarmerie katangaise deux bataillons de l’armge nationale congolaise qui venaient d’btre frafchement form& a la base de Kitona (premier et troisieme bataillons), 30. En ce qui concerne la region de Kivu, elle &ait occupee par quelques compagnies d’origine katangaise centre plusieurs bataillons de 11arm6e nationale congolaise, ainsi qu’une portion de mercenaires command6s par le colonel Peters. Un bataillon d’anciens gendarmes katangais encadres par un certain Schramme contr6lait la rEgion de Kindu. 31. Quant EI la rtSgion du Katanga, elle Btait en maj eure paxtie tenue par les elements de l’armee nationale oongolaise, relay6e en beaucoup d’endroits par les volontaires du colonel Peters. 32. Le plan projet 6tait simple; il COnSiStait & faire Bolater des troubles a Kisangani avec l’aide des anciens gendarmes katangais qui viendxaient au besoin enoadrer quelques unit&s de mercenaires en OpC%ttiOn clans cette region. Parallelement a cette o@V.tion, les troupes ayant fait partie de l’ex-gendarmerie katangaise station&es au Kivu provoqueraient des incidents qu’exploiteraient les hommes du colonel peters qui, en l’occuxrence, auraient fait dBfection pour soutenir le mouvement des insurges. Et ta&is qulun climat g6n6xal d’instabilit6 aurait Bt6 cre6 dans tous l’est du pays, le colonel Peters, dent nous avcns dit que les hommes Btaient cent&s au Katanga, occuperaient tous les secteurs contr616s par lui en meme temps qu’il ferait mouvement vers le sud, de facon a faire jcnction avec un groupe de mercenaires stationnes en Angola. Ces mexCenaixeS StatiOnn& en Angola Btaient charges de prendre l%xodrome de Lubumbashi - pour ceux qui ne le savent pas, Lubum- 33. Colonel Peters, forewarned of the plan by Colonel Hoare, also rejected the proposals that had been made earlier to his former chief; he took the first plane to Kinshasa, where he divulged the entire plan which had been set on foot. That enabled the Government to take steps to deal with the situation, 33. Le colonel Peters, prevenu du plan par le colonel Hoare, rejeta egalement les propositions qui avaient Bt.6 faites auparavant a son ancien chef; il stembarqua dans le premier avion B destination de Kinshasa oh il devoila tout le plan qui avait BtB mis sur pied. Ceci permit au gouvernement de prendre des mesurespour faire face Zt la situation. 34. Although some incidents did manage to break out at Kisangani, they were quickly brought under control. And since Colonel Peters had refused to play along, the mercenaries stationed in Angola were never able to leave their base. The Congolese Government thus has in its possession the valuable information supplied to it concerning the recruitment of mercenaries in certain countries and their training at bases situated near the Angola-Congolese border. To mention but two of these bases, I cite the Henrique de Carvalho and Vila Luso camps, 34. Nganmoins, des incidents purent quand mdme &later a Kisangani, mais ils furent rapidement circonscrits. Et, comme le colonel Peters avait refuse! de jouer le jeu, les mercenaires cantonnes en Angola ne purent jamais quitter leur base. Le Gouvernement congolais a done retenu l’information precieuse qu’on venait de lui fournir et selon laquelle les mercenaires recrutes dans certains pays Btaient entrain& dans des bases situees B proximitt! de la fronti&re de 1’Angola et du Congo, Pour ne titer que quelques-unes de ces bases, signalons les camps de Henrique de Carvalho et Vila Luso. 35, The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has also taken note of the brazen statements of another mercenary by the name of Protin, according to which some of the mercenaries, after being recruited, passed through Lisbon in transit before being sent to the bases in Angola to prepare for the assault on Congolese territory, 35. Le Gouvernement de la RBpublique d8mocratique du Congo a Bgalement pris acte des declarations impudentes dtun autre mercenaire, un certain Protin, declarations selon lesquelles certains mercenaires recrut& transitaient par Lisbonne avant d’&re achemines vers les bases de 1’Angola en attendant de deferler sur le territoire congolais. 36. Tout rEcemment encore, la di?couverte d’un camp de mercenaires dans 1fArdeche apermis auGouvernement congolais d’avoir une confirmation sur les diff& rentes informations qu’il avait d&j% recueillies. Et, en Bvoquant ces Wnements, vous m’excuserez d’ouvrir une parenthbse; car mon pays se doit de s’acquitter dlun grand devoir de reconnaissance envers le Gouvernement de la REpublique francaise. C’est grBce 3. son amit% et zt sa politique realiste qu’il a BtB possible de demanteler un vaste rgseau de recrutement de mercenaires. La fermete avec laquelle les autorit& francaises sont intervenues dans cette affaire ne peut que forcer notre reconnaissance et notse respect, 11 est B esperer que les autres Etats pourront stengager r6solument dans cette voie. Ainsi, il nefait plus aujourd’hui l’ombre d’un doute que ces mercenaires Etaient recrut& pour le compte de M. Tshombe dont ils devaient faciliter la prise du pouvoir au Congo apres avoir renvers6 les institutions etablies. 36. Quite recently, the discovery of the camp of mercenaries in Ardeche enabled the Congolese Government to confirm the various reports it had already received. In recalling these events, you will forgive me a digression, for my country feels that it must acknowledge a great debt of gratitude to the Government of the French Republic, Thanks to its friendship and its realistic policy, it has been possible to dismantle a vast network for the recruitment of mercenaries. The firmness with which the French authorities acted in this matter cannot but command our gratitude and respect, It is to be hoped that other States will be able to take resolute action in the same way, Thus, there is today not a shadow of doubt that these mercenaries were recruited on behalf of Mr, Tshombe in order to facilitate his assumption of power in the Congo after overthrowing the established institutions, 37. It has been learned that frogman commandos were being trained in other camps in France for the sole purpose of wreaking havoc in the Congo, The mercenaries arrested by the French authorities revealed the existence of aircraft which were to be used to transport both the equipment and the men thus assembled. It cannot reasonably be believed that aircraft of the T-26 type could leave France, or any other country in Europe, for the purpose of landing men and munitions directly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is also true that the present state of relations between the Congo and its neighbours 37. On a pu apprendre que les commandos d’hommesgrenouilles 6taient entrarYl6s dans d’autres camps en France a seule fin de semer la devastation au Congo. Les mercenaires arrWs par les autoritesfrangaises ont r&616 qufil existait des avions qui devaient servir au transport de 1’6quipement ainsi que des hommes ainsi r&u-&. On ne peut raisonnablement croire que les avions dans le genre de T-26 puissent quitter la France ou un quelconque pays de 1’Europe pour venir larguer des hommes et des munitions directement en RBpublique democratique du Congo. Ilest Bgalement vrai que les relations actuelles du Congo avec ses 39. Immediately after the liquidation of the Katangese secession by United Nations troops, approximately 4,000 men, carrying with them a considerable amount of military equipment, took refuge in Angola. Both the Secretary-General and the Government of the Demo- CXatic Republic of the Congo protested to Portugaland drew its attention to the danger to the Congo represented by the presence of suoh an axmed force so close to its territory. Portugal replied that there was no such camp on its territory and that the troops aIleged to be on its territory were the fruit of the imagination of the Secretary-General and the Congolese Government. 40. Nevertheless, in July 1964, when Mr. Tshombl? came to power as Prime Minister and rebellion was at its height in the Congo, there emergedfrom Angola, as ifby magic, whole battalions of gendarmes, officered by well-trained, well-equipped and well-armed mcscenaries. 41. We have here a complete account ofallthe arms, munitions and clothing which was stored in Angola by Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Schrammc and which was later recovered by the same Mr. TshombB. It should be noted, moreover, that the Katangese secession came to an end in 1963 and that all these former Katangese gondarmes who had found refuge in Angola did not leave that country until around August 1964. Does not this period of a year spent in Angola prove that camps existed in which these gendarmes could be trained and equipped? Even today, as we speak, there still exist in Angola aircraft, lorries and other equipment which was stored there by Mr. Tshombt! during the secession. 42. It might, however, be wondered why Portugal is playing this squalid role of broker in the matter of mercenaries. The answer is very simple, There is an old police axiom which says: “Find cut who profits from the crime.” 43, The Government of the Democratio Republic Of the Congo, followed, moreover, by many other African Governments, has given de jure recognition to the revolutionary Government-in-exile of Angola, headed by or. Holden Roberto, That Government is now on Congolese territory. However, the Lisbon Government has always regarded its African terXitOrleS as forming an integral part of Portugal, Notwithstanding the various United Nations resolutions and recommendations calling on the former colonial States to Carry out decolonization without delay, Portugal has always opposed the general feeling which has ConSiStentlY 39. AU lendemain de la r&orption de la secession katangahe par les troupes des Nations Unies, environ 4 000 hommes emportant un important materiel de guerre se rBfugi??rent en Angola. Le Secretaire general des Nations Unies ainsi que le Gcuvernement de la RCSpublique democratique du Congo protest&rent COntre le Portugal et attirerent l’attention de celui-ci sur le danger que repr&sentait pour le Congo la pr& sence d’une telle armee 5t proxfmit& de son territoire. A quoi le Portugal repondit qufil nlexistait sur Son terrftoire aucun camp de ce genre et que les troupes qU'On signalait sur son territoire etaient le fruit de l’imagination du SecrfXaire general et du Gouvernement congolais. 40. Mais, lorsque, au mois de juillet 1964, M. TshombB vint au pouvoir comme Premier Ministre et que la rebellion battait son plein au Congo, on vit sort& comme par enchantement de 1fAngola des bataillons entiers de gendarmes, encadres de mercenaires bien entrafii%, Bquip& et armi5s. 41. Nous avons ici tout un releve des armes, des munitions, de l’habillement, tout ce qui avait et6 stock@. en Angola par M. Tshombe et M. Schramme et qui, apres, a Bte &cup&6 par le meme M. TshcmbB, A noter, a toutes fins utiles, que la secession katangaise avait pris fin en 1963 et que ces ex-gendarmes katangais qui avaient trouv6 refuge en Angola n’en sortirent qu’aux environs du mois d’aoat 1964. Une an&e de presence en Angola ne prouverait-elle pas lfexistence des camps dans lesquels ces gendarmes avaient pu s’entraiher et s%quiper? Et m&me aujcurdfhui oil nous parlons, il existe encore en Angola des avions, des camions at d’autre mat&e1 We M. Tshombe, pendant la &cession, avait stockesdans ce pays. 42. Mais on peut se demander pourquoi le Portugal Sert de courtier sordide dans cette affaire de mercenaires. La reponse en est toute simple. Un vieil adage policier ne dit-il pas ncherche a qui le Crime profite”? 43. Le Gouvernement de la RBpublique democratique du Congo, suivi d’ailleurs par beaucoup de gouvernemerits africains, a reconnu de jure le gouvernement revolutionnaire de l’hngola en exil, lequel est preside par M. Holden Roberto. Ce gouvernement se trouve en ce moment sus le territoire congolais. Or, le gOu- ’ vernement de Lisbonne a toujours considere 1eS territoires africains oomme faisant partie integrante du territcire portugais. Nonobstant les differentes r&clutions et recommandations des Nations UnieS invitant 1eS anciens Etats coloniaux B proceder San9 retard a la d&olonisation, le Portugal a toujours oppose une 44. What is worse, the Angolan nationalists who were in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were from then on subjected to every kind or harassment and persecution, and their freedom of action was seriously restructed. Thus, the policy of Mr. Tshomb6 corresponded perfectly with Portugal’s policy in the African territories stillunder its control. That is why Mr. Salazar and Mr. Noguera must support any attempt aimed at causing a disturbance in the Congo and at removing from power any nationalist Government apt-by its very nature-to impede their action. 45. The evidence, therefore, of Portugal’s complicity in Mr. TshombB’s attempt at subversion is, I believe, irrefutable. 46, The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a peace-loving country. The principle on which its foreign policy is based is the spread of peace in a world freed from servitude, where the right of all peoples to freedom is recognized. In bringing this matter before the Security Council, my country is not prompted by a spirit of either vengeance or vindictiveness towards Portugal. Furthermoxe, my countsy has nothing to ask of the Lisbon Government exceptfollowing the example of the other African countries and in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly-the immediate liberation of the African peoples who are subject to its unjust domination. 47. What the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to do before this Council today is rather to draw the attention of the world to the threat which Portugal’s interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo presents to international peace and security. For the Congo cannot, without endangering its survival, tolerate such interference any longer without reacting. What the Democratic Republic of the Congo wants is a solemn commitment from the Government of Portugal to refrain in future from giving assistance to any attempts at subversion in its territory, 48. In proceeding thus, the Democratic R.epublic of the Congo feels that it is discharging its obligations as a member of the international community and as a Member of the United Nations. It ventures, therefore, to hope that it will obtain the support of all the members of the Council, because it believes that the 44. Pire, les nationalistes angolais se trouvant sur le terxitoire de la RBpublique democratique du Congo furent d&s ce moment soumis 3 des vexations et per&- cutions de toutes sortes. Leur libertc d’action fut sdrieusement amoindrie. Ainsi, la politique de M. Tshombd colhcidait parfaitement avec celle du Portugal dans les territoires africains encore sous sa ddpendance. Telle est la raison pour laquelle M. Salazar et M. Nogueira doivent soutenir toute tentative qui viendrait troubler l’ordre au Congo, et qui tendrait Bgalement 9, Bcarter du pouvoir tout gouvernement nationaliste susceptible partant de gdner son action. 45. La preuve est ainsi faite, je crois, de la complicite portugaise dans la tentative de subversion amor- &e par M. TshombB. 46. La Rdpublique d8mocratique du Congo estunpays Bpris de paix. Le principe sur lequel repose sa politique Etrangere est l’dpanouissement de la paix dans un monde lib&3 de la servitude et oti tous les peuples se voient reconnaitre la liberte a laquelle ils ont droit. En portant la presente affaire devant le Conseil de sdcurite, mon pays nlest animg a l’bgard du Portugal ni par un esprit de vengeance, ni par un esprit de revendication. Mon pays n’ad’ailleurs rien % demander au gouvernement de Lisbonne si ce n’est, 9 l’instar des autres pays africains et conform&ment aux r&olutions de l’Assembl8e g&&ale des NationsUnies, de lib6rer immediatement les peuples africains soumis a son injuste domination. 4’7. Non, ce que veut la Rdpublique d8mocratique du Congo aujourd’hui, devant ce conseil, c’est appeler llattention du monde sur la menace que les ingerences portugaises dans les affaires du Congo font subir a la paix et s1. la s&.3urit~ internationales. Car le Congo ne pourrait, sans danger pour sa survie, supporter plus longtemps sans r6agir de telles interventions. Ce que veut la Rgpublique ddmocratique du Congo, c’est un engagement solennel du Gouvernement pormgais de se garder & l’avenir de preter main-forte a toute tentative de subversion BUS son territoire. 48. En agissant ainsi, la Republique democratique du Congo a oonscience de remplir ses obligations de membre de la communaut& intesnationale, de Membse des Nations Unies. Elle ose espeser, & ce titre, obtenir l’appui de l’ensemble des membres du Conseil, car nous crayons que la promesse faite par un voleur, 50. My country has suffered a great deal, For six Years we have known only suffering and tragedy, and this is a final appeal which I am making here to all countries to leave us in peace, to leave the people of the Congo in peace, so that they may tend their wounds, Work in peace and build their country. Our sufferings have always been caused by foreign interference, and we would like all such interference to come to an end.

I thank the Minister fox Poreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The next speaker on the list is the representative of Portugal, on whom 1 now call.

Mr. President, may I first of all express my thanks to you and, through you, to your colleagues in the Security Council, for inviting me to participate as the representative of Portugal in the debate which has just begun. I shall be very brief. 53. The Security Council is seized of a complaint lodged by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the effect that mercenaries are stationed in camps at Henrique de Carvalhc and Vila Luso. in Angola, their mission being to disturb the peace in the Congo. Shorn of all the embroidery with which this complaint is sought to be dressed up, the Congolese allegation places a specific and clear-cut issue before the Council: are there any mercenaries in Angola? 1 reply with a full sense of responsibility that there are none; there are no mercenaries in Angola, nor camps, nor war material meant to distuxb the pence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in any other place. 54, At this stage of the debate, I make only this categorical and, I believe, sufficient statement. AS for the Congolese Government, this statement should be not only sufficient but superfluous, for the Congclese Government has known all along that there are no mercenaries in Angola. In fact, earlier this month the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Congo himself took the initiative to discuss this matter with the Portuguese Government through our Ambassador in Brussels. The Foreign Minister, who seemed to be concerned about certain rumours, was assured by OUT Ambassador, on behalf of the Portuguese GCVernment, that the rumours were entirely false. This assurance, which ~8s received by the Congolese Foreign Minister with expressions of appreciation, was further confirmed by a Portuguese Foreign Ministry spokesman in a statement to the Press made on 20 September. 50. Mon pays a beauccup souffert. Depuis six ans, nous n’avons connu que scuffrances et tragedies et clest une pri&re ultime que j’adresse ici 3 tcus les pays de nous laisser tranrluilles, de laisser le peuple du Congo tranquille pour qu’il puisse panser ses blessures, travailler dans la paix et construire le pays, Nous avons scuffert, toujcurs 3. cause des ing& rences BtrangBres, et nous vcudrions que ces ing& xences puissent prendre fin, 51. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je remercie le Ministre des affaires Btxang??res de la R6publique demccratique du Congo. L’orateur suivant est le rep&- scntant du Portugal. Se lui dcnne la parole. 52. M. DE MIRANDA (Portugal) [traduit de l’anglais]: Monsieur le President, qu’il me soit d’abcrd permis de vcus remercier, vous, et B. tsavers vous vcs ccl- Egues du Conseil de s8curit6, de m’avoir invite ZL prendre part au d&bat qui vient de s’ouvrir en tant que repr&sentant du Portugal, Se serai t&s bref. 53. Le Conseil de s6curit6 est saisi dlune plainte formulee par le Gouvernement de la RBpublique demoosatique du Congo & propcs du stationnement dans des camps B Henrique de Carvalhc et Vila Luso, en Angola, de mercenaires qui auraient pour mission de troubler la paix au Congo. Depouillee de tcutes les enjolivures dent on a vculu la parer, cette plainte congolaise pose au Conseil un probEme preois etnet: y a-t-i1 des mfrcenaires en Angola? Je rdponds, en pleine conscience de mes responsabilit&, qu’il nvy en a pas: il nty a pas de mercenaires en Angola, ni de camps, ni de mat&riel de guerre destine a troubler la paix en RBpublfque demccratique du Congo ou en tout autre endroit. 54. A ce stade du dgbat, je me contente de faire cette d6claraticn categorique et, je pense, suffisante. En ce qui ooncerne le Gouvernement congolais, cette declaration devrait &re non seulement suffisante, mais enoore superflue, car ce gouvernement sait depuis toujours qulil n’y a pas de mercenaires en Angola. En fait, au d&but de ce mois, le distingue Mini&e des affaires Btrangkes du Congo en personne a pris l’initiative de discuter de ae prcbleme avec le Gouvernement portugais par lcintermgdiaire de notre ambassadeur Zk Bruxelles. Le Ministre des affaires &trang?zes, qui semblait inquiet de certaines rumeurs, a rec;u des assurances de notre ambassadeur, de la part du Gcuvernement pcrtugais, sur le caractare entierement faux de ces rumeurs. Ces assurance% regues avec satisfaction par le Mini&e des affaires 6trangEres du Congo, ont Et6 confirmBes en cutre Par un Porte-parole du Minis&e des affaixes etrangeres du Portugal dans une declaration faite 51 la presse le 20 septembre. 56. I do not wish to elaborate on these points now. However, before I conclude, I cannot help referring to a matter that is not unconnected with the present debate. As soon as this complaint was lodged, back in Kinshasa, the Congolese radio and other information media launched a hate campaign against Portugal. The emotions thus excited led to the ugly events of 24 September, when the Portuguese Embassy was attacked and set on fire, its archives and other property were sacked, three members of the embassy staff, including the Charge d’affaires. were badly manhandled and held in duress, and the Portuguese flag itself was burnt. At the same time, other Portuguese nationals were ostensibly threatened with attacks on their lives and property. This sudden outburst of anti-Portuguese fury was as artificial as the complaint brought here by the Government of Kinshasa, and, to judge by the attitude of the mob that attacked our embassy, was clearly a sequel to the complaint. 57. My Government therefore thought it advisable to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council with the request that this high organ remind the Congolese Government of its exclusive responsibility to protect the lives and property of the Portuguese nationals living in the Congo. It need hardly be stressed that the attack on the Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa, a condemnable act by all standards of conduct, and the campaign of threats and incitement to violence, raise in the mind of the, Portuguese Government the most serious apprehensions regarding the safety of the Portuguese community in the Congo. 58. I do not propose to give afullreply to the Congolese complaint at today’s meeting. I am sure that it will be easily understood that I need time to study the statement just made by the Foreign Minister of the Congo. From the speech of the Foreign Minister I gather that the Congo is experiencing great difficulties, and we entirely sympathize with the sufferings of the Congolese people, But I fail to see what it all has to do with Portugal, No evidence has been produced except that the Congolese Government prefers the statements made by some mercenaries to assurances 56. Je ne veux pas m’attarder sur cespointsmaintenant. Toutefois, avant de conclure, je ne puis m’emp$cher d’bvoquer un probleme qui n’est pas sans liens avec le pxesent d8bat. Des que cette plainte a i% formulee, la radio congolaise et d’autres organes d’information, 9 Kinshasa, ont entame une campagne de haine centre le Portugal, L’Bmotion ainsi soulevee a conduit aux regrettables Bvenements du 24 septembre, au tours desquels ltambassade du Portugal a BtB attaquee et incendiee, ses archives et d’autres biens mis B sac, trois membres du personnel de l’ambassade, y compris le charge d’affaires, malmen&s et enfermes, tandis que le drapeau portugais lui-meme etait brCil& Au m&me moment, d’autres ressortissants du Portugal etaient ouvertement mena- ~8s d’entreprises centre leur vie et leurs biens. Cet Bclat soudain de coli?re antiportugaise Btait aussi artificiel que la plainte pr&sentee au Conseil par le gouvernement de Kinshasa, et, a en juger par l’attitude de la populace qui a attaque notre ambassade, venait sans aucun doute B la suite de cette plainte. 57. Mon gouvernement a done jug6 oppoxtun de soumettre la question B l’attention duConseilde s8curit8, en priant cette haute assemblde de rappeler au GOUvernement congolais qu’il lui appartient, et a nul autre, de protBger les vies et les biens des ressortissants du Portugal vivant au Congo, I1 est a peine besoin de souligner que l’attaque me&e centre l’ambassade du Portugal 2 Kinshasa, acte condamnable selon toutes les normes de conduite, ainsi que la oampagne de menaces et d’incitations a la violence suscitent chez le Gouvernement poxtngais les apprehensions lesplus graves quant B la sgcurit8 de la communaute portugaise au Congo, 58. Je n’ai pas llintention de rBpondre en totalitfZ & la plainte congolaise au oours de la presente seance. Je suis certain qu’on compxendra faoilement qu’il me faut du temps pour Studier la declaration que vient de faire le Ministre des affaires &rang&es du Congo, De son discours, je retiens que le Congo se troupe dans de grandes difficult8s, et nous compatissons sans reserve aux souffrances du peuple congolais. Je nyarrive cependant pas B discerner ce que cela peut avoir & faire avec le Portugal, 11 n’a pas BtB apporte de preuve, sinon de ce que lo Gouvernement congolais

I call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I too would like to reserve the right to reply to the objections which will be presented to us by the representative of Portugal. powever, I would like to put some questions to him here and now. 62. With respect to the safety of his nationals, I should like him to tell me the exact number of Portuguese living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to tell me also the number of Portuguese whom, since oux country became independent, the Congolese Govexnment has left without protection. I think I can say that the Portuguese nationals in the Congo, some of whom no longer even recognise the authority of Portugal, are living in peace and that no threat has been made against them. We merely, at one point, warned the Lisbon Government that this business of mercenaries coming from Angola was extremely dangerous and apt to cause the wrath of the people to break forth, We added that we would be unable in such event to meet the obligations which tradition and international conventions impose on us with regard to the protection of foreign nationals. 63. As for the sacking of the Portuguese Embassy, I merely wish to point out that the Portuguese Government has in its possession a note from the Congolese authorities, which were themselves surprised by the suddenness of the people’s action and the swift intervention of the highest military authorities, thanks to which it was possible to rescue thediplomatic staff of the Portuguese Embassy at Kinshasa. I think that the representative of Portugal should rather acknowledge the prompt action takenby the Congolese Government. He should also inform the Council of the fact that when, on the following day, over 3,000 young people were about to demonstrate again in front of the Portuguese Embassy, it was the President of the Republic and myself who personally went to the scene in order to dissuade the demonstrators and make them go away. IS that not evidence of our Government’s constant concern to protect his country’s nationals? I do not think that in Portugal the President of the Republic 60. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je donne la parole au Ministre des affaires Btrangeres de la Rtspublique democratique du Congo, 61. M. BOMBOKO (RBpublique democratique duCon- ‘go): Je desire, moi aussi, me rEserver le droit de repondre aux objections qui nous seront exposees par le representant du Portugal. Cependant, je tiens a luf poser di?s maintenant certaines questions, 62. En ce qui concerne la sdcurite de ses ressortissants, je le prie de m’indiquer le nombre exact clcz Portugais qui habitent dans 1aRBpublique democratique du Congo et de m’indiquer Bgalement le nombre de Portugais que, depuis que notre pays est indgpendant, le Gouvernement congolais a laisses saris protection. Je crois pouvoir dire que ces ressortissants portugais qui sont au Congo, et dont oertains ne reconnaissent m&me plus l’autorit8 du Portugal, vivent en paix et qu’aucune menace ne leur a Bte adressee. Nous avons tout simplement, a un certain moment, prevenu le gouvernement de Lisbonne que cette entreprise de mercenaires provenant de l’hngola Etait extri?memeat dangereuse et risquait de dechafher la colbre des populations, Nous avons ajoutd qu’& ce moment-lb nous ne serions pas capables d’assumer les obligations que la tradition et les conventions internationales nous imposent en ce qui concerne la protection des citoyens &rangers. 63. Pour ce qui est du sac de l’ambassade du Portugal, je tiens tout simplement g souligner que le Gouvernement portugais est en possession d’une note Bmanant des autorites congolaises qui ont BtB ellesm&mes surprises par la soudainete de l’action men&c par les populations et de llintervention rapide dcs plus hautes autorittSs militaires, intervention grtcc B laquelle le personnel diplomatique de l’ambassadol du Portugal 8. Kinshasa a pu &tre sauv8. Je crois quc le representant du Portugal devrait plutat reconnal’trcl la prompte intervention du Gouvernement congolals. 11 devrait Bgalement informer le Conseilque, lorsquc , le lendemain, plus de 3 000 jeunes gens ont voulu dc nouveau manifester devant l’ambassade du Portugal, c’est le President de la RBpublique et moi-m6me quf nous sommes rendus sur les lieux pour dissuader les manifestants et les faire partir. N’est-cepas la 1~ temoignage d’une preoccupation con&ante, de la part de notre gouvernement, de proteger les ressortissants 64. As to the assistance given us by the Angolan patriots, it is quite obvious that on this point we can never come to an understanding with Portugal, since, in its view, the territories in Africa are Portuguese territories. We Africans, on the other hand, maintain that they are African territories. How can we possibly reach an understanding? We shall never come to an understanding, unless it be on the day when Portugal, following the example of France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and other colonial Powers, embarks on the process of decolonization. Only then can there be mutual understanding, But as long as Portugal, acting on the basis of a philosophy which history has exposed and discredited, endeavours to exercise its domination over territories which it occupies illegally, no agreement is possible, I believe, moreover, that we, for our part, are only complying with the resolution of the United Nations, which oblige all its Members to support the action of peoples desiring to avail themselves of the principle of self-determination. It is Portugal which fails to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly by refusing, in spite of United Nations recommendations, to embark upon the decolonization which all the African countxies are demanding-and not only the Africans but the whole world. On this point, I think that an undexstanding between ourselves and Portugal is impossible. We in the Congo, together with all the Africans and all justice-loving peoples, say that we must help the Angolans to liberate themselves from this unjust and inhuman domination. 65. I reserve my right to reply to the statement that is to be made by the representative of Portugal by way of a reply at the next meeting. 66. Le PRESIDENT (txaduit du xusse): Le Ministre des affaixes Btranggxes de la RBpublique democratique du Congo a, dans la declaration qu’il vient de faire, pose une question au representant du Portugal. Le President voudrait demander au representant du Portugal s’il serait px&t a repondxe maintenant a la que stion qui lui a Bt6 posee. Je donne la parole au reprhsentant du Portugal,

In the statement which he has just made the Minister fox Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has addressed a question to the representative of Portugal. The Chair would like to ask the repxesentative of Portugal whether he feels that he is ready and in a position to answer that question now. I call upon the representative of Portugal. 67. M. DE MIRANDA (Portugal) [ traduit de l’anglais]: Je ne vois pas l’int8xbt qu’il y aurait a multiplier les reponses et les reponse s aux xeponses. J’ai dit qu’aveo votre permission, Monsieur le President, je donnexais une reponse complete & la prochaine shance.

I see no point, Mr. President, in multiplying replies and countexreplies. I said that I was going to give a full reply, if you will permit me, at the next meeting. 68. Le PRESIDENT (txaduit du xusse): J’ai reQu une lettre datee du 30 septembxe 1966 [S/7520] du repI% sentant permanent du Congo (Brazzaville) aupr&s de l’organisation des Nations Unies dans laquelle il demande lfautorisation de participer a la discussion de cette question au Conseil et de faire une deolaration.

The Chair has received a letter dated 30 Septembex 1966 [S/7520] from the Permanent Representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) to the United Nations requesting permission to take part in the Council’s discussion of the item now before us and to make a statement, 64. En ce qui concexne ltassistance que nous aocoxdent les patriotes angolais, il est bien evident que, sux ce point, nous ne pouvons pas nous entendre avec le Portugal puisque, pour lui, les terxitoires qui se trouvent en Afrique sont des terxitoires portugais. Quant a nous, Africains, nous disons que ce sont des territoixes africains. Comment voulez-vous que nous puissions nous comprendxe? Nous ne nous comprendxons jamais ou nous ne nous compxendxons que le jour oh nous vexxons le Portugal, a l’instar de la France, a l’instar de la Gxande-Bretagne, & l’instar de la Belgique et d’autxes puissances coloniales, commencer le pxooessus de ddoolonisation. A partir de ce moment-la, nous nous compxendxons. Mais aussi longtemps que, se fondant sux une philosophie qui est battue en bxbche par l’histoire, le Portugal pretend exercer sa domination sur de s texritoires qulil occupe illGgalement, il n’est pas possible que nous nous entendions. Je cxois d’ailleuxs que, en ce qui nous concerne, nous ne faisons que nous conformer aux r&solutions de cette organisation qui imposent a tous ses membres l’obligation de soutenix l’action des peuples qui veulent jouir du principe de l’autodetermination. C’est le Portugal qui ne respecte pas les x6solutions du Conseil de s&urite et de l’bssemblde g&i&ale en ntamorpant pas, malgxe les recommandations de cette organisation, la d&olonisation que tous les pays africains sont en train d’exigex, et non seulement les Africains, mais le monde entiex. Sux ce chapitre, je cxois que l’entente entxe nous et le Portugal est impossible, NOUS, Congolais, et tous les Africains aveo nous, de m8me que tous les peuples epris de justice, nous disons que nous devons aider les Angolais a se 1ibBrer de cette domination injuste et inhumaine. 65. Je me r&serve le droit de xepondxe a la rdponse que le xepxesentant du Portugal fera & la proohaine seance.

It now remains for us to decide on the time and date of the next meeting. If I am not mistaken, the consensus is that the next meeting of the Security Council on this item should be convened on Monday at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 4.45’p.m. Litho in UN. Price: U.S. 0.50 {or equivalent In other currencies) 30061-October I%&-2,000 70. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): 11 nous reste maintenant B decider de la date et de l’heure de la prochaine seance. Si j’ai bien compris, les membres du Conseil semblent desirer que la prochaine Gance du Consell de &curite consacree & cette question ait lieu lundi a 15 heures. La s&nce esf lev&e 4 16 h 45’.