S/PV.1452 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. M. A. El K0n.v (United Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.

The Security Council will now continue its examination of the item before it. 3. Before the Council begins its discussion, I should like to draw members’ attention to a number of reports received from the Secretary-General since the Council last discussed this question a week ago; those reports transmit supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and have been circulated in documents S/7930/Add.83 to 87. 4. In addition, the Secretary-General has provided me with three sets of photographs taken by the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal area. One of those sets of photographs relates to the inquiry into the mining incident of 10 September, described in document S/7930/ Add.8 1; the other two, to damage suffered by United Nations installations, reported in document S/7930/ Add.83, paragraphs 3 and 4. I shall pass these photographs around the table during the meeting; if members of the Council wish to examine them in greater detail, they may be inspected in Mr. Chai’s office, room 3519. 5. We adjourned our last meeting on the understanding that members of the Council would hold themselves available for consultations and for further consideration of the item on our agenda in the light of those consultations. That was on 11 September. Since then the President has been conducting consultations with all members of the Council on a daily basis, with a view to determining what further constructive steps could be taken by this Council in the light of the three complaints set out on the agenda before us, and taking into account the reports from General Odd Bull on the incidents in the area. These consultations have obviously not moved as quickly as some members of the Council might have wished. Nevertheless, patience does seem to have its reward and I am now in a position to present to the Council a draft resolution which reflects the agreement obtainable on this subject at this time among the greatest possible number of members of the COUP. On the basis of the informal understanding reached among members of the Council, I should now like to read out the draft resolution and shall subsequently ask members of the Council to take a decision on it in the usual manner, that is by means of a vote. The draft resolution reads as follows: “The Security Council, ‘Recalling the declaration of the Presitient of the Security Council of 9 September 1968, as made at the 1448th meeting of the Council, “1. Insists that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected; “2. Reaffirm its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and urges all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution.” I have asked the Secretariat to circulate the text so that all members may have it before them. 6. With the consent of the members of the Council, I propose that the Council now proceed to vote on the draft resolution just read out. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: None. Abstaining: Algeria. The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with I abstention. 1

I shall now call on those members of the Council that have inscribed their names on my list to speak after the vote. 8. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): We have been a long time anxiously considering what best we can do to prevent further violence and to clear the way to peaceful progress through the efforts of Ambassador Jarring. During these protracted and painstaking consultations we have admired the patience and persistence of our President. Without his forbearance and guidance we could scarcely have reached a positive conclusion. 9. He helped us to take one important step straight away. When the news came of the serious events and loss of life along the Canal on 8 September we met without delay. We proceeded that night to authorize our President to malce an important declaration [1448th meeting, para. 731. It was in the best traditions of the Council that we should meet immediately to check and stop violence, We did not fail to act at once, 10. That action must not be belittled. It expressed the overwhelming desire of the Council; it was a clear call to 1 See resolution 258 (1968). 11. There were other direct results of our endeavoursthough encouragement came not so much from cur speeches as from the statements of the parties. 12. In his first report [S/793O/Add. 74/ General Odd Bull told us that Ambassador Gohar of the United Arab Republic had given an assurance of the continued and unqualified adherence of the United Arab Republic to the cease-fire and to the agreed arrangements to give effect to it on the Canal. “Continued and unqualified”: those were the words of the United Arab Republic, the words that it USed from the beginning. Certainly that was a most valuable assurance. Ambassador BCrard very rightly emphasized its importance when he spoke to us on 10 September (1449th meeting]. 13. We have the recent and explicit assurance of the United Arab Republic that the cease-fire will be respected, 14. We have had equally clear statements from the Israel Government. I say again that we welcomed the decision of the Israel Government to come to the Council-a decision to seek an escape from escalating violence. Ambassador Tekoah told us wlm hc spoke to us on 5 September: “Israel has turned to the Security Council with one purpose in mind: to find in it support for strengthening the fabric of the cease-fire established by the Security Council.” [1447th nzcctirzg, para. 93./ Again a most important assurance. 15. Conscqucntly we had one clear course to follow. We had to rely 011 the assurances we had been given. We trusted that they were given in good faith. Anyone who broke those assurances would certainly carry a very heavy and grave responsibility. It was right to reaffirm the declaration we author?& our President to make. It was right to concentrate on the immediate purpose which is allimportant to everything else-the maintemance of the cease-fire on the Canal. 16. IIZ that aim General Odd Bull and his observers have thrcmghout played an admirable part. We commend their speedy, persistent and courageous actions. We call on both sides to give them greater support and every facility to perform their task. 17. Certainly there are other issues which demand our attention, We are greatly concerned about breaches of the cease-fire in the Jordan Valley and in Syria. We must never forget our obligation to the vast number of refugees now facing another winter of suffering. We are constantly aware that we need to save and speed and support the Jarring mission, We shall pursue the aims I have stated. But our obvious and primary duty was to bring our Present discussion to an early end and open the way to Progress towards a settlement by concentrating on the immediate aim of restoring ilIlC1 IllaiIltiIiIliIlg the cease-fire On the Canal. 19: We take only one step today; but it is an important step, It is a necessary step if the way is to be cleared to go forward without delay-to go forward to transform declared principles and purposes into the realities of a peaceful settlement.

I call on the representative of the United Arab Republic. 21. Mr, EL KONY (United Arab Republic): By now it has become very clear that the policies carried out by the Israeli authorities have two main objectives. The first is iu inflame the already tense situation in the area by embarking on a series of attacks which, coupled with the occupation of Arab territories, can only accentuate their provocative nature, The second is a tactical campaign with the avowed aim of confusing the issues and distorting the facts. These objectives of Israeli policy are no longer a secret to anyone, for basic to Israeli thinking is their endeavour to divert the attention of the Council and world public opinion from their aggression and their continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the process, and by deliberately intensifying the causes of friction in the Middle East, they hope equally to create an atmosphere of pressure on certain quarters, out of which they may procure for themselves additional supplies of arms and funds. 22. Despite all those tactics, the confusion and the distortions created by the Israeli authorities, and notwithstanding the support lent to Israel and its representatives in this respect, the facts remain clear. I should like to recall them briefly. 23. It is a fact-and let us never forget it-that on 5 June 1967 Israel launched a treacherous attack against three Arab countries and invaded their territories. Having admitted their wanton aggression, they are at present maintaining it through the oppression of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The references to aggression and aggressors should be confined solely to those who have founded their policies on aggression: namely, Israel. 24. It is also a fact that the Arab territories tl?at have been occupied by the Israeli armed forces since June 1967 are still, to the present day, occupied by those forces. The continued occupation of those territories, viewed against the background of the repeated statements of Israeli leaders, is an ominous phenomenon and can only confirm the knowledge of the sinister Israeli expansionist designs. 25. A third fact is that ten months ago this very Council adopted a resolution [242 (1967)/ by which a Special Representative of the Secretary-General was designated to Secure the implementation of the provisions of that resolution. It is worth recording in this connexion the different positions taken on the one side by my Government and on the other by Israel towards the Security Council resolution in general and towards Ambassador Jarring in particular. While the United Arab Republic has 26. No amount of verbal eloquence on the part of the Israeli representative or of his authorities can alter those facts. Neither the complaint of Israel nor the distortions of facts contained in the statements of the Israeli representative and the Israeli leaders can diminish Israel’s responsibility for the present situation in the Middle East. It should be kept in mind that the tense situation in the Middle East today is the immediate result of Israeli aggression and Israel’s continued and persistent policy of occupation of Arab territories, and its refusal to comply with the resolution of the Security Council. 27. It is CyniCal on the part of the Israeli authorities and their supporters to consider as provocation any protective action the Arab people in these territories take in defence of their legitimate rights, and their opposition to the oppressing forces of occupation. The real, grave and Cont~V-ling provocation is the occupation of Arab territories. 28. The real intentions of Israel with regard to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November were unwittingly disclosed the other day by Mr. Tekoah when he stated before the Council: “in speaking of ‘fundamental’ resolutions, I said, and I quote, ‘the fundamental resolutions . . . of a cease fire’. That was the reference-not to the resolution of 22 November.” [1449th meeting, para. 157.1 This a rather extraordinary kind of interpretation. Mr. Tekoah did not hesitate to confer on the cease-fire resolutions the nature of “fundamental resolutions”-these cease-fire resolutions which by their very essence are of a temporary nature and in accordance with their very provisions are but a first step. At the same time he did not shrink from denying the fundamental nature of resolution 242 (1967), which was adopted unanimously after great efforts and long and tedious consultations. The refusal of Israel to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967) obviously stresses the fact that Israel is bent on aggression, that Israel is inclined towards belligerence, that Israel does not want peace. 29. The Security Council should discharge its responsibility and request forthwith the compliance of Israel with resolution 242 (1967). The Council should not allow Israel to use its obstructive tactics to divert the Council’s attention from the basic elements-which I have expounded on at length-that underlie the situation in the Middle East. 30. The realization by the world community of the dangers inherent in the present situation resulting from the occupation by foreign armed forces of Arab territories has very recently become more acute. On 15 September at Algiers the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted the following resolution: “‘Having heard the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, 011 the situation in “2. Reaffirms, in this respect, its support for the United Arab Republic; “3. Calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, and appeals to all member States of the Organization of African Unity to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of this resolution.” 31. When my Government decided to bring to the attention of the Security Council the latest Israeli attack against the cities of the west bank of the Suez Canal, it expected that the Council would take prompt action and condemn Israel for that act of flagrant aggression. Unfortunately, the action of the Council has been delayed and later obstructed by the intransigence of Israel and its supporters. 32. This is regrettable and is rendered even more regrettable by the fact that the inaction of the Council can only encourage Israel to pursue with impunity its policies of aggression. 33. In conclusion, I should like to stress again that the only solution for the problems in the Middle East is the speedy implementation of resolution 242 (1967). 34. Mr. JARA RECALDE (Paraguay) (translated from Spanish}: My delegation cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution which was distributed to us just now so that it might be adopted by a large majority. It did so in the belief that any appeal to secure the implementation of the cease-fire and to prevent renewed acts of violence would heIp to create an atmosphere more conducive to the exchange of practical ideas which could lead to a just solution of the conflict. To that end, it is also the duty of the parties to give every possible support and co-operation to the Secretary-General’s representative, Mr, Jarring, in his untiring and persevering efforts to bring his difficult task to a successful conclusion. 35. I have to point out, at the same time? that my delegation, faithful to .its traditional policy of repudiating all acts of violence and breaches of the cease-fire, cannot fail to condemn the incident referred to by the representative of Israei in his letter of 2 September to the President of the Security Council (S/8794/, and which led to our present deliberations. 36. Scrupulous observance of the cease-fire by the parties to the dispute and the renunciation of all acts of violence are the prerequisites for the creation of a climate conducive to constructive dialogue. 37. We are convinced that any act of violence, whatever its form, can only inflame passions and thus render even more difficult the peaceful solution of this protracted conflict. 40. My delegation has time and again emphasized that the cease-fire must be strictly maintained by all concerned, not only in order to avoid losses of life, human suffering and material damage but also because any violation of the cease-fire has an adverse effect upon the efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems of the Middle East. This point is covered by paragraph 1 of the resolution. 41. From the discussion of the incidents which have been the subject of our present debate, the importance of the role played by General Odd Bull and his observers in the Suez Canal sector is obvious. I want to say that we understand paragraph 1 to underline the obligations of the parties in that sector to continue, indeed to strengthen, their co-operation with General Odd Bull and his observers. 42. My delegation voted in favour of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. In doing so at that meeting I strongly urged all the parties involved to extend their full co-operation and goodwill to the Special Representative in the exercise of his most difficult and equally important task and in the realization of the high principles embodied in resolution 242 (1967). We therefore whole-heartedly welcome the reaffirmation of that resolution and the call upon the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to Ambassador Jarring in the fulfilment of his mandate under that resolution-that is, as is said in paragraph 3 : “to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resdlution?’ 43. There is no doubt that Ambassador Jarring has done and is doing what was expected of him, and that in a most outstanding manner. But without the co-operation of the parties he cannot make substantial progress in the direction of that peaceful and accepted settlement called for in resolution 242 (1967). 44. We believe that the time has now indeed come for the parties to move with imagination and courage towards a solution.

A short while ago my delegation voted in favour of the resolution that you read out to the Council, Mr. President, although it reflects only a part of the action which we should have liked this Council to take. We have done so in a spirit of co-operation and hope. All of us here, indeed the entire membership of the United &tiOllS, desire peace in the Middle East. It is towards the achievement of this noble end that this Council has SO far directed all its wisdom and resources and adopted resolu- 53. All the efforts made during the past twenty yean to remove from the scene those most immediately concerned, namelY, the Palestinian people, by reducing them to the status of refugees, have proved vain; the heroic resistance of the Palestinian people has achieved an international resonance and dimension, however much the usurpers would like to silence it. 46. When we stress the need for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) we do not even for a moment minimize the importance of respect for the cease-fire by the parties in the area. Respect for the observance of the cease-fire, however, is nat an end in itself. 54. Our Purpose in briefly recalling the basic causes of the tragedy of the Middle East was to emphasize the particular responsibility of this Organization in the matter during the last twenty Years. We also wished to state that the time had come for the Security Council, whose principal function it is to maintain international peace and security, to require the immediate cessation of the Israeli occupation of the 47. In fact, peace-keeping and peace-making in the Middle East are inseparably linked together. The former can hardly be emphasized without equally stressing the need for the latter. It is the conspicuous absence of a rational juxtaposition of these two essential elements from the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 that has led to the present situation. territOrieS of sovereign States, Members of thjs Organ&ation, and to take all necessary steps to contribute to the restoration of ‘the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. No real solution to the tragedy of the Middle East will be achieved so long as the Security Council fails to tackle the very roots of the evil. To ignore this reality and to be content with provisional solutions can only postpone the inevitable. 48. Tension is rising again in. the Middle East. It is our fervent hope that the situation in the area wilI not worsen and that the unqualified reaffirmation by this Council of resolution 242 (1967) will help in creating conditions which will lead to the speedy and full implementation of that resolution, providing a sound basis for the construction of a durable and lasting peace in the Middle East. 55. Consequently, Mr. President, my delegation had no choice but to abstain from votirig on the draft resolution which you read out to the Council.

My delegation wishes to state very briefly the reasons why it cast an affirmative vote on the resolution which the Council has just adopted.

During our recent discussions of the item which is still on the Council’s agenda, the Algerian delegation made it quite clear that provisional solutions which were perpetuated could only aggravate the political situation. We are convinced that this aggravation of the situation will persist until such time as the causes of which it is the effect have been adequately dealt with. Those causes lie in the military occupation of the territories of sovereign States. 57. The text is the result of lengthy and exhaustive negotiations which have been conducted under your able guidance, Mr. President, and all of us are aware of the difficulties which we have met along the way. We are much indebted to you. 58. On this question of the Middle East, a problem of semantics is now added to the political problem, which is quite complex in and of itself. The word “acts” is now supposed to denote the acts of one particular party, while the word “action” is generally thought of as denoting an action by the other party. There are semantic subtleties around the concepts of “maintenance”, “establishment” or “restoration” of the peace. There is the additional question of the emphasis to be placed on peace-keeping, which is supposed to be in the interest of one of the contending parties, and on peace-making, which is construed to be of special interest to the other side. Cease-fire should be mentioned, but should not be mentioned too often lest it be inferred that we visualize a permanent Cease-fire-g S@P 50. The mere toleration of such a situation, which has now subsisted for over a year, is a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and a challenge to its authority. We continue to believe that the source of the dangerous tension which prevails throughout the Middle East is Israel’s constant aggression and its stubborn determination to pursue a policy of territorial expansion at the expense of the Arab countries-not the incidents which are but the expressions of that policy. 51. Moreover, through the escalation of the faits accomplis which Israel has perpetrated sjnce the outset of the crisis in the Middle East, and through the acquiescence and support of certain Powers, Israel has been strengthened in its belief that it may one day reach what are purported to be its biblical frontiers. In our view, failure to require the immediate withdrawal of Israel’s forces of occupation from Sovereign Arab territories constitutes direct encouragement short of the permanent settlement which we are bound to seek. The whole question is by now impregnated with semantics; and semantics can sometimes be as delicate and explosive as plain politics. 59. We mention all these facts in order to make it quite clear that, although acceptable to us, the text that we have to the maintenance of the occupation or at the least to its exploitation as bargaining coin. 60. None the less, the text as finally adopted presents some extremely valuable features, namely. 61. Firstly, it reaffirms the Plesident’s declaration of 9 September requiring strict observance of the cease-fire (1448th meeting, para. 73J. 62. Secondly, it stresses the necessity for all Members of the United Nations to co-operate towards a peaceful settlement of the question of the Middle East. We consider that this paragraph entails, inter &a, an implicit appeal to the major Powers to strive towards mutual understanding on the all-important question of the supply of armaments and implements of war. We have stressed this point of the arms escalation on different occasions and it is our earnest opinion that some day, somehow, the Council will have to tackle this problem from a much more direct and definite approach. The third paragraph of the preamble contains, in our view, the basis for further action by the Security Council in this particulat field. 63. Thirdly, it strikes an acceptable balance between the concepts of peace-keeping and p5ace-making, and it stems from the premise that the responsibility of the Security Council is the achievement of a permanent political decision, nut that of concentrating on isolated incidents, acts of violence, or violations of the ccacc-fire. 64. Fourthly, we are happy to see th:li it r&firms rcsolulion 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which contains the principles and provisions for a fair and equitable solution of the problem. 65, Fifthly, it extends full support to the task of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, in his efforts towards reconciling the views of the contending parties towards a final settlement. 66. These are positive points which compensate for any possible shortcomings. We have cast an affirmative vote on the resolution on the assumption and in the hope that it will contribute to a definite settlement of the question of the Middle East, and with the clear understanding that it is not directed against anyone but is clearly directed towards pence and security in the area. For the delegation of Brazil this is an occasion not only for the explanation of vote, but also for tfie expression of a hope.

First OF all, Mr. President, I should like to join those who have already expressed to you their appreciation and their admiration for the role which you have played in the conduct of the negotiations that have brought us back to the table here 68. The serious incidents in the Suez Canal sector which have been the subject of this Council’s public and private deliberations over the last two weeks have been a matter of deep concern to my Government. This concern has been all the deeper because of the fact that the incidents involved took place in a sector which had been relatively quiet for nearly a year. As Ambassador Ball emphasized to the Council on 11 September (1451st meeting], we have been concerned that the situation in the Suez area could become very dangerous indeed unless the parties on both sides of the Canal exercised the restraint and the forbearance necessary to ensure a scrupulous observance of the ceasefire. 69. For those reasons we considered it essential that the Council should insist, as it did in the resolution just adopted, upon rigorous respect for the cease-fire which the Council had ordered in past resolutions, and that we should thereby supplement and strengthen through a formal resolution the declaration which the President was authorized by the Council to read out on 9 September requiring the parties to observe the cease-fire. 70. Now in addition to those points, I should like to observe that, as Council members, we must all be distressed at the reports circulated to us today of the damage done to United Nations installations on both sides of the Canal during the incidents of 8 September. General Odd Bull has now reported in document S/7930/Add.86 that he has made strong protests to both Israel and the United Arab Republic against actions during that incident which placed the safety of United Nations staff in grave and unnecessary danger. In those actions, control centres and several observation posts were hit in such a way that, to use General Odd Bull’s words, the possibility of error was most unlikely. I feel confident that other members of the Council have in mind, as we do, that a resolution insisting upon rigorous respect for the cease-fire clearly also covers what General Bull has asked for, namely, effective measures to prevent the recurrence of any action which places the safety of the United Nations staff in the area in unnecessary danger-a staff which, after all, serves as the agent of this Council and performs an indispensable role in supervising a cease-fire that has been ordered in our resolutions. ‘71. The need to arrest a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East through a rigorous respect for the cease-fire now becomes all the more critical and urgent as we look to the immediate future, to Ambassador Jarring’s return to New York and the continuation of his peace-making efforts here. I think no one would refuse to agree that this is a critical and important moment for the parties, as well as for Ambassador Jarring’s mission, and thereby a critical and important moment in the pursuit of peace. And none can fail, therefore, to see that the Council had a clear responsibility to make its own contribution to that process. My delegation believes the Council has done so in this most recent step of urging directly the parties 72. The operative elements of the resolution we have just adopted today, in our judgement, wisely and properly place demands and obligations on’ all of the parties. We have insisted that the cease-fire should be rigorously respected by all and all are urged to co-operate to the maximum in the achievement of a settlement. 73. I think that we cannot conclude this meeting without expressing one additional word of concern about further obstacles to peace in the area which have been brought to our attention by documents submitted just last night. Our basic fears and apprehensions about the implications of the Suez incidents have been reinforced by incidents in the Israel-Jordan sector of the cease-fire. Those documents have been put before the Council today. Accordingly, in concluding these comments on the resolution, I should like to take this opportunity of urging that all the Governments in the area should recognize that this resolution we have just adopted is in both language and intent directed to all sectors of the cease-fire.

As I have no further speakers on my list, I should like to speak briefly as the representative of CANADA. 75. In so doing, 1 should like to single out four points pertaining to the question we have been considering which my Government regards as most important. They are not new, but they bear repetition. 7G. Firstly, the goal of this Council and of the States directly concerned in the area must surely be to further the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Secondly, progress towards that goal, through the mission entrusted to the Secretary-General’s distinguished representative, is only impeded by outbreaks of violence which increase tension in the area. Thirdly, the cease-fire resolu- .tions adopted by the Council require the prevention by the parties of any and all violations of the ceasefire. Fourthly, it is incumbent upon the parties to extend the fullest co-operation to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. It is indeed in their interests so to do, for such co-operation will contribute significantly to the maintenance of the cease-fire in the area. 77. As regards the fourth point, I should like to take this opportunity to express, through the Secretary-General, our appreciation of the dedication to duty in hazardous circumstances which has marked the work of the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector. This Council, it seems to me, is indebted to them for their reports and for their highly valuable contribution to the maintenance of the cease-fire. 78. We in this Council cannot falter in our support of resolution 242 (1967), which was adopted unanimously last 79. ln adopting the resolution presented at the opening of this meeting, the Security Council has exercised its authority and has acted with a sense of responsibility in the face of a dangerous and deteriorating situation. I can only hope that the Council’s action will serve as a deterrent to escalation of violence in the Middle East and that, as I suggested in a previous statement, both parties in the Suez Canal sector with which we have been concerned in these discussions will strictly abide by the assurances given of full respect for the cease-fire.

After thorough discussion and lengthy consultations, the Security Council has concluded its consideration of the question of the recent incidents and violations of the cease fire in the Suez Canal zone. 81. The resolution which the Council has just adopted on this question is basically adequate to the needs of the moment and to the situation as it has in fact developed in that region. 82. The violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal zone were the direct result of Israel’s continuing policy of aggression towards the Arab States, and its refusal to comply with the Security Council’s decision and to withdraw its forces from the Arab territories it has occupied. Until quite recently Israel was systematically directing its fresh acts of aggression principally against Jordan; now the Israeli extremists are also intensifying their aggression in the cease-fire area with the United Arab Republic, that is, in the Suez Canal sector. 83.+ Attempts have been made here in the Security Council to represent the situation as though the responsibility for the incidents provoked by Israel rested with the United Arab Republic rather than with Israel. All such manoeUvrCs, however, have collapsed like a house of cards. Nothing remains of the tale of the three helmets and the mysterious footprints in the sand in connexion with the so-called incident of 26 August, nor of that of the alleged Egyptian mine, the detonation of which was used as a pretext for shelling the west bank of the Suez Canal. That shelling, as we now know from the official documents submitted bY General Odd Bull, caused heavy casualties and considerable material damage. 84. Details of the consequences of this new act of aggression and of Israel’s violation of the Security Council’s resolutions on a cease-fire are now known from the report of tile Chief of Staff of UNTSO. General Odd Bull’s report (s/7g3o/AdcE.83/ states that, as a result of the shelling bY 85. And once the deceit was exposed and the truth made known, it became clear that the responsibility for all this lies wholly with Israel. 86. Conclusive evidence has been given in the Council that in both cases there was clear provocation on Israel’s part and that in both cases there was aggressive intent. Such are the facts. 87. In the course of the discussion another fact became even more evident, namely, that, while continuing its previous policy towards the Arab States, Israel is placing every obstacle in the way of efforts to achieve a political settlement in the Near East, is disregarding Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and is thereby virtually paralyzing the activities of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Mr. Jarring. 88. Obviously, in such circumstances, the Seclirity Council’s task and duty, in considering the latest incidents in the Near East, was not only to emphasize the need for strict observance of the cease-fire resolutions, but also to take a further step forward by placing particular emphasis on the need for the earliest possible impIementation of its resolution of 22 November 1967, providing for a political settlement in that area. 89. In that connexion, the USSR delegation considers it essential to point out once more that only through the implementation of that resolution, which calls for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Arab territories occupied as a result of the aggression of June 1967, can the tension be eased and the necessary conditions ensured for a political settlement in the Near East. Until this is done, there can be no peace or tranquillity in that region. 90. The overwhelming majority of the world’s States demand the earliest possible liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab States through the immediate implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. In that connexion, the Council’s special attention must begdrawn to a very recent international document, a resolution’adopted a few days ago by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Organization of African Unity, expressing the will of all Africa, of all the peoples of that great continent. In that resolution, as was pointed out by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El Kony, the Assembly of the Organization of African Unity: “CaZls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967, in accord- This resolution adopted by a high-level African body is clearly directed against those who have been seeking to obstruct compliance with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and who are now seeking to prevent the implementation of that resolution. 91. All sincere supporters of a peaceful settlement ia he Near East may note with satisfaction that the realizatica of the need for the earliest possible implementation of he Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 hasalso been apparent in the statements of the majority of the representatives of States members of the Security Councfl, This realization is now expressed in the decision which the Council has just adopted. 92. The council’s confirmation of that resolution is particularly significant because, since the time of its adop. tion, that resolution has not once been mentioned in Security Council resolutions. In reaffirming that resolution and thereby the need for its implementation, the Security Council urgently calls upon all parties to co-operate more fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in securing the earliest possible fulfilment of the responsibilities laid upon him by that resolution. We all know what those responsibilities were. They were to assist in securing compliance with the provisions of that resolution, and in the first place with the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied by them, and to take all the other steps to bring about a political settlement in the Near East, provided for in that resolution. This is a step in the right direction. 93. The Security Council’s declaration in favour of the speediest possible implementation of that resolution is most timely. That is the main point, the basic significance of the decision which the Council has just adopted. The next step is the implementation of that resolution and that depends wholly upon Israel, since the Arab States have long since expressed their readiness to carry out all the provisions of that resolution. But the matter does not rest with Israel alone; it rests also with those who support it. If they too are prepared to work towards a political settlement in the Near East, as provided for and stipulated in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, then SUCK a settlement can come into being. 94. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is prepared, as it has been from the outset, to do everything possible to that end. 95. In conclusion, we cannot fail to note, in connexion with the item under discussion, the significant and constructive contribution made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El Kony, to the Council’s work and to the ConsuItations among its members, a contribution which led to the elaboration of the draft resolution adopted by the Council. 96. Finally, we should like to take this opportunity to express our sympathy and deep condolences to the rePre-

I call on the representative of Israel.

The Security Council debate initiated by the Israel complaint of 2 September against Egyptian aggression has come to an end. 99. I should like to express to you, Mr. President, our appreciation for the perspicacity, understanding and skill with which you have guided our deliberations. Our appreciation is extended to you and to those members of the Security Council who realized the gravity of the Egyptian attacks, the seriousness of the situ’ation engendered by them, and expressed their concern about these acts of hostility and the danger inherent in their continuation. 100. It is regrettable that the resolution adopted does not reflect these views, bears little relation to the complaint we submitted, and falls short of effective equitable action to halt Egyptian aggression. This is particularly so as there can be no reasonable doubt regarding the facts of the situation, supported as they are by a convincing body of conclusive evidence. 101. It is clear from which side came the unprovoked blows on the cease-fire. It is clear from which side originated the mine-laying raids, the ambushes, the widefront assault by artillery, mortar and tanks. It is clear on which side vehicles were being blown up and people killed, maimed or captured. It is clear which side announced a change of attitude towards the observance of the cease-fire and proclaimed a policy of preventive military operations. 102. The resolution ignores these facts. It is, unfortunately, another expression of the double standard that mars the work of the Security Council on the Middle East question. In its detachment from the Israeli complaint it in fact discriminates against Israel, against Israel’s right to full security from Egyptian attacks under the cease-fire, against the Israeli dead, wounded and captured in wanton Egyptian violations of the cease-fire. 103. TO stay Egyptian acts of aggression and in an endeavour to allay the tension engendered by them, Israel has had recourse to all available United Nations machinery: the United Nations military observers, General Odd Bull, the Security Council. Our requests were simple and modest-to condemn the military attacks against Israel, to 104. We now leave the Security Council table disappointed again and disenchanted. The outcome of the deliberations can under no circumstances be regarded as a satisfactory response to our just complaint, nor does it accord fully with the responsibilities of the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. 105. The Security Council deliberations have, however, helped to unmask Egypt’s attitude and designs. Public opinion in the entire world has not failed to take notice of Egypt’s aggressive policy and actions, which threaten the maintenance of the cease-fire, and of Egypt’s callous attempt to shirk responsibility. The outcome of the debate cannot detract from the gravity of this responsibility. 106. The resolution calls on the parties to observe the cease-fire and to co-operate with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring. My delegation has taken note of the fact that the Arab member of the Security Council did not give his support to this resolution. 107. Israel co-operates and will continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring towards the attainment of agreement on a just and lasting peace. Israel will continue to observe scrupulously the cease-fire with Egypt on the basis of reciprocity. Israel will continue to insist that Egypt should prevent any attacks in violation of the cease-fire. Israel will continue to demand the return of the captured Israeli soldier. Israel will continue to fulfil its obligations to protect its citizens, military and civilian, and the territories under its control.

As there are no further speakers on my list, I take it that we have completed our consideration of the item on our agenda for today. In noting this fact, I would be remiss if I did not thank the members of the Council for their kind remarks addressed to me and for their own patience and co-operation in making today’s decision possible. 109. Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to announce that, in the light of informal consultations, the next meeting of the Security Council will be held at eleven o’oclock in the morning on Friday, 20 September. At that time, with the consent of the Council, we shall take up the question contained in the letter from the representatives of Pakistan and Senegal distributed in document S/8819 dated 17 September 1968. The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Notions publicotionr moy be obtained from bookstores ond distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Notions, Soles Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications der Nations Unies sent en vente dons les librairies et les agencer diporitoires du monde entier. Informez-vows ouprbr de votre librairie ou odrerrez-vour 6: Nations Uni&, Section des venter, New York ou Genive. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Los publicociones de las Naciones Unidas esldn en vento en librerior y coscu dirtribuidoras en lodar portes del mundo. Conrulte a su librero o dirijare o: Nociones Unidar, Secci6n de Venlas, Nueva York o Ginebro. Litho in United Nations, New York Price: SUS. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) 35794-October 1972-2,050