S/PV.1762 Security Council

Before we proceed to consider the agenda, I should like to pay a tribute, as is customary, to the President of the Council for the month of January, Mr. Conzalo Facie, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, who did us the honour of coming to the United Nations on tha : occasion and whose eminent qualities we were able to appreciate. My tribute extends also, of course, to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Femwdo Salazar, who hhnself engaged ably in consultations on the various matters brought to the Council’s attention. 2. My predecessor has already duly welcomed the four other new members of the Council, Since I was not in New York to associate myself with those expressions of welcome, I should like, as the representative of France, to ;rssociate myself with his congratulations in my turn. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Complaint by Imq concerning incidenrs on its frontier with Iran Letter dated 12 Februnvy 1974 frown the Deputy Pennanent Regmsantative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the P&dent of the Security Council (S/11216)

In a letter dated 15 February 1974, the representative of Iran, under rule 37 nf l he provisional rules of procedure of the Council, has requested to be allowed to participate, without the right to vote, in the Council’s debate on the item before it, In accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Charter. If I hear no objection, I propose, in accordance with the Council’s practice and with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to invite the representative of Iran to participate in the Council’s debare without the right to vote. At the invitation of the President, Mr. 8 Hoveyda (Iran) took a place at tlte Council table.

I have also received a letter from the representative of Democratic Yemen asking to be allowed to participate, without the right to vote, in the debate, in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. If I hear no objection, I propose, in accordance with the Council’s practice and with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to invite the representative of Democratic Yemen to participate, without the right to vote, in the Council’s debate. It was so decfded.

This meeting has been convened in response to the request of the representative of Iraq contamed in the letter which is on our agenda. I should like to draw the attention of the Council to another pertinent document, in addition to that letter, namely, the letter addressed to me by the representative of Iran on 12 February 1974[S)11218and Gwr.1).

Mr, President, allow me first LO extend to you, and to the distinguished members of the Council, my sitmre thanks for your prompt response to my Government’s request to hold an urgent meeting of the Council. I have been delegated by my Government to submit to this august body my country’s complaint against Iran. Before I do that, however, allow me to have the honour and the pleasure of extending to you, Sir, our 7. I left Baghdad barely 48 hours ago. I can honestly say that rarely can one witness such a sudden ar.d passionate change in the mood of a couutry withhl the span of a few days as I witnessed in Baghdad recentiy. Only a week ago my Government amlounced sweeping and wide-ranging fInancia1 and economic measures designed to raise the level of income of all the people of Iraq, to reduce the burden of taxation and to increase the purchasing power of all citizens. Those progressive measures were proclaimed to use some of the new revenues to raise the peoples’ standard of Bving and lead the country further on the road of progress and development. The income of all government officers, employees, workers and pensioners was raised considerably. The level and percentage of income tax and those of property, customs and other taxes and duties were reduced. The charges for services rendered by governmental agencies, such as those for electricity and water supply, were considerably lowered. 14. I should like to draw the attention of members of rhd Council to tw6 letters [S/106lS of 24 April 197.2 and S/9323 of 11 July 19691 which are directly related to the item on our agenda. The letter of 24 April 1972, brought to the attention of members of the Council the details of yet another Iranian incursion in a long list of several into Iraqi territory. The letter dated 11 July 1969, contains a resume of the history of the Iraqi-Iranian border disputes. 8. A week ago there was a dominant feeling of joy and optimism among my countrymen, a sense of confidence in the future and in the fact that the country’s wealth was being use: to ensure the welfare of the people and to raise their economic and social standards. It took less than three days and the news of the Iranian aggression to change this jubilation into a feeling of anger, total condemnation and even surprise. My countrymen could not help wondering at and speculating on this sudden and unprovoked turn of events. Why is it that whenever a new and constructive step is taken by Iraq on the road of prosperity and progress, of national unity and solidarity, something of the nature of the Iranian aggression takes place? This wonderment, however, \ras accompanied by a renewed determination: never shall we allow others to encroach on our rights or divert our march towards development and national unity. 15. The problem is neither new nor simple. It goes back in history to the time when Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire, in the sixteenth century, and when modern Iraq inherited +he old Ottoman boundaries as successor of the Ottoman Empire. 16. The Treaty of Erzerum of 31 May 1847 [S/9323, unnex I/ was negotiated as the basis for settlement of the boundaries between the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Wars in Europe, however, delayed the demarcation of the boundariesuntil 1911, when, on 11 December, the Protocol of Teheran was signed by the two parties fmally to settle all border disputes. It provided infer dia hat in the event a divergence of views should a:ise on any issue the question should be suhmitted to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 17. In 1913 the Ottoman Empire and Persia, together with Great Britain and Czarist Russia acting as mediators, signed the Constantinople Protocol of 4Novembe.r /ibid., annex IIf/ which established a boundary delimitation commission composed of commissioners from the four signatory parties. The Delimitation Commission concluded its work in 1914. Its proceedings defined the frontiers in detail. The border dispute was therefore finally settled, as article V of the Constantinople Protocol provided that: 9. NOW I come to the facts of the recent events on my country’s borders with Iran in the Badra country region. IO. On 10 December 1973 a group of Iranian technicians crossed the border into Iraqi territory to survey and delineate the area of ALSabal Police Post. They were accompanied by irregular Iranian troops. They were driven away, but regular Iranian troops replaced them. They are still there, 5 kilometres hiside Iraqi territory. “As soon as part of the frontier has been delimited, such part shall be regarded as finally fixed and shall not be liable to subsequent examination or revision.” Il. On 24 Deccmbcr 1973 Iranian troops again violated Iraq’s territory and attempted to build a road in the Badra county area. 18. After the First World Wa:, however, Iran tried to repudiate those bounddly treaties, and Iranian violation of Iraqi frontiers reached a breaking,pohlt in 1934, when Iraq was finally forced !o submit a formal complaint to the League of Nations in a letter dated 29 November 1934 addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations /see S/9323, sect. IV/. Iraq’s position then, as 12. On 4 February 1974, one day after Baghdad had dispatched its ambassador to Teheran as a gesture of goodwill, lranian armoured mbits supported by heavy artillery launched a premeditated attack on Iraqi border forces, which caused the death of one Iraqi army officer and two privates, wounding seven others. ‘I . . . has left nothing undone in its endeavour to settle the matters at issue direct with the Imperial Persian Government. As will be seen from the correspondence, the numerous conciliatory proposals which it has made, whether for the investigation by joint commissions of particular problems affected by the precise alignment of the boundary, or for the general examination of all causes of hiconvenience to either side arising from that align ment, with a view to eliminating the Inconveniences by appropriate administrative arrangements, have been con. sistently rejected or ignored.” 19. The Iranian position was conveyed to the Iraqi Government in a note dated 25 March 1934 stating that: “, . . the Imperial Persian Government does not acknowledge the official nature of the Boundary Limitation Protocol of 1914, and that it cannot consider the text of the said Protocol as a basis and authority for the definition and futing of the alignment of the boundary between the two Covemments”.l 20. In 1935 direct negotiations between Iraq and Iran were Initiated upon the recommendation of the League’s Council and ended in the conclusion of the Boundary Treaty of 4 July 1937 [S/9323, ennex IV]. Although that Treaty was not favourable to my country, its acceptance demonstrated Iraq’s sincere desire to put an end to the dispute which had dragged on for years. 21. The 1937 Treaty, however, confirmed the validity of the past agreements which Iran had previously declared “null and void”. Article 1 of the Boundary Treaty of 1937 specifically states that the boundary between the two countries is the same as that delimited in 1914 in accordance with the provisions of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913, which the Frontier Delimitation Commission applied on the ground In 1914 and which was described in the proceedings of the Commission. 22. In spite of the Treaty, the Iranian Government continued its encroachment upon Iraq. In its attempts to seize as much as it could of Iraqi territory, the Iranian Government established frontier guardposts with military strength inside Iraq. 23. Those guardposts were established at the following points-and they are irldicated on the map which has been distributed to the members of the Council: (a) AI-Behailah, in the Qalat Salih administrative area, established one kilometre within Iraqi territory; (b) AIJabal, in the Badra county area, established five kilometres within Iraqi territory. This is the same area where the recent Iranian attacks occurred; 1 lmgue ol Naliolrs, Official Jourrral, 16th Year, No. 2, (vebrum 1935), p. 212. (e) Khalat Ian (Kalahan), in the Mandali administrative area, establishes one kilometre within Iraqi territory; and (f) Nee Khedher, in Ma&Ii, also established within Iraqi territory. 24. There were 26 other such posts lllegally established over the years in Iraqi territory. Yet my Covermnent chose to pursue diplomatic means to safeguard its rights, but its repeated protests and communications were in vain, since the Iranian Government persisted in its claims, in contra. vention of the agreements I mentioned earlier. Iran’s aggressive policy towards Iraq was disconthmed for a while during the Second World War, subsequent to the abdication of the former Shah; the Iranian forces were withdrawn from most of the border posts which had been established inside Iraq. Unfortunately, the Iranian Government reverted to its former policy after the war had ended, and attempted to reoccupy the former guzrdposts. When the Iraqi authorities stood fum against those moves, the Iranian Government did not hesitate to resort to the use of force. 25. Iran’s violations of its treaty obligations culminated in its declaration, made in April 1969 to the effect that it was unilaterally abrogating the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937. In this connexion, I would again invite the attention of the members of the Council to document S/9323 wherein the detail8 of the Iranian illegal action and the historical background of the Shatt Al-Arab dispute were amply covered. 26. Since then, the situation along our eastern borders has not been exactly peaceful. My Government drew the attention of the Secretary-General in 1970 and 1971, in several official communications, to the seriousness of the situation on the Iraqi-Iranian border resulting from the continued Iranian concentration of troops and massing of formidable quantities of weapons and war materiel. My Government expressed its zeadincss to accept a special mission of the Secretary-General to investigate the situation along the eastern borders. It had already on several occasions offered to submit the alleged Iranian compiaints regarding the implementation of the 1937 Boundary Treaty to the International Court of Justice. Unfortunately, Iran in both cases turned down our offer. 27. This aggression committed against Iraq is but another step taken in pursuit of Iran’s aggressive policy of expansionism and the fulfilment of the grandiose dream of domlnation and empire, of seehlg the Arab Gulf transformed into a Persian lake. And in the pursuit of that dream, massive Iranian forces launched a cowardly attack in 1971 on the three defenceless islands of Abu Musa, the Greater and the Lesser Tmibs, belonghig to the United Arab Emirates. Now we learn, from Le Monde and the Marlcfrester Gmrdh Weekly of 7 October 1973 that the Shah “has allowed the United States to establish a key electronic listening post on Abu Muss”. According to other sources, a Mr. do Borchgravo goes on: “The Iranians do not yet control all the traffic in the Gulf, but they are certainly moving in that direction. From their new naval gun ompI~cemonts on .2bu Muon and the Greater Tunb Mlands, which they seized from the United Arab EmLate seventeen months ago, they make saot radio checks of uassinn vessels. And thov are even expanding their foothold g the Gulf of Om& and the Indian Ocean, thus making Iran a potential South-Asian a8 well a8 Mid-Eastern power”. “We have every reason to b&eve that Iran wiZ,uso this military build.up to threaten the sole commercial and maht oil artery of Iraq, and to brhtg pressure to bear on my country, and other countries of the area, in fulilbnent of Irant~ expansionist policies.” /16IOth meeting, para. &I]. 29. The Iranian amtament uro~mmmo during the last two years has received wide news c&eragc. In the31 May 1973 issue of Newsweek, there wars a highly revealing article by the senior editor of that magazine, Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave, on Iran’s role in the area, under the title, “Colossus of the oil lanes”. On Iran’s armament programme he wrote the followhlg: Mr. de Borchgrave also quotes the Shah himself on Iran’s role, 88 envisaged by Iran’s ruler: “Not only do we have national and regional responsibilities but also a world role BE guardian and protector of 60 per cent of the world’s oll reserves.” “From his command post at Niavaran Palace in the hills overlookinp. Iran, the Shah has sot out to become the gutidian of the. world’s oil lifeline-a role he clearly relishes. In recent months, he hab: hunched the world’s biggest military build-up sine: the American deployment in Viet-Nam. Teheran’s brass ha8 been buying up milltary hardware from the United States (and to a lesser extent from Britain and Frtume) the way‘most people stock up on a week’s supply of groceries at B supermarket. All told, Iran has spent roughtly $3 billion of it8 oil revenues on military equipment this year alone, and in the next two years Teheran is expected to shell out more for arms than in the pr& 15 years combined. What’s more, the Shah’s tastes rtin to the exotic and the very expensive-from laser-guided bombs and French ground&ground missiles to KC-135 jet t.snkers to refuel his large Fd Phantom fighter-bomber fleet in mid-ah (thereby doubling the jet’s effective range to some 1,400 miles). Among the items on the Shah’s current shopping list: I repeat: “guardian and protector”. The Shah goes on: “Being strong also mean8 we can afford to let people step on our feet, but they must know there is a point beyond which they cannot monkey with us. What we’re buying is a deterrent that will be credible to all our neighbours.. . . The Nixon doctrine says the United States wlll help those who help themselves. That’s what woke doing.” 30. The Iranian Government’s actions in our area would suggest that its interpretation of the Nixon doctrine is that the United States will help those who help themselves to the territories of other people. There is no longer any doubt that the policies implemented by Iran are clearly those of aggrandizement and territotird expansionism. But the Iranian vieions of power and domination are not conEmod to the Gulf area; they now extend to the Indian Ocean as well. The expansi ,I the Iranian navy which is now under way is designed to patrol the sea8 a8 far a8 India, and Iran now claims the right to stop and inspect ships 50 miles off the Imnlan coast. “100 F-4 Phantoms to add to the 72 ho ha8 now-at a total cost of $720 million; “100 F5E Eghters-$300 million; 31. That is how the explosive situation on Iraq’s eastern border8 ha8 developed, causing death and suffering to a large number of people. The situation remains tense and fraught with danger. Several Iranian divisions arc poised in strategic positions across our frontiers. We are confronted by an ambitious, expansionist rind expansively armed war-machine aspiring to play the part of a super-Power. We have suffered from the policies of thie covetous neighbour which readily breaks its treaty commitments and obligatione ln fulfilling its territorial ambitions. Part8 of our territory are now under occupation. Although we prevloualy, on several occasions, drew the attention of the Secrctary.General to the seriousness of the situation a8 a resu!t of the Irnnian incursions, aggressions and troop concentrations, we did not bring our legitimate complaints “10 KC-135 jet tankers-670 million; “700 helicopters-$500 miiiion; “800 British Chieftain tanks-approximately $480 million; “8 cicstroyers, 4 frigates, 12 high.speed gunboats and q repair ships-about $300 million; “14 new Hovercraft to add to what is already the world’s largest operational Hovercraft fleet-f30 mfllion; “2 new air-sea bases-$1 billion. 32. The problem has proved itself tr be insoluble so far for two formidable and very clear reasons: flrst, Iran’s refusal to renounce its territorial claims agabrst Iraq; and second, Iraq’s deter&rod refusal to cede any part of its territory to the Iranian intruders. 33. Thr Securit] Cot&l is duty bound to expend its efforts to see that justice is done, tho ~18 of law uphsld end peace and stabUity restored to the region. Or is an oxpansionist State armed to the teeth to be allowed to encroach upon its neighbours and annex their territories? Iran’s poiicies have already started a dangerous arms race in the region. Perhaps the Iranian Government has roahsed that it is not the only one which can stockpile an arsenal of weapons, and perhaps that is the reason why the Iranian Government would like to see a show-down soonor rather than later. 34. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from l+enchJ: I now call on the representative of Iran. 35. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (fnterpretatfon from l+enchJ: Mr. President, before setting forth my delegation’s views I should like to thank all the members of tho CounciI for having kinoly agreed to allow me to speak here and also to congratulate you on your assumption of the high pO8t which you occupy today during this debate. My delegation, which represents a country enjoying the best of relations with yours, is sure that you wIlI preside over these debates in a spidt of neutrality and sympathy. 36. There ti much irony in the fact that it was Iraq which asked for a meeting of the Security Council on this sorry chapter of the relations between our two countries. For Iran Is the victim of a veritable aggression and yet the: perpetrators of the aggression claisn to occupy.here the position of the plaintiff. We know that certain strategiste recommend attack rather than defence In ordar better to hide the truth. But I must warn the representative of Iraq that his manoeuvre designed to sow confusion by turning facts topsyturvy bespeaks a naivete which Is equalled only by the Inconsistency of his arguments. 37. Unlike Iraq, which on one protoxt or snother has not ceased to provoke disturbances, Iran has constantly tried to show a maximum of self-control and has endoavourod to solve the problems in a spirit of goodnoighbourlinos, particularly through the recently tc-established diplomatic rolations. 38. However, since the Govoromcnt of Iraq has chosen to present here a distortei view of tho recent events, I am duty bound to set the record straight. 40. In recent years a number of Iranians-crutographers, road enpinoers, herdsmen, frontier guards and others-have been constant!, harassed by Iraqis, and we have had to deplore extensive human and materlal losses. Often these Inddents have been accompanied by inoureions of armed Iraqi elemonta into our territory. 41. The inoudon of Iraqi troops on 10 February last was the clbnax of this long series of violations. With the leave of the CounoU , I should iIke to relate the series of event0 that preceded this latest attack. 42. On 15 December 1973, at 1530 hours local time, the Iraqi polke opened tke on the Kanisakhat frontier post. me d&&h that followed lasted until 10 o’olook at night of the next day. 43. On 24 December 1973, at 1000 hours Iooal time, armed Iraqi elements took up positians on the heights of Zaluab and opened tire on the Iranian frontier guards that were making their way towards Kanbakhat. The exchange of fire lasted until 3 o’olock that day and caused the death of one Iranian. It was approximately at the same momont that the Iraqi Command oonoentrated heavy forces, reinforced by armoured vehicles, along the heights of the Irsnian Srontier. 44. On 25 December 1973, at 0800 hours local time, the Iraqi forces started to bomb the Iranian frcntier guards in Kanisakhat. The invaders, baoked by heavy mortars and IIUO~IIIO-~M tlm, during the night occupied the three h& of the Zaluab heights that dominate the KanjanCham Dam and the frontier post of Reza Abad. At mId.day, local tbne, on 25 December, the IranIan frontier guard managed to mpe1 the invadsm from Iraq and reestabbsh its positions on the heights. These Incidents caused the death of a soldier. 45. On 26 December 1973, at 0800 hours local tbne, Iraqi armed elements, entabhshod close to the frontier port of Dorraji, In Iraq, oponod flro on the Iranian frontiot guards. 46. After this axios of incidents tho manoeuvres of the Iraqi armed forces and the shootLg continued sporadiodiy and at different intervals. In the meantbne, tho Iraqi forces began to out up fortlflcations to and brtrodua heavy srmamont along the Iraqi side of the frontier. 47. On 30 January 1574, while the Iranisn herdsman were trjtlng their livestock for gaszIng in the Kulak Heights along the frorrtier line, they were sttacked by the Iraqi armed forces. SO. Tho following munition8 belonging to tho Iraqi in= truders wore selzod inside Iran terrltory: one automatic weapon, one mortar bnttory, a large number of CartridgOB, two box08 containing hand gronados, four artillery battorlos, two boxes of R.P.C. amniunltion, and two telephone B&S. S8. Unfortunately, the Irnai urovocntion8 havo not been limited only to-&e froniio; violation8 and the mass deportation8 of Iranian nationals. I shall put boforo the Council a mere few example8 of specific violation8 of the norms of international conduct committed by Iraq in its mlntion8 with Iran. 51. At 0430 hours local time on Sunday, 10 February, Iraqi armed elements, using light and heavy weaponry, artillery, tanks and armoured carriers, ahelled Iranian frontior post8 at the Zaluab heights, Kanisakhat, Reza pbad, Jazman and the KanjaMham Dam. Faced with the80 unprovoked attacks, the Iranian armed forces returned the fire and forced the lntrodudors to withdraw. 59. For n number of years, wo havo been the victims of incredible hate-camuaians on tho unrt of our noiahbour that have acquired qua&p~.thologicai scope and proportions. For days and nights, the press, the radio and the television controilod by the Iraqi State have ceaselessly hurled insults against our legltbnate r&me and incited our people to rebel. 52. In the meantime the commandant of the frontier guards at Mahran tried to contact its Irnqi counterpart. Parenthetically, the denial of this by the General Staff Radio Baghdad on 11 Fobruary is entirely groundless. 60. But thore is something even more serious. The Irnqi authorities have also sot up training camps to train terrorists and send them to Iran to carry out acts of sahotage. They have constantly incited the Iranians, through the radio and television, to plot against the legitimate rOglme and to overthrow the Government by violence. They hnvo offered asylum to alI sort8 of movement8 that are opposed to the constitutional r&me of Iran. 53. A8 a result of this last incunion of 10 February, a certain number of Iranian frontier guards were killed or wounded. The Iraqis left behind on Iranian soil 14 dead and much ammunition and weaponry, which constitutes irre. futnble proof of the violation of Iranian territory by the Iraqis. 54. In the note sent to the Embassy of Iraa in Teheran bv the Minister for Foreign Affair8 of I& on 1 i February /se> S/11218 and Corr.11 my Government described the facts that I have just moitioned, drew the attention of the Irnqi Government to the very dangerous consequences of such violations, and demanded of the Iraqi Government that it take the necessary measures to punish those responsible and to assure the compensation of Iran for the losses suffered in human lives and materlal, and to assure us that in the future such provocations or violations would not be repeated. 61. I would not have mentionod these incredible acts of hostility on the part of a responsible State had I not in my hand8 tangible proof. For, far from di8gUiBbIg their design8 against the security of our nation, the Iraqi authorities have pushed their arrogance to the point of announcing on their government radio and television station8 a series of raids carried out within Iranian territory and originating from Iraqi territory. Thus, to take one example at random, on Friday, 23 Juno 1972, at 10.20 hour8 local time, the radio of Bassora suddenly interrupted it8 programme to broadcast a communiqud signed by the so&led National Liberation Front of Ahwaz. The communiquO began as follows: 55. It must be added that these territorial violations unfortunately arc only one n8peLb of a far vaster and more complex problem which my country has been forced to face in its relation8 with Iraq. “Children of our great nation, Arab peoples of Ahwaz, in the light of the effort8 of the Shah’s rOgim0 to turn Ahwaz, our lost land with all its Arab characteristics, into a Persian province, it now is up to us, in our just socialist stmggle, to reconquer our beloved land and to unite it to our vast Arab homeland.” 56. Thus, two years ago, a few tens of thousands of persons of Iranian origin and nationality, whose families had, for the most part, lived in Iraq for several geherations, were summarily arrested by the 1r;qi police, bundled into trucks and buses and literally dumped on the Iranian front%r without any other form of tiial. The practice of expelling Iranians has since been continued, although, after certain appeals, they have not been as massive in number. 62. In using the name of Ahwaz, the capit;il of our province, the communiqu6 was speaking of the entire proving of Khuzistan where our main oil industries are “At 0030 hours local time, on 3 JUIIC 1972, one of our detachments of fedayeen attacked 011 Iranian gendarmerie post in Kharabeb in the very heart of Uio province of Ahwru and inflicted tile foiiowing 108808: Seven soldiers killed; destruction of the entire ammunition dump; destruction of an automatic field gun that the cncmy wa8 using against U8. “Our force8 managed to silence the -nemy artiiiery and returned sound and 8afc to their bases after 20 minutes.” 64. Allow me also to quote from the long list of radio Baghdad broodcrists that 1 hove before me, ono corn. mtiniqu6 put out in the form of a slogan on 13 September 1972, at 2030 hour8 local time: “Revolutionary workers, Iraniun ma8888 united under the just banner of the fight against the mercenaries of Iran, arise.” 65. Mombet% of the Council, I shall not take up your time by auotinn ail the bulletins that attest to premeditated in&ions if Irontans torritoiy or of inciting ihe people to revolt in Iran. The example8 I hove quoted ore sufficiently clear lo reveal the true nature of the acts of that Government of Iraq that today wishes to pose h the Security Council a8 a victim. I could go ou for hours madhi cutting8 from the pre88, exccrp6 from the Iraqi radio and television that would illustrate similar bellicose design8 against other province8 of my country, but 1 shall refrain from doing 80. I shall, however, hold at the disposal of the members of the Council that may desire them the document8 that I po88e88. it is, however, intereeting, I think. to Bee in the liaht of these facts, the accusationsof “bnp&ialism”, of “o&esSion’*, of “expansionism”, that the representative of Iraq, foi~owing in the footsteps Of hi8 own Government, has launched against my country. 66. It should not be believed that Iran alone is exposed to these acts of Iraq that ore contrary lo the terms of international low. It happen8 to be a general and current practice in Iraqi circle8 to carry out these acts. I 8hall content myself at this moment with citing il few facts. 67. In 1973, the Iraqi troops unleashed a premeditated attack against n neighbouring country and set up their bridgebcad on its territory. And it was only after very strong diplomatic pressure that they were forced to wltbdraw. But what is curious and edifying is to recall the broadcast from Rtidio Baghdad o !O March 1973, the day of tbo invasion that I am referring to. In fact, it was a repetition of its usual claun, in that it accused the other party of having started the firing to which the Iraqi troops were “forced to reply”. 70. In a statement uf 10 February 1973 tho Government of the country conoorned expressed the consternation and shock caused by the discovery of o voritablc arsenal in the Iraqi Ihnbassy building and by the betrayal of the fraternal mlations between two Muslim COUntrie8. 71, I shall not multiply these examples, but these acts ore not surprishlg to UB because f-r a long time we hove been exposed to the curious octivitioa of our neighbour. Theso act8 prove the origin of the violations of our territory and of i.ltcrnationd law. These sets indicate who in these CO808 is the expansionist in our region. 72. The city of Baghdad, formerly known ss Madinatal&lam-the city of peace--has, in fact, today become a centre of conspiracy against the security of States, and quite justifiabiy has acquired a notoriety for its iraining camp for armed groups intended for sabotage iii neighbouring countries. 73. Therefore, it can be seen that the plaintive language of the representative of Iraq in this Council is in singular contrast with the oggressivc attitude adopted by hi8 Government. And it is hardly the delegation of Iraq that is most indicated to come to give us lessons on international conduct. 74. Gbvious~y, I can put many other facts before the Council. But I tbhlk that the few example8 I have given will inform the member8 of this body regarding the contents of the other documents I hove in my po%ess& Nor do I wish to go into consideration of the true reasons hidden behind the2 acts. I merely wish to reply to gome of the comments mode by the representative of Iraq in his statement. 75. The representative of Iraq said that we msssscd troops along the frontier-1 think he said numerou8 troops. Once S&U he drifted into exaggeration. But I wonder what a m8pon8ibiC Government is expected to do fpllowing upon an incident a8 regrettable a8 that of 1.0 Fcbruar] lost? Is it. not normal for any country to adopt the measures dictated by its defence needs? Furthermore, Iraq ha4 already planned In advance for the defence of its frontier. According to my information, bcforc the incident of 10 February lraai trooos Olonr! the frontier amounted to about two divi’sions, includhig one infantry brigade, one nrmourci brigade, two heavy artillcry batallions, four light artilicly batteries, three police batnliions and, ia the lirst bne, a botailion of mechonieed cavahy, on annourcd bntallion, two anti-aircraft bataihons and two anti-tank batnliions. That wos nt R thnc when Iran had only frontier posts aud gendarmerie posts. Furthermore, according to my informa- 81. Without trying to remopen the debate on this question, I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the impasse ln which we fmd ourselves on this matter is the direct result of the intransigent policy of Iraq over a period of 32 years. In fact, despite our numerous representations, Iraq has always refused to implement certain basic clauses of that treaty. I do not wish to take up the time of the Council on this matter since our oosltion was made amply clear in the letters of 1 and 9 Mai and of 2September 1969 /S/9190, S/9200 and Add.1 and S/9425/ addressed by the representative of Iran to the President of the Security Council at that time. 77. Moreover, it is not the first time that Iraq has loudly denounced the existence of a dangerous situation provoked by its own actions. The representative of Iraq recalled the letter of his delegation of February 1970 to the Secretary General warning of what he celled the massive concentration of troops along the frontiers and claiming that that constituted a threat and a danger. Obviously the representative of Iraq, then as today, omitted to say that Iraq on its side had set up a number of forces along the frontier and that Iran had proposed in a letter to the Secretary-General a simultaneous withdrawal of the forces, negotiated between the two parties. 82. The representative of Iraq also alluded to the three islands nf the Persian Gulf over which Iran re-establlshed its sovereignty, the exercise of which had been interrupted during the colonial period. That question was examined by the Security Council on 9 December 1971 /16lOth meeting/, and the representative of Iraq cited this matter at great length. I shall say that our position was described at that time, end I see no reason whatever to state now what our representative said at that meeting of the Security Council. Suffice it to recall and to stress once again that those Iranian islands had been wrested from the sovereignty of my country during the colonial domination of the region 80 years earlier. All we did was to restore the exercise of our sovereignty over that area that had never ceased to belong to Iran. 7%. The sole difference between then and today is that at that time Iraq had not alerted the Security Council, but had only informed the Secretary-General. The representative of Iraq may think that he is ln a stronger position today because his country is a member of the Council. But 1 wish to tell my Iraqi colleague that his calculations on that score ere false. 83. The representative of Iraq saw fit to criticixe our defence policy. He cited at length newspaper articles from various countries. I shall not cite newspaper articles, for I believe that after the summary that I have given of the activities of our neighbour, and of certain extracts from Iraqi State radio and television broadcasts, it would be very difficult for anyone to blame us. Hence, any criticism by the representative of Iraq seems to me to be quite out of place. 79. The representative of Iraq has contended that Iranian troops were on Iraqi territory to a depth of 5 kilometres, according to the French interpretation to which I listened. Obviously that is entirely false. The bloody encounter of lat week took place on hill 343, ln Zaluab and on the heights of Reza Abad, that is to say, on Iranian territory. If the Iraqis, in mentioning the 5 kilometre factor, were fi&hlg of the region of Kanisakhat, I must stress the fact that that was not the scene of the bloody incident on 10 February. For a number of years a lot of border incidents have occurred at that point within Iranian territory. If the Iraqis have any claims on that area, that is another question. There then would perhaps be a difference on the question of the drawing of borders. But we have long tried to urge the Iraqis to discuss this matter in order to resolve our points of disagreement, including differences concerning the drawing of the boucdaries. But from the procedural point of view it is necessary ior the two parties to agree on the modalities of such a discussion in order to resolve these differences. But here-and I repeat---in our discussion the 84. As I said from the rostrum of the General Assembly in October 1973, 6‘ . * * the arms expenditure of any country should be measured in the light of its size, population, gross national product and per capifu income. And I submit that, on the basis of authoritative surveys by the London Institute of Strategic Studies, confinned by the Swedish International Peace Research institute (SlPRl) surveys, the arms expenditure in Iraq since 1965, in terms of percentage both of gross national produce and per ,apitu income, has been substantially more than Iran’s.“s 2 See Officbl Records of the Gencrd Assembly. Twenty.e~hllr Session, Pletrary A-feelings, 2135th meeting, pars. 156. 86, Once more I must draw the Council’s attention to the fierce hatred of the Iraqi authorities for Iran-a hatred irrefutably proven by the recent events. The magnitude of the recent Iraqi violations was such that the armed forces of that country even attacked the Kanjan Cham Dam, which supplies irrigation waters to the peasants of the region. 87. The new Iraqi attacks are all the more incomprehensible to us, and, I am sure, to the Council also, since they lmmedlately followed the resumption of diplomatic relations between our countries, at a time when conditions propitious for the hnprovement of relations between the two parties had begun to appear on the horizon. Even more astonishing is the fact that instead of making use of the recently reeestablished relations, the Iraqi authorities prefer to come to the Security Council and accuse Iran of having initiated those incidents. I have put the truth before the Council. I have explained and proved to the Council who the aggressor was. And I must add that from the end of December until this day the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad has sent three notes and the hlinistry of Foreign Affairs in Teheran sent two notes to the Iraqi authorities. Today those five notes are still awaiting a reply. 88. Even so, and to leave the door open to negotiations between the parties-which is the only reasonable and fruitful course-Iran abstained from calling on the Security Councl!. And today in this august body I repeat that we consider the recent events regrettable frontier incidents, and we trust that such violations wffl not recur and that the dispute between the parties will be solved peacefully. That is why we have set tomorrow morning as the time for the presentation by the Ambassador of Iraq of his credentials in Teheran. What we are seeking is not confrontation with Iraq but d!rect negotiation based on the principles of international law and justice, principles which take fully Into account the legitimate interests of the two parties, in oV ’ .r to achieve a full settlement of the whole dispute. 89. We trust that the Government of Iraq will also set its feet on the road of reason and will duly consider the contents of our notes as well as our constant and patient offers for negotiation to bring about a complete normalization of our relations. 90. I believe it is in that ligllt tltat the Security Council can best contdbute to the creation of the necessary favourable climate between the parties, 1-l recommending to Iraq that it have recourse to the existing diplomatic relations between the countries. 91, The PRESIDENT I’vterpremtion from I+erdr): I call upon the representa; _ of Iraq, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply. 93. I have addressed myself to a clear specific questionthe question of an armed incursion into our territory and the military occupation of part of it, resulting from Iran’s refusal to abide by its legal obligations and treaty under. takbtgs. But we have been treated to a variety of arguments, evasions and diversions. We have been accused of inciting terrorism, sending arms into other countries, threatening the lives of the innocent, But then those are not arguments that are new to t!te Council. The Council has heard them before, from another party that was very covetous of Arab territory. J em delighted to say that those arguments were totally and utterly rejected then, as I hope they will be rejected now. 94. My colleague from Iran has been telling the Council that Iraq attacked Iran’s borde:s, and that the Iraqis left their arms and the bodies of their comrades in Iranian terdtory. 95. Now, let me ask lthn one very simple question: What line does Iran regard as its boundary? By what means does Iran defme what is its territory and what is not its territory? 96. The clahn is that when we drive away intruders, we are harrasslng Iranian engineers and topographers, I must inform the members of the Council that Iranian engineers and topographers have been most industrious on Iraqi frontiers. The typical ploy used for this creeping annexation and the incursions into Iraqi territory has been exactly that of sending these land enpineers, topographers, cartogra. phers, escorted by regular armed Iranian troops, If they are not spotted and driven away, a military emplacement is Immediately established; then a border post is built, the Iranian flag is raised, and a new claim is made upon Iraqi territory. I have told the Council how many times this ltas been done ln the past. And that is exactly what the Iranians were attempting to do when the clash that is the immediate subject of this discussion took place on 10 February. 97. I have referred, in part, to the armada and armed arsenal which Iran has become. The representative of Iran, quoting the Institute of Strategic Studies, claimed that we spend more per cupfta on armaments. Perhaps that is true, But if we spend more on one gun than they spend on 10, in reiation to per cupitu income, does that make us more daring, more covetous, more aggressive? J believe this argument is too spurious to be taken seriously. 98. We have also been accused of carrying out illegal acts in other countries-acts that are contrary to the norms of diplomatic behaviour. Let me ask the representative of Iran: Is Irar trying to punish Iraq for these acts? Has Iraqi territory been set as a fine for these acts? Has !ran become not only the protector-as its ruler claims it to be-but the policeman, judge and executioner of our arca? Have the norms of intemationa! relations so deteriorated that a State can allot to itself such a role? 100. The whole issue between Iraq and Iran centres on one question: Does Iran recognlze its treaty obligations as they are specified and clearly stated In the 1937 Boundary Treaty between Iraq and Iran? If that is the case, and there is no dispute, we are willing to sit down with them today, on the basis of that Treaty, to consider any complaint they may have, regarding navigation, regarding alignment of the border, or any other subject. And we will certainly reach an agreement. They can go to the International Court of Justlce.and put whatever complaint they have before it, and we wlll submit to its ruling. 107. If I made reference to some instances of Ns country’s actions vls&vls other countries, it was not at all in order to enter upon problems that are no concern of mine, but merely in order to characterize the customary attitude of his country. The only reply he has made to me has been in the form of slogans, without reference to facts. 108. So far as the frontier is concerned, and what he said about It, I might remind hlm that my Government has taken every opportunity of repeating its readiness, as of todav. to sit down at a table with the representatives of Iraq to consider the totality of the points at issue between the two countries, on the basis of the tried and tested rules of international law and international justice. 101. But perhaps they are following the very good example of 1935 and 1936, when direct negotiatfona were going on between Iraq and lran over the establishment of a new border treaty. I refer here to a meeting that took place between the IraqI Minister Plenipotentiary ln Teheran ln 1936 and the Shah, Shah Reza, who is quoted as having said: “Iraq is calling me to account by the centimetre and the mllllmetre. I want no more than two miles of Shatt-Al-Arab opposite Abadan.” He got seven. Now his successor wants more, How much more? Is lt only water? Is it land? Where do the Iranian borders stand; where do they end? What rule of law governs them? 109. As usual, the representative of Iraq has sent the bail back to me and claimed that it was always his country that had sought negotiations with mine and that it waa my countrv that had refused. May I remind him that in 1969 my present Minister for Foreign Affairs, who at that timo was Under-Secretary of State for PolItical AffRirs, headed a delegation which went to Baghdad to initiate negotiations and that circumstances-which I do not wish to mention now-obliged him to pack his bags and go home again becaus the Iraqi delegation was uawlIllng to negotiate. 102. My country faces a very critical situation. Part of it has been occupied and is still under the occupation of the Iranian armed forces. Heavy artlllery and tanks have been Introduced into that area. A concentration of six Iranian dlvlaions stand at strategic points on our borders. At the point of the 10 February clash there is a tank battalion and a mechanlzed regiment In attack and readiness formation. We have taken defensive measures and we have deployed our troops occasionally, We have come to the Council because. we do not want war; we do not want bloodshed; we do not want this kind of relations to be the rule between us and our neighbour Iran. 110. As to the question of the troops purportedly massed along the frontier, there again he sends the ball back to me. I wonder whether in the reply just given by the repreaentatlve of Iraq to some of my statements there waa anything that needs to be taken into consideration. 111. I shall conclude by taking careful note of what he has said, particularly as concerns negotiations between the two countries for the purpose of resolving our disputes. I can only repeat what my Foreign MInIster said on this subject at the last session of the General Assembly. 103. But we cannot tolerate occupation; we coot tolerate humiliation. For flve years we have been patient and tolerant. We have explored, as my colleagues well know, every means and every venue for reaching an agreement, either bilaterally or through the good offices of many friendly persons and friendly States. These efforts have been to no avail. On the contrary, the rate of incidents has been increasIng; they have become bloodier and bloodier. On 10 February they reached a new pitch and a new height. “Iran has repeatedly offered to resolve its problems with Iraq in accordance with accepted norms of lntomational law and practice of States and with due regard to the principles of equity and mutuJ rights and the interests of both parties.“s, 4

I shall say only a few words. I have expressed the readiness of my Government to enter immediately into direct negotiations with the Iranian Government once it recognizes its obligation under the mutually binding border Treaty of 1937. I have not received an affmnative reply. 104. Unless this Council rules for the establishmefit of the rule of law, unless it acts for the preservation of the peace, urdess it tells the aggressor to desist and the lawbreaker to respect international law, then it has been established to no avail, and that would be to the sorrow of everyone, in Iraq and in Iran. 3 Ibid., 2127lh mce~ing, yam. 190. 4 Quoted in Englld~ by the sycaker. number of occusions from 1969 to the present day. I do rite tueetltig rose at 5.25 pm. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS Unite4 Nations publications may be obtained from bwkstmea and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bwkatore or write to: United Nations. .Salea Section. New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LBS PUBLICATION5 DES NATION5 lJNl5S Les publications dea Nations Unies Bent en vente dam lee librairies et les s3enees d&maitaires du mondo entier. Infonnez-vous auprPs de votra Iibraire ou adrew%.-vou B : Nations Unies. Section den ventes, New York ou GenBve. KAH IlOAY’lHTb HBAAHHB OPI’AHH3A9HR OB’bE~HHEHHhlX HAUHH COMO CONSBGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicacionea de Is8 Nnciones Uuidas &An en venta en IibrerIns y ~888~ diatribuidoran en todas pates do1 mundo. cOr.sulte a su librero o dirljssa 8: Nscionea Uoides. See&n de Ventas. Nuove York o Ginebra. Lltho in United Nations, New York P&e: $U.S. 1.00 - 74.32001--AprU 1930-2,200