S/PV.2061 Security Council

Before we commence the business for the afternoon, I should like on behalf of the Council to express our appreciation to Ambassador Troyanovsky of the Soviet Union, President for the month of February, for the precise and skilful way in which he conducted the business of the Council. Adoption of the agenda

I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Angola, Benin, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia in which they request that they should be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. 3. In view of the limited number of places at the Council table. I invite those representatives to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

The first speaker is the representative of the Upper Volta, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group for the month of March. Accordingly, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

Mr. President, before entering into the debate, I would join in your congratulations to the representative of the Soviet Union, who was President of the Security Council last month. I am sure that all of us fully appreciated the excellent manner in which he conducted the work of the Council during the past month. 6. I wish to thank the members of the Council for having acceded so promptly to the request which I, as Chairman of the African Group, submitted to them to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia in the light of the latest developments in that British colony. I am particularly happy that this debate is being held under the presidency of one of the most illustrious representatives of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, Ambassador Ivor Richard. 7. Mr. President, I am most happy at this fortunate coincidence, which I would describe as historic. You are undoubtedly the man best fitted to guide this debate, not only because of your qualities as a skilled diplomat, which we all recognize, but also and above all because the Government which you represent here bears the historical responsibility for the drama unfolding in that country of Africa in which more than 6 million men and women are denied the most elementary rights inherent in human dignity. In congratulating you on your accession to the presidency for this month of March, I should also like to tell you that I am assured in advance that you will successfully guide the work of the Council which will undoubtedly lead to the preservation of international peace and security in the world in general-the principal role of this organ-and in Southern Rhodesia in particular. 8. It is precisely because international peace and security may be gravely jeopardized in southern Africa and specif- 10. Africans love peace and wish to live in peace. The true people of Southern Rhodesia, forced to take up arms under the weight of 80 years of colonial oppression, seek genuine peace and not a parody of peace which would enable the oppressor of today to legalize his existence tomorrow in the eyes of the world and to refine his Fascist practices. 11. The Southern Rhodesian problem cannot be solved within the framework of any internal settlement. And internal to what: to the British colony we know or to the racist illegal minority regime under Ian Smith? The initial illegality that taints the very existence of that regime requires the Council and the international community not only not to recognize such a settlement but actually to condemn it. The very idea of a colony is today as anachronistic as it is illegal. 12. In fact, this so-<:alled internal settlement thought up by Ian Smith and the white minority to suit themselves and in their interest cannot objectively guarantee the exercise of power by the people of Zimbabwe for the people of Zimbabwe. It is intended first of all to cause a fratricidal dvil war for which the people of Zimbabwe would pay the costs in the resultant disastrous consequences. The internationalization of the conflict would then become inevitable and all southern Africa would be in flames, to the great joy of the merchants of cannon and ideologies, who would there find choice ground where they could quench their thirst for money and domination with the blood of the African peoples. Peace and security would be definitively jeopardized in Africa and throughout the world. 13. That is why, in full and complete recognition of the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to live in freedom and independence and to be the master of its destiny, the Council must accept and affirm that that destiny is indivisible. If we do not wish those who bear responsibility for the tragedy suffered by the 6 million blacks who make up the people of Zimbabwe, and whose 14. The procedure to be followed in order to achieve this flows directly froin the right of the people of Zimbabwe to live in freedom and independence, and cannot be the subject of any misunderstanding: that is, negotiations between the colonizing Power and all the liberation movements, leading to neutralization of the forces of oppression of the military and racist regime so as to guarantee the establishment of majority rule and, finally, the process of accession to independence of Zimbabwe on the basis of free and genuine elections. The Anglo-American proposals, while containing some gaps and weaknesses of which we are aware and which we have not failed to emphasize, nevertheless constitute a framework and a base for negotiations which wisdom counsels us to consider as such. I 5. The future of the people of Zimbabwe cannot and must not be sold off cheap simply because, in order to have a clear conscience, it is easier to wash one's hands of the matter as Pontius Pilate did. 16. The Council, which is the guardian of international peace and security will, I am certain, take the appropriate decisions to preserve that peace and security which are so dear to us all; if not, it is to be feared that Africans will have no choice but to continue and intensify the armed struggle until final victory. 17. In assuming their responsibilities before the Council and in acquitting themselves of their duties, the African States and the African peoples, on whose behalf I have the signal honour to address the Council today, have no doubt that the Council will for its part also assume its responsibilities in the interests of all mankind.

The next speaker is the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

In requesting to take part in the current proceedings of the Security Council, my delegation is conscious of the historical significance of the present debate. For it may well be that the outcome of the Council's deliberations over this question may prove to be one of the most important decisions taken by the Council on issues affecting international peace and security. 20. It was almost 12 years ago that the Council determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia, brought about by the illegal minority racist regime, constituted a threat to international peace and security. Since then, the situation has moved from one stage of deterioration to another and no one can seriously deny the fact that today, more than ever before, the Smith regime with its oppressive and repressive measures, coupled with its diabolical machi- 21 • It is with this background in mind that the African S~ates, through the current Chairman of the African Group, tlie representative of the Upper Volta, have requested the pre~en,t meeting of the Security Council. More specifically, ~fnca s concern relates to the present manoeuvres of the illegal racist minority regime aimed, on the one hand, at perpetu_ating the structures of domination and repression in Rhodesia and, on the other, at precipitating conditions for an escalation of the war in that unfortunate land with dire consequences for its people, both black and white. 22. The so-called internal settlement contrived by the rebel Smith is no settlement. It is certainly no panacea that would produce a resolution of the conflict. Rather, it is a p~escri~tion for its escalation and the broadening of its dimensions and magnitude. In a nutshell it is the latest and certainly one of the more deadly of' the series of manoeuvres that the international community has now come to expect from Mr. Smith and his collaborators. 23. What is therefore surprising is not so much that the Smith regime should devise all sorts of techniques to maintain itself in power in Southern Rhodesia-the history of the conflict in Zimbabwe since the proclamation of the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 should clearly make us consider this as a logical move-but that there should be some, even in responsible positions, who may be beginning to entertain certain illusions in favour of Smith's schemes. It is both amazing and sad that this should be so because all of us should know better. After all, Smith has by now clearly distinguished himself by his determination to try and prolong as far as possible his regime's survival at all costs and in all circumstances. 24. This latest move by the minority regime should therefore be viewed in its proper context, taking into account the historical evolution of the situation. Viewing it in that context, therefore, one can only come up with one singular conclusion. This is that, faced with the mounting pressures of the armed struggle, as well as increasing international isolation and opposition, Mr. Smith has clearly realized that the old manoeuvres and old tactics of absolute obduracy and arrogance will lead him nowhere; hence the new manoeuvres and new tactics. But, while the tactics have changed, the central purpose of the regime to maintain itself in one form or another has not changed a bit. 25. Clearly, therefore, from the Smith regime's point of view, the central objective of the so-called internal settlement is not to bring about the genuine transfer of power from the minority to the majority. For the Smith regime has not been ail of a sudden converted to belief in majority rule. Rather, the objective of the exercise is to obstruct such a genuine transfer by instituting a system which, while appearing to confer power on the black majority, essen- 26. I shall avoid the temptation of discussing the specific provisions of the so-called internal settlement as reported by the press. To indulge in such an exercise would be to circumvent the main problem. The relevant question is really whether this so-called internal settlement is in any way a real settlement. Will it bring to an end the illegal racist minority regime with its instruments of oppression and domination? Will it ensure for the people of Zimbabwe a genuine and effective transfer of power from the minority to the majority? Does it provide for conditions in which a genuine exercise of self-determination can take place in that country? Will it stop the rapidly escalating military confrontation between, on the one hand, Mr. Smith's army of repression and oppression and, on the other, the freedom fighters led by the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe? Clearly the answer to these very pertinent questions is a categorical no. 27. Writing in the New York Long Island newspaper, Newsday, in February this year, the paper's national correspondent, Mr. Les Payne, made, inter alia, the following observations concerning the so-called settlement: "Majority rule, Ian Smith said a few years ago, would not come to Rhodesia in a thousand years. In the Prime Minister's recent concession to one-man, one-vote, a thousand years seem to be the amount of time he would like to allow for it to be implemented. "The negotiated internal settlement blueprints a gradual introduction of Africans into the Government and the economy of Rhodesia. The interim government would be 50 per cent European, even though they make up less than 5 per cent of the population. The plan guarantees whites actual control for 10 years beyond that. The pace of change would be in white hands. They would control the economy, the military, the Civil Service, the educational system. Under this scheme, Africans would gain only an appearance of control over their voting precincts and neighbourhoods. "The white supremacist delusion dressed up as majority rule is Smith's answer to the guerilla war pressure that drove him to the bargaining table." 28. Going through the provisions of the agreement for the so-called internal settlement, as reported in the press, one could not agree more.with those comments by the Newsday correspondent. 29. The so-called internal settlement does not provide for the demolition of Mr. Smith's instruments of domination and oppression. To all intents and purposes, the rebel regime's army, police and security forces remain intact. We are supposed to believe that those security forces, which have been the backbone of Mr. Smith's rebellion against the British Crown, the backbone of defiance against the international community and the pillar of internal aggres- 30. To add to the cynicism, a lot of hue and cry is made of the fact that there are to be elections in Zimbabwe with universal adult suffrage leading to majority rule. Naturally, since we have all been fighting for majority rule, it is tempting for Mr. Smith to attempt to bamboozle world public opinion by appearing to accept that goal. The pertinent question is: Under what conditions and in what circumstances wiU those elections l)C: held? The nationalists who for years have been fighting the illegal n!gime and what it stands for may certainly be forgiven if they distrust .Mr. Smith's good intentions. They may be forgiven if they refuse overnight to treat the army and security forces of the oppressor as the guarantor of their freedom and liberty. Above all, does it really require any special talent or wisdom to know that there could never be any climate of confidence in Rhodesia when all those instruments of repression and oppression form part of the so-called internal settlement? And, witl1 the maintenance of all such structures of domination, how can anyone seriously characterize the "deal" as constituting a means for the genuine transfer of power? 31. For more than 10 years now, Zimbabwean patriots have fought and died for the liberation of their fatherland. The struggle has been long and arduous; it has been very bitter. Is it realistic to expect that just when the pressures of their combined efforts and sacrifices, coupled with international pressures, have begun to signal the beginning of the end of minority rule, that they will now allow Mr. Smith's manoeuvres to rob them of the fruits of their struggle? It would indeed be an insult to their intelligence if we believed that the mere cosmetic change of Mr. Smith's role in the affairs of Rhodesia, while his minority clique continued effectively to remain in charge, would presage a genuine resolution of the conflict. Such misconceptions are at best a tragic exercise in self-deception. 32. It should therefore surprise no one that such internal deals will not stop the war nor will they prevent those who are genuinely concerned in the resolution of the conflict from continuing effectively to support the freedom fighters. Smith's internal deals, far from putting an end to the conflict, will lead to its exacerbation and escalation. I submit that that is not what the Council is interested in seeing happen in Zimbabwe. I also hope that it is not the type of situation that Her Majesty's Government, as the administering Power over the Territory, would like to encourage. 33. As far as my Government's position is concerned, our attitude is unequivocal. In concert with the other African States we have, through the thirtieth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting at Tripoli last month, clearly and decisively rejected any such deals. For, faithful to the struggle of the 34. It is important, very important, that the international community should properly understand this latest manoeuvre of the Smith regime. While clearly safeguarding the real power bases of the minority-particularly its security forces-, the Smith regime, in order to overcome international opposition and resistance, is desperately hoping that the international community, and more particularly the countries of the Western world with which Smith believes he has a natural affmity, will be prepared to accept the appearance, rather than the reality, of a transfer of power. But it is significant to note that some important segments of opinion in the Western world which Smith was hoping to deceive are beginning to recognize his manoeuvres for what they really are. The New York Times of yesterday, in its editorial, reflected that recognition when it declared: " ... The deal is little more than a device for keeping real power in the hands of Rhodesia's small white minority ... " •.. The 4 per cent minority would retain effective control of the army and civil service. 'Majority rule' so hobbled by minority rights means no real transfer of power, no matter how many blacks acquire ministerial trappings." 35. But the people of Zimbabwe who have shed their blood to end racist and colonial domination in their land and the African States which have consistently supported them in this struggle cannot and will not succumb to the designs of the Smith regime. Moreover, this very Organization, which has stood firm in opposition to the racist minority regime, cannot remain idle while Smith is cun• ningly creating conditions for a more serious escalation of the war that will have serious international repercussions. No one who is interested in the freedom, peace and stability of southern Africa should entertain any illusions about this deal. Put differently, any sanctioning of the so-called internal settlement can only further inflame the already explosive situation-and here we must express our very grave concern at some of the accolades given to the Smith regime's latest manoeuvre. 36. We believe that such positive evaluations are as unfortunate as they are dangerous. They have only served to encourage the Smith regime in its belief that it can strike an internal deal and outmanoeuvre the anti-colonialist and anti-racist forces both within and outside Zimbabwe. Persisting in the belief that he can still outsmart everybody, Smith hopes to buy more time and create more havoc and devastation. But the liberation war is a reality and the patriotic forces will continue to fight. Free Africa, for its part, has a clear obligation to support that fight so long as the objective of a genuine transfer of power has not been achieved. 37. Jn bringing our concern to the Security Council, we consider this meeting an opportune occasion to warn friend and foe alike of the dangers inherent in the present ~8. Any support, in whatever form, for the Smith regime's internal settlement, any tendency to equivocate can eventually have the most far-reaching repercussions if the struggle in Zimbabwe continues, as indeed it must. To those who sometimes like to conceive of Africa's problems in terms of global strategy and even cold war considerations we say that they would be well advised to recognize that the struggle for freedom in Zimbabwe will continue and ~ll be supported by free Africa and by all those who' have m the past provided and will in the future provide that struggle with the necessary means for its prosecution. 39. Let me make one point abundantly clear. In calling for the rejection of the so-called internal settlement, we do so conscious of the fact that this deal is in reality an invitation to further violence and further bloodshed. It is an invitation to prolonged warfare. We are also conscious of the fact that what the Smith regime is trying to do is to promote what has rightly been descrihed as a "black-on-black civil war". 40. Our interest is to put an end to the war. Our concern is to avoid the internationalization of the conflict. But an end to the present escalating violent confrontation can only be achieved through the genuine resolution of the conflict. To pretend that such a solution can be achieved while ignoring the reality of the war situation in Zimbabwe is, at best, to adopt an ostrich-like posture. It is understandable for Smith, whose armed forces are locked in combat with the forces of the Patriotic Front, to attempt to achieve through manoeuvres what his armed forces have failed to accomplish on the battlefield. But it is both ludicrous and nai"ve to believe that there can be a cease-fire in Zimbabwe without the consent of the fighting forces under the leadership of the Patriotic Front. It is even more absurd to expect that those forces will acquiesce in the effective perpetuation of the power of the minority in a different guise, as envisaged under the so-called internal settlement. 41. If we are, as we must be, seriously interested in finding a just and lasting solution to the vexing problem of Rhodesia, then we must uncompromisingly work for a genuine resolution of the conflict. Such a resolution must have among its indispensable elements the following: the ending of the illegal racist minority regime and the dismantling of its instruments of oppression and repression, principally its armed forces; the effective transfer of power from the minority to the majority, and the emergence of Zimbabwe as an independent State, such effective transfer also presupposing the creation of a new Zimbabwe army; the creation of a climate of confidence in the Territory where the people of Zimbabwe can freely determine their future government. It follows that the maintenance of Smith's instruments of oppression, principally his armed forces, is totally incompatible with the creation of such a climate of confidence. 42. We reject the so-called internal settlement because it negates the aforementioned principles. By the same token, 43. Less than one month after the publication of those proposals, the Security Council, on 29 September 1977, adopted resolution 415 (1977), in which, inter alia, it requested the Secretary-General to appoint a representative to enter into discussions with the British Resident Commis• sioner designate and with all the parties concerning the military and associated arrangements that are considered necessary to effect transition to majority rule. Subse• quently, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand was appointed, and he, together with Lord Carver, has had discussions with the parties concerned. Indeed, after the Malta talks between the British, the Americans and the Patriotic Front, it had been our expectation that the negotiations would be pursued in earnest. 44. To our very profound regret and concern, we have witnessed over the past few weeks and days, in the wake of the reports of the so-called internal settlement, a kind of resignation on the part of the authors of the Anglo• American plan to the manoeuvres of the Smith regime. Commenting on this alarming development, the Tanzania Daily News of 28 February, in a lead commentary, stated, inter alia: "The British have described the reported 'agreement in principle' in Salisbury as 'a step in the right direction'. Now the Americans, who had earlier rejected the Salisbury agreement, sound as if they are having second thoughts. Smith is being allowed to take the initiative and both the British and the Americans are beginning to take a 'wait and see' attitude. "Both the British and the Americans now seem content with taking the back seat and letting Ian Smith do the driving. They have all but allowed Smith to wrest the initiative from them. They have all but abandoned their own proposals. This is clearly unacceptable to the Patriotic Front, the front-line States and to Africa." 45. It is the height of irony that Smith should in fact be allowed to run the show and even be commended by the very people who, in their own proposals, had clearly assumed that the rebel leader would surrender power. We can only observe that, if an impression is created that the United Kingdom or the United States, or both, are willing 47. Naturally, I cannot conclude my statement without expressing my gratitude to all the members of the Council for affording me the oppormnity to address this august body on so crucial an issue. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania is happy to see you, Mr. President, a very distinguished representative of a Commonwealth country with which we maintain friendly relations, presiding over the Council's deliberations. 48. It is perhaps a fitting coincidence that the United Kingdom should be presiding over the current debate. After all, Southern Rhodesia is a British colony, and most of the problems that we arc now faced with in that unhappy land are not totally unrelated to the United Kingdom's own acts of omission and commission over the years as administering Power. My hope-indeed, the fervent hope of my Government-is that the United Kingdom will use its influence both in the Security Council and outside it to promote a genuine settlement of tJ1e conflict in Zimbabwe, for to do otherwise would be most unfortunate and indeed unworthy of a Power with colonial responsibility for the Territory. 49. It would be particularly unfortunate because it would constitute yet another error in the history of the tragedy of errors committed by the United Kingdom in the Southern Rhodesian question. This is not the time for us to go into the history of the acts of omission and commission of the administering Power with regard to this question. But let me just remind this Council that it was the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, who declared in I 965 that Britain would not use force to quell the rebellion, even if Smith went ahead and made his unilateral declaration of independence. Whatever may have been Mr. Wilson's motives, in effect his statement was certainly taken by Mr. Smith as a green light to go ahead with his rebellion. After all, one does not tell a potential thief that, while stealing is a crime, he could get away without serious punishment. 50. We do sincerely hope that, in the particular circumstances of developments in Zimbabwe today, we shall not l:ie witnessing the fulfilment of the adage "History repeats 5 I. Mr. President, in the last few months-and indeed during the most recent years-our two Govermn~nts, th; Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, have worked fairly closely in an attempt to find a negotiated settlement of the Zimbabwe question. We hope that this will continue to be the case, for it would be unfortunate if we found ourselves moving once again along the path of confrontation rather tJ1an that of co-operation. 52. I am therefore confident that your sense of integrity, your capabilities and abilities, coupled with the realities of the situation, will prove to be invaluable assets in enabling the Council to reject decisively the path to chaos, further violence and bloodshed-a path that is clearly indicated in the current so-called internal settlement. l also believe that it is within the Council's capabilities to put an end to this charade and to promote instead conditions that are conducive to a real solution of the conflict in Southern Rhodesia.

I thank the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania for the kind words that he addressed to me and to my country, and I take note of the unkind words that he addressed to me and to my country. 54. The next speaker is the representative of Zambia. I invite her to take a seat at the Council table and to make her statement. 55. MISS KONIE (Zambia): The Security Council is meeting at a critical tfme in order to consider the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. Since 11 November 1965, the question of Southern Rhodesia has been a perennial item on the agenda of the Council and on that of the United Nations in general, but it has defied solution. As the foregoing implies, this meeting is but one in a series. The only unusual characteristic of this particular meeting is that it is taking place under the presidency of the colonial Power in Southern Rhodesia. In addition to the involvement of the British for generations in Southern Rhodesia, you, Mr. President, are personally familiar with and have for quite some time been intimately involved in attempts to find a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. One is reminded of the abortive Geneva conference of only two years ago that was presided over by none other than yourself. 56. Zambia has been watching the situation in Rhodesia very closely. We have reached the conclusion that the recent so-called internal settlement in the British colony of Rhodesia is a sell-out and cannot provide a meaningful solution of the Rhodesian problem for a variety of reasons. 57. The so-called internal settlement in essence perpet• uates the illegal regime in Rhodesia. We regard it as retrogressive. It is even worse than the Kissinger proposals of 1976 which were rejected at Geneva. It clearly en• Prem Chand. In hatching the so-called internal settlement formula, Smith is clearly seeking to undermine and to frustrate the Anglo-American initiative. 59. In spite of some obvious flaws in the Anglo-American proposals, Zambia, along with other front-line States, continues to regard those proposals as providing a framew~rk that could lead to the genuine independence of Zimbabwe. We had hoped that the United States and the United Kingdom would be both willing and able to work for the success of their own initiative. We had also hoped that they had undertaken that initiative with the full determination not to allow Smith to continue to fool them and the rest of the international community. 60. Recent reports, attributed to the United States and to the United Kingdom concerning their attitude towards the so-called internal settlement in Southern Rhodesia, have, to say the least, been disquieting. In particular, statements emanating from the British Foreign Office have continued to give the impression that the British Government is ready to abandon the Anglo-American proposals in favour of the scheme devised by Ian Smith. We find this reprehensible and unacceptable. The British Government should not attempt to wash its hands of the Southern Rhodesian problem before it is resolved amicably. The United Kingdom should not repeat its historical mistakes with regard to South Africa and Palestine the ominous consequences of which continue today. The only notable positive voice that we have heard from Washington is that of Ambassador Andrew Young, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations. He has made statements on the so-called internal settlement negotiations that have shown realism and farsightedness. We know that those statements have earned him the mischievous criticism of reactionary elements in his country, but we hope and trust that his Government will stand by the position he has taken. 61. We are entitled to expect that the proponents of the Anglo-American proposals will be the first to defend them. If they were sincere in advancing the proposals, we do not expect them to abandon them on the altar of expediency. Their credibility is at stake. The circumstances that motivated them in making the proposals for a genuine settlement in Zimbabwe have not changed. If anything, they have worsened and become all the more visible. 62. Southern Rhodesia is today fast drifting towards an ugly holocaust. Smith has intensified his repression of the black majority. Every Zimbabwean, particularly in the so-called protected villages, is a virtual prisoner. The very basic human rights that the rest of the world takes for 63. In concocting his so-called internal settlement scheme, Smith was so nai've as to behave as though the thousands of freedom fighters now dealing devastating blows to his regime did not exist. To believe that these brave young men and women, who have sacrificed their lives for the liberation of Zimbabwe, could lay down their arms because of a sham settlement is to indulge in a costly exercise in self-deception. Indeed, one would have to live in a fool's paradise not to know that only the genuine liberation of Zimbabwe will stop the war that is now raging in that unfortunate land. Realistically speaking, no settlement in Zimbabwe that excludes the fighting forces of the Patriotic Front can be sustained. 64. The concurrence and participation of the fighting forces in any settlement in Zimbabwe is totally indispensable for the stability and genuine independence of that country. The attempts of Ian Smith and his clique to circumvent the fighting cadres are intended only to create a civil war in Zimbabwe. 65. The facts clearly show that in reality the so-called internal settlement gives effective power to Smith, who continues to control the army, the air force, the police and the judiciary. This means controlling the entire machinery of state. The intention of Ian Smith is to divide and rule. Smith's intention in the whole exercise is to cause utter confusion and conflict among the Africans in Zimbabwe, the Organization of African Unity and the whole interna• tional community. 66. Zambia contends that nothing has changed in the Rhodesian situation. Zambia therefore condemns and totally rejects the so-called internal agreement just concluded at Salisbury. 67. Zambia will continue to work for genuine majority rule and independence in Zimbabwe, as indeed in Namibia and South Africa. We reiterate our support for armed struggle in Zimbabwe. It is the effectiveness of the armed struggle waged by the Patriotic Front which prompted the Anglo-American initiative, as indeed the Geneva conference in 1976. We believe that continued and intensified armed struggle is imperative for the success of any negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. As a basis for negotiations, the Anglo-American proposals and the armed struggle, both of which we shall continue to support, are, in our view, not contradictory but complementary. 68. The Patriotic Front deserves the full support of all well-meaning countries for the mature manner in which its members have conducted themselves with regard to the Anglo-American proposals, as demonstrated at the recent talks in Malta between representatives of the Patriotic Front, on the one hand, and representatives of the United 69. Zambia calls upon all Member States to reject the so-called internal settlement. The United Nations must not acquiesce in the scheme of Ian Smith, which is fraught with dangerous consequences not only for Zimbabwe but for the whole of southern Africa. We must remain true to the principles and purposes of the United Nations and seek genuine majority rule and independence in Zimbabwe 'in accordance with· the numerous relevant United Nations resolutions, including ~neral Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). 70. It is now fashionable for the racist minority regimes in southern Africa to talk about so-called internal settlements with a view to circum\·enting the authority of the United Nations. South Afric.a· is currently watching developments in Southern Rhodesia for their relevance to Namibia. We must reject and combat these manoeuvres calculated to preserve white power and privilege in southern Africa and