S/PV.2250 Security Council

I should like, at the very outset of this meeting, to express on behalf of the Council to the Government of Algeria very deep condolences and sympathy for the severe damage and loss of life which Algeria has suffered in connection with the earthquake that occurred there on 10 October. The members of the Council fully share the grief of the people of Algeria over this great catastrophe. Expression of thanks to the retiring Preside&

As this is the first open meeting of the Council for the month of October, I should like to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to the President for the month of September, Mr. TaIeb Slim, representative of Tunisia, for the tireless efforts and great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council’s proceedings during September, when the Council had to consider especially difficult matters. ’ Adoption of the agenda The agendu was udopted. The situation between Iran and Iraq

In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2247th and 2248th meetings, I invite the representative of . Iraq to take a place at the Council table and I invite the representative of Japan to take the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. 5. -The PRESIDENT (interpret&on from Russian): Members of the Council have before them the following documents: S/14205, containing the report of the Secretary-General requested by the Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 479 (1980); S/14203, containing the text of a letter dated 29 September from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General; S/ 14206, containing the text of a letter dated 1 October from the Charge d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran to’ the Secretary-General; S/14210, containing the text of a letter dated 6 October from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General; S/14213, containing the text of a letter dated 10 October from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council; S/14214, containing the text of a letter dated 12 October from the Charge d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran to the Secretary-General; and S/14216, containing the text of a letter dated 13 October from the Charge d’tiaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran to the Secretary-General. 6. I welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Saadoon Hammadi, and invite him to make his statement.

Mr. President, allow me first to extend to you and to the other members of the 8. As one of the founding Members of the United Nations, Iraq has strongly ‘adhered in its international relations to the purposes, principles and rules of the Charter. As we are a member of the non-aligned movement, the principles:‘of non-alignment constitute the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We have not only dedicated ourselves to those principles but have also translated them into ‘action in our international relations. Whether in our region or in the world arena, our policy has always been the preservation of international peace and security, as well as the avoidance of world economic catastrophe. But this policy asbolutely rejects any form of interference from any quarter, irrespective of its pretext. Hence, we cannot agree to any attempt or action to interfere in the internal affairs of our country contrary to the legally established norms of State conduct. 9. Having said that, permit me to state that the problem of which the Council is seized should be looked upon in its proper perspective. Otherwise, we are liable to overlook some of its important dimensions and consequently no viable solution would be likely to emerge. The problem is neither new nor simple. It goes back over 460 years of history. It is not a mere border problem or a minor conflict over navigational rights. It is much wider than that. Historically it is established that, since the year 1520, 18 treaties have been concluded by the “Persian State” with its westem neighbours on its relations therewith; including the question of borders, only to be terminated by that State, whether by word or by deed. 10. We are neighbours of Iran and have shared with the Iranian peoples cultural, religious and humanitarian ties. We have for some time been convinced that the policies and actions of the successive regimes in Iran are clearly those of territorial expansionism. I shall not bother the Council with a detailed historical account. I need only recall one fact of very recent history. All of us witnessed the visions of power and domination of the Shah, which were not confined to the Arabian Gulf area but extended also to the Indian Ocean and beyond. And today we all know that President Bani-Sadr of Iran has declared that between Muslim countries there are no borders. That is not meant to indicate a policy of free and open relations among Islamic States, because the Iranian Govemment claims that many Islamic countries belong to Iran -countries such as Bahrain, Yemen and Oman-and even the capital of my country. 11. The Iranian Government and its representatives claim that, since the Islamic Republic was established in Iran, my Government has adopted a hostile attitude towards the new regime. That allegation is utterly baseless. Khomeini was given refuge in Iraq for about 15 years, and he was given full-scale moral and material support for over seven years. Iraq welcomed the new regime from the very early days, in every sense. “neighbourly and friendly peoples of Iran, hoping that the new republican regime will open wider opportunities to serve the friendly Iranian peoples in a manner that promotes Iran’s role in the service of peace and justice in the world and forges the strongest relations of friendship with the Arab countries in general and Iraq in particular”. 13. To that telegram we received two answers from Khomeini-a nice one, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and another one published by the Pars News Agency and some newspapers between 19 and 21 Arpil, expressing an entirely different attitude in a hostile tone and with improper language. So we pursued the matter through diplomatic channels to seek clarification. We were told by Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi that the former telegram was the official one and that an investigation would be carried out to find out how the second version appeared. We considered the matter settled, although the outcome of that investigation was not communicated to us and we did not see any official correction in the Iranian press later on. 14. Despite that unhappy incident, we continued our official contacts. My Governmentaddressed to the Bazargan Government a note in which it expressed its earnest intention to establish the closest fraternal ties and co-operative relations with neighbouring peoples and countries, especially with Iran, on the basis of respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the legitimate aspirations of peoples in accordance with principles they have chosen oftheir own free will. The note also expressed the view that Iraq had a special view on relations between the people of Iraq and the neighbouring peoples of Iran and Turkey, for those peoples were not merely neighbours but brothers with which the Arab nation in general and the Iraqi people in particular were related by old Islamic ties and a common history stretching over hundreds of years. In addition, the people of Iraq, which had struggled for years against colonial domination, corrupt monarchy and exploitation, had achieved their victory through the revolution of 17 July I%8 led by the Arab Baath Socialist Party. Hence the people of Iraq looked with sympathy upon and supported the struggle waged by the friendly and neighbourly Iranian peoples for freedom, justice and progress. It felt joy and pride when the Iranian people achieved victory in those respects. In the note similar satisfaction was expressed regarding the statements and positions of Prime Minister Bazargan which emphasized the Islamic character of some of the popular trends in Iran, because such had been the prin- IS, Later on, my Government extended an invitation to Prime Minister Bazargan to visit Iraq and discuss bilateral relations and bases for mutual co-operation:‘The same invitation was renewed by the Iraqi Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council during the month of Ramadan-in July and August 1979-in a telegram on that religious occasion. I should say for the record that Mr. Bazargan was also co-operative ‘and tried to strengthen relations between the two countries. 16. .Even after our relations with Iran became tense, the President of the Republic of Iraq, in two meetings with Mr. Yazdi in Havana last year, clearly expressed his willingness to meet with the Iranian leaders at the highest level to resolve our differences peacefully. I reaffirmed the same thing to Minister Yazdi when 1 met with him last year here at the United Nations. Minister Yazdi said that they would consider the matter in Tehran-but nothing happened. 17. Now let us ask: what was the outcome of all those efforts-which surely cannot by any criterion be considered to be hostile? 18. Prime Minister Bazargan resigned, and with him went Foreign Minister Yazdi. So the arena was left free for Khomeini and his followers. At that time, Khomeini reached the point of unmasking the true intentions of his Islamic revolution, by deciding to export it to Iraq and the Arabian Gulf region. Under his auspices, and with his blessings, a meeting was held at Qum of the leaders of the reactionary and sectarian Dawa Party-which means the “Call Party”. The decision was reached to overthrow our Govemment through subversion, sabotage and terrorism by the so-called Jondi El-Imam-that is, the Imam’s Soldiers, meaning the militants of the Dawa Party. The idea was that after enough terror had reigned in Iraq to destabilize its Government, then a popular uprising would bring it down. Here Khomeini was obviously thinking that what he had achieved in Iran could be secured in Iraq as well. 19. The task of the so-called Jondi.El-Imam-the Imam’s Soldiers-was carried out by Iranian infiltrators and residents in Iraq as well as by first-generation Iraqis of Iranian origin. We witnessed all over our country, and particularly in the central and southern parts, acts of sabotage and terrorism of’ mounting magnitude. Such acts were committed at Al-Thawra and Khadhumain in Baghdad, and in cities like Kar- 20. ‘All those acts were directed from Qum, as daily instructions were issued to Dawa agents through Khomeini’s broadcasting stations from Tehran, Qasre-Shirin, Ahwaz, Abadan and Kurdistan. Those stations also issued instructions to manufacture local bombs for use in killing innocent citizens. The Iraqi security forces seized considerable amounts of money, arms, bombs, poisons and explosive materials in the hideouts of the aforesaid criminal group. 21. The most cruel terrorist act was the throwing of bombs at a huge student gathering at the Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad on 1 April 1980, where an attempt was made to assassinate Mr. Tariq Aziz, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Deputy Prime Minister. During that terrorist act lives were lost, and many persons were injured. Similarly, bombs were thrown from the Iranian school at Wazriya Street on the funeral procession of those innocent persons who had been murdered in a previous incident, on 5 April, in which some Iranian diplomats took part. In addition, an attempt was made on 12 April on the life of the Minister of Culture and Information, in front of his Ministry. 22. In ail those incidents, Iranians were caught who fit the description of Jondi El-Imam. 23. We reacted to those acts of terrorism by expelling Iranian residents from our country. Our action :- was prompted by reasons of internal security, as no State in the world could be expected to condone acts against its internal security by foreigners residing within it. 24. It is worth noting that, parallel with the acts I have just described, the Barzani followers-now harboured in and supported by Iran-began to commit similar acts of terrorism in the northern part of our country. In addition, the Khomeini authorities began to prevent the return of Iraqi Kurds from Iran to Iraq, and to persecute any remnants of families when some members of families had succeeded in returning to their homeland. All those acts were accompanied by a formidable public media propaganda campaign unprecedented in its fanatical and sectarian religious overtones. Iraq, in fact, was not alone in witnessing such acts. Similar actions were attempted in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. 26. The Khomeini authohiies accuse us of fomenting, civil strife in Iran amongst the national minorities. Those authorities have lost sight ,of the fact that the Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans.and Baluchi, and the other national minorities in Iran,,,coniributed to the national struggle which brought the downfall of the Shah. It was natural, therefore, that those minorities expected the so-called Islamic revohnion to grant them their national rights. Iraq has nothing to do with their renewed struggle to achieve their national aspirations. Why should we? What inherent hostility could we possibly have had towards Iran or the Iranian peoples, or Khomeini’s for that matter,. had it not been for the most dangerous of a!! forms of interference in our internal affairs? 27. Iraq has placed before the Council, in document S/9323 of 11 July 1969, some historical facts and details regarding the legal status of the Iraqi-Iranian border up to 1969. That document will be brought up to date and presented to the Council in order to show that the policy of territorial expansion is a cardinal policy of successive Iranian Governments. That policy has always followed the same pattern: first, an Iranian allegation; then, a denial of legal obligations, to be followed by a new legal instrument designed to secure a territorial gain for Iran; then the same sequence repeating itself. 28. The Algiers agreement of 6 March 1975’ was no exception to that pattern. The political situation in our region during the period prior to that date witnessed the emergence of the Shah in Iran as the policeman of the region. The expansionist plans and pretentions of the Shah were met by ‘us with’ a firm adherence to sovereignty, full independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Neither ideologically nor pragmatically did we fit into the picture; hence the reactionary rebellion of Barzani was adopted as the means for a solution. 29. The idea was to disrupt our national unity in order to overcome our resistance. The Shah provided huge quantities of sophisticated armaments to Barzani. The Iranian army gave important logistical support to the rebellion. Israel for its part armed and trained Kurdish rebels under Barzani from 1965 to 1975, and also provided them with instructors.This was reported by The Ne\lt York Times of 29 September 1980, which published a report on the disclosure of what it termed the “tightly suppressed secret” by Menachem Begin on the date just mentioned. The report indicates 30. Against that political background the Algiers agreement was negotiated and concluded in the form of a package deal. It had both political and juridical aspects. The spirit of the agreement was that the parties decided in a!! sincerity to conclude it with a view to reaching “a final and lasting solution to a!! the problems pending between their two countries”, and that the arrangements agreed upon were “in accordance with the principles of territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs”. The elements of the package deal were the definitive demarcation of land frontiers on the basis of legal agreements between the two countries; the delimitation of water frontiers in the Shatt-Al-Arab according to the thalweg line; the restoration of mutual security and trust along the common boundaries and the commitment to exercise strict and effective control over them with a view to putting an end to a!! acts ofinliltration of a subversive character, whatever their origin. The most fundamental obligation which the two parties assumed and which indicated the package-deal nature of the agreement was paragraph 4 thereof, in which the parties considered the three provisions just mentioned as “integral elements of an overall settiement and, accordingly, any breach of its component parts would be clearly incompatible with the spirit of the . . . agreement”. 3 1. In order to translate those arrangements into more concrete instruments, a joint Iraqi-Iranian Ministerial Commission was established in which Algeria participated, and a Treaty concerning the, State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations, along with three protocols and annexes, were signed at Baghdad on 13 June 1975.’ In that connection, it is worth noting that article 4 of the Treaty explicitly consecrated the package-deal nature of the Algiers agreement. 32. Upon the coming into force of the Treaty, Iran acquired sovereignty over half of the Shatt-Al- Arab, hence securing an early advantage. In return, Iraq did not receive the land areas that Iran had trespassed on contrary to its international obligations. This was the situation when the Shah was toppled from power. Upon the installation of the new regime in Tehran, the Government of Iraq saw fit to allow the new Government a period of grace before pressing for the completion of the process of the return of the areas belonging to Iraq. 34. I should like to quote here a few examples of the scores of statements made by high-ranking Iranian officials and directed against Iraq and the Arab countries. “We must do our utmost to export our revolution to the other parts of the world and renounce the concept of keeping the revolution within our own boundaries.” On 3 April 1980, Ghotbzadeh, the then Foreign Minister of Iran, declared that Aden and Baghdad belonged to Iran; on 9 April he further added that his Government had decided to overthrow the Iraqi Govemement. BaniSadr, the President of Iran, in an interview with Al-Nahat Al-Arabi wa Al-Dawli, in its issue 151 of 24 March, stated that Iran would not evacuate or return the three Arab islands it had occupied by force in 1971 and that the Arab States of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were not independent States. Khomeini was ,quoted in the Jumhuri lslami dated 19 April as saying that “the Iraqi people should liberate itself from the claws of the enemy; it is the duty of the Iraqi people and army to turn against this non-Islamic party in Iraq”. In an interview with Radio Monte Carlo on 30 April, Ghotbzadeh denied the Arabs the right to reclaim the three islands of Abu Musa and Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Arabian Gulf, because, he said, all the countries around the Gulf are historically part of Iranian territory. In an interview in the AI-Khaleej newspaper of 1 May, Ghotbzadeh was asked whether he did not consider Khomeini’s statement to the effect that if Iraq continued in its policies, he, Khomeini, would go to Baghdad to liberate the Iraqi people as interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Ghotbzadeh replied: “This could not be considered as interference in Iraq’s affairs since we consider the Islamic nation as one, and the Imam [Khomeini] is a religious leader; he is thus a ieader for the Iraqi people and all Islamic peoples; as he feels responsibie for Iran, so he feels responsibility towards Iraq.” 36. In addition, the present Iranian Government committed another grave violation of the Algiers agreement. While the aforesaid agreement enjoined Iran to restore security and trust along its common boundaries with Iraq, and to exercise strict and effective control for the purpose of putting an end to all infiltrations of a subversive character, the Iranian Govem- 37. Unlike the Ayatollah” Khomeini, Iraq still has faith in this international brganization. Iraq has, in fact, twice brought complaints against Iran before the Council. The first was in 1971 when Iran occupied by force the three strategic Aiab islands in the Arabian Gulf, and that complaint was brought on behalf of the Sheikhdom of Ras El-Kheyma. It is sad to have to state that the failure of the Council .to effect Iranian withdrawal from the occupied islands served to encourage the Shah and his ‘successors to pursue their dream of establishing Persian hegemony over the whole of the Arabian Gulf. Iraq’s second complaint before the Council was made in 1974, after Iranian acts of aggression committed across the same borders as are the cause of the present conflict. Again United Nations mediation failed to stop Iranian expansionist ambitions and Iran engaged, as I have already stated, in blatant military interference in northern Iraq. 38. The prelude to the present conflict was not limited to what I have mentioned so far. There were not less thau 57 violations of Iraqi airspace by Iranian military &craft between the period from 23 February I979 to 28 May 1980. In addition to the repeated Iranian artillery fire on Iraqi territories and border police posts, there were more than 15 intensive Iranian bombardments between 26 August 1979 and 3 June 1980. Most of the bombardments originated from the Iraqi lands held by Iran, namely, Zain Al-Qaws, Saif Sa’ad and Maimak. Iraqi and foreign vessels navigating the Shatt-Al-Arab were often subjected to attacks by Iran. All those incidents and violations were the subject of numerous official notes delivered to the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, to which no Iranian replies were received. 39. Declarations were made in official circles in Iran that Iran no longer considered itself bound by the Algiers agreement. On 19 June 1979, Mr. Sadiq Tabtabai, the political assistant to the Iranian Ministry of the Interior, said that Iran did not implement the Algiers agreement. In a statement broadcast by Iran’s television network on I5 September 1980, General Falahi, Deputy Joint Chiefof Staffof the Iranian Army, said that Iran did not recognize the Algiers agreement and that the tireas of Ztiin Al-Qaws and Saif Sa’ad were Iranian, as was Shatt-Al-Arab. The latest statement was that of President Bani-Sadr himself. He was reported by Tehran Radio on 17 September to have said the following to the French news agency: “On the political plane, Iran has not fulfilled the Algiers 40. The response of the Government of Iran to this legitimate position was to escalate the situation to total war through indiscriminate hostile acts involving the use of force against Iraqi and foreign vessels in Shatt-Al-Arab. Iran started bombing civilian centres and economic establishments inside our country. Consequently, my Government was left with no choice but to direct preventive strikes against military targets in Iran. There was, to borrow from the well-known Caroline Case, a “necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation’* .2 -In taking those actions my Government clearly and openly declared that Iranian civilian targets would not be the object of military strikes unless Iran continued to strike at such targets in Iraq. Thus, our actions involve “nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it”.2 41. Iraq does not stand for war, nor does it believe in the use of force in international relations. Iraq, as its record proves, and particularly in its frontier relations with Iran, has always adhered strictly and honourably to the letter and the spirit.of its international commitments. But at the .same time Iraq does not accept any form of threat or aggression against its sovereignty and dignity, and we are ready to make all the sacrifices necessary for the preservation of our legitimate rights and vital interests. 42. Concern has been expressed regarding the repercussions of the recent events on the world economic interests which might be adversely affected. Let me point out at once that Iraq is keen to protect within the limits of its ability the economic interests of other nations. Any attempt to widen the character and scope of our problem with Iran would endanger the situation. Such an attitude would invite further foreign intervention in our part of the world, which we earnestly want to keep outside the sphere of influence and rivahy of the big Powers, in the interest of international peace and security and world economic prosperity. 44. Iran officially rejected the call of the Council. Moreover, in response to the good-will mission undertaken by the President of Pakistan and the Secretary- General of the Islamic Conference, we offered a unilateral cease-fire from 5 to 8 October, which actually went into effect at dawn on 5 October. Iran’s response was a large-scale attack on land and sea and in the ‘air. 45. I should like finally to reaffirm before the Council that Iraq does not stand for the use of force in international relations. We firmly believe in the peaceful settlement of disputes. We fully realize that, as a developing country, we need to utilize all our energies and resources for social and economic development. But, at the same time, we cannot remain idle in the face of any encroachment upon our legitimate sovereign rights in. the totality of our territories, or upon our security, peace and well-being.

I now call on the representative of Iran.

I need not emphasize the significance that we attach to this meeting of the Council. Indeed, the Prime Minister of my country has decided, in view of the importance of the matter before the Council and its significance to the United Nations, to come in person to explain our position and to participate in the deliberations of the Council. However, he will not be able to arrive in New York until Thursday. Accordingly, Mr. President, I ask you to arrange a meeting for the coming Friday so that he . can present the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the matter on the agenda.

The next speaker is the representative of Cuba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

First of all, I should like to express to you, Comrade President, my delegation’s pleasure that you will be presiding over the meetings of the Council in October. Apart from your outstanding diplomatic qualities and your well-known position on matters of 50. I should also like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, the representative of Tunisia, for the efforts he made last month, when he presided over the meetings of the Council. 51. I wish to thank you and the other members of the Council for having allowed me to speak. The situation which has arisen between Iran and Iraq is of grave concern to all countries members of the non-aligned movement, to the third world in general and to all peace-loving forces and States. For this reason I have received instructions from my Government to take part in the consideration of this matter in my capacity as representative of the President of the non-aligned movement. 52. It is well known that it is a cardinal objective of the non-aligned countries to ensure the defence of international peace and security, the non-use of force or the threat of use of force in international relations, the promotion of solidarity and co-operation among Member States and the settlement by peaceful means of conflicts which arise anywhere in the world and which could endanger international peace and secu- . rity, especially those conflicts which involve nonaligned countries. 53. We were truly distressed to leam,of the outbreak of armed conflict between Iran and Iraq. The Govemement and the people of Cuba have maintained close relations of friendship and co-operation with Iraq for many years. My Government, together with the other member States of the non-aligned movement, paid a tribute at the sixth summit Conference, at Havana, to the Iranian people for their triumph against the oppression of the Shah and welcomed the incorporation of Iran in our movement as a fully fledged member. Our feelings towards both peoples, therefore, can but be based on fraternal friendship and the principles and objectives of the policy of nonalignment. 54. When the conflict broke out a few weeks ago, President Fidel Castro, exercising his powers as President of the non-aligned movement and guided by the decisions of the Movement regarding the peaceful settlement of conflicts among Member countries, decided to send the Minister for External Relations of Cuba, Comrade Isidoro Malmierca, to Baghdad and Tehran bearing personal messages to President Saddam Hussein and President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, 55. I am not betraying sky secret when I say that my Government, like all responsible Governments in the world, is deeply disturbed by the development of events, which not only have caused considerable material damage and irreparable loss of life in both. countries but are a serious threat to peace and stability in that sensitive and important region of the world. The Government of Cuba,, consequently, will spare no effort to contribute to a’peaceful and honourable settlement of that conflict, in conditions acceptable to both sides. Our Minister for External Relations, who, as I have said, is carrying out a second round of talks with the leaders of Iraq and Iran, will continue his efforts to achieve this result. 56. I am sure that I am reflecting the feelings of my colleagues in the non-aligned movement when I say that the efforts of the international community must be directed now to an early peaceful and ~mutually satisfactory settlement of the conflict; that an escalation of the military operations, which would only increase the likelihood of the conflict spreading, must be prevented at all costs; and that all States Members of the United Nations must refrain from any action which might lead to a worsening of the present delicate situation. 57. In summary, my delegation hopes that the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the .maintenance of international peace and security, will make an active contribution to the speedy termination of the conflict. In this context, we welcome the efforts being made by the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, and various organizations and Govemments . 58. As the representative of the President of the non-aligned movement, I wish to reaffirm solemnly the desire of my Government, together with the Gove’mments of other members of the Movement, to promote peace and restore friendly relations between the Governments of Iran and Iraq, which could only benefit the interests and the unity of all our countries and peoples. The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m. NOTES _ . . I See United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1017, No. 14903. 2 The American Journal of International Law, vol. 32,. 1938, p. 89. . . HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS ; United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores’and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS D&NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les 1ib:airies et les agences depositaims du monde entier. 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