S/PV.2274 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
11
Speeches
4
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
Security Council deliberations
Southern Africa and apartheid
UN procedural rules
Global economic relations
Arab political groupings
Peace processes and negotiations
In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [2267th to 2272nd meetings], I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Togo, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.
4. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Benyahia :, (Algeria), Mr. Jorge (Angola), Mr. Kaiser (Bangladesh), Mr. Ho1111g~~vo14 (Benin), Mr. Co&a da Costa (Brazil), Mr. Simbananiye (Burundi), Mr. Duprry (Canada), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr, Cedle-Giorgis (Ethiopia), Mr. Jelonek (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Coumbassa
(Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kuscrmaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kasina (Kenya), Mr. Barwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Monteiro (Mozambique), Mr. Baba (Nigeria), Mr. Shahi (Pakistan), Mr. Marinescrr (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Mr. Conteh (Sierra Lromz), Mr. Fourie (South Africa), Mr. Balasubramaniatn (Sri Lanka), Mr. Akakpo-Ahianyo (Togo), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Vrhovec (Yugoslavia), Mr. Kamanda wa Kamalzda (Zaire), Mr. Goma (Zambia) and Mr. Mangwende (Zimbabwe) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.
I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Guyana in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.
At the invitation qf the President, Mr. Sin&i/ (Guyana) took the place reservedfor him at the side of the Council chamber.
In accordance with the decision taken at the 2267th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.
In accordance with the decision taken also at the 2267th meeting, I invite Mr. Peter Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.
I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the following documents: S/14458, containing the text of a note verbale dated 23 April 1981 from the Mission of Algeria to the
6. The first speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.
Mr. President, my delegation wishes to thank you and, through you, the Security Council for permitting Canada to participate in this debate the outcome of which may be of critical importance to the lives and future of many people.
8. At the outset, Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, I wish to express our appreciation for the statesmanlike manner-which in numerous cases has called forward your excellent sense of humour-with which you have presided over these deliberations. The relations between our two countries have always been warm and friendly, in some measure because of the close family links of so many of our two peoples.
9. As one of the initiators and drafters of the settlement plan for Namibia in 1978 [S/12636], it is with the deepest regret that three years later we find the Council still having to consider this issue. Namibia should long since have become an independent State and Member of the United Nations.
10. Since the inception of the effort to achieve an internationally accepted settlement, Canada has worked closely with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The efforts of the Group of Five-as we have become known-have profited from the support of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the Organization and from close co-operation with the Group of African States, particularly the front-line States and Nigeria.
11. Canada regrets the failure of the Geneva talks and is deeply concerned over South Africa’s intransigent attitude, which has blocked implementation of the United Nations settlement plan and heightened tensions throughout southern Africa. Without an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia, the situation can only deteriorate, leading inevitably to an intensification of the armed conflict and to growing regional instability. The South African position is legally, politically and morally untenable and cannot be long maintained.
12. While referring to the question of propriety, however, my delegation feels obliged to express its concern that the Council chose on the opening day of its deliberations on this issue [2267th mectir7g] not to allow all parties concerned in the Namibian question to address the Council under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. Canada believes strongly in the principle of universality as an underlying tenet of the Council’s
14. Active consultations among the five Western Powers are continuing to determine how a negotiated settletnent might best be pursued. The complexity of the situation calls for carefully considered judgements on the part of every participant. The next steps in the effort could affect the course of events in southern Africa for some time to come.
15. Canada believes that the way must be left open for the pursuit of an internationally acceptable settlement. It is with that in mind that we contemplate with the deepest concern the call before the Council for sanctions. Such a course, we believe, would probably put an end to United Nations efforts and could indefinitely delay progress towards Namibian independence.
16. The frustrations of the international community over the failure to bring the United Nations effort to a successful conclusion are fully shared by Canada and our colleagues in the group of five Western Powers. At this time, when the chances of early progress seem slight, the negotiation process must be intensified and every effort made to build on the substantial body of work which has gone into the issue so far, It is essential to retain support for a negotiated solution and to avoid unnecessarily putting obstacles in that path. My Government urges the Security Council to reiterate that support and reaffirms its own commitment to the ultimate goal of self-determination for the Namibian people.
The next speaker is the representative of Bangladesh. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.
I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for giving me an opportunity to address this august Council on a question in which the people and Government of Bangladesh have been deeply involved.
19. It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the high office of President pf the Council for this month. You personify the spirit of the Irish people, their courage, compassion, their unflinching commitment to peace and justice. We have the highest regard and esteem
21. Today, as I address the Council, I am overwhelmed by the backdrop of these deliberations. They are attended by Ministers for Foreign Affairs representing the peoples of continents. They have come here in person and taken time out of their busy life at the behest of the non-aligned movement to demonstrate by their presence the sense of outrage and exhaustion of patience at the continued contempt for international opinion shown by a tiny segment of humanity that is obsessed by a sense of racist supremacy. The world has witnessed the Pretoria white minority rkgime’s continued defiance of and disregard for the numerous United Nations decisions aimed at bringing about a peaceful transition of Namibia from colonial domination to freedom. South Africa has chosen the path of ruthless suppression of the people of Namibia, condemning them to all forms of degradation; South Africa continues ruthlessly to exploit the natural resources of Namibia which by no stretch of imagination belong to it, and in addition, uses that sacred Territory with impunity as a springboard for unleashing acts of terrorism leading to death and destruction and destabilization of the whole of the southern African region.
22. As has been explained in great detail in the course of this debate, South Africa has, in every sense of the word, violated the terms of the Mandate provided for in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The South African record in Namibia is the bleakest chronicle of human history.
23. The heart of the problem is remarkable in simplicity: a Territory occupied by military brute force and a people deprived of its right to self-determination and national independence.
24. In the year 1966 the General Assembly terminated South Africa’s Mandate over Namibia [r.c~solution 2145 (XXZ)] and in the following year established the United Nations Council for South West Africa, later renamed the United Nations Council for Namibia, to administer that Territory until independence [~~solution 2248 (S-V)]. Upon the request of the Security Council, the International Court of Justice in an advisory opinion in 1971’ declared that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal. The decision of the General Assembly and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice clearly underline the juridical status of the Territory.
25. But, despite universal condemnation and rejection, South Africa’s hold over Namibia continues; indeed, it is more firmly entrenched than ever before.
26. This august body has been seized of this problem for years, trying one set of useful peaceful solutions after another. In the course of the last three years of deliberations, South Africa has, as always, deliberately placed one obstacle after another in the way of implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). It has raised innumerable objections to every effort of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and as one demand has been met it has promptly raised a new one, each time injecting an extraneous element. The convening of the Geneva pre-implementation talks rekindled some hope-against hope-that the decolonization of Namibia would be achieved through peaceful means. But it was not to be. The racist regime once again chose the path of intransigence and missed agreat opportunity to bring about a peaceful transition of Namibia to freedom and national independence.
27. We congratulate and admire the far-sighted leadership of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the true and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, for its enormous patience and far-sightedness in co-operating with the international community, and its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement as well as an agreement on a target date for the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). But here again, unfortunately but predictably, South Africa chose the path of intransigence and prevarication and frustrated the efforts of the international community to bring about a peaceful and orderly transition of Namibia to freedom and national independence.
28. We congratulate the front-line States on their patience, understanding and flexibility and their acceptance at the same time of enormous sacrifices in dealing with the difficult situation created by South Africa. The statesmanship shown by the leaders of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Nigeria, the ITnited Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe causes us to feel pride and admiration. This is a time of need for them, and we shall all stand by them now and until their ordeal is over.
29. I should also like to express the deep appreciation of my country for the remarkable efforts made by the Secretary-General, for his valiant and patient efforts and those of his able advisers to persuade South Africa to see reason and thus bring about peaceful independence for the people of Namibia. I wish here to reiterate to the Secretary-General the unanimous and continuous support of the Government and people of Bangladesh for all his efforts in the cause of peace in the world.
“Bangladesh believes that a just solution of the problem can only be achieved through implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Algiers plan of action. We also believe that the right of self-determination of the Namibian people can only be exercised through elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations and with the active and full participation of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia.”
31. Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) provide the only practical framework for ushering in independence for the people of Namibia through a democratic and peaceful process. The members of the contact group of Western Powers had and have a special responsibility towards speedy implementation of the plan. All the relevant Security Council resolutions have been adopted with the full knowledge and understanding of the members of the contact group. Their responsibility derives not only from the fact of their commitment as per resolution 435 (1978). The members of the contact group owe it to themselves as well to bring to successful fruition months and years of work that have been put into the endeavour to find a peaceful solution to this problem. It is the firm belief of my delegation that the intransigence and dilatory tactics of South Africa will not be allowed to get the better of the commitment of the members of the contact group. They should impress upon South Africa that they, like all others, do not support or acquiesce in its activities.
32. We cannot accept any attempt to seek a solution outside the framework of the United Nations. We deplore all attempts by the South African authorities to impose a so-called internal solution on the people of Namibia. It is unfortunate and distressing to note that the white minority regime of South Africa has not yet learned a lesson from the events that took place in the not-too-distant past in a neighbouring country. The
33. We cannot put the clock back in spite of the subterfuges and prevarications being resorted to by the regime of South Africa. Has the world community forgotten the resolutions adopted by the Security Council? Can we ignore the extraordinary display of determination shown by the peoples of the world? More recently we have seen the combined decision of the countries of the non-aligned movement adopted at the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers. Do we not remember resolution 439 (1978), paragraph 6 of which warns South Africa in no unmistakable terms that its failure to co-operate with the Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978) would compel the Council:
“to meet forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof, so as to ensure South Africa’s compliance with the aforementioned resolutions”.
34. We are sitting on volcanic resentment. Frustration is building up not only in Africa but in the whole world. The time has now come to act, and act we must, with dispatch. Any further delay in the implementation of Council resolutions would only bring about more misery and suffering for the people of Namibia. We must now give serious consideration to the question of adopting other means, including comprehensive mandatory sanctions, to force South Africa to heed international opinion.
On the question of Namibia practically everything has been said and practically everything has been tried. We could pay a tribute to the eloquence, imagination and perseverance of Member States were it not for the fact that at this time what prevails is a feeling of deep frustration. It is the general conviction that we have already gone beyond what is tolerable and that the United Nations must without delay take steps to safeguard its honour and its future.
36. This debate, which is honoured by the presence of many Ministers for Foreign Affairs, has been called
37. In this task he has succeeded Ambassador Florin of the German Democratic Republic, who guided our work with a sure hand and whose constant contribution to the cause of decolonization is highly appreciated by delegations which represent developing countries.
38. These meetings of the Council mark the end of a long process which has exhausted rhetoric and which has given world public opinion evidence of the dramatic impotence of the United Nations. But that process has also created a universal symbol, Namibia, in the light of which the foreign policy of States and the commitment of each to the principles of the Organization become absolutely clear.
39. Three decades ago Namibia appeared on the map as one of the many Territories and peoples subject to colonial domination, It was one piece in the great puzzle of decolonization which the international community was called upon to solve.
40. Since then and within the framework of innumerable wars of independence and liberation struggles, the most profound political transformation of the modern world has taken place: the achievement of sovereignty by almost 90 States, which today make up the international majority.
41. The case of Namibia comes before us today as a regrettable historical remnant of a past reality. It prolongs in time and concentrates in space all the abuses and injustices which stem from that radical disdain for the human being and for his fundamental rights, which we commonly call colonialism.
42. During this debate there has been an accumulation of irrefutable arguments against the illegal occupation of Namibia and the logic of the Power which supports it. It is a question of the usurpation of sovereignty, the objective of which is the economic and strategic appropriation of a vast area and its natural resources, by means of the systematic repression of the Namibian people and acts of aggression and intimidation against neighbouring States.
43. The case of Namibia crystallizes the obstacles which have been raised to the independence of many nations as well as the pillage to which they have been subjected. It explains the militant solidarity with which representatives of developing countries speak in this forum, regardless of their geographical origin, regardless of their system of government.
44. However, beyond the tragedy of Namibia and the solidarity it engenders, the question we are considering places at issue the solvency of the United
45. We shall not undertake an analysis of the problem. For that we have many decisions by competent bodies: the International Court of Justice, the General Assembly and the Security Council. This is not the time to discuss the substance of the problem; the case of Namibia has long since been judged. What is needed now is compliance with resolutions which have been adopted, without subterfuge, escape hatches or covert alliances.
46. Again these days ideological prospects and political positions have come to light which are well known to all of us and on which we need not comment. What is important is to know whether the members of the Council are determined to ensure compliance with the international will by promoting the immediate independence of the people of Namibia and the full exercise of its national rights.
47. This debate has yielded at least one coincidence: all the speakers have reiterated a commitment to achieving the independence of Namibia as soon as possible and to abiding by the terms of resolution 435 (1978). The differences of opinion arise with regard to the method by which that objective is to be attained -and perhaps with the goals of each one of us-that is to say, with the final meaning attached to the principle of self-determination of peoples.
48. Under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations and of relevant resolutions, the independence of a people entails the unrestricted right of that people to select the form of government which better suits its interests, to select its own path to development and freely to dispose of its natural resources. We cannot accept any limitations to the sovereignty of any nation and we do not accept conditional independence for Namibia.
49. Thus the choice of method is a matter of substance. What is the meaning of the formulation in the London communiqu6 that we should adopt “measures aimed at giving greater confidence to all of the parties on the future of an independent Namibia” [S/f&.57, nnnex]?
50. Resolution 435 (1978) mentions only two parties to this conflict: South Africa and SWAPO. The rest of us act under a mandate of the international community but we are not interested parties in a legal sense. To hold otherwise would be to accept the validity of hegemonies or to endorse the theory of “vital interests”, which contradicts the principle of non-intervention and which we reject outright.
51. Is the question then, one of giving guarantees to the other party: to South Africa, to the aggressive
52. In that point we find the true meaning of our recent procedural debate, in which an attempt was made to present a manipulated faction as a party to the conflict, thus establishing a perverse confusion between servility and freedom.
53. It was certainly not our intention to bar freedom of expression. If our intention had been to encourage that, we could have invited representatives of truly significant political parties and trends of opinion, from various States, including members of the Council. What we avoided through our vote was the appearance in this chamber of a caricature of an independent Namibia.
54. Good relations between neighbouring States must be based on equity and mutual respect. They must never be imposed by economic domination or political guardianship. That is all the more true when the balance which seems to be sought would strengthen the racist regime which the conscience of the world has repeatedly condemned.
55. In accordance with United Nations resolutions, what we are seeking is the opposite sort of balance: we want a fighting Namibia, responsible, proud of its racial and national identity and strongly supported by African solidarity, a Namibia destined to become a bastion against the Pretoria regime; we want to facilitate the achievement of the other task to which we are committed, and which we seem sometimes to have forgotten: the elimination of apartheid.
56. Social crises within States have almost always been the price, and the origin, of the process of afftrmation and national transformation. By what authority can we countries which have been the protagonists in the great revolutions of the modem era require of a newly emerging State that, for the sake of an artificial stability, it sacrifice its future and prolong its neo-colonial condition?
57. TWO choices have been presented to the Council to achieve implementation of resolution 435 (1978): to make greater concessions to South Africa or to exert effective pressure on it.
58. In the context of principles, the option is not open to debate: the United Nations can scarcely retreat before those who violate its resolutions and do harm to its principles. The Geneva meeting clearly established the limit beyond which any new offer or concession to the occupying Power would be ineffective and a mockery of the international community.
60. Every day that passes without our halting the Pretoria regime, that regime becomes stronger. According to irrefutable testimony, South Africa has made use of the open and covert support it enjoys to attain a considerable degree of self-sufficiency in the manufacture of weapons, and still continues to import ever more sophisticated military material.
61. We have repeatedly been asked to be realistic. We suppose that this does not imply calling on the Council to bow to a specific policy of power or to admit its impotence at South Africa’s challenge. We understand being realistic to mean the calm analysis of problems and the responsible search for solutions, in accordance with the interests of the whole of the international community.
62. South Africa, of course, is not only an enclave of the past, but an aspect of the present, to the extent that it is the axis of a vast network of economic, political and military interests, facts and figures about which are available to everyone. But it is also true that the very forces which support South Africa and which feed on it would not like to see their international prestige and their relations with other States of Africa and the developing world compromised in this conflict.
63. Thus, it is essential to eliminate the ambiguity and duplicitous language which have held up the work of the Organization. We must clearly show Pretoria that it is wrong to consider the independence of Zimbabwe only as a tactical retreat which we asked of it, in exchange for which we would have to tolerate deferring the liberation of Namibia or allowing it to take place in such conditions that it would represent no threat whatever to South Africa’s interests.
64. We must also show our determination to continue fighting apartheid and promoting the sound, peaceful economic and political development of the peoples of Africa, safeguarding them from aggression.
65. It is time to banish misunderstandings and to restore international confidence, not in the future of Namibia-which is within the sovereignty of its people-but in the fair play and good intentions of those of us who reflect international political will.
66. It is also time to guard against certain trends which could cause this case to be an indication of future strategies. We must prevent struggles for the decolonization and liberation of peoples from being affected by rigid bipolar concepts of international society. We must prevent our nations from being considered empty spaces and our peoples pawns in a policy of blocs.
68. Through the years, Mexico has clearly demonstrated the steadfastness of its position with regard to Namibia. Our attitude is based on a time-honoured national tradition. We are, in our way, a front-line country: we border on two civilizations and two levels of development. We have suffered territorial occupation and colonialism. Our revolutions preceded and accompany the struggle which today liberates many peoples for the full exercise of their sovereignty.
69. For those reasons, my delegation considers that the matter at hand, more than any other, justifies the application of the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, and that if that Chapter did not exist it would have to be written now in the light of South Africa’s behaviour.
70. The PRESIDBNT: The next speaker is the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.
Mr, President, to begin with, I should like to thank you and all the members of the Security Council for having given my country an opportunity to participate in this debate. The debate on the situation in Namibia has reached a crucial stage. The importance of this problem for Africa and the international community as a whole has been underlined by the participation of more than 20 Ministers from all over the world.
72. Mr. President, it is with particular pleasure that we see you, the eminent representative of a country with which we entertain the most friendly and closest relations, in the Chair. We are sure that under your able and imaginative guidance the deliberations of this body will lead to positive results.
73. Let me also pay a warm tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Florin, for the masterly way in which he steered the work of the Council last month.
74. When the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the Security Council in 1977, it was resolved, together with Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to work actively and constructively towards ensuring that Namibia would attain its independence in a democratic way. The settlement plan on which the parties concerned agreed [S//2636] became the basis of Council resolution 435 (1978). The aim of resolution 435 (1978) is in full accord with the foremost objective of our policy towards
75. We have clearly expressed our regret that the Geneva meeting on Namibia was unable to achieve its aim owing to the inflexible attitude of South Africa. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that there is no sound alternative to a negotiated settlement of the Namibia question, We appeal again to South Africa and SWAP0 not to aggravate tension through acts of aggression and border violation.
76. The meeting of the five Western Powers in London last week led to agreement among the participants that endeavours to secure a settlement for Namibia are to remain solidly based on Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Five are about to prepare further steps towards progress on the way to independence for Namibia. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Five will meet in Rome in a few days’ time to discuss the action to be taken. All participants in the present debate should recognize the importance of that commitment at this juncture and should help this eminent body of the United Nations to adopt a position which will encourage the resumption of constructive negotiations.
77. The success of further endeavours towards a peaceful settlement of the Namibia problem will depend on whether a climate of confidence can be established among all parties concerned. The Geneva meeting has already provided an opportunity to reduce prejudices and mutual distrust. Further steps are needed to create a sense of security and confidence in the future, without which there will be no independence for Namibia under conditions of stability.
78. In our view, the imposition of sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter at this point would escalate confrontation and would lead to a deterioration in the negotiating climate without bringing us closer to the aim we jointly pursue. It would indeed be South Africa’s neighbours that would bear the brunt of these sanctions. Southern Africa would be turned into an area of instability from which international conflicts of unforeseeable dimensions could emanate.
79. President Nyerere once said that it was in man’s nature not to rest until he enjoyed freedom and human dignity, which is an integral part offreedom. If man was denied these rights, Nyerere continued, he would stand up sooner or later and fight for his personal freedom within his society or for the freedom of his society from alien domination.
The next speaker is Mr. Johnstone Makatini, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure at the 2272nd meeting, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.
82. Mr. MAKATINI: Mr. President, I thank you and all the other members of the Council for affording me the opportunity to express the views of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) on this burning issue before the Council.
83. I should like at the outset to join the several Ministers and representatives who have preceded me and extend to you, Mr. President, the warmest felicitations on your assumption of the lofty position of President of the Council during the month of April. The able manner in which you are conducting this important debate convinces us that, under your guidance and given the co-operation of all the other members, the Council can indeed achieve the sacred objective so ardently expected by the oppressed and struggling peoples of Namibia and South Africa. I hasten to add that our hopes are further reinforced by the Irish people’s well-known traditional support for the international fight against upurtheid.
84. I should like also to congratulate your eminent predecessor, Ambassador Florin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, on the able manner in which he conducted the affairs of the Council last month.
85. The importance attached to this debate by the peoples of Africa and the world that love freedom, justice and peace cannot be overemphasized. It is being clearly shown by the unprecedented participation of so many Ministers for Foreign Affairs and others of leading cabinet rank, Africa, Asia, Latin America and part of Europe have, through spokesmen given a mandate by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the non-aligned countries, with unparalleled vigour and unity of purpose articulated the position of more than two-thirds of humanity on the decolonization of Namibia. Adopted at New Delhi and reinforced at Addis Ababa, Luanda and Algiers, that position is an unequivocal expression of the grave concern and indignation of the so-called third world over the continued illegal occupation of Namibia. This criminal situation which in itself constitutes a threat to international peace and security is further aggravated by the attendant crimes being perpetrated daily by the upartheid rCgime with ferocious brutality not only
not only motivated by our conviction that the struggle being waged by the oppressed peoples of Namibia
and South Africa is one and indivisible. It is also a I
manifestation of the profound admiration and solidarity our people feels towards the valiant Namibian people, 1 which, under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, are today spearheading our common struggle against the common enemy, and which have in the past two years registered important political, diplomatic and military victories, which we share. It is also to declare for the world to know that we for our part intend to spare no effort towards the intensification of the ongoing political and armed struggle in South Africa and to help hasten the inevitable vindication of General Malan’s panic-motivated observation that “no nation can simultaneously fight an insurgency on its borders and fight insurgency at home”.
87. In the wake of the combined victories registered by the brotherly peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which drastically changed the balance of forces in our favour, the impact of the heroic struggle being waged by the Namibian people has further heightened the determination of our people to play and conclude their long-awaited role in the total liberation of our continent.
88. We consider every procrastination or prevarication aimed at buying time for the apartheid rt5gime in Namibia as directed against our struggle and as part of the imperialist global strategy to ensure the bolstering and spread of the hated rkgime’s hegemonistic tentacles, which are totally inimical not only to the aspirations of our people but also to those of the entire continent and progressive mankind.
89. As stated in the past few days by most of the speakers, including Mr. Picho Owiny, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Uganda [2267tlz meeting], the history of Namibia is one of continued betrayal of trust. Throughout the long history of colonialism, four forces have combined to thwart in Namibia the outcome long achieved in other former German Territories like Togo, part of Cameroon and erstwhile Tanganiyka. These have been and continue to be the giant transnational corporations operating in Namibia, the white minority racists who enjoy paradise and power in Namibia, the armed forces of the apartheid regime which occupy Namibia and some Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which are bent on the perpetuation of the status quo in Namibia.
90. We do not intend to dwell at length on the historical details which have been so eloquently articulated by a number of honourable Ministers and representatives. Suffice it to stress that the problem of Namibia
91. From the time when the South African regime challenged the credentials of the United Nations to deal with the question of Namibia as the legal successor to the League of Nations and when it requested-unsuccessfully-that Namibia be incorporated as its fifth province, right up to its intransigence at the Geneva pre-implementation meeting, that regime has clearly demonstrated its irreversible rejection of a negotiated settlement which would conform to the previous decisions of the Council. It is against that background that the application to have the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) address the Council and the statement made by the representative of the Pretoria rCgime must be examined.
92. South Africa’s inability unilaterally to defy world opinion on the question of Namibia has been demonstrated by its constantly changing strategies. When assured of full support by powerful allies; it adopts an openly defiant attitude; when convinced that the international pressure is too strong to resist, South Africa and the same allies opt for a neo-colonialist solution. The roots of such a current neo-colonialist strategy designed to impose a fictitious solution in Namibia can be traced to South Africa’s invasion of Angola and the subsequent defeat it suffered, Much that has happened since then-like the recent resounding victory of the patriotic forces in Zimbabwe under the leadership of Comrade Robert Mugabe and the SWAPO-ANC heightened level of mass and armed confrontation in Namibia and South Africa itselfhas led to renewed and frantic attempts at imposing a neo-colonialist situation. In this the imperialist Powers have played a significant role.
93. In January 1976 the Council adopted resolution 385 (1976), providing for free and fair elections. South Africa refused to comply and instead announced its own sham elections in Namibia. In a quest for its own
94. Alarmed by the persistent call for mandatory economic sanctions, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America urged the United Nations to allow them an opportunity of negotiating with South Africa to accept United Nations supervised and controlled elections. In April 1978 the r6gime announced its acceptance of the plan. At the same time, it mounted the most savage repression against SWAP0 and its followers. Cassinga in Angola was attacked and more than 800 unarmed men, women and children, refugees, were killed. That point was most effectively conveyed last week by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania [2273rl1 meeting].
95. In December 1978 the rbgime forced gun-point elections in Namibia. Not surprisingly, DTA won the so-called elections, which flew in the face of Council resolution 435 (1978). Then came one “reason” after another for not complying with the United Nations plan for the implementation of resolution 439 (1978). What has happened since then convinces us that the main objective was to provide South Africa with a breathing period within which to consolidate its aggressive position in Namibia and launch a murderous onslaught against the people of Namibia, SWAP0 and the front-line States, especially Angola and Zambia.
96. Today, the DTA-dominated “National Assembly” has been transformed into the so-called Council of Ministers with full executive powers, thereby reaching the last stage before the proclamation of a unilateral declaration of independence. The attempt to have DTA, that illegal puppet entity created by the illegal occupant of Namibia, address the Council was therefore a public relations exercise intended to earn it international recognition, in keeping with the strategy of unilateral declaration of independence.
97. A flurry of appeals has been made also to the Council members and the non-aligned spokesmen not to allow the so-called understandable frustration to gain the upper hand. The Council is being exhorted to abandon the idea envisaged in the Charter for the solution of such cases. We are being told not to resort to confrontation but to allow for continued persuasion. We are of course not told why the contact group’s promised collective leverage over South Africa has not been used.
98. These appeals, which come after so gross a breach of promise, are tantamount to asking SWAPO, the OAU and the non-aligned countries to endorse the rapidly unfolding plot aimed at thwarting the Iiberation of Namibia and facilitating the destabilization of and aggression against the front-line States, whose
99, The Federal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia made an extremely important point when he said:
“The attempt to portray [the problem of Namibia] as part of East-West confrontation constitutes a manoeuvre by South Africa aimed at making use of current international tensions in order to prolong its occupation of Namibia and its domination in southern Africa” [2270th meeiing, para. 1311.
While it is true that this is not new, that this manoeuvre is in fact in keeping with the regime’s oppressive legislation, which defines any activity designed to bring about social, political or economic change in South Africa as furtherance of communism, there are two additional elements which are cause for concern.
100. South Africa’s use of this age-old tactic, universally rejected as a vain attempt at isolating the national liberation movement by projecting the legitimate struggle against apartheid as being engineered by some external and generally unknown force, has hitherto posed no serious problem. After all, all oppressive regimes-be they Fascist, colonialist, racist or imperialist-have, at different times in isolation and with equal dismal failure, resorted to it in a vain attempt to halt the national upsurge of the anti-colonial and antiracist struggle. That was the case in Algeria, Angola, GuineaBissau, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and other Territories. It has always been the case in Namibia and South Africa, to the degree that an impression is created that blacks are considered inherently incapable of determining on their own that, having been robbed of their land and denied their inalienable basic human rights by an alien Power, they must follow in the footsteps of the American people and scores of others to fight, gun in hand, for their independence and liberty.
101. A number of the Ministers participating in this debate no doubt recall that only yesterday they shared with SWAP0 and ANC the terrorist and Marxist label. George Washington would have dismissed such propaganda with the same attitude as Comrade Robert Mugabe did only a year ago.
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103. On this question the Johannesburg Week/y Star of 15 April observes that:
“Without question, Mr. Reagan means to have better relations with South Africa. He has a nostalgic view of South Africa as a staunch ally of the past. , , and a keen sense of South Africa’s importance as supplier of defence-related minerals.
“South Africa’s anti-communist rhetoric also attracts Mr. Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State, who tends to see southern Africa through the same East-West lens as his one-time patron, Dr. Kissinger, did”.
104. Recalling the notorious secret memorandum 39 drawn up by the National Security Council during Nixon’s Administration, which argued that there was no realistic or supportable alternative for the Americans except to side with the whites in southern Africa, the New Statesman of 4 April declares:
“Twelve years later, the Reagan Administration is torn between two impulses. One urges the building of American power on African territory to reverse the political and military failures of the past, topple the Angola and Mozambique regimes, annihilate the SWAP0 movement in Namibia, and destroy the African National Congress and other movements for liberation in South Africa. The second impulse would avoid open United States moves toward these objectives, but it differs from the first only in the willingness to let South Africa pull the trigger.
“Walvis Bay . . . is described by Reagan officials as ‘unquestionably South African territory’.
“Washington has told both the South Africans and Dirk Mudge, the leader of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia, who was in Washington immediately after the intelligence officers, that they should stall on negotiations for as long as will be ! necessary to build the DTA into a credible election 1 force against SWAPO.”
105. The second element which is cause for serious ! concern is the growing Pretoria-Washington con-
108. In the light of all that, I must say that we are very suspicious of the reports that the most colonial of all colonial problems, the question of Namibia, is to be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming NATO meeting in Rome on 4 May.
106. But even more disturbing is a report published by a South African newspaper that usually reflects the regime’s thinking. That report says:
“NATO countries are becoming steadily more alarmed and strategists feel that if NATO itself cannot move into the critical area because of South Africa’s position as a pariah State, the individual countries with interests in this zone must accept the responsibility”.
109. That is why we call on the Council to prevent any attempt at taking the problem of Namibia out of the framework of the United Nations. That is why we call for affirmation of resolution 435 (1978) without any strengthening or independent amendment. That is why we call for the immediate imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.
107. It is for that reason that we wish to sound the alarm and warn against the dangers entailed in the highly orchestrated campaign to project the Namibian struggle for the decolonization of that illegally occupied Territory as falling within the East-West conflict. The same goes for the campaign to characterize the liberation movement of southern Africa, SWAP0 and ANC, as terrorists or Soviet proxies. The intentions are particularly sinister when one remembers that only two years ago the General Assembly unanimously adopted a Declaration on South Africa [resolution 34/930], expressing solidarity with the struggling people of South Africa, in which all the Member States committed themselves against overt or covert military intervention in support or defence of the apartheid
110. A lsrtu contirzw. Power to the people!
The meeting rose ut 1.10 pm.
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UN Project. “S/PV.2274.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-2274/. Accessed .