S/PV.2629 Security Council

In accordance with a decisidh taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Seereekissoon (Mauritius) took R place at the CounciI table.

In accordance with a desion taken at the 2624th meeting, I invite the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of that Council to take a place at the Council table. .’ 1 At the ‘tiitation of the President, Mr. Sinclair (Acting President of the United Nations Councilfor Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took a place at the Council tabIe.

In accordance with a decision taken at, the 2624th meeting, I invite Mr. Toivo ya Toivo, Secretary-General of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Toivo ya Toivo took a PIace at the Coun&I table. 4. ‘The PRES!DENT: In accordance with decisions taken at pre@iouS meetings on this item [262&h to 2626th and 2628th meetings], I invite the representatives of Cameroon, Canada, Cuba; Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, the Islamic Republic.of Itin, the Libya Arab Jamahiriya, Senegal, South Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Engo (Cameroon), Mr. Lewis (Conada), Mr. Oramas OIiva (Cuba), Mr. Char (Czechoslovakia). Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. tiutenschkzger (FederaI RepubIic of Germany), Mr. Gbeho (Ghana), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (rslamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Azzaroirk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. &n-r& 1 (Senegao. Mr.. von Schimding (South Africa), Mr. EI-FattaI (Syrian Arab @pubIic)),’ Mr. Bouziri (Twtisia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zombiir) took the pIaces reservedfor them at the side of the Council chamber. ._. ‘, ,‘.. ‘. 5. The PRESIDENT: Members of. the Council have before theni document S/17633; which contains the text ofa +ira’ft resolution submitted by Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar,‘ Peru and Trinidad and Tobago. 6. ‘The first speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite hiti to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

At the outset, Sir, I must extend my sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency. I have no doubt that under your leadership the Council will achieve considerable success, particularly as compared with its past record regarding the situation in Namibia. I congratulate you in advance on that success. 9. There is a verse from the Holy Koran which is veti suitable in the context of today’s debate. It reads: 10. The decade of the 196Os, which began with theadoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries atid Peoples [resdution 1.514 (xv], culminated in the acliievement of independence by colonial Territories and by Territdries under the trusteeship bf Othei States. Since then, 57 countries have become independent, the majoiity Gf them ;1 the African continent. Although Namibia was o& 6f the’& of those Territories tb be ,disc&ed in & United-Natioiis in connection with the granting of indipendentie and’an end to colonialism, unfortunately, for many reasons, the people of Namibia have been prevented from gaining such a victory. 11. Since 1966, and particularly with the formation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the international consciousness optimistically decided that an important step towards freeing the people of Namibia from the heavy yoke of imperialism had been taken, a step that would be followed by easier, faster steps towards fulfilling a longheld international aspiration. The anxious oppressed all over the world, who had been observing the situation in Namibia for years, hoped that the ice had finally been broken and that the journey towards the freedom of Namibia had at last started. 12. From then on, all anxious eyes were’ turned ‘1&j’ hope towards the United NatiotiS,-Coui&l for Namibia. Unfortunately, however, 19 years have passed since then, and they are still anxiously waiting, but to no avail. To their disappointment, the Security Council, the very Council whose name has created false hopes and so many false expectations, has proved to be the malady, rather than the remedy. 13. In the Council there are some who have remained tod politely and too politically silent in the face of the Namibian problem. We are absolutely convinced that such courteous delicacy is so important to certain members only because it pays off. When circumstances require, the same courteous, polite gentlemen behave as savagely and bru: tally as those in Sduth Africa. 14. To be brief, Iwish to &k all mdmbers of the Council a few simple questions. Why is it that imperialism ‘i’s treated like a property that can be inherited or passed from one generation or country to another? Is it not the &s-e that imperialism arid col&ialism and all their, Eaitetri and Western, old and modern, manifestations must really die? 16. Why is it that, it spite of the will of the whole world, the socalled interim government collaborates with the plunderers? Why does it support the destroyeis of all the national liberation Fovements? Why does it work hand in harih with the aparrfieia.r&i~e of Pretoria? Did not the Council itseif declare that the establishment of the interim government wa’s null and void? How, then, can we welcome the South’ African dilatory manoeuvres reflected in document S/1!627? * 17.. ‘-The’ ‘interim government is, as a matter of fact, anothei device for prolonging colonial domination over Namibia. @ is the multi-party system, which aims at the assimilatiqn, and ,d+uction of SWAP0 in a group of surrogate parties that,,,the enemy, has invented for that p&pose.- :, ~~ 18. Two days ago [262&h &ering], the representative of the Pretoria rigime once again in this chamber linked the independence of Namibia to the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Why is the independence of Namibia alway obstructed by a linkage policy-by, let us say, a linkage excuse? It is most unfortunate that the supporters of that rbgime still defend such excuses. 19. The statement issued by the United States Department of State on 19 April 1985 contains the following piece of evidence: . “Wi note that the South African announcement from Cape Town yesterday affirms South Africa’s intention to pursue the current negotiating effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia under the United Nations settlement plan. It is the United States position that these negotiations involving Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola offer the best prospect for a settlement leading to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978):’ [See S/17119, annex.] Again we : see traces of the well-known linkage policy. 20. Why is it that implementation of ihe Declaration on. the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples must bede!ayed and delayed in spite of all the support for, that Declaration and the subsequent relevant resol$ions? Y I, ,. _. . 21. Why .A it that after a lapse of 100 years since the co!o.Gialization of Namibia, 40 years since the foundation of the ,United Nations, 25 years since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, and Peoples and 19 years since the General 23. There are hundreds of questions and many more quotations that could be brought before the Council, but I shall omit them simply for the sake of brevity. 24. My Government proposes that the committee called for in paragraph 12 of draft resolution S/17633 should take charge of also preparing a report on the actual impact and consequences of selective sanctions on the South African economic situation. Such a report may convince us that selective sanctions fall short of inducing the racist rulers of the Pretoria regime to comply with the will of the international community. 25. To appreciate why certain “respected” members of the Council are bound to condone all crimes of the Pretoria regime against its own people as well as those against the people of Namibia, the following quotation from The New York Times of 3 August 1985 will suffice: “while American bank lending to the South African public sector has been halved since 1982, to a total of $302.2 million as of March, loans to the private sector have soared. In particular,, loans : to South African banks skyrocketed to more than $3.5 billion as of September, from less than $500 million in 1979.1’ ., ‘.. , This means that those loans have increased sevenfold, and I believe this explains why certain support for the crimes committed by the criminals in South Africa seems to be justified by certain members. _ _“.I . I

‘Mr. President, your country and mine have always,maintained the most cordial and friendly relations and have cooperated in a broad range of activities. It. gives me great pleasure, therefore, to see you, a distinguished .dipldmat of Australia, presiding over the affairs of the Council for the month of November. 27. Permit me also to extend our thanks and congratulations to Mr. Walters, of the United States, who directed the deliberations of the Council in October. 28. A great disaster has fallen suddenly on our sister nation of Colombia. I take this opportunity to convey to 30. Can the Council, which was’charged by the whole community of nations with maintaining international peace and security, continue to stand irresolute while the inhuman and abhorrent system of uparrheid still persists? Can it remain unmoved when a trust which was reposed in good faith, but obviously in error, to a Member of the United Nations in respect of Namibia has been betrayed and when the trustee, despite its sacred obligations, holds fast to what is not its own and keeps in servitude the peoples entrusted to it. 31. What is at stake, therefore, is also the good name and the credibility of the United Nations and of the Security Council which are so crucial to the effective functioning of : these bodies. 32. This is indeed a very serious question. The submission by South Africa to the Council in a letter dated 12 November 1985 [S/Z762n and the most recent intervention by its representative in the Council [262&h meeting] are proof positive that whatever games the regime is playing, it is not cricket. Had it been, I remind my colleagues, South Africa would have long departed the trusted wicket :’ and Namibia would now be batting with free and flourishing strokes to the glory of its own people. 33. Instead, we have South Africa attempting by a ploy to impose upon the Council and the world a puppet rigime, a so-called Transitional Government of National Unity at Windhoek, which the international community in all its forums had already rejected out of hand’for the fake that ,it :obviausly was. ‘It reminds one of the stratagem employed in certain circles ‘where, ‘in consideration of a noble cause, there is tacked on to the main document an unacceptable provision in the hope that it would ride piggyback, as it were, to acceptance and approval. Or it may be a double .ploy to ensure rejection of the whole document, including the substantive question, in this case selection of the electoral system which would have triggered the other steps preceding elections, such as the repealing of all discriminatory or restrictive laws and regulations, the return of refugees, the withdrawal of South African forces, and the release of political prisoners. 34. Thp Council, by its resolution 566 (1985), specifically condemned the installation by the racist regime in South Africa of a so-called Transitional Government of National 35. That South Aft-L&in the light of this, should issue as part of an offtcial document of the,Security Council [see S/17627, annex] a statement by the so-called cabinet of that Transitional Government purporting to state its choice on the question of an electoral system for Namibia is an affront to the Council and a clear, unambiguous manifestation of the utter contempt in which the Pretoria regime holds the Council and the international community. 36. Since the United Nations does not recognize the socalled interim government in Namibia, for South Africa to attempt to give some degree of legality and credibility to the collection of surrogates and puppets that comprise the interim administration clearly indicates that South Africa has embarked on a new phase of its obstructionist policy with regard to Namibian independence and selfdetermination. 37. The Council must clearly demonstrate to South Africa that it has made a serious miscalculation of the determination and commitment of the Council to ensure the implementation of its resolutions ‘and its resolve to carry out its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. It is clear that the introduction by South Africa of extraneous issues such as “linkage” or ‘Lparallelism**, which seek to impose irrelevant prcconditions on the resolution of the problem; undoubtedly undermines South Africa’s claim of desiring a peaceful solution to the crisis. 38. The responses of the Council to the political and diplomatic machinations of the racist regime must be firm. In the context of Articles 39,41 and 42 of the Charter, the Council should affirm that South Africa’s intransigence on the Namibian question, by its aggressive acts against, the people of Namibia and its noncompfiance with the Council resolutions on Namibia, constitutes a threat to intemational peace and security, and the Council must accordingly decide what measures are to be employed to give effect to its own resolutions; In its deliberations on this question, the Council must always be mindful of the fact that the illegally occupied territory of Namibia is used as a springboard by South Africa for acts of aggression against other countries in southern Africa in contravention of the ’ Charter. 39. The draft resolution before us provides a framework for action by the Council at this time. By the draft resolution, the Council would decide to impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter, and in conformity with its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security it must act. It should, moreover, decide to adopt enforcement measures against South Africa, including those outlined in paragraph 8 of the draft resolution.’

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before us. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote. 42. I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

The subject of this debate is a problem on which, as I said yesterday [2626zh meering], the members of the Council have one view: we are all agreed on the ‘illegality of South African occupation of .Namibia and on the necessity of Namibia gaining its freedom and independence in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) without delay. We agree unanimously on the goal, but sadly it appears that we are not agreed on the details of action. 44. This is sad .because unanimity is perhaps our best means to achieve our common goal. Numerous speakers in this debate have emphasized the importance of rellecting, in, the vote on the draft resolution, the unanimity which unquestionably exists within the Council with regard to South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia. ,. 45 I I .was struck, for example, by the remarks yesterday by the representative, of Burkina Faso [ibid] about the value .of consensus, At that same meeting, you, yourself, Sir, joined me in drawingattention toth&ommonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, adopted by the heads of Governments of Commonwealth States at their meeting at Nassau from 16 to 22 October last,’ and you hoped to see a firm resolution which would attract unanimous support and which ‘would send a clear and strong signal to South Africa., 46.’ The representative of Canada spoke in similar terms this ,moming 12628th meeting]. Both the representative of Denmark and I strongly hoped for unanimity, and when I said those things I believed they were achievable. In seeking to work with other members of the Council for a unanimous resolution, the United Kingdom was not engaging in empty rhetoric or looking for a comfortable berth. It, was our belief, which I think is widely shared in the’.Council’and throughout the United Nations, that our best chance of influencing South Africa lay through a resolution which was at the same time firm, realistic and sup ported by all 15 members of the Council. We felt that a less than unanimous Council, .on the. other hand, would only encourage South Africa and anyone else opposed to an early negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. It would encourage them to play upon our differences. It would mask our.common determination to procure forthwith the independence of Namibia. , 55. The Pretoria Government’s obstinacy and its continuing intransigence are fraught with consequences for the stability of the region. Measures must therefore be taken to bring the south African Government to abide by the resolutions of the Council and put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia. This is the concern which led the French authorities to participate in the drafting and the adoption of resolution 566 (1985). This same concern led us to adopt an equally constructive approach during negotiations on the draft resolution which is now before us, negotiations which we would have liked to be able to continue. 48. It would have shown the South African Government that it had no allies and could hope for none. It would have shown them that if they persisted in their illegal occupation of Namibia, the consequences would have been mounting pressures. It would have shown them that their presence in Namibia was-and is-counter-productive for their own interests. 56. In this debate, as in all debates of the Council, France is concerned with realism and effectiveness. Unfortunately, while we agree with the feelings that lie behind this draft resolution, it does not meet those concerns, The wording does not seem to us the! most appropriate for enabling progress to be made towards the sqlution,the international community has outlined for the question of Namibia. That is why my delegation will, regretfully, abstain in the vote. However, I should like to say that France, on its own initiative and within the framework of the European Eco- ,nomic Cdmmpnity, will continue to pursue its actions and to exert increased pressure upon South Africa. France has demonstrated its resolve through the measures it has already taken, measures which have been recently added to by the Prime Minister of Fence. 49. I cannot but feel, as a practical matter, that the rejection of our clear and principled advice will be unfoitunate for the people of Namibia, and also for Angola. We &gret this missed opportunity. It is worse than an error; ,it is a blunder. Defeat has been snatched from the jaws of unaiimity and a victory of sorts has been handed to South Africa. 50. Having offered a better course, my delegation will be obliged to vote against the draft resolution, because it is likkly to be counter-productive and because it would have the effect of preempting the strategy on which we have agreed .with our Cotimonwealth-partners. We on our side are not prepared to render nugsltory the very significant agreement reached at Nassau barely a month ago. It is a great pity .that our efforts to achieve unanimity have been frustrated and that comfort ‘has thereby been afforded to the .party which least deserves it: South Africa.

Permit me at the outset, Sir, on behalf of the entire American delegation, to welcome your assumption of the presidency of the Council. We feel confident that our vessel will be well ste&d ,under such a distinguished helmsman, distinguished alike .for his wisdom, energy and tact. 51. Nevertheless, my Government remains determined to work for the independence of Namibia without delay. 58. Permit me also to express the deep regret of my Government at the news of Jhe recent natural calamity in Colombia. In expressing sympathy with our sister Republic to the south, we do so in the knowledge that the brave $eople of Colombia ~$1 surmount this, tragedy, as they .have other difficult times in the past. 52. Mr. de KfiMOULARIA (France) (inferprerution from French): Sir, it is with pleasure that I follo\?l the tradition of hai!ing your accession to the presidency pf the Council and express wishes for success during your term as President. Each of my predecessors has spoken of and referred to their couxitries’ relations with Australia. As y& know, it is a country I know well, and so I am the best person to testify to the excellent relations between Australia and France. I cannot myself tafk about cricket, as some of my colleagues have done, but I could mention rugby, since we have ,often met on the rugby field, the field of friendship. 59. At this critical juncture in the ,history of southern Africa, a debate such as the one’ under way here in the Council holds.particular relevance. We have come a long way since the Councjl adopted resolution 435 (1978) seven years ago. One hurdle after another has been overcome, and we find ourselves today-I should like to hope-near the end qf an arduous journey. An act qr two more of goodwill, gestures of true statesmanship by the involved parties, and the region will have taken a major step towards a peaceful solution of the problems and strife that now beset it. 53. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to ask’the representative of the United States, Mr. Okun, to accept our thanks for the good humour, competence and authority demonstrated by the presidency of our friend Mr. Walters. “the Secretary-General [will] appoint a United Nations special representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations. transition assistance group.” [See S/12636, para. 2.1 Section II states that:: ’ j “The elections-will be under the supervision and control , of the United Nations*’ [ibid., para. 5J. I recaii also that the plan has been adopted and accepted by the South African Government. 61. As my British colleague did yesterday [2626th meeting], I too must refer to the request addressed to you, Mr. President, by six Namibian political parties to participate in this debate. The United States believes it most important that all relevant parties with information to impart to the Council be permitted to speak under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Such a stance is .consistent with the universality of the United Nations. Furthermore, all parties should be accorded equal treatment under the terms of the settlement plan. Hence, it is our view that a request from one or another member of a Namibian political party to address the Council should be accorded sympathetic consideration. 62. That said, it is the long-standing view of my Govemment, as well as other members of the Council, that persons acting as representatives of the so-called transitional government, the creation of which was declared null and void by the Council, should not be given the right to speak here. 63. As regards the draft resolution before us, it is with regret that we shall vote against it. My delegation will do so because it would impose mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. My Government’s position on this matter is well known. I would add in this case that, actively engaged as the United States is in seeking a negotiated solution of the problem of Namibia, we would utterly negate our good offices by supporting mandatory sanctions. We sincerely regret that this draft resolution persisted in that short-sighted course of action.

I shall now put the draft resolution in document S/17633 to the vote. k vote was taken by show of hands. Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: France. i%e result of the vote was 12 in favour, 2 against and I abstention. The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative votes being those ?f permanent members of the Councif.

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

In my capacity as coordinator of the non-aligned States members of the Council, I should like to make some comments on the draft on which we have just voted. 67. As the members of the Council are aware, the Political Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda from 4 to 7 September last [S/l7610 and Corr. 1, annex I’J, urged the Security Council to meet once again to consider the question of Namibia and to renew the appeal for the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 68. In furtherance of that mandate received from the non-aligned countries, the delegation of India, in its capacity as Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, requested this series of meetings of the Council, which over the past three days has been dealing with the question of. the decolonization of Namibia. 69. As the result of that debate, the non-aligned countries jointly submitted the draft resolution which was just voted on and which reflects their true feeling as to the strategy to be followed in the case of Namibia. Since its presentation within the due time-limit, the sponsors maintained constant contacts with delegations, seeking to bring their positions closer to our own. In some cases we achieved that completely, as is reflected in the draft resolution and the result of the vote. There were substantive considerations which we were unable to reconcile as the inevitable result of different approaches to the problem, and as is only normal those differences were also reflected in the vote. 70. To negotiate is to seek convergence and consensus when that is possible. However, that is often not possible in the United Nations and elsewhere in spite of the efforts made and the goodwill shown, as has occurred here. But to negotiate is not to falter or to submit, although those efforts proved insufficient in the face of circumstances which ruled out consensus. 71. In connection with progress made in other organizations and associations-which we duly appreciate-we 72. We non-aligned countries trust that the growing awareness of all the peoples of the world of the undeniable justice of Namibia’s case and the inexorable force of history will allow us soon to overcome those disagreements and together bring about the end of the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia and ensure the final achievement of its freedom and independence.

I wish now to speak briefly in my capacity as representative of Australia. 76. I now resume my function as President of the Council. .. 74. Australia voted for the draft resolution. We did so to express our strong support for the cause of Namibian independence and our attachment to the United Nations plan under resolution 435 (1978). As I said in my statement yesterday [262&h meettig], Australia supports the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions in order to bring South Africa to accept its international obligations .and bring Namibia to early independence. Austratia is also fully committed to the approach adopted by the heads of Governments of Commonwealth States at their -recent 77. The Council has concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. . The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m. .\ . 7 ., NOTES ’ See XXVI: 227. 2 See A/40/817. _I t . r’ . ._ : I . HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies’sont en vente dam les librairies et les agences depositaims du monde entier. Informez-vous aupres de votre libraire ou adressez-vous a : Nations Unies, Section des. ventes, New York ou Get&e. ICAIC I-IoJIYvwrb ci3~I-IIaI oPrAHH3Ak@iki OEbEWHEHHbIx HAL&In tI3lWiliX0~WISf3ilIUH 06IdZiIieKHb~x HamtRt.rO~~o KYH%iTbBKHUXCHbIXM~a3HHaX EliSCliTCTB&XBOBCCXp&iOHilX MHpa.&?BOmTeCnpaBKH 06 H3AKWUIXBBWIIeMKHSiXCHOM Mara3riHe xmi nsimi~e no anpecy: GprarinXtuttr G6z+eAtinetttibtx Hat@, Cexmir no ~OAruKeH3AlUid. HbO-tiOpK%lJISi )&ZlIeBa. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas estan en venta en librcrfas y cams distribuidoras en todas pattes de1 mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirfjase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccidn de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-61439-March 1995-1,925