S/PV.3543 Security Council

I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Malaysia and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), document S/1995/444, and a letter dated 9 June 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, documents S/1995/470 and Addendum 1. Members of the Council also have before them document S/1995/478, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Netherlands, Oman and the United ", the modalities of financing to be determined later". Paragraph 10 will then read: “Decides accordingly to authorize an increase in UNPF/UNPROFOR personnel, acting under the present mandate and on the terms set out in the above-mentioned letter, by up to 12,500 additional troops, the modalities of financing to be determined later;”. I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1995/477, identical letters dated 12 June 1995 from the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/480, letter dated 12 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/483, letter dated 14 June 1995 from the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the text of a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, His Excellency Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, whom I welcome and whom I invite to make his statement.

It is indeed an honour to be before the members of the Council, particular you, Sir, who, as President of the Council for this month, have performed so brilliantly in your task. We also take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of France, His Excellency Mr. Jean-Bernard Mérimée, for his most able performance last month, when I was still one of the United Nations colleagues of Council members. Maybe we were naive. Maybe by rejecting those half- measures, by demanding our full rights and by calling upon the world Powers to meet their clear responsibilities in the face of aggression and genocide, we would have ultimately forced a true remedy. However, we could not afford to be so callous, so calculating with the most urgent physical needs of our population, even if some intended by giving us bread to muffle the screams of agony and cries for justice of those who continued to be “ethnically cleansed”, shelled and murdered. Still, we also do not wish here to seem ungrateful or, especially, insensitive, by not taking the care to point out that most of those who sought to help our citizens, especially those courageous men and women of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and so many other organizations, offered their help with the purest of motives. Unfortunately, it appears that their good will and commitment to mankind, combined with our desperation for food and other essentials, was taken advantage of by more calculating political forces. We were all lectured that there was a choice between humanitarian assistance and the United Nations mission on the one hand and real remedies to bring about real peace and justice on the other. But time has shown that there really never was a real dilemma. The day of reckoning has come, and manufactured arguments have been exposed, running down the side of the wall like cheap paint in the midst of a rain storm. Even the half-measures that the United Nations mission has offered, which helped sustain our people at one time, have now almost totally evaporated. Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac are denied any level of humanitarian assistance. Their populations are constantly targeted and murdered, and the stranglehold is allowed to tighten without response. Furthermore, Serbian forces no longer just hold our civilians hostage to their war aims, but have now become so emboldened as to take United Nations personnel as human shields. Serbian terrorist tactics produce further The exclusion zone around Sarajevo is violated by the Serbians and ignored by those who are obligated to enforce it. Now we look forward to deployment of the rapid-reaction capability. It is the expectation of my Government that this mission will seek to reverse the negative process and enable the United Nations mission in our Republic once again to be fully and faithfully implemented. In this context, we have given our consent to this new deployment. We could express notions of scepticism and even cynicism. Instead, we offer mutual cooperation in the most urgent task before our Government and the United Nations: to alleviate the humanitarian situation, loosen the stranglehold on our population and cities and lift the terrorism targeting civilians and United Nations personnel alike. I think we all know that this is the last chance. And based upon experience we will continue to hope for the best, but must frankly anticipate the least as we consider our options.

I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

At the outset, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month and convey our appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of France. We also wish to thank the Secretary-General for his report, contained in document S/1995/444. Recent events in Bosnia and Herzegovina have led us to a situation which calls for a timely review of the future role of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Bosnian Serbs continue to humiliate the United Nations by taking its peace-keepers hostage and defying relevant Security Council resolutions, giving a worldwide impression that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, is ineffective in addressing a threat to international peace and security. The Working Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of OIC Contact Group members and UNPROFOR troop contributors, has carefully examined the report of the Secretary-General and has already presented its position, which my delegation fully supports. Let me at this stage make the following comments and observations on the report of the Secretary-General. The report contains several contradictions and, in some cases, inaccurate information. For example, in paragraph 67, it is incorrect to indicate that neither party to the conflict seems to have reached the firm conclusion that it has a better chance of achieving its objectives at the negotiating table than on the battlefield. Indeed, it is only the Bosnian Serbs who have rejected the Contact Group peace plan and opted for a military solution. We wish to reiterate our demand that the Bosnian Serbs accept the peace plan so as to resolve the conflict with a political solution. The mandate for UNPROFOR has been clearly spelled out in the relevant Security Council resolutions, including in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter and its enforcement. We do not agree with the attempt to characterize UNPROFOR as merely a peace-keeping operation and to downplay UNPROFOR’s mandate relating to its enforcement responsibilities. The existing mandate suffers from a lack of implementation. UNPROFOR should be provided with the required means for the full implementation of the mandate. In this regard, our position on the options presented by the Secretary-General is as follows. On Option A, we do not agree that UNPROFOR should withdraw from Bosnia. On the contrary, the United Nations Force should be increased and strengthened to enable it fully to implement its mandate. On Option B, the existing mandate of UNPROFOR should be retained, but the means of implementation need to be adapted. We do not agree with maintaining the status quo, as this policy has proved to be a failure. As for option D, we do not agree that this option is the way to move forward, especially when the Bosnian Serbs have once again blatantly challenged the will of the international community by taking United Nations peace- keepers hostage. This option will weaken UNPROFOR’s mandate rather than strengthen it. We too believe that a combination of some of the elements pertaining to the options contained in the Secretary-General’s report will strengthen UNPROFOR and thereby enable it effectively to discharge as well as fully meet its mandate. In this regard, we recall that the OIC paper has elaborated the steps which UNPROFOR can take in order fully to fulfil its mandate. We welcome the establishment of the rapid reaction capacity (RRC) under the command and control of the United Nations to assist UNPROFOR in the implementation of its mandate. UNPROFOR’s mandate must be implemented robustly in order to maintain the credibility and dignity of the United Nations mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We believe that the RRC should also be used for the protection of the civilian population, particularly in the safe areas, with air support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in addition to the protection of UNPROFOR personnel. The RRC should also establish land corridors for humanitarian aid. We feel that it is also timely for the Council now to act on the Secretary-General’s earlier report on the safe areas by adopting the heavy option as compared to the present light option. We object to any move that would abandon the safe areas, and wish to insist that UNPROFOR should continue to protect the safe areas. Resolution 836 (1993) permits UNPROFOR to use force to protect the safe areas and the civilians in them. The mandate is available for UNPROFOR and by extension NATO to neutralize weapons violating the safe areas. In this regard, it will be necessary to neutralize the surface-to-air missile systems deployed by the Pale Serbs. The recent downing of the NATO F-16 makes it necessary to take such action. As for the exclusion zones, it should be recalled that the zone and weapons collection points were set up as an alternative to air strikes. However, if the weapons collection points in the context of reprisals against United Nations personnel become an obstacle to implementing My delegation also wishes to state in clear terms the need for security guarantees for the Bosnian Government in terms of its right to self-defence, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, including by lifting the arms embargo. We are inclined to go along with the adoption of the draft resolution before the Council. This adoption, we hope, will contribute towards fully enforcing all relevant Security Council resolutions and act as an effective deterrent to any coercive measures or violence perpetrated against United Nations personnel and civilian populations in the safe areas. Finally, it is equally important that all offers to strengthen the UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be sidelined as we proceed with the deployment of the RRC.

I thank the representative of Malaysia for his kind words addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are sure that, through your wisdom and skill, the work of the Council will be crowned with success as it considers the issues before it. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of France, Ambassador Mérimée, on his efforts as President of the Security Council last month. Allow me also to express my support for the statement we have just heard by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council is today considering the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, having entered a new phase, threatens both the prestige of the United Nations and In the light of the Council’s earlier resolutions, the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires the Council to take a strong position from which it can adopt firm resolutions and provide answers to the following questions. First, have the provisions for halting the Serb aggression against the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including resolutions 757 (1992), 777 (1992) and others, been implemented? Secondly, will the United Nations allow a State Member of the Organization to be annihilated through the forcible occupation of its territory by a party possessing a military arsenal enabling it to launch a military operation from which it continues to benefit through aggressive territorial expansion? Thirdly, the contingents of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were deployed to repel that aggression and ensure the protection of civilians. Have we provided them with the means to attain the noble objectives for which they were deployed? Fourthly, the Council established the concept of “safe areas” in order to protect the unoccupied territories of Bosnia. Is the Council going to honour that commitment and try to overcome the difficulties resulting from the continued Serb occupation of these territories? Fifthly, if the situation has worsened because of the Serb party’s rejection of all international peace efforts and initiatives, will the international community allow the United Nations to renounce its role of putting an end to the crisis? Will the United Nations withdraw from the territory and leave the strong aggressor on an equal footing with the victim? Sixthly, will the United Nations allow itself to turn a blind eye to the policy of racial, religious and political discrimination and the policy of “ethnic cleansing”? First of all, the Egyptian delegation agrees with the Secretary-General that we must highlight the importance of the credibility of the United Nations. Nevertheless, we wish to point out that in order to ensure that credibility, we must first apply the provisions of the Charter and implement the resolutions of the Security Council in order to force the intransigent Serb party to respect the norms of international legality. Thus, we shall be able to put an end to the threat to international peace and security before dealing with problems of development, environment and human rights, which, as pointed out in paragraph 82 of the report, cannot be solved unless the region enjoys peace and stability. Secondly, to call for the demilitarization of the “safe areas”, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1979, will mean that the last remaining territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of defenceless, unarmed civilian populations subjugated under the Serb occupation. The international community must not accept this. The purpose of the “safe areas” is to provide international protection for the territories and their population, but their demilitarization will mean that they will be under the Serb forces’ domination if the international forces withdraw or are unable to ensure their defence. The argument that certain Government armed forces should be included in the demilitarization process is inadmissible. Those forces are there because the territories are an integral part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and were so even before the current conflict in the region began. Thirdly, the options available to the Council must be studied in the light of the detailed information contained in the report on UNPROFOR’s mandate, because the four options cannot be studied in isolation from other options and possibilities. The third option would presuppose a strengthening of the mandate, but it would also mean modifying that mandate; this is not admissible because UNPROFOR’s current mandate, as established by the Security Council, is sufficient. All that is needed is to ensure that there is a Fourthly, Egypt supports the conclusions of the Secretary-General in paragraph 67 of his report to the effect that the international mediation efforts have come to a standstill and that the Security Council should therefore reassess the situation and adopt another initiative to relaunch the peace process. Egypt is participating in UNPROFOR with military forces and also with military and police observers. We pay tribute to the courage of those forces, which are accomplishing noble, humanitarian tasks. None the less, the delegation of Egypt reminds the Council and the Secretariat that Egypt has in the past offered — and is still prepared to provide — further contingents to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and help it accomplish the many urgent tasks assigned to it by the Council: if the United Nations and the UNPROFOR command feel that there is a need for reinforcements, Egypt would be prepared to consider the possibility. Egypt is gratified at NATO’s initiative to establish a rapid reaction force that would enable UNPROFOR to defend the safe areas in particular and the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in general; to restore the rule of international law; and to restore to the region the stability to which it aspires. In conclusion, the delegation of Egypt regrets the fact that the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been mishandled from the outset: that mishandling is the reason why we are now all frustrated at the doubts expressed by many parties. That mishandling has also played into the hands of the Serbs and has encouraged them to defy the Security Council and its resolutions. If the Serbs keep this up, the international order will necessarily lose credibility and a double standard will have been established that cannot but compromise the position of the international community as a whole.

I thank the representative of Egypt for his kind words addressed to me. The next speaker is the Permanent Representative of Croatia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. President, my delegation is pleased to see you presiding over the proceedings of the Security Council this month. We are confident that I should also like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée of France, under whose prudent guidance the Council deliberated during the month of May. Croatia welcomes the efforts of the Security Council and the international community to bring about a just and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will continue to contribute to this as much as possible under the circumstances. With this in mind, we support the draft resolution before us now in the sincere hope that it will benefit the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia welcomes the establishment of the rapid reaction force and is ready to provide all the logistical support required for its successful deployment. It is our understanding that, while the rapid reaction force will use some command and logistic facilities on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, its theatre of operation will be exclusively on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding the possible use of the rapid reaction force outside that theatre, the Croatian Government is of the firm view that any operational use of the rapid reaction force on the territory of the Republic of Croatia may proceed only after consultations with my Government, and with its prior approval and consent.

I thank the Permanent Representative of Croatia for his kind words addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Turkey. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are confident that, under your able guidance, the Council will successfully discharge its responsibilities. I should also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée of France for the remarkable manner in which he conducted the work of the Council in May. Regrettably, three years after the beginning of the aggression against a State Member of the United The international community is committed, under numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, to preserving the territorial integrity, unity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR should implement its existing mandate fully and in keeping with this commitment. It cannot and should not continue to be a tool for a policy of appeasement. As a troop-contributing country we attach great importance to the safety and security of United Nations personnel. However, we believe that priority number one was always, and continues to be, the protection of the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Almost all Security Council resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina refer to Chapter VII of the Charter. The United Nations Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as a protection force and has never, from the very outset, been a traditional peace-keeping force. It is the strong conviction of my Government that UNPROFOR should be reinforced so that it has the capability to implement its existing mandate robustly and in full. The Turkish Minister of Defence therefore participated actively in the NATO and European Union Defence Ministers’ meeting on 3 June in Paris, and supported the meeting’s conclusions. Turkey has also stated its readiness to contribute to the force that is to be created to provide UNPROFOR with a rapid reaction capability. Consequently, we believe that the adoption of the draft resolution on UNPROFOR by the Council will be a step in the right direction. In this context, I should like to draw particular attention to the draft resolution’s operative paragraph 9. We hope that a time has come when resolve and firmness will be demonstrated. It will soon be a full year that the Pale Serbs have been refusing to accept the five-nation Contact Group peace plan. This intransigent position on their part is the only stumbling-block in the way of credible peace negotiations. Recognition by the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders is also essential for a lasting peace. If Belgrade is sincere in its policy of isolating Pale, it should side with those Bosnian Serbs who want to live in a multicultural, multi-religious and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina, not with those who long for an ethnically pure Greater Serbia. However, and regrettably, we still do not see any promising signs that Belgrade is moving in this direction. If we want to restore the credibility of the United Nations, we should make a determined stand against terrorism and blackmail. Resolute action is long overdue.

I thank the representative of Turkey for his kind words addressed to me. It is my understanding that the Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it, as orally revised in its provisional form. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote. There being no objection, it is so decided. I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. President, today in Bosnia and Herzegovina we have in UNPROFOR a United Nations presence expected to keep the peace, render humanitarian assistance and promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict through political negotiation. Its performance of this task is premised on the cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Unfortunately, for most of its stay so far in Bosnia, it cannot be said that UNPROFOR has enjoyed the confidence and cooperation of both parties: its personnel have been In essence, all the arguments in favour of a total withdrawal of the United Nations from Bosnia are present, yet we all agree that Bosnia should not be abandoned, that humanitarian assistance must continue to be rendered and that civilian populations must be protected to the extent possible. We also agree that the war must be contained, and that the credibility of the United Nations must not be allowed to suffer irreparably through a precipitate withdrawal. There lies the dilemma of the Security Council and of the international community. If we compare this with other situations, we can see that to talk of having reached a turning-point in the Council’s assessment of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would almost be an understatement. Indeed, my delegation believes that the turning-point has been passed beyond which UNPROFOR’s ability to operate effectively, efficiently and safely in much of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of impartiality and the consent of all the parties, may be seriously compromised. The United Nations must therefore endeavour to maintain its neutrality and avoid falling down the slippery slope of becoming involved as a combatant in the field. The crisis of the last two and a half weeks — following the air strikes — in which UNPROFOR personnel were detained by the Bosnian Serb forces, many of them in humiliating circumstances and in violation of international norms of military conduct, has been a source of great concern to my Government. It is concerned not only about the safety of those detained but about the image of the United Nations, and it is against this background that my delegation has carefully considered the recent report of the Secretary-General on the performance of UNPROFOR. In examining this report, we took careful note of the key observations of the Secretary-General, which, inter alia, include a reference to the parties’ lingering illusion that a military solution to the conflict is possible: UNPROFOR is not in Bosnia to end or to fight a war, but to create the necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, a recurring refrain throughout the A related notion is reflected in his remark that military protection serves primarily to dissuade random or unorganized attacks, and cannot substitute for the consent and cooperation of the parties. According to the Secretary-General, “consent and cooperation could be assured, in the midst of war, only by strict adherence to the peace- keeping principles of impartiality and transparency.” (S/1995/444, para. 56) In the absence of the required consent and cooperation, only limited measures are available to reduce the risks to the Force’s personnel. In his report, the Secretary-General has requested the Security Council to spell out UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia clearly and to also clarify the ambiguities surrounding its assigned tasks. In this connection, he has put forward four options for the future of UNPROFOR. The Council’s current response — to increase the number of troops in Bosnia to protect UNPROFOR better and enhance its capability to discharge its duties — does not answer some of the pertinent questions that have been posed by the Secretary-General, nor would it, in our view, enhance UNPROFOR’s performance of its duties in the long run, in the absence of a cease-fire, a cessation of hostilities, cooperation from both parties and an intensification of the political process. Nevertheless, we have taken note of the assurance that in spite of the significant increase in the strength of UNPROFOR through the rapid reaction force, which would have the effect of changing its configuration as a peace-keeping operation, the status and impartiality of UNPROFOR will be maintained. Given my Government’s view that countries in the region, particularly those with some leverage, have a primary responsibility in terms of initiatives to resolve this crisis, and given our commitment not to abandon Bosnia as it tries to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, my delegation will go along with the present draft resolution. In this context, we appreciate the readiness of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to provide up to 12,500 additional troops to augment UNPROFOR’s strength. It is the hope of my Government that, while we are improving UNPROFOR’s protection and capability, initiatives on the diplomatic political track will resume and be pursued with In conclusion, we would like to restate our strong condemnation of all attacks on UNPROFOR personnel by whosoever committed. The taking of hostages constitutes an act of terrorism under international law, and it is unacceptable. We call on the parties, especially the Bosnian Serbs, to respect the status of United Nations personnel and to release forthwith and unconditionally those who are still being held. We also call on the parties to renounce the military option and to commit themselves to a resolution of the conflict through political agreement, for which the Contact Group Peace Plan serves as a good starting point.

We look at the draft resolution in the general context of the situation in Bosnia and its possible future development, including from the point of view of continuing and enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations operations. Nowadays it is often said that the lesson to be learned from the present escalation of the Bosnian crisis is that measures must be taken to prevent attacks against United Nations personnel. While we agree with the grounds for such measures, we think that the main lesson is far broader: that the use of force is not a panacea, and that decisive action is needed to achieve a breakthrough for a political settlement. In our view, those clear conclusions were reflected in the report of the Secretary-General on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). One of the key ideas in the report relates to the need to draw a clear distinction between peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations. In considering the various options for the future of UNPROFOR, the Secretary-General has noted the advantages that could be gained by a return to a purely peace-keeping function for the operation. We think those arguments are very convincing. We are convinced that, independent of the question of the draft resolution, the assessment set out in the report of the Secretary-General remains valid for the future work of the Council, and not just on the question of Bosnia. In principle, we favour enhancing the security of United Nations personnel, including through providing UNPROFOR with a rapid-reaction capability. Russia is as interested as others in ending the treacherous actions against peace-keeping personnel, whatever their source. It is of paramount importance that the draft resolution clearly calls for the maintenance of UNPROFOR’s impartial, peace-keeping nature and for the retention of present decision-making procedures and rules of engagement. We are grateful to the sponsors for taking into account several of our other proposals as well, including that relating to the demilitarization of the safe areas. We call on both sides to facilitate the implementation of that idea, which would make it possible to prevent the emergence of hotbeds of tension around these areas and to prevent the possible misuse of their status, especially for preparing military attacks. It would also enhance the safety of the peaceful civilians living there. It is extremely important that, as stated in the draft resolution, measures to strengthen UNPROFOR should be implemented in consultation with all parties. At the same time, some of our important proposed amendments were not taken into account. Specifically, the draft resolution does not manage to avoid the impression that the rapid reaction force is intended to operate against one of the Bosnian parties. We fully share the anger over inadmissible acts committed by Bosnian Serbs, to which the draft resolution refers in detail. But we cannot fail to note that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina too bears responsibility for provocations, for violating agreements and for direct attacks on UNPROFOR. Today not only the Serbs but Government forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are blockading UNPROFOR peace-keepers. A few days ago the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued an ultimatum to the Canadian contingent near Visoko, demanding the withdrawal of two observation posts, which were then subjected to mortar and artillery fire. As we speak, Government forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are attempting a massive attack in the Sarajevo region. We warned about this threat and proposed that the Security Council express its concern about this matter in the very text of the draft resolution. That proposal was not adopted. We now face a serious escalation of the military situation in Bosnia. We have no doubt about the right of Governments to choose any policy. But if United Nations forces are in a country and if Security Council resolutions have been adopted on the matter, there is a concomitant obligation to implement the decisions of the Council. We are also concerned about the haste with which the draft resolution was brought before the Council. The Secretary-General’s document on financial implications appeared only a few hours ago. But the main thing is that the Council did not have time to agree on reliable guarantees against attempts to use the rapid-reaction force to involve UNPROFOR in a war. Such attempts are already under way; we cannot ignore them. We do not expect this to happen; we expect that the administration of the United Nations operation, which bears a great responsibility, will display the necessary wisdom and care in implementing the decision with respect to possible action by the rapid-reaction force and carefully take into account the possible consequences of any acts of force, so as not to allow further use of force in Bosnia or a repetition of the hostage crisis — and ultimately so as not to permit the situation to be played out according to the Somalia scenario. We also expect that the main efforts of the administration of the United Nations operations will be focused on ensuring the cooperation of both parties, having them conclude a cease-fire agreement and putting a decisive end to hostilities. In the light of all the circumstances which I have mentioned, Russia will be forced to abstain in the voting. At the same time, we feel that it is necessary once again to call quite seriously upon all parties to the conflict to forgo any attempt to resolve their differences on the battlefield; rather, they should try to do so at the negotiating table. As was indicated at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group in the Netherlands, Russia assumes that it is necessary to make additional efforts to give a new impetus to the settlement process. In this context, the key issue is the question of ending the sanctions against Belgrade. The possibilities of the negotiating process have not been fully exhausted and we will continue to cooperate with all in a political

At the outset, I would like on behalf of the Indonesian delegation to express our sincere appreciation to the sponsors of the draft resolution. We are particularly grateful that the sponsors have responded to various suggestions and proposals submitted by a number of delegations, including the Caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement. The draft resolution addresses many of the important issues raised by the Secretary-General in his report and his letter of 9 June 1995. We deeply appreciate the Secretary-General’s comprehensive analysis of the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and his presentation of a set of options regarding its future role. The Council’s consideration of these options and of concrete proposals to reinforce UNPROFOR evolved from these options, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s letter did not, of course, take place in isolation from recent developments in the field. In this regard, my delegation is pleased to note that the draft resolution seeks to address both the long- established shortcomings of the peace-keeping missions and those which have been brought to the fore by recent developments. The steady deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has served to bring into greater focus the many unacceptable facets of the conflict: obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance, hostage taking, intensified and unprovoked attacks on safe areas and civilian population, as well as those on UNPROFOR personnel and, of course, the abhorrent policy of “ethnic cleansing”. The Council has on many occasions pronounced its condemnation of these acts in unmistakable terms, which are exemplified in the draft resolution. The draft, however, goes beyond expressions of condemnation and concern. Its basic thrust is to provide UNPROFOR with the necessary means more effectively to implement its mandate. This is a paramount objective which my delegation fully endorses. The establishment of the rapid reaction force is an important step in giving UNPROFOR increased tactical and operational flexibility in the field that will enable it more effectively to protect safe areas and civilian populations, protect UNPROFOR personnel, ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance, in particular in the safe areas, and perform other duties in accordance with its mandate. Furthermore, we In this context, the Council must do its utmost to ensure that the decision it is about to take today will make significant and positive contributions towards altering the unacceptable status quo. We realize that the support and cooperation of the parties concerned is a prerequisite for any peace-keeping operation. However, throughout UNPROFOR’s presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this requirement has been manipulated by the Bosnian Serbs, thereby incrementally eroding the authority of the Force. Such brazen tactics should not be continuously responded to either by inaction or by appeasement; rather, they should be addressed with decisiveness to ensure the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions. This is indispensable if UNPROFOR is to maintain its credibility. One of the most important tasks of UNPROFOR is to protect safe areas from armed attacks or any other hostile acts. Lately, we have witnessed incessant and indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population by the Bosnian Serbs, particularly in Sarajevo, which have resulted in civilian casualties. Consequently, it has become increasingly obvious that the safe areas have become unsafe areas. For this reason, the deployment of a rapid reaction force should address, in particular, the issue of enhancing UNPROFOR’s capability in insuring the security of the civilian population. We are cognizant of the calls for the demilitarization of safe areas as a means to enhance the protection of the civilian population therein. My delegation believes, however, that demilitarization which is confined to the safe areas is inherently unjust, since it is tantamount to depriving the victims of the necessary means to protect themselves while leaving the aggressors free to continue and intensify their wanton attacks from the surrounding areas and thereby strengthening the military advantage of the Bosnian Serbs. This will provide the aggressors with the incentive to further encroach upon the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and renew their campaign of “ethnic cleansing”. It is in this context that the Non-Aligned Movement Caucus has proposed that demilitarization based on mutual agreements should apply not only to the safe areas, but also to their immediate surroundings. My delegation is pleased to note that the sponsors have agreed to this proposal, as reflected in the draft resolution. Finally, my delegation would like to stress that, while we support a more robust UNPROFOR, it is imperative that a search for a political settlement be vigorously pursued, as emphasized in the draft resolution. In this context, we support the demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the peace plan proposed by the Five-Nation Contact Group. My delegation expresses the hope that the adoption of the draft resolution will create a climate conducive to reaching agreement on a cease-fire and a complete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would facilitate the efforts to reach a comprehensive political settlement. In this light, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The delegation of Honduras wishes first of all to thank the Secretary-General for his report submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995). The report deals realistically and frankly with the central aspects of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the factors that have led to the virtual paralysis in the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The recent tragic events in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which followed the conclusion of the agreement on a cessation of hostilities and which, regrettably, led to the resumption of military action and the loss of precious human lives in the “safe areas” of Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Tuzla and to a situation of insecurity for the United Nations personnel that make up UNPROFOR, demonstrated the parties lack of will to resolve the conflict by peaceful means as well as their inaccurate assessment of UNPROFOR’s objectives in that country. These facts have brought home to the Council the need to conduct a review of the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina so that, while making its personnel less vulnerable, it can also enhance their capacity to fulfil UNPROFOR’s objectives. The purpose of UNPROFOR is to keep the peace, not impose it. A revision of UNPROFOR’s mandate in order to allow it to take military action without the cooperation of one of the parties or to ensure the protection of its own personnel was not a viable possibility. This would have distorted its objectives without ensuring cooperation by the parties and would also have run the risk that the parties might take more radical positions and that they might consider the United Nations presence in the country to be biased. Taking all these aspects into account, my delegation studied the proposal for the integration of a rapid reaction force under United Nations command and available to UNPROFOR as a solution that would help the operation fulfil its mandate, maintain security for its units, help its redeployment and facilitate its movements. My delegation supports this proposal not only because its objective is to strengthen UNPROFOR’s capacity to fulfil it mandate while reducing the risk to its personnel, but also because, above all, it will continue to be a peace-keeping operation. In his report the Secretary-General refers to the deficiencies inherent in the “safe area” regime, which limit UNPROFOR’s capacity to carry out its mandate effectively and to prevent deliberate attacks originating from and directed against these areas. In his report of 1 December 1994 the Secretary-General had already pointed out that in order to apply the “safe area” concept successfully, it was necessary to accept, among other things, the fundamental principle that the purpose of the “safe areas” is to protect the civilian population and not to defend territories or military positions and that UNPROFOR’s protection of these areas is not intended to make UNPROFOR a party to the conflict. The Secretary- General stated that in order to achieve the primary These views, which we share, were reiterated by the Secretary-General in his report of last 30 May. We believe the military presence of the parties in the “safe areas” or the launching of attacks from or against them is totally inconsistent with the fundamental principles that should govern these areas and, in essence, are one of the causes of the current situation of destabilization in the region and the risky, difficult situation now facing UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its mandate. We must therefore express our agreement with the provisions of the draft resolution we are going to vote on, as it highlights the need to demilitarize the “safe areas” by mutual agreement. My delegation also shares the views of the Council of General Affairs of the European Union, as contained in its declaration on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted last 29 May. The deliberate bombardment of the civilian population in the “safe areas” and the taking of United Nations soldiers and observers as hostages are completely unacceptable acts that must be condemned by the entire international community. The persons still being held must be released immediately and unconditionally. We recognize that the work done by UNPROFOR personnel is difficult and dangerous, and we wish to express to them our respect for their courage and dedication. I wish to conclude by saying that my delegation is a co-sponsor of the present draft resolution because it contains the elements that we consider essential for resolving the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: it asserts that it is only through peaceful means that the parties can arrive at a lasting solution, it appeals to the parties to cooperate effectively with the United Nations mission, it ensures the protection of UNPROFOR personnel and the capacity of UNPROFOR to fulfil its mandate, it addresses the problems of the “safe areas” realistically and it urges the parties to negotiate a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities by making it clear to them that there can be no

The Chinese delegation has been following closely the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is deeply sympathetic with the Bosnian people in the sufferings brought on them by war. We sincerely hope to see an early end to the conflict and war there. The Bosnian crisis is now at a critical moment. It is therefore imperative for the international community and all the parties concerned to do whatever they can to ensure that the cease-fire be restored between the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all hostilities, bloodshed and conflicts be stopped and a solution acceptable to all be found through patient and pragmatic negotiations so that the cease-fire will become a lasting peace and a new stable peace mechanism will be established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, we wish to reiterate that any solution should ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the legitimate rights and interests of all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be fully respected. A United Nations peace-keeping operation, as the name indicates, is for the purpose of keeping peace rather than fighting. United Nations peace-keeping efforts should therefore be aimed at creating conditions for peace rather than aggravating crises. This is the fundamental starting point and ultimate objective of the Security Council in making decisions on peace-keeping operations. The draft resolution before us calls for the establishment a rapid reaction force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Chapter VII of the Charter. The establishment of this force is for the purpose of enforcement actions and brings about a de facto change to the peace-keeping status of UNPROFOR. Once the force is put into operation, it is bound to become a party to the conflict, thus depriving UNPROFOR of its status as a peace-keeping force. There have already been important lessons for United Nations peace-keeping operations in this regard, and one should avoid committing similar errors. However, while the ambiguity in the mandate of UNPROFOR referred to in the Secretary-General’s report still exists, calls have been made consistently to expand UNPROFOR further before certain major issues are resolved, in total disregard of the basic principles We are of the view that the establishment of a rapid reaction force will lead to many political and military complications. Moreover, it will substantially increase United Nations peace-keeping expenditure. At a time when the United Nations is in a financial crisis, it is all the more necessary for the Security Council to act within the means available to it, without wilfully increasing the burden of the States Members of the United Nations. It is therefore neither appropriate nor desirable to finance the establishment of the rapid reaction force from the United Nations peace-keeping budget. According to the amended text, financing modalities will be determined later. This is unprecedented in the history of United Nations peace- keeping operations and may not prove beneficial to this operation either. It is on this basis that we repeatedly put forward an amendment on this issue in the informal consultations. However, our reasonable amendment was not fully accepted, which the Chinese delegation regrets. The Chinese delegation cannot support this draft resolution, since many of its elements run counter to our principled position, a position which we wish to place on record. However, taking into account the fact that many developing countries wish the Security Council to take appropriate measures to alleviate the very pressing crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the fact that the draft resolution stresses the importance of a political settlement to the Bosnian question and of protecting the security of United Nations peace-keeping personnel and that it has incorporated some of our amendments, the Chinese delegation will abstain on the draft resolution before us.

The Secretary-General’s report (S/1995/444) provides a candid and honest assessment of the latest developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have noted in particular, and carefully studied, the options that he outlined and the analysis of their implications. The crisis in Bosnia has indeed put the reputation and credibility of the United Nations on the line, and it is right for the Secretary-General to alert the Security Council to the wider ramifications of the situation in that country. The spectacle of United Nations peace-keepers taken hostage, some of them tied to poles like sacrificial lambs, has outraged my delegation beyond belief. It has always been unacceptable to us that UNPROFOR troops often have been targeted for attack by the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and openly criticized and condemned by those they are supposed to be helping maintain peace, but for the Serbs to actually chain them to poles, bridges and other objects was the worst humiliation of United Nations personnel and a callous demonstration of total disrespect for the authority of the United Nations. The Bosnian Serbs should unconditionally release the United Nations peace-keepers they are still holding hostage and remove all the restrictions they have placed on those they have blockaded. The pertinent question to raise concerning this issue, as does the Secretary-General in paragraph 60 of his report, is: “whether UNPROFOR is to be a peace-keeping operation, conducting itself in accordance with the established principles and practices for such operations, or an enforcement operation” (S/1995/444, para. 60). This question is central to the continued presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. We had hoped that the debate on this rather intractable question would have featured more The basic complicating factor in the Bosnian conflict is the absence of a cease-fire. There can be no peace- keeping without a cease-fire, because if there is no cease- fire, there is no peace to keep. We have nothing against strengthening the United Nations force in Bosnia. We are, however, a little concerned about the possibility of UNPROFOR getting engulfed in that senseless and wasteful war. We have taken note of the fact that the rapid-reaction force will operate under peace-keeping rules of engagement. There are still, however, lingering questions begging to be asked. A simple one is: have we drawn any lessons from the troubles that have brought us to this terrible pass? And under what circumstances exactly would the rapid-reaction force be called in? Is NATO air power still relevant, or has it been superseded by the rapid-reaction force? How are we going to treat the parties if they continue to behave in the way they have behaved in the past? Are we now going to engage them militarily? And are the UNPROFOR troops going to be quartered in large camps à la Somalia in order to afford them protection? Here are some more questions: what will be the parties’ perception of this rapid-reaction force? Have we ascertained their perceptions? Will they treat it as impartial? In his report, the Secretary-General has attributed the current crisis in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations mission in Bosnia to attempts to make it serve the purposes of both peace-keeping and peace- enforcement. In our present efforts to enhance the capacity of UNPROFOR to better implement its mandate, we should guard against creating the perception in the eyes of the parties to the conflict that UNPROFOR is a peace- enforcement mission, which it is not and should not be. All these questions and the concerns we have raised cannot detract from our sympathy with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Government we recognize. We have voted in favour of all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemning the Serb forces. We are also very much aware — painfully aware, in fact — that We wish the new-look UNPROFOR were operating under different conditions than those that currently obtain on the ground. I must repeat: a cease-fire is a must, because you cannot keep peace where there is no cease- fire, where hostilities continue unabated. If there is no cease-fire, our efforts in Bosnia will continue to be futile. We wish the men and women of UNPROFOR success in the tasks ahead. Theirs has thus far been an impossible task.

The disparity between the objectives and the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), on the one hand, and the wherewithal at its disposal, on the other has always been one of the most vexing problems bedeviling that operation. In seeking compliance with Security Council resolutions, and indeed in protecting its own personnel, UNPROFOR has had a widely bifurcated choice between two options: its own persuasive abilities, and air power. UNPROFOR’s persuasive abilities, never a terribly strong choice, have been dissipating with every additional failure, with every additional concession. And yet UNPROFOR leadership demonstrated a marked reluctance, a distaste even, for employing air power, a reluctance that bothered many observers, who felt it overly cautious. As events of the past weeks have demonstrated, that caution was appropriate. From the military point of view, UNPROFOR indeed turned out to be extremely vulnerable, and the Bosnian Serb hostage- taking demonstrated that for all to see. The taking of hostages is reprehensible and despicable. It has been described as a terrorist act, and we agree with that description. It cannot be tolerated by the international community. The hostage crisis is a crisis for all of UNPROFOR at least, and is the main reason why the Czech Republic supports, indeed has joined in sponsoring, the draft resolution before the Council. On the initiative of France and Britain, the two countries whose UNPROFOR contingents are the largest, and of the Netherlands, we are now authorizing the sending of a rapid-reaction force which will bring into better alignment the mandate of UNPROFOR and the means at its disposal. A tank or an armoured personnel Several aspects of this draft resolution are important for us: it preserves the peace-keeping nature of UNPROFOR. It is easy to argue — now, regrettably and alarmingly, perhaps even more than at other times — that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no peace to keep. But the important aspect is that, peace or not, UNPROFOR is not turning into a peacemaking or a peace-enforcement operation. For this reason, too, we are satisfied that Chapter VII of the Charter is invoked only in the context of UNPROFOR’s self-defence and freedom of movement, and that the draft resolution is in this regard not breaking any new ground. We also reiterate the impartial status of UNPROFOR. The Security Council, thus, through this draft resolution would emphasize once again that peaceful negotiations, not war, are the way to settle the conflict; peaceful negotiations which should take the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point. We are happy to have the very welcome agreement of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the deployment of the rapid-reaction force — and from the legal point of view, no other party can veto it, of course. However, practical considerations make it necessary that conversations and contacts should proceed with all parties, in order to win their acquiescence, if not their agreement, at least ex post facto if not in advance. We encourage the Secretary-General to proceed with efforts along these lines.

The United States supports the establishment of a rapid-reaction force within the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and we will materially support its deployment and its operations. UNPROFOR must be able to defend itself if it is to implement its mandate in full. It is vital that UNPROFOR remain, and be effective, in Bosnia. As the events of recent weeks have demonstrated so vividly, UNPROFOR is vulnerable, and, as a consequence, its mission is vulnerable. We were outraged at the seizure of hostages, and we call for the unconditional release of those still being held. We are determined to take steps to prevent such incidents of illegality and obstruction from We have no illusions about the difficulties UNPROFOR faces, even as its defensive capabilities are enhanced. The responsibility for allowing UNPROFOR to operate safely and effectively falls squarely on those parties who would interfere with its operations. But despite interference, and despite the unsatisfactory nature of the current situation, my Government still believes that the continued presence of UNPROFOR provides the best opportunity to keep this conflict from spreading and the best chance for avoiding further destruction and civilian deaths. I have spoken of the responsibility of the parties, in the plural, but I am not speaking here of moral equivalence. The Bosnian Serbs are the party that has taken United Nations personnel hostage in gross violation of international law. It is the Bosnian Serbs who have committed the greatest violence against non-military targets. It is the Bosnian Serbs who have been guilty most frequently of obstructing the delivery of humanitarian supplies. And it is the Bosnian Serbs who have consistently rejected the Contact Group plan. My Government supports establishment of the rapid reaction force, but we cannot do so honestly without confronting squarely the substantial funding implications that such a decision entails. My Government requested a modification to the draft resolution because we strongly believe that the costs of the rapid reaction force should not be financed through the assessment process. We vote in favour of this draft resolution on the clear understanding that by doing so we are not incurring any direct financial obligation. To put the matter simply, in a time of serious budgetary cutbacks we are not now prepared to pay the lion’s share of the cost of expanding this Force. As Members of the Council know, the issue of financing United Nations peace-keeping operations on a satisfactory and timely basis is troublesome. The primary When the rapid reaction force for Bosnia was first proposed, it was our understanding that it would be financed outside normal peace-keeping assessment procedures, and we so informed our Congress and our public. In the British, French and Dutch proposal annexed to the Secretary-General’s letter of 9 June, we learned that our allies sought payment through normal peace-keeping assessments. We have been struggling with that request ever since. Although we are voting in favour of this draft resolution today, we want to make it very clear that we are not endorsing that passage in the annex to the Secretary-General’s letter of 9 June that proposes payment through normal United Nations peace-keeping assessments. There are other methods to finance a force of this kind. The normal peace-keeping method stated in the annex is an expression of intent by the British, French and Dutch Governments; it does not represent my Government’s position; and the draft resolution makes it clear that the Council has yet to decide how this force will be funded. Because we do support the early deployment of the force, we will need to work out suitable financing in the days ahead. In doing so, we should bear in mind, my Government believes, the extraordinary funding requirements of UNPROFOR, particularly in comparison with any other single peace-keeping operation or even all others combined. For that reason, we simply cannot conduct business as usual when it comes to expanding this mission. We are prepared to discuss the options with an open mind. Perhaps participating nations could take the lead in paying their own way and forgoing reimbursement. Perhaps a voluntary fund could be established to help cover some of the costs. These and other ideas are worth exploring. What is important is doing so seriously and soon.

The Council will now proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/1995/478, as orally revised in its provisional form.

The result of the voting is as follows: 13 in favour, none against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution, as orally revised in its provisional form, has been adopted as resolution 998 (1995). I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Sir David Hannay (United Kingdom): Two and a half months ago this Council voted to continue the presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. At that time I said that my Government was increasingly concerned by the slide towards an intensified war, that this would increase the difficulties that UNPROFOR faced and that it might even call into question its ability to remain. The events of the last few weeks have shown all too clearly how easy it is for matters to escalate rapidly. UNPROFOR has been blocked at every turn from pursuing its mandate — the mandate which both parties had previously accepted. It has been intimidated and attacked; its personnel have been taken hostage. It is even It is against this background that my Government and those of France, the Netherlands and other countries have decided to offer reinforcements to UNPROFOR. We therefore welcome the adoption of this resolution, of which my country was a sponsor, authorizing the necessary increase in the UNPROFOR force ceiling to allow those reinforcements to deploy. The adoption of this resolution is a clear demonstration of international resolve and commitment to the work of the United Nations in Bosnia. These reinforcements mean that for the first time the United Nations commanders will have at their disposal a credible rapid reaction capability. It will strengthen UNPROFOR’s ability to defend itself, increase the range of options open to the United Nations commanders to respond robustly against attacks on UNPROFOR, and facilitate UNPROFOR’s ability to carry out its mandate effectively, including to resupply its own troops. These reinforcements will be an integral part of the existing United Nations peace-keeping operation and will be under the existing United Nations chain of command, functioning within the existing mandate. But let me make it clear that UNPROFOR’s mission remains one of peace- keeping. It is there to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid, to assist the parties in developing and implementing cease-fire agreements on the ground and to help provide a breathing space for the political process. It is not there to go to war with either side. Some have suggested that the decision by my Government and others to send reinforcements reflects a hidden agenda: to bring about the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Withdrawal is not our objective. We are determined to do everything possible to ensure that UNPROFOR is able to remain in Bosnia. But, ultimately, whether it does so is up to the parties themselves. UNPROFOR can only be successful if it has the continued consent and cooperation of all sides. If the parties instead insist on embracing the military option, if UNPROFOR is prevented from carrying out its tasks or if it faces unacceptable risks, then there may be no choice but to withdraw UNPROFOR. We applaud the efforts of the United Nations commanders on the ground and their troops in maintaining a firm line throughout the current crisis. We also salute the fortitude of those peace-keepers who have been detained. I must now refer to the amendment to paragraph 10 of the resolution. My delegation has been able to accept the addition of the words at the end of that paragraph both because it understands the domestic political difficulties which the delegation of the United States is facing at this moment and also in order to avoid any conceivable interpretation that today’s decision has in itself imposed an exact and specific financial obligation on any State. But it must be clear to all of us that the Security Council has no locus to take decisions in financial questions. The Charter reserves to the General Assembly the responsibility for budgetary and financial matters. In our view, therefore, the amendment of paragraph 10 does not and cannot change the financial procedures followed by this Organization. The Secretary-General said in paragraph 3 of the financial addendum to his letter of 9 June that he will recommend to the General Assembly that the costs relating to the reinforcement of UNPROFOR should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States, in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is the understanding of my delegation that the Secretary-General will proceed in the well-established manner and present to the General Assembly at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with his statement in the financial addendum, estimates for the cost of the activities of the reinforcement which we are approving in today’s resolution. Indeed, paragraph 9 of the resolution makes it clear that we are approving this reinforcement on the terms set out in the Secretary-General’s letter. The General Assembly will then exercise its Charter responsibilities under Article 17, paragraph 2, in the normal way. UNPROFOR is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The overriding objective must remain a political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. UNPROFOR, even

My delegation heartily welcomes the adoption of resolution 998 (1995), on the strengthening of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). It was essential for the Council to act swiftly in order to make possible the prompt deployment of elements of the rapid reaction force proposed by the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. As the Council knows, the Governments of those three countries, faced with the grave deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina — the systematic impeding of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the blockading of the Sarajevo airport, attacks against UNPROFOR personnel, the taking of UNPROFOR personnel as hostages and attacks against the civilian population — decided that the only possible response was to provide UNPROFOR with new means, for twin objectives. The first is to better assure the security of its personnel. It was inadmissible that UNPROFOR personnel should continue to be subjected to threats, restrictions on their freedom of action, detention or direct attacks as they carried out their functions. The United Nations soldiers could not continue to live in that state of constant insecurity and humiliation. The second objective is to enable UNPROFOR to fulfil its mission. In this regard, it was necessary to give the military commanders in the field a broader range of means to react. At present they can choose only between endless — and usually fruitless — negotiations with the parties and resort to air power. The resolution the Council has just adopted contains a provision that the modalities of financing will be determined later. To our mind, this is not a matter of bypassing the usual rules for financing peace-keeping operations, nor is it an attempt to undermine the prerogatives of the General Assembly. We understand that this provision simply means that it is not up to the Council itself to establish the modalities for financing for an operation it decides upon. It goes without saying that the deployment of additional troops must not be delayed because of this. Faced with UNPROFOR’s serious difficulties on the ground, the impossibility of its carrying out its missions and the attacks to which it has been subjected, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, rather than electing to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposed that additional means be made available to the United Nations. The resolution the Council has just adopted will have to be implemented quickly if we want to make UNPROFOR less vulnerable and enable it to carry out its mandate: to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, see that the safe areas are respected and monitor current or future agreements on a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. My Government expects the new means made available to the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be used judiciously, but not weakly. The humiliation of UNPROFOR personnel must cease, and the United Nations mandate must henceforth be carried out. France will not remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina unless its soldiers can maintain their pride and honour and serve effectively in the cause of peace. My Government is determined that the sacrifices it has made thus far and the new efforts to which it is prepared to commit itself must not be in vain. It will spare no effort to restart the negotiation process and will fully support all initiatives to that end.

Italy welcomes the Security Council’s adoption of today’s resolution, which follows the Secretary-General’s recommendation to establish a rapid reaction capacity, as proposed by France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This resolution aims to allow the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to implement its mandate in a more satisfactory manner and authorizes an increase in the operation’s personnel such as to include this new force. I would recall that the Italian Government has expressed its willingness to provide this capacity with its full support. Italy has always believed that the continued presence of UNPROFOR is indispensable to foster political stability and provide support for humanitarian relief to a population so brutally victimized by a long and ruthless conflict. We also believe that the establishment of a rapid reaction capacity is a prerequisite to reinvigorating the action of UNPROFOR and to fully restoring its effectiveness and credibility, which have been steadily undermined by the failure of the parties — especially the Bosnian Serbs — to collaborate. This gradual process of deterioration in the situation and in the conditions in which UNPROFOR is called on to perform its activities culminated in the Bosnian Serbs’ taking hundreds of Blue Helmets as hostages. This act defies all international laws, and we firmly condemn it, as we do the Bosnian Serbs’ heinous practice of attacking the defenceless population in the safe areas. While we express our satisfaction over the recent release of most of the Today’s resolution emphasizes, and rightly so, that there can be no military solution to the Bosnian conflict. This is why we believe that the reinforcement of UNPROFOR being decided on today cannot be separated from a vigorous relaunching of the negotiation process. We thus request all the Bosnian parties to renounce attempts at military solutions, which would inevitably cause terrible new suffering to the civilian population and further distance the already fragile prospects of peace. In this context, the information received from the United Nations Secretariat today on new military initiatives by Bosnian Government forces north-west of Sarajevo raises very serious concerns. At the same time, we issue a new appeal to the Bosnian Serbs to finally accept the peace plan of the Contact Group, which — let us not forget — has already been accepted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We also hope that the international community will intensify its efforts to foster the peace process. Finally, I wish to affirm the urgent need that delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian people, particularly in the safe areas, be fully resumed and continued without further disturbances. We consider the obstacles to these deliveries to be unacceptable, and we condemn the cynical recourse to such obstructive acts as a means of pressuring and intimidating the civilian population. Today’s resolution is meant to give more force and credibility to UNPROFOR’s action, and can, we hope, make an important contribution to this end.

Today’s deliberations on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a new twist in the course of events in that region. The latest escalation of attacks by the Bosnian Serbs on the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), ranging from sniping to detention and including the use of United Nations personnel as human shields, is clearly a blatant violation of international humanitarian law and norms. This new defiance demonstrated by the Bosnian Serbs is clearly yet another challenge to the will of the international community, whose credibility is thus tested once again. Based on this understanding, we would like to reiterate our objection to the use of force as a means to settle differences. It is our opinion that dialogue and negotiation are not only a civilized mechanism, but the most suitable and acceptable way of reconciling differences, leading ultimately to a comprehensive political settlement. We agree with the Secretary-General’s opinion, as expressed in his latest report to the Security Council, on the necessity of reassessing the role of the United Nations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a manner that will strengthen security for United Nations peace-keepers and enhance the protection of the civilian population within a mandate that is to be fully implemented. In this context, we view the proposal to establish a rapid reaction force as an option that deserves our utmost attention. It is our hope that this additional capacity will be capable of discharging its duties and functions and provide additional security to UNPROFOR personnel under the command of the United Nations. We see no problem with the mandate itself. We know that the mandate is there; the main problem lies in its implementation. On the question of the safe areas established in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the relevant Security Council resolutions, my delegation believes that United Nations protection should not be confined to those isolated and scattered pockets, the so-called safe areas, but that it must be extended to all territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully share the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his report that the safe areas are not safe and that they need to be made safe. Therefore, it is our hope that the international community will be able to establish very clear modalities on how to protect the safe areas and their inhabitants, especially when they are under attack or siege or when humanitarian convoys are prevented from reaching them. We welcome the provisions contained in the resolution that has just been adopted by the Council. At the same time, we would like to emphasize the right of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to defend itself in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the need for this Member State to be consulted on all matters, in In conclusion, my delegation, recognizing the vital role that this rapid reaction force will play, co-sponsored the draft resolution just adopted as Security Council resolution 998 (1995) and fully supports its objectives.

The resolution we have just adopted resulted from an arduous process of consultations and negotiations, in the course of which the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not improved. On the contrary, the parties have steadily distanced themselves from the options presented to them for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between them. We say this because it is clear that one of the parties in Bosnia has done more than to withdraw its consent for a United Nations presence; it has in fact gone much further, having described the United Nations as an enemy and having regarded the hostages it took as prisoners of war. We regret that long after the beginning of this deplorable episode we are still obliged to address it in paragraph 1 of tonight’s resolution. We are also concerned about recent reports of military preparations by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina which can be understood as tending towards renewed, and heightened, confrontation. One might also ask whether the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has any real chance to fulfil its mandate if the fears aroused by those facts turn out to be justified. We are grateful to the Member States and Secretariat staff who designed and formulated the option set out in this resolution. They had to evaluate innumerable factors in deciding to create a rapid-reaction capability. We understand that this is a compromise between the requirements imposed by the realities of the conflict and the functional limits inherent in peace-keeping operations. We are confident that, after an evaluation of all the factors at issue, this decision was taken on the basis of the recent lessons learned by the Security Council in its experience with this conflict. In our view, the first lesson is that the contradictions between the mandate of a peace-keeping force and what that force may be asked to do on the ground can be very costly. In most instances, such contradictions arise from Contradictions resulting from the conduct of the parties underlie every conflict, but the Security Council must not become involved in those contradictions, lest it lose its capacity to act and its credibility. We fully agree with the Secretary-General’s view, stated in his most recent report on UNPROFOR, that the process should be relaunched and intensified through new political initiatives, through which the work of the peace- keeping force could be affirmed. To attempt the opposite by seeking political results as a result of the activities of the peace-keeping forces would not reflect a correct perception of the mandate of those forces. That is why we attach particular importance to paragraph 2 of the resolution. These recent experiences also indicate that UNPROFOR’s action in fulfilment of its mandate must be based on the following premises. The will of the parties for conciliation can come only from those parties, as reflected in paragraph 3 of the resolution. We must take the greatest care to preserve a precise relationship between the mandate of our peace-keeping forces and the tasks entrusted to them. In that context we attach particular importance to the resolution’s reference to UNPROFOR’s impartiality. Among the matters addressed by the resolution, my delegation attaches particular importance to the reference to safe areas. We recall that for some time the Secretary- General has been making proposals with reference to this concept, and has submitted two reports which we have not yet studied. Obviously, it is necessary to guarantee the protection of those areas and to guarantee their humanitarian needs. Here, the Council’s concern is clearly expressed in operative paragraphs 6 and 7; we hope that their provisions will lead to concrete actions by the parties. The other concept to which we want to refer relates to the use of force, especially through the rapid-reaction capability established by this resolution. We believe that the use of force should be restricted to self-defence and should be engaged in with great care, lest the delicate line between It only remains for us to hope that, unlike what has taken place on other occasions, our capacity to act will not be overtaken by events.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Germany. The German Government is deeply concerned about the further deterioration of the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The continued strangulation of Sarajevo can under no circumstances be justified. The latest news about the situation in and around Sarajevo gives rise to the fear that there could be a new round of intensified hostilities in the days to come. In this context, it continues to be important not to forget who is the victim and who is the aggressor in Bosnia. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a peace-keeping operation sustained by the international community at great cost and with a heavy toll in human lives, is confronted with an ever more aggressive environment and with hostile actions, in particular from the Bosnian Serb side. The taking of UNPROFOR personnel as hostages is a contemptible act. We also condemn the continued strangulation of Sarajevo and the horrifying shelling of safe areas, which on a single day in Tuzla led to the death of 71 Bosnians, most of them young. We support the continued presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. We support the plans by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and the Netherlands to reinforce UNPROFOR with a rapid- reaction capability of up to 12,500 additional troops to assist the mission in carrying out more effectively its humanitarian mandate. That is why my delegation voted in favour of this text and joined in sponsoring it. It is a necessary step to ensure that the rapid-reaction forces can be brought to the theatre as soon as possible. A stronger UNPROFOR will be in a better position to defend itself, to fulfil its mandate and to protect the suffering civilian population wherever possible. The parties have to agree without further delay to a cease-fire and a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, a stronger I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.