S/PV.398 Security Council

Before calling to the Security Council table the representatives of those Governments which have already participated in the discussion on the Indonesian question under Article 31 of the Charter, I sho111d like to dispose of the question raised in the letter from the permanent representative of Burma [S/1200J, addressed to the President of the Security Council. This letter is dated 11 Jan!.lary and has been circulated to the members of the Security Council. . As the members of the Council will observe, the Government of Burma has requested the privilege of participating in the discussions on the Indonesian question in the Security Council llnuer Article 31, for the reasons which are fnllv set out in this letter. . \ CONSEIL DE SECURITE PROCES.VERBAUX OFFICIELS QUATRIEME ANNEE No 2 TROIS.CENT.QUATRE.VINGT.DIX. HUITIEME SEANCE Tannc ,t Lake Success, New-Y()r!l, le mardi 11 janvier 1949, d 15 heM'cs. Preside-nt: Le general McNAUCiHTON (Canada). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique socialiste sovil,hique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Roywme-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 1. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda 398) 1. Adoption de J'ordre du jour. 2. Qllestion indonesienne. 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 3. Demallde de la Birmanie tendant il ce que le representant de ce pays siege it la table du Conseil pendant la discussion sur la question indo- nesienue Le PRE.SIDENT (tmdllit de l'angl.a.is): Avant d'inviter a prend~e place ala table du Conseil les rep resentants des Gouvemements qui ont deja participe it la discussion sur la question indone- sienne en vertu de l'Alticle 31 de la Charte, je voudrais que le Conseil regIe la question sou- levee dans la lettre' adressee ;1ll Presider~t du Conseil de securite par le representant perma- nent de la Birmanie [S/1200). Cette lettre est datee du 11 janvier et a ete distribuee aux mem· bres du Conseil.' Ainsi que les membres du Conseil pellvent le :emarquer, le Gouvernement de la Birmanie a 5011icite, ell vel·tu de I'Article 31, le privilege de participer, pour 1es raisons exposees clans cette lettre, al1X clehats que le Conseil de securite consacre it la question indonesienne. Ther{f being no discus~-ion,it was so derided. 4-, Continuation of the disell8siQn on the Indonesian question At tlle invitation of t}w Pr::sideni, Mr. Hood, representative of Australia; Mr. Nisot, repre- sentative of Belgium; Mr. So Nyun, representa~ tive of Aurma; Sir 13cnegal Rama Rau, repre- sentative of India; Mr, van Roijen, t'l1presentative of the Netherlands; Mr, Ingles, representative of the Philippims; and .Mr. Palar, rept'l!sr:nlatt.ve of tl:e R{!P1~btic of Indonesia, took their Places at the Sew.rity Council table. The PRESlDENT: When we adjourned OUT dis- cussion of the Indonesian question last Friday [397th meeting}, I suggested that the members of the Council would wish to have some time to wnsider the importar.t statements made at that meeting, particularly those made by the represen- tative of the Netherlands and the representative of Indonesia, and also to study the reports which had just been received from our Committee of Good Offices and :he Consular Commission which are contained in documents Si1l89 and 8/1190. Since then, three more messages have been re- ceived from the Corr.mittee of Good Offices, These have been circulated as documents Sj1l93. 5/1194 and 5/1199. '[he last document reached Lake Success only this morning and was issued to members of the Securi~y Council fOT the first time at this rne"eting. Members will note that in document S/1193 ~hey may find a further :eport from the Committee of Good Offices dated 8 ]armary, stating that arrangements have been made for the despatch of military observers to the various areas in Java and in Sumatra, beginning en the morning of January. Keeping in mind this information and the further information given in 5/1]99, we s~lall now continne our discussion. In accordance with our usual ctlstom, tnt"re will be simultaneous interpretation for those nations invited to participa:e under Article 31 and the usual consec:utive interpretation for mem- bers of the Security Council. Mr. ]ESSUP (United States of America) : My delegation has taken into account, as be Presi- dent suggested, the statements which were made ~efore the S{"Cllrity C::otmcil at our last meeting. My Government still can find no adequate justifi- cation for the military action taken by the Nether- :ands ,in Indonesia. In many important respects the reasons justi- fying tl1eir action Pl,t forth by the Netherlands representative at the 389th meeting of the Se- curity Council on 22 December in Paris, and again here last Friday, are not supported by the reports of the CColllmittee of Good Offices. 4. Suite de la discussion sur la question indoJ1F!sienne Sur l'invitation dl£ President, M, H o'Jcl, repre- J'enta-r.t de l'Australie; M. Nisct, representant de la Belgique; M. So Nyun, representant de fa· BirmCNni8; Sir Benegal Rama Rau, representa1lt de l'lndt; M. vm, Roi;'en, represelJtant des Pays- Bas; M. 11:glas, reprasmtu1:t des Philippines, et M. Palar, reprhmtalll de la. Republique d'ltuJo- 'lcsic, prcm~ent place d la table du Conseil. Le PRESlOENT (traduit de l'angiais) : En ajour- nant la discussion de la question indonesienne vendredi dernier I397blle seance}, j'ai estime que les membres du Conseil vOltdraient sans doute disposer d'uII certain temp~ pour examiner les importantes declarations eritendues a cette seance, en particulier celles des represelltants des Pays- Bas et de_ la Republique d'Indonesie. et aussi pour Hudier les rappoTts des documents 5/1189 et 5/1190 qui "it:nllt:lll de nOllS etre communi- ques par notre Commission de bons offices et par la Commission consula;re. Depuis lors, nous avons re~u trois nouvelles :::ommunications de la Commission de bons offices, les documents 5/1193, S/l194 et 5/1199. L<;; dern:cr de ces documents n'est parvenu a Lake Stccess que ce matin et n'a pu etre distribue aux membres du Conseil de securite qu'au cours de la presente seance. Les menbres remarqueront que le docu- ment 5/1193 contieul un Ilou"eau rapport dc la Com:nissicn de jons offices en date du 8 janvier, au il est dit que des dispcsitions ont ete pri~es pour l'envoi d'abservateurs militaire: dans les diffe~ents sectellts de Java et de Sumatra a partir du 9 janvier au matia. Compte tenu de ces renseignements et des autres indications fournies dans le dQcument 5/1199, nous allons poursuivre la discussion. Suivant la pratique habituelle, nous applique- rons pour les declarations des representnnts des Etat!' invites a participer a la disc.ussion en vertu de l'Article 31, le systeme de l'intel'pretation simultanee et pOLlr celles des membres du Conseil, le .<;ysteme de l'interpretation CQ::Isecutive. M, ]ESSUP (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais); Comme 1'a suggere le President, ma celegation a pris note des declarations faites deva."lt le Conseil de S€curite au cours. de notre dern:ere seance, Man bO'.lveroement considere toujours que l'action militaire entreprise par Ies Pays-Bas en Indonesie n'est pas justinee, A bien des egards et S~lr des poi:1ts impor- tants, !~.<; raiso,s invoquees a cet effet par le representarlt des Pays~Ba; Jors de la 38geme seance du Conseil de securite, tenue le 22 decem- bre, a P<'-ris, et, ici enci:,re, venclredi dernier, ne sont pas corroborees par leg rapports de la Commission de bons offices. The United States, joining, with Colombia and Syria, introduced a resolution [5/1142] which called upon both parties to cease hostilities forthwith and immediately to withdraw their armed forces to their respective sides of the de~ militarized zones under the Renville Agreement of 17 January 1948. Unfortunately, the paragraph calling for the withdrawal of forces was not adopted by the Security Council. The Security Council, on 24 December [392nd meeting], did pass the resolu- tion [5/1150] calling upon the parties to cease hostilities forthwith and to release the political prisoners who had been arrested since 18 De- cember. Later, on 28 December [394th meeting], the Security Council passed the additional reso- lution [5/1162] calling on the Netherlands authorities to release the political prisoners within twenty-four hours. The Netherlands representative has a~snred the Security Council that his Government has complied with the cease~fire demand and with the release of prisoners ordered by the Security Council. Neither my Government nor the Com- mittee of Good Offices considers that the Nether- lands has done so. In that connexion, I should like to read from the report of the Committee of Good Offices [5/1189] which has been distributed to us. In the conclusions of the report the Com- mittee says: "12. The Committee is not in a position to report that there has been satisfactory compliance with sub-paragraph (a) of the resolution of 24 December, which called on the parties to cease hostilities. "(A) The telegram dispatched to territorial commanders in Java by the Chief of Staff of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army at 1700, 29 December 1948 is, according to its tenns, for information and cannot be construed as an oIdel' to 'cease hostilities forthwith'. The dissemina- tion of the order of the Commander-in-Chief to territorial commanders in Java which confirmed the fac:t that hostilities in Java had ended at 2400 of 31 December was begun at 1845, Batavia time, 2 January. In Stlmatra where a 'special emergency situation' existed, the par~l1el order disseminated late on 4 January had an effectil'e time of 1200,5 J<lnuary 1949. ,, ,i "(B) It is noted that these orders were issued at a time when the 'operational phase' of mi1i~ "12. La Commission n'est pas en mesure de declarer, dans le present rapport, qu'une suite satisfaisante a ete donnec aux dispositions de l'alinea a) de la resolution du 24 decembre, qui invitait les parties a eesser 1es hostilites. HA) Le telegramme adresse le 29 decemb~e 1948 a 17 heures, aux commandants de tertl- toire~ aJava par le chef d'etat-major de l'armee royale des Pays·Bas en Indonesie, a ete envoye pour information, d'apres la maniere dont il est redige et ne peut etre interprete comme un 'ordre'de "cesser les hostilites sur-le-champ". L'ordre du commandant en chef aux comman- dants de territoires a Java, ordre qui confinnait le fait que les hostilites a Java avaient pris fin le 31 decembre, a minuit, a commence a etre transmis le 2 janvier a 18 h. 45, heul'e de Bat~­ via. A Sumatra, ou existait nne "situation partl- cuW:rement critique", un ordre similaire, transmis tard dans la journee du 4 janvier, fixait la date et l'heure d'execution au 5 janvier 1949, a 12 heures. "B) Il est a noter que ces ordres oht ete don- nes au moment ou la "phase pratique" des acti· "(C) As a result of the immobilization of its military observers, the Committee h<.ls no first- hand information as to the effect of the orders discussed above." I might interpolate that the lack of information of the Committee was due to the fact that the military observers were not allowed at that time to move out into the field for purposes of observation. The report continues: "(D) The Committee is of the opi~iOl.\ that these orders issued more than a week after the adoption of the resolution of 24 December, and expressed as they were, cannot be looked npon as satisfactory compliance with sub-paragraph (a) of the resolution. "(E) There is no channel available to tlte Committee for dissemination of the resolution of 24 December to the Government or to the comomnders of the Republican Army. "13. Sub-paragraph (b) of the Security Council's resohltion of 24 December calling for the immediate release of the President of the Republic: alld other political prisoners has 110t been implemented. So far as the Committee is aware, President Soekarno, Vice-President Ratta, and the other members of the Republican Gov- ernment who were captured by Netherlallds forces on 19 Decelllber are still under deten- tion ... "15. Despite the statements made to the Se- curity Council by the Netherlands representative on 27 and 29 December. the Committee has not been in a position to make independent investi- gations of any kind in the field for the purpose of carrying out its functions under the resolution of 24 December. It has been heard unofficially and infonnally that certain military and naval liaison officers attached to seme of the consulan officials in Batavia took advantage of a Nether- lands offer to conduct tbem on a tour of some of the mtlitary areas on 5 and 6 January. These officers are not the military observers of the Committee of Good Offices and their observations are not avnilable to the Committee, even if their tour was the type of field investigation and observation required by the functions of the Committee." ]1". pourrais ajouter iei que, si la Commission manquait de renseignements, c'est parce que, a Cl". moment~la, les observateurs militaires n'etaient pas autorises a se rendre sur 1es lieux d'opera- tions pour y elfeduer des observations. Le rap- port poursuit: "D) La Commission estime que ees ordn~s. donnes [Jlus d'une semaille apres l'adoption de la resolution du 24 decembre et dans les terllles ou ils sont rediges, ne peuvent etre consideres comme une e..xecution satisfaisante de I'alinea a) de la resolution. "E) La Commission ne dispose d'aucun moyen pour transmettre la resolution du 24 decembre au Gouvernemellt ou atlX chefs !llilitaires de I'annee republicaine. "13. L'a1inea b) de [a resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 24 decembre, qui demande la mise en liberte immediate du President de la Repuhlique et des autres prisonniers politiques, n'a pas ete execute. JIlsgu'ici, la Commission sait selllement que le President Soekaruo, le Viee- President Hatta et les autres membres du Gou- vernement republicain, captures par les forces netlrlandaises le 19 deeembre, sont toujours detenus ... "15. En depit des declarations que le repre- sentant des Pays-Bas a faites an Conseil de seen- rite les 27 et 29 deeembre, la Commission n'a pas ete en rnesure de procMer cl. des enquetes independantes sur place en vue de remplir 1es fonctions que 1ui confie la resolution dtl 24 de- cembre. Les autorites neerlandaises n'ayant pas Zllltorise ou facilite le retour a leur poste des observatenrs militaires de la Commission ... , eeux~ci n'ont pu se livrer a a1.1cune observation. Ii nous est revenu, de source officieuse, que cer- tains offic.iers de liaison de I'armee et de la marine, detaches attpres de certains cOllsnlats it. Batavia, ont profite d'nne ofire des Pays-Bas qui leur ava;ent propose de les emmener visiter cer- taines des zones mi1itaires, les 5 et 6 janvier. Cl'S officiers ne sont pas des observateurs militaires de la Commission de bans offices, qui ne peut connaitre le resultnt de leurs observations ffieme si la visite qll'ils ont hite constitue le type cl'en- quete et d'observatiOllS sur place qu'exige l'exe~ cution des fonctions de In Commission," The continuance of military action of the Netherlands authorities after the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 24 December' was clearly an act of defiance on the part of the Netherlands authorities. No excuses offered by the Netherlands Government can conceal the fact that it has failed to comply with the Security Council demands both in refusing to order a cease-fire immediately and in refusing to release the political prisoners immediately. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the representative of the Netherlands has failed to relieve his Government from the serious charge that it has violated the Charter of the United Nations. The purpose of ~he Security Council cease- fire resolution of 24 December was to stop the fighting in Indonesia immediately so that the dispute could be settled not by force but by the processes of peaceful settlement enjoined on Member States by the Charter. Even though members of the Security Council were well aware that it was the Netherlands authorities which had initiated tfle resumption of military action, the resolution of the Security Council called on both parties to order a cease·fire. In such situations as those which existed at that time, this is an appropriate form of Security Council resolution, since the cessation must be mutual, no matter who is responsible for starting the fighting. It must be assumed that, in ordering a cease-fire, the Security Council could only have intended that such an order would apply equally and simultaneously to both sides. The Council could not have expected one side to comply unilaterally while the other considered itself free to comply at such a time and in such a way as it saw fit. The continuance of military action by the Nether- Lands forces until all military objectives had been taken cannot be regarded as compliance with the cease~ti.re order. Certainly the reservation of the right by one side to use its own forces in the territory of the other to eliminate the anned resistance of that other side which may thus far have escaped destruction, cannot be regarded as compliance with the cease-fire resolution. Taking these factors into account, I am sure that the Security Council has no intention of approving action cOllsolidating military victories which themselves were gained as a result of open defiance of an Grder of the Security Council. Probably the most striking and clearest dis- regard of the orders of the Security Council is to be found in the refusal of the Netherlands authorities to release President Soekarno, Prime et Minister Hatta and the other leading officials of ~ the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Ik Quite aside from the disregard of the Security ~ Council resolution of 28 December [S/1164] 1ft which required that these prisoners should be j'(released within twenty-four hours, there is the 'eJ present fact these persons are still not at liberty. En poursuivant lellr action militaire apres l'adoption par le Conseil de securite de la reso· lution du 24 decembre, les autorires neerIan- daises font nettement un geste de deri. Tous les pretextes invoques par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne sauraient dissimuler le fait qu'i1 ne s'est pas conforme aux ordres du Conseil de secu- rite, puisqu'iI a refuse a la fois d'ordonner de cesser le feu sur-le-champ et de liberer immedia· tement les prisonniers politiques. Le Gottvernement des Etats-Unis estime que le representant des Pays-Bas n'a pas reussi a laver son Gouvernement de l'accusation grave d'avoir viole la Charte des Nations Ulties. La resolution du Conseil de securite, en date du 24 decembre, ordonnant la cessation des hosti.:. lites, avait pOllr but de mettre immediatement fin aux combats cn Indorresie de maniere a pou- voir resoudre le differend, non par la force mais par les moyens pacifiques auxquels la Charte enjoint nux Etats Membres de recourir. Les membres du Conseil savaient pertinemment que c'etaier.t les autorites neerlandaises qui avaient pris J'initiative d'une reprise de l'activite mili~ taire; la resolutiondu Comeil de securite invite pourtant les deux parties aordonner un "cessez- le-feu". Etant donne la situation a l'epoque, le Conseil avait raison d'agir ainsi, puisque les hostilites doivent cesser de part et d'autre, quel que soit ce1ui qui les a declenchees. Donc, en ordonnant de cesser le feu, le Conseil de secu- rite entendait forcement qu'un teI ordre s'appli- quat e.galement et simultanement aux deux par- ties, 11 ne pouvait entrer dans les vues du Conseil qu'une seule des parties se conforme a SOLt ordre, alors que l'alltre se considerait comme libre d'ob6ir quand elle le jugerait bon et i sa guise. Puisque les autorites neerlandaises ont poursuivi les operations militaires jusqu'a la conquete de tous les objectifs militaires, on ne S311rait dire qu'elles ant respecte l'ordre de cesser le feu. 11 est evident qne,- si l'une des deux parties se reserve le droit d'utiliser ses forces sur le terri- toire de l'autre partie pour eliminer chez celle-ci toute resistance armee qui aurait jusqJ,le-la echappe ala destruction, on ne saurait dire qu'elle s'est conformee a la resolution ordonnant de cesser le feu. Pour toutes ces raisons, je suis persuade que le Conseil de securite n'entend nullement approu- ver des actes qui consolident des victoires mili- taires remportees au mepris evident de ses ordres. Ce qtli constitue la meconnaissance la plus neHe et la plus evidente des ordres du Conseil de securite, c'est probablement le refus des auto- rites neerlandaises de 1iberer le President 50e- karno, le President du Conseil Hatta et les autres principaux dirigeants de la Republique d'Inclo- nesie. Non seulement on rt'a tenu aucun compte de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 28 decembre [5/1164] exigeant la mise en Iiberte de ces prisonniers dans les vingt-quatre heures, mais,encore ccs personnes, al'heure actuelle, n'ont I hav-e just seen dowment 5/1199 containing a further report f:-om the Committee of Good OfriC(".3 conccrnitlg the question of the r'll"tention of President Soekarnc, Prime Minister Hatta and other leading officials of the Republic of Indonesia. It appears from this document that there i~ some question as to the present whereabouts or these officials, but I fmd nothing in the text of ilie letter from the Netherlaflds delegation of 11 January, which is reproduced in that document, to alter the essential facts and the conclusions from those facts which I haye just dmwn. The clear intent uf the resolutions of the Se- curIty Council on this point was that the high officials of the Republican Government should be restored to a position in which tlley would be free to exercise their governmental authority. The minimum which would Seem to be called for at this moment is that the President and other in~erned officers of the Republic sho·.1ld be allowed to ret'.lrn to their capital and to exercise their appropriate fUllctions :here, free from the con- st:-aint of any occupying anny. They should be free to establish and tr.aintain contact with other officiais of tbeir Government. They should also be free to provide their own fcrces for the main- tenance of law and order in ]ogjakarta. Further, my Government, in considering the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute, cannot hut recall a history af non~co-operation on the P3.rt of the Ketherlands in the work of the Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia. The failure to achieve a political settlement and the protracted negotia- tions which followed the signing of the Renvil!e Agreement ir: January 1948 broaght about in IndOl·,esia a'O increased tension between the Netherlands and the Republic, with a conseqaent increase in f,rovocative incidents which sorely strained the tmce. The bill of particulars for these acts av~r a period of mont[lS is recorded il1 the reports of the Committf'e of (;00<1 Offices to the Security Cotmtil. From these reports it appears that even prior to the resumption of military action against tIle J(epubJ:c, the Nether- lands pursued a policy whi<:h had the ~ffect of weakening the Republic, working unnecessary IJardship on the population, isolating the Repub- licanGovern:nent economically and politicaliy, and presenting it with a prefabricated interim administration for In<!onesia with which it was to associate itself but whic11 it had no part in forming. My Govcrr.ment considers these acts and the failure of the Netherlands to enter into bona fide I1 ressort ue cc document qu'on ne sait pas t'.xac'ement ou se trouvent actuellemellt ces per- scmnalites; mais je ne trouve den, dans le texte de la lettre de la delegat:on des Pays-Bas datee dll 11 j<:.uvier et reproduite dans ce document, qui change quoi que ~e soit a l'es3entiel des faits et aux c::mdusions q:le je viens d'en tirer. A cet eg<!rd, le Conseil de secll~ite voulait evidemment que, camme suite a ses resolutions, :es fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la Repu- blique soient mis de nouveau a merne d'exercer :ellr~ fOllctiullS gOllvernclnentalcs. II semble qLl~ le minimum que 1'an puisse atte:1.dre en ce mo- ment, c'est que le President et les nutres fonction- nai~s de la RepubJique internes, aient la faculte de ~etaurner dans leur capilale et d'y excrcCl:" les fanctiom qui Ieurs reviennent, i l'abri de toute contrainte de :a part d'tme armee d'occu- patbn. Ils deyraient etre a meme d'etablir et de l11aintemr le contac: avec les autres fonction- naites de 1ear Gouvernement. Ils devraient egn- lement aVOtr la faclllte de constitue: les forces necessai~es au maint;en de I'ordre public a Djok- jakarta. En outre, lorsqu'il considere le differend qui oppose les Pays-Bas et l'Indonesie, mOll Gouver- nerr;ent ne peut uublier que les Pays~Ba.s n'ont pas aide aux travaux de la Commission de bons offices en Indone.sie. Il n'a pas ete possible d'aboutir a un regiement politique, des negocia- tions interminables ont suivi la s:gnature de I'Accord du Renv-ille en janvier 1948. 11 en est resdte, en Indonesie, un surcroit de tension entre les Pa}'s~Ba5 et la Republique avec, pour conse- ql1ence, llD surcroit d'illcidents de cnractere pro~ vocateur qui ant mis la treve a. une rude epreuve. Le deUlil de ces incidents, s\~tendant sur une periode de plusieurs mois, figure dans les rap· ports adresses au Conseil de seccrite par la Commission de bans offices. I1 ressort de ces rapports glle, metTle avant la reprise de l'activite militaire cantre la Repllblique, les Pays-Bas ant pocrsuivi une poHtique ayant pour diet d'affaiblir la Republique, d'imposer i la population des sacrifices inutiles, d'isoler econorniquement ~t politiqucment le GOl1vernement rcptlblicain et de le doter, pOUr diriger l'Indonesie, d'une adminis- tration interimaire avec laquelle il aurait eu a c?ra~orer suns avoir pu participer a son orga. ntSatlOn. Man Gouvernement estime que ces actes et le fait que les Pays-Bas n'unt pas a vrai dire entre~ The Republic of Indonesia represents the largest single political factor in the projected federation and should therefore have a voice in the formation of the federation. The Republic has a two-fold nature. First, it is a political entity; secondly, it is the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter attribute cannot be .eliminated by any amount of military fort::e, The Netherlands Government may find that, far from assuring law and order in the Indies, the course upon which it has embarked may instead let loose forces of terror, chaos and sabotage It may well be that the only victory will be that of the forces of anarchy. My Government is of the opllllOn that real pe<.H.:e in Indonesia can be expected only if there is a settlement of the political issues on the basis of the principles and procedures agreed to by the parties in the Linggadjati and Renville Agree~ rnents [S/649, Appl'ltdices Xlll and Vlli] and Under the auspices of the United Nations. The responsibility for the future rests in the first instance on the Netherlands authorities. The Security Council has a right to assume that the Netherlands Government will, in accordanc~ with its obligations, bring to an end its defiance of the Security Council and give its full co-opera- tion towards reaching a fair and reasonable solu~ tion of the Indonesian qtlestion. My Government has, over a substantial period of time, devoted serious thought to this problem and to its proper solution. Our views are con- tainerl in the plan which our representative on the Committee of Good Offices submitted to the two parties on 10 September of last year and which was accepted by both of them as a basis for the resumption of negotiations, If Indo- msian leaders were restored to their rightful position as the responsible representatives of the Republic of Indone~iaJ free to conduct the affairs of their Government and to negotiate freely with the Netherlands Government concerning the future of Indonesia, and if these two Govern- ments could proceed to negotiate on the basis of this proposal in accOI'dance with their earlier undertakings, this would be a notable contribution to the ultimate solution of the Indonesian problem. I I I • See Political Events in the Rrp"bl,c of b:dalle.,;:a, Netherlands Information Bureau, New York, page .34. Pendant un temps assez long, mOll Gouverne- ment a murement etudie ce prob1eme et la solu- tion qu'jJ convient d'y apporter. Notre point de vue est expose dans le plan que notre represen- tant a la Commission do,: oons offices a presente aux deux parties le 10 septe.mbre de I'annee der- niere, et qu'elles ont accepte toutes deux comtne base de la reprise des negociations. Si les dirl- geants indonesiells etaient reintegres dans leur situation legitime de repl'esentaTIts re5ponsables de la Republiql1e cJ'Indonesie, libres de gerer les affaires de leur GOtlver11ement et de negocler sans entraves avec le GOl1verr,ement des Pays-Bas au sujet de l'avenir de I'Illdonesie, et si ces deux Gouvernements pouvaient ensuitc enlamer des negociations sur la base de cette pmposition, conformetnent a lell1's engagements anterieurs, cela contribuerait beaucoup a la solution finale du prob1eme indonesien. 'Voir The Political Evenls ia tht Reimblic of JI,do~ ~lesia, public par le Bureau d'informatioll des Pays-Bas, This programme contemplates a tennination of t1-:e type of military oCCllpation of the country which has been brought about by Netherlands rr:qitary action. The withdrawal of the Nether- lands armies should hegin at the earliest possible date and as r:tpidly as the need for the preserva- tion of law and order permits. The occupation rr_ust be completely terminatec. before an effective traosfer et sovereignty can take place. My Government believes tlmt the l~ngth of time which should ela.:Jse between the p~esent moment and the date when the elections should take place, arid also the date of transier of scvereignty, should be c:alcu1ated in term~ of months, not in terms of years. As soon as elections have been held and a provisional regin:e set up, authority should be turned over progressively to the new regime by the Netl1erlands Government, and the transfer sr.ou1d have been completed by the time ar which sovereignty is assu:ned by be United States of Indonesia. As I stated earlier, the problen1 of Indonesia remains a matter of interna:ional concern with which the Security COltnci1 must continue to deal. The carrying out of the steps necessary for the ultimate transfer of the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia. should, we believe, be accomp:ished under the auspices of the United Nations and with the help cf the machinery it affords. The Committee of Good Offices, in its report of 7 January [S/1189], has appropriately pointed Ott, that "it does not wish to be j)l1t in a positiolJ of seeming to apprme by its participa~ tion or e~'en its authentication, any settlement based on force rather than on true negotiation". The Committee of Good Offices was created originally as an instrument to further free neQ'O- tiations between the parties. The action of the Netherlands has temporarily suspended the Com- mittee's ability to carry out that function but the Cound's agencies in tJ-:e field remai'n in existence, ready to c~rry out -:ny task assigned to them by the Secunty eoured. No t~uporary suspension of the functioning of an agency of the Security Council can operate to ren-lOve an established interest of the United Nations in dealing with a situation to which the Security Cound has already addressed itself. In this connexion it is necessary to caB atten- tion to the report of the Committee of Good Offices which indicates that the Ne:her1ands le~ garanties n~ce~saires pour .que !e vote. SO!t a I'abri de toute contrainte. Les libertes de reUnion, de parole et de la presse doivent etre .garanties, aimi que le prevoit l'Accord du Retlv,tlle. Ce programme envisage la fin du genre d'occll- pation militaire a laC]t\elle l'activite .militail'e (}es Pays-Bas a somnis le pays. Le retralt des ~rmee:s: neerlandaises devrait com:nencer le plus tot pos- sible et aussi rapidement que le pennet le maill- tien de l'ordre public. Il faut que l'evacl\atiol1. soit chose. faite avant de proceder all transfel-t de souverainete. Mon Gouvernement estime C]\ie le dela: qui nOllS separe de la dute des elections et aussi de la date du transfert de souverainete doit etre de l'ordre de quelques mois et qu'il ne saurait etre question d'annees. Aussitot apres les elections et la creation d'un' regime provisoire. le Gouvernel11ent des Pay~-Ba~ de.vrait pelt iI. pell p<.sser les pouvoirs a ce norveau regime; le transfert devrait etre acheve au moment ou les Etats-Unis (l'Indonesif' aSSUnlf'ront l~ sotlve- rainete. Comme. je l'ai deja dit, le pmbl~e de l'Indo- ne-sie reste une question d'interet internaf.onal dout'le Conseil de securite doit demeurer saisi. Les mesures necessaires pour le transfert de la souverainete allx Et;:tts-Ul1is d'Indonesie <ie- vraient, pensons-nous, etre appliqnees sous I('s auspices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et a l'aide des moyens qu'elle fournit. La Commis- sion de bons offices, dans son rapport du 7 jan- vier [5/1189J a souligne opportunement qu'elle "ne desire pas se trollver dans line situation telle qu'elle paraitrait approuver, par participation di- recte OLl par acquiescement, tm reglement hase sur la fonne et non sur des negoeiations veri- tables". La Commis:sion de bons offices :L ete con~Uc, des t'origine, comtne un moyen de faeiliter de 1ibres negociations entre les parties. L'actioll entreprise par les Pays-Bas a pour :tn temps mis la Con:mission dans l'incapacite de remp1ir ce role, mais i1 existe tottjours sur place des orga- nismes ~elevant du Conseil de secl1l'ite qui restent pre.ts a accomplir les taches qlle le Conseil tellr assigne. Le fait que le fonctlonnement d'un org<'.- nisme du Conseil de securtte soit temporairement sL1spendu ne saun.it du meme coup effacer l'inte~ ret qu: l'qrganisation des Nations Unies porte a une SlttmtlOn clo:1t le CO::J.seil de' securite s'est deja preoccupe. A cet egard, je rappe1.1e qlle le rapport d~ la Commission de bans offices indiC]ue que 1es auto- rites neerlandaises ont pris stir elles de poser la acldre~sed to the Committee of Good Offices, This is not a question which concerns the Nether- lands authorities. The Security Council can utilize any agency which it considers appropriate, and it is the obligation of a Member of the United Nations to co-operate with any and all agencies operating- under Security Council instnlctions. It cannot he denied that despite the efforts of some Governments of States which are members of the Scurity Council. this hody has not vet succeeded in m·ercomillg" the obstadt,s which have been placed in the path of achieving a peaceful settle- ment in IndOlwsia. The responsibility of the Netherlands (;overmuent for this lack of Sl1ccess has already been made dear. Another obstacle has bcen creatc(l lw the action of n Memher of the l.' l1ikd NationS" which has, in many parts of the world, sougIlt to obstrtlct the Sllcccssful operation of the United Nutions. I refer to the Union of So\'iet Socialist Repllblics. \VIll'l1 this ql1estioll of Indoncsia wa:; bcing discU5SC'l! in the Sccllrit\· Council ill Paris, the Soviet 1'11iOll, speaking-both thr{ll1~h it~ OWI1 reprcscl1tatiw and Ihnll1gh the representative of the l"krainian SOyid S0cialist Republic, followed its familiar pr<lCCdllrC of endeavouring to cloak its own impru[JC'r actions by seeking" tu placc the blame on someone el5c. Thc n>prescntati\'c (Jf the PSSR r39IslllIcl'lil1Y] ami the reprcsentative of the LTkrainiall SSR [393rd IItcctillol both insinuated that the Govcrnment of the United States was in some way responsible for the ::lction of the Nethcrlands ill rcwrtin!; to hostilities against the Indonesian Repuhlic. It thus 1,ecomcs necessary to point Ollt again cCltain salient facts, In the first place, it was the Governlllent of the Uniterl Slates which took the initiative in convening- an urgent lllceting of the Security Council when it became <lppnrent that the Ncther- lands was resortiJ1g to militar.v "cHon ill Indo· nesia [5(1128J. It was the Government of the USSR which endeavoured to pre\'ent the Security Cotlncil fmm acting promptly by insisthlg that the Council meeting should be deferred for three days. Every otht'r member of the Council attended the 387th meeting on 20 Decemher ex- cept the two Soviet representatives. The United States also took the initiative, in conjunction with the repl'esentativcs of Colombia and Syria, in proposing a rcsolution [S(1142] to the Security Council to deal with the situation, but the USSR representative refused to support this resolution [3921/([ mecting] . .He later tried to covcr 11p this further attempt to block Security COl1ncil action by introducing a resolution of his Own [S(1148 alUi Sj1148jCorr.l] which he kncw conld not be adopted by the Council. More flmdament'll, however, that these obstructionist tactics in the Secllfity Council, is the fact that the USSR is fundamentally opposed to the Gov- ernment of the Republic of Indonesia and has itself. through the Comml1nist Party-which is, of course, its mOllthpiece throughout the world -sought to undermine and overthrow this Gov- ernment. LOrS([llC cdtc question de l'Il1dom~sie a ete disClltec, i.J. Paris, par le Conseil de sccurite, l'Union sovictique, par la voix de son pl'Opre rcpresentant et dl1 l'eprescntant de la Repl1blique sodnlistc sovietique d'Ukraillc a Cll recours a sa tactiquc hJhituelle de camoufler ses actes repre- hensibles en rejetant le blame sur autrui. Le representant de l't:RSS [391Cmc s6auccJ et le representallt de la RSS d'Ukraine [3938mc Jt~mJ~'cJ ont tOllS dellx laissc entendre qlle le Gouvernemellt des Etats-L'nis etnit en quclquc sorte rcsjloll:;<tblc de cc: gl1'avaient fait les Pays~ Gas en engage<lllt les h()~tilites ayec la. Repl1bliqtw ,1'Indoncsie. Il dcvient donc lU~cessaire de rap~ peltr cncore certains bits saillants. En premier licu, c'est le GotWernemellt des Elats-Ulli~ qui a pris l'initiative de faire convo- quer d\1rg-ence le Con:;cil de secl1ritc, lorsqu'il e~t devcllu evident 'ltle les Pays-Bas avaient rr.cours a l';u.,tioll militaire en Indonesie [S/ll2S}, C'est le Gouverncment de l'URSS lllli n. essaye d'empecher le Conseil de secl1rite d'agir promptement ell insistant pour que la seance du COllseil soit retanlec de trois joms. A l'exception des deux representants sovietiques, tOllS les membres du Conseil ont a~siste a la 387emc seance, tellt1e le 20 deccmbre. Conjointement avec les represent~llts de l~ Calombic et de la Syrie, les Etats-Ullls ant aUSSl pris l'initiative de proposer un~ res~luti?l; [5/1142J tendant a ce quc le Conseil de secunte agisse en l'occurrence, mais le representant de I'VRSS a refuse d'appuyer cette resolutioll r392cI1Ic seance1. Il a plus tard essaye de camou- Her cette mant:el1vre destince a faire obstacle a. I'action dll Conseil en soumeltant nnc resolution [5/1148 ct S/1148(Corr.l] qui ne pouvait pas ~ il le savnit - etre adoptee par le COIlseil. Ce qui est plus grave que cette tactiqlle d'obstructi0!1 all Conseil de secllrite, c'est que I'URSS est radl- calement opposee au Gouvernement de la Repu- blique d'Indonesie et 9t1'elle a cherche a, nU,ire it ce GOllvernement et a le renverser par 1action dtl parti cOl"nmuniste - qui est, on le sait, son The communist line which, I repeat once more, means the line of the Soviet Government, accused that distinguished statesman of th",_ Indonesian Republic Mr. Hatta, of being a traitor to his country. ' At the very time when editorials were appeming to this effect in the CUInll1unist Party organs in Paris, the USSR represent;'.tive on the Security Conor.il sought to cover tip the actual pohy of his Government by identifying himself with the Council's endeavours to secure the release uf Mr, I-latta and other politic;:\l prisoners ~392nd meeting]. These are tile facts, which are on the record ;md known to the world, and which reveal that the Government of the USSR is not interested :0 supporting the Government or the Indonesian RepllJJic or in restoring pf'ace to Indonesia. On the contrary, it is following its familiar tactics Wllich it has used in Korea, in Greece, in Berlin and again, r_ow, in IlldolJesia, and which have been described in the speeches of many repre- s;e1t8.tives at the last session of the General Asse~nbly-namely, seeking, to overthrow a lawful democratic' Government and to undermine its authority. But the USSR dres nnt want an inde- pendent Indonesl2.: :t wants an Indonesia under the domination and contL'O! of a communist mincrity talring its 'orders from Moscow. Ar:y- where in the world wilen a communist govern- ment c1imb.~ in t!lrough the window, indeper.d~ enee is kicked out of the door. T::te Govrrnment of the United States. on the contrary, has viewed with admiration the efforts of the Indonesian pecple, both in the Republic a.mI ehewhere, to gain their independence, and it 113-5 steadfastly sought to support them. The Government or the United States still takes that positio:1, and it is for tbis reasun lhat it has taken the lead in endeavouring in the Security COllllCil :md in the Comm:.ttee of Goac Offices to bring abottt a peaceful adjustment of the diffiwlties between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlamls Government, :wd 1.0 establish th!' United States of IndonesiE. as onc of the fullv sovel'e:gn a:1d independent peoples 01 the world. Mr. NrsoT (Eelgium) (traas]ated from Fn;nch) : I wish to make;) comment of a purely juridical nttl1re. E I h~ve uodf'rst(]nd ,:orrectly the United States representative stated that- 'tl:e Security Council resohtticns of 1 August and 1 November Mosc~u. La revolte cornmuniste contre le Gou- vernement du President Soekarno et du Presi~ dent du Conseil Hatta a ete en sui uue tentative du Gouyememel1t de l'URSS oour retlverser la Rcpt6lique d'Indonesie. En outre, lorsque le Gouvernement des Pays-Eas a repris les hosti- lites contre la Republiqlle d'hdonesie, le parti communiste a eu, Pf.JUl- politique officielle, si ran en jr.ge par sa presse, non pas de deplore I' eet acte mais de s'en rejouir sans dissimuler sa satis- fac.tion en y yoyant le dlatiment du Gouverne~ ment du President Soekarno et du President du Conscil Hatta pour ~voir reprimc et fait ec.hOller une revolte communiste. La politiquc communiS1.e q\li, je le reIH~.te unc fois de plus.. est la poliriClue du Gouvernement sovietique, a consiste a accuser M. Hatta, eet homme d'Etat indonesiel1 di5tinguc, d'ctre un traitre a son pays. Au moment meme ou des editcria\l){ ne Cl'. genre paraissaient dans les jour- naux tlu parti canm1ttnisle de Paris, le repn!:sen· tant de I'URSS au Conseil de see-utite s'effan:;;ait de donnel' le c.hange ~\1r la veritable poli~ique de son Gouvemement en encourage-ant hanternent les efforts que tentait le Conseil pour faire: liberer M. Hatta et le£ aut res prisonnien politiqucs [392eme seance]. ' Tels sont les faits, officiel1ement constates et conrlUS du monde entier, et qui revdent que le Gouvcrnement de FUR SS ne se preoctllpe pas de soutenir le Gouvernement de la Republiqne d'Indonesie ou de reta1Jtir la paix en Il1donesie, All contraire, il aplJJh~l1e sa tactique c.ontumiere, qu'il a e:11ployee en eorie, en Grece, a Berlin et maintenant encore en Indonesie, tactique exposee par de nombreux representants au cours de III demiere session de ['Assemb[ee genera[e et qui t:Sl ut: chercher a renverser un gouve:rnernent ICRRl et dClUocratique et a saper son autorite. Ca~ l'URSS ne veut pas d'llnc lndonesie :nde- per.dallte; eUe veut une Inc1unesie plC\.cec SO~1S 10, c01;pe cl'une minerite communiste qui prend les Ol'dres de Moscou, Ql1e] Que soit le pays dll mO(lde on un gouvemernent communiste entre par la fenitre, J'indepedance est mise a la parte a coups de pied. Le Gouver;lement des Etats-Unis, au contraire, a admire les efforts que le peup1c indonesien a deployes, (ant dans l,t Rt':Pllblique qll'en d'autres lie:.tx. pour acqucrir son inclependance, et a tOIl- jaurs cnerche ales soutenir. Le GOllV~lT1elllent des Etats·Unjs garde cette altitude et c'est ponr_ qUal il a. tte le premier, hUlt au Conseil de seClt- rite qu'a la Commisison de bons offices, a s'effOl"- cer d'aplanir par des moyens pacHiql1es les diffi- cUltes qui ont surgi entre la Rcpubliquc d'Indo- nesie et le GOllvernement des Pavs-Bas et de hire ties Etals-Unis d'Indonesie l'un des peltples dll monde qd aient Ullf sqllverainete et Llne inde- pendanLe pleines et entiere:. M. NIS<Yt (Ee1glql1e): Je presenterai une remarque d'ordre put'ement juridiq1.le. Si j'aj bien entendu, le representant des Etats- -Cnis a declare que 1e~ resolutiollS du Conseil dE" securite des 1er aout et ler novembre 1947 avaient: s~lch a step. When tl1e resollltions of 1 August and 1 No· vembcr were adopted, there were some extremely spirited debates on the question of the corope· tence of the Security Council; it was even agreed that that question remained entirely unprejudiced. It wOltld therefore be imposisble to accept as well-founded the explanation that the Security Council passed those resolutions under the con- viction that it was applying Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council could not possibly be bound by the interpretation g'iven by the United States delegation; such an interpretation must be considered as the opinion of its author, and his alOlle. Mr. TSIANG (China): In the latter 'part of December, the Security Council had several meet- ings in Paris on tile Indonesian question. In those meetings, the statements ami votes of the Chinese delegation indicated clearly enough the general attitude of my delegation with regard to the question before the Council. Last Friday [397th mct!tittg] , important statements were m<lde by the representatives of the Philippines, India and Australia. To much of what they had to tell us on that occasion I can subscribe, I shall not repeat what has been said here so often, nor do I wish at this stage of the debate to press the question of responsibility for the present state of affairs in Indonesia, I have asked to speak in order to present to the Council what I consider to he the essenti.al elements of a constructive and definite solution of this problem. In the first place, we are all agreed-including the parties to the dispute~that Indonesia shonld enjoy freedom, that this freedom should take the form of an independent federated United States of Indonesia, and that that federation should be a partner, with the Netherlands, in the estab- lishment of 11 Netherlands Indonesian union. These points were a part of the Linggadj<tti Agreement. They also form a part of the Ren- ,<->ill!' Agreement. They have been restated here by the representative of the Netherlands as stil1 constihlting the fundamental policy of the Gov- emment of the Netherlands, These political principles have not been dis- puted. 'They must of course form a part of the definite solution we seek, but the trouble hitherto has been their implementation. Now, it is obvious that an essential part in carrying these principles into effect is a free plebiscite by the people ot Indonesia, a plebiscite to elect a constitutional convention which will draft and adopt the future constitution of the United States of Indonesia. J'ai demande la parole afin d'exposer au Con- seH ce qne je considere comme les elE~ments essentie1s d'une solution constructive et precise de ce -probleme. En premier lieu, nOtlS sommes taus d'accord - y compris les parties all differend - POUI' que l'Indonesie soit libre, qu'elle forme .llne federa- tion independante, les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, et que ceUe federation s'assode <lUX Pays-Bas dans la constitution cl\me Union neerlando-indone- sienne. Tout cela est prevu dans I'Accord de Linggadjati et aussi dans l'Accord du Rellville. Le represer.tant des Pays-Bas a confirnle id meme que ces trois pl"incipes constituaient tou- jours le iondement de la politique dll Gouverne- meot des Pays-Bas. Ces principes politiques n'ont pas ete contestes. lis doivent, evidernment, entrer en ligne de compte dans la solution definitive ql'e nOll5 recherchons, mais la difficulte a ete jusqll'ici de les appliquer. Or, i1 est evident que pour leur donner effet, it fant avant tout proceder en Indonesie i un libre plebiscite, qui aura pour objet l'election d'une assembJee constituante chargee d'elaborer et d'adopter la future constitution des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. M. TsrANG (Chine) (tmduit de l'anglais): Entre le 1.~ et le 31 decembre, le Conseil de secu- rite a tenu a Paris pll1sieltrs seances sm la question illdonesienne. Au cours de ces reunions, les declarations et les votes de la.. delegation de la Chine oot clairement 1110ntre SOIl attitllde a l'egard de la qucstlon soumise a l'examen du Conseil. Vendrecli demier [397e11l'<' seance], les representants des Philippines, de l'Inde et de l'Anstralie ont fait d'importan~es declarations. ]e souscris a une grande partie des vues qu'ils nOl(S ont exposees a cette occasion. Je ne repeterai tJ1lS ce que l'on a si sonvent dit ici meme et je ne vettx pa::, a ce point de la discussion, insister sur la qllestion des rcsponsabilites en ce qui concerne ia situation en Indonesie. In the. opinion of my delegation, any constr!-1c- tive and definite ,solution of the IndoneSian problem. ITUlst embrace;the most solid guarantees of the freedom u~ election throughot~t lnnonesia to that future constihlen: assembly. T11at is the fir5~ element of the solution which I wish to set before the Security Council. The authorities of the Netherlands h:;lve t-.ri~d to Justi fy their military action on the grounds of so-:alled :llfiltrafon and sabotage by the Inco~ nesian Army. Such justification is not acceptable to I1S. Tt is not borne out by the reports of cur Committee of Good Offices on the spot. Never- th'e1ess the concern for peace and order in Indo- nesia on the part of the iUI:horities is n. legitimate concern. It should be and has been shared by the ;"e::;pcI15lb1c leaders of thf' Indonesian Re- public. On th2t point, again, there is 1]0 difference of opinion hetween the two parties to the dispute. So far 0.5 we of the Security Council are con- cerned, we certainl), cannot desire to allow dis· order,s to spread over In:1onesia. On the contrary, the COlmc:il has every reason to support the forces 'wDrking for peace and order, both in ordinary circumstances and especially at a time when an all· important plehi.~c.i:f'. is about to take place. In thE opinion of my ddegation, the second essenfal element to a constructi.ve solution ef lhb proble.-n is the estab1i~hmf'.nt of guarantees in regard to peace and order in Indonesia. If the analysi~ that I ha-ve attempted to produce is correct, it mear,s that the Security Council here- after mt:st p1:J.y a more positive role in Indones:a flan hitaerto. After the signing of the Linggad- jati Agreement, the two parties themselves mig:-tt ha\c worked O:.1t a so]tlt:or., bllt that turned out not to be the case j and this was not because we here in tJ-:F. Security Council wished to go out of our way to interfere in Indone~ian affairs. Af:er the signing of the RellviUe Agreement, with the help of :he moderate <.JuLh<Jrit:r of the Com· mitte~ of Good Offices, ti1e two parties again mighl llave worked OUt a solution wihotlt further :nter:erence from the Securiey Council. But as conditions st~l1c1 to date, after the breaking out of hostilities for a secw.cl time, it seems to roe :0 be entirely Ollt of tr.e question that the tIVO parties by themselves today could worl( oltl a peaceftl solution withollt th:s 'Council's playing a more positiye ro:c. It is ior this reason that I plene with the representative of the Nether- lauds not to emphasize ":lis objection to the com- petence of the Security COl.:ndl· in this matter. I myself always regretted that reservation on the part of the Netnerlan~s autiorities. My rldegatioll tak~ t~e. s.:anu that, in present world cor.ditions, any Member State which denies the competence of the United Nations in an effort to make peace, is taking a reaction:try positio:1. It celi<tinly has not proved helpful in Cotmexioll with the Indones:an problem_ 'the.re· fore, 1 ,say tbt the third essential element,in a constructive soltltion of this problem is the adop- tion of a more posit:ve role in Indonesia in the ft:wre, both :0 respect of the plebiscite and in De t'avis de ma delegatio::l, :oute solution cons~ tructive et definitive du pmbleme indonesiell doit pre-voir, dans toute I'Indonesie, ?our l'elect:on de cette future assemblee cons:ituante, :es plus sotdes garantie:i ee Jibertc. Tel e:;t le premier cle· ment de la so:ution que :e desire proposer au Conseil de ::;ecurite. Les autorites neerla:1daises od essaye de justi. fie, leur action rdlitaire el~ alleguant l~s infiltra- tions et le sabotage dont l'armee indonesienne se serai: rendue cOL:pable. Nous ne pouvons accep~ ter <:es raisons, dent nous ne trouvons pas la cO:lfirmation dans les rapports :le la Commission dE: bons offices. It n'en reste pas mains qLle les antorites se p~euccupent ii. juste ti:l'e du main. tien de l'ordre public en Indonesie. Ce SOUcl lIoit et:e partage, et :'a ete en falt par Les dirigeants responsables de la Repub;hlue ir:doncsienne. L3 encore, allCUne divergence d'opinions ne separe les partie~ a.l differe.nd. Pour ce qui est du Couseil de secllrite, nous ne saurions evicemrr:;ent sou· haiter qu'on laj~ge le desordre gagner tDlite l'In~ donesie. Bien au contraire, le Conseil a toutes r:tisons :le SOlltenir les forces qui travaiUent pour la paix e: pour l'ordre dar.s des circonstanccs ordinaires, e11 it i)lus fcrte raison, a la veille cl'un plebiscite :re.s important, D'a?res ma delegation, le second element essen~ tiel d':me solution constructive est I'e,ablissc:ncnt de ga~'anties en ce qui COtlce:ne le ;llaintieu de l'ordre public en Indonesie. Si l'nnalyse que. j'<li tente de p:esenter est exacte, elle signifie qL.1e le CQnseil de sccurire devr:c clans ]'avenir jouel· en Indones:e un role plus cancret qll'iJ ne l'a fait jl1sqn'ir.i. Apres la signature de rACCOfe. de Ling- gadjati, les deux parties auraie:Itptt aboutir d'eiles-memes ~ tne solution. ~i eIles n'ont pas abouti, on ne ;Jeut dire qll\lrIe poHtisue incon- sideree :I'intervention dans Ies affaires interieures de l'Indow:::;:e de la part du COllseij en Rnit la cause. Apn~s la 3ignature de l'Accorc du Ren- vitre, les deux partieR auraient pu encore cherchcr l1ne solntioll sans <Lutre intervention du Conseil I :le sec.ucite, avec l'appui de l'autorite mains eten- due de la Commission de bans offices. Toutefoi~, da:1.s \'etat actuef des cr.oses, les hostilites ayant repris pour la seconde rois, il ne pent plus etl'e question, semble-:-il,<::;.ue les det;x parties arrivent maintellant iJ. une solution p2.citiq·Je ;;i le Conseil ne joue pas U:1. :-61e ?It.s posid. C'est pourquoi j'adjure le representant des Pays-Bas de ne pas maintenir l'argument cl'incompetence q'j'il '3- oppose a:1 Conseil de secmite en cctte affaire. ]'ai toujours regrette que les at~toritf.s net:r1all- daises aient formulecette reserve. Ma delegatiol: afl1rn:e q~e, dans' la situation <l,l.:tudle du O1ondc, tout Etat M emhte c;ui nie la com;:H~tence de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, .nlors ql1'elJe s'dlorce d'etabh la pa;x, adopte une attitl1de reac:tionnaire. Ce genre d'attitude n'a pas contribl1e a l'esoudre le probleme :nc.onesien. Je , declare d011C que la troisieme co~diiion essen- . tielle.d'tme sc-lution wnstructive de ce problf:me, est que le Conseil joue dcsormais en In:ionesie un role plus pc.sitif, tant en ::e qui concerne le Having presented to the Security Council the essential elements of a constructive solution as my delegation sees it, I should like to conclude my statement with one further observation. Un- fortunate, indeed, tragic, as this conflict in Indonesia is, it has not assumed the nature of a conflict between the East and the West. I am very glad to note that a number of representatives of Governments in Europe and in North and South America have spoken in favour of a just solution of the problem in Indonesia. In the Security Council, at least, the division on this qnestion has not been along geographic, religious or racial lines. I wish to point this out because any misunderstanding by the world on this point would be very serious. The world has enough divisions as it is. We should not add to them by bringing here a con- flict between the East and the West, because that is not the nature of this problem. For our part-that is, for the part of the repre- sentatives from Asia-I am glad to point out the statement of the representative of India [397th meeting] in which he called the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the A&ian Conference to be convened in Delhi on 20 1anuary is calculated and planned to be within the frame~ work of the United Nations, \Vhatever our differences of opinion may be in regard to the Indonesian question, I am glad to note that every delegation has tried to treat this question as a ql1estion by itself without reference to racial, religious or geographical prejudices. This is something which is entirely to the good. MT. MOE (Norway).: It would not be of any use for a new member of the Security Council to enter into a discussion of all the aspects of the case now before the Council. It has unfortu- nately been on the agenda of the Council for. a considerable time. I should like, however, to say a feyv words in order to explain the attitude of my Govel·nment. In our opinion, the military actiori undertaken by the Government of the Netherlands in Indo- nesia is not justified and is not in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter. As to th!' background of the military action, it seems to my Government that we are faced with a case where it is evident that all the wrong is not on one side and all the right on the other. One side "1I is' not entirely black, nor the other side entirely white. :l, [)( It is deeply to be regretted that the Govern- . .! m~nt of the Republic of Indonesia, which has Jt made a great effort to organize the new Republic ~~ ina proper way, has evidently not been able to ne control entirely the political, military and semi~ ~>i, military forces within its territory, The Gov- :I emment of the Republic of Indonesia is certainly. Ayant presente au Causei! de securite ce que ma delegation consid(~re comme les eh~ments essentiels d'llne solution constructive, je voudrais conc!tlre man expose par une derniere obser- vation, Aussi malheurell){, aussi tragique meme que soit Cl' conflit d'Indonesie, il n'a pas pris le caractere d\m conflit entre l'Orient et 1'0cci- dent. Je suis heureux de consb.ter qu'un certain nombre de repl'esentants des Gouvernements de l'Europe et de I'Amerique du Nord et du Sud pTeconisent une solution equitable du probleme indo~esien, Au Conseil de securite tOllt au moins, les cbvergences d'opinicns en la matiere ne depen- dent pas de considerations geographiques, ra- ciales 01.1 religieuses. le tiens a le signaler, car il serait tres grave que le monde se llH~prenne sut' ce point. Le monde est trap divise en Cl' moment pOllr que nous ajoutions a la Iiste des causes de dissension LlD conflit entre l'Orient et !'Occident - telIe n'est pas, en effet) la nature du probleme qUJ nous occupe. En ce qui nous concerne, nous, les represen- tants de I'Asie, je suis heureux de rappeler que le repr~sentant de l'Inde a attire l'attention dtt Conseil de securite [397enl-€ seance] SlIT le fait que la Conference asiatique, q\li doit se reunir a New-Delhi le 20 janvier, a ete preparee et doit se tenir dans le cadre de I'Organisation des Nations Unies. Quelles que soient nos divergenres d'opinions sur la question indonesienne, j'ai plaisll'a noter Cll1e toutes les delegations se sont efforcees de la traiter C01TIme un pro1.Jh~me en .soi, sans faire etat de prejuges l'acial1X, religieux ou geogl"a~ phiqlles. 11 y a lieu de nons en feliciter. M. MOE (Norvege) (traduit de l'anglais): 11 ne servirait a rien qu'un nouveau membre dn Conseil de sccmite reprenne la discussion de to,lS les aspects de l'affaire dont g'occupe actl1el~ tement le CousEil et qui est malheurellsement a j'Ol'dre du jour depuis longtemps dej,t le vou~ drais toutefois dire quelques mats afin d'exposer l'attitude de mon GOllvemement. A notl'e avis, les meSl1res militaires prises en Indonesie par le GollYerneml'.n~ des Pays-Bas ne sont pas jtl.stifiees et ne sont conformes ni a la lettre, ni a l'esprit de la Charte. TOlltefois. si on considere les circoI1stances dans lesqllelles ce Gouvernement a agi, je ne crois pas qu'en I'occur- rence tous les torts soient du meme cote et qlL'une partie ait entierement rnison et 1'a11t1'e entiere~ inent tert. 11 fallt de[llorer que le Gouvernement de la Repl.lblique indonesienne, qtli a fait un gros effort .pour hien organiser la nouvelle R~publigue, n'ait manifestement pt'. contenir tont a fait les forces politiques, militaires et semi-militaires existant sur son territoire, Le GOltverneme-nt'de'laRepu- blique indonesienne comprend' certainement que, rep~esentatives of the Repubhc of IndonesIa will admit it-that the Ndher);mcl, Government, had several reasons for complaint about the attltuc1e of the RepuJlic, The contention of the Netherlands Gov~rn­ ment that the Republic has not adhered st:'lctly to the tma agreement seems" on the Ilasls. of available ll1tterial, to be not wIthout foundatIOn, The attilllde of Dutch public opinion a::ld of the Ne~herlands Governnent is, -berefore,. to a cer- tain extent -Jndcrstandable, BLIt even If onf' car. understand this attitude it is impossible to con- done the so-called police action, It is rather astonishing and depre~sing that ~he Netherlands GOl'ernment and Parltament, whIch my Govern- ment hold in such high esteem, have deli~rately chosen military action to remedy an c.dmlttedl)' c1ifl\cult situation, This action is, as I have al- ready stated, contrary to the lelLer and ~pirit oi the Charter We had thought that the tIme had passed when armed force Was llsed as an instru- mellt in international negotiations, We thought that the establishment of th United Nationa meant that internatimal disputes should be solved by negotiation, mediation or arbitration, and not by force, and tl1at the Netherlands, with it,S tra- dition of peace and democracy, should be In the vanguard of those nations trying to practise tolerance and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. It is with deep so~row that I have to give expression to the profound disappointment of my GoverlUnent in this respect. In launching the so~called police action, the Netherlands Government has also ignored and delied the United Nations. As .11reaJy pointed out by several speakers previously in the Council, it is impoSi.ible to understand why the Nether~ lands Government, when it found that it had reaSOn to complain about the attitude of the ReplJbJic, did not bring its complaint before the CommlUee of Good Offices or before tr.e Security Council. My Government associates 'Itself fully with the statement made by he representative of the United Kingdom at the 392nd meeting of the Security CDuncII, a statement to the effect tllat: " "if, for any reason, the Netherlands GOl~ emment felt unable any longer to condur.t direct negotiations with the Repubjc of Indonesia it should have availed itself of the services of 'the Committee of Good Offices before resorting to action by ferce of arms, which has inflamed world op:nion and can only embitter relations between the Netherlands Government and the Republic," In acting otherwise, the Netherlands Govern- ment has not only shown its disregard for the 3. rnnstate_ <IU'il avait des raisons de se plaindre de ['attitude de la Republique, 11'''- pas parte sa plainte devant la Commission de bons offices DU deva:tt le Conseil de securite, Mon Gouverne- ment s'associe pleincment it la ded<ln.lion fai~e par le representant du Royal1lue-Uni ala 392cme I seance du Conseil, lorsqu'il a dH: ", , , Si, pOUr une raison q~ekonqlJe, le Gou~ I' vernement neerlandai~ a estirne ne plus potlvoir mener des negotiations directes aVEt; la Rtflll- bliqce d'Indonesie, il aurait cia [aire appel ar,~ r service!? de la Commi3sion de bOlls oGees ava~t ~ de recomir ala for<:e des armes, ce qui a sou[eve ,r l'opi:lion m<:>ndiale et ne peut qu'envenimcr les ~. rapports eXlstant entre le GOllvernement neer- ;' bndais et la Republique," En agissant differeniment, le GOuvernemcnt d~s Pays-Bas a non settlement montre qu'il ne We fail to understand how anybody believes that the clock of history can be turned back and thnt force will succeed in subjugating democratic aml nntional aspir<ttiom which, in the opinion of my Government, should be encomaged, since national freedom is the only solid foundation for international co-operation. In his very moving letter to the President of the Security Council [5/1179J the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, expresses the fear that this so-called police action may leave bchind a legacy of hatred and enmity, and that such a prospect must be viewed as a grave threat to the restoration of peace in SOltth East Asia, That is why, in the opinion of my Government, it is the dtlty of the Secnrity Council to take effective measures which will, as far as this is possible, remedy tbe possibly serious conseqllences of the Netherlands military action. POllr ces raisolls, le COllseil de securite n'a pas seulement le droit, mais atlssi le devoir, de veiller d'abord a ce que l'application des modalites prevues dans I'ordre de 'cesser le feu ne puissent donner lieu a de nouvel1es hosti.lites. Les <lppre~ hensions qu'eprotlvent ace sl1jet les represcntants de la Republiqne d'Indonesic 50nt tOllt a fait comprehensibles. La Commission de bons offices devrait done avoir JJom- tache ill111I<::diate de Yeil- ler ace qu'Otl ne poursuive pas les hostiHtes !lOUS le pretexte de sevir contre des bandes armees. Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne la mise en liberte des prisonnjers, nOtlS sommes tres surpris d'ap- prendre que ie Gonvernement des Pays·Bas c1'Oit pouvoir declarer qt1e le.s prisonniers ont ete relicbes alors qu'en fait ils ont ete internes. Pader de "negodations" en de tenes drcons~ tances, c'est vraiment donner a ce mot un sens tOllt nouveau, Il est e,galement inconcevablc que l'une Oil l'autre partie puisse tirer un avantage CJl1elconque de ce qui s'est passe. Cela signifie qu'en piin- cipe les forces armees neerlandaises doivent se retirer du territoire nipublicain. Je dis "en prin- cipe", car le retrait des forces militaires sur leurs andennes positions devrait etre He a un arran- gement satisfaisant pOllr le maintien .de l'ordre public, et j'insiste sur ce point. Les representants de la Republique devront admettre que le Gou~ vernement des P<tys-Bas a raison cl'insister SUi l'extreme gravite de ce probleme. Non seulement la Republique devra donner des garanties suffi· santes ace sujet, mals elle dcvra le hire en coope- ration avec le Conseil de securite ou la Com- mission de bans offices creee par cc dernier, et .dans une certaine mesure sous leur contr61e et leur haute atttorite. Il devrait at1 mains etre pos~ sible d'aboutir a un arrangement qui assllrerait le maintien par des forces militaires neerlan~ For these ~easons the Securitv Cotlneil has not only the right but also the duty· first of all to see to it that the qualifications attached to the cease~ fire demand do not give rise to new hostilities. The doubts of the representative of the Republic of Indonesia in this respect are fully under- standable. It should, therefore, be an immediate tnsle for the Committee of Good Offices to en- sure that, under the guise of action against roving groups, hostilities are not continued. As to the other point-the release of the prisoners-we are astonished to hear that the Netherlands Govern- ment is able to state that prisoners have been released when in fact they have been interned; and to talk about negotiations under such cir- cumstance is really to give an entirely new mean~ ing to the word "negotiations". It is also inconceivable that any advantage should be allowed to result for either one of the parties as a consequence of what has taken place. This means that in principle the Netherlands armed forces must be withdrawn from Repub- lican territory, I say "in principle" because the withdrawal of the mililary forces to their former posltions would have to be subject to a satisfac- tory arrang-ement for the maintenance of law and order-and I insist on this. The representatives of the Republic will have to admit that the Nether- lands Government is right in insisting on the extreme gravity of this problem. Not only would the Republic have to give sufficient guarantees ,in this respect, but it would have to do so in -co-operation with, and, to a certain extent, under the wotrol and supervision of, the Security Council or its Committee of Good Offices. It, should at least be possible to work out an arrange- ment whereby the necessary secuiity would be NOllS n'arrivons pas it comprendre comment on peut croire possible d'entravcr la marche inexorable du temps et esperer que la force etouf- fera des aspi:·ations nationales et democratiql1cs qui, de l'avis de mon GOLlvernement, devraient ctre encouragees puisql1e la liberte nationale est la seule base soEde de cooperation internationale. Dans la lettre tres. emouvante qu'il a envoyee au President dtl Conseil de securite [5/11791, Sir Mohammed Zafn111an Khan, Ministre des ::J.ffaires etrangeres du Pakistan, exprime la crainte que cette pre.tenduc operation de police laissc derriere el1e des haioes et des inimitU~s tenaces et cstime qu'une telle perspective doit etre consi~ deree comme une grave mena.ce au retablissement de In. paix dans l'Asie sud-oricntale. C'est pour- quai, de I'avis de man Gouvernement, le Conseil. de ~ec:urite, a le df'voir de prendre des mesures efficaces pour parer, dans la mesnre ou i1 peut le faire, aux graves consequences que pourrait avoir l'action militaire des Pays-Bas. This distrust is probably also the reason for its having been impossible to arrive at an inter-' pretation of the negotiated agreements to which both parties should adhere, and this inability to find a common interpretation has again given rise to new su.~picions and to more distrust. It is . in these circumstances that, in the opinion of my delegation, the United Nations could play a very useful part in the solution of the dispute. First of all the Security Council, acting through its Committee of Good Offices, or directly, should be given the power to mediate between the parties 011 its own initiative in order to arrive at an interpretation of the Renville politica.l principles acceptable to both parties. Fmther, if the parties are unable to agree, the Committee of Good Offices should have the pown to arbitrate the differences. To all who study the documents and En premier lieu, le Conseil de securite, agissant directement 011 par l'intermediaire de sa Commis- sion ell" bons offices, devrait se voir attribuer le pouvoir d'agir, de sa propre initiative, comme mediateur entre 1es deux parties, afin d'arriver a une interpretation des principes politiques de l'Aceord dl! Rc'I1'uitlc acceptable poltr toutes deux, En outre, si les parties ne peuvent se mettre d'ac- ·cord, la Commission de bons offices devrait etre Ce qui faciliterait grandement la tiche de la Commission de bens offices c'est que, comme l'a suggere au COllfS de son intervention le repre- sentant des Etats-Unis, le Conseil de securite fixe une date pour des elections libres et une date pour le transfert de souverainete. I1 appa- rait qu'il ne suffirait pas, tant s'en faut, d'arriver par un travail de mediation accompli sous Ies auspices du Conseil de secUl'ite, aune interpre- tation des principes d\! Renville acceptee par les deux parties. En effet, comme j'ai essaye de le montrer, ce qui empeche tellement d'aboutir a The task of the Committee of Good Offices would also be very much facilitated if, as sug- gested by the representative of the ~nited States in his remarks, the Security Council would· fix a date for free elections and a date for the surrender of sovereignty. It is evident, however, that it would be far from sufficient to arrive at an agreed interpretation of the Renmll.e principles by active mediation under the auspices of the Security Council. As I have tried to point out, the main reason for the impossib1ity of arriving at a peaceful settlement is not so much the failure to agree as the deep-seated distrust of the parties for each other. It is for this reason that the most useful function which the United Nations could undertake in the solution of tllis dispute would be to act as the trustee of the agreement al'Tived at and as the supervisor of its implementation. The Secttrity CO'lncil would be responsibJ.e to each side for ensuring that the other side abided by the agreement. Even if the parties do not trust each other, tiJey shonld trust the United Nations. I do not see why the parties should not accept this way ont of the difficulties. Ull reglement pa.cifique n'est pas tant l'impossibilite d'arriver a un accord, que la proionde meflance qu'eprollvent ['une pour l'autre les deux parties. Ce que l'Orgallisation des Nations Unies a done de mieux i faire pour la solution de ce differend, c'est de s'eriger en gardienne de ]'accord et de presider a son application. Le ConseiI cie secu- rite serait responsable devant chacune des parties da respect de I'accord par I'autre. Meme si les parties n'ont pas conflance l'une dans l'autre, elles devraient se fi{or i 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. Je ne vois pas pourquoi les parties n'accep- teraient pas cette solution des difficultes. 11 y a accord sur le but: la creation d'une Union neer1ando-indonesienne, ayant i sa tete la sOl1veraine des Pays-Bas et comprenant deux partenaires egaux: d'nne part, le Royaume des Pays-Bas, d'autre part, tme Union indonesienne. Je crois comprendre, d'apres les declarations des parties en presence, qu'elles n'ont pas cesse de considerel' que c'est la le but. Les difficult.es ne portent que sur la periode de transition, Ies arran- gements provisoires necessaires pour aboutir a la creation de l'UniOll Pay's-Bas-Indonesie. There is agreement as to the aim: the estab- lishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian union headed by the Netherlands Sovereign and com- posed of two equal partners, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and a United States of Indo- nesia. I take it from statements by the parties that they still consider this to be the goal; the difficulties concern only the interim period, the interim arrangments necessary to arrive at the establishment of the Nether1ands·lndonesian union. IJ me semble que les parties devraient savoir gre ~ une tierce partie, l'Organisation des Na- tions Unies, de les aider a surmontel' ce!> diffi- cultes. Si e1les n'acceptent pas ·cette offre d'assis- tance, beaucol1p, certes, douteront {]u'elles veuiIlent vraiment realiser ]'ideal tant de fois proclame. L'assistanct' du Conseil de securite est, pour autant que je sache, le seu1 moyen propre a faire disparaitre OU, tout au mains, a calmer la It seems to me that the parties should be grateful for the assistance of a third party, the United Nations, in overcoming these diffiCtllties. If they do not accept this offer of assistance, many will certainly have doubts whether the repeatedly pmcJaimed aims are seriously meant. The assistance of the Security Council is, as far as I can see, the orily way to eliminate or at least to reduce the distrl1st which the parties have for each other, dist111St which is the reason why it has not been possible to arrive at a peaceful settlement. The Netherlands Government would have the guarantee of the United Nations tllat any possible violation of the truce and the agree- melt on the part of the Republic would be marked and that pressure would be bFought to bear by the Security Council on the Republlc in order to put an immediate end to such a possible violation; and vice versa, the Republic would have the guarantee of the United Nations that the Netherlands Governn.lent would not, as the Republican leaders fear it does, use a: different. interpretation and take action to" undermine the Reptlblic and deprive it of its jmlependence. ffil~fiallce qui anime 1es parties l'une contre l'alltre et exp1ique pourql1oi i1 n'a pas ete possible d'aboutir a un reglement pacifique. L'Organi- sation des Nations Unles garantirait all. Gouver- nement des Pa.ys-Bas que tonte violation even~ ttlelle de la treve et de l'accord, de la part de 1.. Republique d'Indonesie, ser.ait notee et que le Consei1 de secllrite ferait pression sur la Repu- blique POLlf qu'elle mette Ull terme immedia~ a cette violation; inversement, elle garantirait ~ la Republiqueque le Gotlvernement des Pays- 'Eas s~abstie:ldra d'intel'prCter I'accord d'une autre maniere, comme1e craignellt les chefs repu- bliql.ins, et qu'il ne fera rien pour nnire a la , Republiqtte et la priver de son il1depemlance. e e, le ~. e- ,e I am fully aware that I have not entered into many details which will have to be carefully considered, but the det~ils can be worked ot;t later. The main questton. at the moment IS whether the principle i~se1f, can be accepted by the parties. My suggestlOn IS that w~ should. try a solution along tho~e lines if t?e ,umt,:d NatIOns is not to abdicate entirely and ehromate Its~lf from this dispute, which is so full of far-re~c~mg.an,cl dangerotlS consequences, In our opmlOn lt lS more important to find a sol?tion t~~ to. try to fix responsibilities and, to :'Olce recnmmatlO~s. In our opinion the solution IS to get ,the partle.s to resume negotiations, with the Security COllncII or the Committee of (':rOod Offices empowered to mediate, to arbitrate and to act <IS trustee between the palties. :Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Soci~ist Repu,b- lics) {trmlslaled from Rlusja11~: .Durml'! the dls- cussion in the Security Councd 11l Pans of the aggreSSIOn of the Netherlands Government against the Republic of ~ndon~sia, the. USSR ddegation fully set forth Its pomt of view and submitted draft resolutions [Sj1148 and S/1159] designed to put an end to that aggression. H~w­ ever, since the general debate on the question has been reopened, the USSR delegation feels oblige(l to make a few additional remarks. The substance of the question under discussion is simply that the Netherlands Government has committed an act of aggression against the Re- public of Indonesia in violation of the well-known Rellville Agreement previously concluded between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, under the terms of which all controverial ques- tions arising between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, as weB as the question of the governmental structure of Indonesia, must be settled by political negotiation between the Netherlands Government and the Government of Indonesia. One of the reasons for this Netherlands aggres- sion against Indonesia has been that the Security Council has, from the first, failed to fulfil its obligation to maintain the peace. Instead of set- ting up an authoritative commmittee composed of all its members, the Security Council contented itself with establishing the so-called Committee of Good Offices, which turned out to be merely a screen to help the Netherlands authorities pre- pare new acts of agg.ression against the Republic of Indonesia. The Secmity Council, which, under Article 24 of the Charter, has primary responsi- bility for the maintenance of international peace and security and must ensure prompt and effective action in that respect on behalf of the United Nations, did not take appropriate steps to stop the new aggression by the Netherlands against M, MALIK (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (tradl~it du rasse): Lors de la dis- cussion an Conseil de secl1rite, a Paris, de la question de I'agressiotl commise contre la Repu- bliql1e d'Indonesie par le Gouvernement neer- landais, la. delegation de l'URSS a expose, en detail son point de vue et a depose des proJets de resolutions [S/1148 et 5/1159] tcndant u mettre effectivement fin a. cette <lgression. Nean~ moins, puisquc I'on reprend la discussion gene- rale de ceUe question, la delegation de l'URSS estime indispensable de faire quelques observa- tions complementaires. Le fond de la ques(101l que nOllS diseutOllS en ce moment se reduit a ceci: le Gouvernement neerlandais a commis un .'lcte d'agression contre la Republique d.'Indonesie en violation de l'ac- cord bien connl1 du Renville qui avait ete pre- cedemment conc111 entre les Pays·Bas et la Repu- blique d'Indonesie et en vertu dllquel toutes les questions de la structure gouvernementale de l'Indonesie devaient etre resolues au moyen de conversations politiques entre le Gonvernement des Pays-Bas et le Gouvernement de la Rept1~ blique d'Indonesie. L'une des raisons pour lesquclles les Pays-Bas ont lance leur agression en Indonesie a ete que le Conseil de securite n'a pas, des le debut, rempli Ies obligations qui IUl inconlbaient pDur maintcnir la paix. Au lieu de creer une Commission ayant de l'autorite et d'y faire partieiper taus ses mem- bres, le Conseil de se-write s'est contente de former la Corrunission dite de bans offices qui a montre qu'elle n'a fait que servir d'ecran a l'abri duquel les autorites neerlandaises ont pu preparer de nouveaux ades d'agression contre la Republiqtle d'Indonesie. Le Conseil de secu,- rite aqui incombe, en vertu de l'Article 24 de la Charte des Nations Unies, la responsabilite prin- cipale pour le maintien de la paix et de la. s6curite internationales et qui, conformement acet Article, doit assurer l'action rapide et efficace de l'Orga- Instead of accepting such just and concrete proposals, the Council contented itself with addressing a completely abstract appeal to the two parties asking. them to end military operations and to free prisoners. Nothing further was done. The injustice and absurdity of such an appeal to both "the parties" \vere obvious to any objec- tive and unbiassed pel'son, for the whole world knows that it was not Republican troops that had attacked and invaded territory controlled by the Netherlands authorities but that, on the contrary, Netherlands troops had attacked the Indonesian Republic and invaded its territory, and that the President and other political leaders of the Republic had been arrested not by Repub- lican, but by Netherlands, authorities. By submitting its draft resolution containing the appeal to "the parties" [5/1142J the United States delegation in fact side-stepped the sub- stance of the question and shielded t11e Nether- lands Government's aggressive acts against the Republic. What is more, the results of the voting o~ that draft resolution [392nd meeting] even showed that the proposal call1ng upon "the parties" to withdraw their armed forces, had been presented by the United States delegation only in order to have it rejected. The machinery of voting in the Security Council was deliberately used for that purpose. I: was only necessary fOJ: two delegations of the Anglo-American bloc to abstain, for that point not to obtain the requisite number of votes and, consequently, not to be adopted. The representative of the Ukrain- ian SSR had been detained in New York, having been refused the eatry visa to France, and was unable to take part in the vote. Among the dele- gations that comprise the so-called Americ:m majority in the Security Council, there were two delegations that would not, in any event, wnnt the proposal to withdraw armed forces-namely, thosc of Canada and Argentina. They abstained w]-len those proposals were voted upon, together with 111e representatives of the colonial powers, France and Belgium. The result was that the . proposal to withdraw troops could not possibly be adopted. Thus, by making use of the voting macllinecy, the Anglo-American majority scuttled that point. Finally, the USSR draft resolution provided for the est<1blishment of a commission of the Security Council composed of representatives of all the States members of the Security Council, which was to supervise the fulfilment of the Cotlllcil's resolution on the cessation of militarv -operations and the withdrawal of Netherland"s troops, and also to assist in settling the conflict as a whole between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. That draft resolution was, however, rejected by the Anglo-American majority. It is worth pointing out that, when the item dealing with the withdrawal of Netherlands troops was put to the vote, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingpom abstained from voting, thereby preventing its adoption. The United States representative declared, in this connexion, that he was unable to vote for that proposal because his own proposal for the wit~,~ drawal of troops by both sides, which was identi- cal with this one, had been rejected. It is doubt~ fu] whether anyone, with the possible exception of the speaker himself, could take such an arglt- ment seriously. It was quite clear that, if the United States representative had really wished to put an end to aggression, he should, after the defeat of his own proposal, have supported any other identical proposal. He failed to do so, how- ever, and the United Kingdom representative f(Jllo:wed his example. Hiding behind the purely fafJclful pretext we have just mentioned, they turned down the USSR proposal dealing with the withdrawal of Dutch troops. As a result the Council adopted a weak and Illlsatisfactory ;eso- lutlOn [S/1150J from which the basic point dealing with the withdrawal of Dutch troops had been excluded deliberately. It has become obvious that some members of the Security COlmcil shield the Netherlands Govel'l1rnent's aggression against the Republic of Indonesia and that the United States and the United Kingdom did not wish to take measnres for the withdrawal of Dutch troops from the territory of the Republic. Is it unjust and pre- mature to df<.lw such a conclusion? No. This opinion is fully borne out by the events which soon followed. Ce projet a ete rejete par la majorite ang10- americaine. 11 est a remarqller que, lorsgue la question du retrait des troupes neer1andaises a cte posce, les representants des Etats-Unis d'Ame- r\qne et du Royaume-Uni se sont abstcnus de prendre part a'.1 scrutin et, par la meme, ont en fait rejete cc point, A cc prapos, le l'epresentant des Etats-UnlS cl'Ameriqne a declare ClU'il ne potlvait voter en favclIr de cette proposition parce que, a~t-il dit, 1'00 n'avait pas adopte son propre projet qtli avait ete mis aux voix aupa- ravant, et qui etait semblable a la proposition de l'URSS ptlisqu'il tendait egalement an retrait des troupes des deux parties. 11 est diffici1e de croire qu'il se trouvera qnelqtt'un, si l'on exclut peut-fure l'autel1r de cette declaration, qui puisse prendre au serieux un argument de ce g-e:1re. 11 est tout a fait evident que, si le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique voulait reellement mettre fin a l'agl:ession, il amait, apres le rejet de sa propre proposition, vote pOllr toute autre propo- sition similaire. Neanmoins, ni lui, r.i le repre- sentant du Royaume-Uni qtil a suivi son exemple, ne !Jont fait. S'aDl'itant derriere le pretexte pure- ment imaginaire que nous venons d'indiC]uer, i1s ont rejete la proposition de la delegation de l'URSS tendant all 1'etrait des troupes neerlan- daises. Aussi, le Conseil a-t-il adopte une reso- lution [5/1150] faible et peu satisfaisante ql1i, a dessein, ne comprenait pas le point fondamen- tal que constitlle le retrait des troupes neerlaodaises. I1 est devenu evident qlle certaios membres du Conscil de securite C011Vrent l'agression du Gouvernement neerlandais contre la Republique d'!ndontsie, et que les Etats-Unis d'All1crique et le Royaume-Uni ne vettlent pas prendre de meSl1res en VIle du retrait des troupes oeerla1\- daises du territoire de la RepubEque. Est-il injuste et preIT.ature de tirer une telle conclusion? NOli. Les evenements qui se S011t dercules peu apres ont pleinement confirme le bien-fonde de cette opinion. "The Security Council "Conside1's it necessary that the Netherlands trooIJS should be withdrawn immediately to the positions whic.h they occupied' before military operations against the Indonesian Republic were renewed". The delegations of the following live States voted for this draft resolution [393rd meeting]: the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Syria, China and .Colombia. Two more votes were needed for its adoption. Yet this time, too, the represent~tives of the United States and the United Kingdom abstained, thereby making adoption of the reso- lution impossible. Thus for the second time they prevented the adoption Df a proposal the imple- mentation of which might have forced the aggres- sor to withdraw his troops from the territory of his victim and consequently migl1t have made the resolution and the actions of the Security Council truly efiective, as the Charter requires. It was precisejy the delegations of the United .States of America and of the United Kingdom that, by the way they voted, determined the decision: that is to say that, for the second time, they turned down the proposal for the withdrawal of Netherlands troops, It has become quite obvious that the United States delegation, with the aid of the United Kingdom delegation, first utilized the machinery of voting to have its own proposal for the with- drawal of armed forces by both "the parties" rejected; then the two delegations, by twice ab- staining from voting, rejected first the USSR proposal and next the proposal of the Ukrainian SSR that the Netherlands troops should with- draw from the Republic:an territory they had seized. , ;,, :. Such are the facts about the vote in the Se- curity Council on the proposal to withdraw troops. This situation is not what certain people who have spoken here would like to paint it- people w110 sound the trumpet of Jericho when they [Jour out calumnies and fabrications upon the USSR. but, when they pretend to criticize the position taken by the United States, sink to a .soft, timid, even caressing, whisper. " "; ••·es ~ ""' ,be ni At that same Council meeting 27 December ,li~ 1393rd meeting], it al~o became dear that the uel Netherlands Government was violating the Coun- e ~ cil'.;; resolution of 24 December [5/1150] on the ~rI~ cessation of military operations. The representa- E):.. tive of the Netherlands stated cynically that his siet Government did not consiuer it possible to 51. stop military operation~ against the Indonesian :le: -Republic. ho~tiIitics agabst the Indonesi2n Republic, sub~ mitted a draft resolution [S/lD9] ordering the :;:-.,retherlaods Gov~m:nent to Cease military opera- tiom:: within twenty·four hOlIrs of the adoption of that resolution -by the Security Council. Under the pretext that the Cound must wai: until the Net,erlands Government had studied the Council's resolution [5/1150J and had given its final answer, ~he representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and with them the majority of the members of the Council who fonaw their lead, dSQ rejectec that proposai of the USSR, fair thot:gb it was. The Security Council wait!"d fnr that answer from the Nether- lands Government until 29 December. On that date, however, 1396th 11lu#ng] the Netherlands Governl11l'.nt once mQre announced throegh its representative that it still needed some time for the completio:J of its milit:ll)' operations, in other W,]H!"" for the final strangulation of the Indo- nesian Republic and tbe occnpation of its whole territory. The USSR delegation proposed to the Ang[o- American majo~ity in the Council that effective and decis:ve steps should be taken to ca:! to o:,der the shaITleless ~ggressor and to force him to respect and carry out the resolutions of the Security Council. That proposal, however, was not supported by the Anglo-American majority, in F<lrticlllnr by the United States and United Kingdom delegations. The United Kingdom delegation st;1teil th.at its Government was satis- fied with such a reply of the Netr.erJands Govern- ment, while the United States representative, though pretending to be dissatisfied with that Government's position, said nevertheless that his delegation was satisfied with the fatt that t:1e Primt: Minister of tf:e Netherlands intended sho:-tly to go to Indonesia in person. All these fact3 show that the nelf'gations of the United State3 md United Kingdom in the Security CO~1neil have adopted a po:icy not oerely of shielding, but of givitg ontright support to, the Netherlands GOvernment's acts of aggress~on against the Inconesian Republic. It was they who scuttled the resolution on tl1e withdrawal of the Netherlands troops frorr. the teritory of the Republic and who did not allow effecfive meaSt:res to be tHke~ tn curb the aggressor. In its stattmect nladc :n the Security Couttril on 24 December [392nd meeting). the USSR del<;gation has already cited facts showing, :hat Umted States representatives on the so-eillpd Committee of Geod Offices had, during their so~ journ in Indonesia, on tlle one hancl, forced the G(.l\'emmCllt of the Republic to m2ke ever gTe:'lter concessions to tlle derna.nds of the Nethel"lands Government-concessions w:"ieh meant a virWal t:apitulation to the cynical demands of the. Ncber~ lands aggressor-anel, on the other hand, had urged it to ref.n:ss the. activities of the democratic majo~ite dt: Conseil qui les sUlvent, ont egalf':ment rejete ceUe proposition equitable soumise par !'URSS. Jusqu'au 29 decembre [3968me seance], le COllSeil de securitc n attendu la ,epoMse clu Gouvernerr.e.nt neerlandais, A cette date. le Gau:" vernement nee.rlandais a declare une" fois de plus, pa;" le trucherr.cnt de son :-eprec:entant, qu'il lu! faIlait quelque temp~ pour r:1ettre fin .'!11X operations militaires, c'est-a.-dire pour etouffer dfflllitivemcnt In Republi'1ue d'Jnnon~sie et pour occuper el1tieremellt son territoire. La deUigation de I'URSS s'est adressee a. la majQrite anglo-americaim: aU Consei: de securite en p~oposallt de prend~e des mesu~es immecliates, efficaces et (lecisives, an."l de rappeler a l'ordre l'agresscur ehonte et Je le forcer a respecter et a mettre a execution les resolutiJUS du COJlseil de securite. Cependant, ceUe proposition 11'a pas trouve de soutien <luprt:~ de :a rnajor:te .:ltlglo. a:nericdne et, en premier lieu, aLlprh de;; dele- gations des Eta:s-Unis d'Ameriqne et du Royaume-Ulli. La delegation du Royamne·Uni a declare que le GouvernelUent du Royaume- Uui se considerait satisfait de cette l'eponse de la part du Gouvememcct ncc:'lanclais. Quant an representant des Etats-Unis, tout en faisant mille de n'etre pas satis:ait de I'attitude cn GO'..1.veme· Der.t neerhuld<'lls, il n'cn a pas moins declare qlle la delegation des Etats-Unis d'Ameriqt:e eLait satisfaite d'aprrendre (]ue le Premier Millistre des Pays-Bits avait l'intention de se rendre prow chnineme:lt ell Indollesie. Taus ccs faits montrent que les delegations des Etats-Unis cl'.A..meriql1e et du Royalln\e- :Jni au CO~lseil ::le secnr:te, non contentes de cot!vrir la politique agressive du GOltvernement :lecrlande.is contl·e la R.epubJique d'lllLluaes:e, se 30r:t mises a sotltenir directemer.t cette poiitique. Ce So:1t predsement ces delegations Cjui ont fait echouer au CO:lseil de securite le projet de n~so­ lution tendill1t all retrait des tz·oupes neerlan- da:ses du territoire de la Repl1bliqtce et ('cui n'ont pa3 permis que des mestlres eff!cac(:s Eu~scnt pr:ses afin ue rappeler L'~gresseur a la rr.isOll. Da."ls la declaration qu'eUe avait faite au Conseil de securite, lE 24 c1ecembre 1392eme seance), la delegaticn de \'URSS avait deja preSente des faits Qui montl'aiellt que les rep:,esentants des Etats-U:lis d'Ameriqlle a la Commission ditc de bons office", ant, au CQnts de lcl.ll" sejoul' en Indo- nesie, d'une part, oblige le Gouvernement de la R.~pl1bliquc a faire des eoncessiorls de plus en pbs gr:mdes aux exigences du GOllvernement neerlandais - concessior.s qlli, en fait, equiva~ talent a une capitulation du Gouvernement de la R~pt1b1iql1e dev~nt les exigences cyni:]ues des Dy so doing, the United Statrs representatives on the Committee of Good Offices undermined the strength of the Republic and played into the hands of the Netherlands aggressors. The United States Press cites data proving that the United States, in point of fact, financed Netherlands ag~ression in Indonesia. According to this Press, it was the Marshall Plan which enabled the Netherlands Govemment to prepare and carry out its attack against the Indonesian Republic. For the first year of operation of the Marshall Plan, the Netherlands obtained credits of <lpproxirnately 270 million dollars, with an additional 84 million dollars provided for Nether- lands pl·operty-owners in Indonesia. Not one cent of those funds was allocated to the Republic of Indonesia, the people of which have for long been endming severe hardships as a result of the cruel economic blockade imposed by the Nether- lands authorities. Thus the Marshall Plan gives the Netherlands Government in 1948 credits totalling 354 million dollars. According to other information furnished by the United States Press, the Netherlands spends 365 million doUars a year on the main- tenance of its army, navy and air forces. Conse- qucntly, the maintenance of the armed forces used by the Netherlands to attack the Republic of Indonesia is practically financed· by the credits received under the Marshall Plan. This was recognized by Unitcd States Senator GeOl'ge Malone, who was reported in the New York Times of 23 December as saying: "Without the money we gave the Dutch untler the Marshall Plan, they could not do what they are doing in Indonesia. They have blockaded those little Indonesians and now they are going to whip them." As everyone knows, the Netherlands is a member of the military alliance of the Western Union. Other members of it are the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, which were members of the Security Council at the time when the Netherlands attack on the Indonesian Republic was planned and executcd. The Treaty under which that Union was formed provides for consultation among its members regarding any situation which might constitute a threat to the peace, no matter where that threat may arise. According: to this and other provisions of the Treaty of alliance, the members of the Western Union could not fail to consult on the question of the preparation by the Netherlands of an attack on the Indonesian Republic. Does not that mean that the United Kingdom, France and :1 Belgium have given their consent to this aggres· ~ sion by the Netherlands GOvernment agaill5t .; Indonesia? , Such are the facts, and no amount of slander and insinuation com:erning the "attitude of Moscow" and the "communist menace in Indo- nesia" will help the United States representative to divest his country and its representatives on the Committee of Good Offices and on the Se- curity Council of the responsibility' for the aggression committed by the Netherlands Gov~ eroment against the Republic of Indonesia and its peace-loving people, or for the attempts to prevent the Security Council from putting an end to that aggression. By repeating, in the speech he made today, the tales spun by the Netherlands aggressors about the pretended eommttnist threat in Indonesia, the United States representative has, openly and be- fore the whole world, tried to justify Netherlands aggression in Indonesia and to defend the aggres- sor. The reason for that is that United States monopolists need, not a free and independent Indonesia, but a colonial Indonesia, in which it would be easier to hold the people in servitude and grow rich on the country's abundant natural resources. A scientific genius of the past century wrote the following about the seventeenth century Dutch colonizers in Indonesia; "The history of Dutch colonization presents an incomparable picture of betrayal, corruption, murder and villainy. Wherever the Dutch colonizers set foot, they left only corpses and ruins." No matter what excuses are given by the aggres30rs and those who aid and abet them, no matter what powers of invelltion they may dis- play to cover up and justify aggression, they will never be able to deceive either the peoples of.the Tous ces faits pris ensemble montrent, de toute evidence, qu'il y a etltente au sujet de la question indonesienne, car i! est tout a fait clair que s'il n'avait pas compte sur le soutien tacite ou direct des Etats-Unis d'Ameriq~e et du Royaume-Uni, le Gouvernement w~erlandais n'aurait jamais ase attaC]uer la Republique d'Indonesie, violer I'Ac~ord du Rcnv-ille, faire fi de la Charte des NatIOns Unies et refuser d'executer les resolutions du Conseil de. secLlrite tendant a la cessation :imme- diate des operations militaires et a la liberation du President et des autres hommes politiques republicains. Cc n'est que parce qu'il comptait sur ce soutien, ce n'est que par s~ite de }'attittlde adoptee par les delegations des Etats-Unis d'Ame- rique et du Royaume-Uni au Conseil de seeu- rite que le Gouvernement neerlandais a lance son agression cynique contre la Republique d'In- donesie, qu'il a "iole la Charte des Nations Unies et agi atl mepris de ses engagements interna- tional\x. Tels sont les faits, et aucune calomnie, aucune insinuation quant a la pretendue "attitude de Moscou" ou a la non mains pretendue "menace tommuniste en Indonesie" ne sauront permettre aux representants des EtatshUnis de d6gager la responsabi]jte que Ies Etats-Unis d'Ameriqtte et leurs representants a la Commission de bans offi~ ces ont clans l'agression commise par le Gou- vernement neerlalldais contre la RepubIique d'In- doneSle et son peuple pacifique, ainsi que dans tout ce qui a ete fait pour empecher le Conseil de securite de mettre fin a cette agression. En reprenant, au cours de la presente seance, les contes que' les agresseurs neerlandais ant repandus sur une pretendue menace communiste en Indonesie, le representant des Etats-Unis a; ouvertement et devant le mondc. entier, tente de justifier l'agression neerbndaise en Indonesie et de de£endre l'agresseur. Ce qui explique cette- sitttation, c'est que les monopoles des EtatshUnis d'Ameriqlle ant besoin, non point d'une Indo- nesie libre et independante, mais d'une Indonesie coloniale dans laquelle il serait plus facile de tenir la population en selvitude, et de realiser des benefices au moyen des immenses richesses nat!l- relle~ de ce pays, L'un des genies de la science du siecle dernier a ecrit les lignes suivantes au sujer des coloni- ~~~~~~s neerlandais du XVIIeme siec1e, en Indo- "L'histoire du colonialisme neerlandais pre- sente un tableau unique de trahison. de concus- sion, de meurtres et de lachete. Partollt Oll les colonisateurs neerlandais ont mis les pieds, ils. n'ont laisse ql1e cadavres et ruines." QueUes que soient les fxttlSeS que presentent l'agresseur et ceux qui le protegent et qui l'aident. (]uel fjllC soit l'espri-t cl'invention dont ils pt1isscnt faire preuve pour justifier cette agression ils ,. .., ' n arrlveront lamals a tromper les pCllples dl1~ Is it not monstrous that in the twentieth cen- tury, at a time when there is an international Organization, the Ullited Nations, designed, as stated in the Charter, "to save succeeding genera- tions from the scollrge of war" and "to re-affirm faith ... in the equal rights, .. of nations large and small", the Nethel'lands aggressors should still try to foist colonial slavery upon the Indo- nesian people by means of treachery and aggres- sion? Has the Security Council-the organ of, the United Nations bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the protection of the legitimate interests of countries and nations which are vic- tims of aggression-the right to take no steps to compel the aggressor to desist? The Security Council has taken no such_ steps. In dealing with the Indonesian question, it has demonstrated to the peoples of the world, most flagrantly, how the international Organization, the United Na- tions, is being \lsed by a group of States, under the leadership of the United States and the United Kingdom, for narrow, selfish ends. It has re- vealed how these States, which claim to represent the majority in this Organization, try to guide work along lines inconsistent with its basic pur- poses and to utilize it not to maintain peace and security, not to protect the lawful interests of States and peoples that are the victims of aggression, but to lend support, open or tacit, to those who are guilty of aggression against peace-1.oving peoples. N'est-il pas monstrueux de voir qu'au XXeme si?de, alars qu'il existe line Organisation inter- nationale des NationsUnies, ~yal1t pOltr tache, comme I'indique la Charte de cette Organisation, de "preserver les generations futures dufleau de la guerre" et de "procl<lmer notre fa! dans l'egalite des droits • ' . des nations, grandes et petites", les agresseurs m!erlandais s'efforcent, tout comme avant, d'imposer, all moyen de l'agression et de la mauvaise fai la servitude coloniale au peuple d'Indonesie? Le ConseU de securite, aqui la Charte confie la tache du main- tien de la paix et de la securite internationales et de la protection des legitimes interets des pays et des peuples victimes d'une agression, a-t·il le droit de ne pas prendre de mesures en vue de forcer l'agresseur arnettre fin a ses agissements? Cependant, i1 n'a pas adopte ees mesures. Par son examen de I'affaire d'Indonesie, le Conseil de securite a montre de mani~re flagrante devant tOllS les peuples de l'univers que I'Organisation internationa1e des Nations Unies est utilisee dans des buts purement egoistes par un groupe d'Etats diriges par les .Etats-Unis d'Amerique et le Royaume-Uni. n a rnontre comment ces Etats, qlli pretendent former la majorite de cette Orga~ nisation, tentent de donner aUK travaux d~s Nations Unies une direction qui ne correspond nulleme~t aux buts fondamentaux de l'Organi~ sation, comment ils s'efforcent de se servir de cette Organisation, non pour assurer la paix: et la securite internationales, non pour proteger les. legitimes inten~ts des Etats et des peuples vie- times de I'agression, mais pour accarder un appui direct ou tacite aceux qui sont cDupables d'agres- sion contre des peuples pacifiques. Avec taus Ies autres Etats pacifiques et demo- cratiques Membres de !'Organisation des Nations Unies, I'URSS insiste pour que les dispositions de la Charte relatives at: maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales, a la lutte contre toute agression, quelle que soit sa forme, soient observees d'une maniere rigoureuse. L'histoire montre que l'URSS a taujours candamne les transactions de certaines grandes Puissances avec des pays agresseurs au detriment d'autres Puis- sances paeifiques.. La deleg-,ation de l'URSS estime flU'il est indispensable de prononcer une con· damnation formelle contre le GOl1vernernent neer1andais qui s'est rendu coupable d'agression contre la Republique d'Indonesie, ainsi que contre ceux qui soutiennent et encouragent cctte agres- sion, qui passent des compromis aver: l'agresseur au detriment du pettple paeifique de !'Indom~sie. Together with all other peace-loving demo- cratic States which are Members of the United Nations, the USSR insists on the strict observ- ance of the provisions of the Charter dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security and with the resistance to aggression anywhere in the world and in whatever form it takes. History shows that the USSR has always condemned deals with aggressor nations at the expense of peace·loving peoples, The USSR delegation thinks it imperative strongly to con- demn the aggressive acts of the Netherlands Gov. t'.rnment against the Republic of Indonesia, as well as the actions of those who connive at and encourage those acts and who make deals with the aggressor. at the expense of the peace-loving Indonesian people. Si naus VOU10llS respecter les obligations que nos pays ont contractees en signant la Charte des Nations Unies et qui sont de inainteruret de renforcer la paix et la securite -internationales. de mettre rapidement et effectivement fin a I'agression et de prendre Ies mesttres qui s'im- posent pour la protection des Ie.gitirnes intere;is des Etats victimes de l'agression, nous devons mettre it execution la Charte des Nations Unies, condamner I'agression comm\se par le Gouverne- ment neerlandais contre la Republique d'Indo· nesie, exiger la mise en reuvre des resolutions du Conseil de securite tendant a la cessation immediate des operations militaires et a la libe~ If we wish to live up to the obligations assumed by Our countries under the Charter to strengthen and maintain international peace and security, to put an end to aggression promptly and effectively and to take decisive steps to protect the lawful interests of States victims of aggression, we must carry out the provisions of the Charter. We must condemn the aggression committed by the Netherlands Government against the Indonesian Republic, demand the fulfilment of the Security Council resolutions on the immediate cessation of military operations and the release of the captured poltical leaders of the Indonesian Republic, and finally, compel the aggressor, the Netherlands That is the only way .to strengthen t~e United Nations raise the prestige and authonty of the Securit; Council, and mai?tain and promote international peace and secunty.

In view of the lateness af the hour I should like to ask the representative of FraC:ce whether he would consent to the post~ ponement of the French interpretation of the remarks just made by the representative of the USSR until our next meeting. Mr. PAROD{ (France) (translated from French): Yes. Mr. MALIK (Union cd Soviet Socialist Repub~ lics) (translated from Rus'sian): I do not agree that interpretation into French is for the benefit of the French representative only. Under the rules of procedure, French is a working language and all the remarks of the members of the Security Council must be interpreted into the two working languages. That is what ottr rules of procedure say. If the President of the Security Council and the French representative think, however, that this interpretation is given only for the benefit of the representative of France, and consequently decide not to have my speech interpreted into French, I shall not insist on the interpretation. Mr. PARODI (France) (franlsattd from Frcmch): I do not think that the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has quite understood, for unless I myself am mis~ taken, I understood that the interpretation was to be postponed until the next meeting, not that there was to be no interpretation. It Was on that condition that I gave my consent and I think that if the Soviet Union representative now understands what the President was proposing, he will realize that his remarks were pointless. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub~ lies) (trrmslaJed from Russia): I understood the President's stJ,tement correctly and maintainmy opinion. The PllES[DENT; I would say to the representat!ve of the USSR that all I asked the representative of France was whether he would object -to postponing the interpretation into French until our next meeting. There is no intention whatsoever, I assure him, of dispensing with the French interpretation. Coming from a dual language country, where French is' one of the languages spoken, I should be the last person here to ask that the French language be dispensed with. Under these circumstances, I would ask the representative of the USSR whether he would agree with the procedure which I have indicated. Mr. 1fALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub~ lies) (translated from RussjaJ~): The USSR delegation holds the view that /he rules of procedure must be applied and j,Herpreted by all the mem- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Comme it se fait tard je voudrais demander au representant de la France s'il consentirait a ce qu'on remit a notre prochaine seance l'interpretation en fran~ais des observations que vient de formuler le representant de l'URSS. M. PARODI (France): Oui. M. MALIK (Union des Republiqtle.S sodalistes sovietiques) (tradt.it dlf Y1Isse) : ]e ne considere pas qu~ I'interpretation en fran~ais soit uniquement destinee au representant: de la France. D'apres notre reglement interieUf, le frall~ais est l'une des langues de travail et toutes les interventions des memhres du Conseil doivent etre traduites dans les deux langues de travail. VoilA ce que dit notre reglernent interieur. Cependant, si le Pre.sident du Conseil et le representant de la France estiment que cette interpretation n'est faite que pour le representant de la France et s'ils de.cident, par consequent, de ne pas faire interpreter man intervention en fram;ais, je n'insisterai pas pour que cette interpretatiorl ait lieu. M. PARODI (France): Je pense que le repn~sen­ tant de l'Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques a mal compris, car, a mains que je n'aie moi-meme commis une erreur, j'avais compri~ non pas que l'interpretation en fran91is n'aurait pas lieu, mais qu'eUe serait remise a la prochaine seance. Cest dans ces conditions que j'ai donne man accord et je pense que si le representant de I'Union sovietiqlle comprend maintenant ce que le President a propose, il reconnaitra que ses observations etaient sans objet. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): rai bien corn· pris la declaration du President du Consei] de sikurite, et je maintiens man point de vue. Le PRE'.srm:NT (tyadllit de falt,rylais): Je VOlldrais repondre nu representant de l'URSS que je me bornais it demander au representant de la France s'il verrait un inconvenient a ce que l'interpretation en franc;ais soit remise :'t. notre prochaine seance. Je peux l'assurer qu'il n'etait n\lllcment dans roes intentions de supprimer l'interpretation en franc;ais. Venant d'un pays ou I'on parle deux langues dont I'une est le franc;ais, je serais le dernier ici a demander la suppression de la langue franc;aise. Dans ces conditions, je demande au represen~ tant de I'URSS s'jl accepte qLle nous procedions comme je l'ai propose. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiqttes) (traduit dll. nuS€'): La delegation de l'URSS estime que le reglement interieur doit etre applique et interprete par taus les mernbres As regards the proposal that the interpretation of my speech into French should take place at the next meeting, I do not object, in view of the lateness of the hour.

I thank the representative of the USSR for his courtesy, which will facilitate our business and enable us to expedite our work tonight. During the course of this meeting, we have heard a number of most important statements, indicative of the views of the members of the Council as to the nature and scope of action which should, in their judgment,be taken by the Council. However, we have not so far had an opportunity to hear the reply which the representative of the Netherlands may wish to make, nor have the various suggestions which have been made been crystallized in the form of a draft resolution. This, I think, is a matter of the most far-reaching significance, as it is indeed most necessary that the text of any resolution we may adopt should be adequate to the complex circumstances with which we are under obligation to deal, and that it should be so precisely framed that it will not only do full justice to both parties, but also will command the widest measure of support. This is necessary in order that we may obtain the practical results we seek. Au cours de cette seance, nous avons entendu un certain nombre de declarations t.es importantes, dans lesquelles les membres du Conseil ont expose 1eurs vues sur la nature et la portee de I'action que le Conseil devrait, a leur avis, entreprendre. Toutefois nous n'avons pas eu jusqu'ici l'occasion d'entendre la reponse que le representant des Pays-Bas tient peut-etre a donner. Par ailleurs, les diverses propositions presentees n'ont pas ete concretisees sous forme de projets de resolution, Je crois que c'est la un fait extremement significatif, car i1 est certes indispensable que le texte de tollte resolution que nous pouvons etre amenes it. adopter tienne compte des circons~ tances complexes devant lesquelles nOllS nous trouvons et qu'il soit etabli avec la precision vou1ue, non seulernent pour rendre pleinement justice aux deux parties, mais aussi pour etre assure du plus large appui. It le faut. si nous voulons abontir aulC resultats pratiques que nous recherchons. I would therefore propose that the Security Council should now adjourn and that we should meet again on Friday afternoon, when we should hear any further statements which members of the Council or the representatives of those nations present at this table under the provisions of Article 31 of the Chartl'r may wish to make. Then, I would hope that we might be able to carry forward our discussion within the framework of a specific draft text. I be1i~Ye that we should thus be in a better position to determine the action which the Council usefully can, and appropriately should, take in regard to the situation in Indonesia. Je propose donc que nous levions la seance et nous reunissions de nouveau vendredi apres-midi, pour entendre les autres declarations que les membres du Conseil ou les repre:sentants des na· tions presentl's a cette table en vertu de l'Ar M tide 31 de la Charte pourraient avoir a faire. respere qu'ensuite nous paurrons continuer ootre discussion dans le cadre d'un projet de texte precis. Il me semble que nOllS serions ainsi mieux. a meme de detenniner queUe action appropriee le Conseil devrait et pourrait utilement entreprendre en ce qui concerne la situation en Indonesie. Quant au jour et a I'heure de la prochaine seance, je suis, bien entendu, aux ordres du Conseil. Si ses membres estiment possible d'avoi. alors en mains le texte d'un projet de resolution, nous pourrions nous reunit" demain apres-midi ou jeudi matin. As regards the time for the next meeting, I am, of course, in the hands of the Council. If members think we could have the tl'xt of a proposed draft resolution by that time, we might meet tomorrow afternoon or Thursday morning. ",,, ", '." " li~ Puisque personne ne demande la parole, la seance est levee; le Conseil se reunira de nou~ veau vendredi a 15 heures. As there -are no comml'nts, the Council will now adjourn and will meet again on Friday at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 6.45 p,m. En ce qui concerne la proposition qui a ete faite au sujet de l'interpretation de mon interyention en fran~ais, je n'ai pas d'objection, etant donne l'heure tardive, ace que cette interpretation soit faite a la prochaine seame. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je remercie le representant de I'URSS de sa. courtoisie, qui facilitera notre tache et nous permettra d'aIler plus vite Cl' soir. La seance est levee a18 h. 45.